

12.45 hrs.

## DEMANDS\* FOR GRANTS—Contd.

## MINISTRY OF DEFENCE—contd.

**Mr. Speaker:** Further discussion and voting on the Demands for Grants under the Control of the Ministry of Defence together with the cut motions moved.

The hon. Minister might continue his speech.

**The Minister of Defence (Shri Y. B. Chavan):** Mr. Speaker, I am grateful to the Members of this House for discussing the Defence Ministry's Demands in a dignified and objective manner and offering constructive criticisms on defence policy and defence preparedness. I find from the notes I have taken of the points that there are two categories of criticism. One is of a broad type, of a general nature, partly political and partly concerning defence problems directly or indirectly. The second deals with specific aspects of defence policy and defence preparedness.

I propose to deal with the first category first. What are these criticisms? I might give out a few of the phrases which possibly will represent the content of the criticisms: there was a **feeling that there is a lack of realism**; there was a feeling that a certain reorientation of defence strategy is called for, one hon. Member said that the idea of self-sufficiency in defence production is a dangerous illusion—if I am quoting him aright; there was a demand for unification of command and integration of services; there was also an incidental remark, very vaguely argued, that non-alignment has resulted in some sort of isolation as a result of certain interpretations

put on it—that was the argument made by Shri Frank Anthony.

Taking the first point of criticism, namely, that there is lack of realism, I would certainly take a review of what is, really speaking, the reality today. What is the reality of the situation as it prevails as far as our northern borders are concerned? Here I am reminded of the situation last year when we were discussing the Defence Demands under similar circumstances. Today when we are discussing these Demands, the situation fundamentally remains the same; possibly it has become a little more complicated. But certainly it is necessary to take a clear view of the situation if we have to find the solutions.

The new factor that has arisen between last year when we discussed the Demands and today when we are discussing these Demands, is the situation that has arisen between China and Pakistan. The growing association between China and Pakistan appears to have certain dangerous implications and we will have to take a very clear note of this one important factor. After we take this clear picture, let us see what is happening on the Chinese border. This time last year—I am trying to give a clear idea and trying to explain the basic thinking that has prompted Government to proceed with defence preparations today in comparison to what were the compelling reasons that induced us to take the decisions that we did last year—this time last year we were wondering what the Chinese might do after the melting of the snows in the Himalayas. A large number of prisoners of war were in their hands and we were thinking what China was going to do that day, the next day, that week, the next week. Those circumstances prevailing at that time compelled us to plan for the immediate future, to take decisions and make plans to meet the

\*Moved with the recommendation of the President.

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problems that the emergency would throw up in the immediate or near future. Today, when the situation has become a little more complex, and at the same time made itself very clear, we were in a position to take a little longer view of the problem. We can think for this year, for the next year and the year after that. I can tell this hon. House in confidence that this year we are working on the basis of a sort of five-year-plan for defence preparedness of the country.

**Shri Raghunath Singh** (Varanasi): Very good. That is what we want.

**Shri Ranga** (Chittoor): You said you were going to do the same thing last year.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan**: Certainly, even last year we said we were having this for the immediate future; we were having a longer perspective that time too.

**Shri Ranga**: Both for the short period and longer period we sanctioned money.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath** (Hoshangabad): Are we not also planning to meet an immediate attack, which God forbid?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan**: As I said, we are taking a longer view. That does not mean that we are not thinking of the immediate future. We have to keep plans for the immediate future and also take a long-term view, but I am saying this, that certainly our thinking about defence preparedness has entered a second phase, if I may say so, that we are now trying to plan for five years.

**Shri Ranga**: That is so far as China is concerned. What about Pakistan?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan**: That is so far as China is concerned, and so far as the defence of India is concerned, from whatever corner the danger may come.

This defence plan is based on what? I am trying to meet the point that a certain reorientation of strategy is necessary. What is, after all, the strategy of a country? I am not talking about the tactics of a particular battle on a particular front. What they should do is a matter for the Commander in charge of that particular corps or theatre to decide and implement. The general strategy of the defence of a country certainly depends upon a very realistic assessment that has to be made of the threat—that may be threat from China or some other corner too—and it is on this assessment that we have to take decisions as to what must be our preparations so far as the Army is concerned, so far as the Air Force is concerned, so far as the Navy is concerned, so far as defence production is concerned. It is these decisions, really speaking, that constitute the general strategy of the country as a whole.

So, it is much better that we try to understand what the nature of the threat is. As far as China is concerned, besides the military threat,—if at all we are to understand the nature of the military threat, it would be necessary to understand their political and economic motivations too—it seems that China is following the very classic method of having a chain of satellites around it for its own safety. India is a big land Power and its neighbour. When they thought it was not possible for them to make a satellite of India, they tried to militarily humiliate her. But at the same time, we must see that there is also another objective in their mind, and they can disrupt our whole life, our whole progress, by disrupting our economic development too. So, along with this military threat, we must also take into account their objective of economically disrupting the progress of our country. So, when we have to decide about our defence preparedness, we have, at the same time, to see that these preparations of defence

do not come in the way of our economic development as well. That also then becomes part of the strategy of defence of the country.

The strategy of the defence of a country is never exclusively a military affair. It is, really speaking, some sort of military-political-economic doctrine or theory, and our entire defence preparedness and our concept of defence preparedness are based on meeting the threat, the military threat; at the same time, our strategy must be to see that our economic development is not only not disrupted, but that it goes ahead with the same speed that we have in our mind today, because a developing economy would certainly add some new points of strain even for the direct defence preparedness.

Taking all these things into consideration, we have also to take note of the Pakistan problem, because, naturally, the friendship of Pakistan with China certainly means that the entire northern border, including the international border with West Pakistan, the border with East Pakistan and the entire northern border, become a live problem for us. That means, we get our army and our defence preparedness committed everywhere. But we had taken risks, we had taken note of the threat of China more, and we were, really speaking, taking steps towards that direction for the last year or so. But, Pakistan, in the last few months, has tried to make the cease-fire line and the international border more hot and more alive by undertaking more acts of encroachment, more acts of firing and more raids both in the Western sector and the Eastern sector. I am only mentioning this position because when we are planning, we have to take all these factors into consideration. And when this problem becomes a long-term problem, we will have to prepare ourselves for continuous progress, progress and preparedness in phases. If anybody just gets up and asks me solutions for all the problems

for all time to come, possibly I may not be able to give all the answers, but that does not mean that we are not making any preparations. When we say that we are trying to plan for a certain thing, the very concept of planning is a process of fixing up priorities. Naturally, we have to have certain priorities.

I must admit here, before I go to the other aspects of the problem that in the present preparations for this year or a year or two, naturally the Navy has to take a lower place. I am trying to invite the attention of Shri Raghunath Singh, who is some sort of specialist on the problems of the Navy. Naturally, the Navy has its own importance, and its own role in the defence of the country, taking into consideration the long coast line of the country and also the development of other navies around us. We will certainly have to take note of that, and see in course of time that we develop our Navy as a balanced force. We will do that. Certainly we are trying to replace our ageing ships, and to reach some sort of agreement with a foreign company to build frigates in our own country. Also, we are trying to secure a submarine for our training purposes. But, at the same time, we must reconcile ourselves to the situation that in the development of the three services, the Navy will have to take a lower place.

**Shri Tyagi (Dehra Dun):** That is obvious.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** That is obvious. Sometimes it is necessary to emphasize the obvious to make the whole position clear.

In the case of the Army, as mentioned in my speech last year, our commitment was for its expansion and for its modernisation. I then gave the information to the House that we wanted to raise six more mountain divisions. That is the reorientation of strategy when we said that we not merely wanted to expand

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the Army, but we wanted to introduce certain new methods of tactics; when we said that we wanted to raise mountain divisions, it meant that we wanted to introduce an element of mobility in the divisions and at the same time introduce training so that our troops would be able to fight at high altitudes and in mountainous terrain more effectively. At the same time we wanted to provide high or more fire power to the troops. This could be done only by introducing new weapons. By modernisation of the army, I meant providing them with new types of vehicles, weapons with higher fire power, and better communications system.

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As regards expansion, we have raised nearly three lakhs of other ranks last year and in the last 14-16 months, about 10,000 officers. The number possibly may look small but the tremendous effort that they represent is not small. To recruit three lakhs means screening of nearly 10-12 lakhs of people; recruiting 10,000 officers means screening and examining nearly 4-5 times that number. It is a commendable work done by our recruitment organisation, it is a tribute to the nation also, as that means that in one year there were nearly 14-15 lakhs of men and nearly 40-50,000 young men who offered themselves voluntarily to join the Army. This country never thought of any conscription because we always depend upon the patriotic urge of the people to come forward and join the Armed Forces. So, we have only started the process of modernisation. Some hon. Members referred to the report. In order to introduce new weapons, we have to identify them and standardise them and if necessary develop them further. That is another aspect of strategy, the production system also becomes part of the national strategy. When we want to introduce a particular type in our Army and when it is not produced

in the country, we go to the international market and we find possibly that it is not produced anywhere because others' defence production is related to their defence strategy and defence requirements. Possibly, very advanced countries do not think in terms of producing guns to be used in infantry; they have gone to more sophisticated systems of weapons.

**Shri Karni Singhji (Bikaner):** Does not our modernisation include nuclear preparedness?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I am coming to that. I will give the other aspects of production when I come to arms production as such. The problem of expansion and modernisation of our Air Force is a serious problem and the House will excuse me for not giving more detailed information about the nature of planes, the number of planes we propose to have, etc. But we have decided on a certain size of our Air Force taking into consideration the nature of the threat that will have to be faced.

**Shri Ranga:** You used to say these things two years ago; in the same way it is said again . . . (*Interruptions*).

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** People are the same; solution possibly will have to be the same.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Only the enemies are getting stronger.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** The major points that guide us about the composition of the Air Force strength is: firstly, giving some sort of a close support to the fighting formations of the Army, secondly, to intercept and attack the incoming enemy aircraft, thirdly, to provide for movement of troops and cater to logistical requirements and fourthly, to provide communications. These are the guiding tasks. The production of Gnat is on. Two other planes, HF 24 and Mach-1 have reached the stage when we can esta-

blish production of them; in case of Mach-2 we have yet to find out an engine which could give the desired results and our efforts unfortunately have not been successful. We had decided to get some engines from Soviet Russia but that also has not the desired power. Our efforts have reached 1:4 or 1:5. We are now trying to collaborate with the UAR Government who are developing a very good engine; possibly they can take our air frames and we can take their engines; it is still at the stage of proposal and we are going to negotiate this matter with the UAR Government.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** What about MIG 21 . . . (Interruptions).

**Shri Frank Anthony** (Nominated—Anglo-Indians): Before he goes on, without disclosing too much can he tell us how HF-24 will compare *vis-a-vis* the American fighter planes which Pakistan has got. We are bogged down with this Mach-2.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** The Hon. Member will realise the difficulty about aircraft development. By the time it reached the production stage, it becomes obsolescent. Technical development is so fast that even to remain where we are we have to run very fast.

**Shri Karni Singhji:** The pertinent point is this: does Pakistan and China have planes that are faster than ours?

**Shri Frank Anthony:** Yes, much faster, twice as fast as ours.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I do want to let the hon. Member know how much we know about China; I do not want China to know that.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** They know everything about us.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It is a very important step that we are establishing production of this type of planes in our country. I think it was Shrimati

Sharda Mukerjee who said that we had a bewildering variety of aircraft.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I said that.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I do not mind giving credit to this hon. Member but I want to meet this argument. We reached this situation because we have to depend upon other people. When we take a particular type of aircraft from somebody, we have to depend upon them for spares and by the time we want spares, possibly they have given up production of that aircraft and have gone on to something else. That is the difficulty that we come across every time. How are we going to meet this difficulty? If we do not have spares for aircraft after five or six years of their purchase, we reach a stage which, Shrimati Sharada Mukerjee described the other day, was: some aircraft without spares and some spares without aircraft. If at all we have to meet this situation, the only thing that we can do is to establish production of our own in this particular matter.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** You have not done it for eight years.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** If necessary we have to wait for a few years more. Naturally, these developments take place rather slowly. Shri Frank Anthony knows about these matters.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** What about MIG 21? You were interrupted then.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I am coming to that. About MIG 21, he himself made a suggestion, he threw a hint. I think he was rather misinformed about it. Many times on the floor of this House we have given the information that we have decided that on three projects, on three units: one for the air-frame; the second for the engine and a third for electronics. One will be established at Nasik; the other at Koraput and the third at

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Hyderabad. I must say that a certain amount of progress has been made. A company has been formed and the project has been handed over to the company. A project report from Soviet Russia has been received and it is being examined and implemented. The civil works have started in a big way in Nasik. A small beginning has been made at Koraput. In Hyderabad, the preliminary works are being examined. But the other important step that is being taken about the development of this factory is to train our own skilled personnel for this. And for that purpose, a training institute has been started at Nasik. For the requirements of the unit at Koraput, a training institute is being started in Bangalore, HAL. For the first year for two or three terms, this institute will function at Bangalore, but later on it will be located on the site itself. This is the progress made about MIG.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Are Soviet technicians coming here for training our men?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** There are some Russian technicians who are training them, but most of the training will be done by our own people also.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** May I ask why the Tata Committee condemned the MIG project?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** They possibly said that, but it was not found acceptable to Government.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** They said it is unsuitable here.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** But the Government have also decided, for very good reasons. Certainly, if they appoint a Committee, that does not mean that they should accept all the recommendations of the Committee. Instead of appointing a Committee, to make recommendations, one can appoint a committee to take decisions

But that is not the way the Government functions; leaving the matter of decision to someone else.

So, really speaking, our important requirement is that of all-weather fighter planes. That, really speaking, is our requirement, and for that very purpose, the Joint Air Exercises came to our help technically, because at the technical level, the need and the requirement of such a plane was established. It was found necessary that as far as the technicians were concerned, the Indian Air Force does need some sort of supersonic fighter, and we have projected our requirements from where we can get, and it is in this connection that I would like to make a reference to certain remarks made by the hon. Member Shrimati Renu Chakravartty. She said that some representatives of Lockheed came to India and met a certain Minister in the early hours of the day. I can tell her that I found out from the Finance Minister himself personally who told me that nobody saw him. But certainly the representative was in India and he met the Secretary, Shri Boothalingam, and the Defence Secretary, Shri Rao. There is nothing wrong about it. And I can tell her that he met them absolutely during office hours, at 10.30 or 11 O'clock. It was not in the early hours of the day. Now, when we need a particular type of planes, I think it is better that we try to acquire them or require them if certain financial arrangements are possible and feasible. And that is what is being done.

**Shrimati Renu Chakravartty (Barrackpore):** Are you getting it, and under what terms?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Certain offers are there. We have to consider them; whether they will be within our reach or not is a matter that will have to be gone into. But certainly there is nothing wrong in trying to get it. As the hon. Member herself stated, let us get them if we can get them.

**Shri Morarka (Jhunjhunu):** Even in the early hours!

**Shri Tyagi:** Whether it is in the early hours or not, that does not make much difference.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Such a suggestion was made and I think it is not rather very desirable. I wanted to make a reference to it—to the remark about the early hours of the day; she had a certain hint at it which was not very good. (*Interruption*).

**Shri Ramanathan Chettiar (Karur):** The hon. Member has forgotten that we are in a state of emergency.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I would like to come to the specific points. I have dealt with the first category of criticisms. I would now like to go into some of the other specific criticisms that were made. The first criticism in this respect was about the large surrenders on sanctioned amounts. I would like to take a few minutes of this House on that point, because this hon. House is entitled to know the facts. When it sanctions a certain amount certainly for some important work, and if it is not spent, naturally they are entitled to seek an explanation for it, and I owe an explanation to this hon. House. If we see the estimated budget, we will find that really speaking, the surrendered amount comes to about Rs. 58 crores. Out of this Rs. 58 crores, Rs. 14 crores is on the revenue account and nearly Rs. 44 crores goes to the capital account. First of all, I would like to invite the attention of this hon. House to the fact that the attempt this year was of a very tremendous size. This year, practically we had doubled the budgeted amounts compared to the last year. That means our efforts at defence preparedness are trying to absorb 100 per cent more money. In this, the money which is not spent comes to about five to six per cent. It is not a question of percentage, but sometimes percentages also are useful to know the size of the problem.

**Shri A. P. Jain (Tumkur):** We have given the money and it has to be spent.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I quite agree. But, at the same time, I will give the reasons why they could not be spent. As I said, Rs. 14 crores could not be spent as far as the revenue account was concerned. Rs. 44 crores was on the capital account, out of which Rs. 33 crores or Rs. 34 crores come under the new factories. I would like the hon. House to see the difficulties. This effort at establishing the new factories was married to the possibility of getting aid from other countries. It was not merely a question of spending the rupee element of it in this country, because we cannot start spending the money on the construction of factories in anticipation of the type of machinery that we are likely to get. With all our efforts—fact is fact—we could not succeed in getting aid for this production effort except one factory unit—St. Louis unit, which is going to be established at Varangaon for the small arms ammunition.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Was aid from any country declined by the Government?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It was not a question of declining. It did not materialise, I should say. I do not want to put it negatively, because it is not a question of blaming anybody, because they may have their own difficulties possibly. Perhaps it would be necessary for us even now, this year, to depend on aid, but suppose, if we do not get aid, the question is whether we have to forgo some of our other things in the Planning Division and try to have this production base. It will be a rather important decision for the Government as a whole. As I said, we have to take into consideration the strategic, economic development also. But certainly we would like to take further efforts in that direction. But why is it that large amounts on capital expenditure could not be spent? The reason was

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it was for certain uncertain factors over which neither I nor the Defence Ministry or the Government or this hon. House had any control. This particular fact has to be taken into consideration. I am merely trying to explain things. I do not say that I am satisfied with this. I am not satisfied.

**Shri Tyagi:** Are you sure that the amounts now in the revised estimate shall be spent by the end of the financial year?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Yes, Sir. I can assure the hon. Member Shri Tyagi that the revised estimate amounts will be spent. Whatever check that one can make—as the hon. Member himself is aware how these checks can be made—will be made and I have come to the conclusion that the revised estimate amounts would be spent.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** I am sorry to interrupt, Sir. The statement is good as far as it goes. But is it a fact that up to the end of January, 1964 only about Rs. 560 crores were spent out of the Rs. 800 crores and odd of even the revised estimates?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Approximately about Rs. 600 crores were spent. Naturally the bulk of the expenditure comes in the last three months. For example, the salaries and pay are always accounted for on the quarterly basis. The pay etc. of the entire services will be credited in the month of March. I gave this point just to illustrate my argument.

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया (फर्रुखाबाद) :**  
यह साल भर का है या तीन महीने का है ?

**श्री यशवन्त राव चव्हाण :** तीन महीने का है ।

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** इमने क्या ज्यादा फर्क पड़ता है ।

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** The money will be accounted in the month of March for January, February and March. This is just one point for illustration.

The other important point is about the unification of the command. I would like to go into the history of the problem. It is better that we analyse this; possibly in doing so, I will also try to grasp the problem more effectively. It is better to go into the history of the position. Normally in this matter, we go by what is prevailing in the other countries, particularly the United Kingdom. What was the position in our country? There was very rigid unification before independence, because their Army Commander-in-Chief was supposed to be the Commander-in-Chief of all the services. But after independence, we have deliberately changed this position. We have now put every Chief of Staff in charge of his own service. There can be that type of integration which prevails in America, if we have got the balanced development of all the three services. We cannot say that that situation prevails in our country today. If we had taken that sort of attitude and made the Army Commander-in-Chief as the supreme person of all the armed services, possibly our Air Force would not have made the same progress as it has made in the last 10 or 15 years in our country. Naturally I must say that our integration is rather more logical and more perfect than what they have tried to do now in U.K. Till last year they were having three Ministries functioning independently of each other. We have no such thing, because all the three services function in an integrated way under one Defence Ministry here.

Certainly the most important committee that we have is the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. That committee is the highest technical advisory body of the Government. One point made by Mr. Anthony was about the chairmanship of the Chiefs of Staff



Committee. The rule prevails there that the senior member among the Chiefs of Staff would be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I do not think there is anything wrong about it.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** What about operational command?

**Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur):** Why not by rotation?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Let us not try to make it so absurd. Let us see what is the function of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He is not the operational head. Really speaking, he is the Chairman who coordinates, who presides over the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. He is not the chief operational head, as is the Chief of Defence Staff in England, for example. We can certainly have it; I do not say we should not have it. But we can have it when we reach that stage when we have developed all the three services in a balanced manner; at that stage certainly one can think about it. A particular type of organisation would be good for a particular type of situation. It would be wrong to say that what is good for England today is good for us, or that the type of organisation which prevails in the Pentagon is good for us. Possibly it is not so. I can certainly say that we have not come to the stage when we can take a final view about it and say that we can have a Chief of Defence Staff as in England or we can have the type of organisation which prevails in America. From my own experience, I find that our system is more elastic. For example, in 1963, out of 365 days in the year, I met all the three Chiefs of Staff together on 169 days. We could review the situation, discuss and assess matters. They have direct approach to the Defence Minister, with whom they can sit and discuss matters. Really speaking, we should evolve systems and institutions according to our own

requirements. If experience shows us that certain modifications will be necessary in this organisation, I would not be hesitant to accept those modifications.

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : नतीजा क्या इतना खराब है? नतीजा खराब पद्धति बढ़िया।

**Shri Frank Anthony:** About this separation of operational command, how does it function on the field? What happened in NEFA? Was anybody in direct overall operational command or did they have an independent air command?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** The system there was that the Corps Commander was in charge of the operations.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** Including air?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Yes; including air. There is nothing wrong in this. But it did not function in this particular case for reasons which I have explained in my assessment of the NEFA Enquiry. It does not mean that that particular system was wrong. That type of operation cannot be run from Delhi—that was exactly the criticism. Really speaking, it must be in the hands of those people who are there.

Shri Ranga and certain hon. Members referred to the recruitment from the mountain regions of the hilly people. In the very large recruitment that was done last year, I have got figures to show that nearly 17 per cent of the people were recruited from those very regions. So, it should not be sought to be conveyed that in the recruitment effort, these regions were neglected or were not taken note of.

At the same time, there was another very pertinent point raised by Mr. Tyagi on some other occasion. He asked, what are we doing about the training in the border areas? I must say that that is a very important point. I do not say it is not important. But we have got certain priorities in this matter, which the hon.

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Member would try to realise. When we are raising such a large army and making such large commitments, can we give priority for arming them and finding the equipment for this large army which we are raising or can we try to go on arming the border people? Certainly efforts will be necessary for that, but that will have to be taken up at a later stage. But the very concept of taking the help of the local people is accepted as part of our preparations. For his information, I may tell him that in U.P. in certain sectors, scouts—not boy scouts, but the word 'scout' here really means some sort of trained personnel—will be helping the army in case of operations. Similar training is being undertaken in Himachal Pradesh and U.P. Certainly the idea has taken birth and it will grow from time to time as conditions become favourable.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Combine farming and fighting.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Yes.

The other point that was raised was about the military assistance programme. Certainly we have given some more information on this point many times on the floor of the House.

Sir, the assistance programme falls under two broad groups. One is the programme agreed to at the Nassau Conference and the other is the post Nassau programme. The understanding between the Government of India and the Government of USA, UK and Australia was that the supplies would be made under certain conditions. Those conditions are: (i) the weapons, ammunitions and other supplies provided will be used only for the purpose of resisting the Chinese aggression—this point was made by the hon. Member, Shrimati Renu Chakravartty—(ii) that the Government of India will offer necessary facilities to the representatives of the Government concerned attached to their Missions in India for the purpose of observing and reviewing the use of such articles; and, (iii) that the Government of India will offer for return to the

respective Governments such articles furnished by them which are no longer needed for the purpose for which they were originally made available. I would like to say that we have accepted these conditions and we want to honour those conditions. But, Sir, I know what the people have in their mind. Suppose tomorrow there is some trouble from Pakistan, what do we do? They will say, have we resources enough? I must say that without these equipments that we receive from these countries, we can certainly resist them.

I do not propose to under-estimate the assistance that we have received. But it is better we understand the size of the equipment that we have received in respect of our own requirements. We say, we wanted to raise six new mountain divisions. It will be very interesting to note what will be the cost of raising such a mountain division. I find that the cost of equipment required for raising a new infantry division is estimated at Rs. 25 crores per division, and the combat reserves, equipments and ammunitions for a period of three months would amount to Rs. 7.5 crores per division. That means, for six divisions, to raise six divisions with these equipments and reserves, the cost will come to nearly Rs. 200 crores. What we feel is, really speaking... (*Interruption*). It is a question of simple arithmetic. It is 25 plus 7 multiplied by 6 which comes to nearly Rs. 200 crores. The army equipment and ammunition promised under the Nassau programme amounts to Rs. 30 crores which comes to nearly 15 per cent of the actual cost of the equipments that we need. I am trying to give this information not in any way to under-estimate the assistance that is given. We are very grateful to the prompt and timely help given to us. But it should not be asked, if we do so, if we want to accept these conditions, what will happen if the difficulty comes from another corner. In order to assure the hon. House, I have tried to give this information.

Now, I mentioned about six factories. At the same time, I do not want this hon. House to go away with an impression that nothing is done on the production front. I must say, the existing units of our defence production are doing an absolutely wonderful work. I am entirely one with Shrimati Renu Chakravarty in giving my heartfelt thanks to the workers in these factories. They have produced nearly from a minimum of 80 per cent to a maximum of 100 per cent more in quantitative production. Apart from that, the modernisation of existing units have gone very well, and the most important point that matters is that these units have established the production of 26 new items which our own requirement projected. Certainly, in the course of one year, this development is something very encouraging, because if we just say that the production side is not doing well we, really speaking, try to demoralise the people who are working on that front. Therefore, I am making a mention of this particular aspect.

I would like to come to another point, and that is the point about air accidents. The hon. Member, Shri Kamath, during the course of this debate and even previously had raised the question of appointment of some sort of a Parliamentary Commission to go into this.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Not some sort of, but a real Parliamentary Commission, a full-fledged Parliamentary Commission.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Yes, a real Parliamentary Commission. I did give my serious thought to this problem, but I must inform the hon. House that I cannot accept that recommendation or suggestion. I will give the reasons. First of all, I want to let the hon. House know that my idea is not to evade any enquiry. The usual type of enquiry which was held by the Air Force officers is not enough. I have come to the conclusion that some sort of an enquiry by persons not entirely connected with the Air

Force should be held. Therefore, I have decided to appoint a Committee under the chairmanship of Shri Khera, our Cabinet Secretary, with which will be associated as member, Shri Katju, Director-General of Civil Aviation and also Air Vice Marshal Arjan Singh, Vice Chief of Air Staff, there will also be another Member-Secretary. The terms of reference of this Committee will be to examine the existing regulations and arrangements for flying and flying safety, for clearing an aircraft as fit for flying and the standards of training of a pilot in relation to the task he is entrusted with; secondly, to examine the adequacy of the above regulations and arrangements and their implementation; and, thirdly, to recommend remedial measures, if any, to minimise accidents.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Sir, if you will kindly permit me, I want to say just one thing. I do not question the competence of the officers mentioned. But I do want to say that it is wholly unsatisfactory. We want a real Parliamentary Commission because of the seriousness of the matter.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I have not completed. It will be rather unfair for the Members of Parliament also to go into this enquiry. There are two points on which I do not want to accept it. Firstly, our idea is not to demoralise the Air Force. I would like to tell hon. Members, unfortunately, in the recent few months there were a series of accidents which created an anxiety in everybody's mind, which I do share. But, at the same time, we must not forget, during the NEFA campaign, the wonderful work our air force did without a single accident. That is something which we should take note of.

**Shri Nath Pal:** Much more than 'taking note' was done. Handsome tributes were paid for the magnificent work that our boys did in NEFA.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** We have to see that ultimately we do not demoralise them. Some sort of a Parliamentary Commission would create a sort of feeling in their mind as if something is being done to find fault with them.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** That will buck them up.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Again, such a committee will have to deal with a large amount of operational data. I think this is a compelling reason which kept me out of the consideration of this type of an enquiry. This is a very important argument. I would like to say that demoralisation comes the other way too. If we just try to create that psychology that in the Air Force they have always to play for safety, that also is not good. There is a difference between civil aviation and the Air Force, because they are supposed to take the risk and fulfil their mission.

**An Hon. Member:** Calculated risk.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Everybody has to take a calculated risk. Sometimes even knowingly he is supposed to take an uncalculated risk. He has to be trained for that purpose.

Again, I must say—again I may be told that I am using statistics to prove something—the flying hours in the Air Force has increased nearly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times more than what was done in 1954 or 1955. I cannot give the flying hours because it will be rather an important information. They have the method of calculating the accident rate per 10,000 flying hours. According to the statistics that is made available to me, they say that compared to other countries the rate is certainly within limits. Therefore, I must put on record the fine work that has been done by our Air Force and the tremendous training commitment that they have done. We must not give an impression that by opening this enquiry we are trying to express any sense of censor.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** We will strengthen them.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Really speaking, our idea is to strengthen them. We cannot afford to lose such trained valuable lives. That is, really speaking, more important for us. Life of the Air Force is also very important for us. But we must try to find out whether there are any defects which are unconsciously there and which we can try to eliminate. Really speaking, that is the purpose of this enquiry.

**Shrimati Renu Chakravarty:** Besides the three points which he has mentioned regarding the terms of reference what about radio transmission by Pakistan radios about which a reference was made in this House earlier?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** That is a matter for investigation.

**Shrimati Renu Chakravarty:** Should it also not be made a term of reference?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** That need not be a term of reference of this Committee. The functions and purpose of this Committee are quite different. The last point that I want to make is about the Canteen Stores Department, CSDI as it is popularly known, to which a reference was made by Shri Trivedi. The CSDI is essentially a welfare organisation. As we all know our troops are stationed in far-flung forward areas, where marketing facilities are not available. For a large number of requirements of the army personnel outside the issue of rations, which are supplied by the Government itself, they have to depend on some sort of supplying agency. In order to provide this facility, during the British days some agency started functioning. First of all, it was the Contractors' Syndicate, which was replaced by the Canteen Stores Department in 1942. The present CSDI came into existence in 1947.

It is not making use of any Government money. Though the former CSD had taken some Government loans, the CSDI have repaid them with interest. At the present moment, of course, they enjoy certain concessions and special privileges like military credit notes for movement of goods and certain concessions in the matter of accommodation, transport etc. These facilities are reasonable and necessary, because a purely commercial organisation may not provide such facilities where they are most necessary, namely, in the forward areas. This type of agency is now contemplated and accepted in principle even in the case of civilian employees. There we think in terms of consumer co-operatives. The CSDI is doing practically the same work. The profit that it earns is used for welfare purposes of the army personnel.

It is true that some objections have been raised and Audit has pointed out that the accounts of this organisation should form part of the Consolidated Fund of India. This matter is being examined. We have to ensure ultimately that while the personnel of the armed forces do not lose the benefit of this organisation, at the same time, it becomes part of the Consolidated Fund of India.

These are some of the points that have been raised during the course of the discussion. In conclusion, I will say that I have found during my visits to the training centres and forward areas that the morale of the armed forces is something of which we can legitimately be proud. I am grateful to this hon. House for paying very good compliments to the personnel of all the three services. I am sure it will give them courage, strength and a great sense of patriotism and make them equal to the task that they will be asked to face if any invasion comes from any quarter. I am sure these people, with their courage, patriotism and

capacity as trained personnel, will save India in times of emergency.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Sir, on a point of information. Is it a fact that Government has still not moved our troops to the MacMahon line, and has left that matter to the judgment or decision of our Generals and, if so, is the Minister aware of the celebrated . . .

(At this stage, a paper fell down from the Press Gallery).

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Sorry, Sir.

**Mr. Speaker:** Is it some communication to me? Or is it negligence? That should not happen. The press people should remain awake and not sleep over their papers.

**Shri Nath Pai:** They may be excused.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Is the Minister aware of the celebrated military dictum that war or defence is too serious a matter to be left to the Generals only?

**श्री राम सेवक यादव (बाराबंकी) :**  
जातियों के नाम पर रेजीमेंटों के नाम रखने का जहाँ तक सम्बन्ध है यह मांग की जाती है कि और भी रेजीमेंटों का नाम जातियों के नाम पर रखा जाए। मैं जानना चाहता हूँ कि क्या मन्त्रालय जातियों के नाम पर जो मौजूदा रेजीमेंट्स हैं उनको समाप्त करने के प्रश्न पर विचार कर रहा है या वह चाहता है कि जातियों के नाम पर और भी रेजीमेंटों के नाम रखे जायें।

**Shri Frank Anthony:** The Minister was not pleased to tell us as to what policy he is pursuing with regard to nuclear research for producing ordinary conventional weapons. Secondly, what about the army council?

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** आसन्न पत्तन परिषद के बारे में और ऊँचे प्रकरणों के

[डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया]

अनुपात के बारे में माननीय रक्षा मंत्री ने कुछ नहीं कहा है, यह बात मैं आपकी अदावत में कहे देता हूँ।

दूसरा प्रश्न मेरा यह है कि दरांग में जो बोमडाला से भी ज्यादा उत्तर में है जब चीनी सेना ने हिन्दुस्तानी प्रतिनिधियों को उनके हथियार समर्पित किए तो भाषण में और आपसी बातचीत में उन्होंने कहा कि तुम्हारे निशाने बाज हमसे ज्यादा अच्छे थे, तुम्हारे हथियार हम से ज्यादा अच्छे थे लेकिन तुम में कुछ कमो थी जिसके सबब तुम भाग गए। क्या माननीय रक्षा मंत्री ने इस बात की अब तक जवाब को है और की है तो उसका क्या नतीजा निकला है ?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I could answer only one or two points; not all of them. On the point that was mentioned about the MacMahon line, our civil administration has reached the MacMahon line.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** What about the military?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** As far as the military is concerned, as the Prime Minister has stated many times on the floor of this House, whether to go or not, when to go, where to go, how far to go etc. are matters for the army military leaders to decide.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Has the Government asked them not to go to the MacMahon line?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** No. About the percentages which Dr. Lohia wanted to know, I am sorry, I have not got the figures. I will certainly find out whether there is no scope for lower officers to become officers in the army.

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** लोअर अफसर नहीं, सिपाही।

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Some of these sepoy become JCOs and NCOs. I

find from the recent recruitment to the officers' cadre that nearly 20 per cent of the officers are drawn from the ranks of JCOs and NCOs.

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** ब्रिगेडियर से ऊपर नहीं यानी, जनरलज वगैरह के लिए कह रहा हूँ।

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I did make a reference to that. I said I have no information on that point. I did say that.

About some of the other smaller points which have been raised, I will examine them and reply to the hon. Members, as I did last time.

**श्री राम सेवक यादव :** मेरे प्रश्न का उत्तर नहीं मिला है।

**अध्यक्ष महोदय :** उन्होंने कहा है कि जिनका उत्तर वह नहीं दे सकेंगे उनको एग्जेमिन करेंगे।

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया :** दरांग के बारे में कहा जाए तो ज्यादा अच्छा होगा।

**Shri Frank Anthony:** What is the policy with regard to producing conventional nuclear weapons? That was not explained.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** No experiments are being done on that and it is not the policy of the Government to do it.

**Shri Karni Singhji:** Are we going to allow China to make these experiments before we make them?

**Mr. Speaker:** Order, order. What about the cut motions?

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** I want cut motion No. 6 to be put separately, while 7 and 62 may be put together.

**Shri Ranga:** Mine is No. 39, the same as No. 6.

**Mr. Speaker:** So, it could not be moved. It was not moved.

**Shri Ranga:** The next day we corrected it.

**Mr. Speaker:** When it is barred, how could it be corrected?

**Shri Ranga:** How can it be barred? The usual practice was, if the same cut motion has been given notice of by half a dozen members separately all the six names would be added to the cut motion.

**Mr. Speaker:** I assure him that is not the practice. He should kindly refresh his memory.

**Shri Ranga:** Then there are three more cut motions, 35, 36 and 37. If it is convenient to you, all the three may be put together.

**Mr. Speaker:** Everything is convenient to me, whatever he wants me to do. I believe there are no other

**Division No. 11]**

cut motions which have to be put separately.

I shall now put cut motion No. 6, which is the same as 39, to the vote of the House.

The question is:

"That the Demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Failure to take effective steps for building up the national defences, and thus failing to seriously implement the solemn pledge taken in the House on November 14, 1962 to drive out the Chinese invader from the sacred soil of India." (6)]

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** The cut motion, Sir, is directed against the Government as a whole and let the entire Government take note of this.

**Mr. Speaker:** Let the Lobbies be cleared.

*The Lok Sabha divided:*

[13.57 hrs.]

## AYES

Aney, Dr. M.S.  
Bade, Shri  
Basant Kunwari, Shrimati  
Barua, Shri R.  
Berwa, Shri Onkar Lal  
Bheel, Shri P.H.  
Deo, Shri P.K.  
Kamath, Shri Hari Vishnu

Himmatsinhji, Shri  
Kachhavaia, Shri  
Karni Singhji, Shri  
Lohia, Dr. Ram Manohar  
Mahananda, Shri  
Mandal, Shri B.N.  
Masani, Shri M.R.  
Mehta, Shri Jashvant

Nath Pai, Shri  
Ranga, Shri  
Reddy, Shri Narasimha  
Sezhiyan, Shri  
Shashank Manjari, Shrimati  
Vishram Prasad, Shri  
Yadav, Shri Ram Sewak  
Yashpal Singh, Shri

## NOES

Akkamma Devi, Shrimati  
Alva, Shri A.S.  
Bal Krishna Singh, Shri  
Balmiki, Shri  
Barkataki, Shrimati Renuka  
Basappa, Shri  
Baswant, Shri  
Bhattacharrya, Shri C.K.  
Birendra Bahadur Singh, Shri  
Bist, Shri J.B.S.  
Brajeshwar Prasad, Shri  
Brij Raj Singh Kotah, Shri  
Chakraverti, Shri P.R.  
Chanda, Shrimati Jyotana  
Chandrabhan Singh, Shri  
Chaudhuri, Shri D.S.  
Chavan, Shri D.R.  
Chavan, Shri Y.B.

Chavda, Shrimati  
Chuni Lal, Shri  
Daffe, Shri  
Das, Shri B.K.  
Das, Shri Sudhansu  
Dass, Shri G.  
Dighe, Shri  
Dwivedi, Shri M.L.  
Gahmari, Shri  
Ganapati Ram, Shri  
Gandhi, Shri V.B.  
Hanada, Shri Subodh  
Hem Raj, Shri  
Iqbal Singh, Shri  
Jadhav, Shri M.L.  
Jain, Shri A.P.  
Jyotishi, Shri J.P.  
Khan, Shri Osman Ali  
Koujalgi, Shri H.V.

Koroki, Shri Lladhar  
Kureel, Shri B.N.  
LakshmiKanthamma, Shrimati  
Lalit Sen, Shri  
Mandal, Dr. P.  
Manjyangadan, Shri  
Marandi, Shri  
Mehta, Shri J. R.  
Mohiuddin, Shri  
Morarka, Shri  
More, Shri K.L.  
More, Shri S.S.  
Mukane, Shri  
Mukerjee, Shrimati Sharda  
Musafir Shri, G.S.  
Naidu, Shri V.G.  
Pande, Shri K.N.  
Pandey, Shri R.S.

## NOES—contd.

Pandey, Shri Vishwa Nath  
 Patel, Shri P.R.  
 Patel, Shri Rajeshwar  
 Raghunath Singh, Shri  
 Raghuramaiah, Shri  
 Rai, Shrimati Sahadrabai  
 Raj Bahadur, Shri  
 Rajdeo Singh, Shri  
 Raju, Shri D.B.  
 Ram Sewak, Shri  
 Ramanathan Chettiar, Shri  
 Ramaswamy, Shri V.K.  
 Rananjai Singh, Shri

Rane, Shri  
 Rao, Shri Krishnamoorthy  
 Rao, Shri Muthyal  
 Retan Lal, Shri  
 Raut, Shri Bholi  
 Ray, Shrimati Renuka  
 Reddy, Shrimati Yashoda  
 Roy, Shri Bishwanath  
 Sadhu, Ram, Shri  
 Saha, Dr. S.K.  
 Samanta, Shri S.C.  
 Saraf, Shri Sham Lal  
 Satyabhama Devi, Shrimati  
 Sen, Shri P.G.

Shree Narayan Das, Shri  
 Singha, Shri G.K.  
 Sinhasan Singh, Shri  
 Soy, Shri H.C.  
 Subbaraman, Shri C.  
 Sumat Prasad, Shri  
 Swaran Singh, Shri  
 Tiwary, Shri D.N.  
 Tiwary, Shri K.N.  
 Tyagi, Shri  
 Uikay, Shri  
 Varma, Shri M.L.  
 Yadav, Shri Ram Harkh  
 Yadava, Shri B.P.

**Mr. Speaker:** The result of the Division is: Ayes .. 24; Noes .. 95.

*The motion was negatived.*

**Mr. Speaker:** I shall now put cut motions 7 and 62 to the vote of the House.

*The cut motions (Nos. 7 and 62) were put and negatived*

**Mr. Speaker:** Now, I shall put cut motions 35, 36 and 37 to the vote of the House.

**Shri Ranga:** These may kindly be read out.

**Mr. Speaker:** The cut motions read as follows:

“That the Demand under the Head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.”

[Failure to broadbase the Defence Council and convene it more frequently. (35)].

[Failure to publish the full NEFA Report by Gen. Henderson Brooks. (36)].

[Need for a Committee including a few retired Generals to study the possibilities of eliminating wastage in the Defence expenditure and to suggest ways and means of tightening control. (37) ]

**Shri Ranga:** All the three may be put together and the House may divide.

**Mr. Speaker:** He should know that if all the three are put together, I cannot order a division. He may choose one of them.

**Shri Ranga:** All right. Cut Motion No. 36 might be put.

**Mr. Speaker:** I shall now put Cut Motion No. 36 to the vote of the House.

14 hrs.

**Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati):** I did not hear the bell in the Library. Something seems to be wrong with the bell there.

**Mr. Speaker:** That may be so; I shall make enquiries.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** His vote may be taken into account and added to the result of the previous division.

**Mr. Speaker:** That is not possible.

Probably, Shri Hem Barua was much too busy with his talks there. Other Members have been able to come from the Central Hall.

**Shri Hem Barua:** I was in the Library in the first floor.



**Mr. Speaker:** It is the duty of the party whip also to inform the hon. Member.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** He is himself the party whip.

**Mr. Speaker:** I shall now put cut motion No. 36 to vote.

The question is:

"That the Demand under the Head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Failure to publish the full NEFA Report by Gen. Henderson Brooks (36) ]

Let the Lobby be cleared.

**Shri Nath Pai:** It is up to them to think about the implications of this, because when the Defence Ministry's

Demands are being voted upon and there are cut motions which imply censure on the Government, only one Cabinet Minister is here supporting Shri Y. B. Chavan. Is there something more to it?

**Mr. Speaker:** The whole Government will go out if the censure succeeds.

**Shri Tyagi:** I think that my hon. friends are not serious about this.

**Shri Nath Pai:** We are very serious.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** If my hon. friend Shri Tyagi is serious, he would not vote against it.

*The Lok Sabha divided:*

Division No. 12]

[14.03 hrs.

### AYES

Bade, Shri  
Barua, Shri Hem  
Barua, Shri R.  
Basant Kunwari, Shrimati  
Berwa, Shri Onkar Lal  
Bheel Shri P.H.  
Chaudhary, Shri Y.S.  
Chaudhuri, Shri Tridib Kumar  
Deo, Shri P.K.

Himmatsinhji, Shri  
Kachhwaia, Shri  
Kamath, Shri Hari Vishnu  
Karni Singhji, Shri  
Lohia, Dr. Ram Manohar  
Mahananda, Shri  
Mandal, Shri B.N.  
Massani, Shri M.R.  
Mehta, Shri Jashwant

Nath Pai, Shri  
Ranga, Shri  
Reddy, Shri Narasimha  
Sezhiyan, Shri  
Shashank Manjari, Shrimati  
Shastri, Shri Prakash Vir  
Vishram Prasad, Shri  
Yadav, Shri Ram Sewak  
Yashpal Singh, Shri

### NOES

Akkamma Devi, Shrimati  
Alva, Shri A.S.  
Aney, Dr. M.S.  
Balakrishnan, Shri  
Balmiki, Shri  
Barkataki, Shrimati Renuka  
Basappa, Shri  
Baswant, Shri  
Bhattacharyya, Shri C.K.  
Birendra Bahadur Singh, Shri  
Bist, Shri J.B.S.  
Brajeshwar Prasad, Shri  
Brij Raj Singh Kotah, Shri  
Chakraverti, Shri P.R.  
Chanda, Shrimati Jyotsna  
Chandrabhan Singh, Shri  
Chaudhuri, Shri D.S.  
Chavan, Shri D.R.  
Chavan, Shri Y.B.  
Chavda, Shrimati  
Chuni Lal, Shri

Dafe, Shri  
Das, Shri B.K.  
Das, Shri Sudhansu  
Dass, Shri G.  
Dighe, Shri  
Dwivedi, Shri M.L.  
Gahmari, Shri  
Ganapati Ram, Shri  
Gandhi, Shri V.B.  
Hanada, Shri Subodh  
Hem Raj, Shri  
Iqbal Singh, Shri  
Jadhav, Shri M.L.  
Jain, Shri A.P.  
Jyotshi, Shri J.P.  
Khan, Shri Osman Ali  
Kotaki, Shri Liladhar  
Korjalgii, Shri H.V.  
Kureel, Shri B.N.  
Lakshminanthamma, Shrimati  
Lalit Sen, Shri

Laskar, Shri N.R.  
Mandal, Dr. P.  
Maniyangadan, Shri  
Marandi, Shri  
Mehta, Shri J.R.  
Mishra, Shri Mahesh Dutta  
Mohiuddin, Shri  
Morarka, Shri  
More, Shri K.L.  
More, Shri S.S.  
Mukane, Shri  
Mukerjee, Shrimati Sharda  
Musafir, Shri G.S.  
Naidu, Shri V.G.  
Pande, Shri K.N.  
Pandey, Shri R.S.  
Pande, Shri Sarjoo  
Pandey, Shri Vishwa Nath  
Patel, Shri P.R.  
Patel, Shri Rajeshwar  
Raghunath Singh, Shri

## NOES—contd.

Raghuramaiah, Shri  
Rai, Shrimati Sahodrabai  
Raj Bahadur, Shri  
Rajdeo Singh, Shri  
Raju, Shri D.B.  
Ram Sewak, Shri  
Ramanathan Chattiar, Shri  
Ramaswamy, Shri V.K.  
Ramanjai Singh, Shri  
Rane, Shri  
Rao, Shri Krishnamoorthy  
Rao, Shri Muthyal

Rattan Lal, Shri  
Raut, Shri Bhola  
Ray, Shrimati Renuka  
Reddy, Shrimati Yashoda  
Roy, Shri Bishwanath  
Sadhu Ram, Shri  
Saha, Dr. S. K.  
Samanta, Shri S. C.  
Sarsaf, Shri Sham Lal  
Saryabhama Devi, Shrimati  
Sen, Shri P. G.  
Sherma, Shri K. C.

Singha, Shri G. K.  
Sinhasan Singh, Shri  
Soy, Shri H.C.  
Subramaniam, Shri C.  
Sumat Prasad, Shri  
Swaran Singh, Shri  
Tiwary, Shri D. N.  
Tiwary, Shri K. N.  
Tyagi, Shri  
Uikey, Shri  
Verma, Shri M. L.  
Yadav, Shri Ram Harkh  
Yadava, Shri B.P.

**Mr. Speaker:** The result of the Division is:

*Ayes : 27; Noes : 99.*

*The motion was negatived.*

**Mr. Speaker:** I shall now put cut motions Nos. 35 and 37 to the vote of the House.

*The cut motions (Nos. 35 and 37) were put and negatived.*

**Mr. Speaker:** I shall now put all other cut motions to vote.

*All the other cut motions were put and negatived.*

**Mr. Speaker:** The question is:

"That the respective sums not exceeding the amounts shown in the fourth column of the Order Paper, be granted to the President to complete the sums necessary to defray the charges that will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of the heads of demands entered in the second column thereof against Demands Nos. 3 to 7 and 113 relating to the Ministry of Defence."

*The motion was adopted.*

[The motions for Demands for Grants which were adopted by the Lok Sabha, are reproduced below—Ed.]

## DEMAND NO. 3—MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 55,46,000 be granted to the

President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Ministry of Defence'."

## DEMAND NO. 4—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—ARMY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 5,34,31,13,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective—Army'."

## DEMAND NO. 5—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—NAVY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 21,21,62,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective—Navy'."

## DEMAND NO. 6—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—AIR FORCE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,14,22,58,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Defence Services, Effective—Air Force'."

DEMAND No. 7—DEFENCE SERVICES—  
NON-EFFECTIVE

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 20,07,50,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Defence Services—Non-Effective'."

DEMAND No. 113—DEFENCE CAPITAL  
OUTLAY

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,29,20,42,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Defence Capital Outlay'."

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT

**Mr. Speaker:** The House will now proceed with the discussion and voting on the Demands for Grants under the control of the Ministry of Transport, for which 5 hours have been allotted.

Hon. Members who want to move cut motions may send slips to the Table within ten minutes indicating the numbers of the cut motions which they want to move and they will be treated as having been moved subject to their being otherwise in order.

DEMAND No. 82—MINISTRY OF  
TRANSPORT

**Mr. Speaker:** Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 97,34,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Ministry of Transport'."

DEMAND No. 83—METEOROLOGY

**Mr. Speaker:** Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 2,45,78,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Meteorology'."

DEMAND No. 84—CENTRAL ROAD FUND  
**Mr. Speaker:** Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 4,03,76,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Central Road Fund'."

DEMAND No. 85—COMMUNICATIONS  
(INCLUDING NATIONAL HIGHWAYS)

**Mr. Speaker:** Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 7,02,51,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Communications (including National Highways)'."

DEMAND No. 86—MERCANTILE MARINE

**Mr. Speaker:** Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,18,74,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1965, in respect of 'Mercantile Marine'."

DEMAND No. 87—LIGHTHOUSES AND  
LIGHTSHIPS

**Mr. Speaker:** Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,00,19,000 be granted to the