

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member may have another opportunity to raise this point, perhaps in the debate on the President's address.

Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati): May I draw the attention of the hon. Finance Minister to a statement made by the Finance Minister of Kerala to the effect that this moratorium has resulted in great difficulties for the public there and if so, whether the Finance Minister of Kerala had a discussion with the hon. Finance Minister here and, if so, with what result?

Shri A. K. Gopalan: May I also inform the House that in Kerala, the Chief Minister and others and some of the Assembly members also have passed a resolution to the effect that Kerala should be saved or something like that? There is a campaign run by some of the M.L.As. So, it is not a question that it is not a serious thing when the Kerala Government—the Chief Minister as well as the Finance Minister—have given a statement about it.

Shri Morarji Desai: I had some discussion with some of the Ministers of Kerala and I asked them what they proposed to do. They said there was some difficulty; not that there was something like a crisis or anything like that. I asked whether they propose that the moratorium should be lifted. They said 'No'. I said: "What do you suggest that I should do?" They said "We cannot say". What am I to do under these circumstances? Some difficulties do arise, but new arrangements have got to be made and there are some difficulties, but there is no serious situation as is alleged. That is all I have to say.

Mr. Speaker: Very well. The hon. Prime Minister.

Shri Braj Raj Singh (Firozabad): What about the adjournment motion, Sir?

Mr. Speaker: Enough has been said about this motion. I do not allow the motion.

12.06 hrs.

STATEMENT RE: SITUATION IN CONGO

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): For the last many months, as the House very well knows, the situation in the Congo has been a worsening one, a deteriorating one.

I shall not, at the present moment, go into the details of that, but throughout this period, we have been drawing the attention of the countries concerned, and of the United Nations, towards the situation, and suggesting various steps and measures to be taken. One of the principal ones that I suggested, and I myself mentioned it in the United Nations when I was there, was the reconvening of Parliament there to decide what kind of Government they wanted, and to prevent outside interference. The Government or the authorities that were functioning there at the time were the President, Mr. Kasavubu, and Mr. Mobutu. Mr. Mobutu came on the scene by a *coup d'etat* and not by legal or constitutional method. Mr. Kasavubu had a certain legal standing because he had been elected as President just as Mr. Lumumba had been elected as the Prime Minister. They both had a certain constitutional standing. Subsequently they fell out and attempted to take action against each other, each one of them trying to dismiss the other from his high office. The Parliament met—that was the last occasion that the Congolese Parliament met—and they did not agree with these respective dismissals and asked both of them to carry on, one as President and the other as Prime Minister. That was the last time when the Parliament came into the picture. Then other things happened which have no semblance of legality and Mr. Mobutu came into the picture with control of the so-called National Congolese Army.

Since then, every attempt was made by Mr. Mobutu, first of all that Parlia-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

ment should not meet, and secondly, to make Mr. Lumumba ineffective. Some checks were put on this by the United Nations authorities there and Mr. Lumumba was protected even to some extent by the Lumumba forces, but anyhow this attempt continued. It is a long story and I shall not go into that.

One fact that has to be borne in mind is, one of the first things that the United Nations decided, when they came into the Congo, was that the Belgian military and para military forces should be withdrawn. In fact, most of them were withdrawn. That was in August last or thereabouts. But soon after, the Belgians started coming back in very considerable numbers. Reference was made to this in the second report of the United Nations Representative, which was distributed here among members. But this was challenged and it was stated that the Belgian Government was not doing this but the private parties were doing this at the invitation of the authorities there, the authorities of Katanga or Mr. Mobutu. Our own opinion has been, and it has been confirmed completely, that these authorities, more especially Mr. Tshombe, was in effect functioning for practical purposes as a representative of the so-called Belgian advisors. There were a large number of Belgian officers in the civil field and it was really they who were carrying on and dictating policies to the Katanga Government chiefly and, may be to some extent to the Leopoldville Government also. They were protected in doing this on the plea "Oh! we should not interfere with the independence of the Congo" So, this curious fact remained that the very persons who were interfering most with the independence of the Congo were taking shelter under the plea that no one else should interfere.

So, this has gone on, Sir, till various attempts were made by the United Nations. But, somehow, the interpretation of the United Nations

mandate was so limited that they could not function there. All kinds of disgraceful things happened there and the plea was that the United Nations mandate prevented them from interfering. So, a great deal of resentment arose among the members of the United Nations, among those who have sent forces to the Congo at the request of the United Nations, and several countries even decided to withdraw their forces because they did not agree with the policy that has been pursued by the United Nations or rather the absence of policy, the passive inertness of the United Nations there. But it was not quite inert. The United Nations has done quite a very fine piece of work there in the field of feeding people and looking after them. But in the political field it had become very passive and its passivity naturally was all in favour of those people who had seized power and were exploiting it to their own advantage, more especially in Katanga and elsewhere.

Now another crisis arose because of these forces being withdrawn; because, if all the United Nations forces were withdrawn from there, the United Nations ceases to function there and will withdraw itself. If that happened, if the United Nations withdrew, the consequence was not only that there would be a continuing civil war but there was the danger of outside powers coming in a big way to help their respective coteries or those whom they acknowledged, which was a very serious thing. Also, the failure of the United Nations there would redound to the great discredit of the United Nations and make it difficult for it to function in future in any like emergency. All this has happened.

Now, some time back, Mr. Lumumba, who was in some kind of detention in Leopoldville, escaped from there. He was captured by Mr. Mobutu's forces somewhere,

brought back and put in a prison. From that prison a few days back he was removed to Katanga in spite of many protests, because the Katanga people were, rather Mr. Tshombe was, his bitterest enemy.

Then, about this time a commission went there, the so-called Conciliation Commission and everyone in the Commission agreed that their principal activity should be to meet Mr. Lumumba to have any kind of conciliation, because he was the person who counted most there. It is a fact that he counted a great deal and that he was a popular leader. They were not allowed to meet him and ultimately they were practically on the point of coming back before meeting him. Mr. Tshombe informed them—it is rather significant that they were informed through a Belgian officer or Belgian adviser of Mr. Tshombe—that they could not meet Mr. Lumumba. It was a few days ago only.

Then came the news of the escape of Mr. Lumumba. This news was given by the Katanga authorities. Very few people believed this, hardly any person and they feared that this meant possibly some attempt at liquidating Mr. Lumumba and his advisers. Two or three days later it turned out to be true.

Now there are many aspects of this tragedy. There is no doubt that Mr. Lumumba was murdered and the kind of explanation that the Katanga authorities have given was so extraordinary and so audacious that it surprised one that any of these people should have that audacity to say things; while completely disclaiming, rather indirectly, that they are responsible for the murder. They have done everything to make people suspect that they are directly responsible for this. It is interesting to see that they refuse to permit even now any inquiry. They refused even to indicate where he was murdered or to indicate where his grave was, as they say they have put him in a grave, the reason being

and this is to be noted, lest that place becomes a place of pilgrimage. It shows what his bitterest enemies think of Mr. Lumumba—his grave would become a place of pilgrimage by the Congolese people. It would indeed have become so because Mr. Lumumba, in a sense, was the founder of the national movement. It is not a very old-established movement but he was the founder and there can be not a shadow of doubt that whatever his failings or weaknesses may be that he was by far the most popular figure in the Congo not only among his own tribes but among others too. The tribal elements conflict with each other but among them he was the most popular figure. And it should be remembered that it was Mr. Lumumba who invited the United Nations to come to their help six months ago. It was at his request that the United Nations decided to send their contingent there.

So, now we have this situation. Mr. Lumumba was murdered. He was murdered in a brutal and callous manner. He was murdered by people who in doing so, apart from the fact of murder, defied the whole process of the United Nations, its previous resolutions and even the present demands. They insulted the United Nations and the Conciliation Commission in every way. It is a picture which naturally angers one and which is going to have, and is having in fact, very far-reaching and serious consequences.

As regards the policy of India, our policy in such matters must necessarily be limited by our capacity. Obviously, we cannot go and fight a war in the Congo. We have helped the United Nations, although we did not send any combat troops, in other ways and, if necessary, and if really we thought it was necessary from the world point of view or from the point of view of the Congo, we would even send combat troops. But we cannot possibly send them except through the United Nations. We cannot stand by ourselves there

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

to fight all and sundry. We can only do that if we are convinced that they will be used rightly for the freedom of the Congo people and not to support the gangster regimes that function there.

It is most unfortunate that when there was a chance of some better and more effective policies being pursued by the UN this tragedy should have occurred. It is possible that it was the fear of these better policies being pursued that hastened Mr. Lumumba's death, that is, his opponents did not want him to live longer lest the other policies should come into play. It is a fact that in the United Nations even those who had been reluctant to take any effective step were coming round to the belief that something effective should be done and not this inert policy and passive support of the existing conditions there. The United Nations themselves were thinking of this and the United States of America under the new regime—we were informed—had definitely decided to change the old policies and do several things—I do not say all things, but many things—which we had been asking for for these many months and which not only we but others too had been asking.

So just when there was some hope of this new policy coming up, which included of course naturally the release of Mr. Lumumba and the factional forces there being brought under control or disarmed as also many other things which probably the House knows about, namely, summoning of the Parliament, just when opinion was veering round to that and—I cannot say because of the opposition there also—possibly some such step would have been taken by the UN that this tragedy occurred.

Now this morning further developments have appeared in the papers—in fact, every day will bring these

developments—and I should have thought it better for us and for the other countries to await the decisions of the Security Council which is meeting from day to day before finally deciding on its own policy. Speaking for my Government, in spite of all our dismay at all that has happened and our disagreement on many of the policies that the United Nations has pursued in the Congo during the last few months, it would seem to us that if the United Nations withdraws from the Congo it would be a disaster because then the field is left open to civil war and large-scale foreign intervention in various ways, not on one side only but on every side. On the other hand, if it is not effective, there is no point in its being there if it cannot take action and punish the guilty persons.

One of the actions that is quite essential in the circumstances is the withdrawal of these foreign elements from there, chiefly the Belgians. It is not good enough for the Belgian Government or for anyone to say, "We did not send them. They have privately gone at the invitation of the Katanga Government". What the Katanga Government is in reality is not quite clear—whether it is Mr. Tshombe or the Belgian advisers. So if they like themselves to go there there is no difficulty about that. But it is clear that the foreign elements there, chiefly the Belgians, must withdraw if there is going to be any attempt at a control of this problem.

Therefore we feel that the United Nations should not retire. But—and there is a big 'but'—it can only stay on if it changes its past policy very largely and if it insists on these basic matters. It is no good now trying to get poor Mr. Lumumba released because he is not there, but these foreign elements must be controlled and must be made to withdraw specially—I repeat—the Belgians.

Today apart from the death of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Tshombe's and Colonel Mobutu's armies, such as they are led by Belgian officers—at least Mr. Tshombe's army; I am not quite sure about Mr. Mobutu's army—are marching across the Congo and are dealing with all opposition in their own brutal and callous way. Their attempt apparently has been to crush and put an end to all pro-Lumumba elements before the Security Council comes to any decision so as to forestall it and present it with an accomplished fact. That was the idea and probably this killing of Mr. Lumumba was a part of that grand design.

So we have made our position quite clear not only to the United Nations but to other countries concerned. In spite of our anger and our great resentment at all that has happened—one cannot merely be swept away by anger and do something which may create more difficulties—we have restrained ourselves although we felt strongly and we do feel strongly. We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council to come to firm decisions so that the U.N. authority there can function effectively and strongly. This means that it should function even if it is necessary to use armed force and not merely look on others using armed force for a wrong purpose; that the foreign elements must go from there and that the so-called Congolese army should be controlled and disarmed.

These are the immediate issues. Then, having got the situation under control, it should try to get Parliament to meet for deciding what kind of Government they will have, the object being that there should be unity and that the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo should be preserved. Their own people through their elected Parliament should decide what kind of Government they will have and no one else intervening except to help them. If any help has to be given to them it should go through the United Nations and not

through other sources. There are other matters too, but this is the broad position.

We were asked, maybe about two weeks ago, by the United Nations to send further combat troops there—not further because there were no combat troops there. We have about 800 personnel there doing hospital and supply work and signals. Because some countries were withdrawing their forces from there we were asked by the United Nations to send some armed forces. In our answer we made our position clear. We said that we do believe that the United Nations should function there because as soon as they withdraw there will be a collapse of everything and one does not quite know where this disaster will take the Congo. But in the way the UN had been functioning we completely disagreed with their method and we pointed out the various things that I have mentioned here and some others. If that could be done we would get over our reluctance and help even by sending some Combat troops to the Congo. That is the position we took up then. That holds still. So now we are waiting for whatever the decisions may be during the next two or three, or four or five days and will then fashion our policy accordingly.

Shrimati Renu Chakravartty (Basirhat): May I ask a question?

Mr. Speaker: The statement has been sufficiently long.

Shrimati Renu Chakravartty: Just one question, Sir.

Mr. Speaker: It will lead to another question. Papers to be laid on the Table.

12.29 hrs.

RE: MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT

Shri S. L. Saksena (Maharajganj): There are other adjournment motions also.

Shri Braj Raj Singh (Firozabad): There was the adjournment motion regarding the affairs in the Banaras Hindu University. Ten teachers in