

LOK SABHA
 Thursday, 29th March, 1956

The Lok Sabha met at Half Past Ten of the Clock.

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

(See Part I)

11-30 A. M.

PAPER LAID ON THE TABLE

**AMENDMENTS TO DISPLACED PERSONS
 (COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION)
 RULES**

The Minister of Rehabilitation (Shri Mehr Chand Khanna): I beg to lay on the Table under sub-section (3) of section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, a copy of the Notification No. S.R.O. 716, dated the 24th March, 1956, making certain amendments to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. [Placed in Library. See No. S-113/56.]

**CALLING ATTENTION TO
 MATTER OF URGENT
 PUBLIC IMPORTANCE**

**CONDITIONS OF HINDUS IN EAST PAKIS-
 TAN AND MIGRATION THEREFROM**

Shri Vallatharas (Pudukkottai): Under Rule 216, I beg to call the attention of the Minister of Rehabilitation to the following matter of urgent public importance and I request that he may make a statement thereon:

“Condition of Hindus in East Pakistan and migration therefrom.”

The Minister of Rehabilitation (Shri Mehr Chand Khanna): The matter of migration of Hindus from East Pakistan is already before the House. It has been under discussion since yesterday and my colleague, Shri C. C. Biswas, Minister of Law and Minority Affairs, has already made a detailed statement giving the reasons for the exodus of Hindus from East Pakistan. The Prime

Minister will also be making a statement in this connection. I therefore, do not propose to take the time of the House and would like to seek your permission to lay my statement on the Table of the House. [See Appendix VI annexure No. 1.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (Shri Satya Narayan Sinha): With your permission, Sir, I rise to announce for the information of this Sabha certain changes in the programme of dates for the Voting on Demands for Grants necessitated by the intervention of certain emergent items in the list of business for today.

Voting on Demands for Grants under the control of the Ministry of Rehabilitation will be taken up on Saturday, the 31st March, and concluded on Monday, the 2nd April.

The order and dates for Voting on Demands for other Ministries will remain unchanged except for the Ministry of Education which will be taken up on the 16th April instead of on the 3rd April, and for the Ministry of Finance which will be taken up on the 16th April, as provided, but concluded on the 17th April.

I will announce in due course the date for the consideration of the Budget estimates for 1956-57 for the State of Travancore-Cochin.

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS*

Mr. Speaker: The House will now resume further discussion of the Demands for Grants relating to the Ministry of External Affairs. Out of 8 hours allotted for the Demands of this Ministry, 5 hours and 11 minutes were availed of yesterday and 2 hours and 49 minutes now remain.

Shri N. V. Gadgil will now continue his speech.

Shri Gadgil (Poona Central): When the House rose yesterday, I was stressing the necessity and desirability of not

*Moved with the recommendation of the President.

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taking a panicky or exaggerated view of border incidents which happened just a few days ago. At the same time I emphasised the necessity of keeping a vigilant eye on all that was happening in Kashmir. Obviously, as I stated yesterday, all that was happening was the product of a certain strategy on the part of the Pakistan Government. If the reports in the Press are correct, arms given under the provisions of American Aid were used in course of such raids or border incidents. It is done obviously with some motive and they are trying these new arms which they have got from Washington in order to know the effect so far as the actual use of the arms is concerned and also to know the reactions of the Indian people about it. The whole idea of the Pakistan Government seems to be that having failed to secure a settlement to their satisfaction so far as Kashmir is concerned, they are now trying to negotiate from strength or through strength. As has been rightly pointed out by our Prime Minister, we are not out for a race in armaments, we have and will continue to negotiate on the strength which comes to an individual, or to a nation, when the cause that he stands for is righteous and just. That remains by and large the general aspect of our policy with respect to Kashmir. It is not a question of Kashmir alone, but I think that in the Kashmir dispute, those who are in very little way connected with it are trying to take interest one way or the other—not that they will succeed in turning Kashmir into Korea, but the question of Kashmir must be considered in the larger context of world politics and our policy towards the same. In my humble view, the test of judging whether our foreign policy is correct is whether the ideal that we have set before us so far as international matters are concerned and which is also referred to in the Directive Principles of our Constitution is served or not. Have we been able to further the cause of peace and its maintenance during the last eight years. And if we can answer honestly that we have, then surely the policy we have followed has given us good dividends and is a successful policy. Even in the matter of Kashmir, there is a silver lining. Those who have followed the proceedings of the Central Legislature in Karachi a few days ago will see that in the light of the fact that the Islamic Republic is a sort of controlled democracy, certain views or, I may say, second-thoughts on what has been done

by the authorities in Kashmir with respect to foreign policy were expressed. That is a sign of hope that if not today, at least tomorrow, sanity will return and those who are in charge of affairs in Pakistan will realise that their best friend is not the U.S.A. but Bharat. They may not realise it today; they will realise it tomorrow. But between today and tomorrow, let us not say or do anything on our part that will add bitterness to the situation which is already sufficiently explosive and bitter.

In the international sphere, an event of great importance has occurred, namely, the new line that has been adopted by the Soviet Government. There has been a devaluation of Stalin and Stalinism. Whether it was done all of a sudden or whether it was a product of a process which continued to operate before is a matter of no small importance, but it seems that what they have done is politically correct. And if today they have adopted this line, they are certain that they are not alone in this world so far as the socialist economy is concerned. Twenty or twenty-five years ago theirs was the only country which stood outright for socialism. Today they know that many modern States are socialist and a few are trying to be socialistic. So, their fear is no more so intense as it was, because a socialist State means a State in which the people have a predominant voice, and the people by and large are not interested in disturbing the peace in the world; they definitely stand against war. I am not a psychologist, but very recently a Russian author, by name Gorar, has written a book which deals with the psychology of the national character and temperament of the Russian people. And he has come to the conclusion that the Russian character suddenly goes from one extreme to another like the pendulum and in between there is no such thing as evolutionary process or ordered freedom, but that is explained by certain Russian customs. A Russian child, the author says, is clothed so tightly for the first few months and only when the child is to be given bath or is to be fed, the clothes are removed. The child naturally wants to express through movements of its hands and feet what it feels. That being denied at the very early age, the result is the growth of a sub-conscious hatred or opposition to the environments of the child. And that has gone, according to the Russian author, into the making up of national temperament. Therefore, whenever Russia takes a step either it is this extreme or that extreme.

Whatever it is, we are not concerned with the process. We are concerned with the product. We are not concerned with the subjective aspect; we are concerned with the objective aspect. I think that this new line in the course of a few years will fully work out and it will be to the benefit of maintenance of peace in this world.

Now, I am not exaggerating what we did at Avadi or what we did here in passing a resolution which stated that India's future will be a socialist society. But at the same time, I feel a little pride that some influence of this may have affected them: here is a country which has followed an independent foreign policy and so far as the character of its future society is concerned, it is going to be definitely socialist. Therefore, it will be against war and definitely for the maintenance of peace in this world. I do not want to take any undue credit. Along with many other circumstances and factors that they must have noticed, I cannot help feeling that this step by our country must have played quite a substantial part in that.

Our policy has so far been—it has often been said—not merely that of neutralism but dynamic neutralism. It is not a policy of helplessness but it is a positive policy in which initiative and action have a definite and adequate place. Therefore, the question is whether we should follow it or whether there is any necessity or whether any circumstances have occurred that will justify a review of the same. So far as the long-term aspect is concerned, I am definitely of the considered view that the foundations of our policy have been well laid and we have successfully carried it. If what is happening in the world today is very encouraging, it is, in some small measure, due to our policy.

Now, taking the short-term aspect, it may be, that people will say that there are so many skeletons in the cupboard. There is Ceylon, then Pakistan, Kashmir, this that and the other. In this context, what I would suggest is this. If Kashmir issue has to be negotiated, by all means negotiate it because nothing pleases us more than the matter should be settled in a manner in which it will reflect credit on both parties. That has been, by and large, our attitude throughout these eight years. But if it is to go to and be settled again in the UNO, then, I very respectfully request our Prime Minister and our great leader to consi-

der this. Our original stand was that Pakistan being the aggressor, it must be declared definitely that Pakistan is the aggressor. Unless that declaration comes, we should not move an inch further. We gave up that stand, not finally but we said: all right, that stand should remain in abeyance for the time being because circumstances may be created in which a negotiated settlement might be possible. But if a negotiated settlement is not possible and if something as has been suggested in the speech of the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Karachi where he said that India is the aggressor because they are in Kashmir and if they are the aggressor, surely the use of American armaments and ammunition would be justified, we see how things are manipulated. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary today to insist on our first demand that a declaration should be made that Pakistan is the aggressor. If that is so, certain consequences are bound to follow. But at the same time, our approach for the solution of all outstanding questions through conciliation, through negotiation and exchange of views should be pursued. I do not want to say that we should confer again and again and again. But if it is necessary to confer every fortnight, by all means confer because everybody knows what the alternative is.

I have made two suggestions: one with respect to the exodus of Hindus from East Pakistan and the other for insisting on Pakistan being declared an aggressor because it is a strategic point—a point on which the future development of our relations—between us and Pakistan—depend. If they say that we are aggressors because we are in Kashmir, well, it gives an altogether new aspect to the controversy. I have nothing more to say except, as I said, that we must not be panicky; we must go about with quiet courage and dignity of behaviour because ultimately they will do good to us.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, I have often had the privilege of addressing this House in regard to international affairs. I am afraid I repeat myself on these occasions because I do feel that certain aspects of the changing world today are so important that they should always be borne in mind. So, the House will forgive me if, on this occasion also, I say something which, perhaps, I have said before.

Some little time ago, I made a statement in this House in regard to certain

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very important matters—more especially, the conversations we had with some eminent statesmen who came here. I shall not of course repeat that but I shall have to refer to some of those important matters again.

Acharya Kripalani was good enough to say that our foreign policy was right in principle—the broad objectives and possibly even certain broad achievements—but that we tended to go wrong in regard to details, in regard to tactics to be employed. Other hon. Members opposite criticised it in various ways also.

Now, it is perfectly true that we in our foreign policy or in any other policy have not had a run of success everywhere, that we have met with difficulties and are likely to meet with many more difficulties, that we have faced lack of success in many of our important problems and it may be that if some wise step had been taken previously in regard to some particular problem it would have led to better results. It is so easy to be wise after the event. Nevertheless, I would like the House to remember that all these so-called problems—small problems—are not isolated ones; they are intimately connected with some of the basic problems of the world today. You can hardly separate any problem from these basic conflicts of the world today. Therefore, even a small problem tends to become a big one in its consequence. And to imagine that you can settle any small problem, or one which affects us particularly, without reference to the other aspects, the world aspects is to make a mistake.

Now again, if I may draw the attention of the House to certain very remarkable and basic changes that have taken place and are taking place in the world, and which I believe are changing or will change the whole context of thinking and action in the world in various spheres of activity—you may make your approach as you like; you may call it the development of technology to an extreme degree leading ultimately to the invention and use of the atomic bomb or the hydrogen bomb—I am referring to the hydrogen bomb as an aspect of the development of technology and not as something that will kill and devastate vast numbers of people—it is this development of technology in industrial civilisation which has reached this level of tremendous power which may inflict infinite disaster on humanity and which

may also do enormous good. The mere release of this power—and humanity will use it more and more for good or ill—is a new feature in the world today which upsets all previous thinking. It upsets military thinking. All the textbooks on war that have been written thus far are out of date because of these new factors. That, I think most people recognise. But, perhaps, they do not recognise that it upsets political thinking, or should upset it if we can get out of our grooves, and it upsets economic thinking and all the isms to which we have been attached in the past. We have had a great deal of truth in them, a good measure, but they are out of date. I do venture to say that this tremendous increase in the power available to humanity today has made our previous thinking militarily, politically and economically out of date to some extent and unless we adapt ourselves to this new age which is dawning upon us we shall be left behind and not be able to take advantage of these new conditions or protect ourselves from the new dangers. That is an important basic fact that has to be kept in mind.

Now, one of the results of this new development is that violence and the methods of violence have become so tremendously powerful that, practically speaking, they have become useless and,—it is an extraordinary thing to say,—they have over-reached themselves, that is, if they go on further they are not useless but they destroy.

Take the question of war and disarmament. People have discussed disarmament for years and years past, honest people desiring to put an end to war etc. or at least to lessen the chances of war. But they have never come to an agreement. Why? Because, essentially some party or other thought that war would pay, that war would lead to victory or they have a fair chance of victory and they are not prepared to give up their fair chance of victory in order to achieve certain objectives that they had. Therefore they would not agree to disarmament.

Now for the first time, I would say, in the world's history, it is gradually dawning on people that war does not lead to victory and will not lead to victory in the modern context—I am talking of course of big-scale war. Therefore, for the first time I imagine, the question of disarmament is being considered or will be considered in much more realistic terms than at any time

previously because of this realisation logically. Of course, war is completely ruled out by any reasonable or logical approach because it cannot yield any of the results aimed at and it is bound to—even with the limited knowledge at our disposal in regard to the effects of the use of hydrogen bomb—lead to almost universal disaster. Mind you, there are certain uncertain factors about which we do not know yet but which may even mean something worse. Now, therefore, logically one comes to the conclusion that war should be completely ruled out.

But hon. Members know well enough that life is not completely governed by logic. There are passions and hatreds, fears and apprehensions which come in the way. And so today, even more so than before, we feel the position that logic, reason and good sense tell us the path we should follow and the fears, apprehensions and hatreds tend to push us—not us or our country, I mean the world—in a different direction. Nevertheless, one cannot ultimately ignore reality and the reality is typified by that symbol of the age today, the atom bomb or the hydrogen bomb and the great energy behind it, the tremendous power behind it, the power for destruction in war or otherwise.

This is an important factor which I sometimes, I fear, repeat very much because it is the governing factor of the age today and it is governing it not only in human hands for use political and, I would again repeat, in the economic domain. In fact, all economic thinking has been affected by the tremendous increase in technology, the tremendous advance in technology, the tremendous capacity to produce wealth, or goods, or necessary articles.

Two or three generations back, possibly, nobody could even think of this abundance of goods for everybody—the possibility of it. A hundred years or so ago any economist thought in terms of scarcity. Then came the period when people gradually began to think in terms of some abundance. But the wildest hopes of individuals and prophets have been exceeded by the power of modern technology and modern science to produce wealth and also to produce not only wealth but very very powerful weapons. But it is all in the same line of technological development. Whether you call it happiness on one side or misery and destruction on the other, it is power which they produced and put in human hands for use.

Now, this is the background and in this background any reasonable or logical approach must, therefore, necessarily be away from war and conflict of the violent type. One does not deny that there are many conflicts, social conflicts and the like, in society between nations and the rest. But the solution of those conflicts, big or small, by methods of violence is undesirable. In the big way they are not solved; there have been destruction to both; but in the small way, relatively small way, it is dangerous to apply that method because that might lead you to the bigger conflict so that, what has been said by the prophets and sages in the past, that violence and hatreds etc., are bad morally, has become today the extremely practical method of considering these matters.

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— Morality apart, from the strictly opportunist and the narrowest point of view today, violence is a folly, in a big way or a small way. Naturally, violence will continue in a small way. Man will hate another man in anger. That is a different matter. The point is basically that the high moral outlook of the great men of the past today has become the practical consequence of the developments of the modern age. This is the background.

If it is so, then this business of cold war and anything that leads to cold war also completely lacks sense. It has no meaning, because cold war is only a step to prepare the atmosphere for a hot war. Cold war means the development of hatred and the spirit of violence and the preparation for war violence all the time. It is folly to spend all your energy to do something which you want to avoid doing. It has no meaning. Again, you may do it because of fears and the like. There is always that conflict in peoples' mind. But, it is a wrong policy fundamentally. Logically there can be no dispute about that.

The policy we have followed in this country with more or less success—I do not claim any wonderful success for it; but I do claim, with all respect that it looks in the right direction—tries to work in the right direction. It may make mistakes, it has made mistakes in minor matters, or for the matter of that, in some major matters. But, it does lay emphasis on the right things,—call them what you like,—on the right means. Because of that, it has evoked a certain wide response in peoples mind

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all over the world. I am not for the moment referring to the Governments; certainly, Governments also. We say that we are friendly to all countries. Naturally, the degree of our co-operation with countries differs, because it is a two-way traffic. You cannot co-operate one way. But, our offer of friendship is always there, I hope, with every country, even those who might at present be hostile to us or with whom we may have some problems or conflicts.

Sometimes people, rather with some disdain, refer to our neutralism. I do not think we are neutral. I hope we are not neutral about any vital matter. But, this business of talking about neutrality itself denotes a state of mind which can only think in terms of war. Neutrality is a word which applies to war and belligerency. It is the opposite of belligerency. People have developed a state of affairs in the world where you cannot get out of the war mentality. You talk about belligerency and neutrality. In terms of no war or peaceful conditions, the use of the word 'neutral' is completely out of place. It has no meaning. Why it is used is this. They can only conceive of two basic attitudes in the world today, represented, by and large, by the two great groups of nations which are supposed to be more or less opposed to each other and you are supposed to fall in line with this or that. You have no business to try to find a place for yourself in thought or action. This kind of thing is essentially authoritarian thinking whether it is done by this side or that side. It is also essentially military thinking of war and lining up here or there. I cannot understand how any reasonable person, whatever his views may be,—he may differ from me—should confine his thinking to this military approach to this question. That is one of the misfortunes of the age. The fears and apprehensions which the people have felt have made them think more and more in this confined soldier's way. A soldier is an excellent person. You give him a particular job: do this, fight and defeat the enemy. He tries his best to do it whether he succeeds or not. But, obviously, in politics, and more so, in human life, if you start always making that soldier's approach you will get into difficulties. The world has got into these difficulties because military thinking, military phraseology and methods have been introduced into our political activities. While on this question of neutrality, I would like again to lay stress on this, that a per-

son who considers our political or other activities neutral, in that sense, has completely failed to understand them. I would advise him to try to make another effort to understand them. I would advise him to try to make an effort to get out of his narrow shell of thinking which does not represent the whole of the world. It is desirable for the world that people should think differently from each other and then come together and co-operate. I wanted to lay stress on this background phenomenon.

Today, broadly speaking, if you want to know what the basic world problems are at the present moment, one, of course, is the basic problem, which has led to numerous off shoots, the problem of atomic energy coming into the field. I would connect that with the problem of disarmament which is of exceeding importance. I believe, for the reasons I have stated, that there is a little more hopeful chance of something being achieved in regard to disarmament. Why? Because of this progressive realisation that it does not profit anybody not to do so; in fact, it is harmful. But, I cannot say definitely, of course.

Then, take, for the present, a very explosive region of the world, the western Asia, conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries, the region of the Baghdad pact and the like. Here again, in a sense, the problems, important as they are, are not world problems. But, obviously, they are so inter-related with world problems that some kind of upset or explosion there will affect the world and one does not know exactly what might happen. The fact of the matter is that in the 19th century, a certain not very happy equilibrium was established in the world by the dominance of certain European powers practically all over the world. That continued till the beginning of the First World War. The First World War upset that equilibrium in many ways,—political, economic. Some empires vanished. The period between the two World Wars intervened, a troubled period, a difficult one. Always an attempt has been made to find some equilibrium and it has been a failure. The Second World War came and upset the old 19th century balances still more. Ever since then, the world has been grouping about to find some equilibrium. Meanwhile, apart from the emergence of these great giants, America and the Soviet Union, in terms of material power, this atomic energy comes in—another upsetting factor.

Now, the countries which enjoyed the privileged position in that 19th century set-up, many of them, have lost their position—at least that particular position. It is not easy for them to adjust themselves to the new thinking, the new balances in the world, the new balances—apart from the giants coming up—and the new renaissance in Asia and Asian countries becoming independent in their different ways, whether it is India or China or Indonesia or Burma or other countries. The old balances go on being changed and Governments, and very wise Governments cannot easily keep pace with those practical developments. Of course, the most remarkable fact about this lack of recognition of changes is the fact that some great countries still seem to lack awareness, proper awareness, that a great country like China is there. Of course they know it. Nevertheless they seem to lack something, or, otherwise, their policy would be different.

But it is not merely a question of China. It is really a question of the outlook on all Asian problems or African problems and the idea that, as previously they have to be settled by the great powers whom we all respect, hardly taking into consideration what the countries of Asia might feel about it. There has been a slight change, and the countries of Asia are sometimes asked about it, or, may be that they have been even allowed to sit in the corner of the council chamber. But the fundamental fact, this basic conception, still remains—that it is the duty, the responsibility and obligation of these great countries of the western world to carry the burden of the world, of Asia and Africa; like weary Titans they face all these problems and carry this burden of Asia when progressive Asia does not want them to carry that burden.

So, this kind of difficulty is there, and facts and events have gone on, bringing about enormous changes and yet, the mind of man cannot keep pace, and it keeps in the old ruts. I am not blaming anybody outside, but we ourselves, all of us, are equally guilty of this. We go on using the same clichés, the same slogans which bear no meaning today; but we go on repeating them. Some of our friends opposite—Shri H. N. Mukherjee—cannot forget the Commonwealth and our being in the Commonwealth. He thinks probably that is the root of evil. Well, I have often spoken on this subject. We are in the Commonwealth, I think, because it is good for us and

good for the causes which we wish to support and because it does not come in our way at all, in the policies that we pursue, and it is—and might be helpful. We are in the Commonwealth because we welcome every kind of association with other countries, provided it does not come in the way of our policies. We have other associations with other countries, in Asia and Europe, which are as close and sometimes closer than our association with the countries of the Commonwealth—our neighbouring countries of Burma, Indonesia or some European countries like Yugoslavia or others. We have very close relations with them in every way. They are not labelled by something. Remember this: every type of alliance, whatever it may be, is restrictive. It may be helpful, but it is restrictive. I welcome this type of Commonwealth connection, because it is not an alliance, because there is no restrictive feature in it, and because one can go one's way. I would like this type of association—not in the Commonwealth, I mean—but this type of free association to take place all over the world, in other countries. It is far better than that alliance type, and of course, it is infinitely better than the military alliance which is always, inevitably, a challenge to some other country and comes in the way of our friendship with other countries. Therefore, I would beg this House to consider that this has nothing to do with our liking a country or disliking it. In the Commonwealth there are some countries which are, or rather, with whom our relations are not very friendly at present. There is Pakistan. I want friendly relations with Pakistan and it is inevitable that sometime or the other, we have to have them.

Take another country which does not really concern us very much. There is South Africa. Our relations with South Africa are nil. It does not affect us. It does not affect our being in the Commonwealth or not being in it, except that in a temper one might do this or that. It is not a good thing for an individual, much less for a nation, to go about functioning in a temper.

Now, it may be perhaps thought—I am not quite sure—that it might be embarrassing for us to function with South Africa, to function in the United Nations and walk out of the United Nations, because South Africa is there or because Portugal is there. It may be embarrassing. On the other hand, it might also be that our being there might not be terribly welcomed by the other

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parties and they might find it very embarrassing in the pursuit of their policies. Any how, my submission is that any kind of contact that we have with another country, whatever that country, is a good thing provided it does not come in the way and restrict our progress in any direction in which we wish to go forward.

I think that the Commonwealth connection is definitely helpful in some wider causes we have at heart including the cause of peace. Tomorrow, six months later or nine months later—I do not know—some other countries may come into the Commonwealth, some African countries like Gold Coast, and Nigeria a little later. It will be an occasion of some historical significance, I think, when a purely African country like Gold Coast attains independence and functions with equality among other independent and relatively important countries. We want to encourage that tendency. May be that our presence there does encourage it, the various developments in Africa. It is true,—and hon. Members have reminded me,—why this is happening in the Commonwealth or in Africa or somewhere else. They ask, “What are you going to do about it”? Obviously we cannot do much or perhaps anything at all in regard to many things. It does not do good for a Government or as an individual for me to go about denouncing all the things that we dislike. Then all my life would be spent in denouncing things that I dislike! So there are so many things that one does not like to say or do in this world. One has to put up with them till the time comes when you can say or do things which can be useful. Therefore, I submit that at any time it would be bad for us to follow a policy of just hitting out verbally or otherwise, more especially in the present day. With all these new forces at work, new ideas new powers, it has become necessary to seek as many friendly contacts as possible to spread the area of friendship and to lessen the area of conflict. Our policy is directed to that end. Naturally in regard to those problems that we have, our own problems, we have to deal with them to the best of our ability. Naturally also, it is not possible always to fit in practice with theory. Sometimes one has to adapt these things in the best possible way, in the best way open to one, but the theory, the objective and the method should always be kept clearly in mind and one should not just allow the theory to be kept as something to

be used, let us say, for public purposes, to delude people and go in the opposite direction.

Now, that are our immediate problems? I was talking about the international problems and I mentioned Western Asia, Israel, Egypt and disarmament, the Baghdad Pact. There is, of course, SEATO. And then there is the question of China and Indo-China, and the most important world problem of all, the economic growth of the parts of the world that are under-developed. It is of vital importance.

Just a word about the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. I spoke about it the other day. It is clear that if the analysis that I have ventured to place before the House is at all correct, then any approach by military pacts, any approach like that of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO is a wrong approach, is a dangerous approach, is a harmful approach. It creates, it sets in motion all the wrong tendencies and prevents the right tendencies from developing. I may be wrong in my premises, but if my premises are correct, it inevitably follows that this is so, and it is a matter of little consequence to me whether you suspect any country of dishonesty or lack of *bona fides*. You may consider its policy to be hypocritical. You should take every factor into consideration. But if you adopt the right policy, having regard to certain world factors, the question of a particular country functioning not with complete honesty does not make too much difference. The point is you should be honest in your policy, and if you are honest and straightforward, you may be tripped, of course, you may make a mistake, but fundamentally you will not fall into error. SEATO and Baghdad Pacts, apart from their being, I think, basically in the wrong direction affect us intimately and in a sense tend to encircle us from two or three directions. And also, as the House knows, certainly the Baghdad Pact has, in fact, created in Western Asia far greater tension and conflict than ever before. It has certainly put one country against another country, the countries that were friendly to each other. Now, how anyone can say that this has brought security and stability to Western Asia I do not know.

Hon. Members know, talking about the Baghdad Pact, or for the matter of that SEATO too, that it is said to be the Northern or middle tier of defence, and presumably it is meant for defence against aggression if it takes place from

the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee which country will commit aggression, which will not. Every great country and every powerful country tends to expand and tends to be somewhat aggressive. It is very, very difficult for a giant not to function sometimes as a giant. One can guard oneself as much as possible. One can create an atmosphere so that the giant will function mildly or not aggressively and all that, but it is inherent in a giant's strength that he should somehow try to use that strength if he does not like something, whichever giant of the world you might apply that to in whatever way. But, surely nobody here imagines that, let us say, the Pakistan Government entered this Pact because they expected some imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union. It is obviously not so. And if we read the Pakistan newspapers or read the statements made by responsible people in Pakistan, they make it perfectly clear they have done so because of India, because either—if you like, you may put it this way—they are rather apprehensive of India, or because they want to develop strength and, as the phrase now goes speak with strength: Whatever it is, they have joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO essentially because of their hostility to India. I am sorry because I do not feel hostility towards them and I cannot conceive of a war with Pakistan without the utmost dismay, but there it is. My point is that people enter into these pacts, countries enter into them, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, and I can mention others too in various parts of the world, with different motives. I am quite sure that the other members of the Baghdad Pact have no hostility to India. Obviously they have not entered into the Baghdad Pact because of their feeling against India, as I am equally sure that India was the motive thought of Pakistan when it entered this Pact—India as well as perhaps some others—so that these different motives come in. I am prepared to accept completely the assurance given to me by the leaders of the United States of America. I am quite sure they did not mean ill. They did not think even probably of India in this connection. Their minds were elsewhere, on the northern, western and middle tiers of defence. But the effect is the same, and the effect is you get tied up, you get interlocked. Countries get interlocked with each other, each pulling in different directions and in a crisis you are pulled away in a direction you never thought of going.

Look at the series of alliances and military pacts in this whole region of South-East and Eastern Asia. It is almost as bad, I must say, as these big, international trusts and combines. We do not quite know who is pulling where. Things are happening but nobody appears to be responsible. The danger of it, apart from the essential danger of any pact, is any odd member of one of these pacts can set in motion something which would gradually pull in not only the members of that pact, but some other inter-related pact of which they are common members, and so the whole thing goes into a turmoil. So, naturally both for larger reasons and for narrow reasons of self-interest, we took exception, and we do take exception to the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. We think,—I may repeat,—that they push the world in a wrong direction. They do not recognise that new factors are working. Instead of taking advantage of these new factors which go towards disarmament and lessening of tension and towards peace, they deliberately check them and encourage the other factors which increase hatred and fear and apprehension and come in the way of disarmament. I do not understand how any person can equate military pacts and alliances with the approach to disarmament.

Now, if I may say so, there are two types of alliances and treaties. Personally I would rather have none of them, of any type, but I can understand an alliance or some kind of a treaty between countries which have been or are opposed to each other. Broadly speaking, this type of agreement is referred to often as the Locarno agreement, because at Locarno, in the late twenties, the victorious Allies, England, France, America etc., came to terms with their old enemy Germany, enemy of the First World War. Now, there was some meaning in that, because that meant the coming together of those who had been hostile, and therefore it released tension. I happened to be at the time in Geneva—I think it was in 1926,—when Germany was welcomed for the first time into the League of Nations. The future, of course, was hidden, the Second World War and all that. Anyhow, there was the Locarno treaty, and Germany came in. There was much embracing between the German delegates and the French delegates on that occasion in the League of Nations hall.

I say that that type of agreement has some meaning. It takes you somewhere,

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and mind you, it gives you an assurance, it gives each country an assurance that if any member of that group breaks the law or breaks the treaty, the others would come down upon it. That is an equal assurance to every member. But in regard to the other type of treaty, that is, if a group of allies representing one side binds itself together against the other, then obviously the first effect of it is to create a reaction, which leads the other group of allies to bind itself together in another hostile group. So, it leads to hostile groups. It does not bring us peace or security at all. It is not for me to say whether it is not justified; it may be justified in some cases in self-protection, but normally speaking, it seems to me that it will lead us away from the creation of that feeling of security etc.

There is one larger thing which I should like to refer to, namely, this question of the economic growth of the under-developed parts of the world, which is intimately connected with political conditions, intimately connected with the question of giving aid or not, political pressures exercised, military pressures exercised, and which has almost been considered not purely from the economic angle but from the political angle also.

It is obvious that if this imbalance continues between the very rich countries and the poor, apart from being a source of misery and unhappiness, it will be continuously a source of trouble and conflict, and might lead to conflicts, so that it has to be remedied even from the point of view of the richer countries. Now, there is nothing wrong about the richer countries, from their own point of view or from any other, helping to remove it, giving aid to the development of those countries. But it may be that some element of wrong comes in in the manner of doing it; it produces wrong results.

In this connection, I should like to refer to a proposal with which India has been associated for some time, a proposal before the United Nations; and it is still being discussed; in fact, I think, in about six weeks' time there is a meeting in New York to discuss it further. This is known in the modern way of capital letters as SUNFED, SUNFED meaning Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. You will notice perhaps that the word 'Special' was put in there; if 'S' was not there, then it became 'UNFED', which

was very unfortunate. So, 'S' was put in to avoid this.

In the last three or four years, our representatives in the United Nations have been persuading us, the idea being that help to the more undeveloped nations should come through international agencies, and not so much by bilateral arrangements which tend to have political consequences. We have met with enormous difficulties. The great Powers, whoever they might be, do not like this way of doing things. They like to distribute largess to the poor and needy, and have not only the mental satisfaction of having done good but also that of knowing that the other knows that they have done good to it, and may be, getting something in exchange.

We have arrived at a stage now; even now, it has not been decided, but at last we have arrived at a stage where various countries, all the other countries, have been asked to give their reactions to this proposal and these reports are going to be considered in about six weeks' time in New York.

I mention this because I attach a good deal of importance to this proposal for SUNFED, because it will bring about gradually and completely, I hope, a different relationship between the giver and the taker, which will be advantageous to both, certainly to the taker, but also to the giver, because then it is done impersonally through international organisations, and there is not this giving of largess by one country to another, and sometimes with political strings attached.

Coming to our own major problems.—I am not referring to the world problems now—of course, there are problems with Pakistan—Kashmir, this tremendous exodus which is coming from East Bengal etc. There are the two other old problems, the canal waters and evacuees. There is this question of border troubles. Then, apart from this, there are the other problems. There is the problem of South Africa, of course; it is always there, the problem of people of Indian descent in South Africa. There is the question of Goa. There is the question of Ceylon. I am not going into these in any detail; hon. Members know them pretty well.

I wish to say something about some issues with Pakistan.

We are also entangled—it is not our problem, but we are entangled—in the Indio-China problems, because of our co-chairmanship of the international

commission there. More specially, difficulties have arisen in South Viet Nam, because the present Government in South Viet Nam refuse to recognise, refuse to accept their responsibilities flowing from the Geneva agreement on the ground that they did not sign the agreement. True, they did not sign it, but they are a successor government to the French, and the French signed it. They have accepted all the advantages of that agreement, and they still continue to enjoy the advantages of that agreement, but till now, they have not accepted the obligations. Well, that puts us in a very difficult position, because we are in Indo-China or in Viet Nam because of the Geneva agreement. If the Geneva agreement is not accepted, then we have no place there, and we have simply to pack up and come back. It is an easy thing for us to pack up and come back, but we know that if the international commission is ended, it is likely to lead to trouble; the conflict will again be there. And we do not wish nor does anybody else wish that we should walk out in this way. Even the South Viet Nam Government are very anxious that we should remain there, and yet thus far they have not made it very easy for us to remain, because of their non-recognition of their obligations. Naturally, I spoke about this matter at some length to the three distinguished statesmen who came here, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who with Mr. Molotov is co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pineau. Of course I do not know how things will develop. But there have been some hopeful signs recently that the South Viet-Nam Government might accept the obligations flowing from the Geneva Agreement and thus make it easier for us to function.

Meanwhile, another difficulty has arisen, which has nothing to do with that, which is not directly our concern. Cambodia, which has practically gone out of the ken of the International Commission—not entirely but practically; there are only some minor matters to be dealt with—has been asserting with some force that it will not adhere to any power bloc, and it wants friendly relations with other countries. Perhaps, as a result of this, it is not in too happy a position with some of its neighbours, South Viet-Nam on the one side and Thailand on the other. Whatever the reason may be, there is a kind of closure of the borders there, and partly some kind of economic blockade.

I should come now to some of our problems with Pakistan. The facts are well known—I am referring for the moment to this exodus. I really do not know what I could say at this stage profitably to the House. My colleagues, the Minister of Law and Minority Affairs and the Minister of Rehabilitation, have stated the facts before this House in some detail. It is clear that this continuing major migration is something of tremendous significance. Apart from the great burden on us, it is a matter of tremendous significance, and in the ultimate analysis, it is not merely a matter of casting a huge burden on us but, I believe, of harming Pakisan greatly too. Do not imagine that this kind of migration is ultimately good for the country from which it comes. I have no doubt that the past migration from East Bengal has hit East Pakistan hard. The quality of it has gone down. Naturally, when trained people, skilled people, go out, the quality suffers. It is not numbers that count; it is quality that matters. And a good deal of quality has come out of East Pakistan.

If you go back to history, you will see that one of the reasons of the advance of England towards industrialisation was the fact that religious wars drove out very prosperous weavers from France and that part of Europe to England, and those people then became the persons through whom gradually industrialisation, inventions and the like developed. So it is a very very short-sighted policy for those in Pakistan to imagine that seizing hold of this house, this property and this job here and there and driving out people who have played an important part in the economic life of the country—I am leaving out the political aspect—would be good for them.

I think it was Shri Gadgil who made a suggestion—it has been made before—about asking them for land. You may, of course, ask but one doesn't ask for things which patently are going to be refused and for which one has no means of getting by other ways. Ultimately, no country gives up land. Why should they? If they are prepared to give up land, they could very well settle the people on that land. It is not that. It is a question of dealing with this matter in other ways, so far as one can.

Undoubtedly, a situation has arisen, I believe, when the leaders of Pakistan themselves realise the extreme gravity of

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all that is happening. I do not think myself that it is the Government of Pakistan or even, if I may say so, the present Government of East Bengal, that wants to encourage this, but I do say that it is the large number of minor officials and others who have very probably encouraged this—apart from economic conditions and the like.

I have taken a good deal of the time of the House, but there is one matter I should like to deal with slightly more fully, and that is Kashmir. There has been in the past so much said, so many papers written, so many reports made about Kashmir that so far as we are concerned, we have got, I think, about 10 fat printed volumes of these papers. It is quite impossible to keep pace with them or to remember these thousands of papers and other things that have been written. Therefore, there is possibly a tendency, not in this House, but generally, of forgetting certain basic facts. I am surprised at the ignorance often shown by eminent foreign observers and by the foreign Press. Whether it is an assumed ignorance or not, I do not know, but there it is.

Therefore, I want just to refresh the memory of this House by repeating a few of the salient facts. Hon. Members will forgive me if I do not mention everything, because I cannot,—and I do not want anyone to criticise me afterwards, 'Oh, he did not mention that'—there are too many things, the story is too long a one. But basically, it begins in the last half of October 1947 when there was an invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State through Pakistan and by Pakistan. Now, there can be no doubt about this aggression by Pakistan. There are many factors which may be argued about; we say one thing and Pakistan may say another. But there are some facts which, I believe are above argument. They are established. Of course, some person may argue about everything. But broadly speaking, one may treat them as established—those facts.

Now, the first established fact is that there was aggression by Pakistan in October 1947 resulting in widespread killing, destruction and loot. This, being the initial fact governing this whole Kashmir affair, must be remembered, because everything subsequently flowed from it and everything and every decision that may be taken, every consideration that may be given to the Kashmir

problem, has always to keep this basic fact in mind.

Quite apart from the position of India in regard to Kashmir—I shall go into that a little later—one thing is perfectly clear that there was no shadow of justification for Pakistan to be there, to commit this aggression.

Now, the second fact to be remembered is that legally and constitutionally, Pakistan acceded to India. There is no doubt about it. I am sorry I meant Kashmir.

Shri Kamath (Hoshangabad): Shape of things to come.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: This also is an undoubted fact. You may criticise the speed with which this was done, the manner of it, but the fact is that, legally and constitutionally, the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India. Therefore, it became the duty of the Indian Union to defend, to protect, Kashmir from aggression and drive out the invaders. I would go a step further and say that even if Kashmir had not acceded to India, even then it would be our duty to defend it. I am trying to develop a constitutional argument in stating the point (*Interruption*). It is because of India being a continuing entity. That is, we were India and we are India and a part of it went out, opted out, let us say, and became Pakistan. We allowed it to opt out. Now, whatever did not opt out remained with India till such time as something was done, some decision was taken. That is, our responsibilities continued in regard to every part of what was India until that part deliberately and positively became not India. I am even taking into consideration that no final decision had been taken about Kashmir's accession to India; but the fact that it was not in Pakistan itself cast a duty upon us to protect it against any attack. But, however, this point does not arise because in effect it did accede to India.

Remember that all this was in the first 3 or 4 months of our independence. With our background, we were very anxious to avoid military operations. We had to send some troops to Pakistan—I am sorry I am getting mixed up—to Kashmir and I well remember the tremendous concern and anxiety with which we considered this question. For two days we considered it. The first day, that is, the day after we got news of this invasion—the next day we met in the Defence Committee and considered it for hours. We were in a very difficult

position because we could not obviously and easily send any help. We did not have any proper Air Force then—even aircraft. Then, we waited for a day and a half and when we heard further news of this destruction and loot etc., at great risk and with great difficulty, it was decided—I think at 6 p.m. in the evening in our Defence Committee—to intervene knowing that it was a very difficult work and involved great risks for us. And, all the night preparations were made to send some of our forces—not many of them. I think we could altogether send some two or three hundred. We had no aircraft; we had to stop all the private airlines and use them and at six o'clock next morning we sent these 250 or odd people.

At that time we did not know—though we knew that Pakistan was aiding and abetting these persons—that we were to come face to face with the Pakistan Army. We thought that we will be fighting the tribal people and we thought that 200 or 300 would be enough to deal with the tribal people. If I may say so, it was a piece of organisational work for the decision having been taken at 6 o'clock in the evening and by 5 o'clock the next morning they were gone. It is not very big if you are an organised country but just after independence and when everything was in a state of flux it was a difficult thing. These 250 or so arrived there almost at the last moment. If they had arrived, may be, 12 hours later, it might have been too late. That is so far as the city of Srinagar was concerned.

Then other things happened and these people and some other forces that went gradually drove out those tribal invaders from the valley, up a little above the valley up to a place called Uri, where suddenly they found something much more than the tribal people. They found the Pakistan Army entrenched there in Kashmir territory. Obviously, it became difficult for our small force—which was at that time perhaps about a thousand or so—to push out an entrenched regular Army. Since then, of course, operations took place between the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army, these tribal folk faded and they did not count for much.

When we saw this, we gave a great deal of thought to it. As you know, as the House knows, ultimately we referred the matter to the Security Council. Many people have criticised us for doing that. As I said, it is easy to be wise after the event. But, I think, it was a right

step to take and there is not doubt in my mind that the matter would have gone there whether we took it or somebody else took it.

Shri Kamath : Did Mahatma Gandhi advise against it ?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru : The hon. Member has mentioned Mahatma Gandhi's name. I do not like to bring in his name but as the hon. Member has mentioned it I shall say something about him in this connection.

When this first invasion took place in Kashmir and we sent our soldiers, I was very greatly worried. All our upbringing had been against war and for peace and our plunging in here and taking these risks of war developing upset me very much. And, naturally, I went to Mahatma Gandhi to seek his advice. I did not wish to drag him into this picture but I could not help doing it as long as he was here. And, his advice was that in the circumstances it was the duty of India to go to the rescue of Kashmir and to go to the rescue of Kashmir with arms, with Armed Forces.

Shri Kamath : My point was the reference to the United Nations.

1 P.M.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru : Subsequently, when we had decided or were considering the question of our going to the United Nations, I remember taking to him the draft which we had prepared of the memorandum for the United Nations and showing it to him and consulting him about the phraseology of it and I think he made some suggestions in regard to which we tried to embody. It is not fair for me now or at any time to take shelter under Gandhiji's advice in this matter and I do not wish the House to imagine that I am doing so. But the hon. Member opposite suddenly mentioned his name. I only wish to say that the decision was ours, not his, but at no time did I lose touch with him or his counsel in this matter. And we tried to adapt our own views as far as we could in the circumstances under his advice. When this went to the Security Council, they put in long memoranda and they were supported later by very very long speeches. In these memoranda it was stated very stoutly and very strongly that Pakistan had not committed any aggression, any invasion, nor had it aided or abetted anybody to commit aggression. There

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was an absolutely complete and total denial of what we said. Having done that, they brought in all kinds of other issues; they talked about genocide, not in Kashmir but in Delhi, Punjab and all over; they talked about Junagadh and some other States in Kathiawar.

Shri Gadgil : Manavdar.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru : In fact, the greater part of the memoranda was dealing not with the Kashmir issue, which they slurred over and about which they said they had nothing to do with, but with other matters. It will be interesting for the House to remember that they said to the Security Council, "You must consider and decide all these questions—genocide, Junagadh, etc., and they must be decided together with Kashmir simultaneously. I am repeating all this to show the mental attitude of Pakistan, first the complete denial of everything, and only a little later they had to admit these things which they had denied, and then trying to divert the mind of the Security Council to complete the other problems which we have not mentioned and which did not arise in that connection. I must confess that I was very much taken aback by this tissue of lies that have been put forward by the Pakistan representative before the Security Council. Naturally, we tried to answer that in terms of fact; we produced pictures and what, not. It is interesting for this House to know that lately, in the last year or so, there have been quite a number of statements from prominent people in Pakistan, in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, giving details of how they organised this raid from Pakistan, not only details but demands made by one party in the North West Frontier Province on the other for the amount spent in organising it and trying to recover it. Also, only recently, there was a statement by one of the leading officers of a case admitting it. I am merely pointing out how Pakistan was basing its case in the Security Council; it is something which can only be described as completely false and they had to admit it as false later. When the U. N. Commission came here, then it became quite impossible for Pakistan to say that their forces were not there—because the U.N. Commission would see them there. It was then that they admitted that their forces were there. They said it subsequently, not originally. They might have mentioned it in the U.N. debate which was taking place only a

little before; they did not do so. It was, only under compulsion, when they were going to be found out completely, that they admitted it. In the U.N. Resolution, I think, on the 13th August 1948, it was stated—

"The Commission recognise that as the presence of troops in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation, since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State."

This was the Commission's recommendation. Please observe the language; it is mildly put. "As the presence of troops in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State"—it is a mild way of saying that they had told a lie in the Security Council there and they found the troops here—a material change in the situation as it was represented. Privately the Commission people told us that of course all this was falsely stated, it was complete aggression, but they added, "We have come here to settle the matter peacefully and if we go about publicly condemning everybody, it will become difficult to settle it." So, they tried to avoid giving expression clearly on their decision on aggression, which they admitted and which, in fact, indirectly they stated too.

The point now to remember is that because of this admission of aggression, the first thing they required was for Pakistan to withdraw its armed forces from the area of the State occupied by it. That was the first thing. There was a great deal of talk about plebiscite and a good deal of talk as to what India should and should not do. But throughout this period, the first demand of the United Nations has been in every respect the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from that area occupied by them. Other factors came later. We were asked later to withdraw the bulk of our forces, that is, on Pakistan withdrawing from that area, we were asked, to relieve tension, to withdraw the bulk of our forces, but retain our army in the State in order to give it protection. The right of our army to be there was recognised, but it was stated that since Pakistan is withdrawing completely from Jammu and Kashmir State, India also can reduce her forces

as that would tend to bring about a better atmosphere. It is agreed, but the point I wish the House to remember is that the first essential should be the withdrawal of Pakistan armed forces from that area of the State which they had occupied. Today, 8½ years after that, those armed forces are still there. All this talk of plebiscite and other things is completely beside the point. In fact, those questions only arose when Pakistan had taken a certain step, that is, withdrawal of armed forces. And Pakistan is out of court till it performed its primary duty by getting out of that part of the Jammu State on which it committed aggression. This is a major fact to be remembered. Many attempts were made during these years—discussions etc.—to deal with the conditions laid down in the U.N. Resolution; I am not going into all that detail. I have mentioned one essential thing. There were many other conditions—prerequisites—to plebiscite. Well, many attempts were made. They did not yield results. I am not going into detail as to whose fault it was. The fact is that they did not yield results. It has been found that the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State could not remain continually in a state of suspended animation in regard to Kashmir; something has to be done. Years have passed and then certain steps were taken by the Jammu and Kashmir Government with the concurrence of the Government of India, to elect, to convene a Constituent Assembly. That was done. We staid even then that actually the Constituent Assembly was free to decide any constitution it liked but we made it clear that we continued to be bound by our international commitments.

More years passed and while on the one hand Pakistan continued to occupy a part of the State on which they had committed aggression, the Constituent Assembly proceeded to draw up the Constitution of the State and passed very important measures of land reforms; great development works were undertaken and the people of the State, except those under the forcible occupation of Pakistan, made progress. Jammu and Kashmir experienced more prosperity under their own Government than they had at any time previously in living memory or before. A very simple test of this is the number of visitors who had gone to Kashmir last year. An unprecedented number of 50,000 went there: at no time, even during the war, had such numbers gone there.

Eight or nine years have passed and these major changes took place and the Kashmir people were settled. I cannot speak with authority about the other side and the changes that have taken place there. The Governor-General of Pakistan—I mean, now the President—and others repeatedly talk about the abject slavery of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State under their present regime. I really do not know why they should talk in this irresponsible manner. Jammu and Kashmir State is not a closed book on the subject. 50,000 tourists went there and if there is one thing which is very established, it is this that the State has never been so prosperous before.

It is not for me to say what the state of people on the other side of the cease-fire line is. But I notice that there is a continuous attempt by people on that side to come over to this side to share in the prosperity.

Well, all this was happening and we were discussing various ways with the Prime Minister of Pakistan and a new development took place. This was the promise of military aid from the USA to Pakistan—a promise which was subsequently fulfilled. This created not only a new military situation but a new political situation; and the procedure thus far followed by us became out of date and had to be viewed a fresh. That situation has become progressively worse because of the flow of this military aid to Pakistan and the conclusion of SEATO and the Baghdad Pacts. In our discussing or considering this question of Kashmir with Pakistan representatives and others, apart from legal and constitutional issues, we have this practical aspect of it in mind; that is, we wanted to promote the happiness and freedom of the people of Kashmir and we wanted to avoid any step being taken which would be disruptive, which would upset things which had settled down and which might lead to migration of people this way or that way and which further, if that happened, would again lead to conflict with Pakistan which we wanted to avoid; because, while we were desirous of settling this Kashmir problem with Pakistan, there was no settlement of the Kashmir problem if that itself—the manner of settling itself—would lead to conflict with Pakistan. So, this is an important consideration; because, as things settle down, any step which might have been logical some years back becomes more and more difficult; it means uprooting of things that

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have become fixed—legally, constitutionally and practically.

We pointed this out last time when the Prime Minister of Pakistan came here. I pointed this out: "You can talk to me; you have talked for the last five or six years about these pre-conditions laid down previously in the UN Resolution. We have not come to an agreement. The departure of the Pakistan armed forces itself has not taken place. I am prepared to talk to you, if you like, on the subject but it is not very likely that, when we have failed for the last five or six years, we are likely to come to a rapid agreement, more especially when new factors have come." They came in a little later—these factors, military aid, etc., which have changed the situation completely and all our previous discussions had to be abandoned because the basis of discussion has changed—the military aspect, apart from the political aspect. I said: 'You must recognise facts as they are. It is no good proceeding on the basis of old things ignoring the existing facts'.

Meanwhile, another thing was happening. Constitutional developments have taken place both in our Constitution and that of the Jammu and Kashmir State. As perhaps hon. Members will remember; we have in our Constitution laid down that we could not agree to any change in regard to the Jammu and Kashmir State without the concurrence of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly. That is the constitutional position. I pointed this out to the distinguished representatives from Pakistan who came here.

I will mention it; it is not directly concerned with us but it did somewhat concern the people of Kashmir indirectly. It was a development in West Pakistan—that is, the creation of one unit in West Pakistan. Now, as a consequence of all these factors, I have made it quite clear to the Pakistan representatives that while I am prepared to discuss any aspect of this question, if they want to be realistic, they must accept the changes and they must take into consideration all that had happened during these seven or eight years and not talk in terms of eight or nine years ago. Well, they did not quite accept that position and there the matter ended.

Now, the only alternative, I said, was a continuing dead-lock in our talks. I had offered sometime back a no-war declaration to the Pakistan Government: that, under no circumstances, would

India and Pakistan go to war for the settlement of any dispute. There was considerable correspondence. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who was then the Prime Minister, did not agree to that because he said: 'Before you make that declaration, you must settle the questions at issue or you must agree to their being settled—inevitably settled or automatically settled, rather—by some process like arbitration, etc.'. I pointed out to him that I would very gladly settle these questions but they had already made various attempts and they could not succeed. I thought that by a no-war declaration a new atmosphere would be created which would help us in settling them. I said, let us consider advance in both lines. Further I said, when you talk to me to bind myself down to a strict schedule the question of dispute arises. When a dispute arises it is referred for conciliation for one month, may be two months, one month more for mediation, or two months and then arbitration. Within 4 or 5 months it is over. I said, I am not aware of any country having committed itself to arbitration about any problem, political or other, that might be raised in the future. I said I am not aware of this because when we fix our sovereignty it fixes matters of high State policies which can only be considered by the countries concerned. There are many other questions which can be settled otherwise. So, to ask us to commit ourselves in the future in this way was not a wise or feasible approach. There the matter ended.

Now, the present Prime Minister of Pakistan has again mentioned this matter and I gladly welcome his proposal. But it is clear that we must not tie us in a no-war declaration with all kinds of conditions etc. Then you get the same vicious circle, you must settle first and then make a no-war declaration, if you settle everything then it is not necessary to have a no-war declaration and this business of trying to commit us to arbitration.

I want to be quite frank with this House and with the Pakistan Government. Having had 9 years of this Kashmir affairs in changing phases and this problem affecting certainly the people of Jammu and Kashmir State, affecting India in a variety of ways, affecting our Constitution and our sovereignty, affecting our vital interests, am I to be expected to agree to some outside authority becoming an arbitrator in this matter?

Some Hon. Members : No.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru : I cannot understand. No country can agree to this kind of disposal of vital issues. But I do think that since we both agreed,—both Pakistan authorities and we,—that on no account should we go to war at each other, that we should settle our problems peacefully, they may not be settled for some time. It is better to have a problem pending than to go to war for it. Therefore, it would be a very desirable thing, a helpful thing, to have a no-war declaration.

One thing more. The Pakistan President said with great force that in all these border incidents, in every one of them, India was guilty. Well, any number of incidents have occurred. I cannot discuss each one of them, and it may be that even if I have one case they may have another in regard to it. But at least in regard to 10 incidents on the Jammu border the United Nations Observers stated that Pakistan was the aggressor. So I take their word for it. But again I would repeat what I said here in my statement the other day, about the Nekeval incident. The Nekeval incident stands out in a stark manner not because 12 persons were killed—that is bad enough—but in the way it has been dealt with by the Pakistan Government. Now, the present President of the Pakistan Republic was in Delhi when we received the report of the U.N. Observers in regard to this incident. It was handed over to him and to the then Prime Minister. They assured us, and in fact the Prime Minister stated in public, that they would deal with and punish those who were found guilty by the U.N. Observers. This is not our opinion which might be challenged by Pakistan. This was the opinion of the U.N. Observers after an enquiry. Anyhow, they had themselves said that they would carry out the job and punish the guilty. I am astonished that an year or more has passed and nothing has been done. I am still further astonished that statements should be made that we are the aggressors in all these incidents.

I am afraid I have taken a great deal of the time of the House, but I did wish to refer to the Kashmir matter in some details and to bring out some basic facts. I hope that the Pakistan Government and the people will consider these basic facts and realise that we mean no ill to them—to Pakistan. It will be absurd for us to mean any ill to them because our prosperity is connected with their prosperity. We want to be friends with them. We want to settle all our

problems in a friendly way and I am sure we can settle them if our approach is a friend's approach.

Shri N. C. Chatterjee (Hooghly) : Mr. Speaker, my friend to my left Prof. Mukherjee, was telling me that when we hear the Prime Minister delivering his eloquent speeches on foreign policy we generally have a Sunday-school feeling. We get strong doses of idealism, emotion and high-sounding principles. This time, I must admit, the Prime Minister has come down from giddy heights to *terra firma* and has said something which is more realistic and a little more objective.

But, Sir, coming from Bengal I must say that I am thoroughly disappointed because he did not give us any indication of his policy how he would tackle the terrible problem of the mounting migration of uprooted humanity which was crossing the border from Pakistan.

Yesterday we listened to the Law Minister and we heard one of his usual pathetic admission of complete futility and utter helplessness. It has become almost an annual feature for this Minority Minister to come here and to say that "we have appealed to Pakistan, we have addressed letters and sent reminders but we have received no satisfactory reply and nothing has happened." I wish he had not taken up our time by quoting from some of the replies he had got from Pakistan. I wish they had gone in to the waste-paper basket, if he has any.

The real problem is much more serious. I wrote to the Prime Minister a few days back telling him that my State of West Bengal, the truncated and divided State which has suffered grievously as the result of the vivisection of India, is in great peril and along with it a good part of India is in peril because of this colossal problem of migrating humanity. I gave him two reasons. The hon. Law Minister has not referred to them. One was the unfortunate statement of Mr. Gaznafar Ali suggesting that the border should be sealed. It accentuated the exodus. It was a very very unfortunate statement which the Pakistan Ambassador made. It was a counsel of despair. Naturally it added to the uncertainty and uneasiness of the unfortunate minority community there. Secondly, there was another cause. It is that the Constitution, which has been fashioned by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, has put a brand of inferior citizenship on the Hindu minority there and that has also made their position still more difficult.

[Shri N. C. Chatterjee]

I had the privilege, of coming into contact, during the last week-end when I went down to Calcutta, of meeting a number of migrants and talking to them who have just crossed over from East Pakistan. Remember, they are not the upper *bhadralog*; they are the agriculturists, most of them *namasudras*. They are the fighting people who stuck to the land; who were rooted to the land. They were rooted to the soil. They did not care for politics. They did not care for constitutional agitation. They were so much rooted to the soil that even after the terrific migration started since the partition, even after the colossal tragedy of 1950, they stuck to Pakistan. Now, that agricultural class is moving. The *Namasudras* are moving, from East Bengal. It is one of the worst social tragedies that have happened in any State or in any country in the world. In one corner of East Bengal, which is the meeting place of three districts, Jessore, Khulna and Faridpur there is a big *Namasudra* territory inhabited by about 15 lakhs of *Namasudras*. They are fighters. They can defend themselves against aggression. Even in the worst days of the Noakhali tragedy, they stuck to their plots of land. I remember I had the privilege of going to Mahatma Gandhi, just after the Radcliffe Award had been published, along with some *Namasudra* leaders from that area including one *Namasudra* M.L.A. who represented that part of Bengal in the undivided Bengal legislature. We went to Mahatma Gandhi and told him, "You gave us your word,"—I also pleaded for them.—"What a terrible tragedy has now happened." The Law Minister knows it, because he was a Member of the Bengal Boundary Commission. I hope he had said something to Pakistan out of his own experience. As one of the Commissioners, he could easily tell his counterpart, "What nonsense are you talking? Don't you realise that in the district of Khulna, one part, even according to the census under the Muslim League regime one part was a predominantly Hindu majority area? Yet it had gone to Pakistan." The *Namasudra* leaders pleaded with Gandhiji and there was some overture made for something to be done. But nothing happened. It was then too early after the partition. So, nothing could be done.

Three or four factors are now happening in East Bengal which the Minority Minister and the Prime Minister ought to know, and this House should know.

This is what the people told me just two or three days back in Calcutta. What is happening is this. They said, "We do not like to come, we had our lands, we had our cultivation, and we stuck to our properties and our hearths and homes in spite of many difficulties." They could even take charge of their own properties although there was a sense of insecurity. Firstly, in East Pakistan they have recently started a Village Defence Party in many villages. This Village Defence party is officially meant to defend the interests also of the minority community. Unfortunately for the Hindus, the village defence party has been given the right of nocturnal search. Whenever a Hindu house is burgled or a theft takes place this village defence party has got the right to enter houses and it has been practically given some police power. It enters the homes of people and has the right of entry or search in the night. That has aggravated the sense of insecurity. I met representatives who have come from Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur and Dacca and other areas. They told me that all this was happening. The thieves are still active. Those who are sent to catch the thieves do really abet them and are playing the part of thieves and burglars.

Secondly what they have done is very curious. I do not think the hon. Law Minister knows it. I do not know whether he had any chance of meeting these people who have recently come. They have levied in 1954 and later and are still exacting special tax of nine pice or 0-2-3 in the rupee which is added to the Union rates for the purpose of this village defence party. That has been an additional burden on these people. Thirdly, what they are complaining of is this. There is the police, which has created a lot of difficulties. It is said that even the judiciary has, in some cases,—I am very sorry to report to this House—taken a communal attitude. Even when there is practically no evidence, Hindus are hauled up as culprits in any case started by a Muslim complainant. They do not get justice. One man told me,—I can give the name, the address and everything to the hon. Minister for Law or the Prime Minister—that a Sessions Judge, in his charge to the jury, said, "Remember, here is a case of a Muslim who was victimised by a Hindu; therefore, it is your duty in Pakistan to teach him a lesson." Although the evidence was practically nil, the man got 5 years' rigorous imprisonment.

Fourthly, what is happening is this. I am satisfied myself that this is the only silver lining in the dark cloud. The Chief Minister of East Bengal, Mr. Sarkar, is anxious to do something to help the minority community and to keep them there. Shri Gadgil was suggesting something with regard to demand for land. The Prime Minister has slurred over it. He has not got the courage to face it. I wish we had a statesman today of the type of Sardar Patel. He would have tackled it. He is the man who suggested it. Cannot the Law Minister tell them that Pakistan was created on a particular principle? We never accepted the two-nation theory. But, Radcliffe actually demarcated this area and gave you this entire territory on the basis of Mr. Jinnah's declaration, on the basis of the solemn assurance of the creator of Pakistan that 112 lakhs of Hindus would be kept there, that there will be no discrimination against them and that they would be treated fairly and squarely. There has been breach of this fundamental pledge. There has been a wanton violation of that principle. Why cannot the Law Minister or the Home Minister or the Prime Minister say, "You have done something which has sabotaged the very basis of the creation of Pakistan, and therefore you are not entitled to the whole of that area?" I submit that that is entirely proper. There is nothing improper in it. Sardar Patel demanded it now that this agricultural community is moving, and you cannot resist it, if nothing can be done, this House should make up its mind whether you would finish them there or take over the entire minority community from East Bengal. You cannot play with this problem.

[MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER *in the Chair*]

The trouble is not what Shri Gadgil was saying. The trouble is your own policy. West Pakistan wants the Hindus to be driven out. The West Pakistan Government's deliberate and calculated policy is to squeeze out these people. I am telling you this because the West Pakistan people are holding the key positions in East Bengal. The unfortunate tragedy is there. Although there may be the Chief Minister or some Ministers who are trying to do something to restore the sense of confidence in the minority community, they are paralysed by this West Pakistan element. They are determined to reduce the East Bengal Zone to a minority area so that, if these 1 crore or the 70 or 80 lakhs of people

go out, it would be to their advantage. I do not know whether Shri Mehr Chand Khanna realises it. It is not merely the East Bengal Muslims that have got the parity. It is the deliberate policy of the West Pakistan element which is still dominating East Bengal and they are trying their best to add to these troubles. I am pointing out that it is nothing improper and it is nothing unfair. It will be perfectly legitimate to point out to them that when they accepted this responsibility of keeping these people and they are determined to sabotage this basis, the time has come when there should be a revision of territories and that can be demanded.

In the *Hindusthan Standard*, which is, of course, a Congress paper of some standing, of the 27th March, it is reported that an official directive has been recently circulated in East Bengal to all commercial establishments. They have been asked to employ only Pakistani Muslims because others are "Ghost Pakistanis". Therefore, the Hindus in East Pakistan are 'ghost' Pakistanis. They are not really Pakistanis. Therefore, they say that "you should employ Pakistani Muslims only." The Government of India, so far as I know, had made some protests against any official directive given in East Pakistan to engage only Pakistanis. The Pakistan Government had explained that it involved no discrimination as the Hindus living there were also Pakistanis. With this directive, there has been a bigger trouble. As a matter of fact, I can show to Shri Khanna or the Law Minister who have now come over, and those people were officials employed in the railways and in other concerns and they had been there for years as permanent employees. Their services have now been terminated without any rhyme or reason. First of all they were converted into temporary employees and then their services are being terminated without any tangible reason. The latest circular has gone to the unabashed length of saying that—it says explicitly—the Hindus must not be employed. As a matter of fact, those Hindus were living there for generations. Big commercial firms in East Bengal had been employing Hindus as local agents and for generations they had specialised in this task and that has been a very helpful avocation. If they completely eliminate them, it means not only starving one family but several families. Those local agents have got branches in different parts, and so, elimination of them would mean great disaster.

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We have great respect for Panch Shila. But unfortunately we find that in spite of the high idealism of our Prime Minister, Panch Shila is not working in any place where India's honour and India's interests are concerned it is not working in Ceylon or in Pakistan. It is not working in South Africa or Goa or with regard to Kashmir. It may be working elsewhere, but wherever India's national interests are involved, it is not working. It is a matter of regret that there is a greater drift to-day between India and Western democracies.

Last year, when I was in Europe, travelling in some European countries, I found that there was a general feeling that our neutrality was only a lip service to the cult of neutrality and that our neutrality is not really neutral and that we are taking sides. I hope the Prime Minister, when he visits the United States of America, will be able to dispel to some extent this misunderstanding, and will be able to convince people of the western democracies that that is not so. I told them in my tour that it is not correct to say that simply because our Prime Minister goes to Soviet Russia he has completely gone red or that he is changing his ideology. But it is expected from a man of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's stature and ideology that he should fight against the menace of communism even on the ideological place. But the people whom I met said that they were disappointed. I told them that particularly in Andhra and other places, his party has been fighting communism and fighting it successfully.

We are very happy that the Prime Minister has today categorically declared that the SEADO business is actuated by hostility against India. What is the good of Mr. Dulles saying here, in his talks with the Prime Minister at Delhi, that they have not got that particular intention of being hostile towards India, that there is no motive, and that they are not motivated by the attitude of aggression in their pact with Pakistan. Certainly, a man of Mr. Dulles' position and a statesman like President Eisenhower should realise that the intention of the person is judged by the natural and inevitable consequences of his action. What is their action? The action is, intensification of the military aid to Pakistan. The intensification of the military aid to Pakistan constitutes a serious menace to India's safety, India's integrity and India's national existence. I

am sorry that there is no realisation of that grave national emergency in the benches opposite.

The Prime Minister who has some hold over the youth of the country should not merely spin out phrases here but he should convince the people as to the real danger. Talk of Panch Shila. Talk of idealism: Stick to your high principles. But, at the same time, keep your powder dry. That is statesmanship. That is the only way of seeing that these Pakistanis who are developing progressively a belligerent attitude towards it realise the danger. The Prime Minister is quite right in saying that with regard to Kashmir they are actuated by a hostile attitude. That is what poor Syama Prasad Mukherjee was saying day after day. The Prime Minister has declared today, that it was a cold, calculated, unabashed falsehood which they uttered when they said that there was no aggression on the part of Pakistan when Kashmir was invaded. Actually, the Pakistan authorities managed the whole thing under the guise of a tribal show, but that show was only a facade. Ammunitions were supplied by the Pakistan army. The Ordnance depot at Rawalpindi supplied them. Thousands of gallons of petrol were supplied by Pakistan authorities. We all know that. You can, never, by appealing to their sanity or reason, persuade them to change their tactics today. That stratagem will always be defeated. Therefore, the right thing that the Prime Minister should have done today is to say that we accept the declaration of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir as final and irrevocable. Accept it, and declare that the problem is finished. Let there be no question about it, or of any further plebiscite. When I had an opportunity of visiting that State, the Hindus and Muslims came and appealed to us, "For Heaven's sake, do not allow the Prime Minister to talk continually of plebiscite or to think in terms of plebiscite." They said: "You are doing the greatest disservice to this country because now you are putting them in a suspense and uncertainty." This plebiscite business should be finished to-day and finished for ever. Nobody has doubted, so far as the Kashmir Muslims are concerned, the completely representative character of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. You know that to a man they have voted for satisfying the accession that acceptance is final. They have voted it. It shall not be altered. Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad has repeatedly declared in Kashmir and here

that that is a final decision and it is an unalterable decision. Why don't you accept that as the unequivocal decision and declaration of the will of the people of Kashmir and be done with it? Why plunge that unfortunate State into continual anarchy and disorder and foment forces inimical to India, forces which are favourable to Pakistan? Marshal Bulganin came; Mr. Khrushchev came. We are obliged to them. They made the categorical declaration that Kashmir is a part of India. Why don't you accept that? Why should not our Prime Minister say that this is a fact and there is an end of it? Why talk merely of constitutional law. Why are you not implementing the declaration constitutionally and putting Kashmir on the constitutional map of India? You should not make only a few articles—article 1 and article 395—apply to that State. You should apply the whole gamut of Articles to that State, and the entire State should be integrated constitutionally. Make it completely final, completely unalterable and unequivocal. That will be doing a great service to Kashmir. You can never trust the other side in this matter, if you allow things to drift.

I do not know what is the information of the Government. But my information is that, as a result of this military pact between the United States and Pakistan, Pakistan is getting about 200 million dollars, and this amount will be utilised for equipping Pakistan's military forces. I am also told—I do not know what is the information of the Prime Minister or the other Ministers—that Pakistan is being supplied with ammunitions on the basis of ten cents to a dollar. In other words, only ten per cent of the price of guns and ammunitions is charged while 90 per cent is just the discount allowed. If this is true, then 200 million dollars really means 1,800 million dollars. Why are they getting it? It is simply because they want to use it against India and especially against Kashmir. Let us not blink at the patent fact. The Prime Minister in a mood of generosity or statesmanship or expediency has continuously declared that he has not got any evidence of planned action by Pakistan regarding these border raids. But look at the frequency and the ferocity. Is it not perfectly clear to any rational human being that their game is a game of probing, theirs is the game of continued, persistent probing as to how we are militarily equipped, probing as to our strength. It is said that up till now we

are much stronger from the military point of view, but even if the present tempo of the Pakistan Army and the supply of ammunition continues as a result of this pact with the U.S.A., then in 1957 we will be beaten and Pakistan will be far ahead of us. It is the duty of the people occupying the Treasury Benches not to adopt any longer an attitude of complacency. What is the good of having a Five-Year plan and treating this Parliament occasionally to all these high-sounding plans and programmes if our national existence is in dire peril? You must give a call to the nation, ask the youth to be prepared for any emergency, ask the people of the Punjab to be ready. We may have differences between communities, between regions, between minorities and majorities, but we are all united that if there is any aggression we will defend the frontiers of the Punjab and of Bengal.

Master Tara Singh the other day has given a call. I appreciate that call. Every right-thinking Indian should accept that in the spirit in which he has said it. He said Punjab is in danger, India is in danger. Every one of us should realise it that our frontiers are in danger, danger due to the persistent policy of these imperialist powers in helping Pakistan not merely in adopting a belligerent attitude, but in equipping it successfully to continue that attitude of belligerency. And Masterji has said that we should take steps especially in the border areas to give arms to our people. That is what we should do, train them to defend, bring up a proper civilian force, equip them and also at the same time build up the morale of the people. The Prime Minister may go any number of times to Washington or New York, but I do not think that they will completely stop this move. The SEATO conference particularly is a great pointer, and we should be particularly careful with regard to aftermath of the SEATO business.

The Prime Minister has said something about it and I am happy that in spite of this fanfare of the Pakistan press, the SEATO Conference was not much of a success. It is said that it was almost a flop. I am reading papers from Europe and America and I find even the *New York Times* which gives Mr. Dulles consistent support has admitted that SEATO had absolutely no competence to take a decision on the Kashmir issue. The notoriously anti-Indian paper, the *Daily Express* of London, was angry with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd for stating that it was not the business of SEATO to

[Shri N. C. Chatterjee]

consider issues like Kashmir, but unfortunately, England which is almost the forty-ninth State of the United States of America was compelled to change its policy, and when this Foreign Minister went to Karachi he sang a different tune.

I am only trying to impress upon the Government one fact and that is this. During my last year's tour in Europe when I attended one of the Commonwealth conferences I found, I am sorry to say, that our public relations department in our chancelleries was very, very weak. Immediate steps should be taken to reorganise them properly. I wrote to the Prime Minister from London that important Indian publicists had complained to me that in spite of all the big facade of the India Office and all that we are doing, our public relations organisation is hopelessly inefficient and inadequate. They bitterly complained to me,—you will be amazed to know,—that they did not get proper materials for the purpose of meeting the scurrilous attacks on the part of the Lisbon press and the Portuguese Government. The *Manchester Guardian*, a great liberal paper, has been known throughout its great career for its pro-Indian sympathy. When we were in the death grip with British imperialism, fighting for our national emancipation, it was helping us, was siding with India against British imperialism. How is it that you have lost the support of that paper? It is an amazing incompetence. Something is wrong somewhere. When I came back from London I impressed upon the Prime Minister the desirability of strengthening our publicity organisations abroad. He has got too many burdens, I know that, but this is a very important thing. How can a Government like the Government of Pakistan capture the British press or the American press, and we Indians, our Government and our Embassies cannot do anything for the purpose of doing their duty towards India? It is an amazing exhibition of complete ineffectiveness and utter incompetence. Something should be done. I do not like to say much on this point, but it is high time that all the misdeeds of Salazar and of his Fascist regime are exposed.

I had an opportunity of telling this House that in the British House of Commons when I had the privilege of giving a talk to some of the Members of Parliament, they asked me one question, and it came from a man who had been a great friend of India, a genuine friend of India, a sincere friend of

India. They thought that 70 per cent of Goa's population was Catholic. I told them it is just the other way about, and I also told them the experience of the type of Christianity we have there. They were simply amazed. They had been fed on Lisbon's propaganda. They had been systematically fed on Salazar's propaganda. How is it a Salazar can do it and we cannot do it?

Publicists, Indian journalists of standing and position have told me that they did not get any proper material from our Public Relations Officers. They do not get the material which they are anxious to put before the British press. I think it is high time that something should be done.

I have told you that the only silver lining to the dark cloud is that there is a Chief Minister of East Bengal who I am told, I do not know, is not in the conspiracy to persistently squeeze out the entire minority population from East Pakistan. He is anxious to do something, may be his hands are paralysed. If the Prime Minister would take up this matter and do something, it may do some good to the tortured minority. There was great hope when Mr. Fazlul Huq routed the Muslim League and came into office and power, but you know what had happened to him. There has been a unilateral implementation of the Liaquat-Nehru Pact. Pakistan has done nothing, we have been persistently doing it. Shrimati Sucheta Kripalani made a suggestion which should be implemented. There is nothing wrong nothing narrow, nothing mean about it. When they are driving out 41 lakhs of our people, and driving them away out across the frontier at the rate of 2,000 per day, why don't you at least cancel the visas of the Pakistani Citizens who work in Calcutta in the docks or the jute mills? Why can't you do this? What is this magnanimity? This is not magnanimity, this is pusillanimity, cowardice, not befitting a great nation, not befitting a nation which preaches Panch Shila, which wants to preach its great idealism throughout the world and wants to put India on the political map of the world.

Some Hon. Members rose.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am sorry I have to call the Deputy Minister now. There is no time. At 2 o'clock he has to reply.

Shri U. M. Trivedi (Chittor): I would request that 5 minutes time may be given to me.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: How long is the Deputy Minister likely to take?

The Deputy Minister of External Affairs (Shri Anil K. Chanda): There are a number of cut motions. I think I will take about 25 minutes or so.

Shrimati Khongmen (Autonomous Distts.—Reserved—Sch. Tribes): May I draw your attention that no one from the tribal areas of Assam has spoken?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is all right. I realise that, but I am sorry that now it is not possible for me because at 2.30 we have to take up the next item and 25 minutes are to be taken by the Deputy Minister, I am sorry I cannot do that.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: Yesterday we agreed to have it from 3 o'clock.

Shri Velayudhan (Quilon cum Mavelikkara—Reserved—Sch. Castes): No, no.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: Yes.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: This morning an announcement was made by the Speaker that it would be taken up at 2.30. I am sorry I cannot do it.

2 P.M.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The following further cut motions relating to Demand No. 23 under the Ministry of External Affairs have been indicated by Members to be moved.

Demand No. 23 Cut Motions: 884 to 893.

Need for withdrawal of Kashmir issue from the U.N.O.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Sending of cultural missions to foreign countries

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Policy of recruitment to Indian Foreign Service

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Expatriation of Indians from Ceylon.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Continued holding of Goa by the Portuguese

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Need for integration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli into the Union of India

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Continuous abnormal influx of Hindus from Pakistan

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Frequent attacks on Indian border by Pakistan

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Position of Indians in Burma

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Apartheid policy of South African Government vis-a-vis Indians

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head 'External Affairs' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: All these cut motions are before the House.

Shri Anil K. Chanda: Mr. Deputy-Speaker Sir, after the intervention of the Prime Minister very little remains for me to do except to refer to certain cut motions moved in the House which the Prime Minister was not able to cover in his speech.

I shall first begin with the tribal problem and the problem of the North-Eastern Frontier Agency which have considerably been agitating the minds of the Members of the House as well as of the public. Of late there has been some

[Shri Anil K. Chanda]

unpleasant happenings in the Naga Hill District of Assam and naturally our minds are exercised over it.

With your permission, Sir, I would like to give a little background to this tribal problem, as affecting the North Eastern Frontier Agency. There are certain basic facts which may not be quite known or realised by the Members of this hon. House. The North East Frontier Agency which is under the direct control of the Government of India is composed of six political divisions, covering an area of 35,000 square miles, peopled by numerous different tribes and the area the terrain, is geographically possibly the most difficult in the whole world. The British were not at all interested in these areas for the simple reason that in their days this international border area hardly constituted a problem for them. They were more interested in the North West Frontier area and hardly at all interested in the North East Frontier with the result that when they left in 1947 they left behind terrible legacy for us.

In the whole of the tribal area comprising not less than 35,000 square miles with three international boundaries there were hardly 8 administrative posts covering less than 5,000 square miles.

I would like to enumerate here the difficulties which we in the administration experienced with regard to the North East Frontier Agency.

To start with, the first difficulty is that judged by the modern standards of progress most of the tribes of these tribal areas are at a comparatively lower level of development. Two: these people divided into a number of tribes themselves had hardly any contact with the plains people and they had very little contacts amongst themselves also. I can give you a small instance which might illustrate my point. Recently during the time of the Republic Day Celebrations, we had a contingent from North East Frontier Agency and as one in the Ministry I had the privilege of entertaining this group coming from North East Frontier Agency to a party in my house. There were other guests also and a suggestion was made that some of these people might give us a dance. Eight or ten people got up to dance, but after a few minutes however it was realised that no dance was possible. I made an enquiry of the interpreter as to what was the reason and I was told that these eight or ten people came from four or

five different tribes. They had their different rhythms of music and dance and they could not converse with each other and therefore they were unable to proceed with the dance. That alone will show not merely that the tribal people did not know our plains people, but even amongst themselves there were hardly any contacts.

There are therefore the racial, cultural and linguistic differences between the tribal people and the people in the plains, as well as amongst themselves. Then there is a peculiarly difficult area—the Naga Hill District. Here, I would like to stress this point: the Naga Hill District is not under our charge. It is a constituent part of the State of Assam. In the Naga Hill district, Christian missionaries had a full way and a large number of people had been converted into Christianity. It may be good, it may be bad—I have nothing to say about it. But the foreign missionaries before our freedom had carried on consistent and deliberate propaganda in this area against India and Indian culture and always stressing upon the distinctiveness and separateness of their culture and ideas from the Indian culture and Indian ideas. On the top of that there was the usual British practice of lavish distribution of political presents, including intoxicating liquors and then also there was that annual bribe money known as *posh* given by the British authorities in those areas to the tribes, so that they may remain good boys and not create any difficulties in the plain areas where development work was going on.

I submit that the substitution of such presents by the more solid benefit granted by a welfare state, the advantages of which are less obvious to the people in the context of immediate gain, therefore has to proceed rather slowly. But the goal is there and we are doing our level best to bring the benefits of progressive and civilised administration to these tribal areas.

In fact the North East Frontier Agency presents a great challenge to civilisation. It is the proud task of our administration to bring a new life to the people inhabiting these difficult areas. The North East Frontier Agency executive have been trying unceasingly to give concrete shape to the ideals, put before them by our Prime Minister. I find in one of the cut motions moved by my hon. friend Prof. Hiren Mukherjee there is reference to our lack of

sympathy and absence of understanding of the tribal problems and the people's needs. Now I would like to quote here from certain directives which were given by our Prime Minister to our officers who had been selected for serving in the North East Frontier Agency. This is how our Prime Minister put the problem :

"There are generally two ways of approaching the problem of the tribal people. One might be called the anthropological approach or treating these people as museum specimens to be observed and written about and not as living human beings with whom one could work and play. The other approach is of rather ignoring that they are something special and different and trying to absorb them into the normal pattern of society elsewhere. Both these approaches are wrong.

The approach to the tribal people should be one of learning from them and having learnt, to try to help and co-operate."

Then he said : addressing the officers selected—

"If you approach the tribal people with affection, go to them as a liberating force and as a friend so that they may feel you have come not to take away something from them but to give them something—that is the right integration. But if they feel you have come to impose yourself, to interfere and come in their way, to try to change their methods of living, to take away their land, to push some of your businessmen there who will exploit them, then it is all completely wrong. The less we hear of this type of integration and consolidation of the tribal areas, the better."

I submit there could hardly be any nobler ideals put before our officers to carry out governmental policy so far as the tribal people are concerned. We have been giving from the very beginning special emphasis on our efforts to select our officers as far as possible from the tribal people themselves, and to give training to others as far as possible within the special circumstances prevailing in those areas. And I am happy to say that today in grade I of our Frontier

Service, no less than 13 officers are from the tribal people themselves, in grade II 30, and in grade III 860.

I may refer here to the various objectives which we have put before ourselves with regard to the NEFA. The first is the self-sufficiency of food. That is a very tremendous problem with the tribal people. Some time ago, I had the pleasure of going right into the interior of the Tirap hill district, off the beaten track, right on the border of Burma. The tribal people there, headed by their various chiefs, in hundreds, came to greet me and welcome me. I found that most of them had some sort of a very spectacular belt of cane round their stomachs, something like an exaggerated belt. I asked them what the reason was. The first answer was something like what an Englishman would have given, and it was 'This is our custom'. It has been truly said that an Englishman and a savage can never break "the cake of custom." But anyway they said, custom. I was not satisfied with it, and I asked an old chief who was there as to what was the special reason of this custom of having a belt made of cane in several turnings round their stomachs like this. He said, "We live in an area where very often owing to the vagaries of climate and whether and natural circumstances, we have to go without food, and therefore the belt is there, and all that we have to do is to tighten it, and we save ourselves from hunger." That is the position. Therefore, we had been very particular to bring about self-sufficiency of food in those areas.

Secondly, there is the question of health and eradication of disease. Certain diseases there are endemic; there are diseases like goitre; and there is very heavy incidence of tuberculosis and venereal diseases amongst some of these tribes. As a result of a survey we have carried out in some of these areas, we have come across tribes which are fast dwindling in numbers and therefore we have given a very high priority to the question of health and the eradication of disease.

Then, there was the question of education and literacy. There is also something which we considered very important, namely the preservation of tribal culture, their folklore, songs, dances etc. Of course, the *sine qua non* of all progress in this area is the construction of roads and tracks. Naturally we have been paying the utmost attention

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to the construction of roads, because most of these areas are days' march away from the plains and the bases.

I would like to place before the House some of the records of our achievements during the last few years. I would like to remind the Honourable members that it was only from 1950 onwards that we have taken up the administration of these areas seriously in hand. Where there were none, during the six years, we have put up eight veterinary dispensaries and nearly 50,000 cases had been attended to. There has been an increase in the output of paddy during these years, amounting to 16 lakhs maunds. With regard to communication, in 1951, we had only 138 miles of roads, and 2,969 miles of porter tracks. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan, it is expected that with an expenditure of Rs. 1.09 crores we shall have made 229 miles of all-weather roads, 224 miles of fair-weather roads, bridle paths totalling to 362 miles, mule paths for 1,192 miles and porter tracks for 2,448 miles. I submit that this is a very formidable record, considering the fact that the actual construction work in that area has to be restricted to only five months of the year because of the heavy rainfall. In the Second Five-Year Plan, we have allotted Rs. 2.50 crores for roads.

With regard to health, where in 1948 there were only 23 doctors, in 1955, we had 94 doctors. The number of hospitals and dispensaries and health units in 1948 was 15, but today we have got 83. And the expenditure on health items which was in 1948 Rs. 1.47 lakhs has been Rs. 25.70 lakhs in 1955. At present there is one doctor for 9,000 people, and one hospital bed for every 2,100 people. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, we contemplate to have one doctor for every 6,000 people and one hospital bed for every 1,300 people.

With regard to education, I think the progress has been even more spectacular, because whereas in 1947 there were only two lower primary schools in the whole of NEFA, today we have, as a result of the last eight years of our administration there, 152 lower primary schools, 16 middle schools and 2 high schools, and altogether, there are 7,000 tribal boys studying in these schools. At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, we hope to have 20,000 students.

Without going any further into details, I think the figures that we have

given with regard to health, agriculture, and education alone would convince the House that our record is certainly praiseworthy, and we have every reason to congratulate our officers, who in the midst of the most tremendous difficulties, miles away from their hearth and home, miles away from their own people, have been carrying on this great and good work.

In the Second Five-Year Plan, we have been granted over Rs. 9 crores for development work in the NEFA.

With regard to the present troubles in the Naga Hills district, I can only regret the fact that these unpleasant happenings have taken place. But all this happens to be not in our own area, but in the adjacent district, the Naga Hill district, which is under the administrative control of the Government of Assam. Of these six political divisions that we have, comprising an area of 35,000 square miles, only one portion of one of the districts adjacent to the Naga Hills district the Tuensang area, was affected by lawlessness during the middle of last year, when members of the more aggressive and rebellious sections of the Naga National Council, because things were too hot for them in the Naga Hills district; had percolated into the Tuensang area, and taking advantage of the difficult terrain and the lack of development in that particular zone created some havoc on the loyal villages. We took strong and firm action as was needed and now I am happy to say, so far as Tuensang is concerned, there has been complete peace, and there has been no trouble whatsoever. So far as the other five districts are concerned, there has not been any trouble ever since we have begun the work of pushing on our administration right up to the border.

Recently, I had the occasion to visit the Tirap Hills district, and I was very happy to see for myself the spontaneous co-operation which our administration has been getting from the tribal people in those areas. Actually, it was my great pleasure and privilege to commence the work of road-building in a particular area, where no less than 1,50 tribal people had gathered from all round that district, to take part in that work.

A lot of criticism has been made about our publicity work in foreign Missions. An hon. Member Shri N. C. Chatterjee hurled his usual eloquent invective at us, with regard to what he had been told by the Indian journalists

in London about the lack of publicity material in London. It does surprise me a little bit, because apart from anything else, we actually publish a weekly newspaper from our High Commission in London. I do not see how it is possible for our Indian journalists in London to remain starved of news and material so far as the Indian High Commission is concerned.

Let me give you a picture of our publicity machine. We have 37 of our Missions abroad, which have a full publicity section. Of these 37, 2 were last year. For a part of the year, three of our Missions abroad were not adequately staffed for lack of suitable personnel. Everyday from our headquarters five Morsecasts are sent supplying news and publicity material to our publicity posts abroad. From the headquarters in Delhi, last year we issued no fewer than 19 pamphlets and also there was a monthly issue of a paper called *Foreign Affairs Record* which contains all the official texts of Government statements about foreign policy etc.

With regard to Goa, I would like to inform you that during the last year we have published several pamphlets on Goa from our various posts in different languages, such as :

- Story of Goa* (English) from London,
- Inside Goa* (") from Sydney,
- Inside Goa* (Portuguese) from Rio de Janeiro,
- Inside Goa* (English) from Washington,
- Inside Goa* (English) from headquarters,
- Inside Goa* (Spanish) from Buenos Aires,
- Inside Goa* (Italian) from Rome.

The *Story of Goa*, which is an illustrated booklet giving the whole historical background up to the present position has become very very popular and we are in the midst of publishing translations of it in Spanish, Portuguese, French, German and Arabic. Over and above all this, we have supplied copies of 8 articles written by independent persons with regard to the Portuguese possessions in India for publicity purposes to these Missions. We had also distributed 5 different books written by different authors in English and Portuguese and even fictional literature dealing with life in Goa and the other Portuguese territories in India. I do not know, in the face of all these statistics which I have placed before the House, how any hon. Member could still say that our policy

with regard to Goa has failed only because we have not been able to carry out adequate publicity.

It has been said that not a single vote in the House of Commons has ever been swayed by any speech delivered on the floor of the House. Members go according to their political conscience. I know that the pen is mightier than the sword, but I refuse to believe that any amount of publicity would help in changing the policy of any particular government which has got its own particular interests and which has its own particular ideological affiliations. But that does not mean that we are entirely satisfied with our publicity machine. Much yet remains to be done. We shall be only too happy if hon. Members who go out and have contacts with the outside world would give us their suggestions as to how we can improve our publicity machine.

I would have liked to touch on certain other matters, but unfortunately, I have not the time to do so. But I have to take up the question of a cut motion moved by my hon. friend, Shri H. N. Mukherjee. It is about what he referred to as the Roy Behanan case. It is a very sad case and I wish, for all parties concerned, Shri H. N. Mukherjee had not referred to it in this House by way of a cut motion. If he had any doubts about the role played by a particular officer in our New York office and if he had spoken to me, I would have unreservedly placed all the documents and letters we have at his disposal and he would have realised that, based on wrong facts, he had defamed a very able sincere and loyal servant of the State.

As regards the Roy Behanan case, of which I do not think many Members of the House are aware, I would briefly trace the tragic history of the case. Mr. Behanan, an Indian national, was an officer of the United Nations and his wife was a qualified doctor, children's disease specialist. On 4th April 1952 their ten-year old son died on an operation table in a big New York hospital. The sequence of events is as follows :

April 4, 1952 : Death of Roy Behanan, ten year old.

April 21, 1952 : The matter was reported to the District Attorney of Queens County.

July 1952: The International News Service gave publicity to the matter.

August and September 1952 : The District Attorney of New York State informed the parents, the Behanans, that

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unless they supplied a special pathologist for the examination of the documents etc., he would not be able to carry on with this case. That the Behanans did, and the eminent pathologist they provided said that on a study of the autopsy protocols etc. it was clearly seen that the boy died due to the negligence of the surgeon and the anaesthetist concerned.

March, /April 1953 : There was a Grand Jury investigation on the death of Roy Behanan. The surgeon and the anaesthetist were indicated on a charge of manslaughter in the second degree.

March 28 : A motion was moved by the two defendant doctors to quash the indictment against them before Judge Farrell of the Queens County.

June 1953 to March 1954 : Mrs. Behanan, who was herself a doctor, spent a considerable amount of time going into the working of the medical system of American hospitals etc.

Now, the officer, Shri Arthur Lall, who was then the Consul-General in our New York office comes into the picture at this stage. In April 1954, the Behanans, whom of course, Shri Lall knew very well, contacted him and wanted a special prosecutor to appeal against the dismissal of the indictment against the doctors. They asked Shri Lall to put the case before the Governor. At the point, what the Behanans wanted was that the case should be expedited. The case was *sub judice*. Obviously, our Consul-General could not do anything with regard to the decision of the court. All he was expected to do was to seek the help of the Governor of New York State for expediting the judicial trial, because, as you remember, nearly two years had already elapsed. Our Consul-General—the Consul-General is not really a diplomatic officer ; he is a consular officer—immediately contacted our Embassy in Washington and our Minister there advised the Consul-General that he should himself take the matter up with the Governor of New York State. In May, our Consul-General wrote to the Governor's office seeking his kind help for a quick despatch in the case. On June 23, our Consul-General received a communication from the Assistant Counsel to the Governor saying that the Judge had dismissed the case. It was the delay about the disposal of the case that the Behanans had complained. The decision had now been pronounced. On 11th July, the Behanans wrote again to Shri Lall saying that the matter was

still pending with the Governor. Shri Lall, of course, immediately replied that he had already received information from the Counsel to the Governor, that a decision had already been given and the case had been dismissed. In that letter of 11th July, the Behanans had stated—I would particularly draw attention to one sentence—, at the close of the letter—I have seen the letter myself :—

“We thank you very much for all you are doing in this matter.”

It was after this that the Behanans made a request to our Consul-General for a special prosecutor to try the case. Our Consul-General was urged to take up this matter with the Governor. The Consul-General immediately wrote to the Counsel to the Governor enclosing a copy of Mr. Behanan's petition and requesting that the matter be put before the Governor. On 16th August, a reply was received from the Governor's office with a photostatic copy of the Judge's decision dismissing the indictment, adding that the records showed that there was nothing which necessitated any special prosecutor to be appointed to go over the case again. It was also stated that the careful consideration of all material submitted did not disclose any basis for further action in the matter by his office. This is the whole case.

Shri A. M. Thomas (Ernakulam) : May I enquire from the hon. Deputy Minister whether he has seen that book published by Mrs. Behanan, *Justice Towards Asians* and the facts disclosed therein? In the light of those facts, did the Ministry of External Affairs take up the matter again?

Shri Anil K. Chanda : I have seen the book. Before the book was published a manuscript copy was sent to our Prime Minister and our Ministry went into the whole case. Chapter XX refers to what the author calls the misdeeds of our Consul-General. Now, I have quoted from the relevant documents of the case before the House and I may add that our Consul-General wanted the permission of Government to sue the authors of that book for defamation. It is not for me here to say anything with regard to the legal system of New York State or of the hospital arrangements in New York City. What I am concerned here is the reputation of the officer, who, I say, has been defamed by the way that Shri H. N. Mukherjee referred to this case.

I wish, Sir, he were here to realise his mistake. As I said before, if he had only mentioned this case to me I would have placed all the material before him and he would have been in a position to exercise independent judgment. If he were here, I would have liked to remind him that Oxford oratory and Christian charity might go hand in hand.

Shrimati Renu Chakravartty (Basirhat): Who is a Christian?

[**MR. SPEAKER** in the Chair]

Mr. Speaker: I shall now put all the cut motions to the vote of the House.

All the cut motions were negatived.

Mr. Speaker: The question is:

"That the respective sums not exceeding the amounts shown in the fourth column of the Order Paper be granted to the President to complete the sums necessary to defray the charges that will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1957, in respect of the following heads of Demands entered in the second column thereof:

Demands Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25 and 119."

The motion was adopted.

[*The motions for Demands for Grants which were adopted by the Lok Sabha, are reproduced below:—Ed.]*

DEMAND NO 22—TRIBAL AREAS

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 6,10,57,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1957, in the respect of 'Tribal Areas'."

DEMAND NO. 23—EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 6,81,65,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1957, in the respect of 'Tribal Areas'."

DEMAND NO. 24—STATE OF PONDICHERRY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 2,78,94,000 be granted to the

President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1957 in respect of 'State of Pondicherry'."

DEMAND NO. 25—MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 5,07,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1957, in respect of 'Miscellaneous Expenditure under the Ministry of External Affairs'."

DEMAND NO. 119—CAPITAL OUTLAY OF MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 25,33,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1957, in respect of 'Capital Outlay of Ministry of External Affairs'."

RESOLUTION RE. PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION RE. TRAVANCORE-COCHIN

The Minister of Home Affairs (Pandit G. B. Pant): Sir, I beg to move:

"That this House approves the Proclamation issued by the President on the 23rd March, 1956, under Article 356 of the Constitution, assuming to himself all the functions of the Government of Travancore-Cochin."

Sir, I am thankful to you and also to the hon. Members of this House for allowing me to move this Resolution. It has interfered with the programme chalked out for this session to some extent and that indicates the urgency of the matter with which I am dealing.

The step taken by the President had become imperative and inevitable. I regret that the circumstances, which were not altogether edifying, should have led up to this culmination. I would have preferred the normal course of constitutional administration to remain intact.