

12.17 hrs.

MESSAGES FROM RAJYA SABHA

Secretary: Sir, I have to report the following Messages received from the Secretary of Rajya Sabha:—

- (1) 'In accordance with the provisions of rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Rajya Sabha, I am directed to enclose a copy of the Special Marriage (Amendment) Bill, 1963, which has been passed by the Rajya Sabha at its sitting held on the 21st January, 1963.'
- (2) 'In accordance with the provisions of rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Rajya Sabha, I am directed to enclose a copy of the Limitation Bill, 1963, which has been passed by the Rajya Sabha at its sitting held on the 21st January, 1963.'
- (3) 'In accordance with the provisions of rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Rajya Sabha, I am directed to enclose a copy of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Bill, 1963, which has been passed by the Rajya Sabha at its sitting held on the 22nd January, 1963.'

12.17½ hrs.

BILLS LAID ON THE TABLE, AS PASSED BY RAJYA SABHA

Secretary: Sir, I lay on the Table of the House the following Bills, as passed by Rajya Sabha:—

- (1) The Special Marriage (Amendment) Bill, 1963.
- (2) The Limitation Bill, 1963.
- (3) The Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Bill, 1963.

12.18 hrs.

MOTION RE. COLOMBO CONFERENCE PROPOSALS

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Prime Minister.

श्री राम सेवक यादव (बाराबंकी) : प्वाइंट ऑफ ऑर्डर । प्रधान मंत्री जी यह प्रस्ताव रखने जा रहे हैं मैं उनसे पहले ही अपना प्वाइंट ऑफ ऑर्डर उठाना चाहता हूँ ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : उनसे पहले यह नहीं हो सकता ।

श्री र.म. सेवक यादव : मैं इसलिए पहले अपना प्वाइंट ऑफ ऑर्डर रखना चाहता हूँ कि यह प्रस्ताव गन्ना नहीं जा सकता ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : जिस वक़्त वह सब लेंगे उस वक़्त मैं आपको बतल दूंगा कि आप अपना प्वाइंट ऑफ ऑर्डर रखें, इस वक़्त नहीं ।

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Atomic Energy (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Sir, I beg to move:

"That the proposals of the Conference of six non-aligned Nations held at Colombo between the 10th and 12th of December, 1962, with the clarifications given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana in the meetings with the Prime Minister of India and his colleagues on the 12th and 13th of January, 1963 laid on the Table of the House on the 21st January, 1963 be taken into consideration."

श्री राम सेवक यादव : इस सम्बन्ध में मेरा निवेदन है कि नवम्बर में इस माननीय सदन ने इस आशय का प्रस्ताव खड़े हो कर पारित किया था कि जब तक चीनी हमारे देश की पवित्र भूमि के एक एक इंच से खदेड़ नहीं दिए जाते तब तक हम संघर्ष जारी रखेंगे, चाहे वह जितना लम्बा और कठिन हो और

[श्री गम सेवक यादव]

इस प्रस्ताव को जब हम पारित कर चुके हैं तो उस प्रस्ताव के रहते हुए, यह जो कोलम्बो प्रस्ताव है, और जो उसके बिल्कुल विपरीत जाता है, नहीं आ सकता। मेरा विनम्र निवेदन है कि यह प्रस्ताव उसके विपरीत है इसलिए इसको यहाँ पेश नहीं किया जा सकता।

श्री किशन पटनायक (मम्बलपुर)
मुझे भी कुछ बहना है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह कोई डिस्कशन नहीं है। एक प्वाइंट आफ आर्डर उठाया गया है, उसका जवाब दिया जाएगा।

पालियामेंट एक फैसला ले चुकी है। और अब जो प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब प्रस्ताव रखने जा रहे हैं वह इसलिए कि यही पालियामेंट इस पर गौर करे। अभी उन्होंने कुछ कहा नहीं, बतलाया नहीं कि क्या होगा। पालियामेंट को पूरा हक है कि वह अपनी किसी फँसले में तबदीली करे। अभी तक तो तबदीली का सवाल ही नहीं है। मगर अगर पालियामेंट तबदीली करना भी चाहे तो उसको हक है। इसमें कोई चीज ऐसी नहीं है कि जो पालियामेंट के सामने पेश नहीं की जा सकती। प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब ने यह नहीं कहा कि मैं बदलता हूँ या मैं कोई तबदीली पेश करता हूँ या और कोई चीज लाता हूँ। उन्होंने यही कहा है कि मैं इसको कंसीडर करने के लिए पालियामेंट के सामने रखता हूँ। तो पालियामेंट को हक है कि वह सोचे और गौर करे या उसने पहले जो फैसला दिया है उस पर गौर करे। जो चीज पालियामेंट के सामने रखी जाएगी उस पर वह विचार कर सकती है और फैसला दे सकती है। तो आखिरी फैसला पालियामेंट का ही होगा। इस प्रस्ताव में कोई ऐसी चीज नहीं है जो पहले प्रस्ताव के बखिलाफ हो।

श्री किशन पटनायक : आज के अखबार में आया है कि प्रधान मंत्री ने इन प्रिंसिपल

कोलम्बो प्रोजेक्ट को स्वीकृति दे दी है। अगर यह सही है तो फिर इस पर विचार करना फिजूल है। पहले प्रधान मंत्री साहब यह कहें कि उन्होंने ऐसा नहीं कहा।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : पहले आप उनकी स्पीच तो सुनिये कि वह क्या कहना चाहते हैं।

श्री किशन पटनायक : पहले आप तो मेरी बात सुन लीजिए।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैंने आपकी बात सुनी और तब कहा कि आप उनकी स्पीच सुन लीजिए।

श्री किशन पटनायक : मैंने अभी खत्म नहीं किया है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : अगर आप दो घंटे तक खत्म नहीं करेंगे तो यह बात कब तक चलती रहेगी। आपने जो कहा था उसका जवाब मैंने दे दिया। मेरी मज्ज में नहीं आता कि जब लीडर बोलते हैं तो फिर दूसरे मेम्बर क्या कहना चाहते हैं।
I will ask the hon. Member to resume his seat now.

श्री किशन पटनायक : मैंने उसका दूसरा पहलू भी आपके सामने रखा जो कि अखबार में आ गया है। आपने कहा कि पालियामेंट का जो निश्चय था उसमें कोई तबदीली नहीं हुई है तो मेरा कहना यह है कि पालियामेंट ने जो गौर रखी थी उसके भीतर ही इस बीच में प्रधान मंत्री जो ने कुछ कर दिया है जो कि पालियामेंट के उस निश्चय के खिलाफ है। इसके लिए उनको इस पालियामेंट में माफ़ी मांगनी चाहिए क्योंकि पालियामेंट ने जो निश्चय किया है उसके खिलाफ उन्होंने कुछ किया है.....
(Interruptions)

Mr. Speaker: If hon. Members will only allow me to deal with the hon.

Members who stand up, then probably we might proceed more quickly. The hon. Prime Minister.

श्री राम सेवक यादव : अध्यक्ष महोदय, एक निवेदन यह है कि अभी आपने कहा कि प्रधान मंत्री जी उम फैमले के खिलाफ कोई निर्णय लेने नहीं जा रहे हैं, उम पर कोई निश्चय नहीं करने जा रहे हैं और पार्लियामेंट को हक है कि वह अपने पुराने निर्णय को बदल सकती है तो यह पुराने निर्णय को बदलने का भी प्रस्ताव नहीं है। इसका मतलब यह है कि १६ नवम्बर का प्रस्ताव हमारा जहाँ था वहीं पर है। इसमें तो हमारे इस कथन में कि प्रधान मंत्री जी के मौजूदा प्रस्ताव पर बिलार नहीं होना चाहिए और भी शक्ति आ जाती है।

Mr. Speaker: Hon. Prime Minister.

Shri Priya Gupta (Katihar): What is the decision on that point?

Mr. Speaker: There is no point; hence there is no decision.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr. Speaker, Sir, I should like to refer to some recent events which no doubt are in the minds—

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : अध्यक्ष महोदय, विषयान्तर। चूँकि यह महत्वपूर्ण विषय है और प्रधान मंत्री जी को बड़ी अच्छी हिन्दी आती है इसलिए उन्हें अंग्रेजी में अपना भाषण न कर हिन्दी में करना चाहिए।

अध्यक्ष महोदय आइंर, आइंर।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द (करनाल) : मेरी प्रार्थना सुन लें।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैं आपकी प्रार्थना तब सुनूँ जब आप कोई नई बात कहते हों। हमेशा खड़े होकर आप वही पुरानी हिन्दी में भाषण हों, कहते हैं। इसके अलावा और आपको कुछ कहना नहीं होता है मैं सुनना नहीं चाहता मैं उनके लीडर से कहूँगा कि इस बात

को बन्द होना चाहिए। हर दफे, हर रोज अगर यही चलेगा तो मैं नहीं सुनूँगा।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : जब तक यहाँ हिन्दी में नहीं बोलेंगे यह जरूर रहेगा। आखिर इसका मतलब क्या हुआ? जब देश की राष्ट्र भाषा हिन्दी है और जब हम हिन्दी में भाषण होने के लिए आवाज़ उठाते हैं तो आप हिन्दी को दबाना चाहते हैं? अगर आपकी यही नीति है तो आप हिन्दी को कैसे ला सकेंगे ?

अध्यक्ष महोदय : अगर माननीय सदस्य नहीं बैठेंगे तो मुझे हिन्दी को तो नहीं लेकिन उनको जरूर दबाना पड़ेगा।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : आप मुझे नहीं दबा सकते यह तो मेरे साथ हिन्दी को दबाना है

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must resume his seat.

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : हिन्दी को नहीं दबाना है तो फिर हिन्दी को बलवा दीजिये।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : आप बैठेंगे या नहीं ?

श्री रामसेवक यादव : अध्यक्ष महोदय, मेरा निवेदन है कि प्रधान मंत्री जी हिन्दी, अंग्रेजी दोनों भाषाओं में बोलें।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह प्राइम मिनिस्टर और हर एक मمبر की अपनी मर्जी है कि दोनों भाषाओं में से जिस भाषा में वह बोलना चाहे, बोल सकता है। इस वक्त पोजीशन यही है।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द मैं भी प्रार्थना करता हूँ कि हिन्दी में बोलें।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : अब मैं मمبر साहब का नाम लूँगा कि वह इस हाउस की बाकायदा कार्यवाही में बाधा डाल रहे हैं और इसके अग्रे जो कार्यवाही होगी वह फिर आयेंगी।

Proposals

श्री राम सेवक यादव : अध्यक्ष महोदय, मेरा निवेदन आपके जगिए प्रशन मंत्री जी से है और वह यह है कि प्रशन मंत्री जी एक बार पिछली पार्लियामेंट में दोनों भाषाओं में बोले थे और जैसा कि स्वामी जी का कहना है वह महत्वपूर्ण विषय है, उनके भी समझने का प्रया है और लखों और करोड़ों देशवासियों को समझना है इसलिए प्रशन मंत्री जी इस अवसर पर दोनों भाषाओं में बोलें। अंग्रेजी में भी बोलें और हिन्दी में भी बोलें।

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Prime Minister.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, on the last occasion Parliament discussed this question of Chinese aggression on the 10th of December, 1962 and expressed approval of the measures and policy adopted by Government to meet the situation resulting from the invasion of India by China. Since then a number of events have taken place which I should like to mention to the House.

On the 15th December, the Consulates-general of India and China in the respective countries were closed. The withdrawal of Chinese forces from the NEFA area continued during this period. There were, however, reports of violation of the unilateral cease-fire by the Chinese army. 716 sick and wounded Indian soldiers and 13 dead bodies of prisoners were returned by the Chinese forces. On the 17th December Mr. G. S. Peiris, envoy of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, brought the Colombo Conference proposals to New Delhi and handed them over to the Prime Minister.

A joint communique was issued by Pakistan and China on complete agreement in principle in regard to the alignment of their border on 26th December, 1962.

China and Mongolia signed a border treaty in Peking on the 26th December 1962.

Premier Chou En-lai sent a reply dated 30th December 1962 to Prime Minister's letter of December 1, 1962.

Prime Minister's reply to Premier Chou En-lai's letter of 30th December, 1962 was sent on January 1, 1963.

Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike visited Peking from 31st December to 8th January.

Ghana Delegation led by Mr. Kofi Asante Ofori-Atta, Minister of Justice, arrived on 9th January in Delhi.

Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike arrived in New Delhi on 10th January.

The U.A.R. Delegation led by Mr. Ali Sabry arrived in Delhi on 12th January.

Discussions with the three delegations took place on 12th and 13th January 1963.

A joint communique was issued at New Delhi on 13th January.

The Chinese forces started withdrawing from 10th December, 1962. The latest position of Chinese withdrawals and restoration of civil administration is as follows in NEFA:

Kameng Frontier Division: Political Officer reached Tawang on 21st January, Adviser arrived on 22nd January.

Subansari Frontier Division: Chinese are reported to have withdrawn from all areas. We have not received reports about the reoccupation by us of Limeking, Naba and Taksing. The delay may be due to the fact that bridges to Limeking and Taksing have been destroyed or washed away.

Siang Frontier Division: Chinese are reported to have withdrawn from all areas and civil administration has been restored in Manigong and Mechuka. Tuting remained in our possession throughout.

Lohit Frontier Division: Walong has been re-occupied. A patrol sent from there found the Chinese near Thochu stream within our territory near Kibithoo. Restoration of civil

administration in Kibithoo has been deferred until the complete withdrawal of the Chinese from the area.

Indian administration has not yet been extended to areas between Tawang and the frontier, and in the Kibithoo area along the frontier as the Chinese have not fully withdrawn from these areas.

We have repeatedly stated in this House in answer to the Chinese proposals that we were unable to enter into any talks or discussions with them so long as the Chinese did not agree at least to the restoration of the *status quo* prior to their aggression since the 8th September, 1962. The whole House expressed its agreement on this. (*Interruptions*).

Shri Kishan Pattnayak: On a point of order, Sir. The Parliament has never agreed to this proposal.

Mr. Speaker: What is the point of order in this?

Shri Priya Gupta: He is making a wrong statement.

Mr. Speaker: He can correct it when he speaks. He will have that opportunity. There is no point of order.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: The Chinese proposals first came on the 24th October, which we rejected. In rejecting them, we had stated then that we can only consider any relevant proposal when the position which existed on 7th September, 1962 was restored. That has come up before the House repeatedly. (*Interruptions*)

Shri Priya Gupta: It is imposed upon us.

Mr. Speaker: It cannot be imposed if he has the freedom to say something and he goes on saying in spite of... (*Interruptions*). Order, order.

Shri Priya Gupta: I am sorry, Sir.

Mr. Speaker: What the Members object to is that there was no mention about the line or the situation on the

8th of September in the resolution which the Parliament adopted.

An Hon. Member: No, not at all.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It was not mentioned because the question had not arisen. The resolution of November stands and must stand; there is no question of one's going behind it.

Shri Priya Gupta: Then do not get irritated.

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. If he cannot contain himself, then I will have to help him.

Shri Priya Gupta: Thank you, Sir.

Mr. Speaker: Should I? Does he want that I should assist him in that?

Shri Priya Gupta: No. He gets irritated, that is what I submitted to you.

Mr. Speaker: I will only ask the Leader of the Party...

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy (Kendrapara): I am sorry, Sir, for what has happened.

Mr. Speaker: That expression of being sorry has been expressed so many times by the hon. Member.

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy: I hope he will bear in mind, certainly, all that has happened to-day and in future he will act as any disciplined Member of our party in the House will do.

Mr. Speaker: Thank you. I expect this from the leaders at least.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I was recounting, Sir, the course of events in the last few weeks, and I venture to say—it may be that an hon. Member may not agree with what I say, but I think it is a correct recount—that we passed a resolution in November and by that the House was undoubtedly bound till the House said something else. I do not think any occasion has arisen for us to consider even that that resolution should be changed in

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

any respect. That resolution dealt with how this problem should be settled finally, and our position is exactly the same.

Then, as I said, firstly, on the 24th October the Chinese made a proposal called the "three-point proposal". To that proposal we did not agree and we said then that we cannot consider this even as a temporary matter, that is, even for purposes of discussing it, not for the purpose of putting aside the November resolution but for the purpose of discussing it, till the position of the 8th September is restored. That was the position. That came up repeatedly before this House, and it is perfectly true, if the hon. Member wants to lay stress on it, that that point was not formally adopted by resolution by this House. But there are many things which happen in this House, which are stated in this House and stated repeatedly with regard to Government policy and which are then admitted as the Government's policy. My point is that the November resolution was not in any sense affected by subsequent happenings; it remains still and it will remain. The position taken in this House repeatedly, and also on the last occasion when this was discussed, was that we cannot consider this matter and discuss it with the Chinese Government until the position on the 8th September is restored. That has been the position. Therefore, subsequent happenings have to be considered by us on that basis.

Now, Sir, when we met last time on the 10th December and discussed this, the Colombo Conference was at the point of meeting or was meeting that very day. It was to have met on 1st December, but then it was postponed and it met on the 10th December—10th, 11th, 12th or thereabouts—and this House happened to meet and discuss this question. Then we did not know what the Colombo proposals were going to be. But we know that they were meeting and a

reference was made to it in the course of the debate. A reference was also made by us, on behalf of the Government, to the effect that we can only consider this matter after the position on 8th September is restored.

Well, the Colombo Conference met and put forward some proposals. They went to Peking—some of their representatives—and then later came to Delhi. Their proposals as originally framed were not clear in regard to one or two matters and were liable to one or two different interpretations. So the first thing we did when they came to us was to ask them to clarify their proposals and to make us understand exactly what they were so that they might avoid any misinterpretation or different interpretations, and it was only when they had done that would we be in a position to express our opinion in regard to them.

In considering that matter the issue before us then was how far these were in conformity with what we had said repeatedly, that the position prior to 8th September be restored. Also, it must be remembered that it was stated all along that any response that we may give or the Government of the People's Republic of China may give to it or any steps we may take in regard to their proposals would not prejudice in the slightest the position of either of the two Governments as regards their conception of the final alignment of the frontier.

The whole purpose of this exercise was to create a situation when something could be considered by the two parties. Before creating that situation, I repeat, we had said that something should be done, that is, the Chinese should vacate the aggression they had indulged in after 7th September. There is no question, therefore, of our going behind or varying in the slightest the resolution passed by this House in November.

The merits of the dispute were not considered by the Colombo countries or any other. It was only to pave the way for discussion between the representatives of both the parties and, as I said, we can only discuss them if certain conditions were created and certain aggression committed by the Chinese was vacated.

Now, these proposals as explained and amplified by them in answer to our questions related to these three sectors; the western, middle and eastern sectors of our border. In regard to the eastern sector the position prior to the 8th September was that the Chinese forces were to the north of the international boundary and the Indian forces were to the south of this boundary—that is, what is normally called the McMahon Line for facility; it is not named McMahon Line officially nor did Mr. McMahon, or whatever his title was, lay down that. He recognised it as the existing boundary. Therefore, I refer to it as McMahon Line for facility. The boundary is said to be the high ridge of the Himalayas there and it continues into Burma. In fact, the Chinese Government has recognised this boundary of the high ridge in Burma. So, before the 8th September no Chinese forces elements had come across that boundary there except—there is one exception in Longju, as the House well knows, Longju being a village just on the frontier. In regard to this the position that was taken some time ago was that for the present nobody, neither party, should occupy it. The Chinese had forcibly occupied it previously and later it was suggested that neither party should occupy it. The Colombo Conference proposals, as clarified by the visiting delegations, confirm this position except as regards the Thag La ridge area, which the Chinese call Chadong area, where we have a border post known as the Dhola post. The Colombo proposals and the clarifications refer to these areas Thag La Ridge and Longju, as “remaining areas arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and

the People's Republic of China by direct discussion.” That is to say, in regard to the Eastern sector, the 8th September position was, according to the Colombo Conference proposals, entirely restored, except in regard to Thag La Ridge area and the Dhola post. These are within three miles of the McMahon line. About this the Colombo proposals stated that this matter may be left undecided, They left it to the parties to decide by direct discussion. That is the position, so far as the eastern sector is concerned.

With regard to the middle sector, the Colombo Conference proposals required the *status quo* to be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*. This conforms to the Government of India's position that the *status quo* prior to the 8th September, 1962 should be restored as there has been no conflict in this area and the existing situation has not been disturbed.

Coming to the western sector, i.e. Ladakh sector, the restoration of the *status quo* as it obtained prior to 8th September would result in re-establishment of all the Indian posts shown in blue in the maps circulated to members. We have circulated a large number of maps to hon. Members as well as the Colombo conference. Therefore, I am not reading them out because they have already obtained enough publicity. If we went back to the 8th September position in the western sector, this would have resulted in the re-establishment of all the Indian posts shown in blue in the maps circulated to Members. This will also mean that the Chinese will maintain the old Chinese posts at the locations shown in red in the same map. The Colombo Conference proposes that a 20 kilometre area will be cleared by the withdrawal of Chinese forces, and this area is to be administered by civilian posts of both sides, Indian and Chinese. The House will observe that this area which is to be administered by civilian posts

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on both sides covers the entire area in which Indian posts existed prior to the 8th September except for two or three posts to the west of Sumdo. On the other hand, the 20-kilometre withdrawal by the Chinese forces entails the Chinese forces going several kilometres beyond the international boundary in the region of Spanggur and further south. The Colombo Conference proposals and the clarifications thus satisfy the demand made for the restoration of the *status quo* prior to the 8th September. The slight variation is about two or three Indian posts west of Sumdo. This is, however, compensated by Chinese withdrawals in the region of Spanggur and further south; also, by the fact that many Chinese military posts have to be removed from the withdrawal area. If hon. Members consider this matter with the help of maps, they will observe that this position, as indicated by the Colombo Conference proposals, has certain advantages over the one which we had previously indicated, that is, the restoration of the 8th September position. In the 8th September position the Chinese were there in strength, in very large strength, in that area and we had also some posts. In that particular area it was obviously much to the advantage of the Chinese, because of their large strength etc. Now, if this Colombo Conference proposal is accepted in regard to the western sector, it removes the Chinese strength from that sector and makes that sector a demilitarised area, with our posts as well as Chinese posts, by agreements being civil posts, in equal number with equal number of people and similarity of arms. It would be civil arm, police arm or small arm. This, I think, is definitely better than the restoration of Chinese posts in that area in a big way with large arms.

On full consideration of these matters as contained in the Colombo Conference resolutions and their clarifications we came to the conclusion that these proposals fulfilled the essence

of the demand made for a restoration of the *status quo* prior to the 8th September. I, thereupon, sent a letter to the Ceylon Prime Minister, stating that the Government of India accept in principle the Colombo Conference proposals in the light of the clarification given and will take further action to place them before the Indian Parliament for consideration before the Government of India can finally accept them.

I had told the Ceylon Prime Minister and her colleagues that we would like to know the attitude of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Colombo Conference proposals and clarifications as this would facilitate the consideration of the proposals and the clarifications by our own Parliament. I have just this morning received a message from the Ceylon Prime Minister, conveying the Chinese attitude to the Colombo Conference proposals. The telegram from Mrs. Bandaranaike reads as follows:

"In response to my telegram of January 14th I have received today a reply from Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Prime Minister Chou En-lai has reiterated his earlier acceptance in principle of proposals of Colombo Conference as a preliminary basis for the meeting of Indian and Chinese officials to discuss the stabilisation of cease-fire and disengagement and to promote Sino-Indian boundary negotiations.

The Chinese Government however maintains two points of interpretation in their memorandum that I handed over to you but they hope that difference in interpretation between the Chinese and Indian sides will not prevent the speedy holding of talks between the Indian and Chinese officials. They hope these differences will be resolved in their talks."

Perhaps hon. Members may have seen yesterday the report of what was

stated by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi more or less to this effect; that is to say, while they repeat that they have accepted the Colombo Conference proposals in principle, they raise some vital matters in which they differ from them. It is obvious that the Chinese Government do not accept the Colombo Conference proposals as "a definite basis providing conditions for the acceptance of both parties", nor do they accept the Colombo proposals and the clarifications given by the three Colombo Conference delegations who visited Delhi. The Chinese Government maintain certain points of their own interpretation of the Colombo proposals. This obviously means that they have not accepted the Colombo proposals as a whole. We on our part are, however, clear that there can be no talks and discussions between officials as stated in the Colombo Conference proposals to settle the points left for decision by direct discussions between the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China by the Colombo Conference, unless the Government of the People's Republic of China accept in to the Colombo Conference proposals and their clarifications.

I should like to call the attention of the House to this fact that the Colombo Conference was, of course, held not at our instance. In fact, the Conference was organised and people were invited without any reference to us except when this fact was decided upon. Then the Ceylon Government was good enough to inform us that this was being done by the Prime Minister of Ceylon. Thereafter, in regard to these things, we have communicated with the Ceylon Government and not with the Chinese Government. Throughout this period we have not conferred with the Chinese Government in regard to the Colombo proposals. It is for the Chinese Government to communicate with Colombo and for Colombo to tell us, or for us to communicate to the Ceylon Government and for them to tell the Chinese.

So, now it is fairly clear from what Marshal Chen Yi has said and from the message received by us through the Prime Minister of Ceylon, it appears that the Chinese Government have not accepted the Colombo proposals in regard to certain important matters. Therefore there has not been any acceptance *in toto*. The Government of India, therefore, cannot decide about doing anything unless the position is quite clear. But we have to decide and we have to say something definite in regard to the Colombo proposals. Whether they lead to any further steps in the direction of talks with the Chinese Government depends upon the Chinese Government accepting them.

The Government of India have always maintained that they are in favour of settling differences by peaceful talks and discussions. In spite of the massive Chinese aggression they were prepared to undertake talks and discussions in regard to the differences between India and The People's Republic of China in one or several stages as may be necessary. I even mentioned in this House previously that we would be perfectly prepared to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration if it is agreed to. Anyhow, we were perfectly prepared to follow any peaceful method for the solution of this matter provided that the conditions for such discussions arise and the basis for these talks is created.

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : श्रीमती भण्डार-
नायके के कहने में ही वापसी करनी थी
तो पहले ही कर ली होती। वीथियों
हजार आदमियों को बन्धन क्यों किया ?
चीनियों को सीमा में बाहर प्रवेश हो
कर आप विदेश को चले गये थे।

अध्यक्ष महोदय मैं तो हैरान हो
गया कि स्वामी जी अब कुछ समझ बनाने
हैं।

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: We have
always been willing and are willing

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to take to peaceful methods for the solution of any dispute provided the conditions for such talks are created. We had pointed out repeatedly that the conditions would be created by their vacating the new aggression that they had indulged in since the 8th September. When we made that proposal first in October the Chinese Government did not respond to it. Subsequently they added to their own proposal the fact of their unilateral withdrawal and a cease-fire. Now the Colombo Conference powers have put forward their own proposals which essentially bring about the restoration of the *status quo* prior to the 8th September. We indicated our acceptance in principle of these proposals and their clarifications to the Ceylon Prime Minister without any attempt to vary them or make exceptions to them, because we felt that these proposals have either to be accepted as a whole or rejected. Any attempt to accept them in part will mean a rejection of them as a whole. We feel, therefore, that both the Governments concerned must express their willingness to accept these proposals and clarifications *in toto* before the next stage of settling the remaining issues left for decision by the two Governments can be taken in direct talks and discussions. That is the position we have taken up and I submit to the House that that would be the correct position. I trust that the House agrees with this approach to the question, so that we may proceed on this basis.

Some Hon. Members: No, no.

An Hon. Member: Shame!

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: The hon. Member is ashamed of something. He need not shout out his shame here (Interruption).

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह वह कह रहे हैं जो अक्सर कहते हैं कि हम अंग्रेजी नहीं समझ सकते हैं।

श्री जवाहरलाल नेहरू : गलती से कह दिया गया . . .

श्री राम सेवक यादव : चीन और भारत की समस्या से ज्यादा महत्व अंग्रेजी का है, आपके लिहाज से ?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Therefore to put it succinctly, the position before us is that, firstly, we cannot have any kind of talks, even preliminary talks, unless we are satisfied that the condition we had laid down about the 8th September, 1962 position being restored, is met; secondly, even if it is met and even if talks take place, they have to be about various preliminary matters. Then they may lead to other matters. On no account, at the present moment or in these preliminary matters, do we consider the merits of the case. They are not changed.

When we asked for the restoration of the 8th September line, that had nothing to do with our accepting that line as a settlement; of course, not.

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : हमारे प्रधान मंत्री जी को समस्या पर तो बहुत गुस्सा आ जाता है लेकिन चीन पर नहीं आता है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : आप जो कह रहे हैं, मैं तो समझ रहा हूँ। मगर जो दूसरी तरफ से कहा जाता है वह भी आप समझिये। आप समझिये कि आप पार्लियामेंट में हैं और यहाँ सीरियस मामलों को कमिडर कर रहे हैं। यहाँ कोई बाहर का जलमा नहीं है। बार बार आप रकबट न डालें आप मुनें। आपको हक होगा, जो कुछ आप कहना चाहते हैं, कहने का जब आप बोलेंगे।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : हमें कौन बोलने देगा ?

अध्यक्ष महोदय : आप अपने लीडर को कहिये कि वह आपका नाम भेजे और

इसको आप अपने लीडर पर छोड़ दीजिये। अगर वह नहीं आपका नाम भेजते हैं, तो छोड़ दीजिये उन पार्टी को।

Shri Bade (Khargone): How can the Chair request the hon. Member to leave the Party? That is objectionable.

An Hon. Member: It is a suggestion for action.

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैं इसलिए कह सकता हूँ कि वह कहते हैं कि मुझे बोलने का कोई नहीं देगा। आप जानते हैं...

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : आप नहीं बोलने देंगे।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मुझे अफसोस है कि विद्युत पार्टी का ऐसी बात कहना है। जो नाम विद्युत भेजेगा, उसीको तो मैं बुलाऊंगा। अगर वह इजाजत नहीं देता है तो मेरा क्या कसूर है।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : जो अनुकूल बोलेंगे उसको तो बोलने दिया जाएगा और जो प्रतिकूल बोलेंगे, उनको धक्के मार निकाल दिया जाएगा।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : जो बार-बार इस तरह से खड़ा होता है, उसको भी नहीं बोलने देगा।

श्री रामेश्वरानन्द : बहुत मृदु चुके हैं मध्यन्याय की कथा।

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I regret, Sir, that this matter that we are discussing which, as the whole House realises, is one of high importance not only in the present but for the future also, should be reduced occasionally to a very much lower level by these interruptions.

I submit that the present question, although this is a complicated matter and we have to consider it in all its

aspects and it may have far-reaching results, first of all, is that in keeping fully with the Resolution that we passed in November—that is a Resolution passed in all seriousness and in all determination; and we are determined to carry it out however long it may take and however it may end—and realising that, anything that happens in between will be governed by that Resolution. Certainly, we have often said, and I hope that we shall continue saying it and acting accordingly, that our basic policy is of adopting and pursuing peaceful methods, and at the same time to maintain our determination to preserve our freedom and integrity. These are basic policies. I do not think that there is any conflict between them; there should be none. But some people....

13 hrs.

Shri Priya Gupta: After changing the definition of freedom and integrity.

Shri Sham Lal Saraf (Jammu and Kashmir): We seek your guidance, Sir. It is very difficult for us to follow what is happening here, if every time there are interruptions like this.

Shri Ram Sewak Yadav: Interruptions are also part of the proceedings.

Shri Joachim Alva (Kanara): May I submit that the foreign affairs debates have been conducted by us with great dignity in the past? It is not quite fair to interrupt the hon. Prime Minister in this fashion.

श्री राम सेवक यादव : अगर हम इस नीति में अपनी जमीन खो दें तो यह हमको पसन्द नहीं है।

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy: Interruptions are relevant. I do not think that all interruptions are taboo.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Therefore, the present question before us is to be viewed in this context, first of all.

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our firm determination to carry out what we have said in our November resolution, our firm determination; at the same time, we cannot, I feel, reject any peaceful method; in fact, we should definitely pursue peaceful methods where they do not come in the way of our firm determination, in the way of our integrity and freedom, in the way of anything that is honourable to India.

Shri Priya Gupta: Determined to violate.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Some hon. Members perhaps do not agree with our general outlook, to preserve and to carry on with peaceful methods. It is open to them to disagree. But I think that that has been our policy for a long time and I do not think that that policy should be interfered with. Otherwise our policy is a useless one, and that policy becomes one of . . .

Shri Ram Sewak Yadav: It has been useless, and it has been proved.

Mr. Speaker: Every word that is being uttered should be listened to and appreciated, so that all the implications may be studied by the hon. Members when they have to make speeches; instead of that, if they make interruptions, they miss certain words and then perhaps shout or interrupt, without fully realising what the implications would be. I would rather request them to listen patiently, to see what it means and then to reply in the debate. That would be much better.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Thank you.

What I was venturing to say was this. I was not saying anything against any Member or any party. I was venturing to say that there are two basic policies, or rather two aspects of the some policy that we pursue and we have always pursued. One is to pursue peaceful methods for the solution of anything; and we think that such peaceful methods should be applied everywhere; we have said so repeatedly, and when we tell others to do so, we cannot obviously reject

them because then we are hypocrites. But the second part that we must preserve, and we must be determined to to preserve, our freedom and integrity is an equally important part. In fact, I was saying in regard to the first part, that is, peaceful methods, that if it is demonstrated that they do not preserve our freedom and integrity, then they have failed in their purpose. We have to take them, because in any event, the objective is to preserve our freedom and integrity. But if there are any aggressors, as there are today, we push them out of India, to preserve this freedom and integrity. Therefore, we have taken such steps, and we are taking steps to strengthen our Army or our Defence Forces, our economic position and all that for that purpose, and we shall continue to strengthen them, because, apart from the fact that if some such, preliminary talks take place, they are very preliminary and nobody can say whether they will lead to anything or not, I regret to say that we find it very very difficult to believe in the *bona fides* of the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, whether one believes in it or not, one has to deal with people, because if you believed in it, then all would be well; therefore, we have to pursue certain methods.

And I do submit that keeping all this, that is, keeping this close that we are going to continue strengthening ourselves to the best of our ability and proclaiming what we said in our November resolution that we shall never submit to coercion and military pressure, yet, we cannot rule out peaceful methods of approach, and that is right not in the moral sense only but even in a diplomatic sense in a political sense, because the world is rather tired of the attitude that sometimes nations take up of solving difficulties by military means, by military coercion.

Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur): We are not sure that the Chinese are tired of these methods.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: That is the reason why the Chinese aggression has created a great deal of opposition in the world. There is no doubt about it. A large part of the world, even many persons who normally would approve of what they do, many countries, I mean, have objected to it; they have criticised it in a lower measure or a higher key; that is a different matter. Anyhow we who have stood for such methods, peaceful methods, cannot possibly say that peaceful methods are bad; we can say and we shall be justified in saying that we tried peaceful methods, but they did not achieve the results hoped for, and, therefore, we have to adopt other methods. We are not rejecting other methods; we are preparing for other methods, but we cannot reject them, and, therefore, we have to consider any approach at the present moment, not by the Chinese Government but by other countries, other countries which are friends of ours, and we have to give it every consideration, and it would be bad both from the point of view of our policy and from the point of view of any diplomatic approach to this problem for us to treat the approach of these friendly countries without due consideration.

And I do submit that we are not, I would repeat, we are not at the present moment dealing with what position China takes up or not, as I have stated; the present position of the Chinese Government is, as far as I can see, one of rejection of the proposals of the Colombo Conference as a whole. We are, therefore, dealing with the Colombo proposals and ourselves, what our reaction is, not the Chinese, and I do submit that these Colombo proposals fulfil the test we have laid down of restoring the position as it was on the 7th of September. They do not fully do that, I admit, as I have said; in two or three matters, they do not, but while they do not do so there, in other matters, they go a little beyond it in our favour, and on the whole, I think that it is a mat-

ter, an adequate matter, for favourable consideration.

I would submit that we cannot take any step unilaterally in this matter, because it is for the Chinese Government to do so also, but so far as we are concerned, I have to reply to the Ceylon Prime Minister, and I wish to tell her and the Colombo Conference people that we agree to their proposals with the clarifications that they have given us because that is important, because it is those clarifications to which the Chinese Government has objected or some factors that flow out of these clarifications. I want to say that, and I trust that I shall have the approval of the House to say that to her.

Shri Tyagi (Dehra Dun): I wish to seek a clarification.

Mr. Speaker: Let me place the motion before the House first.

Dr. M. S. Aney (Nagpur): Before you place the motion before the House, I would like to ask one question by way of clarification. What is the next step to be taken after we finish our discussion? Is that step to be taken by the Colombo Conference or by the Chinese Government?

Shri Tyagi: May I also put my question?

Mr. Speaker: These are things that will be made clear in speeches. The Prime Minister will reply at the end. If all the clarifications are sought now, what else is left for discussion?

Shri Tyagi: It is not an argument. I only want a clarification so that whatever is said may be after knowing that.

In the papers we have read today, there is a news item about this. *The Hindustan Times* today carries an AP news item emanating from Colombo saying that 'China objects to a suggestion by the six Colombo Powers that a demilitarised zone in the Ladakh sector of the disputed Sino-Indian border be jointly policed by Indians and Chinese.' This is attri-

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buted to a reliable source. It is further mentioned:

"The Chinese objection was incorporated in a memorandum from the Chinese which Ceylon Premier Sirimavo Bandaranaike delivered to New Delhi, the source said".

If this is so, I wanted to know whether it has been received or not.

Mr. Speaker: Was this the one that the hon. Prime Minister referred to?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: No, no. Dr. M. S. Aney asked, what is the next step, that is, I take it, in regard to these matters. In regard to these matters, the first step, before the matter comes up for consideration and the next step, is for the two Governments to approve *in toto* the Colombo proposals. Having approved of them, then the question may arise of implementing those proposals in the areas in question. That will mean some of our officials or military officers going there and reporting that they have been implemented, or if there is any doubt, refer it to us. After all that is done, the question may arise or representatives of the Chinese and Indian Governments considering the matter on the merits.

As for what the hon. Member, Shri Tyagi, said, that is perfectly correct, that the Chinese are objecting to various things. In the message which I read out—the telegram which Mr. Chou En-lai has sent to Prime Minister Bandaranaike—he has rather toned it down. But I believe the Chinese Government objects to several important things, one of them being this, about this area which was to be demilitarised. There was no message to us, but he had written about this to the Prime Minister of Ceylon just as she was leaving Peking. She showed us his letter. We did not get a letter either from her or from him. But she showed us a letter which Prime Minister

Chou En-lai written to her—either he wrote it or Marshal Chen Yi wrote it, I am not sure; it was one of them—in which certain points were stated which were not in keeping with the Colombo proposals, which were opposed to them.

Shri Priya Gupta: On a point of clarification. Have the Prime Minister of Ceylon and the other members of the Colombo Conference which made this recommendation assured us that the Chinese will not resume aggression? If not, what next?

Mr. Speaker: No assurance.

श्री किशन पटनायक : मुझे यह कहना है कि प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब ने अभी पीपुलस मंच की बात कही। २० नवम्बर को प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने सदन को कहा था कि चाहे कुछ भी हो, जंग जारी रहेगी जब तक हम बिल्कुल जीत न लें, तो क्या प्राइम मिनिस्टर की जीत हो गयी ?

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved:

"That the proposals of the Conference of six non-aligned Nations held at Colombo between the 10th and 12th of December, 1962, with the clarifications given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana in the meetings with the Prime Minister of India and his colleagues on the 12th and 13th of January, 1963, laid on the Table of the House on the 21st January, 1963, be taken into consideration."

There are also substitute motions.

Shri Yajnik (Ahmedabad): I am not moving the substitute motion which standing in my name.

Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri (Berhampur): All the others whose names are mentioned there are also not moving it.

श्री राम सेवक यादव : कल मेरी जो लोगों से बात हुई थी उस पर मैंने

सोचा था कि मैं अपना प्रस्ताव वापस ले लूँ। लोगों ने यह वचन दिया था कि प्रस्ताव की स्वीकृति की बात नहीं होगी इसलिए मैंने ऐसा सोचा था। लेकिन हम अपने को शोर्बे में नहीं रखना चाहते कि हाँ और नहीं में चाहे प्रस्ताव पास न हो लेकिन वास्तव में पास हो जाए। इन दोनों में फर्क है। तो पहले मैंने सोचा था कि मैं वापस ले लूँ। लेकिन प्राइम मिनिस्टर साहब का भाषण सुनने के बाद मैं इस नतीजे पर पहुँचा हूँ कि मैं अपना संशोधन पेश करूँ। मैं अपना संशोधन पेश करता हूँ :

"That for the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:—

"This House, having considered the proposals of the Conference of six non-aligned Nations held at Colombo between the 10th and 12th of December, 1962, with the clarifications given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana in the meetings with the Prime Minister of India and his colleagues on the 12th and 13th of January, 1963, laid on the Table of the House on the 21st January, 1963, is of the opinion that the proposals are not in keeping with the honour, sovereignty and integrity of India." (2)

अध्यक्ष महोदय : श्री राम सेवक यादव और श्री किशन पटनायक इसको मूव करते हैं। यही एक सब्स्टीट्यूट मोशन है।

श्री भू० ना० मंडल : (महरमा) : श्री राम सेवक यादव ने जो संशोधन दिया है उसमें मैंने और संशोधन दिया है वह जोड़ दिया जाए।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : वह भी पहुँच गया है। जो लीडर ने दिया है दूसरे मम्बर उसमें अमेंडमेंट चाहते हैं। वह भी मैंने पास पहुँच गया है।

Shri Priya Gupta: On a point of order. Is it in order for a Member of the Socialist Group to move an amendment to the amendment moved by his Group leader without consulting the leader himself?

Mr. Speaker: That is for the Group to decide.

Shri Priya Gupta: I seek your ruling.

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. I have not to decide the internal affairs of any party.

Shri S. N. Chaturvedi (Firozabad): The amendment is not before the House.

Mr. Speaker: There are two. I will read them out. Both are tabled by Shri B. N. Mandal. One is:

"That the following be added at the end of the amendment:—

"Therefore, the Colombo proposals may not be considered."

This is out of order. It cannot be an amendment to Shri Ram Sewak Yadav's substitute motion, because that substitute motion says:

'...having considered the proposal of the Conference....'

The second seeks to add at the end of the substitute motion the following:

"Therefore, till the Chinese aggressors are not driven out of the boundary line of the 15th August, 1947, the Colombo proposals may not be considered".

Here also the same thing applies because the substitute motion as I said, starts by saying:

'having considered the proposals of the Conference....'

Therefore, both the Amendments are out of order.

The House has now before it the original motion as well as the substitute motion moved by Shri Yadav.

Shri A. K. Gopalan (Kasergod): We have before us the Colombo Conference proposals with clarifications, the motion moved by the Prime Minister and also the speech that the

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Prime Minister has just now made. We have to consider first who made and come to conclusions which are in the broader interests of the nation and the future of our people. We should not be swept off by the current of resentment nor should we be victims of momentary emotions.

When a proposal like this is made, we have to consider first who made the proposal, what the proposals are, and when and how the proposals were made. When we look at the problem in this manner, we find that the Colombo conference proposals with the clarifications constitute a reasonable basis for starting negotiations, consistent with our honour and our vital interests.

The Colombo conference countries—Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ghana and the UAR—are important non-aligned countries. They follow more or less a policy of non-alignment and promotion of peace. In all vital respects, the philosophy of peace and non-alignment had its origin and development in this country under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru. Our Parliament has played a role in shaping and strengthening that policy and its implementation in various fields of international activities on different occasions. We have given our whole-hearted support to our Prime Minister in carrying forward this policy of peace and non-alignment. The six participants of the Colombo conference are, so to say, countries which share by and large our own views and follow by and large our own methods and also share our own opinions. Thus, they are our friends, and proposals made by such people, we can be sure, will not go against our vital interests. They have no axe to grind, they have nothing to gain by bringing us down. The fact that we must bear in mind is that their stature also will increase to the extent our stature increases in the world. It is, therefore, necessary that we take their proposals seriously and

in a spirit of goodwill and understanding.

Secondly, the proposals have been made in response to an urge which we ourselves have on different occasions felt, faced with serious international crises. The Chinese aggression on our soil had created a very serious situation and even danger to world peace. No matter how some try to minimise it, it was clear that if the war on our borders had prolonged, we would have been embroiled in a world conflict. Sides would have been taken by the mighty Powers and our land would have been perhaps turned into a prey of thermo-nuclear holocaust. Both peace in Asia and peace in the world would have been at stake. It is in these circumstances that the six non-aligned Colombo Powers, realising the seriousness of the impending catastrophe, took upon themselves the responsibility of bringing the raging war to an end and getting the two countries to sit at the negotiating table. We should be thankful to them for this and appreciate their sincerity and goodwill.

After five days of continuous discussion, they have produced a formula. They have weighed the claims of both sides. True, we could not get all that we wanted. We are sorry for that. But should we not think of the consequences of rejecting off-hand their proposals? After all, in today's world no country can exist on its own, alone, isolated from other countries. Considering the background of both decades of colonial domination, recent attainment of independence and the immense problems of developing their economy and culture, these countries are our natural allies. Thus, from the point of view of the credentials of the sponsors as well as from the point of view of their time of sponsoring, the proposals are definitely to be taken up seriously, and the spirit in which they are made should be appreciated sincerely.

Now, let us take the gist of the proposals themselves. The Prime Minis-

ter has explained to us the proposals and the clarifications. We know precisely what they amount to. I am sure that this House will appreciate that they substantially conform to our original stand of withdrawal to the pre-September 8, position. True, they may not be completely in accordance with our demand, but what we have to consider is this, that in a situation in which the two great countries of Asia are locked in combat, it is rather immature on our part to say that we will not speak to the other party unless we get what we want. In the modern world, the essence of international relations is the spirit of compromise. Recent events in other parts of the world have demonstrated this. In Laos and Cuba, for example, we have found that no international conflict today can be settled on the basis of complete victory for one party or the other. If world peace is to be safeguarded and if the fate of humanity is to be saved from a terrible thermo-nuclear catastrophe, the nations with conflicting claims have to adjust to each other and must learn to co-exist in a spirit of compromise and give and take.

Our Prime Minister himself, during the last debate in Parliament, has emphasized that it will be foolish to think that the border dispute between India and China can be settled by war. He said that in a war, neither China nor India could be victorious, and the possibility is that both countries will be ruined. So, we have to look at these proposals and approach them in an objective, dispassionate and sober manner.

There are some people who say: let us wait till we are strong and are in a position to throw them out. I should think that this argument has no substance. If we can wait till we are strong, so the other country can also wait. While we make ourselves strong, it will be futile to think the other side would be keeping quite. Time will work for both sides. It is not particularly favourable to us alone. Actually, the same theory was put forward in other places, and ex-

perience has shown that the advance of time does not mean any superiority to either side. What has happened is that it has become more difficult for either side to negotiate and settle the issue. So, this doctrine of waiting for military superiority is an empty doctrine. It will only end in perpetuating the cold war atmosphere within the country and tension on the borders.

Shri Jayaprakash Narayan has two days ago spoken about the consequences of the policy of military superiority with China. I am quoting the report:

"Rapid technical progress would have to be made if India were to develop its defence ability. He estimated that India would have to spend Rs. 2,000 crores a year on defence to protect itself against Chinese attacks. A defence expenditure of that size would be possible only if the people reduced food consumption to one-fourth and gave up all essential things."

To those who argue that we can get military aid for strengthening our defence, Shri Narayan replied:

"Even if the U.S.A. gave without strings, India would have to bow to it and submit to its pressure."

This is the consequence of large-scale military aid from imperialist countries. This has been said not by a communist, but by a confirmed anti-communist. So, those who argue in favour of building up our military strength against China with U.S. help should think of the consequences. Are we to fight for our security on the borders and barter away our freedom in the process?

In fact, even the small amount of military aid which we have received from Britain and the U.S.A. has brought us sufficient pressure on the issue of Kashmir. Taking advantage of our adversities on the border, the U.S. and British imperialists have been trying to stampede us into a

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surrender of Kashmir. Therefore, those who talk of building our strength on the basis of military aid should think of the serious consequences to our country, its liberty and its future. If our people have to cut down one-fourth of their meagre offtake of food-grains in order to build up our military strength, you can imagine the consequences of such a drastic situation.

At the same time, we must not relax our efforts to strengthen the defence potential of the country, to make it capable of facing any new aggression from any quarter. We must construct our own self-reliant defence potential. We must build up a powerful defence industry, and modernise our armed forces in every way. We must depend upon our own strength.

These proposals have come at a time when the Chinese have effected a unilateral cease-fire and have respected it. The proposals are meant to stabilise the cease-fire in order to create conditions necessary for starting negotiations, but they do not affect our claims. This has been made clear to us. All right-thinking people in the country demand negotiations. That is why Acharya Vinoba Bhave says:

"We must not say that we are not willing to talk with China".

If our opponents give us the smallest opening for talks we should seize the opportunity and meet them half-way. That is what he says. He goes on to say:

"It is those who have no self-confidence who lay down conditions and insist on the letter rather than the spirit. These matters cannot be resolved on the basis of conditions. We must be bold enough to enter upon negotiations as soon as there is the slightest opportunity. That is the demand of our times."

To those who say that entering into negotiations is a sign of weakness I would commend what Acharya Bhave has to say on this question:

"Now it takes as much courage to leap into the area of peace as to leap into the battlefield of war. The timid and the cowardly can have no place either on the field of battle or in the councils of peace—they are doomed to defect alike in both. It is the brave who go forward boldly to play their part in peace negotiations."

I agree with Acharya Vinoba Bhave when he says that not seizing the opportunity for negotiations when it arises is not a sign of strength but of weakness.

It is not only necessary to satisfy ourselves that we are just and correct but it is also necessary to show to the world that we are just and correct and to put our opponent wrong in the eyes of the world. This is the essence of statecraft. Let us hope that the Government of China will accept these proposals with the clarifications and come to the negotiating table. If they do not do so, the world will blame them and they will have to bear the consequences. I would, therefore, strongly urge this House to see that the proposals of the non-aligned nations with the clarifications are taken as the basis for negotiations with the People's Republic of China and leave the hands of the Government free to discuss and settle the disputes.

Shri Ranga (Chittoor): Mr. Speaker, it is my duty to dissociate myself from the suggestion made by my hon. friend, the leader of the Communist Party and also the stand taken by the Prime Minister in regard to the Colombo proposals. I do not consider these proposals to be honourable, just or fair to us. My hon. friend the leader of the Communist Party has gone into the credentials of these non-aligned countries and their governments which

have thought it fit to intervene and help us to achieve a correct solution and smoothen the relationship between India and China. They have failed to live up to the expectation of being fair in this conflict, as between the countries that are involved in this conflict. Nowhere have they been willing to say that India has been just in her approach. Nowhere have they showed the moral courage to declare China to be an aggressor. My hon. friend wants us to believe that every one of us is completely non-aligned. If that is so, why was it that the dictator or the President of Ghana took exception to England's offer of support to our efforts in self-defence?

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy: They are non-aligned between India and China.

Shri Ranga: Why is it that he had to be brought round after a lot of coaxing from various countries, including the UAR, as was suggested by my hon. friend the Prime Minister? Are these countries completely non-aligned? With whom are they non-aligned? The whole world knows how so many of them have come to be impressed with the established might, the demonstrated might of China. My hon. friend is not even prepared to say in this House, even today, that Communist China committed aggression on our country and is an aggressor. He is anxious that the House should consider them both as non-aligned countries.

Shri A. K. Gopalan: So many resolutions have been passed. Why should he say that we have not said it?

Shri Ranga: Is he saying it now?

Shri A. K. Gopalan: Not only now.

Shri Ranga: If he has said so, then it is very strange for him to say that here are these two countries which are fighting and they have got to be treated fairly, justly and equally, on

a par and all the rest of it. The whole purport of his speech is very clear. Here are these two countries which have been at war with each other. Is it not clear which one is on the right side and which one on the wrong side? He says: we are not concerned with that at all; we only want peace and therefore let them come to terms.

Shri A. K. Gopalan: I am sorry he has not followed my speech.

Shri Ranga: That was the purport of his speech and it is for the House to draw its own conclusions.

These countries have come and offered a proposal which my hon. friend the Prime Minister is prepared to consider as being reasonable and almost approximating to his own offer of peace that he had made earlier. Is it reasonable to expect us to allow the Chinese to come into partnership, territorial and administrative partnership with us on our own soil which she had grabbed? Is it reasonable for them to take into account a corridor which is farther and very much away inside our area from some of the places which had been shown to be ours and to be on the line of September 8th on the maps circulated by the Government themselves, by the Defence Ministry or the External Affairs Ministry? There are two places, very important places which are indicated here: Sumdo and Dehra. Dehra was almost on the line that was indicated by the maps circulated by the External Affairs Ministry or the Defence Ministry, on the line that was supposed to have been the September 8th line. Yet here in this map that has been supplied to us by the Government through the courtesy of Colombo Powers we find that it is more or less 15 miles away from the mauve line which is supposed to be the outer fringe of this corridor. In the whole of this corridor China is expected to become our partner.

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13.39 hrs.

[MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER in the Chair]

Till yesterday they were our partners in fighting, in dealing death blow to our people, in inflicting defeat on our troops and humiliating our country and in holding our own Prime Minister and the whole country to the world's ridicule. With that China we are expected now to become partners and embrace them! It is an extraordinary type of co-existence that my hon. friend of the Communist Party is suggesting here. In this area we had more check-posts than the Chinese in the past, only in the recent past. Yet, there is to be parity between the two. Who is to decide which particular check-post has to be occupied by whom? There has got to be a conference of Ministers and officers. If they are not able to agree among themselves, as has been the case in the past tortuous negotiations that we had to carry on with the Chinese during the past four or five years, who is to decide—the Colombo powers. Therefore, they have got to have an office either in Delhi or in Colombo and be in permanent conference in order to be able to arbitrate on every one of these petty points according to them—important points according to us—which would arise between our officers and their officers. All these things have got to go on only in the preliminary process and that may take one year or many years. We would not have the initiative at all just because we are now thinking of giving up that initiative which we ought to have had and which we should seize at least now and begin to protect the honour of our country.

My hon. friend the Prime Minister made so many statements in our country and if I am to quote the relevant passages from them the whole of my time will be taken up. I need only mention one or two things here. He said, "resisting the aggressor will cost us dearly." Are we thinking of resist-

ing? We are only thinking of reaching a partnership with china according to the proposals. "Would you agree with firej—he was addressing the heads of various Governments—"that this high cost must be paid to maintain our independence and territorial integrity?" Are we thinking in those terms? It is for the Prime Minister to answer later on.

Then, he wanted to preserve the honour and integrity of India. Are we going to do that through these proposals? Have we not declared that she has been an aggressor? She has declared war on us. She has broken so many of her own plighted words. She could not be trusted at all. She was talking with double tongue and her double talk cannot be comprehended by the Prime Minister and various other people also in our country. What happens to all these things? "We must reach an agreement some day." My hon friend the Prime Minister says, "how can anybody in his senses think in terms of defeating China?" Who ever has suggested it? In Korea, was China defeated? Was China conquered? Did not the United Nations troops have to go all the way to Peking in order to push them beyond the 38th parallel? Surely, could not we think of a similar thing here also without having to destroy or defeat China as a whole and declare ourselves to be the conquerors? Would it not be possible for us some day, with our troops and with all those friends who would come here as our allies to drive them outside our own territory and regain the territorial integrity of our country and then make it impossible for the Chinese to cross the border as has happened in Korea? They say, "Why should we pursue this defeatist policy?" "Oh, so much money is to be spent on the defence forces" Have we got the necessary defence forces today? Can we possibly build them up in two or three years as we have got to stand on our own feet? It is not as in the olden days. You have got other

countries also. Why is it, we did not refer this matter to the United Nations? Why is it we did not make it perfectly clear to the rest of the world that China is at war with us and therefore we break off diplomatic relations with China and we treat her as an aggressor and therefore we invite all those countries which are prepared to come and side with us and stand by us in order to retrieve our own honour? Does not our blood boil at the thought of having had to receive so many blows and so many defeats at the hands of China? What has she lost? She has gained everything. She has frightened all those nations: not only the six or seven nations which met at the Colombo conference but all the nations in this Afro-Asian part of the world. Only the other day, his own Minister was obliged to tell us that not more than five nations, all those in the Afro-Asian area, had the courage to assure us that in their view China is an aggressor. All the rest of them are simply frightened. They are living under the pall and the threat, the power and the thralldom of the Soviet, and China, and the communist fifth columnists all over this area. In these circumstances, are we to feel so very happy and grateful that some of those people have come forward to think in terms of these proposals?

When Mahatma Gandhi was asked by the British Government to cooperate with them during the last war, he said "No", and he told them that by fighting for the freedom of India he was laying the foundations for the achievement of freedom of all countries in Asia and Africa. It was because India has been able to achieve her freedom, it has become so very easy for so many of those other countries, except Algeria and Indo-China to achieve their own national freedom comparatively with almost very little sacrifice and suffering. One would have expected them to feel friendly towards us out of sheer sense of

honour and decency, not to speak of gratitude. But, instead of that, they have preferred to remain neutral even with regard to us, non-aligned even with regard to us. Why? Because China is today the conqueror. That is why she has gone back, not because of any soft corner towards India. It is because she has been able to kick our own country in such dishonourable and disgusting manner; it is because she has been able to establish before the whole world in spite of Soviet Russia's frowns in spite of the proffered support from America and England and all those other countries and in spite of the brave speeches that we are making and by the leader of the House. She has been able to demonstrate to the whole world that she is the victor and she can afford to declare a unilateral cease-fire and go back, leaving us prostrate and panting for our breath and not even having the strength to throw off the dust from our clothing and from our body in our parlous condition. That is why she has done this. It is this China that we are now inviting into a partnership over the huge corridor which we have had this all this time.

The Prime Minister of China con-fabulated with our own Prime Minister in spite of protests made by so many of us here in this House, by Shri Masani, who unfortunately does not happen to be here in this House, who had the courage to protest against extending that invitation to the Prime Minister of China, when our Prime Minister invited him here. What did he do? While they were discussing things here, and afterwards, even before the ink dried on the paper on which they had written their joint communique, the Chinese troops were occupying our places in the north-eastern frontier. That is the China of today.

Why need I say all this? The Prime Minister himself has borne testimony to this. Even today he does not feel sure that he can trust the Chinese

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Government and the communist government. But we are to invite them into partnership. When they have a particular post—they have said 20 to 50 people—they are expected to have only those weapons which are expected to be supplied to frontier guards or civil guards. Where is the guarantee that instead of 50, they would not have 500? Instead of 50 people, where is the guarantee that they would not have many other people—military-minded and military-trained people,—who, at the same time, would be working as cooks or as servants and in various other capacities? Where is the guarantee that they would not be biting and nibbling at it and dishonouring this kind of agreement and these proposals? Why should we invite them into partnership? And where? On our own soil? Why? We must somehow or other have a kind of peaceful border! If we are to have a peaceful border, let there not be any partnership at all. That is one thing. Then, let us also be in a position to face them up right up to their own troops, so that we would know what they are doing and they would know what we are doing and at any particular moment we would be able to join issue with them.

Dr. M. S. Aney: The Prime Minister said there were certain proposals made to us and these proposals are being considered: which is going to be, what we call, the demilitarised zone, etc. So, the position is much better than the position which would have been there in the absence of these proposals. That is what he said.

Shri Ranga: In the absence of these proposals they would continue to remain where they are, but as enemies, as people whose right to occupation would not be recognised by us. We do not know when we would have the opportunity of driving them out. But we certainly go on waiting for that. "Oh," our Communist friend says, "it is going to cost Rs. 2,000

crores," and he quotes saints. I do not know whether he is competent to do that. But, anyhow.....

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: His time is up. He has taken 17 minutes.

Shri Ranga: Excuse me. Well, he made certain quotations; he said it will cost Rs. 2,000 crores. It would cost Rs. 2,000 crores for China also. They would not mind it. It is true that for China it does not matter whether 10 lakhs of 20 lakhs of people die of hunger; we do not want a similar situation. But are we to fight these people only by ourselves?

The Prime Minister himself has given the answer by sending appeals to all the countries all over the world and welcoming the support that came from a number of western democratic countries. They are there ready to help us one by one, if that is absolutely necessary. Otherwise, we can seek the aid of the United Nations. Where is the harm in invoking the aid of the United Nations? Why do we not ask for it? Why is it that we do not assure all those who would be willing to help us that we are determined to win back our territory? Every moment of our war preparations, we are also talking about peace. Therefore, they may feel that any moment we may let down everybody and make them look ridiculous; not only ridiculous, but also helpless in their own countries *vis-a-vis* their own electorate, because they have to go to their electorate; they are democracies. They have to collect all the funds and provide us with all the assistance. They have to assure all their people that India is really determined to win back her lost territory, achieve her own territorial integrity and take necessary steps and build herself up in such a way through her own "Plan for Victory" that it would not be possible for China once again to cross our border.

Had China ever had the temerity to cross the 38th parallel in Korea once

she was driven away? America, England and all those nations cooperated with the United Nations in order to see that the Chinese communist aggression was vacated and kept back. Then, why should we be afraid? Nasser was not afraid. We seem to be thinking somehow or other that we are helpless. Nasser was helpless vis-a-vis England and France. Yet, he had the strength of mind and spirit to stand against them. Why should we be afraid of Soviet Russia or China or any of these countries, lest our non-alignment policy should be affected and destroyed? Recently the 'n' the brigade of non-alignment policy has come up. Let them bring back from them. Pakistan is supposed to be with the western pacts. Yet, has it prevented her from having her own deal with China?

Yugoslavia was a communist country. When she was threatened by the mighty Stalin, with all the granite strength that he had built up over a period of 25 years, did Tito get cold feet as we seem to be getting cold feet in our country? Did he not defy them and did he not rely upon the world public opinion and did not the world respond courageously and heroically? Even America did not hesitate in offering her support to Yugoslavia, although America is a democratic country and Yugoslavia is a communist country. Yet, they were able to come together and Yugoslavia was able to invite and welcome the assistance that was given by America. So, he was able to stand up to Stalin and today he is the victor not only in regard to his own national integrity but also in regard to his own stand over the communist jargon.

Shri Harish Chandra Mathur (Jalore): That is why Tito is full of praise for non-alignment who has supported non-alignment more than Tito whom Shri Ranga is quoting.

Shri Ranga: I am not for the present inveighing against non-alignment.

You can have all the dinners and toasts over it; also, at the proper moment, I would not hesitate to toast you. But even if you are to stick to your non-alignment, it does not prevent you from welcoming and asking for support from the western democratic countries.

Shri Harish Chandra Mathur: We have asked for it and they have come to our assistance.

Shri Ranga: They have come to our rescue; it is good. And we have also to assure ourselves that we are determined to develop our own national struggle and national spirit.

Shri Harish Chandra Mathur: That was our November resolution.

Shri Ranga: As the President has put it sometime ago, in his own spiritual manner, in this secular State, of which he happens to be the Head, "this is a time of crisis of spirit. This is indeed a crisis of spirit". It for us to decide and determine for ourselves whether we are going to stand by our national honour and dignity, as the Prime Minister himself has coupled those two terms, and do our best to protect the national integrity of our country. Even if we were to have this mauve line all for ourselves, even thereafter, right up to Aksai Chin Road and beyond, there is so much of our motherland, more than 12,000 square miles, nearly as much as Belligum itselm or half as much as West Bengal itself. We have got to win back all that.

Some people say, it is only barren land and what is the earthly use? But barren land is Sahara; barren land comprises all those areas where nuclear tests are being held. It is the thing that is necessary to separate us from China. It is in the barren land there are all sorts of minerals and more than that protection for nuclear war. We have to get back every inch of that barren land. In the

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words of the Prime Minister himself, we should be prepared to pay the highest possible price in order to vindicate our national honour. It is that which is under discussion today; it is that which is in dispute today. That is why I say, if we were to accept these Colombo proposals, we would be dishonouring, disfiguring, discrediting our country and all those great men and ordinary men, men by the plough and men in factories, who have laid down their lives in cooperating with Mahatma Gandhi in achieving our national freedom.

Shri U. N. Dhebar (Rajkot): Sir, I was hearing the two hon. Members who preceded me and trying to find out the basis of their approach. I felt in one place that the hon. Member who spoke first was all in favour of acceptance and the hon. Member who just preceded me, Professor Ranga, was all in favour of its rejection. I was wondering whether it was clear to them as to what exactly we are discussing. We are not discussing the terms of settlement at this moment. We are discussing something which is merely a proposal placed forward before us; we are discussing the reasonableness or otherwise of a proposal placed not, by China, but by some other friendly powers.

I can understand, if the proposals have emanated from China we might look at these proposals with suspicion, which naturally would attach to anything coming from an adversary of that character, about whom we have certain previous experiences. But here are powers, not all of whom, as my hon. friend, Professor Ranga, just now said, are completely devoid of the sense of the duty they owe to this country. They realise it, and especially I can quote two or three powers, they have always maintained that there can be no solidarity in the context of aggression or acquiescence with it. The proposal is emanating from friends who have no personal or poli-

tical interest in advancing the proposal except to bring the two parties together. Would we morally be justified, Sir, in looking at these proposals with suspicion, I am asking myself. What have they done, after all to deserve this amount of suspicion at the hands of Professor Ranga. I can understand it if he were criticising any proposal that has emanated from China, but I cannot understand for the world of it what is the fault of these six powers. The only thing that they have done is to approach us with suggestions, with proposals.

14.00 hrs.

Shri Ranga: Some of them have reached agreement with China.

Shri U. N. Dhebar: I have interfered when Shri Ranga was speaking. He should at least have the courtesy and the coolness to listen to my arguments now.

I think, Sir, it appears to me, that Professor Ranga is labouring under one handicap and that handicap is the handicap of all persons who believe that military strength is the only evidence of strength in this world. His only handicap, I should say, is that he cannot think of any other alternative to military strength as being potent enough to solve the issues of the world. He quoted Mahatma Gandhi as did his predecessor quote Vinobha Bhave.

Shri Ranga: I suppose we both were in jail under the same leadership.

Shri U. N. Dhebar: Therefore, I can use his name, so also can Professor Ranga use his name. But, I say, why should we bring in Mahatma Gandhi in this affair. If we are to follow Mahatma Gandhi, Professor Ranga, will have to recast his programmes, because he could not have tolerated the sight we see in India today, the sight of disparities on the economic front (*Interruption*).

The question before us is, what is the proposal that we are discussing, or

do we believe in peaceful alternative or not. Ultimately, if the proposal is not worth acceptance, nobody on this side also is prepared to countenance such a proposal, or if there is no peaceful alternative available there is nobody on this side prepared to accept a surrender whatever may be the difficulties involved. As the hon. Prime Minister put it to the House, we are committed to a certain approach. We do not consider the military alternative or the military strength as the only solution to solve our problems. Therefore, any time, whosoever brings forward a proposal before us which merits consideration it is our duty to consider that proposal, and that is how this House is considering this proposal.

Now, let us look at this proposal. If the House studies the proposal it will find two or three things which contradict what my hon. friend just now argue. First of all, it will be self-evident to the House that everybody who met at this conference table in Colombo was concerned with this fact that the person who has taken to violent means, to aggression, should not profit by it. They have gone by that test. They may not have put it down on paper in so many words, but they have followed that test. The proof of it is that they have not asked India to vacate a single inch of land as was the desire of the Chinese Government when they put forward the proposal on the 21st November. Not only have they not asked India to vacate a single inch of land, but they have modified the proposal put forward by the Chinese Government in a substantial manner and the withdrawal is on the part of the Chinese armies with the result that NEFA will be completely cleared.

Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati): Not completely.

Shri U. N. Dhebar: Completely of the Chinese armies. No Chinese army will remain there. I think you better consider the proposal. Then, as I said, NEFA will be completely cleared. In the middle sector Bara Hoti

will remain with us. In Ladakh, except for one point the Chinese army will go back beyond the 7th September line. And, what is the extent of that point? I tried to measure it in my own way. It may be that I may be slightly mistaken, but the extent of that position—that was the one on which Professor Ranga laboured so much, and he has not waited to hear my reply—beyond the 7th September line, which lay beyond the control of the Chinese army, will not be more than 35 to 40 miles as against the entire north-south length of 240 or 250 miles, and the depth of it will be from 1 to 15 miles at the most. As against this the Chinese will have to fall back even beyond the 7th September line, even beyond their 7th November line.

Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur): And they will still be on Indian territory.

Shri U. N. Dhebar: The extent to which they will go back north-south will be 200 miles and about 1 to 15 miles east-west.

The question before us is whether this satisfies our test or not as far as military aggression is concerned. I shall come to the question of civil posts afterwards, on which Professor Ranga dilated so much. Will China remain on this side of the 7th September line in NEFA? Chinese army will not remain on this side. Will they remain on this side of the 7th September line in the middle sector? Again, no. Will they remain on this side of the 7th September line in Ladakh? Yes, to the limited extent that I just now said, in only one place and that too to the extent of 35 miles north-south and 1 to 15 miles east-west. What is the price we pay for this? Do we withdraw our armies by a single inch? No. Do we go out completely from the demilitarised one? Again, no. As my hon. friend Dr. Aney just now put to Professor Ranga, it is in this demilitarised zone that a substantial portion of it is beyond the 7th September line and we

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shall also be there. So what we exactly asked for was that they should withdraw beyond the 7th September line. We never thought at that time in terms of having civil posts on the other side of the 7th September line. But now according to this proposal even beyond the 7th September line, in an area of 200 miles long north-south and 1 to 15 miles east-west, in the demilitarised zone, we shall be entitled to have civil posts also.

Shri Nath Pai: We had 39 military posts in the same area.

Shri U. N. Dhebar: Much beyond that also. We are making that only concession. Now, Professor Ranga asks: "Oh! Are we going to join a partnership with those people who are responsible for the blood of our jawans only the other day?" One can characterise it as partnership. One can also characterise it as joint watch. It all depends upon the way of looking at the matter. When we say that we shall be at a place to watch our interest, there is no question of partnership, because our people will be watching our interests and not the interests of the other people. That undertaking will not be a joint concern. We shall be watching our interests and our civil posts. Those who object to this line must be prepared to admit that they believe in no other solution but the military solution of the conflict. I can understand their feelings, but I would say that they would be advising India to play the Chinese game. And what is the Chinese game? China wants a military solution at its own chosen time. China wants a military solution here and now because China knows that India will be better equipped tomorrow. Fourthly, China knows not only that India will be better prepared and better equipped but China will be more and more isolated as it goes on arguing in the manner it is arguing now.

Any proposal that comes before us has got to be looked at from the rea-

listic angle also. Always to go on arguing that military solution is the only solution, in my opinion, is neither good strategy even from the military point of view, nor good politics, nor good diplomacy, nor a realistic approach even to the political problem. May I ask a pertinent question of them? Will they be doing a national service by rejecting a realistic approach? This is an opportunity, we have got to realise, which comes seldom in our way. We have, therefore, to exercise as much caution as is necessary to see whether we are not losing an opportunity. On the one hand, we have to find out a peaceful alternative which is possible and, on the other hand, we have to see that the Chinese return beyond the 8th September line. From the point of view of both these tests, personally speaking, I am satisfied that this proposal is well worth accepting.

There is another fallacy. Sometimes we see that the only solution to a problem is a military solution. But we have got to have regard to the fact that we are living in a changing world, and the world is changing so fast. Between the 20th October and now events have happened in the world which have shown that other powers in the world also have realised that this is a changing world. It is not applicable only to India. Let us look at the map of Europe. It is changing so fast and so rapidly. Countries which were at each other's neck till the other day, France and Germany, what is their relationship now? They are coming nearer and nearer. My hon. friends would have seen from today's papers that they have come forward with a statement that they are prepared to bury the age old animosities and enmities. Similarly, we read about the Berlin issue in today's papers. We found from yesterday's papers that on the issue of nuclear tests Russia has come forward with a suggestion....

Shri Nath Pai: This settlement between France and Germany has become possible after France has given Ruhr to Germany. It would not have

been possible if France had not given it back to Germany.

Shri U. N. Dhebar: We are mistaking the proposals for negotiations as terms of settlement, and that is the difficulty here. If we have been able to realise that this is merely a proposal for negotiation as distinct from terms of settlement, I think this confusion would have gone. We are at a peculiar juncture in the history of our country. It was good of my hon. friends on the other side not to have moved any other motion. Simultaneously, I hope and feel that we shall not try to allow confusion to be created in the country about the nature of these proposals. It is not the final terms of settlement that the Prime Minister or the Government is discussing today. What is required at this hour is to strengthen their hands so that when they sit at the Conference table they go with the unanimous support of this country and secure what is the objective of this House, the objective which we decided upon in the memorable resolution we passed on the 14th of November. What is needed today is one voice; rather than a division of voices. What is required today is to speak with one voice and treat these proposals as proposals for negotiations and not as terms of settlement. We have to examine these proposals as such, and if we examine them as such, I am sure everybody will be convinced that the proposals give to us substantially what we had asked for, namely, the vacation of aggression from the 8th September onwards.

Shrimati Renuka Ray (Malda): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, this House is considering today a matter of the gravest consequence and significance to us and so we must do so as calmly and as quietly as we possibly can. When the Prime Minister spoke, he pointed out the sequence of events which have led to the present discussion on the proposals of the Colombo Conference, the sequence of events that have led to this are events which we in this country can never forget, and

we in this House must always remember. In this House we have taken a pledge in November the 14th that until this aggression on our land, this wanton and treacherous aggression, is vacated, we shall not rest; and, in the Prime Minister's words "we shall see this matter to the end, and the end will have to be victory for India". It is in this context that we must consider the proposals of the six non-aligned nations.

We are grateful to them and we are appreciative of their endeavour to find some kind of a basis on which we in India can talk to the aggressor. But, in doing so we have also to point out that we are rather bewildered, rather confused, to find that they have never used the word "aggression". When other countries have been attacked by imperialist powers like Egypt over the Suez episode by Britain, we openly and frankly came forward and stated that it was aggression. The non-aligned nations' meeting at Colombo may say that as they were trying to bring about negotiations they could not use the term "aggression". Also, as Shri Dhebar has stated, in fact they have recognized China as aggressor when they asked the Chinese to go back and did not ask India to go back from her own territory but yet I must own to a sense of deep disappointment. When we consider the Colombo Conference proposal we have to consider it in that context. We have to remember that we have taken a pledge that we shall not rest until the aggression is vacated. We have also left the door open for negotiations with the Chinese by the offer of restoration of the line before the blatant invasion of the 8th September. We have to see to what extent do the Colombo proposals come near that offer of ours.

We first take the Eastern sector in which this unabashed aggression took place not so long ago and from where the Chinese have since withdrawn and have put forward a new offensive in a new guise—the guise of peace. We find that in regard to this sector the Colombo powers have said that

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India is to get her land restored except for the Thagla Ridge and Longju. I do not wish to discuss Longju because there this thing took place long before the 8th September; but in regard to the Thagla Ridge, we cannot so easily forget the fact that our men fell at the Dhola Post. Yet, we have to consider whether in spite of this, in spite of our sentiment, we should talk or let the basis for talks take place and accept the Colombo proposals on this point.

We have also to consider the Western sector. As Shri Dhebar pointed out, the position there is somewhat similar to that of the 8th September line. In this demilitarised zone now there will be posts both of China and India. But these, I understand, are not to be joint posts where we can watch those who, in the name of frontier guards, send military soldiers. Will it be possible for the Chinese to agree in toto to not having frontier guards, as they term them? Will they accept what we understand by manning of "civilian posts"? These are matters which have yet to be decided.

We have also to remember that the Chinese have said that they have accepted in principle the proposals and, as the hon. Prime Minister himself has pointed out, they have not agreed on some major issues so far. In their proposals the six non-aligned nations have said that the demilitarised zone is to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of India and China. To this, it appears, China has taken some exception. We do not know what ultimately she is going to do or is not going to do.

How are we to look upon these things? I am glad that the Government has asked for clarifications and that the clarifications have to a great extent been supplied. To the extent that they have been supplied it has

become easier for us to look at these proposals of the Colombo powers as being ones which are not so far removed from the proposal of the 8th September line. But even while doing so, I think, there are one or two other points which would need clarification if we are actually to proceed on these proposals.

First of all, as I said, we have to be clear whether the words and the language that is used by China will bear the same interpretation as that of the dictionaries of all other countries in the world. The past does not give us much hope in regard to that for we ourselves have learnt from bitter experience in Ladakh and later during the aggression that when China says one thing and we understand by it what the world would understand, later on they say that it meant something else; that when China produces maps and says in the beginning that they were the maps of Chiang Kai-shek, later on we find that not only those maps were according to her aggressive designs but that as circumstances help her she changes the nature of her maps and claims more in defining the border of India and China. We must not also forget that we did not lay sufficient store in the past by what was her behaviour in Tibet. We recognised the loose suzerainty of China over Tibet but not the right to interfere in her autonomy. But what did China actually do in Tibet? She came forward, took the land and went in for peace offensives. Time and again she did that till the present position.

We are an independent nation. We have understood what China is. We shall not be taken in by her trickeries again. Therefore whatever proposals we may accept or not accept, if they are accepted they will be accepted with this background. I mention all these things because there are some people in this country who may feel that it seems that we are wavering from the pledge that we

took in November in this House. We should not and cannot waver from it. Our country's integrity and honour must always be maintained. It is in that light that we may look at any proposals.

The hon. Prime Minister has said that in principle he has accepted these Colombo powers' proposals on behalf of the country because they come very near the 8th September line. I am sure that the hon. Prime Minister and his Government will give due consideration to all the points that are raised and all the concrete suggestions that are made during these discussions because it was the hon. Prime Minister who said that without the approval of Parliament he could take no steps. Therefore it is that today we are discussing this matter in this House.

I would like to point out in particular that whatever happens about these proposals, whether China accepts them *in toto* or not and whether talks start or not, we can never swerve for one minute from the preparations that we are making, both on the civilian and on the military front. We must not swerve from them because we cannot trust again that neighbour who has played us false. We may have talks with them. We believe in a policy of peace and it is because we have so unswervingly believed in peace that even during the aggression we offered to talk to them if they went behind the line of 8th September. But even if we were to accept these proposals and even if China came to accept them *in toto*, we have to remember China for what she is. We shall certainly talk to them and if the talks lead to some results which are good, well and good; but if they do not lead to results, we shall continue to build up our country to withstand the aggression and to turn out the aggressor.

We are a non-aligned country. The policy of non-alignment has been tested during our hour of trial and has

stood the test very well. USA, the leader of one power bloc, has not only rushed to our aid which we shall never forget but has also openly stated that she does not wish to interfere. In fact, it appears from their trend that they welcome the fact that India is a non-aligned power. It is also quite clear that in spite of the fact that Russia is aligned with China and they are in the same power bloc, Russia too feels that friendship towards India which is non-aligned should continue. There is the talk of these MIG Planes. It may only be a symbol or a token. These MIGs are on the way. It shows that the policy of non-alignment has stood the test of this ordeal at a time when the world does not want a nuclear war. The Cuban crisis and the solving of it show the mind of both Russia and USA. China is really an isolated country because China alone believes in a nuclear war and in trampling upon non-alignment and to see to its destruction. We do not intend to bow down before China either in giving up our territories or our policies and there is no question of non-alignment so far as China is concerned.

Finally, in regard to these Colombo proposals, I hope, in view of the clarifications and a few other clarifications yet required, we shall be able to take them up. Our Prime Minister has accepted these in principle and, I hope, we shall accept them in fact only when we find that China has accepted *in toto*, when we find that those points on which things are not quite clear are also cleared up. One of the main points is that the civilian posts in the Ladakh area in the demilitarised zone shall be joint posts of India and China or else some one must give us an assurance—we can take no assurance from China—that the posts manned by Chinese civilians are indeed manned by civilians. Can the Colombo nations give us the assurance?

With these words, I would merely like to reiterate what we have already told the Colombo powers, that we

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appreciate the fact that they are anxious to bring about a settlement. But, we hope they realise that there is no question of "a dispute" or "conflict". There is an aggressor on the one side and its victim on the other and any talks that we have must be held in the light of this. Finally, we will hold only these talks provided we can do so in such a manner that our honour and integrity remain inviolate as the Prime Minister has said time and again.

Shri U. M. Trivedi (Mandasur): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, it will be the duty of all of us to remember that standing as one man in this House, we passed a Resolution, a very solemn Resolution, that under no circumstances will we cease to continue to fight till the aggressor has been driven out from our land and not an inch of land will be allowed to remain with him. In the course of the debates in this House and in the letters written by the Prime Minister, which he tried to explain so laboriously, he has tried to make out that his intention was that as soon as we have reached a point whereby the forces of aggression can be put behind the 7th September, 1962 line, negotiations between the two may commence. Putting this issue at this broadest base possible, I would like to ask whether the Colombo proposals made by the three powers to us convey any such thing. Either we are not very correct in our own estimation as to the position which we held on the 7th September, 1962 or the Chinese are higgling over the words that the line of actual control is where they have indicated to the Colombo powers. We have read the seven and odd maps that have been supplied to us by the External Affairs Ministry, prepared by the Defence Ministry. They do not tally with our idea of actual control on 7th September, 1962. A very patent fact is that even a man like Shri U.N. Dhebar, an erstwhile Chief Minister of Saurashtra, a lawyer of some standing, a President of the Congress has failed to appreciate this

position and has read between the words the meaning which is not attached to these words. The clarification that has been made in these Colombo proposals on the eastern sector leaves no doubt about it in my mind at least. I am sorry, I do not claim to know more English than probably Shri U. N. Dhebar does, being a science student, but having stayed in England, I know sufficient English to learn at his feet. According to the Colombo Conference proposals, it is said that in **Chedong** or the **Thagla** ridge area and the **Longju** area in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments, the right of the Chinese to hold their forces there is admitted by us. These are the only two places on account of which the whole trouble has arisen before us. It is only these two places, the Thagla ridge and the Longju area which are now in the occupation of the Chinese and which the Chinese invaded on 8th September, 1962, from where we would like them to be driven out. If we accept the proposition, the whole question becomes very apparent to us that these two points have been left for the purpose of negotiation whereas the whole of the Ladakh area, we are prepared to give up. It was obvious, so many times several papers, even foreign papers, American papers, papers from the U.K. had expressed it, even Milliyet from Turkistan had expressed it, that the reason why on the eastern sector of ours a massive attack has been launched is this: that our attention may be focussed on it and, in trying to save the eastern sector, we will give up our claim in the western sector. This is obviously what is meant here. In Ladakh, we had posts in Dehra and Qizil Gilga. They had no posts whatsoever. The whole area of Qizil Gilga coming to 12,000 square miles is being yielded by us on the plain understanding that a parallel line is being drawn of a 20Km. corridor. It is a travesty of fact that this thing goes down the throat of our Prime Minister. To say the least,

it is a very weak-kneed policy on account of which this country has suffered. I am one of those who stood by the Prime Minister, who applauded him. The whole nation had stood by him as one man that we must fight back the Chinese. We have never agreed to the proposal that we will ever come down to this position that whatever terms will be dictated by the Chinese will be acceptable to us merely on the threat of the Army. (Interruptions.)

Shri Tyagi: My friend will realise that it is not a settlement.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I will request my friend Shri Tyagi most humbly, you should not disturb me.

I was looking to the preface of this book which has been supplied to us: *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace*. I will invite the attention of the House and also your attention to this. It has been suggested:

"The Government and the people of India are, by their history and tradition, wedded to the ways of peace. They have always been and are in favour of peaceful settlement of differences between nations. Peace and peaceful settlements can, however be persuaded on only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect."

Each one of us agrees with this proposal.

"It would be fatal to compromise with aggression or submit to the military dictates of the aggressor."

That is a further point which this book makes out. I am one with the proposition that we shall not agree to the proposition of an aggressor who dictates these terms to us.

We must all remember what we had done in the Sela pass. When we study the position well, 20,000 troops were massed against 3 lakhs of Chinese forces. But, by some hoodwinking, 16,000 were left behind and only 4000 were allowed to give

battle to the 3 lakhs of Chinese forces. It is a great shame for us. It is a great victory, I should say, for these forces, the 4000 soldiers who stood against the 3 lakhs of invaders. The battle that they gave has discouraged the Chinese from coming into our territory. This has told them that if all the 20,000 giants had been there, they would have smashed and annihilated them. It is only for this reason that the Cease-fire has been declared. Not that the Chinese were superior in any manner. It is most unfortunate that we forget history. It is Thermopyla which is remembered for 900 soldiers fighting against the Persian hordes. Similarly in Haldighat, 22,000 soldiers fought against 120,000 of the Mogul army. Although they were defeated in the battle, it is Maharana Pratap who is remembered; it is not the Moghul Army which is remembered for this. It is this history which tells us that if all the 20,000 soldiers were there, the whole army of 3 lakhs would not have been able to come across the border. It is the fault of the leadership. It is this greatest mistake that has been committed namely, that we were unprepared. We had to admit that we were un-prepared. This un-preparedness is the bane for us. Today we are being put into a lull. In the last speech I said that this is one of the tactics of Mao Tse-Tung as he says that he always attacks, pauses and attacks again. He creates a lull in our Army. He wants to create a lull in our country. The upsurge—this is what they have described: the national bacteria has come into India. I say that it is not national bacteria, but it is national feeling; there is a national upsurge in the whole country, and the whole country has stood as one man to drive out these people, and we are determined to drive them out. We are intelligent people; we are brave people. We have all the essentials of a brave people, and we are not numerically very weak. It may be that Russia may be frightened; it may be that the others may be frightened, but we a nation of 40 crores need not be frightened by the 70 crores of Chinese. We can stand up

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against them. If that feeling is there with us, I should say that this is not the time for us in any manner to fall back upon the dictates that are being made by the Chinese. Look at the letter of Chou En-lai dated the 24th October, 1962. That is sheer hypocrisy. Are we to yield to this hypocrisy? Are we here as a nation to yield to it? We are not bound to do so. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru is a great man, and there are many followers with him.

Shri Ansar Harvani (Bisauli): Not many, but thousands and millions.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: I do not agree with my friends who say that he has all the followers with him. I am very sorry I do not agree with my hon. friends. The only thing for me to say is this; with all the regard that I might have, with all the regard that my other friends have for him, I would say that this policy of yielding intelligently by an intelligent man who makes himself bow, who bows down to might is always a difficult problem for us. You cannot bend and, you cannot bow down. I know it, that what the Communists want is one thing; what the Congress friends want is another thing; of course, they are in a dilemma. The whole difficulty is that we have to bear the brunt of this attack. I am sorry; I do not want to attack the Prime Minister in his well-meaning thing, but when he says what he has said, I would say that it appears clear that the time has come when we must take courage in both hands and then start fighting. We are not going to remain like this, just looking on, when this Army is coming on a march against us giving the impression that we are not able to throw them back. Whether grass grows in Ladakh or not is not the problem, it is the land that is ours, for which we have to fight; it is the land which is shown from time immemorial to be within our traditional boundary, across which we shall not allow any foreigner to rule.

We have committed a great diplomatic blunder, and we should remem-

ber it. It is time for us to remedy that blunder. That blunder is that the cause of Tibet which ought to have been espoused by us was not espoused by us. Tibet's cause must be espoused. Sinkiang's cause must be espoused. Mongolia's cause is being espoused by Russia and Outer Mongolia has been put in the United Nations. Tibet also ought to have been put in the United Nations. Sinkiang should have been put in the United Nations. If that had been done, the whole problem for our country would have been solved by having a buffer State between us and China; and China would have had nothing to do with us, and we would have had nothing to do with China. We have failed miserably in that, and we have yielded on that. We took a very big stand when the question of Algeria came up. But what made us shrink from our duty in espousing the cause of Tibet? I fail to understand. And which were the countries that espoused the cause of Tibet in the UN General Assembly? El Salvador, Ireland and New Zealand were the countries which made a move for the support of Tibet and for getting the genocide of the poor Tibetans stopped, and they were asking for merely the fundamental human rights of the Tibetans to be recognised, but we raised no voice of support in favour of that move. It is from these policies that one gets the impression that we got frightened of China; if we agree in any manner to have these Colombo proposals considered simply because we are frightened of the Chinese, then I should say, although my voice may not be the voice of all you, that it is the voice of a sufficient number of people in my land, in India, that we must fight back; we must throw them back, and we must stand by the resolution that we had passed in November, 1962.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru has tried to explain in his own manner that substantially we have reached that position which we demanded, namely the position of the 8th September, 1962.

line, and that the parallel has been drawn accordingly. But if you look at the map you will find that in the new map that has been given, the line passes much to the west of Dehra, and it is no satisfaction to us that part of the line, say, about 18 miles, passes even to the east of the international line. When you want to give up an area of nearly 5,900 square miles, it is no consolation to us that an area of 18 square miles comes to us. We have to calculate in these terms.

Apart from this proposition which I have put before you, there is also another thing that comes into the picture. Let us consider what has goaded the Chinese to have this unilateral cease-fire. We have to analyse the position. Is it because the USA and the UK and other Western Powers tried to help us and rushed to our aid? Were they frightened of that? Were they frightened that Formosa might attack them at an untimely hour? Were they afraid that the strained relations between the Soviet Union and China might result in very great harm to the Chinese? Or were they afraid of the Indian soldier who fought so bravely? Were they afraid that the Indian soldier would be able to annihilate them? Time was when we could have repeated the same story and the same fate would have befallen the Chinese Army if we had continued to fight, the fate that befell the German soldiers, the Germans and Napoleon's forces in Russia.

Everybody who gets strong develops the habit of becoming a goonda. But a goonda is always a coward. If you fight him, he runs away. If you try to hit him, he never attacks you. The same thing happens in the international field also. Hitler became a goonda. He wanted to fight with everybody, saying, 'Come on, I am going to defeat all of you'; Belgium was conquered, Holland was conquered, France was conquered, this was conquered, and that was conquered.....

Shri Raghunath Singh (Varanasi): Ultimately he liquidated himself.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: And at last he died.

An Hon. Member: He committed suicide.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: That is right. The whole thing will happen in the same way; if you take up cudgels in the proper manner, this Chinese giant or whatever else you like to call him, or goonda, is not going to succeed against us. It is not possible.

Sir, within the short time that you would generally allow to a speaker, it may not be possible to explain the whole position, and, therefore, I would request you to ring the bell after five minutes.

The question that comes to the fore-most is this. You will remember how Chamberlain was frightened. Chamberlain was frightened by the show of force on the question of Munich. The whole Army and the mighty strength, and the mighty Army and the mighty materials that Germany had were just shown and exhibited to Chamberlain, and Chamberlain with his umbrella, the poor fellow, a peace-loving gentleman, more like our Prime Minister. . . .

Shri Ansar Harvani: No, no.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: . . . went back to his country shaking the umbrella frightened. . . .

Shri Ansar Harvani: No, no. With very great respect, I do reiterate this position. . . .

Shri R. S. Pandey (Guna): It was Chamberlain who gave the best opportunity to the Britishers to fight.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: . . . that we shall not be frightened by the mighty force that the Chinese might show to us; they may have three thousand planes or even more. This whole world today is afraid of a world war.....

Shrimati Renu Chakravartty (Barackpore): Chamberlain gave away somebody else's property. That is the point.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: We also did the same thing when we gave up Tibet. My hon. friend may remember that.

The whole position before us is this. If we study carefully, meticulously and considerately the proposals that have been placed before us by the Colombo Powers, it strikes me that this is merely a hypocrisy on the part of China; the perfidious Chinese are going to play the same treachery which they played with us on the previous occasion also. We have been dragged into this hell from 1954. Even if that year is not accepted, let us have it at 1957, when the Aksai Chin road was exposed and brought to our notice. From that time onwards, every time we have talked and sent letters and letters. We have fought with words. I say we should fight with swords and not with words, and then only these Chinese can be kept in check. But we have fought with words. Chou-en-lai is also fighting with words. He is such a hypocrite that even today he does not use the words the 'Chinese Army'. He uses the words 'Chinese frontier guards', as if we may say we are sending some of our police officers from Delhi to fight back an army: He is talking of 'frontier guards', three lakhs of 'frontier guards', 20 divisions of 'frontier guards' against a small army of India.

It is with this man that we are dealing. We must always remember the hordes and fight the hordes. We cannot forget this position. They are trying to annihilate us if they can. There is absolutely no compunction for us. Their whole desire and aim were guided entirely by a sense of jealousy. India was rising high in the estimation of all countries. Our rupee is selling at a premium everywhere. We were the leaders of the neutrals. Everyone wanted some sort of shelter from us. Looking at the prestige which India was gaining in the world, particularly amongst the

Afro-Asian nations, Mr. Chou-En-lai had hit upon this plan to lower us, to humiliate us. Their aim was our humiliation. It was not only mere humiliation. There was something deeper to it. They probably thought that with the communists sitting here in Parliament and outside Parliament, if they attacked, there would be some sort of upheaval in this country and in the process they would take the opportunity and seize the whole of India and make it entirely into a communist country. They have miserably failed in their aspirations. But we are duty bound now to take courage in both hands and fight back the Chinese and continue to fight back the Chinese till we have driven them out of the territory which we claim, out of the traditional boundary line. There cannot be—I repeat the very words—any compromise with those whom we have declared aggressors, till the aggressors are driven out of that line. If the aggressor goes out of that line, do negotiate. Nobody says, do not negotiate. Peaceful methods are always good and welcome. At the same time, we should not pursue such methods at the cost of being called cowards before the world. I will never agree to such a proposal. With these few words, I conclude.

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy: The Colombo proposals which we are considering after the reply of China received by us through the Ceylon Prime Minister and which was read out by the Prime Minister, have almost received a premature death. We are considering them. The Prime Minister and friends like Shri Dhebar in support are telling us that these proposals not only fulfil our test but are advantageous from the point of view of India.

Before I discuss these proposals and state why I completely disagree with this view, I want, for the benefit of the House, to read out the very stand of the India Government in this matter. What does the September 8 line mean? Why do we insist on it? 'We'

means, it has been made very clear, not the Parliament, but the Government. Parliament stands on its solemn ledge, that we shall continue to fight, however long and hard it may be, till the last aggressor is driven out of this land. So far as Parliament is concerned, there is no other commitment.

It was made very clear after the October 24 proposal—practically that was the original proposal and all developments have come after that—what the stand of Government was. What did we say? We said:

“India made it known that while she was prepared to resolve differences by discussion, she could do so only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect and not under the threat of military might”.

Then we proposed:

“If the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let them go at least”—

not the maximum—

“to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to September, 8, 1962. India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions at any level mutually agreed”—

For what?

“...to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for easing of tension and correction of a situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the *status quo* along the India-China border”.

..Shri Dhebar says these are proposals for settlement.

Shrimati Renu Chakravartty: He said just the opposite.

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy: He said not terms of settlement but proposals for settlement. The hon. lady Member was not here when he was speaking.

We here stated a principle. What was that principle? Before we continue or even start talks for easing tension, it must be made clear—we are not believing in the *bona fides* of the Chinese; the Prime Minister made that clear and has repeated it even today. We are fighting for a principle. We were fighting for a principle in insisting on the restoration of the September 7 position. The principle was violated our trust was betrayed and aggression was committed. For anything to happen after that, first they must go back. From that limited point of view, I feel the Colombo proposals were dangerous in their implications and disastrous in their consequences for this country; politically and militarily, they were advantageous and favourable to our enemy. I feel that the Colombo Powers, who had devoted so much time and effort to this problem have failed to realise the basic issue between India and China. It is a war. It is not a border conflict. We are in the midst of a war. The situation of border conflict had changed after October 20. Therefore we took this resolve. If this country stood united behind the Prime Minister it was not because we thought that he would go on with his own past theory, but because the country gave this mandate—and the Prime Minister resolved to carry it out—that so far China was concerned, we shall maintain the posture of hostility and try to see that China realises that India is not weak, India cannot be subdued like any other Asian neighbouring countries.

I am entirely unconvinced when the Prime Minister says that these proposals are advantageous to us. Take the Ladakh front. What is proposed in the proposals? The Chinese are to withdraw only 20 kilometres from the actual line of control. We were not accepting even that. The actual line of control is the 1959 November line. Are we to believe that after September 8, the Chinese had occupied in the Ladakh sector only 20 kilometres or even less than that? I do not know

[Shri Surendranath Dwivedy.]

where Shri Dhebar got the map to explain to us how many miles from top to bottom they were actually going back, because when we were discussing it with the Prime Minister, he said it was very difficult to have a firm line like that. But am I to understand that they had come only 20 kilometres and are now going back even more than that? This is impossible.

15 hrs.

Shri Dhebar argued that the whole crux of the problem was that the enemy should not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his aggression. Really, that was the issue involved in this withdrawal. I will read out to you what the UAR thinks in this matter. The UAR was a very active partner in this conference it is a country which has stood behind us and tried its best to see that our proposals are accepted, but the UAR was treated by China in the same way as they treated our reasonable proposals, which were rejected by them with contempt. And what does the UAR official magazine say about these very Colombo proposals? It says:

"Aly Sabri came to Colombo to press forward the very proposals earlier made by the UAR Presidential Council. The gist of the proposal is that there should be no gains of war. Although Aly Sabri could not get these proposals fully adopted by the Colombo conference, he succeeded to a very large extent in giving the Colombo proposals a realistic content. These proposals do not give India all that she wants."

It is very clear, I am not sorry that China has treated these suggestions of the non-aligned Asian-African friends as it did. These well-meaning friends tried their best, we have all good wishes for them, but they failed to realise that they were dealing with a country which defied even Russia, the country which has armed

China to the teeth militarily. It has not taken a moment for China to commit aggression and to pooh-pooh the theory of co-existence and believe in the theory of war, defying even Russia.

After all, these Colombo Powers are powerless, they have no influence which can change the attitude of China. We are only sorry that they were put in such an awkward situation. Probably they were trying to save their own faces. China today has really, come to a position when every little country in Asia is afraid of it. Here, I will again read out the statement from the UAR journal where it is clearly stated as to what the background was which made the Colombo Powers take this decision. It says:

"The Asian neighbours of China were apprehensive of Peking's wrath, Pakistan's pro-China propaganda had confused Afro-Asian nations to a large extent."

I would like the Prime Minister to note the rest of it:

"And so poor had been India's diplomatic and public relations work amongst Afro-Asian countries that few of them had any clear idea about the dispute, and few were prepared to believe that the Chinese had mounted a powerful and massive invasion of India's frontiers"

Here lies the real problem. These people did not even think or know that it was a massive invasion. After all, what have they done? There were the Chinese proposals and there were the Indian proposals; each had rejected the other's proposals. So, they tried to find out some *via media*. How can we then say that it is really worthwhile, better, advantageous etc.?

We thanked the Chinese when we were discussing the cease-fire proposals because then there was an element of hesitation in our mind, but

Peking Radio made us see where we stood. Today also I thank them for rejecting these proposals. We are discussing this on a very fateful day because today is the birth day of Netaji Bose. We took the solemn pledge to rid the country of the aggressor on the birth day of our Prime Minister. When the Speaker asked us to stand to give it the solemnity it needed, my mind went back to 26th January, 1930, when I was a very young boy, when Pandit Nehru was the President of the Congress and millions of this country took the pledge of independence to fight against British imperialism. So, while taking the pledge in Parliament, I thought that old spirit had come back. Similarly, if Netaji was able to unite all forces of patriotism, belonging to different creeds, religions etc., to fight unitedly against the tyranny of imperialism, it was because of his uncompromising attitude towards problems and things which he held dear. There cannot be any shilly-shallying so far as India is concerned.

That is how we should view these Colombo proposals. Does it really help us militarily? It does not, it must be admitted.

I am not going to discuss all the points raised by others, whether it is a partnership deal etc. I would request the Prime Minister to clarify this matter. When this idea of the September 8 position came to his mind, not to Parliament's mind, did he only visualise that so many check-posts will be ours and so many will be theirs? It is not so. We were not quarrelling for territorial adjustments. A principle was involved in it, and the Colombo proposals have not done us justice in this respect.

As I have said they were suffering from a weakness. In the very first sentence of their proposals that weakness is brought out when they say that the Colombo proposals are a starting point for a peaceful settlement of the India-China conflict, as if we started the conflict, as if China

never started the conflict. The proposals, as far as the country has understood the Prime Minister, were to enable us to achieve our objective. The objective is to free our territory from the hands of the enemy, to see that aggression is completely warded. So, we have to consider these proposals from that point of view alone. That is the acid test and nothing else. These proposals have not achieved that objective, but rather try to drag us to the conference table, equating us with the aggressor.

Our Prime Minister says we agree to these proposals in principle. China also says that she agrees to the proposals in principle. So, we are friends, we still remain friends. We have a very great thing in common, as it was in the days of *bhai bhai* when we were very good friends. Again it appears that after this aggression and war, our approach is almost common. But China may agree in principle, but it will not go the way you want it to go. China does not believe in those things.

We are all for peaceful means. We have stood with the Prime Minister on the question of non-alignment. We have not quarrelled with that. If we have quarrelled, it is for this reason that your emotional alignment to one bloc was creating difficulties for our own country. But now that phase is over, and if the policy has stood the test, let it continue. If it really enables us to get all the help and assistance needed, from whichever country or whoever is prepared to assist us in our present task, we have no quarrel with that. But again the issue is being confused now by making it appear as if we are gaining some posts and that our aim is achieved. The question of peaceful methods is referred to. The House will remember that not only now but as far as back as 1959 or even 1956 or 1957, whenever we raised this question of China, we had been accused in many ways of being war mongers, etc. Who do not want peaceful methods? Who is quarrelling with that? This coun-

[Shri Surendranath Dwivedy.]

try stands for peace. The Prime Minister is very much worried inspite of the fact that he is the one person in the world today who has steadfastly, without any compromise, inspite of great crisis, stood for the policy of non-alignment when it was attacked from all sides. Still he is worrying today because after the Chinese have grabbed thousands of miles of our territory some proposals are brought for settlement and if we state clearly that these proposals do not meet our minimum demands and if we refuse to do anything with them, the world outside and the non-aligned countries would think that India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru did not want to talk. Does not the world opinion believe that we stand for peaceful settlement of international disputes? We want that not only for us; we want that this policy should be the guiding principle in solving all international problems in the world. Let them understand that if we went on waiting for the world opinion in respect of Goa, could we ever have been able to free Goa from the hands of the Portuguese imperialism. We stand for a principle. We have tried peaceful methods. But China is not prepared to hear to any reasoning whatsoever. The only reason that she would hear is the reason of strength of power. Our attitude towards them can never be the same as before because of practical considerations, because of the fact that China has betrayed our trust, and imposed a situation militarily. We can have peaceful approach to problems but China stands in a different category today. We have exhausted all peaceful means. What is our Prime Minister going to talk to them which we have not written for these five and odd years? Is there anything more? Or is it that if he just goes to the negotiating table and tell the Chinese these things, they will feel convinced and find a way out which they were not able to find from their Marxist-Leninist literature given by Soviet Russia and others? Therefore, so far

as China is concerned, we will be inviting the wrath of our people if we think of peaceful methods and not of military methods because one does not know when China would again invade India. Already they are concentrating in the Chumbi Pass. Even if the Colombo proposals were there, they would have been free to concentrate in those areas of Ladakh where they could easily bring their tanks and other heavy equipment to defeat us. Let us not delude ourselves again that we can meet this challenge just like this. The Prime Minister has given a call to meet this challenge. We accept this challenge. But we cannot accept this challenge unless we build our military might through the help and assistance of friendly countries and keep the posture of hostility so far as China is concerned. The last word I say is this: China has betrayed our trust. Let not posterity say that we have betrayed the people.

Shri A. P. Jain (Tumkur): Mr. Deputy Speaker, the hon. Member Shri Trivedi laid down certain principles for negotiation. He said that we should not negotiate with the Chinese out of fear.

Shri Priya Gupta: He never said so—not like that.

Shri A. P. Jain: It does not do much credit to him... (*Interruption*). Now, he said that we should not submit ourselves to the threat of military might. He quoted from a pamphlet issued by Government and urged that we must have peace only with honour. He said the Chinese were deceptive people; they were calling their soldiers the frontier guards; they were calling India to be the aggressor and that Indian army has launched an attack on China. I have no quarrel with all these premises.

But that does not mean that if there are suitable conditions and if peace can be had with honour, we should reject it. During this morning's dis-

discussion, some questions were raised and we were told that the September 8th proposals as also the Colombo proposals go against the concluding part of the Resolution which we adopted standing solemnly in this House, pledging ourselves to vacate the aggression. It was on the 14th of November, that we took the pledge that we shall not rest until the whole Chinese aggression is vacated. The question is: If we start negotiations on the basis of September 8th or the Colombo proposals, are we going against that pledge? The present negotiations are not meant to give final solutions. They are only starting grounds for negotiations. We should not attach any more importance to them.

Now, the Colombo proposals have not come because of our initiative. We never requested Ceylon or any other country to start any efforts to bring about peace between India and China. The neutral countries of Asia and Africa, on their own accord, thought that the state of tension and war between India and China was not good for the world; they should make an effort to bring India and China together. One should welcome their efforts.

Again, China has been carrying on vigorous propaganda against India that India does not want peace while China wants peace. We have given a lie to that propaganda. Yet China persists in that propaganda. It is in this background that we should consider these proposals.

The first question is whether this House stands committed to the September 8th line. This morning when the Prime Minister was speaking some Opposition Members strongly objected and said that the September 8th proposal was never accepted by the House. In that connection, I may point out that it was on the 27th October, 1962 that the Prime Minister in his letter to Chou En-Lai made the proposal. In the enclosure to that letter, he says:

"If the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let them go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 8th September 1962. India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the status quo along the India-China boundary."

When we discussed the unilateral cease-fire statement of November 21st by the Chinese on the 10th December, we voted a resolution which said: "This House having considered the border situation resulting from the invasion done by China approves of the measures and policy adopted by the Government of India." This 8th September proposal was one of the policies and we gave specific approval to that. Not only that. There was an amendment by the hon. Member, Shri Ram Sewak Yadav to the effect, reject the proposals concerning 8th September and do not enter into negotiations unless the Chinese withdraw to the boundary as it existed on the 15th September, 1947. This proposal was pressed to the vote and it was defeated by 288 voting against and 13th voting for. If the hon. Member goes through the speech the Prime Minister introducing the motion on the 10th December, he will find that it was not only once, not twice, not thrice but about half a dozen times that the Prime Minister made reference to the 8th September proposals, and said that if these proposals are accepted India will be prepared to negotiate. In the background of what has happened, it is preposterous to say that this House has not accepted that India should be prepared to sit across the table with China and to negotiate on the basis of the 8th September proposals.

The next question which arises is this: What is the Colombo offer?

[Shri A. P. Jain.]

How far does it go and how far does it satisfy the conditions of the 8th September proposals? The basis of the 8th September proposals was that the recent aggression must be vacated.

Shri Ram Sewak Yadav: On a point of clarification. Her referred to my amendment.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There is no point. He was quoting from the proceedings. Please sit down. Do not disturb him.

Shri A. P. Jain: We must very dispassionately examine the Colombo proposals and compare them with our September 8 proposals. How far do they satisfy the basic conditions of our 8th September proposals? The Prime Minister has this morning given his views about it. In the map which has been supplied to us, in the region of the Chipchap valley, according to the Chinese proposals of withdrawal by 20 kilometres, the Chinese will be behind the 8th September line. Then, down to the south, the 8th September line is to the east of the points to which the Chinese will withdraw, right up to Samzungling. To the south of Samzungling, all along, the Chinese will be receding farther to the east of the 8th September line. Taking the area as a whole, on the whole the Chinese will be vacating probably a larger area than what they would have vacated if the September 8 position had been accepted. That is an advantage to us.

But then there is a countervailing disadvantage because the 8th September offer contemplated that all the 43 posts which had been overrun by the Chinese after 8th September would be restored and we would be able to occupy them militarily; but that is not going to happen. In fact, according to the clarification given by the Colombo conference, the area vacated by the Chinese will be manned jointly by the civil police of India and China. So, it is not going to be in our exclusive possession. Then we

have also to remember the nature of the terrain there. It is not an area which is inhabited, and the question of actual administration there does not arise in any serious manner.

So far as the eastern sector is concerned, there is only one dispute left over, and that is about the Chedong or the Thagla ridge area. There will have to be negotiations about it. There are these advantages, but there are some countervailing disadvantages also. But by and large, I think the Colombo proposals satisfy the conditions laid down in our September 8 proposals, and they are well worth considering.

Fortunately or unfortunately—whatever view we may take—China has not so far accepted the clarifications of the Colombo proposals as given by the Colombo conference. It may be that there is no settlement, but should we bear the brunt of refusing to negotiate. China has already been carrying on vigorous propaganda against us and that propaganda has won some ground that India does not want to sit across the table and negotiate. One of the great advantages of our not rejecting these proposals would be that it will indicate to the world that we are prepared to accept any reasonable proposals, whether they fructify into success or not. After all, what are we going to lose? We are not going to lose anything if we negotiate on these proposals. If we negotiate, it does not mean that we are going to yield our territory. The Colombo proposals have themselves made this clear. They say:

"The conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries."

But, as Shri Dwivedy said, we have to deal with a dangerous opponent and enemy, a deceptive enemy who does

not stand by his words and therefore we will have to be very careful.

We have to go ahead with our military preparations, expanding our army, properly equip our army, and we have also to maintain the morale of the nation. Unfortunately, when the peace-talks start, there is a little sagging down in the preparation and it will be for the Government to make vigorous preparations for the defence of the country which in its turn will invigorate the people who will maintain their morale.

After all, the biggest preparation for defence is to increase our industrial and agricultural production. We should concentrate on it. This struggle is going to be a prolonged struggle. It may be five years or it may be even more. I am glad that the Planning Commission has decided to maintain the size of the Plan and for the third year of the current Plan they propose to allocate Rs. 1740 crores. I commend this effort of the Planning Commission. Agriculture, I must say, has been lagging behind. Agriculture is very important for India. We are importing quite a lot of foodgrains from outside. India cannot both import foodgrains and pay for the arms. Therefore, we must increase our agricultural production.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member's time is up.

Shri A. P. Jain: I am not going to take much time. For increasing agricultural production we have to invigorate the country-side, and that is the responsibility of the Ministry of Community Development. I am afraid that the Ministry of Community Development is more floating in air and not walking on earth. Yesterday, you will remember, a question was put; it was the first question in the House, "to what extent the Panchayat Raj institutions have been geared up to meet the emergency and to stimulate the war effort?" The reply was that all the men and women of

India, all the 43 crores of people inhabiting this country. . . .

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: This is far beyond the scope of the discussion. Please confine yourselves to the Colombo conference proposals.

Shri A. P. Jain: I am finishing. I shall not take long. The answer given was that all these people are working men and women being mobilised to increase agricultural production. Let us be realistic and let us say how many men we can mobilise. Let us not think of things that ought to be but things that can be done.

So, in short, my opinion is, that these proposals may be discussed. If they are acceptable to China, further negotiations may take place. If they are not acceptable to China, no further negotiations shall take place. But in any case, we should not slacken our war efforts nor allow the morale of the country to slacken and we must concentrate fully and totally on increasing our industrial and agricultural production.

Shri Dasappa (Bangalore): Sir, I rise to support the suggestion that the Colombo proposals are worthy of the consideration of this House. It is not only that these proposals meet very nearly the stand that the Government have taken earlier, namely, that should the Chinese withdraw beyond the line that existed prior to 8th September, 1962, we are prepared to enter into talks. Quite apart from the fact that substantially these proposals meet with that stand taken by us, I am just addressing myself as to whether there is any alternative that would be left to us at this moment, when things have gone so far.

Taking the first point, I entirely endorse what Shri A. P. Jain said about the House being in a way committed to the stand taken by the Government and the Prime Minister, so far as the 8th September line is concerned and requiring the Chinese to

[Shri Dasappa.]

withdraw beyond that line. He has referred to the amendment that was moved by an hon. Member to the following effect:

"For the original motion, the following be substituted, namely:

This House having considered the border situation resulting from the invasion of India by China, is of the opinion that the policy of the Government of India to start negotiations on the condition of withdrawal by the Chinese aggressors to the line of control as on 8th September, 1962 should be rejected and no negotiation should be undertaken till the Chinese aggressors withdraw to the Indian boundary as it existed on the 15th August, 1947."

It is seen that only about 13. voted in favour of the substitute motion and the rest of the House has turned it down. So, I would like to know exactly what the opinion of this House is, so far as the proposal of the Government, calling upon the Chinese to withdraw beyond the 8th September line is whether we have put the stamp of approval on the proposal of the Prime Minister or not. That is the issue before us. I have no misgivings or doubts whatever that the House is committed to that proposition, namely, that should the Chinese withdraw to the 8th September line, an obligation arise on the part of this Government to carry on negotiations. In the circumstances, I think there is no point whatever in some of our friends raising the point that the House is not committed to the 8th September line.

If that is so, then the question arises as to whether the Colombo proposals meet our demand or substantially meet the same. I think the Prime Minister has been at great pains to tell us that substantially the Colombo proposals do meet the stand

that we took. I do not want to repeat what has been said by other speakers earlier, but I would say that it does meet substantially our stand. I do not think anybody has attempted to refute that position. My friend, Prof. Ranga was the one who tried to pick up one or two small posts to the west of the 8th September line and said, this is not substantially what we had bargained for. After all, when it comes to a question of six friendly powers who come to offer their good services for bringing about an amicable settlement, not by any initiative of ourselves, we should consider whether we should not give those proposals a serious consideration. Is there anybody here who questions the bonafides of these six powers? I do not think anybody has ventured to, except again, my friend, Prof. Ranga, who referred to one or two statements of Ghana on the supply of arms and equipment to us. That is a different matter altogether. When we carry on our propaganda, when we send our emissaries there to explain the position of India, why should not they be allowed to change their views in the matter?

In regard to our propaganda machinery—I do not know how often I have said it—it is not really equal to the task. I am sorry to say this. Compared to the propaganda engine which China has unleashed both before the invasion and after, I am afraid that ours is not equal to the task. I am not saying this as my own view. America and other friendly nations have said that when we have got a case which is so strong and righteous, we are not taking all the trouble to put it across to those people. This is, after all, a border dispute between two nations and you cannot expect the other nations to take up all these maps, study the details and find out who is wrong and who is right. There is a border dispute and that is enough for them to think that there is some kind of a case for the other side also. Therefore, I would very much like

that our progaganda machinery is sfficiently strengthened.

Prof.Ranga was not sure about our stand being firm, so far as the negotiations are concerned. Merely because we go about considering these proposals, he seems to suspect that we will let down the unequivocal stand that we have taken on the 14th November, 1962. I am not surprised that Prof. Ranga is not sure about others being firm, because, if I understand aright, in his own political life, he has been changing so often that it is difficult for him to think of anybody taking a firm stand. Just now my friend, Mr. Dwivedy referred to the past stand and pronouncements and statements by the Prime Minister before the independence of India. Let him tell us what exactly has happened since then and whether there has been any kind of change in the same leader. Therefore, I think it is unnecessarily exercising one's own mind to think that the pledge that we took on the 14th November, 1962 will not be honoured.

Mr. Dwivedy also said that so far as China is concerned, war is the only way in which we can fight China. He thinks that there is no other way. I do not know why he seemed to limit this theory only to China. But, in any case, he thinks that China does not understand any other proposition. It may be so. But do not we see the mighty world forces that are at play today. Just a few years ago could we have thought that the relationship between USSR and China would be so strained as, well practically for them to exchange words, at any rate, through a common medium Albania. So, the question is whether our stand is moral. As our stand is right, as I said last time, we have scored a moral victory, and we find that world opinion is veering round more and more to India and China is becoming more and more isolated. I am pretty sure that if we take up an extremely reasonable attitude such as is embodied in the consideration of these proposals, more and more of the world

opinion would be on our side and less on the side of China. Let us go back to our Puranas. We find various things in the Mahabharata. After all, Krishna Paramatma whom we worship so much was not one who did not know some political strategy. He went as doota or the ambassador of the Pandavas. What happened in Kurukshetra? I am not trying to say that there will not be a Kurukshetra between China and India. It may come about. But, Sir, if and when it does come about I think we will be in a much stronger position from the point of view of world opinion and world support than otherwise.

Sir, I do not want to take much of your time. There are many other points, but I think I have said enough to convince the House.

Shri Yajnik: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I have great pleasure and I deem it a privilege to extend my hearty support to the statesman like and patriotic position that the Prime Minister has taken on the Colombo proposals. First I must also express my sense of thankfulness to the six non-aligned powers who met at Colombo to facilitate the talks and negotiations between India and China and to stabilise peace and cease-fire that has been unilaterally imposed by China on India.

Now, I do not understand why any criticism should be indulged in of the Colombo powers. They all are non-aligned powers. They have all been associated with the Afro-Asian conferences and movements. This is the group of non-aligned Afro-Asian powers to which we belong. We do not belong to the eastern or western group but we belong to this non-aligned Afro-Asian group. Therefore, naturally, they were very much worried over the conflict that raged between India and China. And, what harm have they done if they have come out to stabilise the cease-fire that has taken place and to make it possible for India and China to meet together at a conference table?

[Shri Yajnik]

But, at the same time, as they were not connected with us before they naturally could not take cognizance of the merits of our respective positions in the long struggle, in the long conflict that has been ranging between us for years, and as mediators their mouths and lips were sealed so far as the term "aggressor" was concerned. If they had to mediate, they had naturally not to indulge in any adjectives for one side or the other. As mediators they met and saw the three-point cease-fire proposal of the Chinese Government. They also saw and took cognizance of the stand we have taken and hammered out their own proposals for facilitating India-China rapprochement. Now, the two big objectives that they have are stabilisation of the cease-fire and, secondly, rapprochement between India and China at the conference table. Let us not delude ourselves in the idea that the cease-fire has been made permanent by China. They have always been saying that it is unstable. If we do not carry out all the terms that they have imposed by the unilateral cease-fire then, may be, the cease-fire does not remain operative at all. Therefore, it was also necessary that they had to stabilise the cease-fire and, at the same time, make it possible to pave the way for rapprochement between India and China. With these objectives they have made their proposals.

I am sorry to say that many of the critics of the proposals have been carried away by their antagonism to China into disbelieving in the utility of these proposals. Some of them have not even cared to look at the merits of the detailed proposals and the clarifications which the Colombo powers have placed before us.

Let us remember the advance that they have made on the cease-fire proposals of the Chinese and their approximation to our own stand. Take for instance, NEFA, where all attention has been focussed in Longju and Thag La ridge. But did

not the Chinese say, at the same time, that we should remain 20-kilometre away from the MacMahon line? Even today our Government is not sending the military personnel to the MacMahon line; it is only sending civilian personnel. If the cease-fire is not stabilised and if we send our military personnel right up to the MacMahon line, probably the Chinese would do something that is unpalatable to us and might create an unfavourable situation for us. Therefore, the big advance that the Colombo powers propose is that our military installations can be established right up to the MacMahon line. If the Colombo proposals were not there, our military could not have gone right up to the MacMahon line without creating some tension.

Secondly, Thag La ridge and Longju are to be disposed of by discussion by India and China. Of course, we have our own view in this matter but the Colombo powers, naturally, as mediators left it to be discussed between us. That means that any position taken by either of them should be acceptable to the other side. The same applies to Bara Hoti in the middle sector. But the greatest attention has been concentrated on the Ladakh front. There again, it is not clearly understood that the Colombo powers did not endorse the term of the Chinese cease-fire that the Indian forces must withdraw 20 kilometres within their own limits. The Colombo powers made an improvement on the Chinese cease-fire proposal. They say that the Indian army shall remain exactly where it is and will not withdraw 20 kilometres as the Chinese want them to withdraw. This withdrawal in our own land rankled in the heart of the Prime Minister and of all of us because it was most unpalatable and most distressing that we should have to withdraw any kilometre within our own frontiers within the land which we are occupying today both in the civil and Military manner.

Now that rub has been removed and our armies can remain right on this frontier that it occupies today without any misgivings at all, I may say that our army is rather cautious in this matter and the Government is also cautious. Chushul airstrip, for instance, subject to any light from the other quarter, I believe, is still not being repaired. It is still not functioning. The entire area within this Ladakh frontier has still not been fully occupied and is not fully operative.

Now, if the Colombo proposals go through, our army and our installations will be right on the frontier that they occupy and all our aerodromes and installations will be fully operative.

Then, the other part of it is that while we do not withdraw 20 kilometers, the Colombo powers hold down the Chinese Prime Minister to his word that he is prepared to withdraw 20 kilometres from the line that the Chinese occupy today. Now, it is a question of fact and a question of maps. If this line of Chinese withdrawal to 20 kilometers corresponds to the line that has been our line on the 8th September—of course, there are only one or two places or checkposts that do not fall within this purple line on the map that has been given to us—all the rest of our checkposts, namely, 41 or 45, are within this demilitarised zone or the area that has to be demilitarised. The Chinese have not demilitarised it yet. They have not vacated their aggression. They are still waiting probably to see how the Indian Government and the Army responds to their cease-fire proposals. Anyway, they should withdraw if they accept the Colombo proposals.

That is a very great advantage, namely, that we remain where we are while the Chinese forces must withdraw 20 kilometres from the line that they occupy today. So far, I think, everybody, even Members of the Opposition whom I have consult-

ed, are generally not very discontented. But the main rub is about our checkposts and our control of the demilitarised zone. There are angry arguments among Members of all parties of this House, I am sure. Of course, it is true, as the hon. Prime Minister has said, that we did not even have parity in the number of checkposts and the personnel even on the 8th September. They had more checkposts and more personnel. Probably they had about 5000 persons whereas we had only about 500. So, if we get parity, we certainly get more checkposts and we will have a greater number of personnel. Whether the personnel will be civilian or military personnel has certainly to be checked up. I am sure, if we accept these proposals and if they are also accepted by the Chinese, certainly in that case the leaders of both the sides will have a joint inspection team which will go round and check up to see if there are any military personnel which should not be there.

So, so far as this demilitarised zone is concerned, there is no doubt that it will be nearly approximating to and will be better than the position that we had in the demilitarised zone. But, at the same time, I do admit that it is a bitter pill to swallow, namely, that the aggressor and the victim should have an equal number of posts and an equal number of personnel in the area from which we were driven out by inhuman, monstrous and precipitate aggression. It is, I do admit, a bitter pill to swallow, and that has, I am sure, hurt not only Members on this side, but, I think, all Members of Parliament, irrespective of any party affiliations. I do admit that it is a bitter pill....

Shri Hem Barua: Why swallow it at all?

Shri Yajnik: It certainly applies salt to our wounded heart. At the same time, the main thing to remember, when we talk of the proposals is that, as the Prime Minister had said,

[Shri Yajnik]

if we are not to withdraw on the MacMahon line and if we are able to go with all our armies right up to the MacMahon line, if we are not to withdraw from the line that we kept on the Ladakh frontier, if the Chinese forces have to withdraw 20 kilometres to a line that generally approximates to the line of 8th September, 1962, and if we have even more posts and more personnel in the demilitarised zone than what we had on 8th September, 1962, then I say that all the conditions that have been mentioned in the resolution that was adopted at the instance of the Prime Minister have been fulfilled, and, there would be no reason on earth why we should not accept them for consolidating the cease-fire and for paving the way for India-China negotiations.

Now, what is the alternative. Today the Prime Minister has told us that China has not accepted all the proposals with all the implications. If they do not, then, we do not fumble, we should not be afraid, we go on with these negotiations with the Colombo Powers till they give up. If the Chinese do not accept the Colombo proposals, then the responsibility is not ours for rejecting the negotiations; we have not refused the olive branch that the Colombo Powers have offered. If the Chinese Government refuse the olive branch that is their misfortune and that is their funeral. But, supposing this move does not go through, then the frontier, that is, the cease-fire line will be frozen; well, it has been frozen in Kashmir. It might be frozen here also. There might not be negotiations for some time, and China might take it into her head any time to again march her hordes on Indian soil.

In any event, therefore, we have to continue our build-up in the country. We cannot be complacent, and I am sure that Government are keenly alive to their responsibility in the matter, and they will continue to mobilise their men, money and munitions with a view to strengthen the Armed

Forces of the country which can beat back any aggression from whatever side it comes.

Shri Balkrishna Washnik (Gondia): After the Prime Minister has moved this motion, almost all the leaders of the Opposition Parties have participated in this discussion. But I venture to say in all humility that they have rather misunderstood the motion. As my worthy leader, Shri Dhebar, has said, the Colombo proposals are not the terms of settlement. But, as a matter of fact, they are the pre-conditions for starting negotiations. Whether we start the negotiations with the Chinese Government, whether we should settle this boundary dispute in a peaceful way by negotiations, sitting across the table, is the question. These Colombo proposals are nothing but a way that they have suggested to us that. Now there is a cease fire; we should sit across the table and start negotiations. We were never against negotiations; we were never settling this matter by peaceful means. But we were against one thing; we were against the aggressor being benefited by the fruits of aggression. We had clearly stated that if the Chinese returned to the 8th September 1962 line, we would be able to start negotiations with them, we would sit with them and settle this matter peacefully.

16 hrs.

Now, these six non-aligned nations who sat at Colombo evolved certain proposals. These are before us. As the Prime Minister said, we are accepting these proposals in principle. It is because they are not against the position we had taken. We have yet to see whether China accepts these proposals or not. We read in the papers that the Chinese want to accept these proposals with certain reservations and modifications. As the Prime Minister has rightly said, acceptance of these proposals should be *in toto* and not with any reservation. If we

do not accept these proposals in toto it is a way of rejecting them. Since this Government is in a position to accept these proposals, we have now to see whether the Chinese accept these proposals or not. As one of the Opposition Members said, If the Chinese do not accept these proposals in toto, it means that in a way world opinion will be against them.

Some Opposition leaders said that they would like to settle this border dispute by war. As a matter of fact, some of them also said that they would like to fight the Chinese with the help of foreign troops and other aid given by foreign countries. I do not know how far it will be correct for our nation to fight the Chinese aggression with the help of friendly powers. As a matter of fact, we have to build our own strength in NEFA and in Ladakh, wherever we have to fight the Chinese.

16.04 hrs.

[SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTY in the Chair.]

We have to build up our own inner strength. Without that, we will not be able to fight the Chinese. We did not start our fight on the presumption that we would be receiving foreign aid. Our soldiers fought Chinese soldiers with whatever weapons they had, with whatever strength they had with whatever means they had. And they held the Chinese thehe. Of course, there were reverses in certain cases, but that does not show that we are inherently weak. We should not wholly and solely depend on aid that we will be getting from foreign countries.

Big words and loud speeches are not going to win us the war. If we only talk of war, it does not mean that we can go on fighting the Chinese. We have to build up our own strength. I am sure the Government are taking every step to create and develop inner strength. If foreign aid comes, it is welcome. We will take it and it will help us to fight the Chinese, but the main thing is that we ourselves should

be strong. We should try to build up our own strength, but it is not military strength that is going to settle this problem for ever. We have seen in Korea that in spite of all the military strength of the USA, there is still a North Korea and still a South Korea. So, I feel that if our inner strength is cultivated, if we create moral support for us throughout the world, this dispute will be settled.

Talking of military strength does not mean that in a day we are going to create a strength equal to that of China, that every one of the 45 crores of people of this country is going to become military minded overnight and go to the front for fighting, that we can get all the aircraft and everything. Wars are not won by the number of soldiers or the number of weapons with the armed forces, but they are won by strategy. Therefore, I would say that this talk of war should go.

The leader of the Swatantra group said that in the second world war Chamberlain had gone and that in the same way be expected our Prime Minister to go. This is an old point he is making, but he must know that the whole nation is behind the Prime Minister, that the whole nation has faith in him, that it is only the Prime Minister who has been the leader to win our freedom and it is only the Prime Minister who will again lead us to victory through this crisis.

Shri Frank Anthony (Nominated—Anglo-Indians): I speak today with a heavy heart. Perhaps I do not represent all the Members in this respect, but I am one of those who have no doubt that in this time of crisis the Prime Minister alone can furnish the necessary and adequate rallying point to the nation. And I also feel that in this time of emergency, it is important to maximise our unity not only in the country, but, as far as possible, to present a united front in this House. That is why it saddens me, because I feel that I would be failing in my duty if I did not question what I feel are some of the basic mistakes

[Shri Frank Anthony]

in the policies enunciated by the Prime Minister.

May I say in passing that I feel that the consideration of these proposals in this House to say the least, is academic? When yesterday the Prime Minister announced to some of us who met him that he had accepted in principle these Colombo proposals, to put it mildly, it came as an unspeakable shock to me I am not questioning the right of Government to make a decision, but I do say this: it seems not only otiose but it seems somewhat of an affront, perhaps not calculated, but nevertheless an affront to this House, to place before it for consideration proposals in respect of which Government has already committed itself, and I am a little sorry that this should have been done.

We were anxious, we started these sessions well, with a completely united front. We passed that historic resolution of the 14th November. The Prime Minister was persuaded to consult some of us off and on. When the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs deprecated the need for a continuing session, and deprecated even the need for consultations, I reacted somewhat violently. I said that while nobody would question the right of Government to make a decision even on critical matters, we are afraid that they may reach decisions which were far reaching, as I shall show that the decisions to accept the Colombo proposals in my view are not only far-reaching but that they may well be disastrous not only for Indian history but for the history of Asia, they may reach decisions in a hole and corner manner—I used that expression and I repeat it—and then spring this decision vital, critical and disastrous for India, on this House and through this House on the country. That is precisely what is being done. Could not the Prime Minister have summoned some of us? Could he not have conveyed to us the processes of his thinking and after he got our reactions, then come to a vital

policy decision about accepting the Colombo proposals. Instead of that, he commits himself and the Government and then goes through merely the motions which, I say, are a cynical affront to this House—to ask us to consider proposals in respect of which the Government has already committed itself.

I feel that a great deal of damage has been done. There may be a chance for repairing some of this damage and I was assured when I heard the Prime Minister say today that we are not likely to go to the talking table unless we know precisely what the Chinese mean. It would appear that Marshal Chen Yi said that so far as these proposals were concerned they wanted certain clarifications, they wanted certain amendments and they wanted to know what India's interpretation was and then they wanted to tell me what their interpretation was going to be. The Prime Minister is a liberal, if I may say with great respect, so far as China is concerned. He has given hostage after hostage by his naivete to their continuous treachery and duplicity; he has done that. But at long last, better late than never, he has realised that we are dealing with a treacherous and perfidious people. Somebody has rightly remarked: to be able to pin down the Chinese to anything definite, to anything that approximates to truth or definiteness is more difficult than harpooning the most elusive of eels. I was assured when we heard from the Prime Minister that we would not go to the talking table unless we know precisely what the Chinese meant. That, I feel, is the least we can do. We may be able to repair some of the damage which has been caused by the acceptance if we adopt that attitude. Let us know; let us pin down the Chinese, if that is humanly possible, sentence by sentence, letter by letter, and syllable by syllable, before we expose ourselves to further acts of treachery, before we go to the talking table.

When some of us met the Prime Minister we studied these proposals and the clarifications with the help of certain maps. The matter is more or less clear to this House. What was and is the effect of these proposals? In substance they mean this: that the Chinese will withdraw, by and large—I will not go into minor variations—to the 7th September line; that we remain where we are that is—let us remember that too—by and large, the Chinese line of 7th November 1959, their latest avowal of that line. In between the corridor is to be subject to some kind of dual civilian control.

Now, on the 21st of November, the Prime Minister will remember that he told this House categorically that we do not propose to negotiate until the position prior to the 8th September was restored. Now, Sir, let us not quibble. That was a statement of Government policy. But it is equally right to say that it was a unilateral statement in the sense that it was not affirmed and accepted by the House. Many of us felt and we continue to feel that it was a retreat; that it meant an implied endorsement of the fruits of Chinese aggression.

Now, the position is being canvassed and has been canvassed by friends ranging from my hon. friend Shri Gopalan to my hon. friend behind me, Shri Indulal Yagnik. that these proposals are in substance what the Prime Minister said on the 21st of November. In substance, yes. But I disagree entirely with the thesis that they are precisely and in vital respects what the Prime Minister said on the 21st November. Let us assume that we even acquiesced impliedly in what the Prime Minister said. We felt strongly; as I said, it was a retreat from our former forward position. But the cardinal principle involved in that position of retreat was this: the unconditional restoration of all Indian territory up to the 7th September line. That was the principle. My hon. friend can understand me. I am not concern-

ed with the mechanics: I am not concerned with the mathematical formula as my hon. friend Shri Indulal Yagnik tried to canvass—39 posts here, 500 people there, 5,000 people on the Chinese side and so on. What I am concerned with, what the country is necessarily concerned with, is the question of principle. It is a question of principle which goes to the root of the honour of this country. It is a question of principle which must affect the self-respect of every right-thinking Indian. That is what I am concerned with; and the principle that was involved was this: the very least—and I say that the latest position is one of retreat, in a long line of retreats—the very least was the unconditional restoration of the line up to the 7th September.

There is no question of civilian control or any other Chinese control on Indian territory. There is no question of condominium either in Kashmir or in this corridor. Once we start bartering away principles, when once we accept the principle of condominium—may be 2,000 sq. mile. of territory—then how will you rationalise and distinguish the question of condominium in Kashmir or in what people consider as the disputed territory in Kashmir?

What I feel is this. I am not worried about the mathematics of it or the mechanics of it; work it out arithmetically; we gain here, they lose there. And in the final analysis, in the mathematical, arithmetical balance, we might gain something numerically. But the principle is this, and what I feel is this: that our policy has represented a steady retreat. Equally, the Chinese policy—of calculated duplicity—has represented a calculated advance. Every time we have receded, every time they have exaggerated or inflated their claim. That is the position, and today, they are in a position beyond what they accepted in August. I shall show that.

[Shri Frank Anthony]

What I am against is this: because it will emasculate the psychology and the national will of the people. You cannot rationalise these things. You cannot quibble, because, in the final analysis, people will say bluntly that this series of retreats represent nothing but an escalation into the abandonment of one principle after another, and that is what I am against—this escalation into surrender after surrender.

Sir, let me put it this way. My hon. friend Shri Indulal Yagnik seems to have argued that we are arguing from a position of weakness, as if aggression must be recognised. Here is a counsel of defeatism. Shri Yagnik's is a counsel of cravennes; it is a counsel of the extremity of pusillanimity. That is what it comes to. I just do not understand it.

On the 20th February, 1961—I agree—this is what the Prime Minister said:

"It is no good repeating like a *mantram* 'Oh, let us sit down and be friends.' When we are considering a problem like this, we must know the nature of the problem and not give any wrong impression to the public of India, or to the public of the world, as to where we stand, or how this is going to be solved. It is not going to be solved merely by some pious declaration or by pure goodwill. I want good of will always. The fact of the matter is that our case in regard to the border is almost foolproof."

Then, he went on to say:

"The question would only be settled when the Chinese leave this territory. That is the simple issue. It is not a question of horse-trading—all right, you take this, I take this. You halve this, I halve this. It is not a question of that; it is not a question of horse-trading".

On the 30th April, 1961, this is what the Prime Minister said:

"While the Government of India are always willing to negotiate with the Government of China, they cannot obviously compromise with any aggression on our territory, nor can they negotiate as long as their territories remain under Chinese occupation".

The Prime Minister might say that was in February and August of last year and a long time ago. But with great respect, I want to put this to him: On the 14th November, what did he say in this House? It was a stirring and historic resolution; we dedicated ourselves, with faith and hope, to drive the Chinese out of this country. As far as I remember, on the 19th November, 1962, in a stirring appeal to the nation generally, the Prime Minister said, "We will not rest till we drive them out of our country". These are brave words. Sometimes, the Prime Minister says that on this side, we indulge in brave words. Sometimes in a crisis, brave words are not only good, but they are necessary, because they stimulate; they sustain and fortify the will of a country and they are necessary. But what I am against is this. I am not against brave words, but what I am against is the succession of the swallowing ignominiously, gulping down ignominiously those brave words.

Let us see what this has meant in territory. Let us see what these retreats have meant in territory. In 1956, the Chinese drew their line which constituted a claim of 12,000 square miles of Indian territory. According to their 1960 maps, they raised that claim by 2,000. According to their 1959 line—it is their latest claim; they call it their 7th November, 1959 line—it is another 4,000. They have been inflating their claims. In 1956 it was 12,000 square miles; in 1960 more 14,000 square miles and according to the 7th Nov-

ember line, where we are at present, it is 18,000 square miles of our territory. I may be wrong with regard to one or two thousand miles. But now their claim is 18,000 square miles of territory. That is how they have inflated their claim from year to year, step by step. Our 7th September line means that we leave in their occupation at least 16,000 square miles of what we consider Indian territory. I say this with great respect; I am not impugning the motives of the Colombo powers, but I say that the Colombo powers did nothing except indulging in horse-trading. They have done precisely what the Prime Minister condemned in February, 1961, namely, you take this; we take this. You halve this and we have this. That is horse-trading *par excellence*. It is nothing, if it is not horse-trading and the Prime Minister said that Indian territory is not susceptible to any formula of horse-trading.

What I am against is this that the Chinese now are getting in fact, whether we admit it or not, much more than what they wanted recently, as recently as August. I have read their notes of the 4th and 6th August. This is what they have said. On the 4th and 6th August, 1962, they were prepared to negotiate with us unconditionally. The Prime Minister may say, yes, but in August, they had not attacked us. But they themselves on the 4th and 6th August, were prepared to negotiate with us unconditionally. Then they were well behind the 7th September line. What I cannot understand is this. Let us not delude ourselves. The Prime Minister says that we are committed to the resolution of 14th November and we are committed to driving them out. Let us not delude ourselves. Once bilaterally, once we advisedly place our seal on their at least occupying our territory from the 7th September line, then, not in the Prime Minister's life time, not in the life time of any one of us can we move them back from the 7th September line. For generations, per-

haps for 200 years of Indian history at least we will have congealed the position completely, we will have actively placed our own approval, our imprimatur, our specific seal on the Chinese occupying permanently 16,000 square miles of Indian territory. Let us not delude ourselves.

Mr. Chairman: The hon. Member must try to conclude now.

Shri Frank Anthony: Madam, give me at least five more minutes.

Mr. Chairman: The hon. Member has taken 20 minutes. He must come to the points and not go into details.

Shri Frank Anthony: I was hoping, Madam, that we had learnt something from Chinese duplicity. The Chinese live by certain maxims which have now become their creed. The Prime Minister has understood that today. Probably he has read more about China than many of us, but still with the amount of refurbishing and refurbishing of may reading about the Chinese today is nobody's business. But they live by certain maxims which have become their creed: ruse and duplicity, advance and retreat, confuse and demoralise. What I cannot understand is this, that they have applied these maxims blatantly to us and yet we have not today even begun to profit by it.

Take the NEFA area. As I said, they believe in ruse and duplicity, advance and retreat. Even in NEFA why are they holding on to the Thagla Ridge? In 1959 Chou En-lai proposed his notorious package deal. Originally they never remotely claimed at any time any area in NEFA. They merely posited a claim as a counterpoise, and then they tried to put through a package deal: "all right; we will put the largeness of our heart accept your position in NEFA—which was always there, and wor which we did not need any kind of Chinese blessing—and you accept our position in Ladakh". As I have

[Shri Frank Anthony]

said "advance and retreat, confuse and demoralise". They have succeeded completely. Not only are they in the position that Chou En-lai proposed in 1959, but they are beyond that. They were prepared then to swap their so-called claims in NEFA for 12000 miles of territory in Ladakh. By this process of advance and retreat, inflating their claims, today we virtually place our seal on their occupying not 12000 miles of Indian territory but on their occupying 16000 square miles of Indian territory. That is the retreat in terms of territory.

Sir, I want to say a word about the Colombo powers. I feel, Sir, because they are dealing with people like the Prime Minister—decent, sometimes I think a little too decent when he is dealing with people like the Chinese, the Government has been confused and, without knowing, perhaps a little demoralised—and I say this with great respect with regard to the Colombo powers, that they have also fallen a victim to this process of being confused and demoralised. I do not want to say anything to denigrate them, I accept their *bona fide* completely; but I say this, that whatever their intentions were they are calculated to pave the way to a communist hell both for themselves and for India. But I cannot understand their, a sort of, acrobatics in this exercise of non-alignment. In the first place, I do not understand how they equated Communist China, which was a completely aligned power, militarily tied to the Communist bloc, with India whom some of us regard, some of those at least on the other side regard, as the supreme prophet of non-alignment. I cannot understand that equation at all. What is much more un-understandable to me is this as to how they have equated, as they have in fact done, China the aggressor with India, the victim. I do not understand it. All right, I accept the position of my hon. friend Shri Indulal Yajnik that

if they were mediator, they could not use adjectives, although I do not know, because as far as I can see, the people who invoke or intone this *mantram* of non-alignment, at least they apply this unction to their soul that they are nothing if they are not morally courageous. At least we did that on the Suez issue. Did we hesitate in branding the British as aggressors? We did not. What I want to say is this, the stark, tragic fact is that in spite of all their brave posturings these small countries are not, in fact, non-aligned. They cannot be non-aligned and the reason is this.

16.31 hrs.

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

I will finish in a minute. Burma is economically indebted to China. Burma and Cambodia, are cowering under the immediate shadow of Chinese imperialist aggression. Ceylon is a little more removed, but dare not do anything to offend the Chinese. Their whole approach, not because they wanted to do it deliberately but in the context of their living, in the context of their being in the shadow of this giant imperialism, is that they have been completely inhibited. They have moved, as I said, little countries not knowing it perhaps, as emotional satellites of the image of Chinese strength and imperialism, and we have been inclined to succumb to their persuasions, not realising that in succumbing to it they have drawn us into their orbit, perhaps unthinkingly on our part, they have drawn us into their orbit of becoming emotional satellites of the image of Chinese imperialism.

I feel this too that there is this tendency.

Mr. Speaker: He should conclude now.

Shri Frank Anthony: I will conclude in one minute. I feel this too that there is this obsession, with everyone

who masquerads under the label of non-alignment—we ourselves become inhibited. What has happened? We have become non-aligned, so far as our own interests are concerned; that is what have become, paralysed into non-alignment so far as our own interests are concerned. The Colombo Powers had some reasons, small weak, militarily insignificant, as I said, cowering under the shadow of Communist imperialism; they equate us with the Chinese aggressor; but we become non-aligned in our attitude towards our own interests and we accept their equation of the aggressor with the victim of aggression.

May I finally say this? I do not understand—I would like to elaborate this a little more.

Mr. Speaker: There is no time for more further elaboration.

Shri Frank Anthony: I am concluding.

Mr. Speaker: He has asked for one minute.

Shri Frank Anthony: I am concluding now.

Some hon. Members: NO. NO.

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. It is between me and the hon. Member. Why should others come in between?

Shri Frank Anthony: We may need time. But can we buy time by retreating before the Chinese? What time did we buy in accepting their rape of Tibet? Precisely the amount of time they needed in order to build it up into a vast military camp from which they could mount an invasion of this country. What time that my hon. friend Shri Indulal Yajnik was asking for will we buy us this further retreat? Precisely as much time as the Chinese have already decided to give us before they mount another offensive. And I say this, this is not the kind of time that the democracies buy.

Surely, we can prove that even in Asia a democracy caught unprepared yet it is prepared to suffer, is prepared to accept reverses and defeat—ultimately with it will to fight, with the spirit and the will of a free people, tempered in the furnace of law, must inevitably triumph over all the regimented, fear-driven, dehumanised hordes of Chinese communism.

Shri D. C. Sharma (Gurdaspur): Mr. Speaker, Sir, as I was listening to the speech of the hon. Member who preceded me, I remembered a book which I had read some time ago, namely, *Alice in Wonderland*. After listening to him I felt that he was seeing everything topsy-turvy and that there was a lot of confusion in what he said. He had got the wrong image of the Colombo Powers, a false picture of our nation and an entirely distorted notion of what we are aiming at. The very fact that our Prime Minister has come to this House to discuss the Colombo proposals shows what regard he has for this House. He believes in the sovereignty of this House. He believes in the united support of this House. Now that our Prime Minister has come to this House, the hon. Member, Shri Frank Anthony, thinks that he has affronted the House by accepting the principle which he is now bringing before the House. I do not think there is any question of accepting the principle. I think, he has brought this motion before us so that we can discuss it and deliberate over it and finally give our verdict. I think, that is a tribute to democracy and to the democratic way of functioning which all of us like very much.

It has been said that we are forgoing our principle. It has been said that we are going along a line of retreat. I think, this kind of speech will do a lot of good to those persons who believe in the Chinese cause and who believe that China is doing everything possible to harm us. It will not do any good to any Indian who reads this speech. It is not a question of a retreat. It is not a question

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of surrender. As our Prime Minister has said in his opening speech today, there has been a sequence of events. There has not yet been any final event. In that sequence of events which may last very long, I think, this is another event and this event is not going to be the final event. It is not going to bring down the curtain on this unhappy catastrophic drama that is being enacted before our eyes. It is going to be only one of the events in that.

What is that event? The Colombo Powers have been abused today. I think, they mean well by us. They have been friendly to us. They have taken courage in both their hands in order to evolve a formula so that we can gather round the talking table to discuss this problem. They have done good not only to the cause of peace between India and China but to the cause of peace all over the world. They have been the torch-bearers of peace in this troubled world. I believe that we would be very churlish if we did not give them a word of praise. They have done well by us.

What have they done? They have said to us that here are the proposals. These proposals are not going to be the final proposals for settlement. These proposals are to be discussed and after discussion the country will make up its mind as to what to do. I think that it is not proper to think that they have done something which is not conducive to the interests of peace in this country. I believe that they have raised the prestige of the policy of non-alignment in the world. After all, they were the six non-aligned powers. They may be small powers. They may not be prosperous. They may not be big. But after all it was these six non-aligned powers that had come forward in order to find out a *via media* to settle this dispute. No other country has come forward. No big Power has come forward. Therefore, I think that these countries have done the right thing.

The whole policy of our country *vis-a-vis* China has to be looked at in three contexts. In the first place, everyone in this country, every citizen of this country, stands by the resolution that was passed on the 14th of November, 1962, which, you, Sir, said that we should pass while standing; it was a solemn occasion when we passed that resolution. That resolution was to this effect that we shall stand by our country and we shall not rest till the aggression is vacated. I think that the whole thing has to be viewed against this background of that resolution.

Secondly, this has also to be viewed against the background of our policy. I have been in this House for quite a number of years.

Shri U. M. Trivedi: For eleven years nearly.

Shri D. C. Sharma: It is unfortunate that my hon. friend was not here in the Second Lok Sabha. I have been here for quite a number of years, and all the time, I have been hearing on the floor of this House the advantages of negotiations, the advantages of peaceful solution of knotty problems. Our country has stood by that policy, and our country has been making so much of this policy and rightly so. I believe that to tell us not to stand by that policy which we have been enunciating all these years, and not to talk to anybody at the negotiating table will be just abrogating those principles of peaceful negotiations which we have been holding so dear all these years.

The third thing is this. We have seen so many things here. As Shri U. N. Dhebar has said this morning, of course, we stick to the 8th September, 1962 line. But in the Colombo proposals that we have given, there are certain advantages, and there are also certain disadvantages. I do not know by what kind of calculation Shri Frank Anthony has come to the

conclusion that we are going to surrender 16,000 square miles of territory. But I would submit very respectfully that there is no question of surrender. It is only a question of negotiations. My hon. friend has said that we have been having this retreat from one point to another. I think that this is not true. I think that we have been fighting, and at the same time, we have been trying to arrive at a peaceful settlement. My feeling is this that the proposals put forward by the Colombo Powers are such as can be made only the basis of negotiations. They are not the terms of final settlement. They are such terms as we can discuss with them. There is no harm in discussing things with anybody.

Of course, I agree with some of my hon. friends that the Chinese are not to be relied upon what they say and what they do. That is true. Our Prime Minister also has said this morning that he also does not believe always in the *bona fides* of the Chinese. It is one thing not to believe in the *bona fides* of a country, and it is another thing that we try to evolve some method of approach, and this is one of the methods of approach that the Colombo Powers have devised, and I believe that there will be no harm in accepting the Colombo proposals and in going to the negotiating table and discussing those problems.

Another point that I want to make is this, that the country is fully prepared to meet the Chinese challenge. Some of the speeches that have been made on the floor of the House today show that we are weak-kneed, that we have lost the moral fibre to fight them, and that our will is weakening and all that sort of thing. I think that nothing can be farther from the truth than these assertions. Every day that passes strengthens the fibre of our country to fight the Chinese menace, and I find that all kinds of preparations are going to be made for fighting the Chinese menace. Only this morning, we were told by the

Education Minister what was going to be done so far as the schools and colleges were concerned. He has stated that Government are making attempts to give a new kind of education to the youth of our country. In the same way, our ordnance factories are working; our industrial production is increasing. The Third Five Year Plan is not going to be adversely affected. All these things show that the fibre of our country is strong and stable and that nothing can destroy that will to fight and win. I believe in what Cromwell said to his soldiers when he was fighting a civil war, 'Pray to God, but keep your powder dry'. In the same way, our Prime Minister is saying to the nation, 'We will keep our powder dry. We will fight the Chinese to the bitter end and we will not rest till we have got back every inch of the territory subjected to aggression vacated; but at the same time, we will not fight shy of negotiations'. Negotiate and fight, fight and negotiate. If the Chinese have one formula that they should advance and retreat, our formula is, fight and, if necessary, negotiate. If negotiations fail, we will fight and we will go on fighting till victory is ours.

It is not only the Colombo Powers who are watching our policy. Our reactions are being watched all over the world. Our policy so far won us friends in almost every country of the world. There are only three countries which have not said anything positively in our favour; otherwise, every country of the world has said, directly or indirectly, things which have been laudatory of our policy. That is what has happened so far. If we now turn our back upon negotiations, I think we will stultify ourselves. We will be doing something which will be absolutely contrary to the policy we have pursued all these years.

What the Chinese are going to do is not my concern. What interpretations they are going to put is not my concern. But my concern is only

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this, that we should see that we shall not be found wanting so far as the will to fight is concerned, and we shall not be found wanting if there is any opportunity for us to negotiate. This is the dual policy we have adopted. But this dual policy is governed and dominated by one thing, the desire for victory.

I feel there is one thing that needs clarification at the hands of the Prime Minister when he replies to the debate. We should be told very precisely and exactly how many square miles of land will be involved in this kind of thing, which will be in dispute by this time, if we accept the Colombo proposals. Of course, while accepting the Colombo proposals, we do not mean that we shall give away that land to the Chinese. But we should be told about it because otherwise the impression may get abroad that in these negotiations we are not feeling any concern about a large tract of land. This clarification in terms of square miles involved shall have to be given.

I believe the Colombo proposals deserve hearty attention at our hands. As the Prime Minister has said, we accept them in principle. I think these should be made the basis of negotiations. If our negotiations do not succeed and if we do not get our way at the negotiating table, the country will fight and fight and fight to the bitter and till we get back every inch of our territory.

Shri Khadilkar (Khed): Let me at the outset express my full-throated appreciation of the efforts made by the Colombo Powers to break a certain type of deadlock that had developed on our border. It has become all the more necessary because a senior Member, Shri Anthony, while concluding his speech, cast some doubts on their motives and said that they had just tried to spell out.....

Shri Frank Anthony: Not their motives, but their inhibitions. Their motives I accept as being *bona fide*.

Shri Khadilkar: Even then, I feel that no hon. Member of this House should express a feeling of certain reservation on the part of the Colombo Powers in their efforts, as they were doing something very sincerely to find a way out of the dead-lock to bring the two Powers to the negotiating table.

In the present phase which we are entering, we must clearly understand where we stand and what we are discussing. Unfortunately, hon. Members from the Opposition have failed to grasp the significance of this move.

What have the Colombo Powers done? As I said, after their massive invasion, a situation of deadlock was created by the Chinese, because, in their so-called military triumph in a particular battle, they were trying to dictate and play a dual policy. In effect, they said: we have won this battle; even then we are ready for negotiations, if you accept our terms. First, the 24th October terms were there, and then the 7th November 1959 line was again put forward, but we remained firm and said nothing doing till the 8th September line, the *status quo ante* was restored in full and all the gains of aggression were surrendered. Why are the Chinese not prepared today to accept the Colombo proposals *in toto* with the explanations and elucidations that have been offered? If you closely analyse it, you will find that they really meet the demand that we have made more than in substance. The substance of the proposals is that the Chinese will have to surrender all the gains of aggression. I am not going into details because several hon. Members have gone into them, but so far as the Ladakh area is concerned, they will go back and there will be civil posts of both India and China. I would like to ask the hon. Members who say that if we accept the Colombo

proposals it is dishonourable, it is capitulation, it is not consistent with the dignity and honour of this country, what we are accepting. We continue to say what we said before that if the Chinese are prepared to go back to the 8th September line, we are ready for negotiation. That was stated again and again on the floor of the House, and at that time no Member from the Opposition raised a voice of protest saying that unless they vacated every inch of our territory, there should be no talk of negotiation.

Shri U.M. Trivedi: That was the point raised.

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad (Bhagalpur): Only 13 Members opposed it.

Shri Khadilkar: Therefore, let us understand these proposals and their significance.

Shri Anthony is a good lawyer. Even from the tactical point of view, if the Chinese have certain reservations regarding the Colombo proposals at this hour after prior talks with the Prime Minister of Ceylon, when she came here, she came with their assurance and I think she gave all the explanations with the full knowledge that the Chinese will endorse whatever they said here, even then the Chinese today are not prepared to accept *in toto* the proposals and the explanations. Is it not to our advantage to stand unitedly behind the proposals of the Colombo powers because in my opinion they have come forward to restore certain sense of solidarity which was destroyed by the unilateral military action taken by China. The Chinese say time and again that China stands for Asian-African solidarity. If they back out, as they seem to have backed out, their professions will never be trusted in the Afro-Asian world.

Let us understand this point clearly. We are at the moment at the turning point in history. Many Members of

the Opposition have not grasped the full significance of the unfolding of the history at the present juncture. With their limited understanding of the world movement they try to attack the present formula of the Colombo powers. What is happening? Soviet Union and America are trying to come to some sort of an understanding as they feel that with the modern technological development the time has come when the grave issues between the two giants of the world should be settled by peaceful methods only. The new vista or horizon is opening up. At the Belgrade Conference our Prime Minister had forcefully advocated that the main issue before mankind is not anti-imperialist attitude but peace or war. There was a certain misunderstanding and even risk in that attitude: the Afro-Asian countries gathered at Belgrade felt that our Prime Minister's approach was not proper and there was some misunderstanding. But the Prime Minister stuck to that position to the last. Now, the West are coming round to the negotiating table and try to solve the problems not by military might but by other peaceful methods. This is a good augury. When these proposals are before us we just cannot ignore them.

If you listen to the Peking radio. . . .

Mr. Speaker: I have never listened to Peking radio. Why should I be accused of that?

Shri Khadilkar: I occasionally do in order to understand their mind.

Mr. Speaker: He is addressing the Chair; he should be careful.

17 hrs.

Shri Khadilkar: I am sorry for my slip. I was saying that their main propaganda barrage is directed against one person. They want to destroy the image of Nehru. What for? All the time, in season and out of season, in the Afro-Asian world they want to show that the Chinese were prepared

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for negotiations. This border dispute has been kept pending by certain reactionary forces germinating in India, and they are shaping the policies, though Mr. Nehru may talk of peace and peaceful settlement! Why is China doing this? Because they are trying to build up a third force, giving a challenge to the western development as well as to the other Afro-Asian countries, those who are not their satellites, who are not prepared to accept Chinese hegemony in this part of the world, because they feel as Mao has said. I will not give a lengthy quotation. In one of the theoretical articles written by the Chinese author, it has been said, "There can be no exception to this rule. It is impossible to sit on the fence. There is no third group. Neutrality is merely a camouflage. A third group does not exist." I am not quoting the prior portion. So, she has taken up a position just like Dulles used to take. He is not prepared to believe that all the Asiatic and African nations settle down after their newly-achieved freedom and chalk out their own course of evolution. China wants to divide them and polarise the world if possible and give a challenge both ways, indirectly to the western development and directly through India to the Afro-Asian nations.

There is one more aspect which I would like to place before the House, because these proposals should be debated in a wider context. In the west, just after the Napoleonic war, the old system gave way and a new approximation was reached. Nationalism or republicanism, to a large extent, triumphed. Thrones were vacated. They were not destroyed like Napoleon did before. A new approximation is developing in the west. There are two systems—hostile and antagonistic. There is the socialist system and there is the capitalist system. They have come to realise in the modern development of the world that they would have to co-exist with mutual understanding.

On this side of the Pacific, the Chinese are challenging the very basis of this modern development on the frontier of ours. Therefore, when I say this, I say this with full consciousness. In this struggle some people feel that China is not an aggressor.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member's time is up.

Shri Khadilkar: I would request for more time.

Mr. Speaker: If the Congress Members insist that they must have as much time as the Opposition Members have, it becomes very difficult. There is a very large number of Congressmen.

Shri Khadilkar: I have spoken only for ten minutes.

Mr. Speaker: 15 minutes. When did he begin?

Shri Khadilkar: I do not want to quarrel.

Mr. Speaker: Then he ought not to have mentioned like that.

Shri Khadilkar: I do not want to dispute.

Mr. Speaker: He began at 4.50. So, how could he say that he had only ten minutes so far?

Shri Khadilkar: I do not want to challenge. I resume my seat.

Mr. Speaker: If he wants to finish in another two minutes he may speak.

Shri Khadilkar: If you like, I will finish now. I was just saying that we should accept these proposals, because it is to our advantage. There is no question of surrender involved. Moreover, what I feel, as the proposals have come before the House, is this: this is the only way to break the present deadlock. Three sets of opinions are expressed. Some people

feel that if we do not go to the negotiation table, the present deadlock will be continued and that will keep a certain amount of war hysteria in this country. Men like Rajaji have written in their organ that this acceptance of the proposals is a capitulation and therefore, Rajaji has advocated that you must go and attach yourself with the western camp, though the spokesmen of the Swatantra Party have not understood that logic very clearly.

A third, rather surreptitious and romantic way, as I call it, out of the present situation is propounded by some people, saying that unless we wipe out our humiliation, shed the blood of an equal number plus one of the Chinese soldiers on the crest of the Himalayas, there should not be any talk of negotiations. I cannot understand this wild language.

Let this House consider it dispassionately whether it is to the advantage of this country, to our known path, which we have pursued, the path of peace. As far as possible, we are not relying on military means to settle disputes. But as I quoted from *Mahabharata* earlier, अलम शमन तथा युद्ध-य, if we reach the dead end so far as peaceful methods are concerned, we shall certainly take arms. We have not renounced arms. But we will adhere to the basic principles of our policy of non-alignment and not get involved militarily with any of these powers. The Chinese challenge is not only to India, but to the world forces of peace, because China is trying to emerge as a third world power, relying on its military might. We stand firm with full confidence in the Afro-Asian nations, particularly the nations who have gathered at Colombo, who came to build a bridge of understanding between India and China and restore the former spirit of Bandung, which was disturbed by Chinese military action. We must give that assurance to the Colombo powers that every Member of this House would stand by the proposal. There is

nothing dishonourable in it. It is only a way out of the present deadlock, to take the two parties to a negotiating table. I know those who go for negotiations will never forget what happened at Panmunjom. I do not want to quote Charles Turner Joy's reminiscences, who was conducting negotiations there. Ultimately, he had to give up that task, because it was very difficult to negotiate with the Chinese.

अध्यक्ष महोदय : श्री आर० एस० पाण्डेय ।

श्रीमती सहोदरा बाई राय (दमोह): अध्यक्ष महोदय, महिलाओं को भी चांस मिलना चाहिये ।

श्री रा० शि० पाण्डेय : अध्यक्ष महोदय, जहाँ तक इन कोलम्बो प्रस्तावों का सम्बन्ध है, मैं निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि चाइना वार जब से हुई है, तब से लेकर आज तक का इतिहास हमारे सामने है। उस इतिहास की पृष्ठभूमि को अगर हम देखें तो अनुभव होता है कि प्रजातंत्र की रक्षा की दृष्टि से वेस्टर्न पावर्ज ने यह कहा है कि किसी भी कम्युनिस्ट देश से अगर इस तरह का आक्रमण होता है तो हम स्पार्टेनियसली आपकी सहायता के लिए जाएंगे और वे आए। सारा देश इस बात को जानता है कि हमें सहायता का आश्वासन मिला और आर्मी के लिए स्ट्रेटिजिक वैंपज की सहायता हमें दी गई। इतिहास यह भी बताता है कि हमारे अफ्रीका और एशिया के पड़ोसी राष्ट्रों ने भी इस बात को गवारा नहीं किया कि हमारे इस देश के प्रजातंत्र पर किसी भी प्रकार का आक्रमण हो। उन्होंने इस सारी हकीकत को समझा और समझने के बाद वे स्पार्टेनियसली, अपनी ही तरफ से, खुद ही इनिशियेटिव लेकर इकट्ठा हुए और कहा कि यह बात गलत है कि एशिया की भी

[श्री रा० शि० पाण्डेय]

पर, हिमालय की पर्वतमालाओं पर, सीमा की रेखाओं पर रक्त बहे। उन्होंने यह बात पसन्द नहीं की। उनकी इस भावना की हम कद्र करते हैं, जैसे कि पश्चिमी राष्ट्र हमारी सहायता के लिये आये, हमने उनका स्वागत किया, उसी प्रकार एशिया और अफ्रीका के यह देश थे जिन्होंने इस तथ्य को समझा और टोटैलिटेरियन रिजिम को आगे बढ़ने से रोकने में मदद की और उनसे यह कहा कि तुम्हारा यह काम गलत है।

जहाँ तक ऐग्रेशन की बात है, उन्होंने अपने प्रस्ताव में यह बात कही हो या न कही हो, लेकिन मैं अपने एक साथी सदस्य की इस बात से सहमत हूँ कि आखिर उन्होंने हमसे तो कुछ नहीं कहा, हमारे राष्ट्र से कुछ नहीं कहा कि हम एक इंच इधर हटें। उन्होंने चाइना से कहा कि उसको पीछे हटना चाहिये। हालाँकि उन्होंने उससे प्रेसाइजली ८ सितम्बर की बात नहीं कही, लेकिन एक रास्ता निकाला जहाँ तक कि उसको पार्टिकुलर मोटर तक पीछे हटना चाहिये और कहा कि वहाँ पर ज्वायेंट प्रोटेशन के लिये हमारी ज्वायेंट चेक पोस्ट होगी। हाउस इस बात से सहमत हो या न हो लेकिन कोलम्बो प्रपोजल के अन्तर्गत दो प्रश्न थे। एक तो वह जिस का सम्बन्ध राजनीति से था, अर्थात् यह कि एशिया में जो दो महान् राष्ट्र हैं वे आपस में न लड़ें। मैं समझता हूँ कि उनकी इसके लिये प्रशंसा करनी चाहिये। जहाँ तक नेफा का सम्बन्ध है वहाँ पर जो हमने ८ सितम्बर की बात कही थी उसके लिये उन्होंने कहा कि चाइना ८ सितम्बर के स्थान तक पीछे हटे। सिर्फ डोला और लोंगू इन दो स्थानों का झगड़ा है। इस सम्बन्ध में कोलम्बो प्रस्ताव में यह कहा गया कि हम

लोग बैठ कर बात करें। जहाँ तक लद्दाख का प्रश्न है, मैं समझता हूँ कि जहाँ कहीं भी गत्यावरोध पैदा होगा वहाँ उससे नई रोशनी मिलेगी। हम उससे सहमत हों या नहीं, इसी बात के लिये यह प्रस्ताव चाहता है कि पार्लियामेंट इसको समझे और समझने के बाद एक निर्देश दे कि आखिर यह स्थिति आ चुकी है या नहीं कि हम बैठ कर बात करें। जहाँ तक डम बात का प्रश्न है बहुत स्पष्ट शब्दों में प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने कहा है कि वे इस सम्बन्ध में बात करने को तैयार नहीं हैं जब तक कि सिद्धान्ततः चाइना इस बात को स्वीकार नहीं करता है कि वह ८ सितम्बर की लाइन तक पीछे जायेगा। जहाँ तक हमारे सिद्धान्तों का सवाल है, जहाँ तक हमारी मर्यादा का प्रश्न है, जहाँ तक इस निर्णय का प्रश्न है जो कि पार्लियामेंट ने किया, हम उसके पीछे नहीं जाना चाहते। हम सिर्फ एक बात यहाँ पर देखना चाहते हैं कि जो कोलम्बो प्रस्ताव हमारे सामने है क्या वह ऐसी स्थिति पैदा करता है कि हम बैठ कर चीन से बात करें या न करें। केवल यह निर्देश यह प्रस्ताव चाहता है। और इस बात को न केवल एक बार बल्कि जैसा हमारे कुछ साथी सदस्यों ने कहा, कई बार इस सदन में कहा गया है कि अगर ८ सितम्बर की लाइन के पीछे चीन हट जाता है तो फिर हमारा जो झगड़ा हुआ है तो उसको आपस में मिल कर तय कर सकते हैं।

जहाँ तक अपोजीशन का सम्बन्ध है, मैं निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि डिमाक्रैटिक सेट-अप में अपोजीशन का उतना ही इम्पोर्टेंट रोल होता है जितना कि रूलिंग पार्टी का। हर कंट्री में, खास कर जहाँ तक ब्रिटेन का सम्बन्ध है, अपोजीशन हमेशा एक अल्टर्नेटिव प्रपोजल ले कर आता है और गाइड करता है

कि इस तरह से किया जाय, कहता है कि एक यह अल्टर्नेटिव है दूसरा यह अल्टर्नेटिव है। जहाँ तक हम अपने यहाँ के अपोजीशन के रोल को देखते हैं, अगर आप गौर कीजिये, तो वह यही कहता रहा है कि हमारे पास जूता नहीं था, बन्दूक नहीं थी, रंगा साहब कहते हैं कि श्री नाट श्री बुलेट पावरफुल नहीं थी। हर एक आदमी एकस्पर्ट ओपोजीशन ले कर आता है। जहाँ पर सिद्धान्त की बात होती है वहाँ वह यह प्रोफेसी ले कर आते हैं कि हम ने तो पहले ही यह कह दिया था कि पंडित जी जरूर ही समझोता कर लेंगे। इस सदन में भी यह कहा जाता है और इस सदन से बाहर भी। इस सदन में खड़े हो कर सब ने प्रस्ताव पास किया था और यह अपोजीशन भी उस में शामिल था। लेकिन मुझे मालूम है कि खास तौर से स्वतन्त्र पार्टी और जन संघ की पूरी कैम्पेन चल रही है सारे देश में और उन्होंने हर एक मंच से यह कहा कि हम ने तो पहले ही कह दिया था, सन् १९५०, १९५१ और १९५२ में ही कह दिया था कि चीन का आक्रमण होगा। कहीं कहीं तो महर्षि भरविन्द को भी कोट किया जाता है कि महर्षि भरविन्द ने मरने के पहले कहा था कि चीन हम पर हमला करेगा। ऐसी स्वर्गीय आत्माओं का नाम ले कर वे लोग कहते हैं जिन से जा कर हम पूछ भी नहीं सकते हैं। प्रश्न है अपोजीशन का। मैं आप से कहता हूँ कि एक वह दिन आना चाहिये जिस दिन विरोधी दल कुछ दायित्व समझे और देश के अन्दर एलेक्शन, बोटस, सेंटिमेन्ट्स और भोले भाले लोगों को भड़काने की प्रवृत्ति से दूर हो कर एक सालिड और कांक्रिट अपोजीशन का जो रोल होता है अल्टर्नेटिव देने का, उस को दे कि "श्रीमान् प्रधान मंत्री जी आप जो कर रहे हैं उस से हमारा मतभेद है, आप को यह करना चाहिये"। किसी भी विरोधी दल के सदस्य ने यह नहीं कहा कि आप की इस बात से हम यहाँ तक सहमत हैं और यहाँ तक नहीं सहमत हैं। यह हमारी गाय है और यह आप को करना चाहिये। लेकिन

महाँ तो यह है कि हर चीज प्रधान मंत्री की गलत, हर चीज ट्रेजरी बेंचेज की गलत, रूलिंग पार्टी की हर चीज गलत, वार की बात वह करती है तो गलत, शांति की बात करती है तो गलत, फीज की बात करती है तो गलत। हमारे कृपालानी साहब ने इमी प्लोर पर हमारे बजट को क्रिटिसाइज किया था कि यह गरीब देश है, भूखा देश है और गोला बारूद में इतना पैसा खर्च होता है, लेकिन अब कृपालानी साहब क्या कहते हैं ?

Shri S. M. Banerjee (Kanpur): He is not here in the House.

श्री रा० शि० पाण्डेय : जिम समय वह थे उस वक्त की बात कह रहा हूँ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : उन का नाम आप न लें। यह कहिये कि प्रजा सोशलिस्ट पार्टी के लीडर ने यह कहा था और आज प्रजा सोशलिस्ट पार्टी यह कह रही है।

Shri Thirumala Rao (Kakinada): Only today morning Shri Gopalan quoted Shri Jai Prakash Narayan and Acharya Vinoba. Bhava in support of his argument. No exception was taken to that.

Mr. Speaker: There is difference between the two.

An hon. Member: Quotation.

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह मुझे भी मालूम है। There was a difference. I was very carefully listening to Shri Gopalan. He quoted them because he wanted their support for his arguments. So, he said he was also of the opinion held by them. He did not say: "this is my opinion but others hold a different opinion". So, in this case, I would request him not to criticise one particular individual who is not among us. He might say that a leader of the Praja Socialist party held one view earlier and how they hold a different view.

Shri S. M. Banerjee: But he is not the leader of the Praja Socialist Party.

श्री रा० शि० पाण्डेय : मैं आप से निवेदन कर रहा था कि मैं आप की आज्ञा शिरोधार्य करता हूँ, और मैं नाम नहीं लूँगा। अगर नाम लेना भी पड़ा तो लीडर आफ दि पार्टी कहूँगा।

जहाँ तक विरोधी दल का प्रश्न है, एक विरोधी दल के सदस्य ने कहा कि सारा देश एक आदमी के रूप में प्रधान मंत्री के पीछे खड़ा हो गया। मैं आप से कहता हूँ कि अगर प्रधान मंत्री के पीछे सारा देश खड़ा हो गया तो प्रधान मंत्री भी तो कोई चीज हैं। प्रधान मंत्री पर जो विश्वास है, जो आस्था है, जो उम के प्रति राष्ट्रीय भावना होने का दायित्व है, उम के कारण ही सारा देश उन के पीछे खड़ा हो गया। सारा देश किसी विरोधी तत्व के पीछे नहीं खड़ा हुआ। वह कहते हैं कि पंडित जी के पीछे थे। मैं आप से पूछना चाहता हूँ कि अगर पंडित जी के पीछे न खड़े होते तो क्या होता? कम्यूनिस्ट पार्टी ने एग्जेशन का वर्ड इस्तेमाल नहीं किया यह नहीं कहा कि: China has committed aggression और सारे देश के लोग उस के पीछे पड़ गये। उन्होंने कहा: You have to tell categorically that "China has committed aggression" और जब उन्होंने रेजोल्यूशन पास किया और कहा कि चाइना ने एग्रेशन कमिट किया है, तब उन्होंने समझा कि हाँ, कम्यूनिस्ट पार्टी में भी कुछ लोग हो सकते हैं जो पैट्रियाटिक हैं। जिन्होंने ऐसा नहीं कहा उन का क्या हाल हुआ यह आप को मालूम है। अगर हमारे विरोधी जनता के सामने जा कर कहते कि हम पंडित जी के साथ नहीं हैं तो उन को पता चल जाता कि पंडित जी के साथ न होने से क्या बात होती है। मैं आप से कहता हूँ कि यह बात स्पष्ट है कि अगर सारा देश खड़ा हो गया तो उन की टीचिंग्स, उन के इन्स्पिरेशन, उन की प्रेरणा, उन की राष्ट्रीयता, उन के आदर्श,

उनके व्याख्यानों से नहीं खड़ा हुआ। ६०, ७० वर्षों का इतिहास है कांग्रेस का। उस में ५० वर्षों का ज्वलन्त नेतृत्व है पंडित जी का। इस देश के लोगों का विश्वास है कि पंडित जी के हाथों में हमारी रक्षा, देश की रक्षा, देश की सीमाओं की रक्षा सुरक्षित है, और अगर कभी लड़ना भी पड़ा तो हम अपने देश की रक्षा कर सकेंगे। आज यह आस्था और विश्वास है और इसी विश्वास, इसी प्रेरणा, इसी भावना, इसी आस्था तथा निष्ठा के कारण सारा देश एक हो कर खड़ा हो गया।

जहाँ तक कोलम्बो प्रस्तावों की बात है, मैं आप से कहता हूँ कि यह देश लड़ सकता है। पिछले दो महीनों का इस देश का इतिहास जितनी ज्वलन्त शांति का रहा है उतनी ही ज्वलन्त क्रांति का भी रहा है। पंडित जी के सम्बन्ध में एक अमरीकी के मुँह से कही गई बात सुन कर मैं बहुत प्रसन्न हुआ। उस ने कहा कि हमारे देश में इस आक्रमण के बाद प्राइम मिनिस्टर पर जो रिऐक्शन हुआ है वह यह कि हम लड़ेंगे, लड़ेंगे और लड़ेंगे, जब तक एक एक इंच भूमि चीन खाली कर के नहीं जायेगा तब तक लड़ेंगे, और उन्होंने ८ सितम्बर की बात भी दोहराई है कि हम तब तक नेगोशिएशन नहीं करेंगे जब तक चीन ८ सितम्बर की लाइन तक पीछे नहीं चला जाता। यह बात पंडित जी ने कही। इस में कहीं कोई कनफ्यूजन या भ्रम नहीं है। हमारा स्टैंड स्पष्ट है कि हम देश की रक्षा करेंगे, जरूरत होगी गोली चलाने की तो गोली भी चलायेंगे, और जरूरत होगी हथियार चलाने की तो हथियार भी चलायेंगे। लेकिन हम ने संसार के सामने एक उदाहरण रखा है, नान एलाइनमेंट का हमारा सिद्धान्त है, शान्ति का हमारा सिद्धान्त है और अगर आवश्यकता होगी तो हम बैठ कर बात भी करेंगे। लेकिन बात तभी करेंगे जब कि चीन ८ सितम्बर की लाइन तक हट जायेगा और

हम को कोलम्बो प्रस्ताव से क्लियर सिग्नल मिलेगा कि अब अबसर आ गया है, बात करो। अबसर होगा तो हम लड़ेंगे भी और आवश्यकता होगी तो हम बात भी करेंगे।

Mr. Speaker: Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir. Absent. Shri Venkatasubbiah. Absent. Shri Shiv Charan Gupta. Absent. Shri Sham Lal Saraf. Absent. Shri Vidya Charan Shukla. Absent. Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad.

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad: Mr. Speaker, Sir, this is one more occasion for the representatives of the nation to take a vow to drive out the Chinese aggressor which we have done on so many occasions in the past.

Mr. Speaker: We had decided that we shall sit late, if required. Today we will sit upto half past six.

Some Hon. Members: Only upto Six O'clock.

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad: This is one more occasion for this supreme body of the nation to demonstrate its strong will to defend the honour and integrity of the nation. This is one more occasion for us to thank our countrymen for the united stand that they have taken in this grim hour of the nation. We stand by the oath that we have taken in this House. We enjoined upon the Government to make all defence preparations which are necessary to snatch back our land from the Chinese aggressor. We have to see that this spontaneous will of the nation that was expressed with determination, courage and sacrifice is not allowed to slacken.

It is a long-drawn-out battle and therefore there are likely to be many phases of this battle. Our friends in the Opposition have asked why we enter into negotiations and why we do not go on fighting. They do not understand what fighting is. Possibly, they are not military experts. Therefore they quote wrong parallels. A fight is not carried on only by guns and ammunition but it also consists of

in such long-drawn-out battles, sometimes of negotiations and sometimes of going to the front and at other times to have other tactics also. Therefore I take this Colombo proposal or this initiative for negotiations as one phase of that long-drawn-out battle which we envisage in order to fight back the Chinese aggression.

We have been pained to hear the speeches of some of the hon. friends in the Opposition. We have also been enlightened to hear the speech of Shri Yajnik who has given his full support to the Colombo proposals as commended by our Prime Minister. But there were speeches from hon. Members, like, Professor Ranga and Shri Anthony, the nominated Member of this House with no electorate behind him, who said that the country says this. I have also moved in the country during the last 40 days. I reminded my constituency of the election campaign. I moved for 31 days from village to village only to find out what they tell me and to say that in this House. I must say that the country said that it is left to the Government and to the hon. Prime Minister to change his tactics and method as to how to fight back the aggression. Therefore, I think, the country is represented not by my hon. friend, Shri Anthony, or Shri Ranga, who is as mobile as the Chinese frontier claim in his views as we have seen in the past.....

Mr. Speaker: Order, order. That should not be said in these terms.

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad: He has spoken very badly. One of the hon. Members said that the hon. Prime Minister was like Chamberlain. I think, you should hold him also in check.

Mr. Speaker: He might say anything about his views.

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad: I am speaking about his views and am saying that his views are as mobile as the Chinese frontier claim.

Proposals

Mr. Speaker: No.

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad: Anyway, I am reminded of a couplet by Shakespeare, namely,—

“There is a tale told by an idiot
Full of sound and fury signifying
nothing.”

I will, therefore, say that those hon. friends who compare the hon. Prime Minister to Chamberlain do not know history. They do not know what happened during the Gallipoli campaign when Churchill was sent into oblivion by Lloyd George. They do not know Woodrow Wilson who was a messenger of peace but who fought a war. They do not know Franklin Roosevelt who would have been famous for his economics but who also fought a war. Similarly, on this occasion also, when the friends from the Jan Sangh, representing a party in this country which does not, I suppose, believe in the righteousness of democracy in this country, quoted that parallel, I felt that they were setting a very bad precedent in the democracy of this country.

When we speak of the Colombo proposals, I would say that we speak of a certain faith in our battle; there is nobody who is against it; all of us are unanimously agreed that our purpose, and sole purpose, is to fight back the Chinese aggression. Therefore, in regard to the Colombo proposals, my hon. friend should have a little patience. (*Interruptions*). I would request my hon. friends not to disturb me; otherwise, if I wanted I could have disturbed my hon. friends much more than they are disturbing me just now. I would submit that if only they had the patience to hear, they would have found that the Colombo proposals are not proposals to settle the border dispute, but as our leader Shri U. N. Dhebar has said, it is just a way out, to bring back the two nations to negotiate at the table. To negotiate what? My Government will go to the table to negotiate for the vacation of the Chinese aggres-

sion. That is all that we have to do. I think that those friends who are afraid of going in for negotiations are weak, and they are chicken-hearted. They do not know what position India will take at the negotiating table at the present moment. That position will be this. It is true that India has suffered defeat in the early stages, as any country which is wedded to democracy and not shouting for peace while actually preparing for war can have these kinds of setbacks. It is just like an aggressor having the initial advantage that he may have gained. But, today we feel that we have been able to isolate this country, these Chinese bandits from the whole world opinion. We have won a war in the diplomatic field. Therefore, barring the three great countries like Albania etc., the entire world is with us. Therefore, I would enjoin on my Government. I would ask my Government to have advantage of the diplomatic victory, and I would ask my Government to take advantage of the diplomatic defeat and the economic infirmity of the Chinese which they are having at the present hour, and due to which they were forced to declare their unilateral withdrawal.

Coming back to the Colombo proposals, what are those proposals? Let us see how by accepting them we are going to compromise our honour and dignity. I could not find any reply from my hon. friends on this point except the statement that it will compromise the dignity and honour of this country. You can go on shouting, as Hitler who said ‘If you repeat a lie a hundred times, it will become truth’.

Some of my hon. friends in the Opposition believe in the Hitlerian dictum that if you go on repeating a word, it will become truth. What is it that they have been saying from this morning? They have not quoted any instance, and they could not prove by any logic how our dignity and honour will be compromised if we accept to negotiate on the basis of the

Colombo proposals. They only repeated this dictum. Sometime before I had consultations with them in the Lobby, and there also they only went on saying this. I would submit, Sir, that this country and its people are wide awake. Some of my hon. friends have talked so unanimously in support of the war efforts. But I have seen them in the different States and in the different districts. After uttering just two sentences in all the meetings that we had called for to promote the war effort, to mobilise opinion, and to mobilise men, material and munition, they used to talk as if Government was committing some crime. I find that they are resorting to the same tactics here also, when they say that we shall be compromising our dignity and honour by accepting these proposals. How are we compromising? It was in this very House and also outside that the Prime Minister had said that we shall not negotiate with the aggressor unless he reverts back to the 8th September line.

My hon. friends challenge that we have not committed ourselves to this. They forget that in parliamentary democracy, committal does not always necessarily mean a formal resolution passed by the House. Many Government statements are made here, and when no adverse comment comes on them, that means that those statements are accepted.

Apart from that, as Shri A. P. Jain and some others also have pointed out already, an amendment had been moved by the great and enthusiastic socialist friend Shri Ram Sewak Yadav saying that Government should not negotiate even if the Chinese reverted back to the 8th September line. But that amendment had been rejected by the House. So, all those friends who are shouting here that we had not committed ourselves did commit themselves by negating that amendment. Therefore, this House is equally committed. I put the question the other way. This is a debate we are

having here. There is no formal resolution being adopted. I would like to know whether our friends would support this thesis that if all the Members or most of them speak against the Colombo proposals, the Government should say 'yes', because there will be no formal resolution. Do they mean to say that if the majority of Members speak against the proposals, the Government should take that into consideration?

Therefore, I would say it was the commitment of the Government, of this Parliament, of this nation, because this is a nation believing in peace and prosperity. It will be a bad thing for us in this grim hour to give up those very basic principles and that very basic policy for which this country, specially its Prime Minister, is rated so high in the world. We have always advocated that we want peaceful means, but certainly we do not compromise our dignity and honour. In this case, we are not compromising our dignity and honour.

The Colombo proposals only suggest a way out. They cover substantially our demand. Some friends told me in the Lobby that they were initiated by the Chinese. I do not know. They may be having better information. Others say these are American proposals. I do not know about it. I have no knowledge of these things. They may have better knowledge as they may be going very regularly to these Embassies. But I bank upon my party's opinion, my country's opinion and the opinion of my Government and that of the Prime Minister. Therefore, I would say that by and large, the Colombo proposals very substantially meet our point, as stated by the Prime Minister. Therefore, I would not ask my Government to take up a negative attitude before the court of world opinion. I say not to negotiate is the law of the jungle, not to negotiate is uncivilised, not to negotiate is nothing but showing one's weakness.

[Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad]

Therefore, I regard the Colombo proposals as forming a very strong basis which substantially cover our own stand in regard to the 8th September line. Hence I would enjoin upon our Government to accept them. If the Chinese do not accept these proposals, it will once more show to the world the intransigence and purposeless attitude of the Chinese expansionists. Therefore, it will be fruitful and worthwhile and in accord with our dignity and honour for us to accept the proposals, to speak a good word for these Colombo Powers who have tried their best and found out a basis on which we can go to the table, and for what? To convince the Chinese that they are expansionist, they have committed aggression and they should vacate it. Failing that, the other way is always open to us, namely, the military method. I am sure the preparations that are being made in this country since the last many months will continue to be made so that if the Chinese do not see reason, we will be able to hurl them back beyond our frontiers.

Mr. Speaker: Is any representative of the Muslim League or Republican Party present? ... No. As regards the Hindu Mahasabha, the name of Shri Bishanchander Seth is with me in the list. As regards the DMK, there is no one present. I call upon Shri K. Pattanayak. After that, I will call Shri Brajeshwar Prasad.

Shrimati Lakshikanthamma (Khammam): In the last six hours of debate, we have got only ten minutes.

Shri S. M. Banerjee: We are discussing the proportion of time for women.

श्री किशन पटनायक : अध्यक्ष महोदय, पहले मैं एक चीज साफ़ कर देना चाहता हूँ कि यह मिनटम्बर ८ लाइन के बारे में इस हाउस में एक दलील दी जा रही है और वह

यह है कि श्री रामसेवक यादव का जो प्रस्ताव था वह इस हाउस में गिर गया था इसीलिए यह सदन ८ सितम्बर की लाइन को मानता है, यह एक तर्क दिया जा रहा है। लेकिन यह एक असत्यपूर्ण तर्क है क्योंकि श्री रामसेवक यादव ने जो प्रस्ताव किया था उस में सिर्फ़ यह नहीं था कि ८ सितम्बर को ख़त्म किया जाय बल्कि उस में कुछ और चीज़ें भी थीं जैसे कि १५ अगस्त १९४७ को माना जाय। इसलिए जो अग्रेडमेंट गिरा वह पूरा अग्रेडमेंट गिरा था और जब १५ अगस्त १९४७ की जो बात थी वह गिर गयी सदन में लेकिन उस का मतलब यह कभी नहीं निकल सकता है, किमी तर्क के अनुसार नहीं निकल सकता है कि ८ सितम्बर की लाइन को इस सदन ने मान लिया है। ऐसा असत्यपूर्ण तर्क इस हाउस के डिमीशंस के बारे में कम से कम इस सदन में नहीं दिया जाना चाहिए।

इस के साथ ही साथ मैं फिर दुहराता हूँ कि प्रधान मंत्री नेहरू जी ने आज जैसा भाषण दिया वह बिल्कुल आश्चर्यपूर्ण था और इस सदन को * * वाला था . . .

श्री शिवनागयण (वांसी) अध्यक्ष महोदय, श्री ए. प्वागंट और श्री आंडर । “* * वाला” यह शब्द इस्तेमाल करना बहुत ज्यादानी है और माननीय सदस्य को अपने इन शब्दों को वापिस ले लेना चाहिए ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह अच्छे शब्द नहीं हैं जोकि इस तरह से इस्तेमाल किये जायें । प्राइम मिनिस्टर हो या कोई भी मेम्बर हो उसकी बाबत यह कहना कि वह * * रहा है, ठीक नहीं है और ऐसे शब्द डिबेट में नहीं आने चाहिए । यह शब्द अनपार्लियामेंटरी हैं ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : यह शब्द अन-पार्लियामेंटरी तो नहीं हैं ?

देश के एक, एक मंद, एक,
एक औरत और एक, एक बच्चे
की राय है।”

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैंने कहा है कि वे शब्द अनपार्लियामेंटरी हैं। किसी की नीयत पर शक करना और प्राइम मिनिस्टर या इवाह किसी भी मेम्बर के लिए यह कहना कि वह जान बूझ कर * * है ठीक नहीं है। माननीय सदस्य अपने इन शब्दों को विदड़ा कर लें।

श्री किशन पटनायक : यह सदन के प्रति न्यायपूर्ण नहीं था

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह दूसरी बात है लेकिन यह “ * * वाला” शब्द आप विदड़ा करते है या नहीं ?

श्री किशन पटनायक : जी हां, मैं उनको विदड़ा करता हूँ।

तारीख १४ नवम्बर को जो शपथ इस सदन में हम लोगों ने ली थी और जिस शपथ को लेने के समय आपने भी कहा था कि सब लोग खड़े हो जायें उसको जब इस सदन में कोट किया जाता है तो खाली आधा ही कोट किया जाता है जैसे कि आखिरी वह हिस्सा है कि दम नहीं लेंगे, लेकिन उसके साथ साथ आगे और एक वाक्य का हिस्सा है, जैसे कि संघर्ष कितना भी लम्बा और कठिन हो छोड़ दिया जाता है। और इस संघर्ष का क्या अर्थ है वह तो ६ दिन के बाद जब कि बोमडोला का पतन हुआ तब प्राइम मिनिस्टर ने साफ किया। उन दिनों प्रधान मंत्री जी ने इन शब्दों में कहा है :—

“अभी मैं आप लोगों को क्या आश्वासन दूँ सिवाय इसके कि चाहे कुछ भी हो, जंग जारी रहेगी जब तक कि हम लोग बिल्कुल जीत नहीं जाते हैं और फिर उसके साथ जोड़ कर उन्होंने यह कहा कि यह सिर्फ मेरी राय नहीं है, यह सिर्फ इस सदन के बहुमत की राय नहीं है बल्कि इस सदन के एक एक मेम्बर की राय है। यह

ऐसे जोरदार ढंग से जिन बातों को प्रधान मंत्री जी ने कहा था क्या उनको वे इतनी जल्दी भूल गये ? अभी इसका आप किस तरीके से यह अर्थ निकालेंगे कि जंग जारी है और यह जो कोलम्बो प्रोजेक्ट पर निगो-शिपिंग होगी वह भी क्या जंग ही होगी ? शायद चिट्ठी पत्र लिखने और निगोशिपिंग करने को भी हमारे प्रधान मंत्री जी जंग ही मानते है क्योंकि तभी जाकर यह ठीक होगा कि प्रधान मंत्री जी ने जो कहा था वही किया अगर यह सही नहीं है तो फिर प्रधान मंत्री, जरूर जो सदन ने कहा था और जो खुद उन्होंने कहा था, उस के खिलाफ आज कर रहे हैं। भविष्य का इतिहासकार शायद इसको किसी न किसी तरीके से एक कलंक की बात कह कर लिखेगा। वह शायद यह भी कहेगा कि प्रधान मंत्री कुछ ऐसे अकर्मण्य लोग थे, ऐसे जराग्रस्त हो गये थे कि उनको ऐसा करना पड़ा। क्योंकि यह बात नहीं कि जराग्रस्त आदमियों में उत्तेजना नहीं होती है, लेकिन अगर उनमें उत्तेजना होती भी है, तो वह उतनी जल्दी ठंडी पड़ जाती है। जैसे २० नवम्बर को तो यह बात कही और २१ नवम्बर को जब चीन ने ऐलान कर दिया कि हम सीज़फायर करेंगे, तो फिर ८ सितम्बर की लाइन पर आ गए।

८ सितम्बर की लाइन की जो बात चल रही है, या कोलम्बो प्रोजेक्ट की जो बात चल रही है, उसके पीछे अजीब अजीब तर्क दिए जा रहे हैं। हमको आज तक मालूम नहीं था कि जो काफी बूढ़े हो जाते है, वे लोग भी सपनों की दुनिया में बहुत ज्यादा विचरण करते हैं। यह बात हमको आज बहुत अच्छी तरह मालूम हो गई है।

श्री दी० चं० शर्मा : क्यों बुड्डों को निन्दा करते हो ?

श्री किशन पटनायक : कुछ माननीय सदस्यों ने कहा कि इस वक्त चीन विल्कुल आइमोनेटिड है, दुनिया में उसके साथ कार्ट नहीं है ।

एक माननीय सदस्य : अल्बानिया है ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : अल्बानिया को छोड़ कर और कोई नहीं है ? दूसरे देशों में कौन-कौन चीन के साथ है, मैं उतने बारे में नहीं जाऊंगा, लेकिन मैं इतना कह देता हूँ कि* इस देश में बहुत से लोग चीन के साथ हैं ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : किनी चीन को विल्कुल वजन किये वगैर कह देना मुनासिब नहीं है । मेम्बर माहव को चाहिए कि वह जिम्मेदारी से काम लें ।*

श्री किशन पटनायक : *

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह बात बहुत गलत है । अगर माननीय सदस्य ऐसे लपट कहेंगे, तो इसकी इजाजत नहीं दी जा सकती । मतलब तो माननीय सदस्य का कुछ होता है, लेकिन जो शब्द वह इस्तेमाल करने हैं, वे मुनासिब नहीं हैं ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : भैया मतलब यह है कि * मैंने कहा है

अध्यक्ष महोदय : माननीय सदस्य अपने शब्दों को हमेशा तौल कर और वजन करके कहा करे । वह हमेशा ऐसे शब्द कह देते हैं, जो कि बहुत ज्यादा अनुचित होते हैं ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : जो कुछ मैं ने कहा है, मैं ने तो उस का मतलब भी आप के सामने रख दिया है ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : माननीय सदस्य से हर एक बात का मतलब कौन पूछता रहेगा ? जो कुछ रिकार्ड में जायगा, लोग उस को देखेंगे या माननीय सदस्य के मतलब को देखेंगे ?

डा० मा० श्री अग्ने : माननीय सदस्य ने पहले कहा कि उन्हें ने इस सदन को धोखा दिया है और अब वही बात वह दूसरे तरीके से कह रहे हैं ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह तो उग से भी ज्यादा है कि *

श्री किशन पटनायक : मैं ने ऐसा नहीं कहा ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : माननीय सदस्य ने और क्या कहा है ? यह बात रिकार्ड से निकाल दी जायगी ! प्रस वाले भी इस बात को नोट करेंगे कि वे इस को शायी नहीं करेंगे ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : कोलम्बो पावर्ज के प्रति भी काफ़ी आभार-प्रदर्शन किया जा रहा है । लेकिन इस बात को शायद हम भूल जाते हैं कि जब जंग चली थी, जब चीन का हमला हुआ था, तब कोलम्बो पावर्ज में से कोई हम लोगों के साथ सहयोग करने के लिए, हम को फ़ौज़ी मदद देने के लिए, आया था या नहीं । इस बात को आप खुद ही गिन लें कि उन में से कितने आये थे । मैं खुद तटस्थ नीति का हिमायती हूँ, लेकिन मैं यह कहने के लिए कभी नहीं हिचकूंगा कि जब चीन का हिन्दुस्तान के ऊपर हमला हुआ, जब तक जंग चली, उस समय अगर हमारा कोई दोस्त निकला

था, तो अमरीकी गुट के देश, और ज्यादातर अमरीका ही, हिन्दुस्तान का सच्चा दोस्त बन कर आया था, कोलम्बो पावर्ज या तथाकथित तटस्थ देश नहीं आये थे। इसलिए यह कहना एक नकली तर्क है कि ये तटस्थतावादी देश हैं, ये हमारे गुट के लोग हैं और इसलिए ये हमारी भलाई चाहेंगे और ये कभी हमारी बुराई नहीं चाहेंगे।

अगर हम इस बात को मान लेते हैं, तो क्या नतीजा होगा? अभी तो कांग्रेस की तरफ से लोग यह तर्क देंगे ही कि यह एक टेम्पोरेरी चीज है, यह एक टेम्पोरेरी फ्रेज है और यह खत्म हो जायेगा और अगर खत्म नहीं हुआ, तो हम जंग छेड़ देंगे, हम लड़ेंगे। लेकिन यह बात तो हमेशा होती रही है। जब चीन ने तिब्बत पर आक्रमण किया, तो सरकार की ओर से कहा गया कि अगर हम तिब्बत में दखल देंगे, तो विश्व-युद्ध हो जायगा और इसलिए हम कंसे दखल दें। जब लद्दाख में रोड बनाई गई, तो यह कहा गया कि हम नेगोशिएशन चलायेंगे और अगर नेगोशिएशन नहीं चलायेंगे, तो युद्ध हो जायगा। जितनी बार चीन का हमला हुआ है, उतनी बार यह दलील दी गई है। लेकिन अभी तक एक बार भी अपनी तरफ से लड़ाई कर के अपनी जमीन को लौटाने के लिए कोशिश नहीं की गई है।

इस में कोई शक नहीं है कि अगर एक बार हम इन कोलम्बो प्रोपोजलज को मान लेते हैं और समझौते की टेबल पर बैठ जाते हैं, तो फिर यह चीज भी ठप्प हो जायगी और जैसे काश्मीर में हुआ, जैसे चीन के बारे में पहले हो चुका है, वैसे ही जितनी जमीन चीन के पास रह जायगी, वह उसी के पास रह जायेगी और चीन जब चाहेगा, फिर हमला कर देगा। अभी तक तो यह हुआ है कि जब चीन चाहता है, तो हमला

होता है, जब चीन चाहता है, तो जंग होती है और जब चीन चाहता है, तो शान्ति भी होती है—हमारे चाहने पर नहीं होती है।

अगर हम लोग अभी जंग नहीं करते हैं और इस तरह समझौते के टेबल पर बैठ जाते हैं, तो सारे देश का मनोविज्ञान परिवर्तित हो जायगा। सरकार इमर्जेंसी ऐक्ट को जारी रखेगी, क्योंकि कांग्रेस दल को इस से फायदा होगा। उस के बहाने वह काफी विरोध को भी दबा देगी, लेकिन देश में युद्ध का मनोवज्ञान बिल्कुल खत्म हो जायगा, युद्ध के लिए प्रस्तुति खत्म हो जायेगी और जो पुरानी फिजूलखर्ची चल रही थी, वह फिर चलने लगेगी।

लोग पूछते हैं कि विकल्प क्या है? केवल एक ही विकल्प हो सकता है और वह है जंग करना। अगर सरकार जंग करने के लिये तैयार नहीं है, जिस के लिए देश खड़ा हो गया था, जिस के लिए इस सदन ने शपथ ली थी, तो उस को अपना स्थान छोड़ देना चाहिये। यह कोई ठेकेदारी नहीं है कि वे लोग ही यह काम करेंगे। उस को कोई और कर सकते हैं। अगर उन में जंग चलाने के लिए मन, प्रस्तुति और दिमाग नहीं है, तो फिर उन को खुद ही जिम्मेदारी से हट जाना चाहिए।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : दिमाग भी नहीं है ?

श्री किशन पटनायक : जंग क्यों नहीं चलाई जा रही है और सरकार क्यों तैयार नहीं है युद्ध चलाने के लिए, उस के पीछे भी बड़ा भारी कारण है। वह कारण यह है कि अगर युद्ध चलाना पड़ेगा, अगर जंग करनी पड़ेगी, तो अभी देश में जिस किस्म का शासन चल रहा है, सरकार में जिस किस्म की गुटबन्दी, फ़ेवरिटीज और नैपा-

[श्री किशन पटनायक]

टिज़म वगैरह चल रही है, उस सब को बदलना पड़ेगा। * फिज़ूलखर्ची * को खत्म करना पड़ेगा। यह सब खत्म करने के लिये सरकार प्रस्तुत नहीं है, कांग्रेस के लोग प्रस्तुत नहीं हैं। यह है सब से बड़ा कारण, जिस से सरकार युद्ध चलाना नहीं चाहती है, क्योंकि अगर वह युद्ध चलायगी, तो रिश्ततखोरी * को थोड़ा सा बन्द करना पड़ेगा। प्रधान मंत्री नेहरू साहब * ख़ाली अपने भवन में दरी बिछाने

Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad: It is a personal remark. I strongly object to the hon. Member's behaviour. He must be asked to withdraw these remarks.

श्री मोहन स्वरूप (पीलीभीत) : उन की बात तो मुनिए।

श्री भागवत झा आजाद : इस तरह का पर्सनल रिमार्क करना कि * * बिल्कुल गलत है

(Interruptions)

अध्यक्ष महोदय : आर्डर, आर्डर।

श्री मोहन स्वरूप : माननीय सदस्य इस के ठेकेदार नहीं हैं।

श्री भागवत झा आजाद : वह भी ठेकेदार नहीं हैं। (Interruptions)

अध्यक्ष महोदय : आर्डर, आर्डर। जब इतने ठेकेदार हो गये, तो इस में मैं क्या कर सकता हूँ ? क्या माननीय सदस्य अपने आप ही हाथ-पांव से फ़ैसला कर लेंगे ?

मेम्बर साहब से मैं ने पहले कहा कि कुछ हद होनी चाहिए, जहां तक नुकता-चीनी भी हो सकती है। माननीय सदस्य ने * * ऐसे लफ़्ज़ इस्तेमाल किये हैं। क्या यह दुस्त है ? उन का मतलब जो भी हो। वह हमेशा कहते रहते हैं—उन का यह बर्डन आफ सांग है—कि खर्च ज्यादा किया जाता है। वह बात को कहते चले जायें। *

श्री किशन पटनायक : *

श्री मोहन स्वरूप : ** का मतलब बहुत बुरा नहीं हो सकता है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : ** का शब्द ठीक नहीं है।

श्री किशन पटनायक : हम कहते हैं।

श्री पालीवाल (टिण्डौन) : ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि शब्द का अर्थ समझे बिना ही शब्द का प्रयोग माननीय सदस्य कर रहे हैं।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैं माननीय सदस्य को ज्यादा समझता हूँ। वह सब कुछ जान बूझ कर कहते हैं। यह बात गलत है कि वह समझते नहीं हैं। यही तकलीफ माननीय सदस्य के साथ मेरी हमेशा रही है।

श्री रा० शि० पाण्डेय : **

इन दोनों शब्दों को रिकार्ड से हटा दिया जाना चाहिये।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैं हिन्दी का इतना पंडित नहीं हूँ कि जानता होऊँ कि ** के क्या माने होंगे।

श्री प्र० ना० विद्यालंकार (होशियार-पुर) : दोनों के माने एक ही हैं ।

श्री बड़े : बहुत फर्क है ।

Shri Raghunath Singh: Most unparliamentary.

वैदेशिक-कार्य मंत्रालय में उपमंत्री (श्री बिनेश सिंह) : मेरे खयाल में फिजूलखर्ची का शब्द होना चाहिये । जहां तक इन दोनों शब्दों का सम्बन्ध है, ये ऐसे हैं कि इन को यहां पर संसद् में नहीं कहा जाना चाहिये ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : क्या आप का मतलब यह है, जोकि आप पहले से कहते आ रहे हैं कि खर्चा ज्यादा करते हैं या कुछ और भी है ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : ** करते हैं ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय मैं इस की इजाजत नहीं देता हूं । यह काट दिया जाता है अगर आप का कोई और मतलब है । इन दोनों शब्दों को काट दिया जायगा अगर इन का मतलब फिजूलखर्ची के बजाय और किसी जगह जा रहा है ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : यह मैंने बजट के वक्त भी कहा था कि प्रधान मंत्री के वास भवन का कारपेट बदलने के लिए तीन लाख रुपये का खर्चा हुआ है । जिस प्रधान मंत्री के कारपेट के लिये देश का तीन लाख रुपया खर्चा हो सकता है, क्या उस प्रधान मंत्री का दिमाग कभी जंग करने के लिए या युद्ध करने के लिए तैयार हो सकता है । अगर युद्ध चलाने वाला हों तो यह सब खत्म करना होगा । प्रधान मंत्री अपना खर्चीलापन खत्म नहीं करना चाहते हैं, इसी-लिए जंग चलाने के लिए तैयार नहीं हैं ।

श्री भागवत झा आजाद : अभी माननीय सदस्य ने यह कहा कि यह असत्य है कि श्री राम सेवक यादव का एमेंडमेंट इस हाउस में

गिर गया । लेकिन यह बात सच है क्योंकि यह एमेंडमेंट मेरे हाथ में है ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : यह ऐसा शब्द नहीं है ।

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Tiwary. He is not here. Mr. Manaen. He is also not here.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad rose—

Mr. Speaker: I am coming to him. Let me strike out all those who can be struck out. Shri Brajeshwar Prasad.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad (Gaya): Sir, I would like to make a few general observations before I come to the main points of my speech. The man whom I regard as the greatest statesman of the age is being compared to Mr. Chamberlain. I regard Mr. Chamberlain as a greater Statesman than Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill stood for an Anglo-American alliance. Mr. Chamberlain, on the other hand, stood for an Anglo-German alliance. Both were defenders of British imperial interests. The three great achievements of Mr. Churchill are the establishment of Russian hegemony over eastern Europe, the establishment of communism in China and the liquidation of the British empire.

Mr. Speaker: It is very nice to hear all these, but I may enquire whether this is all relevant.

Shri D. C. Sharma: These are general remarks.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: I have said that before I come to the main points of my speech, I would like to make a few general observations.

Mr. Speaker: Simply by saying that, they do not become relevant.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: I will explain to you within a moment how it is relevant. None of these things

[Shri Brajeshwar Prasad]

would have happened if the foreign policy of Mr. Chamberlain had been approved. The essence of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal was that a State must come to terms with a potential aggressor. I hope what I am driving at is now clear. His policy is now being pursued. The concepts of the European Market and of a Union of Western Europe spring from the idea of an Anglo-German alliance. I plead for a political settlement with China.

Mr. Speaker: Now he has come to the point.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: This was necessary, Sir. We are dealing here with the Colombo powers and not with China. The significance of this has not been understood by all of us.

Mr. Speaker: "All" includes the hon. Member himself.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: This was an observation made by the Prime Minister in his opening speech. We have to go through the motion of negotiation for a pretty long time to come. Friends say that China is a menace. I do not agree with this view. Russia has not been able to take West Berlin. America has not been able to take East Berlin. Expansionism has become obsolete in the thermo-nuclear age.

China cannot advance one step further. The conflict between India and China may lead either to a war or to a political settlement or to a stalemate. I am wholeheartedly in favour of a political settlement with China on the basis of a clear recognition by the Chinese that the Aksai Chin Plateau and the Lingzi Tang Plains were never a part of China and are an integral part of India. All facilities for civilian traffic on the Tibet-Sinkiang Road should be guaranteed to China.

We should never come to terms with China or any other power on the basis of handing over any portion of our territory in Kashmir.

Shri D. C. Sharma: Hear, hear.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: There are two reasons why we should pursue a policy of continuing the stalemate *vis-a-vis* China, if the Chinese do not withdraw from the Aksai Chin area. China can never invade India as long as Russia and America are on our side. Russia and America will have to remain on our side as long as China remains hostile to India. We should not try to undermine the foundations of our security.

Shri D. C. Sharma: Hear, hear.

Mr. Speaker: Every time that is not required. Inside the Parliament "hear, hear" is not the form of approbation that is given normally.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: We should not try to undermine the foundations of our security—the best defence system in the world—by coming to terms with China on the basis of handing over Aksai Chin area to her. The defence of India is the responsibility of America and of Russia. History has cast this responsibility upon their shoulders. India is the only country in the world which enjoys the political and the military support of both Russia and America. It is only on the question of defending India that Russia and America co-operate with each other. Why do they do so? Is it because of friendship with us or is it in their own interest to do so? Russia will be driven out of the Caucasus, Siberia and Central Asia, if China is allowed to swallow India. America will be driven out of Asia, the SEATO and the CENTO will be shattered to pieces and Japan, nay, the whole of Asia will be integrated with China if China swallows India.

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It is neither possible, nor desirable, to drive out the Chinese from the Aksai Chin area even if we become militarily stronger than China. The Russians will ask us not to march one step further; the moment our troops try to cross the Tibet-Sinkiang road. America will leave us in the lurch the moment Russia intervenes. What Cuba is to America, probably that or more is the Aksai Chin area to Russia. America will be badly defeated by Russia if a conventional war breaks out between them in the Aksai Chin area. The Chinese army consists of five million soldiers and Russia is the largest, the greatest and the strongest land power on the globe. The whole world will be shattered to pieces if a thermo-nuclear war breaks out between them. The Aksai Chin area can be liberated if both Russia and America attack China of which there is no possibility. There is a political and moral obligation on Russia to support China. If Russia permits India to drive out China from the whole of the Aksai Chin area, the result will be disastrous for both India and Russia. Defeated by India and betrayed by Russia, China will have no alternative left open to her but to join hands with the United States of America....

An Hon. Member: Wonderful logic.

Shri Brajeshwar Prasad: ...like Germany and Japan, who after being defeated, joined hands with the United States of America. In 1939 Russia and Germany came to a political settlement on the basis of the division of Eastern Europe into two spheres of influence, Russian and German. If this comes to pass, Russia will become vulnerable to attack by America from Asia as well and the whole of the continental and the peninsular regions of Asia bordering the Pacific will be divided into two spheres of influence—American and Chinese. To compensate for the loss

sustained in the Pacific, Russia may be permitted to establish her hegemony over the Middle East. Anything may happen to India if she is sandwiched between Russia in the Middle East and America and China in South East Asia.

The second reason why we should pursue a policy of continuing the stalemate *vis-a-vis* China if the Chinese do not withdraw from the Aksai Chin area is that China will never agree to disarmament unless she is ostracised, isolated, boycotted and quarantined by all the nation States of the world. Both Russia and America have boycotted China. The condition precedent to the recognition of China by the USA, to the induction of China into the UNO, to the integration of Formosa with China and to the restoration of friendship between China and Russia and between China and India is a clear indication by China that along with India, Russia and America she also is prepared to disarm herself.

Before I conclude I would like to pay my tribute to the hon. Prime Minister for his wise handling of the grave problems that confront us on the stage of international politics.

There are two assumptions behind our foreign policy which have now been proved to be correct. I have consistently and persistently opposed the policy of non-alignment, but after the Chinese aggression, I have become a votary of the policy of non-alignment. The first assumption is that neither Russia nor America will attack India. This is the first assumption behind our foreign policy. The second is that if any third country attacks India, both Russia and America will rally round India. Both these assumptions have been proved correct to the hilt.

The attack by China on India connotes the failure of the foreign policies of both China and America. I have said more than once on the floor of

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[Shri Brajeshwar Prasad]

the House that the aim of China in attacking India is to drive India into the American camp so that the Sino-Soviet Pact is resurrected. This analysis of mine has now been endorsed by others as well. India has not joined the American camp. The rift between Russia and China has widened and both Russia and America have become our defenders. The giving of military aid to Pakistan was based on the assumption that China will not attack India. Now military aid is being given to India without any strings attached to it.

Shri Kappen (Muvattupuzha): Sir, this House has been called upon to make the most momentous decision not only in its history but in the history of this nation also. If we make a wrong decision, it will spell disaster not only for this nation but also for the whole world. If we make a correct or a right decision, not only morally but also diplomatically and tactically that will get the acclaim of the whole world and the gratitude of the generations to come in this country. Therefore in considering the proposals before us I request that we should not be led by emotion. We should view the proposals in the light of cold reason and decide whether the proposals are to be accepted or rejected.

As has been pointed out, the proposals are not a formula for the settlement of the dispute between India and China. They are at best only a *modus vivendi* for India and China to sit beside a table and discuss the problems that confront them. This fact has to be considered when we consider the proposals before us. It is being said and considered as if the proposals are a formula for the settlement of the border dispute between India and China. Let us examine the proposals. We have only to consider whether the proposal before us estimates to the proposal that we have made to China for negotiations. It has clearly been

pointed out before this House that not only it estimates or comes up to the proposal that we have made to China but in some places we get more territory than we have asked for in our proposals.

In these circumstances, are we to reject this proposal or are we to accept it? What is the harm or what are we going to lose by accepting this proposal? The unilateral cease-fire by China has been there for the last so many days when the Chinese soldiers were vacating our land. Now what has been urged by many people is that we should not be prepared for negotiations but we must fight. This House has been sitting for the last so many days and the cease-fire was there and the withdrawal was going on. Why did we not carry on the fight? Why did we accept the cease-fire proposal in a way and why did we wait? Supposing during this period there was a talk of negotiation, and supposing China and India sat together beside a table and discussed the problems that confronted them, what harm would have happened?

The Colombo proposals are only a *modus vivendi*; they are only a basis for sitting round a table and discussing the problems that confront the two countries.

It may be asked: Will China come to terms? Will China accept these terms? These questions are irrelevant, because supposing China does not accept them, then India will in a victory; so far. India has won a political and tactical victory in this war; so many nations of the world including the communist countries have come forward and supported India's cause, and condemned Chinese policy; excepting a few, probably one or two nations of the world, all the nations of the world have come to the support of India. Suppose we accept the proposals and go to a table and discuss,

and due to the intransigence and unreasonableness of China, the proposals fall through and the discussions fall through, we get the support of the whole world. On the other hand, supposing we reject this proposal, what will be its effect? It means total war, and fighting to the end.

Suppose America and the Western nations are to supply us war materials, and if necessary even soldiers, does the House think that Russia will keep quiet, that Russia will still stand with us? In case there is a war, it is bound to be a world war. In that case, does this House think that Russia will sit quiet and will not join with China and will still stand with India? If it comes to a total war, what will be its effect? India will become the theatre of a world war. Probably there may be nations who desire that the war might be waged in a theatre far away from their countries. For instance, they were not prepared to wage a war in Cuba. But supposing India becomes the theatre for war, what will happen? As Mr. Khrushchev has pointed out, in this nuclear age when there is nuclear warfare, the first explosion will destroy and will kill 70 to 100 lakhs of people. If India becomes the theatre of a world war, what will be left here after the war? Will not India appear a desolate country? And what are we going to gain by it?

A few nations interested in the peace of the world and wishing that there should be world peace met. Let us not consider in what circumstances they met. Shri Frank Anthony has pointed out that they met because they feared China. The six Afro-Asian nations who assembled in Colombo met, according to my hon. friend under the fear of the aggression by China. Therefore, the argument was that their proposals were influenced by that fear. Let us accept for the sake of argument that that is correct. Even then, if we accept the proposals and go to a table and talk what do we lose? We lose nothing. But it may be argued, and it may be pointed out

that we are still arming ourselves as we have to, because the military experts have pointed out that it will take at least three to five years for India to militarily reach the point which has been reached by China. If that is so, suppose we go to war at present. Are we prepared for a war? Are we in a position to fight China without outside help? We have to admit that we are not. If we go to the table for discussion, we get time, we can get armed and prepared. It may be pointed out that China will then say, "India is arming. She is not sincere" and that Pakistan may point out that India is not sincere, she wants to fight Pakistan. Well, difficulties are there. These problems may arise. But even then, is it not better for us to sit round the Table and negotiate? If we succeed—I am sure that we are bound to succeed—do we not achieve our objective? I am sure that China cannot go back on that. Why did China declare a unilateral cease fire? Is it because she loved India? Is it because she respected our Prime minister? It was because she found that internationally she was a loser. Politically tactically and diplomatically she had become a loser. Therefore she withdrew unilaterally. She declared a cease fire and wanted to go back saying 'We are prepared for compromise; we have unilaterally declared a cease fire; we are withdrawing our armies; India is the country which is not prepared for peace.' This allegation may not be there if we sit round the table and discuss the problem. Questions can be settled peacefully.

People have been speaking about war. They have been saying that India must wage a war I am really surprised that some responsible people should be talking about war as if it is a very small thing. In this nuclear age, war means destruction, war means death. Do we want that destruction for this country which has been progressing for the last 15 years? I ask the House to consider the question seriously. If

Proposals

[Shri Kapper]

there is one per cent chance of settling this dispute by negotiation, we have to attempt it for the sake of our country, for the sake of our millions, for the sake of world peace. I thank you for the opportunity given to me.

Shri S. M. Banerjee: I fully associate myself with the noble sentiments expressed by our beloved Prime Minister this morning. I have heard with rapt attention the speeches of those hon. Members who opposed the contention or the ideas put forward by the hon. Prime Minister and gave an idea to this House, and through this House, wanted to convey these feelings to the country, that the Prime Minister had gone back and he was not going to stick to the pledge taken by this House in November 1962.

I have carefully gone through the proposals of Colombo Conference. I must thank those Colombo Powers, specially the Prime Minister of Ceylon, not only for coming to the rescue of our country—though we are strong enough and capable of defending ourselves—but for defending the policy of non-alignment. These Afro-Asian Powers today are more concerned with the Chinese aggression because they have seen and they know what this expansionism means, and it is to defend the integrity, sovereignty, independence and democracy of their own countries that they want that some peaceful settlement should be arrived at in this case. It is no question of acceptance or rejection of these proposals. The question before us is what should be done.

These proposals, according to the Prime Minister, are nearer the 8th September line. I have also cared to see both the maps, and I find—I speak subject to correction with my limited knowledge—that in some places it is better than the 8th September line. It is true, as pointed out by the hon. Prime Minister, that

in some places in the western sector there are certain check-posts which will not remain with us, but after all, when we initiate discussion on the basis of these Colombo proposals, it is open to us to have further negotiations and talk and see that we adhere to our 8th September line.

Let us face realities, the grim reality. China has been condemned by the entire world, I should say, by the communist countries themselves. What happened in Berlin? Three days back, the Chinese representative who spoke was hooted down by the communist countries. Is it not enough condemnation? They are condemned and publicly condemned by all the other communist countries including the Soviet Union. And who is supporting China today? The petty, His Master's Voice Albania. Through Albania and one or two other small countries, China is putting forward its ideology of world domination and expansionism. Today China stands condemned by the communist countries, and I think that our foreign policy has succeeded to this extent that the communist countries have been forced to support us and condemn China. It is the greatest achievement of our foreign policy, and must congratulate the hon. Prime Minister who is an emblem of democracy and non-alignment in this country.

Non-alignment today is an article of faith with us. We cannot tinker with that, and it has been proved beyond doubt after the Chinese aggression that non-alignment is the need of the hour, and it is a message for the entire world, especially for those who believe that by adopting it they can also save their independence.

Now I come to the proposals themselves. China has not rejected them, but accepted them in principle. However, after getting the clarifications, they are opposed to the clarification-

Today, if we reject the whole thing, what is our position before the Afro-Asian countries? It is not a dream, but I feel honestly that India today or tomorrow or the day after is going to lead the entire Afro-Asian countries, provided we follow the correct ideology preached by our Prime Minister. That is my conviction, based on right or wrong politics, I do not know. That is why we have to face the entire Afro-Asian countries.

After all, we cannot follow China. They can reject anything. They can disown the other communist countries who gave them everything, gave them all help. They can reject their ideology, because, unfortunately, they are following an ideology, a path of expansionism which, to my mind, is not the correct path of Marxism.

So, I feel that today these proposals should be accepted in the sense that there should be a positive response to them. I did not press my substitute motion after hearing the Prime Minister, and I am glad that the substitution tabled by me and my hon. friends Shri Yajnik, Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri and others says exactly the same thing. What did we say? With your permission, I should like to refer to a few lines of it:

"This House authorities the Government of India to make a positive response to the Colombo proposals consistent with the pledge taken by this House to have the aggression against India vacated and with the declared policy of the Government of India to secure the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the line of September 8, 1962."

There should be no sense of complacency. I am happy that the ordnance factory workers have produced so much. We have seen so much enthusiasm in this country. There is no other flag flying in the country except the national flag under which we are all united I have urged the Government to continue its measures to mobilise men, money and ammunition to increase the armed strength and preparedness of the people to beat

back any aggression against the country, irrespective of the course that may be taken by the discussions on these proposals. I know we are also discussing with Pakistan. I wish them all success. But what is our slogan? We are getting aid from the Anglo-American bloc countries. We welcome their aid. They have behaved in a very friendly way. But after all we cannot get aid at the cost of Kashmir. Our slogan must be not an inch of Ladakh, NEFA or Kashmir. Many jawans have shed their last drop of blood. That is why I take this opportunity in requesting my friends and these friendly countries who gave us such a timely aid not to attach political strings but to allow the friendly aid to remain friendly. That is why I also say that we should move towards self-sufficiency in Defence matters. The production in ordnance factories has been doubled in three months. 63,000 ordnance factory workers are working 12 hours a day but are taking only 8 hours pay, refusing to take any overtime allowance and are prepared to work more. That is the spirit shown by our workers, ill-clad and ill-fed. They do not even care to take their rations. In Kanpur I have seen their very young children going to take the rations. When their wives ask them to come an hour or two earlier, which they used to do before they say: no, the war is on. That is the moving spirit behind the Resolution which we passed here. My hon. friends are afraid that we are moving towards another direction. It is not so. There is only one direction: Chinese aggression should be vacated. But we should not refuse to negotiate. I remember our hon. Prime Minister saying, when he was attacked by all people here: We shall negotiate and negotiate and negotiate till the bitter end. That is diplomacy; that is statesmanship. I do not know what will happen to this country if sometime—God forbid that—Shri Ranga becomes the Prime Minister of this country.... (Interruptions.) I have seen the letter written by his leader, wanting us to play into the hands of the Anglo-American bloc and had I had more

[Shri S. M. Banerjee]

time, I would have read it. The reactionary forces have today united to oppose the Colombo proposals and negotiations. They criticise outside about unpreparedness. When it is a question of parting with their gold, they do not come forward. But they want the Prime Minister to fight back the Chinese—how?—by playing into the hands of the Anglo American bloc and have talks on Kashmir to divide India further. I have followed with great interest the speeches given by the leaders outside. I am happy that in this House at least such speeches have not been made. So, I request the hon. Prime Minister not to be—I

do not want to use the word "bullied" taken by them. The entire country is with him: I can assure him of that on behalf of the working classes whom I represent. They will shed their last drop of blood and last ounce of energy to defend the integrity of the country. But we should negotiate and create world opinion against China so that we could not only beat them in arms but also in diplomacy and statesmanship.

18.31 hrs.

*The Lok Sabha then adjourned till
January 24, 1963/Magha 4, 1884
(Saka).*
