

passed by the latter when he is away in an outpost fifty miles from the headquarters of the battalion."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member has already spoken on that. There is nothing further to be said. The amendment is now before the House.

Shrimati Lakshmi Menon: I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I shall now put the amendment to vote.

Page 1, line 7,—

after "Assistant Commandant"
insert—

"subject to the conditions that the order is passed by the latter when he is away in an outpost fifty miles from the headquarters of the battalion."

The motion was negatived.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That clause 2 stand part of the Bill".

The motion was adopted.

Clause 2 was added to the Bill.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the Long Title stand part of the Bill."

The motion was adopted.

Clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the Long Title were added to the Bill.

Shrimati Lakshmi Menon: I beg to move:

"That the Bill be passed".

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That the Bill be passed".

The motion was adopted.

14-57 hrs.

**COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS
THIRTY-FIRST REPORT**

Shri Krishna Chandra (Jalesar): I beg to move:

"That this House agrees with the Thirty-first Report of the Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions presented to the House on the 3rd December, 1958."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That this House agrees with the Thirty-first Report of the Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions presented to the House on the 3rd December, 1958."

The motion was adopted.

14-38 hrs.

**RESOLUTION RE: APPOINTMENT
OF A COMMITTEE TO GO INTO
PATTERN OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE—contd.**

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The House will now resume further discussion of the following resolution moved by Shri Naushir Bharucha on the 21st November 1958, namely:

"This House recommends that in view of the far-reaching scientific and technical developments in the field of defence, a Committee consisting of Members of Lok Sabha assisted by technical experts be appointed to examine and suggest changes in the existing pattern of military expenditure."

Out of 2 hours and 30 minutes allotted for the discussion of the resolution, one minute has already been taken up and 2 hours and 29 minutes are left for its further discussion today.

to go into Pattern of
Military Expenditure

[Mr Deputy-Speaker]

Shri Naushir Bharucha may continue his speech

Shri U C Patnaik (Ganjam) I have given notice of a substitute motion

Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Let the original motion be moved first, and then we can take up the substitute motion

Shri Naushir Bharucha (East Khandesh) The question of defence assumes new aspects in a world which is divided by power blocs resting on military strength. Particularly in view of the creation of a military dictatorship in a neighbouring country the question of defence also assumes an aspect of urgency

The object of my resolution is only to focus the attention of the House and of the nation on a subject which is of extreme importance to us all, and to consider our defence strategy very broadly and also the question of our equipment in the light of our very limited resources and to consider what impact scientific developments have on the present state of affairs—particularly, on technique of aggression as well as defence

It is not my intention to offer to this House any ready-made solutions. I am only asking that when there is yet time to think, this House may appoint a committee consisting of hon. Members of this House as well as experts who may go into the various questions which I shall briefly outline. No less a person than Mr. Lloyd George said that tactics in battle fields are governed by certain simple commonplace precepts. It does not require—and I fully agree with him—any extraordinary talent or genius, and I am sure a Committee of this House can consider certain broad aspects

Since the last world war, far-reaching developments have taken place. This world has seen the birth of the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb. Thereafter, we have seen a very rapid development in guided missiles, surface to surface, air to surface and

surface to air. We have also seen the advent of inter-continental ballistic missiles and the intermediate range ballistic missiles. We have seen the development of atomic artillery and tactical atomic weapons. We have seen that now we have submarines capable of launching intermediate range ballistic missiles. Also not so very prominently thrown into bolder relief is the question of bacteriological warfare. I am not at all referring to the possibility of using outer space for aggression.

We are quite convinced that so far as our financial resources are concerned notwithstanding an expenditure of Rs 300 crores on defence per annum, they are extremely limited and that if we at all want to think of any strategy, it will, of necessity, be within the compass of a conventional war. We cannot think in terms of atomic weapons partly because of the line of policy that we have adopted and also because of the financial implications which are so wide and staggering that it will be futile to consider along that line. But if our armed forces have any meaning, they should be capable of resisting aggression assuming for a moment that a conventional war breaks out. In 1957 we suddenly increased our military budget by Rs 50 crores because we were told that a sense of urgency was there and that amount had to be spent, much of it perhaps involving foreign exchange. Now, assuming for a moment that we are getting ready only for a conventional war and that our fighting machine has to be geared for that purpose, even then certain developments have taken place which require the entire question to be considered afresh.

Before I say anything in the matter, let us assume, for a moment, that this country is involved in a conventional war. The first event would be aggression by air. This would pose various problems such as catching the hostile aircraft on the radar screen, communicating warning to the central

control room and sounding an alert for the civilian population. It would pose the problem of the taking off of first line fighter aircraft for interception purposes. Then it would also pose problems of anti-aircraft guns going into action with the help of predictors and range finders. Of course, we are assuming, for a moment, that the bombs which would be dropped will not be nuclear bombs but only high-explosive and incendiary bombs, perhaps not excluding the possibility of gas bombs. Of course, the problem of civil defence immediately arises involving the question of mass psychology. Nowadays, total wars do not involve only the military but also the entire civil population. Hence it becomes a matter of extreme importance for us to bear in mind that the 'home front' must not crack up before the military takes to the field.

How do these technical developments even within the scope of a conventional war affect us? It will be correct to say that in the last war the bombers generally had a cruising speed of 300 miles an hour and fighters had a speed round about 400 miles an hour. Of course, in the latter stages of the war, there were fighters produced in Germany which were capable of attaining super-sonic speeds. But today the position is that even an ordinary bomber has a speed approaching very nearly trans-sonic speed. As a result, the time between detection on radar and communication to the central control room and the time between the central control room communicating it to the first line aircraft and their taking off would be very considerably reduced. Also the effect of technical developments in speeds would be that the bombers would increasingly get through. Even when the speed of bombers was only 300 miles an hour when a fleet of 1,000 bombers used to be sent on a raid, 95 per cent not only got through successfully but came back. Let us take it for granted that with increased speeds, the bombers will always get through.

The second point to be borne in mind is that the time for sounding the alert and people taking cover would be very considerably reduced. In fact, the first warning would be the dropping of the bomb. It will not be possible to send any warning, particularly in view of the type of equipment that we might be having today.

Then, in view of the increased speeds both of the bomber as well as of fighter aircraft, the time for combat in air in dog fights would be reduced to a bare second. When the speed was round about 300 miles an hour, the fighter aircraft and bombers engaging had at least two or three seconds in which to fire an attack; even that time will now be reduced to a bare one second. Therefore, the question is whether the fighter aircraft would be so very useful in bringing down bombers when the bombers have attained such high speeds.

Of course, the aim of every hostile Government is to pack the maximum 'punch' in every sortie of aggression. It has been calculated that since the dawn of human history, about 5 million tons of high explosives have been dropped in all the wars that were fought. But today, if we consider the power of the hydrogen bomb, a single bomb can have that punching power. However, we are not assuming for our purpose that we are likely to be attacked with nuclear weapons. Of course, if we are attacked with nuclear weapons, there would be no defence. But I am assuming that we are having our defence within the framework of a conventional war. But even today the technique of manufacture of the high explosive bombs—TNT—has so far advanced that it has a highly destructive power.

This raises various questions. What have we done so far for the protection of vital installations such as oil and gas, atomic establishments and installations, docks and harbours, railway crossings and marshalling yards.

[Shri Naushir Bharucha]

strategic bridges and even cities' water mains. These are questions which naturally have to be taken into consideration. What is more, since the last war very great advances have been made in the technique of manufacture of incendiary bombs, with the result that with improved techniques nowadays entire localities can be set ablaze. This poses various other questions. If gas bombs are used—they were not used in the last war by Germany not because she wanted to respect the Geneva Convention of 1925 but because it was felt that explosive bombs would do the work quicker and much more effectively than the gas bombs; but you cannot really rule out the possibility of use of gas bombs for psychological reasons—if gas bombs are used, the damage they do is exceedingly small, but the psychology that they create would lead certainly to panic and disastrous results. All these possibilities have to be taken into consideration and in the light thereof the pattern of our military expenditure requires to be revised.

In view of what I have said, let us consider our Air Force. Should we have, for instance, greater emphasis on bombers or fighters? In the last war, England laid a greater emphasis on fighter aircraft for her own peculiar reasons. What is going to be our strategy? Of course, you cannot dispense with fighter aircraft, but the utility of fighter aircraft is decreasing very considerably.

Secondly, is it worthwhile investing money in anti-aircraft guns which give more illusion of protection than real security? It was pointed out that in the last war, it took 14,000 anti-aircraft shells to bring down one aircraft! That was at a time when the cruising speed of planes was only 300 miles an hour. With 600 miles an hour and the aircraft flying nearly 6 to 7 miles high—definitely above 5 miles—and in spite of improved predictors and range finders, to talk

of bringing down an aircraft by anti-aircraft guns is a sheer waste of time. It may be that it may score a fluke hit here or a fluke hit there. In spite of improved predictors and in spite of the fact that we have improved things like the proximity fuses—that is the shell need not hit the aircraft but even if it is within the vicinity of the aircraft the shell automatically explodes, even with this improved technique, it is no use having anti-aircraft guns unless you want to have it first for show. I am not offering here any ready-made solution that this should be discarded or that should be discarded. My purpose is to place before this House certain considerations so that the committee might go into all the various problems.

Only this morning we were told that some anti-aircraft shells running into millions were being scrapped because they had deteriorated in storage. But, are you going to replace them? Is the cost worth while? Are you going to spend more money in having more anti-aircraft guns which will be of no use? And, are you not going to divert our limited funds to things which may be of greater use. Therefore, the pattern of expenditure has to change. That is what I desire the House to consider.

Then the question also is that the entire strategy of aggression or retaliation against the enemy will have to be shifted from high explosive bombs to small incendiary bombs. Why? Probably, because incendiary bombs may be capable of creating equal amount of damage and they may be cheaper and easier to manufacture here. A single aircraft can carry over 2 tons of such incendiary bombs. In the last war these incendiary bombs were very light things and you could handle them with ease. They were hardly 2 or 3 lbs. each. There are improved patterns. If, therefore, the shift is changed from high explosives to incendiaries, very probably you might achieve bet-

ter results because, after all, the purpose of every air attack is to cause the maximum damage in the enemy territory. Therefore, we have got to consider again. Because high explosive bombs may damage and over-destroy a thing. And our objective may not necessarily be to over-destroy, as is the case in atomic warfare. So all these things may have to be considered in which case while purchasing stores for the Army we may have to follow a new pattern of expenditure. We may have to start a factory for the manufacture of incendiary bombs. They are not very difficult to manufacture, they can very easily be manufactured. I do not know whether it is done actually.

Then, also improvement in our warning system may be necessary because of the vast area we have to cover. Then, we have to think over the question of our fighters being equipped with rockets or machine guns. The latest trend is to equip them with rockets. They may be completely useless as far as we are concerned. Maybe that we have to fall back upon the old method of equipping our fighter aircraft with machine-guns capable of firing small shells. All these require to be looked into.

Then, again, there is no use blindly increasing the number of aircraft. Aircraft consume—particularly the bombers consume aviation spirit, aviation fuel on a very large scale. I presume that in the event of war breaking out—let us say between us and Pakistan, though I do not think that such a war will break out because if it breaks out Pakistan will be definitely very much worse off—but let us assume for argument's sake that it is quite likely, in that event Britain, USSR and the United States will remain neutral. They will not help either side with any kind of ammunition or any goods capable of being used in war in which case we will not have the supply of aviation spirit. The result might be that within one,

week our entire air forces will be grounded for want of aviation fuel. It is no use talking merely that we should have 2,000 first-line aircraft since we have also to see that we are capable of fuelling them. And the question of storage of fuel and all such problems arise. Unless we are capable of keeping our sealanes open for importing such aviation spirit, assuming that we are capable of keeping the sealanes open, we cannot get fuel. So, all these things have got to be considered and the pattern of our military expenditure has to be altered accordingly.

Now, take the case of the Navy. Having observed the latest technical developments, the most far-reaching changes are likely to occur in the Navy but that applies where nuclear weapons are used or where atomic submarines are used or where submarines capable of intermediate range ballistic weapons are used. But, our problem is that we have to guard a coastline of 3,500 miles and it is almost humanly impossible to do that with the limited number of our ships. Our strategy should be that we should have more of reconnaissance aircraft capable of keeping a round-the-clock watch on our shores. I should like to know if we are investing heavily on shore guns, in shore batteries. That would be a great mistake as shore battery is mostly capable of flinging a shell only 25 miles away and the expenses involved would be so great that it is useless to have these shore batteries. My own view is that expenditure on shore batteries would be well directed towards reconnaissance aircraft which would give us information quicker. Our coastal defence should also consist of not only dive bombers capable of attacking enemy targets 200 miles away, but also torpedo boats rather than shore guns. We should also be self-sufficient in the matter of manufacturing mines of both types, the acoustic and the magnetic. They are very easy to manufacture. There is nothing extraordinary about them. Because, in the

(Shri Naushir Bharucha)

event of war the ports will have to be defended. Mines will have to be sown round our ports and we would have to lay mines so that hostile ships do not freely enter our ports

I do not know how far it is correct, but speaking subject to correction, I think we are going to have an aircraft carrier. To my mind, it is going to be a big mistake. An aircraft carrier would cost roundabout Rs 20 crores.

Shri U C Patnaik. We have already gone in for it and it is being repaired

Shri Naushir Bharucha. I do not know what the actual cost is, but it cannot be under Rs 20 crores. An aircraft carrier is a most vulnerable thing in war. Unless you have provided it with an air umbrella capable of defending the aircraft carrier, it is of course, not worth while having it. But, why should we have an aircraft carrier? Is it simply because Britain and America have it? Their requirements are different, they have to guard far-flung possessions. India has not to guard any far-flung possessions. Therefore, we do not require aircraft carriers. And the amount that we spend on it may be profitably invested elsewhere. That is what I mean by the pattern of our military expenditure. If war becomes a fact it would be desirable for us to consider exactly how within our limited means we can adequately equip the Armed Forces.

Our Naval personnel is barely 7,800 officers and men in the whole of the Navy and it is supposed to guard 3,500 miles of our coastline. Therefore, we must take it for granted that commando raids and landings will be plentiful and our Navy may not be able to do much in preventing these. The expenditure on our Navy is less than the expenditure of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. All these facts have to be borne in mind. That is what I want. I want that the shape

of expenditure may have to be looked into. But, even assuming that we have everything in the matter of Army, Navy and Air Force, still the nation may crack down completely the moment there is war. Why? Because we are not ready with our Civil Defence.

What is our Civil Defence? If we were considering a pattern of nuclear warfare, then there is no need for Civil Defence, then, we have to reconcile ourselves to Fate. But, when we talk of conventional war, there is scope for Civil Defence. What is our Civil Defence? If you ask the Defence Department, it will say it is not our look-out, it is the look out of the Home Ministry. And the Home Ministry is blissfully solving the problem by ignoring it completely.

I have not seen a single skeleton scheme—let alone a skeleton scheme not even ARP plan nor even a blueprint of it. It is high time that we think of this. If our Defence so urgently requires an additional Rs 50 crores it means that there is some urgency about it. If there is military dictatorship in Pakistan, it really means that we have got to be on the alert. War may not come. But what is the use of the Army unless we are on the alert on all fronts including the home front? But, we have not cared to have anything by way of Civil Defence. In total war, the civilian population plays as big a part and an integral part as our Army.

15 hrs.

Assuming for a moment that in the event of war, air raids will be confined to cities, I ask the hon Member—I should ask the Home Minister—whether we have the necessary organisation for meeting this emergency. I am of the opinion that a Special Ministry of Home Security requires to be created. Till then this problem cannot be solved. Even a very ordinary civil defence organisation would

involve: first, blue-prints for dispersal of non-essential civilian population, secondly, rescue parties after a high explosive attack, thirdly, first aid parties fourthly, demolition squads for unsafe buildings; fifthly emergency repair gangs; sixthly, emergency fire fighting service on an unprecedented scale and seventhly camouflaging of strategic installations, etc. If gas bombs are used, and we must be prepared even for them and have de-contamination squads. Of course, I do not even contemplate what would happen if bacteriological warfare comes.

What I am pointing out is that the nation is not taken into confidence while we keep on spending Rs. 300 crores on our Defence Budget. These civilian organisations of Air Raid Precautions cannot be built up overnight; it takes years of training. But we have not even thought of it.

The question of mass psychology is the most important thing. The enemy can play havoc with mass psychology if people are not properly disciplined and the country would be defeated even before its armed forces had had an opportunity to strike a single blow. Let us understand that the warfare cannot be carried on only by the defence forces. Let us understand that merely a strong army is nothing unless you have got the supporting nation which is well disciplined, and can avoid panic. It has happened in the course of the last war. If you have got to take any lessons from the last war, it is that on occasions panic has caused more casualties than high explosive bombs; false alarms at times have caused more casualties than actual attacks. Unless people are trained and people, including school children, are well disciplined in the event of an air attack, disastrous consequences would follow. The bombers will invariably get there. So, all these things have got to be done.

As Lloyd George said:

"War is a terrible drama moving with the swiftness of a whirlpool to its climax and ultimate decision. It does not leave any time to improvise methods of help."

That is why I have moved this Resolution. I want the Government to consider and think, when there is yet time to think, because in the moment of warfare nothing can be provided and unless the nation is taken into confidence and the nation is disciplined it is futile to think that any nation would be capable of standing a totalitarian warfare or to wage even a conventional warfare. Let us hope and pray that the time does not come. But if we are spending Rs. 300 crores, I think the time has come at least to consider in the light of changed circumstances whether there should not be a shift of emphasis on one aspect of defence or the other and whether we should keep on merely piling up armour plates and not be able to use it. These are the considerations which have impelled me to move this resolution and I hope the Government will take them into consideration.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Resolution moved

"This House recommends that in view of the far-reaching scientific and technical developments in the field of defence, a Committee consisting of Member of the Lok Sabha assisted by technical experts be appointed to examine and suggest changes in the existing pattern of military expenditure."

Now, there as substitute motions Is Shri Patnaik moving his amendment?

Shri U. C. Patnaik: Sir, I beg to move:

That for the original Resolution, the following be substituted, namely:—

"This House recommends that in view of the far reaching, Scientific, Technical and Organizational developments in the field of Defence a Committee consisting of Members of the Lok Sabha, assisted by Technical Experts, be appointed to examine and suggest—

(a) Changes in the existing pattern of military expenditure;

(b) modernisation of the equipment and training of the armed forces;

(c) co-ordination of the Defence Science Organization and Technical Development Establishments under the Defence Ministry with Universities and Research Centres;

(d) integration of Defence with national planning and reorganisation;

(e) association of civilians with national defence;

(f) proper planning for defence purchases;

(g) revision of service conditions of armed forces personnel, and

(h) reorganisation of the Defence Ministry (Secretariat)."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There is another. Is Shri S. M. Banerjee moving it? He is not here. So, it is not moved. Now, both the Resolution and the amendment of Shri Patnaik are before the House.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: Sir, in moving this substitute motion I reiterate the importance that the hon. mover of the Resolution has given to the urgency of taking the nation and this Parliament into confidence about our defence organisation, defence pur-

chases, defence contracts and defence expenditure.

In the first place, I beg to submit that we, in this country, and in this House are refused information that is being given by the Ministry of Defence officially to foreign countries. During the Budget session, I had drawn your notice, Sir, to several books published in England which have been giving information about our defence organisation and the Defence Minister blandly told us that it was not officially given and that he could not help if any information leaks out and is being utilised by publishers. I pointed out later during the last session through a question that the *James Fighting Ship* which did give all the details of our naval organisation in the introductory chapter thank the Government of India and its High Commissioner's office in London for the information so kindly supplied. Then the Ministry could not back out and the reply to my question during last session was that the information had been given because *James Fighting Ship* was an authoritative book on naval organisations and therefore, Government of India had officially given that information. This session I pursued that question with another question relating to a six year plan which this *James Fighting Ship* had been mentioning from year to year in the last two editions. It mentions about India's six year programme. It states: "It was officially announced on 12th June, 1955 that the Indian Navy would receive from Great Britain more than 20 new warships within six years. That includes 12 anti-submarine and anti-aircraft frigate, 8 coastal minesweepers and a number of in-hore minesweepers". That is the six-year plan dated 12th June, 1955 mentioned last year in the *James Fighting Ship* and this year also. The ships that are acquired during the last two years (i.e. after that date) have been acquired under this six year plan.

Our question to the Defence Minister and also to the head of this Government is this: When foreign countries are being given this information, how is it that the tax-payer of India is refused information about these purchases? How is it that Parliament is told in reply to every question that it is a "defence secret" and cannot be divulged in the interests of security?

I now come to the airforce side. Sir, you were in the Chair last time when I brought a number of magazines, like *Aeroplane* and the *Flight* and pointed out that the purchases made by India during the last two years were being given in foreign magazines. The Defence Minister, Shri Krishna Menon was good enough to tell us that he was not responsible for whatever was being found in these journals and that they might have unauthorisedly got the information from our suppliers.

Here is the latest addition to our Parliament Library, which was purchased only yesterday. In this book, *Airforces of the World*, there is a detailed description of our entire airforce organization.

We understand and appreciate that for these international books of repute—as the one published by Jane or by Messrs. William Green and Jonn Fricker—it is for the Government of India to give all details of their aircraft, ships and other strategic defence equipment. But what I object to is, when we Members of Parliament put questions in the House when we refer to our ships or aircraft, the Ministry assumes a cloak of secrecy and says that, for reasons of security, the manufactures in H.A.L. cannot be given, the manufactures in B.E.L. cannot be given, the broad features of the Defence Organisation cannot be given.

Sir, I come back to this book, 'Air Forces of the world.' In the first

page there is a map of India mentioning all the military aerodromes in this country, where they are located, so that if the other country has got a guided missile it can conveniently have them as targets. The strength of the Air Force personnel, of officers and men is given. The number of our aircraft, the number of bombers, fighters etc. are also given. You find the types and makes given—fighter-bombers like Oregon, De Havilland etc. and bombers like English Electric Canberras and so on. Information with regard to all these varieties of aircraft on the defensive as well as offensive and training sides is all given.

Then, in the book itself there are two parts. One part is: before 1954,—that is, before the Air Marshal took over charge what were the military aircraft in this country. The other part is: after 1954—after Air Marshal Mukerjee took over command of the Air Force what are the acquisitions, the number of aircraft purchased, the firms where they were manufactured and so on.

One interesting thing that I find here and which has not been told to us is that in 1956 Russia made a present of two Ilyushins as a gift by the Soviet Government. Then the book goes on to say that Russia sought to interest India in the procurement of MIG 17, fighters and IL 28 light bombers at prices with which western manufacturers would not compete, but after prolonged examination of this equipment the I.A.F. selected another French type to succeed the Toofani. This is a very important statement. In April last, I had read out to the House from a copy of *Aeroplane* which said that although Russia offered to sell us these IL 28 and MIG 17 at one-third the price which we paid for similar aircraft in France and England, we preferred going in for French and British products at three times the price, and it was stated in the British magazine that they were of comparable quality, that

[Shri U. C. Patnaik]

in efficiency the Russian aircraft that we rejected were as good as those we purchased from France and U.K. at three times the price.

Why have we purchased from England and France? Not because we have been always accustomed to those types of aeroplanes. You will find from this list that we have purchased from France, United Kingdom, Canada, United States of America, different types, different makes of bombers, fighter-bombers, fighters and trainers. We have got so many varieties, but still we are going in for further new types from France and U.K. Why are we going in for this museum? That is because there is somebody or other interested in purchases from private firms.

In this book you find that Russia made a present of some planes. We did not have the courtesy of telling the world about it. Why have we rubbed it in here? To show, I presume, that our officers are so interested in the democratic nations that although Russia made a present of aircraft we did not acknowledge it publicly, although Russia offered to give us aircraft of comparable nature at one third the price, we did not go in for it.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Is there any authority for presuming that this information was also conveyed officially by the Government of India.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): May I just say a word, Sir, because I cannot stand the Member saying that we did not acknowledge it or inform the public. One—not two—Ilyushin aircraft was given—supposed to be given to me personally—and it was announced by beat of drums all over the place. I do not know how the hon. Member thinks that it was not announced or publicised. It was publicised greatly in every newspaper. I referred to it

in my speeches. There was a public function accepting it at Palam Aerodrome. I accepted it publicly and I thanked the Ambassador for it. All kinds of things happened. And, may I say, it has nothing to do with Air Force as such. Ilyushin is a type of aircraft like Dakota, only somewhat better and slower, and it is not good for any kind of fighting force.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I am grateful to the hon. Prime Minister for having corrected me. We are glad that our country had acknowledged the receipt of that aircraft. But my question still remains unanswered, namely, when we were offered at 1/3rd the price fighters, fighter bombers and bombers of the same variety as those which we purchased from United Kingdom and France and we purchased them at three times the price, we in Parliament are entitled to know why we turned down that offer

Apart from that, there is another thing in this book which has been recently published. You get here the details of the manufacture in H.A.L. In reply to several questions in Parliament, we were told that the manufacture programme is too secret a thing and that it cannot be given out, whereas all such details are given in this book.

Our defence purchases from outside are kept confidential. Some of our ammunition purchases have been recently considered by two expert committees set up by Defence. You remember, Sir, about the ammunition contract with the Oerlikons, the contract for sale of ammunition to us and for giving us the know-how at our Khamaria factory for which we spent crores of rupees. The Swiss came in 1950 and till 1958 they have not succeeded in the manufacture of the major calibre ammunition. In the minor calibre ammunition, there are two qualities—AP/I and HE/I. The Oerlikons have just established HE/I manufacture, which is defective. They

have not yet gone in for AP/I manufacture. Eight years have elapsed since that agreement for which we have spent crores, still we have not had 40 mm. In regard to 20 mm we are not even today having AP/I manufacture.

Even regarding the HE/I manufacture, I understand that some of our barrels have broken and some of our aircraft have also suffered by the use of that ammunition. Apart from this contract for manufacture, we went in for another contract whereby we purchased from them a huge lot of the ammunition. It was published in one of our weekly magazines about June, 1954 that we had gone in for "dud" weapons. I do not know what steps the Government took all these years, but last year two expert committees were appointed. We find from the newspapers of last month and the month previous to that, that both the expert committees have found that the ammunition was bad. The first committee, which had on it, a representative of the Defence Science Adviser, has it seems, according to the newspaper reports, definitely stated that the ammunition was "dud" and "hazardous for use" even at the time we purchased it. Subsequently, another committee of subordinate, so called, experts was brought in to say that the ammunition can be repaired if some modification is made. According to the newspaper report, the ammunition is short of 5 gms. of explosives, it is short in weight, and if the ammunition is reopened and that weight is added, it will be all right for some time. So, that is our big purchase and big contract with Oerlikons.

Today, the hon. Deputy Minister was kind enough to reply to my Calling Attention Notice. He made a long 13-page statement. It is fairly convincing as far as it goes, and I hope that after perusing the contracts and other things and examining the antecedents of those firms, Parliament will be given the satisfaction, that

these five contracts recently given are genuine. But then, in view of the Oerlikons contract in Switzerland ten years ago, in view of the purchases made through those retired British officers, Sir James Marshall Connwall & Co. and S. C. K. Agencies—we must bear them in mind—we hope that the present contracts are of a better nature. Let us keep an open mind on the subject. But we have to examine them even now. We must examine the antecedents of those firms and find out whether they are having the know-how, because we have discovered that the major contracts with Oerlikons for Ambernath and Khamera have proved flops. They have not been successful.

As I was telling the House, in England the White Paper mentions everything about the defence organization, defence equipment and all that. You know that in the British Parliament, the Prime Minister has to lay on the Table, along with the defence budget, an outline of the future policy, central organization for defence, etc. presented by the Minister of Defence. They give all the details of the defence organization, the strength of their units and all other details. In their annual budgets also, they gave details as I have shown from time to time. We were replied to by the Treasury Benches that though it is necessary for England it is undesirable for India to publish all these things. Evidently Government thinks it is undesirable to give out these facts to Parliament, although foreigners are getting detailed information about them through official hand-outs. I come to one small matter. On the 1st of August, 1958, only four months back, very big changes have been made in the defence organization. Instead of three Lieutenant-Generals, substantive, and two Lieutenant-Generals officiating, you have now got 13 Lieutenant-Generals. On the 31st July last, just a few months ago, you had only a few Lieutenant-Generals.

[Shri U. C. Patnaik]

Now, the number of Lieutenant-Generals has gone up to 13. The number of Major-Generals—I would not like to go into the number—has increased by 28, and the number of Brigadiers has also increased. Then, in these promotions, people from the 23rd rank as Brigadiers have been taken over to the first rank as Major-General, with the result that we hear that there is great dissatisfaction in the ranks of senior officers holding charge of brigades. This is a very serious position.

A number of posts have been created, and not only created, but on the 1st August the number seems to have been enlarged, because you cannot have the army commanders and the corps commanders only as Lieutenant-Generals whereas the others have also become Lieutenant-Generals. So, within a few months before the budget, some four or five of them will become full Generals, with the result that you will have the General himself as a Field-Marshal. That will bring us again to the Navy and the Air Force in the higher commands. In the Air Force the Air Marshal will become the Chief Air Marshal and in the Navy the Vice-Admiral will become Admiral. All these things are going to happen. How is it that our Minister in charge of Defence who is fighting our battles in foreign countries does not care to see these things and to see the repercussions of these things—these enlargements and promotions—and see what things are likely to become in the future and what will be the future implications and how the country will bear such future expansions.

I submit that the pay, conditions of service and the amenities of the other ranks—the NCOs and the JCOs and other lower categories, have not been improved or revised. Their grievance is that when during the British rule they were paying four, three and two annas for regimental funds, they are

now paying Rs. 13, Rs. 9 and Rs. 7 respectively to the regimental funds. They are not consulted about the expenditure. The OC incurs the expenditure and then the amounts collected are not checked by anybody. There is no audit for these amounts. They are called "compulsory cuttings" from the salaries, and in spite of these compulsory cuts, the "contributors" are not consulted in regard to the expenditure, and every battalion and every regiment has huge amounts to its credit. The question is, who is to look after this.

You know, Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, that as a Member of this House on this side, you had once argued about the VCOs—the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers—a cadre which does not exist in any other country. That system was brought in to help young British officers coming as Lieutenants or captains in contacting the men of the army. When the Viceroy left, that system was changed. Our Government made a change. The VCO became a JCO, but the number of JCOs is continuing and is at the same level all the time. At the platoon level, at the company level and at the battalion level, you have still the JCOs there. What has been the JCO hoping for all these ten years? He was hoping that this anomalous position will be done away with after Independence came. The JCO was hoping from time to time that he will be absorbed as a platoon commander, as a company commander and so on. But now, you have increased the number of Regular officers recently. You have increased and converted the number of TCOs, ECOs and the SSROs recruited during the war without any medical certificate, and given them regular commissions. I need not mention the number of regular commissioned officers because according to our Government it will be giving our enemy an idea of our defence strength, but then I can tell you that 50 per cent. of the regular officers, of short service commissions

and temporary service commissions and also emergency service commissions were to be discharged from year to year, because they had been recruited on a temporary basis. They were gradually to be discharged. But then, instead of discharging them from year to year, we have now suddenly made them regular. This new change has taken place, I believe it was also made on or about 1st August.

Sir, suddenly, all these temporary, emergency and short service commissions and all those who had been taken without qualifications, without health certificates, etc., and about whom we have been asking for their discharge and utilisation in civil life, have been put in the regular commission, and have got over the heads of many of the regular commission holders, with the result that in the senior ranks, there is bound to be dissatisfaction, because people who were temporary have been taken over the heads of permanent people.

Among the junior ranks like the junior commissioned officers, there is also a complaint that those people who were due to go away have been confirmed as regulars. I would not go into the psychology of it for lack of time, but then it is high time that our Defence....

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Is he finishing soon?

Shri U. C. Patnaik: Yes, Sir: in a few minutes. I would point out that this is a subject which requires days and days together. We are spending 50 per cent. of our revenue on defence and today defence is the most important subject.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: He should not spend those few minutes on those points.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: Then there is a very major aspect. Our Government should know what are the superior weapons, and what are the fighting advantages of our potential enemy.

When we spend Rs. 300 crores annually on defence, we must know that there is a potential enemy for whom we are spending. If we recognize that there is a potential enemy, we must try to know what are the weapons of that enemy, what are the troop dispositions and what are the bases and what is the likely mode of attack, in order to formulate our strategy of defence. I had the misfortune to put this question to the Defence Minister in a certain consultative committee, and he told me that he was not concerned with troop dispositions, that he is not concerned with the weapons of other countries and that he has left it to the Chiefs of Staff. I have the highest regard for the Chiefs of Staff; they are patriotic Indians and I have nothing to say against them. But every member of the armed service has got an inclination for the particular branch of organisation in which he was trained 20 or 30 years ago. If you put in his hands the entire re-organisation of the country and the preparation for the country's defence, it is a very serious disadvantage to the country, and to the other branches.

I had to give the hon. Minister a copy of all that I had gathered from various papers about weapons, bases and troop dispositions of a potential enemy. Ultimately, I am glad that the Ministry has examined them and found that they were correct. Regarding guided missile bases, on the 14th April this year, Russia has taken objection against the bases in Pakistan. This information is given in a note which is published in the *Asian Recorder* found in our library. It has given details about the guided missile launching bases and air bases for superior type of aircraft—B-47 and B-52—that Pakistan has got from America. Russia gave a strong note of warning that there are guided missile bases at Quetta, Gilgit and Peshawar, and at many other places bases are being constructed with the help of American army engineers and with the help of Omand, Farnsworth.

[Shri U. C. Patnaik]

and Wright, an American firm. Russia has also stated about bases for superior type of strategic aircraft in the regions of Karachi, Kohat, Peshawar, Quetta, Gilgit, Risalpur and Sargodha. Russia has said that these bases which are 4 K.Ms. long meant for heavy Jet bombers as well as the guided missile bases in Pakistan are a menace to the security of Russia and so Russia will take steps to counter-act against that menace. That was on 14th April, 1958.

If these launching grounds and air bases are dangerous to Russia to such an extent that Russia has taken objection to them, does India consider that they are not a source of danger to us? I know we have got great trust in America's good wishes for us and our great hope that America will not allow Pakistan to use these weapons against us. But we ask the Defence Ministry, we ask the Prime Minister of India who is responsible not only for development, but for the defence of the country: If tomorrow, there is an attack with guided missiles on certain towns of India and certain industrial centres or by Bombers of the B-47 and B-52 aircraft, if there is panic throughout the country, there is no civil defence organisation, what will be our position? It is true that we have probably a sort of hope. Just as we hope that America will not allow Pakistan to use the weapons against us, we also hope that Russia and China, in their own interests, will come in and try to come to our rescue at least to safeguard and to see that these bases are not occupied by America. We may have those hopes, but posterity will certainly blame our high command here. Posterity is bound to lay the blame on our Prime Minister later on. There is only one man today in this country and in his name the entire administration is being run—posterity will have the right to say that the Prime Minister jeopardised the security of this country.

Shri Raghunath Singh (Varanasi):
No, no.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: Even if Russia and China come to our rescue, there will be a fight and India will become the arena of warfare.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Why should posterity tell that? Even now he is being told.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I am anticipating what posterity will say.

So, all these things have got to be considered. The day before yesterday, I made some suggestions for integrating our national development with military defence and the Prime Minister was kind enough to agree that on the technical side it can be done, but on the rank and file side, it cannot be done. Even then, I would appeal to the Prime Minister to think over how to integrate and how to have a civil defence organisation. Otherwise, in the event of an attack, in the event of bombardment, all these big projects, factories and towns will all be in danger. So, let us try to re-organise our defence forces and to integrate them with the civilian life, so as to save our money and to see that our country has a strong defence.

श्री रघुनाथ सिंह : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, हमारे अनेक भाइयों ने सेना के सम्बन्ध में तो बहुत कुछ कहा लेकिन नेवी के सम्बन्ध में कुछ नहीं कहा। मैं केवल . . .

उपाध्यक्ष महोदय : आपने सिर्फ नेवी के सम्बन्ध में कहना है तो १५ मिनट में खत्म कर दीजियेगा।

श्री रघुनाथ सिंह : जी हां, मैं इससे पहले ही खत्म कर दूंगा।

नेवी के सम्बन्ध में मुझे यह कहना है कि आज करीब सात बरतों के मैं इस सदन में कहता आ रहा हूँ कि हिन्दुस्तान के पास

जी एक नेवल शिपयार्ड होना चाहिये जहाँ पर कि सब-मैरीन एयरक्राफ्ट कैरियर और जो हमारे शिप्स हैं, उनकी भरम्मत हो सके और हम दूसरे मुल्कों पर आभिस रहने की अपेक्षा अपने देश में ही उनको तैयार कर सकें। हमारी स्थिति यह है कि हिन्दुस्तान को एक टापू के रूप में, एक आइलैंड के रूप में ममला जाना चाहिये। मैं यह इसलिये कहता हूँ कि हिन्दुस्तान का जो दूसरे मुल्कों के साथ सम्बन्ध हो सकता है वह सिर्फ़ नेवी के द्वारा ही हो सकता है और किसी प्रकार से नहीं हो सकता। इसका कारण यह है कि पाकिस्तान बन जाने के कारण स्थल मार्ग में दूसरे मुल्कों के साथ हमारा सम्बन्ध टूट गया है। अब दूसरे मुल्कों के साथ हमारा सम्बन्ध सिर्फ़ शिप्स के द्वारा ही हो सकता है और न शिप्स की रक्षा के लिये नेवी का होना बहुत आवश्यक है।

कुछ भाई कहते हैं कि आजकल वारफेयर में नेवी की जरूरत नहीं है। मैं कहता हूँ कि सब से ज्यादा अगर किसी चीज की जरूरत है तो वह नेवी की ही है। हमारी भारत सरकार का जो बजट है उसमें मे मुश्किल से १३ परसेंट ही नेवी के वास्ते रखा गया है जो बहुत कम है।

मैं आपका ध्यान इस ओर आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ कि अगर आप दुनिया के इतिहास का देखें तो आपको पता चलेगा कि प्रशिया ने जब यूनान पर हमला किया तो यह एथेस की नेवी थी जिस के कारण प्रशिया को डिफ़ीट उटानी पड़ी। इसी तरह से नैपोलियन को नाइल में जो डिफ़ीट हुई वह नेवल वारफेयर के कारण ही हुई। आप यह भी जानते ही हैं कि पिछली लड़ाई में जापानी नांग बयो हारे। उनके पास सिर्फ़ छ एयरक्राफ्ट कैरियर थे। सन् १९४५ में जब उनके न छ एयरक्राफ्ट कैरियर्स का नाश हो गया, उसके बाद आपान का हारना आरम्भ हो गया।

मैं आपका ध्यान इस ओर दिलाना चाहता हूँ कि हिन्दुस्तान का सी कोस्ट है वह करीब ३,००० मील लम्बा है और तीन हजार मील

लम्बी सीमा की रक्षा करने के लिए हमारी तरफ़ से कोई प्रबन्ध नहीं किया गया है। अगर, कोई नेवल पावर आज हिन्दुस्तान पर हमला करती है तो उस गूरल में हम अपनी रक्षा करने में समर्थ होंगे या नहीं, मर्में मुझ को बहुत सन्देह है। १९वीं शताब्दी में अंग्रेजों ने भी जब हिन्दुस्तान की रक्षा का प्रबन्ध किया था तो उस वक्त अयन और सिंगापुर में ही उन्होंने नेवल बेस बनाये थे। ट्रिंकोमाली में भी एयर बेसिस इमी लिये बने थे कि इंडियन घोषण में कोई भी बाहरी नेवी आकर के हिन्दुस्तान की रक्षा में व्यवधान उत्पन्न न कर सके। हमें आज अपने तीन हजार मील लम्बे सी कोस्ट की रक्षा करनी है। आजकल आप देखेंगे कि हम जो पुराने जहाजों के फेर में पड़े हुए हैं। आज आप देखें तो आप को पता चलेगा कि अमरीका में, इन्लैंड में, रूस में, एटोमिक सब-मैरीन बन रहे हैं। हमारे पास इसके मुकाबले में एक भी सब-मैरीन नहीं है। हमने केवल एक एयरक्राफ्ट कैरियर किसी प्रकार से खरीदा है और आपके पास एक एयरक्राफ्ट कैरियर तो था ही, लेकिन उसकी रक्षा तब तक नहीं हो सकती है जब तक कि आपके पास सब-मैरीन न हो। आज हमारे पास सब-मैरीन नहीं है। हम को अपने देश की रक्षा करनी है। हम किसी भी देश पर आक्रमण नहीं करना चाहते। लेकिन हम देखते आये हैं और हमारा अनुभव यह रहा है कि १२०० बरस से बराबर हिन्दुस्तान के ऊपर आक्रमण होते रहे हैं। मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि क्या गारंटी है कि हमारे ऊपर चाहे पाकिस्तान की ओर से और चाहे किमी ओर दूसरे देश की ओर से आक्रमण नहीं होगा। अगर हमारे ऊपर कोई आक्रमण करता है तो दूसरे देशों से हमारा जो कुछ सम्बन्ध या सम्पर्क हो सकता है वह केवल नेवी के द्वारा ही हो सकता है। इसलिये मैं निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि हम और हमारा ज्यादा से ज्यादा ध्यान होना चाहिये।

आप देखेंगे कि रूस ने अभी आप से तीन महीने पहले आर्कटिक घोषण में एक्सपेरिमेंट

[श्री रघुनाथ सिंह]

किया था और उसने एक नये किस्म का सब-मैरीन ईलाक कर ली है जो एटोमिक पावर से चलती है और बर्फ के नीचे हो कर जाती है। वह लैनिनघाट से अलासका तक पहुंची थी। आज जब कुनिया इतनी तरक्की करती आ रही है तो हम ही चुप हो कर शान्त हो कर क्यों बैठे रहें, क्यों न हम भी अपनी रक्षा की पूरी पूरी व्यवस्था कर लें।

आप जानते ही हैं कि जब बाबर ने हिन्दुस्तान पर हमला किया तो उसके साथ सिर्फ २०,००० फौजी थे और राणा सांगा के पास दो लाख की फौज थी। लेकिन इतनी फौज होने पर भी राणा सांगा हार गये और बाबर जीत गया। इसका कारण यह था कि बाबर के पास नई किस्म की तोपें थी, हिन्दुस्तान वालों के पास नई किस्म की तोपें नहीं थी। पानीपत की तीसरी बेटल को आप देखें तो आपको पता चलेगा कि मराठा लोग अहमद शाह अबदाली से इसलिये हारे कि अहमद शाह अबदाली के पास नई प्रकार की बन्दूकें थी, नई प्रकार की तोपें थीं जोकि पश्चिम में ईजाद हुई थी। आज हम चुप हो कर नहीं बैठ सकते हैं। हम शान्तिमय देश हैं लेकिन हमें अपनी रक्षा आप नो करनी ही है। १२०० बरस में हम शान्तिप्रिय देश की हैमियत में चले आ रहे हैं लेकिन फिर भी हम पर आक्रमण होते रहे हैं। इसलिये जैसा कि प्रस्ताव रखा गया है कि हमारी सुरक्षा व्यवस्था का नवीनीकरण होना चाहिये, आधुनिक अस्त्र-शस्त्र हमारे पास होने चाहिये, इसकी ओर आपका ध्यान जाना चाहिये और अगर हम इस अपनी सुरक्षा की ओर ध्यान नहीं देंगे तो यह आ हमारी आजादी है यह रह सकेगी या नहीं, इसमें मुझे सन्देह है।

मे चाहता हूँ कि कम से कम भारतवर्ष में एक नैवल शिपयार्ड होना चाहिये। इस के लिये मैं सात बरस से चिन्ताता आ रहा हूँ और आज फिर मैं बड़े नष्ट शब्दों में निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि आप कम से कम एक नैवल

शिपयार्ड तो रखें। इस पर कौन्सिल ऑफ़ क्रीड पया सर्व्व संशयेगा। डॉ. क्रीड रूपया कर्न धीप नहीं कर सकते यह बड़े भावपूर्ण की बात है। हमारे शिप अगर डेमेज होते हैं और उनकी अगर हमें रिपेयर करवानी होती है तो उनको इंग्लैंड भेजा जाता है। अगर आज हमारे ऊपर हमला होता है और हमारे शिप्स डेमेज हो जाने हैं तो रिपेयर के लिये हमें उन्हें इंग्लैंड भेजना होगा। इस व्यवस्था का अन्त होना ही चाहिये। साथ ही साथ मैं यह भी कहना चाहता हूँ कि नये प्रकार के शिप्स हमको हिन्दुस्तान में तैयार करने चाहिये और एटोमिक सब-मैरीन कम से कम तो हिन्दुस्तान में तैयार होने ही चाहिये ताकि हम अपने शस्त्रास्त्रों का नवीनीकरण करके कोई भी आक्रमण किसी भी अवस्था में हो, उसका सामना कर सकें।

श्री उ० च० पटनायक ने कहा कि हमारे पास शस्त्रास्त्र नहीं होंगे तो आने वाली मत्तानें हम पर होंगी। मैं एक बात कहना चाहता हूँ और वह यह है कि जब युद्ध होता है तो वह केवल शस्त्रास्त्रों से ही नहीं होता है, मारल से भी होता है, आत्मिक शक्ति से भी युद्ध होता है। हम लड़ेंगे और हम आपको विश्वास दिलाने हैं कि हिन्दुस्तान में इतनी शक्ति है कि आज उसको कोई हरा नहीं सकता है। लेकिन हमारे पास हथियार तो होने ही चाहिये। पंडित जवाहरलाल नेहरू जी ने मैं निवेदन करता हूँ कि हम लोगों के हाथ में ऐसे हथियार नों होने ही चाहिये जिन में हम अगर कोई हम पर हमला करें तो उसका उत्तर दे सकें और हम ठूठ न रह जाय।

Shri S. A. Dange (Bombay City—Central): I want to emphasize an aspect to which no reference has so far been made. Some of the criticisms which have been given by the previous two speakers are certainly correct, and I associate myself particularly with the criticisms made by my hon. friend, Shri Patnaik. But then I rose to speak.

because I feel that there is something missing which should be put in order to restore a proper balance of view of the whole affair. I am quite sure the Prime Minister will do what is correct, but I thought I might give one or two suggestions.

For example, the two speeches, if taken in isolation, would give one the impression as if we are on the verge of an immediate war and let us, therefore, think of civil defence and voluntary corps to evacuate towns and how to do this and that. If that impression were to go round the country and if tomorrow in Bombay, Calcutta or Delhi we were to start thinking about evacuations, I think all productive activity would stop and there will be total panic. I am quite sure the previous speakers did not intend that. No, they know it. But if tomorrow the Defence Ministry or the Home Ministry were to take steps to have anti-aircraft watching glasses at house tops, as in London, in that case the net result will be panic. I, therefore, wanted to suggest: let us criticise the whole affair from the point of view of the immediate necessity and certain minimum basic requirements. One of those tasks is certainly not calling for a civilian organisation for evacuation and so on. Therefore, our criticism must take into account the fact that we are not on the eve of an immediate war. As the Prime Minister said the other day, and very correctly, if it is a question of a Great power invading us, we cannot defend ourselves in the sense of having the same kind of armaments; we may defend ourselves in a partisan or guerilla way and we may not surrender the country. But if it comes to arms, a question ought to be put in: where are the arms made and how? The armaments of a modern army can never be manufactured without the base of heavy industry. This is an axiom, an accepted fact in modern economy.

90 mm guns, big air-crafts, bombers, heavy armaments, on what basis are we going to manufacture them? You

may import one piece from Canada, another piece from USA, another piece from UK and another from France or the Soviet Union and make a museum of all the armaments, trucks and cars. But today we have not got—have we?—the capacity to manufacture those things. We are an under-developed country. In ten years we have got the capacity to build up certain things. Therefore, let us not blame ourselves too much for things which we could not have done in ten years but which we can do if we are alert, but let us offer our criticism from the point of view of the fact that some things are not being done quickly and correctly. Therefore, my first proposition is: let us not say we can manufacture big armaments. The Vizag Shipyard took six years to manufacture one merchant ship, and that also, when it was floated, listed. So, apart from the question of appointing wrong agents, there is the question of heavy plates. Who is manufacturing heavy plates in this country? What about tubings? A single tubing industry does not exist in this country, and nothing of vital importance can be manufactured unless there is a tubing industry. Heavy plates cannot be manufactured unless special alloys are there. Regarding special alloys it is still being debated whether it should be in the private sector or the public sector, Bhadravathi sector or the Tata sector and so on. The argument is going on. Then, compressors, simple things, are not yet made here.

Now the most important point is that our Defence Department cannot be self-sufficient in all the arms that we require for our country. That is one fact. Therefore, we cannot blame them for what we cannot do as civilians first. That is, as a Government or as a people, till we have laid the basis for heavy industries, heavy machinery, heavy forgings, chemical industries and so on, heavy armaments cannot be made in this country. That is one thing. When we are doing that, there should be a certain perspective.

[Shri S A Dange]

So the conclusion from my previous proposition would be that not only defence but our whole planning as such ought to concentrate not only on building steel works quickly but also in laying the foundations for and building heavy machinery plants and heavy forgings. No Naval ship is possible without heavy forgings and heavy machinery. A huge crank-shaft of 50' or 105' cannot be cast in any factory here. We have not got the capacity. Therefore I would impress from the point of view of defence the necessity of accepting the establishment of these two plants which we have already planned but to which, I would say, greater attention should be paid. That is one point.

Then coming to the second point, I wish to urge the need to restore a certain balance of thinking in our criticism as well as in our demands on the Defence Department and on the Government as a whole. There has been today a statement about the trucks. On this, of course, our policy has been pure bungling and it has been caused by gentlemen who are interested in commissions rather than in building up an industry in the country. Now, of course as you know, even amongst the Great Powers, viz Germany, France, England or America, what did we find in the last war? These gentlemen who are armament manufacturers are sometimes given a very amiable name. They are called merchants of death. They sell armaments to anybody. It is on record that English guns were sold to the Germans when the Germans were fighting the English. They are interested so far as their profits are concerned. They are unperceptive to as to who dies. They will sell anything to anybody. At present they are selling armaments to Pakistan. Tomorrow they will sell it to us and perfectly at the hundred per cent rate of profit and see how we are killing each other. That is possible.

But what do we do in such a condition? What is our condition? Where is the bungle? The bungle is, as referred to in the statement made in the morning, one of standardisation in certain things. One particular reference that I want to make is, as you know, that the Army depends on mobility. One part of real defence is mobility and mobility means trucks. A truck plant is easily converted into a tank plant. That is a very simple thing. That is no Army secret. Everybody knows it. But what is the position in our country? We are having at least 20 models of small cars imported at the cost of foreign exchange. Not long ago we were manufacturing some six or seven types of trucks—manufacturing means assembly—in this country. We were manufacturing trucks of any type—Studebaker, Chevrolet, Dodge, Fargo etc. Then there was the old Thornycroft—they are still seen here. Any number of trucks are coming in. Any number of models of cars are coming in any size and while complaints are made about foreign exchange! Nobody ever thought of controlling it until there was some hubbub about it. My question is—Why not did this country concentrate on three cars—one small, one medium and one large? Somebody might ask, "Why large?" Yes, in some respects it might be required. There should be three models and no more. But in small cars we have Baby Hindustan, we have Morris, Austin, Standard, Fiat and Vauxhall—of course they are medium cars. So, why have we got a multiplicity of models? I would impress upon the Government the necessity of fixing up three models of three sizes and no more. Similarly, for trucks according to truck capacity fix up a model and have it fully manufactured here. Therefore, I would support the agreements which were revealed here in the morning in the statement of the hon. Defence Minister. Those agreements are necessary and it is well done that they are entered into.

I have heard criticism about these agreements and therefore whatever worth it may have I want to give my support to those agreements. Why do I give my support to them? I give them my support though the method of doing them is another matter. Somebody may have a grouse, as to why the Defence Ministry did it this way or that way. That is not the point. The point is the essence of the agreements. What is the essence? The essence is that the truck manufacturers have been holding the Defence Department and the country at ransom. They dictate prices. Here is a story

Telco is a famous concern. It had a nice debate at the hands of Shri Feroze Gandhi here sometime back. They dictate prices and when they are told that the Army wants trucks, the prices go up. Of course, this is the profit rate of the private sector and the industrialists in this country or in any other country where capitalism flourishes. These people are bound to make profits at the cost of the Army. In fact, in every capitalist country, the Army is one of the biggest sources of profit for private manufacturers. But there, of course, they manufacture a thing completely. Here nothing is manufactured completely. That is the beauty of our whole economy. Every part in itself is complete but when you take the whole thing nothing is complete. But for years and years,—according to this statement, eight or ten years—we have been expecting to have a complete truck and a complete car and nothing is complete. Therefore, what is the Defence Department to do but to go in for an agreement if by this agreement they can secure a complete and full manufacture of a truck and a trailer car. Therefore I would say that in principle the agreement is correct. In principle the policy of the agreements is correct and naturally it has angered these gentlemen because they say, "We have come as far as 60% manufacture." We should have asked them the question: When are you going to have a hundred

per cent manufacture for this poor country of ours? Have those partners of yours in foreign countries deprived you of the fullness of the manufacture and keep that agreement? Why don't you stop that agreement? But they do not because it is the policy. You know it. You can get many illustrations from history. I have no time to quote history. These advanced monopolistic capitalist countries will never allow an underdeveloped country to fully manufacture all the things it needs and be self-reliant and independent.

A thing was revealed after the last war when China obtained its own independence. Manchuria had many plants established by the Japanese in Manchuria after its conquest in 1931. They wanted to make it a base against the Soviet Union and China both. But, still when the plants were established the Japanese played one trick. They kept the manufacture of one important and vital part of every manufacture in Japan. The plants were complete by themselves almost up to 98 per cent but one part they would keep manufacturing in Japan. When China took over those factories they had then to add those parts to supplement that manufacture. This is the policy revealed in Manchuria. This is the policy revealed in many other underdeveloped countries that a complete manufacture of certain vital and essential parts is never allowed by these developed capitalist countries to an underdeveloped country. So, if this agreement were to succeed in securing full manufacture in our ordinary plants, then in that case the Defence Department ought to be congratulated for the agreement and not criticised for it.

Criticism certainly is bound to come from the Walchand Hirachands of Plymouth who supplied defective engines to the Government and made crores of rupees of profits. I know that. A worker who revealed that defective supplies were made was thrown out of employment and today

[Shri S. A. Dange]

he has not been reinstated. These gentlemen want to earn profits at the cost of the country. I do not mind normal profits. Give your services and take your normal profits. If these abnormal profits and bad services are going to be stopped by this agreement, in that case these agreements are a good event. We are bound to have criticism from the Tatas because Telcos have lost its orders. We are bound to have criticism from Plymouth people because Dodge trucks have lost orders. We are bound to have criticism from Birlas because their Studebakers have lost orders. They wanted to make certain extra profits and are not going to reap the profit. In the interest of the country we ought to see that these criticisms do not shake us from the accepted policy which is the basis of this statement. For once I find that a correct policy is enunciated. I hope it is correctly fulfilled.

Of course, agreements are made, but I do not know how they will be worked out. I have my fears about it but I do hope that those fears will prove unfounded and a complete truck and a complete tractor plant will come into this country, that a tractor, a tank and a truck will be manufactured from A to Z by 1961 because there will be enough steel.

We have stuck to the policy of having three steel plants in spite of the sayings of many Tatas and Biren Mukerjees who thought that there should be no steel plants in the State sector and that steel would be surplus. They told the Committee that your steel is all useless and that it will not be sold. Here there are trucks to be manufactured. Navy is demanding heavy armament. Guns have to be cast. Where is the steel going to come from? From foreign countries? Wherefrom are heavy plantings for big ships going to come? There are only three steel plants. Five more steel plants in the Rs. 15 million Plan which is going to be had

in the Third Plan ought to be brought out and ought to be fulfilled.

16 hrs.

All criticisms of such a proposal ought to be put down by public opinion. Therefore, here is this respect, I am completely 100 per cent with the Government in the demand for heavy industry, heavy forgings, heavy machinery, a complete truck, a complete tank and a nice patriotic soldier. We have got a patriotic soldier. We have got a good army. In spite of the multiplication of languages and religions and regionalisms, the Army in India is still one and when the question of India comes, it stands as one. That is a great asset. And, as my friend said, this asset must have arms. The manufacture of arms must not be in the hands of merchants of death, but must be in the State sector, and in the hands of the country. With such an army and with such a country, we can certainly defend ourselves if somebody wants to play with us. I am sure some profit mongers might incite some people to start local wars here and there. But, that is not going to frighten us. So far as large wars are concerned, the big powers are thinking in terms of peace. We ought to spread a sentiment of peace, a sentiment of friendliness as the Prime Minister does correctly on questions of foreign policy. With this, together with the policy of manufacture of machines and heavy industry. I hope our country will be self-sufficient in its defence.

Certainly there are criticisms about the treatment of soldiers, about the relationship between the officers and soldiers, about the question of soldiers being in touch with the people and not being made into a reserve barrack army, isolated from all thinking and so on. That is another matter. That is not the subject of state of defence so far as these vital matters are concerned. I would like to support the Government on these contracts

and certain other policies while subscribing to some of the criticisms made especially by my hon. friend Shri U. C. Patnaik.

Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, this Resolution sponsored by Shri Naushir Bharucha on the necessity of an enquiry into the expenditure pattern of the Defence Ministry in view of the technological and scientific advances of today, is an apt and timely Resolution and I support this Resolution, to use the words of Shri S. A. Dange from A to Z.

It is true that there has been a good deal of advancement so far as technology is concerned. So far as big nations are concerned, today, technology particularly applies to the manufacture and inventions of more war materials. That is why we are making a journey to outer space, and we are having international ballistic missiles, supersonic bombers. It is a fact that there might be advancements like this; but there is particularly one thing very much needed. That is, a nation in order to be very much advanced so far as arms and ammunitions are concerned, and in modern arms and ammunitions, that nation must be industrially strong. In the context of today, it is the country or nation that is industrially strong that can ultimately come out victorious. If we examine the last war, we find that it was heavy industry that the U.S.A. possessed that ultimately decided the war. Let me put it in a different way. It is oil, steel and uranium that decides wars today rather than anything else. It is not the Pearl Harbour disaster or the atomic bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima that decided the last war. As I have already said, it was oil, steel and uranium that decided the last war. Therefore, when we speak of arms and ammunition and our expenditure pattern so far as the Defence Ministry is concerned, to meet the demands of the modern world, we must remember one thing, that it is only as an industrially strong nation,

when the industrial basis is strong, that we can produce these things and cope with the other nations of the world.

Before we get into that problem, there is another problem; that is about the reorganisation of our defence services. When we discuss this Resolution, there is one part of the Resolution related to the scientific and technological developments in the world. There is another part of the Resolution also that is revealed by the Audit Report for the year 1955-56. There are irregularities so far as this department is concerned and this Audit Report has brought out startling figures of irregularities. When internally it is like that, when internally it is weak, to expect that the administration would be able to gear up to the compulsions of a modern war and the modern world, would be expecting too much and it is even contradictory.

Another thing is this. We have never set our mind on the reorganisation of the Defence administration altogether since we have achieved freedom. What about the Defence Administration? Originally, this Defence administration was of the British pattern, and that was of the empire pattern. The purpose was to defend the empire. They did not have to think of so many things. It was a bureaucratic organisation. It was the most bureaucratic department that the Government at that time had. Even in the context of freedom, I am sorry to say, so far as the Defence administration is concerned, it has not been able to shed off any of its deep dyes. We must remember one thing, that the empire pattern is not a national pattern. About that, we have never applied our mind.

This Estimates Committee report has very sound recommendations to make and I think no people can improve upon the recommendations made by the Estimates Committee. Primarily I

[Shri Hem Barua]

say there is an imbalance so far as the responsibilities are concerned between the Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. For that, I suggest the institution or introduction of the Councils system as they have in the United Kingdom. This is a very sound proposition to make and I do not understand why this recommendation made by the Estimates Committee, a recommendation that was made on the floor of the House too, is constantly brushed aside.

About the irregularities, I just want to draw attention to certain very revealing facts. I point this out not because of any other thing, but because of the fact that we want the Army administration or the Defence administration to be well-knit, well-organised and strong. Unless and until these internal difficulties are removed, it will be difficult for the machinery to meet the compulsions of modern times as I said. These are the things that struck me most. Not only this. There is lack of co-ordination, as the Estimates Committee Report has pointed out, between the three Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. Also, there is lack of inter-departmental co-operation or coordination, which has led to certain gross irregularities. The Audit Report on page 14 says about a contract that was given by an Ordnance factory to another Ordnance factory. That was stopped or cancelled in September, 1953. But, the cancellation order was not communicated to the firm concerned till June 1955 and the other Ordnance factory went on producing the material. What happened? It has led to a heavy drain on our exchequer and a loss to the extent of Rs. 7,82,689.

There are other instances like this beginning from as late as 1949. An over-payment was made to a contractor who built a road. The over-payment to the contractor was to the tune of Rs. 55,770. There is another interesting incident.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There would be many. Are they relevant to this debate?

Shri Hem Barua: I will quote only one. There is no verification of stocks so far as the Ordnance factories are concerned, and so far as the Clothing factories are concerned. Once a plant was purchased from an American firm in Calcutta. That was re-sold because that could not be used by us. It was purchased in 1949 and resold in 1956, at a loss of Rs. 38,768. Some things like that: there is irregularity inside. Unless and until these irregularities are removed, unless and until internally it is geared up, I doubt very much how this Administrative machinery is going to be geared to meet the compulsions of modern times or the technological and scientific developments of modern times. That is my argument.

About the contracts, certain fine things were spoken about and I can multiply those instances like anything. This morning the Deputy Minister was good enough to read out a statement. The statement was written in good English. At the same time, he delivered it in his usually fine voice. He delivered it in his unusually fine voice I would rather say. We may accept some of them, but one thing I could not understand, about this Hard Motors. They were given a contract to dismantle certain army ammunition dumps, but their antecedents were not enquired into. It is said that they have only a registered capital of £1,000, that a tax evasion case is going on against them. These are the rumours, but rumours often assume the proportion or appearance of facts.

Whatever that might be, they have been employing, as the hon. Deputy Minister himself admitted in the statement that he presented to the House this morning, an Italian firm as sub-contractors. The statement says that they went globe-trotting in quest of a company that might do this job. They

had been to France, to Germany, to the European countries and could not find any other firm to dismantle the ammunition dumps except this Hard Motors. Then, how is it that they employ another firm from Italy as sub-contractors?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I may bring it to the notice of the hon. Member that it is not the Defence Ministry as a whole that is under discussion today. It is the pattern of expenditure so far as the first resolution is concerned; the second is regarding the reorganisation or proper planning for defence purchases and such other things.

Shri Hem Barua: I will come to that.

My argument is this. I say this resolution is nice. I support this resolution. This resolution has two parts. An enquiry has to be instituted into the expenditure pattern of the Defence Ministry because there is technological and scientific advancement, we have to meet the supersonic bombers, the intercontinental ballistic missiles and all these things. That is one part of the argument. At the same time, I say that the existing expenditure pattern has to be enquired into because of the fact that internally its organisation has certain irregularities. Unless and until these irregularities are wiped out or removed, there can be no success in our attempt to gear it up to meet ...

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That would not concern us so far as the pattern is concerned. It may affect the expenditure, but whether there ought to be a different pattern of expenditure, whether more should be spent on one side or the other is the question.

Shri Hem Barua: The pattern is all right, but in the execution of the pattern, irregularities come in, that is the trouble.

Shri Bharucha has spoken about the sea coast. I wish to say a few things about the land frontier. When we

were not free all our imagination and resources were mobilised on the North-West Frontier because the British rulers felt that the Russian bear was looming large across the Central Asian plains, and there was a constant apprehension of attack, and that is why that frontier was geared up and prepared for defence.

Now I feel the theatre of international affairs is located in South-East Asia. I think Gen. MacArthur was right when he said that the Pacific was no longer a lake. There is tumult in the Pacific with Quemoy and Matsu being shelled, and I think major decisions are to be forged in South-East Asia. That is why we have to think in terms of defence of our land frontier, and this frontier is, as history will show, so vulnerable. The north-east State of Assam is connected with the rest of India by a narrow corridor of barely 45 miles long, and Danzig was only a little less wide. I do not expect a war between India and Pakistan, but then our relations with Pakistan are in the womb of uncertainty. If tomorrow a bomb is dropped, I do not want that bomb to be dropped, from an aircraft on this narrow corridor linking the north-eastern frontier with the rest of this country, then it gets entirely separated and the entire defence line gets broken.

At the same time, what about the roads there? In the hill areas except for narrow bridle paths we have no roads. **Shri Dange** said that modern army units are mechanised. Yes, they are mechanised and mechanised army units need wheels, and wheels need roads. So far as the land and sea routes are concerned, these are things within our grip. We may not be able to manufacture bombers or intercontinental ballistic missiles, not to speak of higher explosives and all that sort of things, but we must make the preliminary attempt or effort to see that our sea and land routes are protected in the interests of the solidarity of the Republic as a whole.

Shri D. C. Sharma (Gurdaspur): The hon. Members who have preceded me have raised this debate to a high technical level, and I am afraid that when we indulge in the technical aspects of defence, we are apt to make very great mistakes. I think that defence is a highly specialised and technical subject and laymen should, because of its very nature and complexity, keep their hands off it as much as possible. But human nature is sometimes very perverse and we sometimes rush in where we should not go.

I have read a few books on the Second World War and one of the conclusions that has been brought out by military experts is this, that Germany lost the Second World War because, apart from other things, Hitler interfered too much with the decisions of the Generals and Marshals. I, therefore, think that if the hon. Defence Minister at a consultative committee meeting told an hon. Member of this House that he did not know where certain bases were and what kind of weapons the country was going to employ, what kind of technical personnel it had etc., I think he was probably on safe ground and behaved as the Defence Minister of any progressive and knowledgeable country should behave.

I feel that my hon. friends over there have tried to simplify war, and I think their conception of war is that which was prevailing before the First World War was fought. Now, war is a very complex business. We talk in terms of war, but there is the political war, the economic war, the psychological war and the cold war. We should not think only of war by armaments and armies.

I must compliment the hon. Member who moved the resolution on his technical knowledge of the subject.

Shri G. C. Patil: Then why waste Rs. 300 crores a year on that?

Shri D. C. Sharma: I will come to you also.

I wish to submit very respectfully that the people who think that war is only a matter of armaments, or that it is only a matter of weapons, are to some extent justified, but this is not the conception of modern war. I have been reading a book on defence in the nuclear age, and this is what the writer says about defence in the nuclear age. Suppose two countries have nuclear weapons of the highest kind, to the pitch of perfection, up-to-dateness and technical adequacy. Whoever uses it first does not necessarily win the war because the atomic bombers of Nation A may be on their way to bomb Nation B while their own homeland is being turned into a crematorium. Both sides may more or less simultaneously knock each other out of the ring. So, this kind of nuclear war is a thing which is beyond the ken of a country like ours. Therefore, I believe that if the people think that the pattern of our military expenditure should be along the lines of these most developed countries, scientifically perfect countries, and scientifically educated countries, I think they are not giving the correct kind of advice to the House or to the nation.

I would, therefore, respectfully submit that we have to develop a kind of perspective, so far as our defence goes. That perspective is not to be conditioned by the grouses that some Members of the House may bring to us or by what we read in some journal published here or abroad, or by what we read in some book. But I think our whole perspective about the defence of our country is to be determined by the overall picture of our country, by what we are doing in all the sectors of national activity in our country. Therefore, I think that our defence has to be integrated with our planning, not planning in the sense in which my hon. friend over there talks; his planning is topsy-turvy, and his planning is a kind of planning which exists, I think, in some Utopia; I do not think any country in the world is doing that kind of planning on that

kind of scale to which my hon. friend always refers, that all the Armed Forces may be sent out to build bridges and roads. Of course, they do build bridges and roads whenever there is an emergency, but I do not think our Armed Forces should always be doing that kind of thing. This socio-economic planning . . .

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I never referred to all the Armed Forces. But I have only said that the MES, the EME and the Engineers Corps as in other countries should have some normal peacetime duties.

Shri D. C. Sharma: I am like a child who said to his mother 'Mamma, I shall understand if you were not to explain it'. I think I would understand the point of view of my hon. friend if he were not to explain it too much. He had explained it so much that nobody is able to understand it.

I submit very respectfully that our best defence for our country, whether we have a potential enemy in Pakistan or we have a potential enemy in any other country, is the First Five Year Plan that we have completed, the Second Five Year Plan which we are in the process of completing and the Third Five Year Plan, the draft of which we shall be getting after six months or one year.

I think it is this kind of integration of defence planning with socio-economic planning that is needed in this country, and I think the country is doing that. As to how much should be spent on the land forces, how much should be spent on the Navy, and how much should be spent on the air forces etc. I think only the pandits of defence can decide it; and luckily, I am not a pandit of defence. I think this is a highly technical subject. I think it should be left to military experts to say how much they are going to give for one sector of defence and how much for another sector of defence. I think we laymen have no right to meddle with these things.

Of course, it is said that the nation is not taken into confidence. I put it

to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and I put it to my hon. friends, 'Is there any country in the world where any Member of the Parliament, including the Defence Minister, knows all about the defence of the country?' I put this question with a due sense of responsibility.

Shri Raghunath Singh: But they must know.

Shri D. C. Sharma: We only know about the broad policies of the country, and I think our country gives us as much to know about the broad policies of defence of this country as any other country does. Therefore, I think, to say that we are kept in ignorance about the problems is not correct.

I think defence is to be judged ultimately by four factors. In the first place, there is training, and I think our training should be made more in keeping with the modern trends of training. Of course, the standards are increasing very fast, and I hope they will improve more and more.

Then, there is the question of equipment. I do not want to go into it. Shri S. A. Dange has dealt with it very adequately, and I hope our country is alive to the problem of equipment, and we are going far, as far as equipment is concerned.

Then there is the question of the morale of the Army. I believe that we shall help the morale of our Army very much if we do not talk about the administrative things concerning the Army on the floor of this House, if we do not try to talk in terms of the promotions of so many Lieutenant-Colonels and Generals and Major Generals. I think, if I may be permitted to say so, if we do that, then we are not helping the morale of the Army, but we are trying to bring down the morale of the Army. I think that these things relating to the Army should not be made debating points on the floor of this House between one group of persons and another group of persons.

[Shri D. C. Sharma]

So far as the morale of our Army is concerned, we have had proof of it. We have had proof of it in Kashmir, and we are having proof of it every day, and I think the morale of our Army is very high. All the same, I would say this. Though we have given Rs. 50 crores extra for this purpose, and our defence production is going up, and though a committee like this would not help, yet, I would suggest very respectfully that this thing should be kept constantly under review, that there should be a kind of preparedness, so far as this thing is concerned.

In conclusion, I would quote from a book where the author says.

"War is a relationship between sovereign states. The object of war is to change the enemy's mind. There are several ways of changing men's minds. The two most important are by the power of reason and the power of fear. These two methods are respectively the Battle of the Brains and the Battle of the Bodies".

Further on, he says:

"The changing of a mind by reason is to be preferred to a change by fear but fear may have a beneficial role, if intelligently used."

I would submit, therefore, that our country which is following in the foot-steps of great leaders who do not want to fight any aggressive war is wedded to the policy of changing the people's minds by the power of reason. I feel that nothing will fill our potential enemy with greater fear and greater dread of our country or with greater apprehension about our country's defence, than what we are doing in the economic and other sectors.

I would, therefore, say that this committee which will be neither here nor there, which will consist of Members of Parliament who know very

little about the subject, and of experts who know too much about the subject will not do any good.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, we always welcome the interest of this House and of hon Members on the subject of our defence, and so, I welcome this discussion. I am grateful for many ideas thrown out, some of which we shall certainly consider.

But may I say right at the outset that I feel we should not, and cannot, accept these Resolutions which involve roving inquiries about almost every subject that might possibly be directly or indirectly connected with defence? I cannot imagine anything more harmful for defence. I can imagine any particular subject being inquired into, any particular aspect, whatever it may be, by a competent committee, but I feel a kind of roving inquiry of this type can only have harmful, and possibly even disastrous, results.

I shall endeavour to say something about our broad approach to this question of defence. But before I do that, may I refer to a few individual matters? The hon. Member, Shri U C Patnaik, as we all know, takes enormous pains over the study of matters connected with defence and his views are, therefore, to be listened to with respect and attention. But unfortunately, sometimes he forgets, he gets lost in the trees completely and forgets the wood. One of his particular subjects in which he takes interest is what is called civil defence. And because he thinks that we have not made any adequate provision or any provision for civil defence, therefore he expects, in the near future, an invasion. I hope I am not exaggerating, but I really was astounded to hear what he said in this connection. His voice almost trembled with excitement when he thought of no civil defence, we being attacked and we appealing to Russia and China to come to our help. Anything more panicky, I have not heard during

these ten years that I have been here, and anything more wrong, I say, fundamentally, basically wrong than to talk about our appealing to Russia and China or any country for help, I cannot conceive of. Have we arrived at this stage that we should go about in a panicky manner shouting that we are going to be destroyed, that we are going to be defeated and we shall ask foreign countries for help? That is not the mentality of a free man, that is not the mentality, I expect, of a Member of Parliament at any rate.

I do submit that if that is the approach to this question, it is not surprising that Shri Patnaik goes wrong all through the line. I would have respected many things that he said because he studies them, but the whole approach is so wrong, so excited, so panic-stricken, so much of a frightened man that its conclusions are likely to be wrong.

The first thing and the second thing and the third thing about defence is not to get panicky, to keep your nerve whatever happens. Even if there is a rain of bombs, we do not get panicky. That of course does not mean that you do not prepare for whatever you have got to face, a contingency that may arise. But I do submit that the approach of Shri Patnaik is hundred per cent wrong in this matter.

May I also say that it is perfectly true that we have taken no particular measures for what is called civil defence? And may I admit that I am largely responsible for that? There have been various proposals that I have consistently vetoed. So I take full responsibility for that. And I do so not because I am complacent, but because the whole idea of civil defence, if I may remind Shri Patnaik, is completely out of date. It has no relation to the present-day world. It may be of course that some people whose ideas date from the days between the two world wars still think of it, but those who have even imbibed this sort of idea in the second world war have given up that idea.

Thirdly, if we want any civil defence, as Shri Patnaik suggests, I should like him to calculate—it has to be efficient; there is no good of civil defence in one place; it must be country-wide, over a large part of the country—how much money would he allocate for civil defence? Are we to spend vast sums of money which are practically not productive at all? We have to care for something else, maybe some other part of Defence. But, leave the money apart. We talked about being prepared for evacuation and all that. These are the very approaches that have to be avoided because these are the approaches of the frightened and the panic-stricken.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I did not refer to evacuation. I simply said that we must be prepared for the superior weapons and other preparation of a potential enemy.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I know we must always be prepared for death but let us better live all the same, and think of life rather than of death. If you go about asking the people to be ready to evacuate, you only make them think that evacuation is near. It is obvious. If you go about digging trenches in Delhi the average man will think that something terrible is going to happen. It is obvious. For my part, if such a contingency occurs—which I do not think will—I am prepared to have a few bombs in Delhi and if those who are frightened will run away from Delhi it will be easier to deal with Delhi then.

It is impossible today in modern warfare to think of having any effective Civil Defence. Today the countries that are going in for real Civil Defence are going to such fantastic lengths that they are creating almost cities underground; whole factories have gone underground and vast populations can go underground spending vast sums of money. Obviously, we cannot do that; we cannot afford even a hundredth part of that expenditure—for that kind of thing.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

Take another thing which is considered absolutely necessary today, radar. And, there are huge screens of radar for thousands of miles in some countries. Obviously, radar is useful. Are we to put a net of radar for 3,000, 4,000 or 5,000 miles round our frontiers and spend half our Budget over it? We have always to consider that. It is all very well to talk. It is no good having radar here and radar there leaving a gap there. It is much better to keep the idea of protecting yourself from that rather than spend such enormous sums of money over it that you have nothing else but radar; nothing behind the radar. You can do nothing else. You have to balance these things. I do not mean to say that you should not have radar. We must have radar. But you cannot put it for thousands of miles all over. I realise that we should have protection all along the line but it is beyond our capacity. In particular places we do have it.

16:39 hrs.

• [MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Shri Raghunath Singh appealed to me in the most tragic tones not to be complacent about our sea coast. He gave us a very pertinent example. He gave us the pertinent example of how the Persians were defeated in the Marathon war by the Greeks, because the Greeks had apparently more ships. I do not know how he imagines that. They were not really a bigger sea-power. But, he should have given a much more nearer example in history and distance; that is, how sea-power brought the British to India. It is much more important than the Greeks defeating the Persians so far as we are concerned. Sea-power brought the Portuguese to Goa and round about and so on. Sea-power has been very important. Sea-power is still important, of course. But, it is also quite true that sea-power is not quite so important as it used to be because of air-power and all kinds of things like these big missiles and all that.

But anyhow we realise the importance of sea-power, not really from the point of view of any big war. But from many points of view it is important and a country with a huge sea-coast like India must not be helpless on sea. It is quite clear. Shri Raghunath Singh accuses us of having only one aircraft carrier and he asks: is that good enough? He said: "Have at least two". Shri Patnaik says: "Why have one aircraft carrier?". Well, I leave it to them to settle the matter; between themselves they can argue it out . . . (Laughter).

So far as we are concerned, I shall be quite frank with the House and say that it was after very careful consideration that we decided to get this aircraft carrier. That is because a large sum of money was involved and we did not intend to get another. An aircraft carrier is of course very helpful and all that. But if you say two, why not say three or four; why should two be a better number than three or one, I do not know. But the point is that one aircraft carrier serves a certain purpose which nothing else serves. It gives us an airfield all over the sea round about India. Otherwise, there are your airfields, of course on land wherever they are. But here you get it all along the coast and in the sea too, where an aircraft carrier could function. It extends your power in that sense very widely and it does many other things. I do not wish to go into that matter. But after a good deal of thought we decided that we should get one aircraft carrier for that purpose and to give training to our people in that type of work also. We do not think that another carrier is needed and we would rather spend that money, if we have it, for other purposes for the Navy or Air Force or whatever it may be.

Then, there is another relatively small matter but of some importance. Shri Patnaik gave a certain historic date—1st of August—when some news

ran into his ken that some people had been promoted and made Lieut-Generals. He thought it a very dangerous development. Shri Patnaik with his extended and intensive studies knows, I suppose, a good deal about various other armies and about the proportions of Generals and others in the other armies to the forces, whatever ranks there are—Field Marshals, Generals, Lieut-Generals, or whatever that may be. He must know that. I commend to him to compare the size and functions of our Army with any other army of that size or much smaller organisations and see how many Generals etc. are there. He was pleased to be sarcastic and say that in a few days or a few months' time, we shall have a bunch of Field Marshals and more Generals. I do submit that this is not a matter for sarcasm and it is not right to treat our eminent Generals and others in this way.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I am sorry; I did not cast any aspersions on them. All that I meant was that when a number of new posts are being created, should not Parliament have an idea of it, as in U.K. where they give Parliament an idea of the defence organisation?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I might inform the hon. Member that as a matter of fact none of these posts of Lieut-Generals except perhaps one was a new post. They were Principal Staff Officers as they were called—PSOs—who were next to the Chief of Staff. They are his principal advisers. So, these few Major-Generals have been promoted as Lieut-Generals. They are not new posts. It is promotion certainly.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I have spoken about twenty Brigadiers being made Major-Generals in new posts.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, yes. I am coming to that. I do not know if the hon. Member wants us to come to Parliament to tell him of every new post of Lance Naik created, every

new post of Brigadier created. I really do not understand it. We are dealing with senior officers who are Lieut-Generals. Four have been created thus far; some have been temporarily Lieutenant Generals, but in the main there are four PSOs. All of them are very senior officers. Our Army, I have long been of opinion—quite apart from anything else—is not adequately officered in number I mean. The top people are heavily worked. Either they have to keep in touch with their Forces or they have to sit and do office work, and our competent Generals doing office work all the time losing touch with the Army is not a good thing. And, for my part I welcome this proposal. I shall be very happy, indeed, if Parliament so likes, to inform Parliament if any such new appointment is created. But I really think that would be burdening Parliament too much. It is, of course, placed before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, and they decide. There are many appointments made on the civil side. I have not heard of Parliament being informed of that. I should like also Shri Patnaik to compare relatively the senior officers of comparable degree on the civil side and the Army and see where they are more. I think the senior side of the Army has been starved of senior officers.

Here is an Army, an Air Force etc. for India—not big numbers, but still considerable numbers—and a criticism was made that instead of having three or four Lieutenant Generals—whatever we had—we have some more. I do submit, Sir, that that is not a proper approach. One talks on the one hand of efficient Army. Shri Patnaik laid stress on civil defence and other things and, on the other hand, criticises our having competent Generals and giving them an opportunity to work. I submit that is a topsy-turvy way of looking at this problem.

Everyone knows that always it is the competent man at the top that

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

counts. Unfortunately, our practice is here that people have to retire from the Army, however competent they are, normally speaking, after they reach a certain age just as in the civil side. But it is quite amazing. Cases come to me—I am not talking about the average person on the civil side, but let us say a very competent engineer—where we push out a competent man because of age limit and international authorities, not one but several, swoop down on him because he is better than many other persons that they have got. We have got a habit of honouring a foreigner who comes here, giving him a high wage and pushing out our man when he reaches the age of 55, which is absurd for a competent technician or a competent scientist. However, in the Army that happens too. Competent men are pushed out because there is no room left for them according to the grades and age limit. Now we want to change all that. We want to have more room for these people to continue and remain there. That is why Brigadiers and others have come in

Then, reference was made by Shri Patnaik to Oerlikons and some ammunitions supplied by them. I do not wish to say much about this matter because it is still under enquiry. This I will say, that the mere fact of repeated enquiries into this matter of the quality of ammunitions supplied by Oerlikons itself shows that it was not considered satisfactory. However, it is being enquired into and I hope that this will tell us precisely what this was and who was responsible for it. Of course all these things are fairly old matters—it is about eight years since they happened.

Shri Hem Barua referred particularly to a case of one of the contracts mentioned this morning—the Hard Motors. I invite Shri Hem Barua to come and have a look at the contract. I agree with him. It is a fact. I did not know it previously, but it is a

fact that the firm that are doing this work have got an income-tax case against them. It is a fact, although that need not necessarily mean that they are incompetent, because that is almost a common failing among many people. It is true. But it is also true, I believe, that the company is registered with a capital of £1,000. But the point is that the contract, if you will read it, is absolutely foolproof. We were going to spend—I forget the exact sum—about Rs 40 lakhs or Rs 50 lakhs or maybe a crore of rupees, just to dump the thing into the sea. We were going to spend the money to get rid of it. We tried hard to get someone to do it. These people came and said, "We will do it and pay you for it." We jumped at it and our military folk and our scientists have been telling us "For God's sake, this might blow up any day. It is dangerous." So we came to terms with the firm. The terms are we pay them nothing to begin with. We have taken, I think, a lakh and a quarter of rupees from them just as security money. They spent all the money. Once they have done the job and given us presumably Rs 50 lakhs worth of that scrap stuff, brass and other things we paid them about Rs 9 lakhs. So, we made a clear profit of Rs 40 lakhs this way. And we would have spent Rs 50 lakhs or Rs 60 lakhs, that is a total of about a crore of rupees. At the most what can happen is, suppose they do not do their job, well we have a lakh and a quarter rupees and we hold on to it. And the other matter is we do not give them anything, and so we do not lose anything. In that sense I mean that it does not matter, and even if these persons are not 100 per cent reliable, the contract itself is foolproof.

In this connection, may I say this? Shri Dange laid stress quite rightly, I think, on the fact that all these defence industries business ultimately depends upon the capacity for heavy industrial production, for industrialization in the country, and industrialization depends on the heavy indus-

to go into Pattern of
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tries. That is obvious. It is obvious that we will have to do all this business of buying ships and other things, because, frankly, we cannot have a gap period which might be risky. I want to be frank to this House that we have had to change our plans much to our distaste several times and spend money on purchasing things which we would rather not have purchased and which we would rather have put in in industrial development. We have to do this because of the military aid which has been given to our neighbour country and which has repeatedly, in our thinking, become so much that it might become a threat to us. And we do not wish to take too much of a risk. Sometimes we have taken risks but we could not take too much of the risk and so we had to divert monies which would have gone towards industrial development and heavy industries, this and that, for immediate purchases.

Our military budget went up considerably last year. Well, it went up simply because we bought a considerable number of aircraft and we simply had to do it, and it was a hard struggle for me and my colleagues to buy that aircraft. We did not want to spend that money and yet could one take an odd risk? We decided not to, and we bought it. There it is. Perhaps if we had taken another decision, nothing would have happened. But one cannot take risks on a country's security in this way. So, this pressure which has been brought to bear upon us in this matter, because of the heavy aid given to our neighbour country has, I regret to say, sometimes compelled us to spend more than we wanted to spend.

Mr. Patnaik, I think, referred to Russian aircraft. I might tell him at no time has there been a question of the Soviet Union offering us any aircraft for sale or otherwise. That Ilyushin which they were good enough to give me when Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin came here was a good aircraft for private travel. It is not a military aircraft at all.

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Shri U. C. Patnaik: I was reading from this book, 'Air Forces of the World' and also from the magazine *Aeroplane* that we had offers of military planes.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: That should be a warning to Mr. Patnaik not to rely on his books too much. It is a fact that we have in the past, two or three years ago, whatever the period may be, occasionally considered the question of purchasing aircraft from the Soviet Union. We might consider it again and we might buy it; there is no bar to it of any kind. But the difficulty in our way at that time was that it meant a completely different establishment to be put up for them, which had to be separate and training up the people. From the long-term point of view, that might be done. But during these years, we have been functioning, as I said chiefly because of this military aid to our neighbour country, in a short-term way and we did not want double establishment, double ways of working and so on. For that reason, after very careful consideration, we gave that order and bought the aircraft from France, or from where I forget.

It is a matter about which two opinions might be held, two opinions. I might say, even amongst us. Some people might say, this way and some the other way. In the balance, we came to this conclusion. But there is absolutely no bar in our minds; anywhere we can get the kind of aircraft which we want, we shall get it from there. But the main thing is our constructing it ourselves. We are making some fairly good progress in that matter in the Hindustan Aircraft. Recently there was a defence industry exhibition and even now most of it is situated in the other big exhibition. I presume some hon. Members have seen it and I would invite others to see it, because that will give a much better idea of the growth of the productive industrial part of defence. You do not see big guns, but new types of ammunition, to which Mr. Patnaik

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referred, which we are making and many other civilian goods.

It was in this connection, I think, that a protest was made some time, "Why should the defence industry make any civilian goods?" My answer to it is, "Of course, why not? Why should not it, when it can make it completely and well?" It is not for the purpose of purely beating down somebody. But we must utilise our normal factories to the best advantage. We have excellent people—technicians, engineers and skilled workers. They are very fine people and we are forced, we have been forced in the past, even to think in terms of retrenchment, because there is no work to do for them. We have got excellent machines. So, some time ago, about a year or more ago, we decided to embark definitely on a plan of expansion. Of course, the idea was an old one, but I am saying we pressed the plan of enlarging and expanding defence production, whatever we could do. A number of conferences, etc., were held with our technicians and engineers in the defence forces and we discussed it. Those people, if I may say so, are a very competent and fine lot of young men.

17 hrs.

They have some fire, some enthusiasm. They want new things to do instead of the old routine work. They wanted to do it and we said, "do it". They worked night and day and began producing many of the things that one sees there and that you will see later. Because, every good craftsman is proud of his work. Give him an opportunity and good initiative. Don't put him in an office to scribble notes. These are good craftsmen and good engineers.

Now I would beg this House to consider: what is the effect? These fine workers of ours, they work very hard. For the exhibition they worked night and day and put it up in five weeks' time. What is the effect of

it, to be told sometimes, not individually I mean, that their work in the Defence Ministry is misbehaving, why have they given this contract, why have they done that and so on? I want this House to be vigilant and look into everything, and they have a right to do that. But I may submit with all respect, there is a way of doing it. If you consider these people who have done this work or give them a hint that there is *mala fide*, they are rogues and scoundrels—I should not use that word—then all their enthusiasm oozes out. It is safe, they say, and that is a fact not to be in the army but in the civil side.

We blame them, and rightly blame them for being static, for doing routine work and then when they get out of the rut, down we come on them. What is the result? They think: it is safe. Let us remain in the rut. Let us not take anything new. We might get into trouble. Why invite trouble? Let us work in our offices and not take a new move anywhere. That is a fact. Our people are good. Some of them are brilliant. But every time they try to go ahead, there is a damper, and they do not know what will be in store for them.

Shri Patnaik referred to information being given to foreign agencies or newspapers and not being supplied to Parliament. If that is so, I am very sorry and I regret it. I rather doubt it. I do not think formally information is given. But, as hon. Members know, in regard to naval matters, we have been particularly in contact with British firms, and it is usual, I take it, that these firms give the information.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: In the introductory portion of the book thanks are given to the Adviser to the High Commissioner in London for having given the information officially. And in reply to a question also the Defence Minister stated during the last session of Parliament that information had been given officially to *James' Fighting Ship*, because that is an authoritative

book on the subject. So, information was given by the Ministry for James' book. It is only denied to us in Parliament.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, as I said, surely any information that can be given anywhere should be given to Parliament. That is the obvious thing. I will certainly look into this matter. I do not know all the facts. But I have a vague recollection about once when we were not prepared to give information, it leaked out in London from other people, and not our people. Then we were asked by them in London and then we said: It has leaked out, you better give it too. We said something like that.

Shri U. C. Patnaik: It is stated in the introduction . . .

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I have got that. I accept what you say. I shall look into the matter and I hope our Defence Ministry will be less cautious in future about supplying information in Parliament.

Then there is a small matter. But I think Shri Bharucha talked about anti-aircraft guns and their use for safety. He is right but not completely so in this matter. Anti-aircraft guns are not going to protect Delhi or any place from attack if an attack comes. But anti-aircraft guns force the aircraft to fly very high. It would not hit the aircraft if it flies 20,000 feet or 30,000 feet high. There is nothing more frustrating than an aircraft coming over an undefended city, flying low and picking you off one by one. That is a terrible experience and I saw a bit of it in Spain long ago. The moment one or two of your aircraft go up or anti-aircraft guns are fired, immediately they fly much higher and immediately the safety margin increases because if you bomb—I am not talking of modern scientific bombing, but if you bomb from 20,000 feet the chances are nine to ten that it goes to the fields and misses the city altogether. Also, it is

psychologically satisfying for the people in the cities to hear these guns firing; whether they hit or not is another matter. They feel that something is being done. It has that effect and it is an important effect. But this can only be done, of course, at various special places, cities, etc., and towns all over.

I am sorry I have taken so much time but what I really wanted to talk about was our broad policy in regard to defence. In one sense it is clear that in this atomic war no country can defend itself, i.e., against atomic weapons and the like. We certainly cannot. We have not got them and we do not propose to have them, at least the atom bombs. But even in an atomic war there is a kind of defence that you can indulge in. If a hydrogen bomb falls in the country I do not know what the result would be. But first of all we think in terms of defence and not offence. I know that it is difficult to draw a rigid line between the two, but there is a difference. There is some difference. We are not likely to have bombers to bomb a place a thousand miles away. We are not interested. We are not going a thousand miles away. We will rather have something which will function near our frontiers to defend them if necessity arises and not go very far. That applies to the Navy, that applies to the Air Force and that applies to the Army. But even in this atomic war, subject always to the fact that if the hydrogen bombs fall here, well, they create havoc in a large part of the country, but even if such things happen I would expect, apart from the horror caused and disaster caused, that an invasion cannot take place by hydrogen bombs. An invasion takes place by land armies, and land armies can be resisted then by land armies or by Navy or whatever it is. There is a big gap between a total destruction of a country and a part destruction by hydrogen bomb and the rest of the country and yet preventing the attacker from landing or if he lands fighting him. In other words, you cannot defeat the enemy but you can

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make it terribly hot for him. You can make it a difficult proposition for him. You can make it a proposition that is not worth while for him. That is why with a competent Army like this with only conventional weapons it can be done.

Secondly—and let us be quite frank about it—as I just now said, there has always been a risk of some conflict with our neighbour country. I am convinced personally that there is very little chance of it for a variety of reasons. I am convinced that most people in Pakistan realise that. Nevertheless, there is the outside risk. One cannot afford to take it.

Take this question of our purchase of those bombers last year—the Canberras. Our appraisal of the situation was that there was danger to our country at a certain time a few months ahead. It may have been a wrong appraisal, but it was an appraisal. Our second appraisal was that if we have these bombers, the danger will not arise at all. The mere fact of our having them will prevent that danger arising. All this was guess work, if you like. One has to proceed by that. We got them. Nothing happened. Nobody knows what would have happened if we had not got them. There is always that kind of possibility. So, to some extent, our defence requirements have been conditioned by these factors. Not in consideration of a great war in which we might be involved; we are not going to be involved so far as we can help it in a great war. I see absolutely no reason why we should be involved although we will be involved, not in the fighting sense, but in the sense of suffering from the effects of a world war. That is the position; that is for defence.

All the money that we spend on purchasing anything, whether it is aircraft or ships or guns or ammunitions, is, in a sense, wasted: not wholly, but wasted in the sense, it is an insurance. We have got nothing out of it. We have not produced it.

Others have produced it. And, in times of peril, suppose there was unfortunately a war, we cannot replace it. We may not get spares for it. We are just helpless. Shri S.A. Dange said about some parts missing. We are completely helpless. Therefore, real security comes in producing our own weapons and it is better to produce second rate weapons yourselves than to rely on first rate weapons from abroad. That is our whole outlook. Of course, first rate weapons as the world produces today, we cannot have. We cannot afford them. We cannot have them. The sort of weapons that we buy from whatever country it may be are really—let us be frank about it—weapons that they have more or less discarded. They have gone to new types of secret weapons which they do not sell. Those weapons that have become well known, they sell, because they do not want them. They are good enough for us and we buy them.

The main thing is the building of the industrial base as I said, even risking having second rate weapons provided you produce them than relying on first rate weapons which come from abroad, which you may not be able to replace by spares or by something or other. That is the broad policy. That is a policy based on defence only: not offence. Of course, politically that is co-ordinated with a policy of friendship with other countries, which is very important, because, this policy of friendship itself is a greater insurance than anything else. And secondly, trying to build up the industrial base both for defence and other things and being vigilant.

May I, Sir, repeat, in conclusion, I have already referred to Pakistan several times in the course of my remarks, because I wanted to speak frankly as to how we look at these matters. But, I do not think there is going to be any war with Pakistan now, tomorrow or later. I do not think so. I cannot say if you ask me honestly that I rule it out absolutely:

I can't I have to prepare for a risk. I do not think it will occur. I do not think the people or the rulers of Pakistan are not wise enough to do it. We certainly are wise enough not to do it. And, if by any dismal chance that occurs, I do not see why Shri U. C. Patnaik or anyone else should needlessly get perturbed or excited about it.

I regret, for the reasons that I have stated, I cannot accept the Resolutions.

Mr. Speaker: Need I put to the House Shri U. C. Patnaik's amendment?

Shri U. C. Patnaik: I do not press my amendment.

Mr. Speaker: The other amendment is not moved. What about Shri Naushir Bharucha's Resolution?

Shri Naushir Bharucha: I shall very briefly reply to the points raised by the hon. Prime Minister. It was not my intention to have any roving enquiry in bringing forward this resolution. In fact, there were certain definite propositions which, had a committee been appointed, could have been placed before it.

I would like the hon. Prime Minister to appreciate that, notwithstanding anything that one may do by way of armed defence, it is possible completely to knock out a city without your armed forces being able to help in the slightest degree. Eventualities like that have to be taken care of. These are matters which I cannot speak out here openly in Parliament, and they would raise such grave issues that the pattern of defence is likely to be affected, and I am convinced that people in authority have not applied their mind to this aspect.

I repeat that it is possible to knock out a city of over a million people completely in a matter of a few hours without your armed forces ever being useful in preventing it.

Secondly, the Prime Minister has said that if we talk of civil defence, people might get panicky. I ask: while there is peace is it not better that people should be panicky a little to begin with and gradually, with civil defence training, learn to conquer their panic, rather than, when a war comes and there is panic all round on account of the war, there should be more panic because people are not trained in civil defence?

This resolution has been useful in one respect. At least we have known the policy of this Government in the matter of civil defence, and that policy is that they are going to do nothing about it. I differ in principle from the views held by the hon. Prime Minister in this respect. I believe that for a nation civil defence is absolutely necessary because it is not merely the army that fights in a total war, it is the nation also; and if the morale of the nation is not kept up, if the home front cracks, then it is immaterial what type of armaments you have, you can never win the war. I am therefore of the opinion that civil defence is absolutely necessary.

It is true also that civil defence, in order to be efficient, may have to be comprehensive and may become very costly, but in times of emergency it is better that we should have a skeleton of a plan rather than none at all.

The hon. Prime Minister has said that it is no use having radars unless you can afford to have a chain of radars suitably spaced and a chain is too costly. Because it is too costly to have a chain if you have radar at one place, a gap and radar a few miles away . . .

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: May I correct the hon. Member? We have got radars. It should not be imagined that we have not got, but I said we cannot use it in the perfect sense of a complete barrier.

Shri Naushir Bharucha: That is exactly what I am coming to. Radar,

[Shri Naushir Bharucha]

in order to be really effective, must have an unbroken chain, so that aircraft passing through any place can be detected, and if today we have not that unbroken chain, then probably there is wastage of money on radar. It is obvious.

Secondly, he referred to anti-aircraft guns. He says that aircraft can be made to fly high. That is true, and I think it might be good to maintain the morale of the people, to have a few anti-aircraft guns. But the point I am making is that when there is a huge sprawling city, even from a height of five miles you can easily drop bombs indiscriminately and the enemy can achieve his main object of striking terror in the mind of the civil population. Therefore, what I wanted is that we should have a committee which would consider numerous such other points. It is no use saying that we will not have civil defence because people will become panicky. Supposing a war starts with very conventional weapons and incendiary bombs are dropped in tens of thousands over cities, if people have not been given rudimentary training to deal with incipient fires, what is going to be the position of your cities? If people are maimed and their limbs are fractured, if we have not got ready a civil defence organisation in the shape of first-aid parties, if we have not got civil defence parties in the shape of rescue parties, what is going to be the morale of the people? Will not the people then become panicky? I say it is a question of taking the small risk of people becoming panicky. It is much better that we should take it now while there is peace when we can control the panic, rather than to find that we are involved in a war and we have got no plans and then there is panic and chaos all round. Remember, with chaos in the nation, your army cannot fight. I am very sorry the hon. Prime Minister feels that way. He says he takes that responsibility. In a parliamentary democracy, what is the responsibility

of a Minister? At best he can resign. But that cannot restore to the nation a civil defence organisation. Anyway, I think that I have done my duty in moving the resolution and focussing the attention of Government on this issue. May be, perhaps later on, I might be able to persuade the Prime Minister or the Government in the Defence Consultative Committee, but, for the present, I do press the resolution, because I feel that the attention of the people must be focussed on this grave problem.

Mr. Speaker: I shall put the resolution to vote.

The question is:

"This House recommends that in view of the far-reaching scientific and technical developments in the field of defence, a Committee consisting of Members of the Lok Sabha assisted by technical experts be appointed to examine and suggest changes in the existing pattern of military expenditure."

The motion was negatived.

Mr. Speaker: Now, we shall take up the half-an-hour discussion.

Shri Panigrahi (Puri): May I move my motion?

Shri Tangamani (Madurai): In the Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions, 2½ hours were allotted, and the time was so fixed that 2 hours and 29 minutes were to be taken up today for Shri Naushir Bharucha's resolution in order to enable the next resolution to be moved.

Shrimati Benu Chakravarty (Basirhat): Let it be formally moved.

Mr. Speaker: In whose name does the next resolution stand? That is in the name of Shri P. R. Ramakrishnan.

Shri Panigrahi: But Shri P. R. Ramakrishnan is absent.

Mr. Speaker: It was only the next resolution that was allowed to be moved. . . .

Shri Panigrahi: But if that hon. Member is absent?

Mr. Speaker: Not the next after next.

Shri Panigrahi: But the Mover of that resolution is absent.

Mr. Speaker: Therefore, we go to the other work.

Shrimati Renu Chakravarty: Normally, what we do is we just allow the next one to be moved formally. .

Mr. Speaker: But this is next after next.

Shrimati Renu Chakravarty: That is immaterial.

Mr. Speaker: When the Member is absent and does not move, then the next after next is taken. But if he is present and does not move, then what should be the position? All right; we shall think of that on that day.

17.23 hrs.

RESOLUTION RE COMMITTEE TO
ASSESS PROGRESS OF LAND
REFORMS IN THE COUNTRY

Shri Panigrahi (Puri): I beg to move:

"This House recommends that a Committee consisting of 15 members of Lok Sabha be appointed to assess the progress made so far in the matter of land reforms all over the country and to submit its report to the House as early as possible."

Mr. Speaker: This will stand over to the next day.

17.24 hrs.

*WEEKLY SCHEDULED FREIGHTER
SERVICE BY AIR INDIA INTER-
NATIONAL

Mr. Speaker: The Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation may make his statement.

The Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation (Shri Mohiuddin): With your permission, I wish to amend the reply given by me to part (c) of Short Notice Question No. 2 on the 27th November, 1958, in the Lok Sabha.

In giving the terms of the contract between Air India International and Seaboard and Western Airlines, I had mentioned that the quantum of gross revenues earned from the carriage of traffic on the India-U.K. route shall be apportioned on the basis of 80 per cent. to Seaboard and Western Airlines and 20 per cent. to Air India International. This was based on the suggestion made by Air India International to Seaboard and Western Airlines during the negotiations. According to the terms of the agreement, the relevant provision is that Air India International will receive 15 per cent of the gross revenue earned for the carriage over the sector U.K.-India and vice versa, for the first six months, and thereafter, the rate of remuneration to the Air India International will be increased to 20 per cent.

I regret that the information I gave to the House on the 27th November, 1958, was not wholly correct.

Mr. Speaker: Does Shri Basumatari still desire to raise this half-an-hour discussion?

Shri Basumatari (Goalpara—Reserved—Sch. Tribes): Yes.

I beg to raise a discussion on the Short Notice Question regarding the announcement made by the Air India International about the running of a

Half-an-hour discussion.