

Shrimati Benu Chakravartty rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. If, however, after perusing the statement, hon. Members feel that there is any real matter to be discussed, a motion may be made, and whenever a motion is made, I will always consider that motion on merits. Copies of the statement will be kept in the Notice Office and members interested may go there and collect a copy. So far as the report by Shri Dharma Vira is concerned, is it available?

Shri Mehr Chand Khanna: No, Sir. I am not placing it here. It is only a departmental enquiry. I may here make one more submission with your permission. Within the next ten or 15 days, in fact earlier than that if I can, I am going to prepare a detailed note on the working of the Dandakaranya project and I shall circulate it to each Member of this House and the other House.

12.33 hrs.

RELEASE OF A MEMBER

Mr. Speaker: I have to inform the House that I have received the following telegram dated the 26th November, 1959, from the Superintendent of Police, Bhopal:

“Shri Ramsingh Bhai Varma, Member, Lok Sabha, released yesterday evening”.

12.34 hrs.

MOTION RE: INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS—Contd.

Mr. Speaker: The House will now take up further consideration of the motion re: India-China Relations. The original motion along with the amendments is before the House. The hon. Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, I must express my gratitude to you and to hon. Members of the House for this debate which has been taking place for the last two days. May I, right in the beginning, say that I am sorry that some words I used on the last occasion when I moved this motion had slightly upset some hon. Members opposite. I talked about a motley crowd with motley ideas or some such thing. I did not mean any disrespect to anybody. What I meant was that people who are of entirely different opinions and groups had gathered together in a resolution, which was not a disrespectful thing to say.

Yesterday, Shri Asoka Mehta referred to a friend of his, Shri M. R. Masani, and said that Shri M. R. Masani's economic ideas would be pushed into the dustbin of history. I would not have ventured to say that although I entirely agree with that statement. Therefore, it surprised me that some remark that I made without any intention of hurting any hon. Member was resented. Anyhow it was not my intention. I am sorry.

In the course of this debate many things have been said, and many criticisms have been made, and yet, the major fact stands out, namely, on the big issues before us there is practically unanimity in this House. I was a little surprised when Acharya Kripalani accused us of treating this matter lightly and casually as a small issue. I can assure him that whatever other mistakes we might have made, we have never considered this question as a small question. In fact, perhaps we might have attached a little more importance to it then even Acharya Kripalani, because we had to give earnest thought to all the consequences, to where it was leading us and to what might happen not today but in the months and years to come. In fact, if I may say so, there came for me one of these peak events of

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history when a plunge has to be taken in some direction which may have powerful and far-reaching effects not only on our country but on Asia and even the world.

It was no small matter that we considered. I can assure him that it was not casually that we considered it. We considered it, keeping all these far-reaching aspects in view, keeping in view all these processes of development in India, our five year plans and everything. All this picture came before me and before my colleagues when we discussed it. So, let us be clear about it, namely, that we are dealing today not with a small or a casual matter but a matter of the utmost significance to the present and the future of India and Asia. That is the approach.

Another thing that struck me very agreeably and pleasantly was the almost unanimous affirmation of what is called the policy of non-alignment. I think perhaps some Members who have affirmed it might have done it maybe with some inhibitions or limitations in their mind. That is possible, even with some different viewpoint. But the fact is that barring perhaps one or two hon. Members—I forget the names—everyone in this House belonging to every party said that there was no other policy open to us but that of non-alignment.

Even those who perhaps cast some doubt on it seemed to me to be labouring under some misapprehension. When they talked about *Panch-sheel* or the five principles, they seemed to imagine that that involved our forgetting the recent developments or ignoring them and finding it impossible to co-operate with the Chinese Government in many ways and generally to carry on in the old way. But the two points are quite different; the policy of non-alignment and of having friendly relations is, I believe, basically a right policy under all circumstances, whatever happens. That is true.

But the policy remaining like that, if two countries fall out, let us say two countries, in the extreme extent, go to war, obviously that policy does not apply to them. It is absurd to say it does. If peace is broken, we deal with the situation in so far as we can. The policy remains good all the same, and it applies to the rest of the world, and later to that part of the world too, because war is a bad thing—anyhow it is not a permanent phenomenon. If people think that what has been happening on our borders and elsewhere has made no great difference, that, of course, is not correct. It has made a tremendous difference. Not only to Government and to our present relations with China, but to what might happen in the future too—that is quite obvious—the wide-spread and deep-seated reaction in our country. There is no doubt about that. From almost, you might say, a little child in a primary school to a grown up man there has been this powerful reaction.

I have ventured sometimes to ask people to be calm about it. That is true. But, I might tell you that I was proud of that reaction. I did not wish that reaction to go in the wrong direction, because, I was afraid that we might fritter the vitality and energy that we may have into unnecessary and even undesirable activities, thinking that we are doing something. The issue was so grave in my mind, so big. Here we are sitting on the edge of history and all kinds of things are going to happen in the future. Are we going to think that we are solving these problems by organising students' demonstrations, or coming in front of Parliament House and waving flags? That way, it does not help. That is minimising the issue. If we are straight about it and if we really feel like that, we shall have to change the millions of people in this country. It is not a question of some additional armies. These are minor things. If this unfortunate thing occurs, we have

to face this and we shall become a nation of armies, every man; let there be no mistake about it. But it is not by petty things, that we shall do it. Every single activity, every single thing that we do—planning, etc.—would have to be conditioned by one major fact, because that will be a struggle for life and death; not as hon. Members say—forgive my mentioning it—“go and occupy that land; force them out”. I am surprised at the casual way such things are thought over and mentioned.

Therefore, may I point out to Acharyaji that we have not casually considered this question, and it is because of its importance and vital effect on the future for all of us in this country, that we have given this matter so much attention? If two of the big countries of Asia, biggest countries, giant countries of Asia, are involved in conflict, it will shake Asia and shake the world. It is not a little border issue that we are troubled about. We are troubled about the border issue, of course; that is a different matter. But the issues surrounding it, round about it, are so huge, vague, deep-seated and far-reaching, inter-twined even, that one has to think about them with all the clarity and strength at one's command, and not be swept away by passion into action which may harm us instead of doing us good. All these are considerations, and we have, in our little wisdom, however limited it may be, tried to consider these aspects. And we shall continue them.

They are too big for any Prime Minister or Government to deal with. We are small men facing great events and great decisions; and we can do very little without the support, the fullest support, of this Parliament and of the people. That support, I believe, is there and will come.

When I appealed to this House two days ago about united effort etc. I meant it in a very much deeper sense. I did not mind all the speeches made here or there, although sometimes

those speeches influence public opinion. They indicate to the outside world that we are not united, that we are quarrelling and that we are weak, which is a bad effect to create on our people or on the outside world. They are mislead by it, because the reality is that on a subject like this India is bound to be united and nobody can break that unity when the danger comes. But there is this to be said. If this House thinks—you will forgive me for being quite frank—that the manner our Government carries on this particular work is not satisfactory, then, of course, it is open to this House to choose more competent men in whom it has faith, in whom the country has faith. That I can understand, for in a crisis there can be no, shall I say, personal considerations by way of courtesy when we face these matters. But if, in your wisdom or in the balance, you feel, this House feels, that this Government has got to face this challenge, or this Prime Minister has to face it, then hold to him and help him, and do not come in his way. I did not mean at all that there should be no criticism. Criticism, of course, there should be. But there are criticisms and criticisms. In a moment of crisis one should not do anything to encourage the opponent or the enemy. One should remain on one's toes, I admit; our people and this House, certainly, should remain on their toes and be wide awake to correct mistakes, to point out mistakes. I do not want any Government, least of all the Government of which I have the honour to be the head, to be treated as if we are all-wise. We are not all-wise; of course not. We are rather common mortals facing great events. Sometimes, of course, the mere association of great events makes a person greater than he is, as many of us grew greater in the old days when we associated ourselves with the struggle for India's independence. Small men and women that we were, we became bigger in stature because we were associated with those great events.

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Now also there is a challenge of these great events and if it is your will and pleasure that I should serve in this capacity in which I have been placed, I am not going to shirk it, and I am going to serve with all my strength and such competence as I have. But, if you make me the instrument of your will for this purpose, do not blunt that instrument; keep it sharp for the work that it is intended to do.

So, we really have to consider this issue in all its ramifications, to which reference has been made in this debate, and many other ramifications. But, in the final analysis, you have to consider it in this much deeper sense of the biggest challenge that they could have—a challenge which may make history for good or bad. Let us not boast. The issues are too grave for boasting. Let us not talk about how we will go and kick them out. China is no small country, nor is India. They are both big countries, ancient countries, and in perhaps somewhat different ways, strong countries. It is absurd, I think, for the Government of China to imagine that they can sit on India or crush India. It is equally absurd for anyone in India to think that we can sit on China or crush China.

Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur): We have never asked for it.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not accusing anybody. I am making a statement as to what we have to face. If the worst comes to the worst and a conflict arises between two mighty countries, it does not much matter if one country has got a few more guns, or a greater army; it may matter in a military sense, but basically when these two giant countries come into conflict in a life and death struggle, no one gives in. No one gives in when he is being crushed. Certainly India does not give in. Something may happen here and there on the borders. We take it. We

deal with it as we think best always keeping in view this distant prospect of what might happen and how we should deal with it. It is therefore an issue of the biggest magnitude. We should not, I submit, however big the issue, lead ourselves to cultivate or to encourage what is being sometimes referred to here as a war psychosis, because let us realise in all consciousness that such a conflict, such a war between India and China will be bad, terribly bad, a tragedy of the deepest kind—a tragedy for us, a tragedy for China too and a tragedy for Asia and the world. Therefore let us not think lightly of it. Let us not take steps which automatically push us in that direction.

That is one side of the picture. The other side is that when this challenge comes, when this danger comes we cannot be complacent. We have to be wide awake and prepared and do all we can to face it if it comes. These are the two sides of the picture and we have to steer a course avoiding extremes.

I am not going to discuss many of the suggestions and proposals made about developing the border and all that. Of course, it is true. But may I say that some of the suggestions made rather surprised me. Dr. Ram Subhag Singh said that we should industrialise NEFA, the Ladakh area and—where else?

The Deputy Minister of External Affairs (Shrimati Lakshmi Menon): Himachal Pradesh.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: There were three places.

Sardar Hukam Singh (Bhatinda): Spiti and Lahaul.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Spiti and Lahaul.

It is a noble ambition of Dr. Ram Subhag Singh. But before we do that we have to think of the little country

of India also. We have to deal with and industrialise it. We might concentrate on industrialising India first before we go across the Himalayas for that purpose. It shows the enthusiasm of our hon. colleagues here in this Parliament, but it also shows that in their enthusiasm they sometimes overshoot the mark and that is not helpful.

Then again, we have been charged. "Why did you walk out of Bara Hoti? Why did you do this? You made a statement in September last and in November you tell us that you walked out of there." Well, I venture to explain the matter. First of all, we have always walked out of Bara Hoti during winter because, broadly speaking—I do not say it is impossible to live there—it is unlivable and uninhabitable in winter. Of course, it is a conceivable possibility that if necessity arose and when there is vast urgency one can do anything. One can go to the North Pole or to the South Pole. That is a different matter. But we have retired and China has retired from there because the place is unlivable. So far as we are concerned, it is, roughly, approachable for five months in the year, that is, the approach routes to Bara Hoti, on China side too, are in other months difficult—the high passes which lead to Bara Hoti are blocked. A person may live there, certainly, with difficulty, but he just cannot travel to and fro in the rest of India for seven months in the year. As I said, one can always do everything if danger threatens and necessity arises. But the idea of living there or putting our people there, cut off from the rest of India for seven months more or less, unless there is urgent necessity, did not seem to me obvious at all or something that was demanded by the honour or interests or the defence of India.

Then again, we had arrived at an arrangement with the Chinese Government some two or three years ago—three years ago, maybe—particularly about this matter that they would not put any armed personnel there and we would not do so. Of

course, you will say, "Why did you come to such an arrangement?" Well, I am sorry that I disagree. When there are any disputes—I am not talking about these big scale border troubles and almost a mountainous invasion and all that; that is a different matter—but when there are disputes as there are plenty of disputes between two countries, they have always to be discussed and arrangements are arrived at. All that is a common factor everywhere where such disputes arise. So, we agreed with them that neither they nor we will send armed personnel there. We have both kept by that in the last two or three years. In summer we go. We did not agree about our withdrawal or not—there is no agreement—but it was by force of circumstances. They withdrew. We withdrew. So, we have been sending our civil personnel there—not that the civil personnel do any civil administration there, but they sit there and they will sit there, of course.

So, I submit that attaching too much importance to these matters and becoming touchy about them rather distorts the picture in our minds. We seem to think that we are going to decide these major matters by, let us say, what they did in the old days. Two persons would fight if a moustache was a little longer or shorter or a little higher or lower. That kind of thing does not apply to these grave national problems.

Some hon. Members talked about common defence with Pakistan. Now I do not wish to discuss that matter, but I would remind the House of the statement that appeared only two days ago—I think day before yesterday—that President Ayub Khan made when he was asked about this letter that I have sent to Premier Chou En-lai. He said that Pakistan will not recognise this because she had a claim to Ladakh, that is, because Pakistan had a claim to Ladakh, he said that I had no business to make proposals to Premier Chou En-lai and that he does not recognise my letter. I am not discussing this. But I am

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just pointing out the inherent difficulties of this question of common defence. But people do not realise fully what difficulties it involves.

Then, about war—limited war, leave out big war—we have had in recent years at least two important but limited wars. One was in Korea and the other was in Indo-China and great and powerful nations were involved in it. After lasting years, those wars ended in some kind of a partial settlement or some kind of a truce: some kind of a settlement, not a complete one perhaps. The troubles have continued, tension has continued. But even there, there was a war in which great nations were involved and ultimately by force of circumstances they came to some settlements which were not very satisfactory to either of them, big nations as they were. I am pointing out, that we have to look at this question not lightly, not vaingloriously, not boastfully, but still firmly and determinedly. It does not mean that we have to shout at the top of our voices in order to be heard. It is action and determination that counts and not a very loud and repeated assertion as to how we feel, although that has to be done when necessity arises.

13 hrs.

There is another thing. There has been a misapprehension evidently and people say that we are creating a no-man's land in Ladakh—it is true—and that we are thereby acknowledging China's claim to the frontier there. First of all, we are not acknowledging it in the slightest degree. It is patent. Secondly, in effect, we are asking them to do what, I believe, was the desire of every Member of this House, that is, to walk out of the territory of India, that we consider India's territory. It is true that we are doing it in a polite way, in a courteous way, in an honourable way for both the countries, because that is the only way to do it. Of course, otherwise, you aim not at getting them to do

something, but at a deadlock and war. Either we come to the decision that all this is nonsense as some people do say, you must not negotiate, you must not talk with them until they do this or that. I believe that in this matter, as in some other matters, the Chinese Government has been in error, has behaved badly; it has not behaved fairly to us, has committed, what I might say, a breach of faith on us—not a breach of faith of any particular word or document, but broadly speaking breach of faith. I believe all that.

But, do you treat a Government or do you expect to be treated in a way to be ordered about? Then, you are in the wrong. No country likes being ordered about. A great country to be ordered about is not either the way of diplomacy or dealing between two countries. Therefore, to say as some hon. Members have said, I am sorry to criticise them, that they must do this or that,—in fact, if you analyse what they say, they must surrender and then we go graciously to talk to them—that is not obviously a feasible proposition. It may please us. We will be very happy if that happens. But, that kind of thing does not happen even with small countries, much less with a great country—deliberately asking the other country to do something which it considers humiliating. There are very very few countries which tolerate that, even small countries, rights or wrongs apart. Therefore, either you aim at a complete deadlock with no way out except war or you aim at finding some doors and windows which might help in removing that deadlock, lessening it and creating an atmosphere where one can possibly get over it and settle the question to our advantage. It is a difficult matter. I cannot say now whether this can be done or not. But, one thing I know absolutely and definitely: to accept the deadlock for ever or to suggest something which confirms that deadlock and leaves no doors open except war, is a bad step, dangerous step, an utterly wrong step, from any point of view.

That does not mean, of course, that we should weaken or we should—the word is often used—go in for appeasement. I do not quite understand what meaning people attach to it. It is a bad word with bad associations. That is true. But, those Members who used it, seemed to think that the alternative to any policy of negotiation or any policy of trying to find some way out was appeasement. That means that they believe in no other course but war. Let us realise it. Because, they may not have used the word war, but the steps they suggested, if taken, inevitably lead to that. We must realise the second, third step. Therefore, I do submit that not only in this case, but always, we should be prepared to negotiate. We should be prepared to meet as we have met even when feelings were rather tense, representatives and leaders of Pakistan. I am prepared to meet them again. I may meet them if chance comes. I am not going to allow my sense of any personal prestige to come in the way of meeting any person anywhere if I think that the cause of my country is served thereby or the cause of peace is served thereby.

It is true that, much as one might desire a meeting, that meeting itself, unless it is held under proper circumstances or a proper atmosphere, with some kind of background and preparation, may lead to nothing. It may fail; it may do harm. It is a different matter. It is a matter of judgment. It is true that any such meeting which has the faintest resemblance to carrying out the behests of another party is absolutely wrong.

I have said, in this particular matter, and the House will remember, Mr. Chou En-lai suggested an early meeting. I have said, "I should be glad to meet you." It seems to me that the meeting could only take place firstly when these proposals that we have sent have been accepted, there is some basis for meeting, tension becomes less or some other preparation made for it. I do not wish to delay anything. I am not trying to escape the very idea of meeting. I want it, I

welcome it as early as possible. But, as I have stated, there must be some preparation, some ground for it. It is a complicated issue. Leaving out the broad question of how the Chinese have behaved in this matter, which, I think, is very bad, even if you come to the narrow issue of the borders here and there, it is a fairly complicated issue, full of history, tradition, this and that and maps.

The Chinese Government has recently published a kind of an Atlas—*atlas* is not perhaps the right word—a collection of maps, plenty of them. I think about two or three are their own maps. The others are maps taken from other countries, all maps, British maps, American maps, French maps, wherever they could get hold of, which they thought to some extent helped their case. Sometimes they help them a little, sometimes more.—*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, some traveller's maps, all that kind of thing. They have done it. We have plenty of maps, very good maps. I have no doubt that our case is a very strong one, broadly speaking. What I mean is, two countries, where there is a dispute, cannot refuse to talk. That is not a legitimate way in the modern world or at any time to deal with. If you are strong, you can, of course, push aside your adversary, talk or no talk, get away. It is a bad habit even then.

In the present case, things have happened which have come as a shock to us. I have no objection to talks about Bara Hoti or one or two other places. These are limited cases of border. Where there is a dispute, let us discuss it. How many hon. Members here, who have warmly protested against our coming out of Bara Hoti, know even the facts about Bara Hoti? But, it is a resentment, a justified resentment because they feel that with the Chinese pushing themselves here and there, we must not put up. I can understand that emotional reaction to it. But very few of us here can discuss the question of Bara Hoti, what the facts are this way or that way, or any other question.

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So, I had no objection to discussing Bara Hoti or one or two other matters which I might mention. We have inherited the dispute not since the Chinese came but from before that.

But the question becomes an entirely different one as it is today; whether it is the so-called Macmahon line or whether it is in Ladakh, it becomes different. Something has happened there which is not a minor border dispute, a minor transgression where there may be doubt about it or not.

Whatever the Chinese Government might feel in their minds, as I said the other day they have an one-track mind more so than other countries. We all have one-track minds to some extent when our national interests are concerned, but I think more than other nations the Chinese Government has that one-track mind, and that has been encouraged or developed or conditioned even more by the semi-isolation in which this revolutionary China has grown up in the last ten years with no contacts with others except a limited circle of nations.

I say this is on a different footing. Here we are for the last ten years talking to them, dealing with them, discussing the Tibetan Treaty with them, and so far as we are concerned, openly and repeatedly declaring what our frontier was—the maps are there—declaring in Parliament and elsewhere, so that there was no doubt as to where we were.

I am for the moment assuming that the Chinese believed in their own case, and believed in their own frontier. Anyhow, they perfectly knew our stand, while the way they put it to us was: yes, this matter, these maps require revision or reconsideration—something like that—which certainly did not close this argument, but broadly the impression created was that they had some minor rectifications to suggest, no more.

In spite of all this, they suddenly, or gradually if you like, creep up and

take possession of these various areas and territories. I am not going into the whole history which the House knows. It does seem to me a definite breach of faith with a country which tried to be friendly to them. I think we have rightly tried to be friendly to them not only because of the past, but more so because of the present and the future, because I do not like, my mind rather does not like, the prospect of the future where these two giant nations of Asia are constantly at each other's throats. It is a bad future for us, and for them, if I may say so, and for Asia certainly.

Therefore, keeping all this in view, we followed a certain policy. There was no question of appeasement. Certainly it was a policy which objected to and disliked the other policy, what might be called anti-policies. We do not believe in anti-policies, broadly speaking, and we think anti-policies are necessarily based on hatred, which is the typical cold war approach to any problem. If you have an enemy you have to fight, go and fight that enemy, down him if you can, but this kind of cold war attitude is, I think, more pernicious than any straight out war. It perverts a nation and an individual who indulges in it. It is far better, as Gandhiji said, if you have a sword in your heart, to take it out and use it, not nurse it in your heart.

So, there was no misunderstanding on our part about what China was as some people imagine. Perhaps we had given more thought to it than most hon. Members here.

Even before the revolution, we developed, we tried to develop, friendly relations with the previous China, the Chiang Kai-shek China, not that we approved of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, it was for China to decide who should rule. But because we attached importance to China as a great country, our neighbour country, the biggest country in Asia, we tried to be friendly with them, and we were

friendly with them; it was not a long period, of course, since we became independent, because two or three years later came the success of this revolution there.

Well, when the revolution came, we discussed this matter, thought of it, with our Ambassador there and others concerned. It was perfectly clear that this revolution was not some kind of a palace revolution. It was what might be called a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings. It was a stable revolution with strength behind it and popularity behind it at that time, whatever might have happened later—there is no doubt about it. It produced a perfectly stable Government, strongly entrenched and popular. That has nothing to do with our liking it or disliking it, that is a different matter. And naturally, we came to the decision that this Government should be recognised, and within two or three months we recognised it.

I might repeat here a phrase which has stuck in my mind. Soon after the Chinese revolution—I forget, maybe a year after, maybe a little more, but about that—a very eminent statesman belonging to the Western Countries who did not like the Chinese revolution said in the course of a talk with some people: "We made a great mistake when the Russian revolution took place, the Soviet revolution; that is, for years we behaved to them, tried to crush them, tried to, you might almost say, put an end to the revolution. We did not succeed in doing so, but we did succeed in embittering everybody and creating these terrible conflicts between us ("us" means those people, Western countries) and Russia." He said: "Let us not repeat that mistake in regard to the Chinese revolution." This was a person who did not like the Chinese revolution. He is an eminent statesman of the Western countries, but he was a wise man.

Now, it is pretty obvious, it was then and it is now, that you cannot deal with these revolutions because you dislike them, cursing them up and

down, bell, book and candle; they do not cease to be. These are elemental things that happen in a country. You have to deal with them. If you like, you can fight them, but you cannot ignore them. That is why we have always been convinced that it is utterly wrong and harmful and dangerous for the world for China not to go into the United Nations. It is not in keeping with the facts of the situation, with the facts of life, it comes in the way. And so, this is what we have been saying in the last ten years and now gradually, even those who have opposed this, have to admit that it would have been better to recognise China progressively they admit it. And indeed, China ought to have been there long ago but for certain complications that arise in regard to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, it is true.

Take even the last meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. When this question of China being seated there was brought up by some countries, including India, people were surprised. They said: "Oh, India goes on doing this in spite of what has happened in Tibet, in spite of what has happened on India's borders. How blind they are!". Well, it is not for me to say who is blind and who is not, but normally, we have found in the last ten years that what we have said, and what action we have proposed has been accepted by the other countries year after year, after much damage had been done, of course, because of their not accepting that advice; they have come round. And you will find that even in the last voting in the United Nations over this Chinese question more people voted for it; more people who had opposed it became neutral or abstained. Those who had abstained voted for it this time, that is, in spite of all these factors which had irritated the countries and irritated us against China, yet, the facts of the situation made people vote more for that in this last session, because there are statesmen there, there are people who think of the future and of the

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present; they cannot ignore these facts. They had to vote. I have no doubt that if China had been....

Acharya Kripalani (Sitamarhi): Is it because the Chinese are disappointed that the world is opposed to them, that they attack their friends?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am afraid, with all respect I say so, that Acharya Kripalani's mind is astray at the present moment. It has nothing to do with what I am saying or with my line of argument. Perhaps, I shall be able to clarify the deep recesses in his mind presently.

Now, I am pointing out that you are dealing with enormous elemental phenomena in the world, with these big revolutions and others. You have to understand them and fight them, if you like, but understand them; you cannot fight without understanding.

Now, I shall come to another aspect of this question which might perhaps lead Acharya Kripalani to have a slightly better understanding of the working of our minds. Ever since the Chinese revolution, we naturally had to think of this major fact of this revolution and what this new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution, apart from the change-over, was going to be a very big factor in Asia and in the world too, and in regard to us. We realised, we knew this much history, that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history, that has been the case. And we saw, or we felt that the two factors taken together, the great push towards industrialisation of that country, plus the amazing pace of its population increase, would create a most dangerous situation; it was obvious; it did not require much cleverness to think of that; every intelligent person in the world more or less thought on those lines.

The population problem itself, a vast population and the pace of growth, greater than almost any in the wide world, creates an explosive

situation; it bursts at the seams, but a big population may be weak, of course, unless it is industrialised. And it is this Industrialisation process that came in powerfully, that gave a push. And I said, the combination of that too, was likely to create, we saw eight, nine or ten years ago that it was likely to create, a very novel and a very dangerous situation, not so much for India, but for India also—that taken also with the fact of China's somewhat inherent tendency to be expansive, when she is strong. So, nobody was blind to this fact. We realised it. We have discussed it here, in other countries repeatedly, because everybody knew it. And gradually, as the years have gone by, this fact has become more and more apparent and obvious. So, if any person thinks that we followed our policy in regard to China, without realising these obvious consequences, he is mistaken. If he thinks that we followed it because of fear of China, he is doubly mistaken. It is not for me to say how weak or strong or fearful we are, but I think it may be said that at no time during these last ten years have we functioned under the urge of fear; not previous to these ten or twelve years, but since we formed a government, we have been conditioned not to function under fear. And something of that lesson and experience has still conditioned us and helped us. There was no question of fear of China. Certainly, there was an appraisal of a situation, of the consequences,—that is a different matter—and further action taken, which helps to prevent a dangerous development of these steps, of course; every country has to take that.

So, I am putting this to the House as the background of our thinking, because people seem to imagine that either we live in a world of our own without thinking of what is happening elsewhere, without realising it, or that we are shrinking in fear. They are mistaken in both ways.

Another point that I might mention is these great revolutions like the

Soviet revolution or the Chinese revolution, and at the same time, in a sense even a greater revolution, that is, the scientific and technological revolution that is taking place; all these have been round us in our generation. We have seen them, technological and scientific. It is only in the last few years that we are really making good. Previously, we had no chance. And we are doing pretty well in it, and I have no doubt that considering the material we have, we shall do well, given an opportunity.

Now, all revolutions, whether it is the French revolution or the Russian or any other, rather tend to function abnormally, obviously; a revolution itself is a departure from normal behaviour, normal development. They become abnormal; they become upheavals; they do not pretend to having drawing-room manners; in fact, they go against drawing-room manners and break things; they are destructive, although also these big revolutions have obviously something constructive in them, something which appeals to people, something which rouses their enthusiasm, obviously. And you see, therefore, these tremendous ferments and upsets and crude things and cruel things happening. Gradually, the revolution subsides, keeping many of the gains of the revolution, but becoming more and more normal, whether it is the French revolution or any other. Of course, it depends on other facts how soon it becomes normal. If conditions, external conditions, prevent it, like wars and tumults, it takes a long time; it is bound to, because people cannot live up to that pitch of excitement of a revolution. Now, we see that normalising process very much at work. So in the Soviet Union, I do not mean to say that that means they are going back on their economic theories, although, without going back, they change them; as wise and pragmatic people, they change them somewhat from time to time, the basis remaining more or less the same.

Now, China is very very far from

normality, and that is our misfortune, and the world's misfortune—that is, strength, considerable strength, coming in an abnormal state of mind. This is a dangerous thing. There it is. One has to face it, combat it, if you like. I am merely analysing the situation.

That is why you find a marked difference between the broad approach of the Soviet Union to world problems and the Chinese approach. I do not think there is any country in the world—of course, all countries are anxious for peace—I do not think there is any country which is more anxious for peace than the Soviet Union. And I think that is the general view of people, even of their opponents. But I doubt if there is any country in the world, if I may put the other thing, which cares less for peace than China today. See the vast difference between the two.

One may talk of other things. Shri M. R. Masani may talk still of International Communism and others may talk of international capitalism. There may perhaps be a grain of truth in what they say. But basically and fundamentally, these cries of these ideas are completely out of date and have no relation to today's world. However, it is not for me to argue it. I am merely stating a fact. The world is changing and I can conceive the two great colossuses today, the Soviet Union and the United States, coming very near to each other, as they are slightly coming. Essentially, these ideas of capitalism and Communism are, as I said, out of date. You may quote scripture. I think Shri M. R. Masani quoted what Chairman Mao said and somebody else quoted Marx. Well, it is interesting to know what Chairman Mao said in the middle of a civil war, many things are said at such times. It may be that Chairman Mao will say the same today. I cannot say. But the fact remains that all these cries become out of date. They are out of date today in this world when you have reached the moon and other things happen. The fact of the matter is that the two

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countries at the present moment in a sense the most advanced technologically, scientifically and all that, are America and the Soviet Union. They both worship technology and the machine. They both think that they will get more and more out of it, and perhaps they both forget that there are some other deeper aspects of human life which cannot be ultimately ignored. So this talk about international capitalism and International Communism, repeating an old slogan, merely prevents us from thinking straight and understanding the changing world.

The hon. Member, Shri Vajpayee, expressed surprise and resentment at the letter I had written to Premier Chou En-lai which was sent on the 16th November, just on the day this House reassembled. Could I not have delayed that letter for two days and got the sanction of the House? I am surprised at this suggestion; as if diplomatic correspondence of any type, even of a trivial type and much more so of an important type, is going to be considered by Parliament before every letter is sent. It is impossible for us to carry on in that way. It cannot simply be done. I am sorry to say so. You have to trust to some extent those people whom you appoint to do this job. If they do badly, take them out, of course. But you have to trust them. There is no other way. You cannot have these letters, communications and despatches all the time put before the House.

That was the reason also why a number of these things were not placed before the House previously. I am accused of keeping things from the House. I did not deliberately do so. But I do not wish that before a thing was completed—the correspondence—I should put my letter and create perhaps a furore before I got a reply. One thing in which this argument or criticism may be applied was about the news regarding the Aksai Chin Road. Now, as I said, we wanted to confirm it. We sent our

men there. It was only in October last year—about a year ago—that we had known that it was there and they had seen it. It was in our territory. Immediately, we wrote to Premier Chou En-lai. We could of course have immediately announced the fact. But the possible result in such cases is that there is no room for talk left. Each side becomes rigid—I do not say they are flexible now. That is not my point, but I am talking of the general practice. Each side becomes rigid; publicity is given; national feeling is roused and the other country reacts to it. Then any talk, any flexible approach, becomes impossible. I may have made a mistake, but I am merely explaining how one cannot all the time announce or publish these facts in Parliament, the Press and the rest. But the broad principle, of course, is there that it is essential for Parliament to be kept in touch with events and there should be no secrecy; there might be delays etc. in order to achieve a certain object.

Reference was made in some speeches to our Defence Minister, I am rather sorry this was done, because large questions of policy become entangled in this way round personalities. I do not challenge the right of any hon. Member to say what he feels like about a Minister or about the Government. It is not a question of challenging that right. Nevertheless, even a right can be exercised rightly or wrongly or at the wrong time or producing wrong results. There are ways of doing it. It is rather embarrassing to talk about personalities anyhow, but it so happens that probably in so far as this House is concerned, I have known the Defence Minister longer than any other person. Shri M. R. Masani shakes his head; may be perhaps he knows him better than I do. Anyhow, I have known him for a long time and worked closely with him for many long years before independence came. and I presume that I know him as well as I know anybody else.

I know his faults as well as his virtues and abilities. I have disagreed with him on many occasions. I am likely to disagree with him in future. But I know that apart from his outstanding ability, he is a man of the deepest patriotism and national feeling, and because of that, all the ability he has would have been insufficient if I had not believed in his patriotism and his love of country.

Then I saw his work in the Defence Ministry. The Defence Ministry in the last two or three years has, in some respects, made very great progress; it has revolutionised the scientific part of it, the production part of it, these two main parts which are of the greatest importance in this crisis—the scientific background and the productive apparatus—giving, if I may say so, far greater status to our leading soldiers and others, because previously they were rather relatively weighed down by other departments and so many other things. You may refer to minor matters. But I may say that I speak from certain experience and I was very sorry that some months ago, this controversy came before the House in connection with an offer of resignation from our Army Chief of Staff I was sorry because of what I felt about the Defence Minister and about the Army Chief of Staff. I had considerable admiration for his ability, for his experience and when this kind of a thing happens when people of worth have some kind of temperamental conflict, it is sad. It is not a question of keeping one man in a job or another person, not. Fortunately that matter was got over and things have gone on smoothly. We are all working together satisfactorily and I would say that this matter in any sense should not be revived because whatever step one might take, it is harmful, especially in these circumstances.

I should like to say one thing. It is exceedingly difficult to talk about oneself or to judge oneself. Now, Acharya Kripalani especially accused

me and said that I was intolerant and that perhaps I was not charitable enough to other's opinions. As I said, it is difficult for me to judge but I have not been able to understand why this excellent virtue of tolerance should be limited to me only.

Acharya Kripalani: May I object? Because you are in authority, because of your position as the Head of the Government and also in the affections of the people, you must be tolerant about other's opinions. I made it very clear—more than once.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I accept that. But the point is that all of us represent something. We are not here merely finding a kushi job. It may be kushi for some. We are here representing some views. The hon. Members here represent the views of their Party or their individual views. All of us are here for that. We stand for those views. I can be attacked for two reasons by anybody: either for the wrongness of the views or for incompetence or for corruption or something like that. These are the various ways in which a person is dealt with. If it is a question of corruption, etc. it is a question of fact. So, more or less, is the question of incompetence. Now, there may be conflict of views. If some views are pronounced which I think to be patently wrong and injurious to the country, am I to remain silent and remain tolerant of this injurious doctrine? Obviously, it is up to me, if I have any views of my own, to put them before the country and to fight the heretical views, if I may say so, of the others and the wrong views. Now for a moment I have to plead for myself and to show how amazingly patient and tolerant I am.....

Acharya Kripalani..... to the foreigners.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Hardly two or three days pass by, certainly not a week, when various articles do not appear in a southern paper from a very eminent person, mainly concerned with attacking me personally

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and my policies. I remain quiet and tolerant and patient. I do not go about arguing. But it reminds me of a rather well-known couplet. It is in French; in La Fontaine's Children's Fables.

Cet animal est tres mechant, Quand on l'attaque il se defend. It means: "This animal is very vicious for, when attacked, it defends itself!" Am I not even to defend by views when they are attacked? Surely, that would be unfair not only to me but to the public before whom I stand for some principles.

Let us of course be tolerant and we must be tolerant. We have also to express our respective views with such ability and force as we command always, I hope, keeping, within the limits of the broader tolerance of each other.

May I just say this to repeat what we have said previously that any aggression on Bhutan or Nepal would be considered by us as aggression of India. I know very well what all this involves—what I am saying. It is a very grave responsibility. But realising all this and thinking it out, we said so long ago and now I want to repeat it because not only of wider considerations but also because of considerations of India's security. If you ask, what will be done if this happens or that happens—obviously I cannot say.

Now, the other day, referring to the ill-treatment of some of our prisoners by the Chinese, I mentioned the Geneva Convention. I think Shri Asoka Mehta said something about that and asked whether China had signed it. I have looked that matter up. It is the Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, August, 12, 1949. The Convention applies to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them. The Conven-

tion was also applicable to cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. No physical or mental torture nor any other form of coercion is to be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. It applies to this. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any other unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Apart from the present Chinese Government accepting it, Premier Chou En-Lai actually made a statement to this effect—I am not quite sure where but I think—in Geneva recognising the Geneva Convention.

I am very grateful to this House for the courtesy it has shown me.

I would again repeat that it is up to us to realise the gravity of the situation fully, because it is not only an army matter, defence matter, and all that, but it goes much further than that. It affects all of us; it affects our production; it affects all our planning; it affects the workers in the factory and the employers; it affects men in every field. All these demands and other things that are made will have to be conditioned by this new position. Strikes, hartals, lock-outs and all that will have to be viewed from this point of view. Students, who I am glad to say have shown so much vitality over this issue, will have to realise that that has to be shown in other ways also which would really help us. So, it applies to all our life.

So far as we are concerned, I cannot function and my Government cannot function in a big way—it can function normally—when these difficulties face us if we do not have the fullest co-operation from Parliament and the people. I appeal, therefore, for that co-operation, and I promise them that we shall keep them in touch with what happens to the best of our ability. I cannot promise that every letter I send shall suddenly or certainly be placed

before them, but it is impossible for us really to function with any kind of secrecy when such grave issues are at stake.

There are a number of amendments. I would, if I may, suggest to the House that the amendment of Shri Kasliwal which of course is in my favour might be adopted.

Mr. Speaker: Before I put Shri Kasliwal's amendment to the vote, I would like to know from hon. Members who have tabled amendments for disapproval whether they want to press them. As far as Shri U. C. Patnaik is concerned, he said at the end of his speech that he was withdrawing his amendment.

Shri Siva Raj (Chingleput-Reserved—Sch. Castes): I do not press my amendment.

Shri U. L. Patil (Dhulia): I do not press my amendment.

Shri Yajnik (Ahmedabad): I do not press my amendment.

Shri Prakash Vir Shastri (Gurgaon): I do not press my amendment.

Acharya Kripalani: I want to press my amendment.

Shri Braj Raj Singh (Ferozabad): I press my amendment.

Mr. Speaker: All the amendments which have not been pressed are treated as withdrawn.

The amendments were, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Speaker: I shall now put Acharya Kripalani's amendment to vote. The question is:

"That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

"This House having considered the White Paper II on India-China

relations laid on the Table of the House on November 16, 1959, and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China laid on the Table of the House on November 20, 1959, regrets the failure of the Government to secure India's frontiers and to safeguard her territorial integrity. In particular, the House regrets—

- (a) the suppression over a period of years from Parliament and the people of the fact of Chinese aggression,
- (b) the absence of measures to ensure the defence of the Himalayan frontiers such as suitable deployment of troops, adequate equipment of our forces, and the construction of necessary roads and air-fields,
- (c) the fact that the latest letter of the Prime Minister to the Chinese Premier does not maintain the stand that negotiations between the two countries can take place only on the basis of prior acceptance by China of our frontier and the immediate vacation of territories forcibly and wrongfully occupied by them,
- (d) the fact in their eagerness for a negotiated settlement Government have suggested that India would withdraw from what has always been Indian territory, in return for the Chinese withdrawing from areas which also are ours, and
- (e) that the Government have announced no clear plans to make the Chinese vacate Indian territories within a reasonable period."

The motion was negatived.

Mr. Speaker: I now put the amendment of Shri Braj Raj Singh and another hon. Member. The question is:

That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

"This House having considered the White Paper II on India-China relations laid on the Table of the House on November 16, 1959, and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China laid on the Table of the House on November 20, 1959, regrets the failure of the Government to secure India's frontiers and to safeguard her territorial integrity. In particular, the House regrets—

- (a) the suppression over a period of years from Parliament and the people of the fact of Chinese aggression,
- (b) the absence of measures to ensure the defence of the Himalayan frontiers such as suitable deployment of troops, adequate equipment of our forces, and the construction of necessary roads and air-fields,
- (c) the fact that the latest letter of the Prime Minister to the Chinese Premier does not maintain the stand that negotiations between the two countries can take place only on the basis of prior acceptance by China of our frontier and the immediate vacation of territories forcibly and wrongfully occupied by them,
- (d) the fact that in their eagerness for a negotiated settlement Government have suggested that India would withdraw from what has always been Indian territory, in return for the Chinese withdrawing

from areas which also are ours, and

- (e) that the Government have announced no clear plans to make the Chinese vacate Indian territories within reasonable period."

The motion was negatived.

Mr. Speaker: Now, I shall put the substitute motion of Shri Kasliwal.

The question is:

That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

"This House having considered the White Paper II on India-China relations laid on the Table of the House on November 16, 1959, and the recent developments on the frontier, and subsequent correspondence between the Governments of India and China laid on the Table of the House on November 20, 1959 approves of and endorses the policy of the Government in this regard."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. Speaker: All other substitute motions for approval are barred.

13.56 hrs.

KERALA STATE LEGISLATURE
(DELEGATION OF POWERS)
BILL

The Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Shri Datar): I beg to move:

"That the Bill to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the State of Kerala to make laws be taken into consideration."

This is a simple measure. The House is aware that on the 31st July,