

**Mr. Speaker:** Let us decide what we are going to do today. There was a demand that the time may be extended for this discussion. There was also a demand that the motion regarding Public Undertakings must also be taken up.

**Shri Ranga:** Introduced.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Moved.

**Mr. Speaker:** Why should we not finish this by 4 o'clock, take up the other motion and finish it even if we have to sit up to 6 o'clock?

**Shri Surendranath Dwivedy:** More time would be necessary for that discussion.

**Mr. Speaker:** If that is the desire of the House, I certainly would not stand in their way. But I wanted, and perhaps the hon. Members were also anxious, that this should be expedited.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** We wanted it to be moved.

**Mr. Speaker:** All right. Then I will call upon the Minister of Defence at 4.00. Only ten minutes will be allowed to the other Minister to move his motion on Public Undertakings. How long will the Minister of Defence take for his reply?

**The Minister of Defence (Shri Y. B. Chavan):** 45 minutes.

**Mr. Speaker:** Then at 4.00 I will call him.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Is the Prime Minister participating in the debate?

**Mr. Speaker:** That will be seen. Let us proceed now. Shri P. K. Deo may continue his speech.

12.08 hrs.

DISCUSSION ON NEFA ENQUIRY  
AND MOTION RE. "OUR DEF-  
ENCE PREPAREDNESS"—contd.

**Shri P. K. Deo (Kalahandi):** Mr. Speaker, Sir, yesterday I was saying that the Government and our Communist friends use the same language in their approach to the Chinese problem and how their thinking and appraisal of the situation are identical. In that regard I wanted to quote from Shri Dange's speech on 12th September, 1959 on the floor of this House.

He said:

"I guarantee that there shall be no invasion—as far as the Prime Minister is concerned he has said so—with the same confidence I guarantee that there shall be no invasion as far as China is concerned. I cannot talk about others."

Sir, on 14th August, 1962, when on behalf of the Swatantra Party I tabled a substitute motion for consideration when this same subject was being discussed and urged that to streamline our defence efforts we should accept military aid from foreign countries without any strings and also demanded that we should get rid of the then Defence Minister who is the root cause of all trouble, we were ridiculed by the Prime Minister. At that time he said:

"It is quite absurd to talk about China invading India or that China has committed aggression. That is bad enough. We should face it and try to get it vacated. But imagining that she is swooping down the whole of India and swallowing it has, I submit, nothing to do with reality or possibility, even remote possibility of any situation."

Subsequent events have unfolded who is right. In spite of the warning given to the Government from these

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benches no action has been taken, no lesson has been learnt. But the report now says that we are unprepared. I say with all the emphasis at my command that this amounts to culpable negligence or it amounts to deliberate sabotage.

Coming to equipment, to wage war successfully the most essential prerequisite is that we should have adequate weapons and warlike stores. It is our misfortune that we lack most of them. Planning has been our watchword since we launched our five-year plans so many years ago, but it had little bearing on defence. No effort was made for the production or procurement of essential equipment. Our former Defence Minister claimed that he modernised the Indian Army and built up the army industry. But we all know how he indulged in dubious projects like coffee percolators, room coolers etc. We know that the AVRO-748 programme is much behind schedule. An average aircraft carrier and a cruiser were acquired at a colossal cost with little relevance to the immediate danger. In the 15th and the 16th centuries our rulers at Delhi made the same mistake. When the Indian Ocean was infested by pirates and Western adventurers, our rulers at Delhi never cared to build a navy to protect the Indian shores. Now when the enemy has been knocking at the door in the northern border over crores of rupees had been spent in strengthening our Navy which is mostly utilised for ceremonial exercises or for goodwill missions.

Time and again we have been told by the Government that our defence efforts are being handicapped by meagre funds. Is it not true that an amount of Rs. 132 crores was surrendered in a period of six years out of the budgeted allotment for the Defence Ministry? If it is closely studied, it will be found that the percentage of surrender goes on increasing. It was 3.2 per cent in 1957-58 and it has risen now to 61 per cent.

Regarding communications I beg to submit that our entire communications have been handicapped by lack of roads. The vehicles were old and defectively maintained. Crores of rupees have been spent on the infamous Tusker Project which adorns the name of our Prime Minister and of our former Defence Minister as the President and the Vice-President. Even though our new Defence Minister has taken charge of the Ministry, his name has not been associated with the Tusker Project and he has got nothing to do with the Tusker Project. The Tusker Project has been conspicuous by financial irregularities. Roads on the maps are not good unless they actually exist.

Regarding vehicles the less said the better. This morning Shri Kamath has reminded this House about the jeep scandal. We tom-tommed about Shaktiman. What happened to its shakti? We all know how lack of communications has been the major factor in the NEFA debacle. To set up isolated posts without the proper supply line virtually amounts to delivering our troops as hostages to the enemy. That is what actually happened.

So far as the system of command is concerned, I will be failing in my duty if I do not point out to this House that so far as the NEFA operation is concerned the difficulty arose when there was a departure from the accepted chain of command. This has been admitted in the report. The hon. Defence Minister has not hesitated to mention this fact in his statement. It is gratifying to note that the general standard of our junior officers was fairly good but at the higher level the shortcomings became more apparent. It is the 4th Indian Division, the crack division of the Indian army, which had fought creditably against Rommel's men and had many victories to its laurels, was routed. If India is proud of anything, then India is proud of her fighting men. If you study the pages of his-

tory, you will always find that whenever the Indian Army faced any major reverses, it was not due to the fault of the fighting forces, but it was always the Generals and the leaders who had let them down, whether it was at Panipat or it was at Plassey.

To keep up the morale of the Armed Forces is the primary duty of every Government. We have seen how many experienced young Generals have been retired prematurely, and one of them had serious public differences with the then Defence Minister. A Brigadier was promoted overnight, superseding many fellow officers, and he was the person who played the disastrous role as the corps commander in the NEFA operations. Now, we learn that he has been profitably rehabilitated in some company.

**Mr. Speaker:** Order, order....

**Shri P. K. Deo:** I have not mentioned any name.

**Mr. Speaker:** The name is so clear that every intelligent person can understand it.

It was in 1960, or 1961 also, when I was the Deputy-Speaker, that a debate had taken place, and Shri Kripalani wanted to mention those names, and I had ruled at that time also that particular names could not be mentioned. We cannot sit here in judgment on what has been done to a particular officer; we cannot decide the promotions of officers or their advancements or the increases in their salaries or other such things. Parliament would not be able to take up those things. So, particular names ought not to be mentioned. All blame might be thrown on Government saying that they have not done this or that....

**Shri P. K. Deo:** We have to keep up the morale of the Defence Forces.

**Mr. Speaker:** Even this might be said that suitable persons were not promoted; it might also be said that supersessions have taken place. But

particular persons cannot be named individually.

**Shri Ranga (Chittoor):** He stands condemned by his own party.

**Mr. Speaker:** That is a different matter. I am only laying down what the procedure in the Parliament debate should be.

**Shri P. K. Deo:** The report has been conspicuous by the fact that there was constant interference from Delhi. The report has rightly said that details of operations should have been left to the officers on the spot, but this was never done.

Another thing which completely bewilders me is the announcement of the Prime Minister prior to his departure to Ceylon as to whether it was a political decision or backed by military advice. The hon. Member from Phulpur, our Prime Minister, made a statement that our chaps should not proceed to the Thagla ridge and oust the Chinese military manoeuvres are not to be talked about from platform. When the Indian Army was going to take up an offensive operation at that particular moment, off went the Defence Minister to the United Nations. This was the height of irresponsibility. The only parallel to that can be found in the Roman history; when Rome was burning, Nero was playing with the fiddle. As a result our 2400 seasoned troops had to retreat in utter confusion and were beaten.

My hon. friend Shri Indrajit Gupta has pointed out that it was the friendship of India with the USSR which compelled China to withdraw from Bomdila. Sir, our friendship with Russia is not a new development. It has been continuing ever since. It is unthinkable where we would have been today if there would not have been timely military aid from the U.K. and the U.S.A. This fact has to be accepted. Time and again, we have told in this House that we should take military aid to strengthen and streamline our Armed Forces but it

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is now proved that it is the timely military aid from the U.K. and the U.S.A. and the replacement of the former Defence Minister by a more determined one which have changed the course of the war and put a halt to the Chinese advance. If action would have been taken earlier, probably, this catastrophe would have been obviated.

Regarding military intelligence, there have been no two opinions that there have been grave shortcomings in this regard. If the intelligence would have worked efficiently, then the report would not have said that the Chinese attack was sudden. Without intelligence, it means that you blindfold the Army and send them to fight. I do not know how it would be possible for them to fight.

In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to a statement made by the Prime Minister on the 10th December 1962, that is, after the debacle in which he says:

"I think, on the whole, our intelligence has been first class."

**Shri Ranga:** He is always 'on the whole'.

**Shri P. K. Deo:** If it was first class, the report would never have said that the Chinese attack was sudden. We know that in this country there has been a network of Chinese spies. In reply to a question, we came to know that some Chinese nationals were in the Indian army. The Chinese eating houses, Chinese dry cleaning shops and beauty parlours have multiplied in recent years. The People's Publishing House, which publishes the communist mouthpiece, had an account in the Bank of China. Still some wing of the Communist Party get their inspiration from China. There is a Chinese lobby in this country. That fact cannot be denied.

In this respect, I would submit that our intelligence has to be streamlined.

The Defence Minister has rightly said that lessons had been learnt in NEFA. I am glad he has been taking corrective steps. He hails from the land of Shivaji. His patriotic words when he left his post in Bombay and came here to take charge still ring in my ears and create enthusiasm in the country. We expect lots from him.

Before I conclude, I would make some suggestions. I suggest that the powers of the Supreme Commander, that is, our President, who is just a figurehead in military matters now, should be vitalised. He should take more interest in the affairs of the armed forces as in the United States of America where the President is authorised to look into the disposition and movement of troops even though Congress raises the army and sanctions expenditure for it.

Secondly, there should be a Defence Council established. It should weigh the various defence needs objectively and independently. It should be free from executive fiat and it should express its opinion freely in military affairs.

Thirdly, the three services should be co-ordinated—some sort of integration of the defence services as has been done in UK according to the British White Paper of July 1963. The **Chiefs of Staff should be free from file work.** They should think more about military problems, tactics, training of troops, their disposition, vulnerability etc. etc.

Fourthly, our defence machinery should be geared up to meet any sudden attack. If—God forbid—there is an attack, it may be a simultaneous one by Pakistan and China. So there should be rethinking in this regard.

At the same time, our policy of non-alignment may be reviewed in this context. The country has paid adequate price for the mistakes the voters of North Bombay have committed.

If the House is anxious that there should be no repetition of such a debacle, if the House is anxious that the scar of humiliation should be effaced from the body of this country, if the House is anxious that the lost battle against China should be won, if the House is anxious that the lost honour should be retrieved, our lost land retaken and our solemn pledge of November 14 redeemed, the only imperative necessity is the appointment of a high power commission to be presided over by a Supreme Court Judge to inquire into the responsibility of the former Defence Minister and the former Chief of the Army Staff and to recommend reforms which are needed to develop and strengthen our defence forces and to effect Cabinet and parliamentary control on policy and organisation.

**Shri K. C. Pant** (Naini Tal): The two statements of the Defence Minister which have been before the House since the day before yesterday had been awaited with intense eagerness, tempered in some measure with scepticism, because the subject lends itself so invitingly to hush-hush treatment. However, the Defence Minister has been refreshingly forthright in uncovering the weak spots, whether in organisation, in execution or in planning. This readiness to accept the mistakes of the past inspires confidence in the Government's determination to put matters right as quickly as possible. That this determination is matched by capacity is evident from the Defence Minister's second statement which makes out a convincing case in support of his claim that the lessons of the NEFA debacle have been learnt well.

On the whole, both these statements have been rather well received by the press and the public. This is not only because they have a ring of honesty about them, but because consistent with the nation's security, they are as comprehensive as they could reasonably be expected to be. I am sure the House will welcome this evidence of the Government's intention to associate

Parliament more and more in matters connected with defence, and I hope the Defence Minister will continue to take this House into his confidence from time to time in the same spirit of candour in matters pertaining to the defence preparedness of the country. This would go a long way to relieving anxiety in the country on this score and may well act as a tonic as it has done in the present case.

The statement on the NEFA reverses can be broken up roughly into three parts (1) relating to purely technical military matters like equipment, system of command etc. (2) intelligence and (3) the political aspects including the important question of equipment. I do not propose to go into the technical aspects except to welcome in passing the various corrective steps outlined in the second statement, as for example, the measures taken to expand the armed forces and their training facilities to give that training the necessary slant to cope with another confrontation with China and to ensure that the accepted chain of command functions undisturbed. All these measures we heartily welcome.

As for our intelligence system, it seems to be in a sorry state of disrepair. Its performance has been found wanting on all counts—collection, evaluation and dissemination. Intelligence is a delicate subject and one would like to avoid it. But its breakdown is so clearly one of the basic factors responsible for the NEFA debacle that we cannot do so. After all, Chinese military preparations across the border must have been going on on a fairly large scale over a longish period of time before the attack actually came. And yet our intelligence was unable to provide a clear picture of the Chinese build-up. There will be general agreement with the Defence Minister's conclusion that "a major overhauling of the intelligence system is required". There is need not only to broaden the base of our intelligence system and to give a more positive role to military intelligence but to clearly demarcate the jurisdiction of civil and

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military intelligence so that neither can encroach upon the territory of the other. At the same time, there should be greater co-ordination between the various agencies dealing with civil intelligence and a closer liaison between the civil and military intelligence wings.

There has been some adverse comment both on the floor of the House and in the statement on the role of senior commanders in last year's operations. Shri Prakash Vir Shastri and Shri P. K. Deo referred to it. I refer in particular to the Defence Minister's remark that it was at higher levels, i.e., higher than Brigadier, that shortcomings, that is shortcomings in commanders, became more apparent. Read out of context, this statement would seem to cast a sweeping aspersion on our senior army officers. However, as the Defence Minister has explained, the Indian Army as a whole was really not tested, and only about 24,000 of our troops were really involved in fighting in Ladakh and NEFA. Even in this limited encounter, our troops gave a good account of themselves in Ladhak and the Lohit Division of NEFA. So, there were good commanders and bad commanders even among the few who took part in these operations. As for those who did not, this criticism obviously does not apply to them.

In considering this matter, we should not lose sight of the historical background. The Indian Army was a successor to the British Army. In the ~~British~~ British days, Indian officers were neither trusted fully, nor were they promoted to the higher echelons of command. An Indian officer in those days could hope to go up to the rank of a Lt. Col. at the highest. When the British left India in the wake of partition, the truncated Indian Army had but a handful of Indian officers, and these naturally had to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of senior British army officers from the Indian Army. This was an inevitable, and, indeed, a most desirable development,

but it had an unwanted side-effect in that these officers, who were thus rapidly promoted did not all get a chance to acquire the normal amount of command experience at the intermediate levels of command. It is really at these levels that a Commander can extend this authority by stages in a natural way over progressively larger bodies of men through bonds of loyalty and confidence woven out of the threads of shared experience. At still higher levels, the Commander's duties leave him no time or opportunity to remain in close touch with his troops. So, it is possible that some of our high-ranking officers may have acquired a handicap in the course of their service through no fault of their own. In spite of this handicap, some of them may be excellent commanders, but the factual background should not be lost sight of.

As regards the general question of defence preparedness, it must be kept in mind that in the past our Army was mainly oriented towards a conflict with Pakistan. This was only natural under the circumstances. It should not be forgotten that till but an year ago, China was not openly, actively hostile in the sense that Pakistan was. I wonder if any one in the country, including my hon. friend Shri Prakash Vir Shastri, would have placed Pakistan below China in the list of defence priorities at that stage. In any case, in view of Pakistan's recent marriage of sin with China, it was just as well that we did not take any military chances with a trigger-happy Pakistan.

If this view is accepted, the only question that remains is to what extent could we have prepared for a conflict with China without weakening our defences against Pakistan? I think it is true to say that if we had not given China more benefit of doubt than she deserved, the country would have been psychologically better prepared than it was to face the massive aggression on:

our soil by China. But it is no less true to say that the most brilliant anticipation of events would not by itself have added greatly, or I should say sufficiently, to our actual military preparedness, which is closely related to the industrial potential of the country and the resources allocated to defence. The factor of resources is decisive, and as we have now seen, the resources required are staggeringly large for a poor country like ours, the generous assistance of friendly countries notwithstanding. Friends opposite might still say: what of that, what the Government is doing today could have been done four years ago. But could it? That is the question. And to what extent could the Government have counted upon the active co-operation of the Opposition in this task?

It is less than a year ago that the Chinese armies cut into our land, and the lesson seems to have been forgotten already. Processions are organised against taxes—we have seen a number of them in recent weeks—signatures are being collected, and there is even talk of openly inciting people not to pay taxes. This is a peculiar way of strengthening our defence preparedness. And if this is the attitude of the Opposition parties today, when one invasion has taken place and the enemy seems menacingly poised for another, do they expect the country to believe that their behaviour would have been less obstructionist our years ago, long before the outbreak of hostilities? Let those who are engaged in this dangerous competition of anti-tax processions and agitations in the midst of the gathering clouds of war, search their hearts and give us an answer.

As regards equipment, I shall restrict myself to welcoming the doubling of the rate of production in our ordnance factories since the emergency, and to a few words regarding the project to manufacture MIGs in India. Shri Prakash Vir Shastri also referred to it. The scheme is to have two factories, one at Nasik to manufacture the fuselage and the other at Koraput in Orissa to manufacture the engines. I agree

with Shri Prakash Vir Shastri that since the body and engine must be exactly tailor made to suit each other, one would have expected that both the factories would have been located under the same roof, or at least near each other, so that frequent consultations would be possible and some of the overheads could be shared. Why two extremities of India were chosen to locate these two complementary units is difficult to understand, and, as far as I can see, it makes the whole project basically inefficient.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath** (Hoshangabad): Pressure from Orissa's Chief Minister.

**Shri K. C. Pant:** I should like briefly to endorse some of the suggestions made by hon. friend Shri Bhakti Darshan yesterday. In his constructive speech, he spoke of the need to expedite the formation of hill divisions and to give preference to the hill people familiar with the terrain and acclimatised by nature in the recruitment to these divisions. He also pleaded for the establishment of mountain warfare schools in different sectors of the Himalayas. He further referred to the intrusion of Chinese planes into the middle sector. I share his concern over these intrusions, and over the possible Chinese intentions behind these intrusions. On my part, I should like to see every able-bodied person on the border given compulsory military training. Many of them have martial traditions, and if they are given the training and good arms, I am sure they would be a source of strength to the country in defending itself.

In the end, may I say that this enquiry should be regarded, not as a post mortem, but as a diagnosis. It is but an incident in a developing situation. Listening to my hon. friend Shri Prakash Vir Shastri yesterday, I could not help feeling that he wasted too much of his golden eloquence in flogging a dead horse. The real usefulness of the NEFA enquiry lies not in fault-finding, but in paving the way to a

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proper reconditioning of the armed forces *vis-a-vis* the task they face on the country's borders. It is on this aspect and on the efforts made by Government since November last to make good the deficiencies of the Army that the debate in this House could most purposefully focus the attention of the country.

Before I sit down, may I quote a few words of wisdom addressed by Sir Winston Churchill to the House of Commons in June, 1940, after the shattering military disaster of Dunkirk. This is what he said, and what he said has a lesson for us too:

"I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot afford it.

"Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past. There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments,—and of Parliaments, for they are in it too,—during the years which led up to this catastrophe.

"They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future."

**Shri Heda** (Nizamabad): Mr. Speaker, what surprises me most is that two basic factors are ignored by the Opposition when speaking on NEFA or similar matters: They are the duration and the course of this war. A massive attack on our soil by Chinese Army took place in October last. I happened to be in Cainsville

in Florida at that time and they asked my reaction. I said that war between China and India had started; it is not going to last less than five years; it may last even 25 years. So, we have to think of this affair, not as a single incident which is complete or which has ended but we have to think of NEFA or Sela or Bomdila as one of the first event in the war that is going on between China and India. In the initial stages it is the aggressor who has got the obvious advantages. He is well prepared for it. However mighty or armed an army might be, it cannot have that advantage which an aggressor has got as the Chinese were aggressors, they got those advantages. So, the reverses we had at Bomdila or Sela should not be exaggerated.

The second factor is the character of our Army. Our Army is known for its daring, valour and courageous stand. If you happen to be in the UK, every other man seems to know something about our Army; they have a high word for the Fourth Division: it has a great name all over the world. The point is that this division or for that matter the entire Army was formed not for defensive purposes but rather for offensive purposes. It went to Africa, Europe, Burma, Singapore, Malaya and so many places to take offensive: it knew to fire and march forward. Here, for the first time they were confronted with a situation where they had to sit, stand and wait and then fire. This was an entirely new strategy which they had to face and in my opinion they faced it very well. You cannot mention Sela and forget Chushul. In Chushul we fared far better and we showed our superiority, courage and valour because there we had the experience and we had been entrenched for a long time. But at Sela, 14000 feet high altitude, the Army had hardly reached that place when they had to face difficulties. At such altitudes it is not so easy to acclimatise oneself, especially for people from the plains.

Then why did the Chinese cease fire? No Member of the Opposition dealt with it. After covering such a long terrain and reaching Sela or even Foothills, why did they not march forward? The reason is: they saw how the country got agitated and stood as one man; it was not bullied and it took a firm decision to fight back. The Chinese had therefore no other alternative but to cease fire. They had sent a good number of forces upto Sela: their supply line between Sela and Walong was very thin and therefore it was not possible for them to hold a long time.

So many stories have been said by friends from the Opposition and I was surprised that they did not refer to the most important part. I do not know whether it is a fact or not. That is immaterial but what is material is how people feel and react to it. Is it not in the knowledge of Mr. Prakash Vir Shastri that when Gen. Chaudhuri was appointed, his first task was to fly to Gauhati and to ask our Army men to go back to Tezpur. He brushed the question of shifting the headquarters from Tezpur to Siliguri. This was an act which created a tremendous feeling in Army, in Gauhati also: I was in Assam for more than a fortnight along with other Members of Parliament. It had a great impact on our Army and the civilian population and they were prepared to give a very good fight. I know General Chaudhuri well as he had been in Hyderabad for a long time. I casually met him but did not try to find out the truth because what is material is the impression you create. On that day when Chaudhuri came on the scene and took the command, the entire psychology was changed and they were confident that they would go on from victory to victory.

In this context, you will have to see certain other things too. My hon. friend Shri Bhakt Dharshan referred to the recruitment. For some historical reasons, so good and some not so good, the British Government recruited people for the Army from a parti-

cular region and some particular castes. Now a days, we find the same thing. A number of persons from other areas were refused though their health was good and they had the necessary height, chest measurements, etc., and they were quite satisfactory. When people from Assam demanded a recruiting centre, a centre was started but again recruitment did not take place.

**Shrimati Jyotsna Chanda (Cachar):** Recruitment is going on in Assam.

**Shri Heda:** I am saying that the number recruited is not satisfactory. There is a good reason for it. What I am saying is that when the people from the new regions, from where the recruitment was not taking place, offer themselves, we should give them preference. When people from the new castes and communities which were not known as martial communities or castes come forward, we should give some preference to them because they are the people who have departed from their ordinary run of life, the life of their ancestors, and they want to join the army to serve the country and die for the country. Therefore, that enthusiasm and determination goes very long. From this angle, we should make the necessary changes in this regard.

No doubt, what happened at Sela or Bomdila was not a good thing. But it agitated the entire country. I found a very important change coming among the people of Assam. The people of Assam, as you know, had never seen war for the last many centuries, may be 10 or 20 centuries. Even in the last war, Netaji did come there with the Indian National Army for a short time . . . (interruption).

**Mr. Speaker:** Order, order.

**Shri Heda:** Netaji did come there, and even the Britishers and American soldiers were stationed there. But the actual fight which Punjab had experienced, which Rajasthan had experi-

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enced, which these border States had experienced, has not been experienced by Assam. I am not casting any aspersions. I come from a State which also did not experience any war for the last many centuries. So, that is not the point. The point is that the people have a particular outlook in a border State and the people have a different outlook in a State which is not a border State.

**Mr. Speaker:** Order, order. There is talking across the Benches.

**Shri Heda:** Now, Assam has become a border State and I am very happy to find that Assam has got an outlook of a border State which is prepared to die for the country, and it is becoming a martial race. I am quite certain that in the future annals of our history, Assam will have a great role. The Assamese generally are peace-loving by nature. But today the Assamese is entirely different. He has awakened; he is conscious of his weakness; he has the preparedness to defend, and he is anxious to overcome any difficulty. If you look at any young Assamese boy or girl, you will feel convinced that Assam has entirely changed today. Their youth is fearless and is ready to face any eventuality. The Assam State can be a good ground for recruitment to our army, navy and air force. They have some of our finest talents. The people are already awake and are in a militant mood. They are happy to sacrifice their all for the freedom of the country. This is a very big advantage. I am quite certain that the psychology created in Assam and all over the country has been a great boon, and with that psychology as an asset, the future course of the war between India and China—history will see and we will see—will be in favour of us, and we will show ourselves far better.

**Shri Nath Pai (Rajapur):** Mr. Speaker, Sir, I feel no sense of elation or enthusiasm in participating in today's debate because the subject-matter of today's discussion is perhaps

the saddest chapter in the history of free India. We are discussing the failure of the Government to prevent aggression and to defend the frontiers of the country. It is true that we do not in anyway share the blame or responsibility for the tragedy that befell our country; nonetheless the stigma of dishonour on our motherland attaches and clings to all of us alike. I am, however, encouraged to speak for, there is the old adage of our forefathers who have said this—and that it the natural difficulty in which many of us find ourselves today:

मूलभाः पृथ्वाः रात्रन् सततं प्रियवादिन्ः  
अप्रियस्य पश्यस्य च वक्ता श्रोता च दुर्लभः"।।

I trust that the Defence Minister will be taking the few submissions that I have to make to him in this light.

Though the Defence Minister has tried to take this House into confidence and to make available to us some of the findings, he was, I think, held back by his loyalty to his colleagues. But I want this to be submitted to you: that it is the right of this House to be told the whole truth. I am not going to defend my case or base my plea on the promise the Prime Minister made on the floor of the Rajya Sabha alone, but I do plead that Parliament is entitled to know the whole truth. And his persistence in withholding from Parliament all that it is entitled to know, apart from being an insupportable encroachment on Parliament's prerogatives and perhaps a calculated contempt of its authority, only strengthens the suspicion that the Government dare not tell the people the whole truth and face the consequences. The Government have vested interest in suppressing the truth, and the specious and unconvincing plea is used—the plea of national interests is used—to shield the Government's own vulnerability to the charge of having failed in its elementary duty to defend this country.

Having said this, I would like to ask the Defence Minister a few questions

which arise out of the statement which he has placed on the Table of the House. First, were all those who were concerned with the defence of our country during those fateful days—were all of them—examined by this Committee? Was the Prime Minister examined? Was the then Defence Minister examined? It is true that no minutes are maintained, no records are maintained, of some very important top-level conferences that took place among the Defence Minister and senior military officials. I would like to know what transpired at a meeting on the 17th October. What was the estimate made? No security is involved in this, and I am going to talk something about security.

I should also like to get an answer to this question: were all relevant documents made available to this commission? Had they access to all the relevant material? Were anybody who wanted to depose allowed to depose before this commission? And finally, what does the commission tell us, apart from what has been included in the statement of the present Defence Minister? Does the commission fasten any responsibility on anybody for what has happened? Does it completely absolve political leadership for the debacle in NEFA? If at all he holds himself responsible, the answers must be provided to these questions, and it is for this reason that I tell him once again: Shri Chavan, yesterday, with a degree of success, has resisted this demand for a further enquiry. I would plead with him that this country will not rest content, you will not have heard the last on the demand for an enquiry, till a full presidential enquiry is instituted and we all know all that has happened.

Do not level this charge of witch-hunting. Witch-hunting, persecution, victimisation, are against the very grain of our national character. It runs counter; it is repugnant to the spirit of tolerance which permeates our democracy. It is only because we seek to put an end to witch-hunting, because we want that the clouds of suspicion and doubt do not fall on those

who may be innocent, that we demand this full enquiry. It is the only way of defending those who may be innocent. Let us not have witch-hunting; it is bad but white-washing is worse. But I would like to tell the Government that in war ultimately discipline and the morale of the army are part of the whole defence apparatus. What is going to happen to their morale, to the discipline which is geared to this apparatus? Already I hear the impression is getting round that when a General may lose the battle—all that happens is this—he will be transferred from one job to another job. This will be an extremely dangerous precedent. I am not going to talk about any individual. It has never interested me in the past; it does not interest me now. But these are matters of very vital import to us. They cannot be brushed aside by raising a false plea.

However, what the report discloses is such an alarming, shocking state of unpreparedness that imagination shudders at the contemplation of what the whole truth may be like. In brief, this statement of the Defence Minister admits that because of sheer incompetence, because of an almost insane obstinacy and immeasurable irresponsibility on the part of those who were charged with the defence of the country, the once proud army was subjected to the humiliation of being beaten on its own soil. The nation's pride was wounded; its honour compromised, its very existence as a free nation endangered. Mr. Chavan's statement admits that such an injury was inflicted on this nation, but it refuses to disclose who were responsible for this injury and this anxiety is there under the pretext of national security. This anxiety to shield the guilty is paraded as being the paramount necessity of national security. The public must be kept in the dark in public interest—indeed extraordinary logic!

13 hrs.

About security, I should like to ask a few pertinent questions. The Prime

[Shri Nath Pai]

Minister speaking in the debate on foreign affairs observed that there is a China lobby in this country. He deplored it by saying "unfortunately, there is a China lobby in this country". The strongest expression this master of English language can find to describe the existence of organised treason is "unfortunate". It is our misfortune that his reactions to these vital matters like treason and defence have of late become so lukewarm, so watery. I would like to ask him now this thing about this China lobby. Is it not a fact, or are we once again indulging in witch-hunting, that there is a China lobby working in the Foreign Ministry? Would he deny that there is a China lobby working—I will quote somebody now—in the Defence Ministry? Would this Government be bold enough to tell the people of this country that there is not a Chinese cell, a pro-Chinese cell in every secretariat, active, organised, and masterminded? Mr. Rawle Knox... (*Interruptions.*)

I heard this kind of absurd interruptions; the same little group interrupted me, when I was speaking on the same defence debate. When I said that there was no ammunition, no command, no shoes and no arms, they got up in a chorus and said, "No, no, no". Mr. Chavan had to say "Yes, yes, yes" after six months. So, be careful before interrupting me.

I would like to say also that this security business is raised to rob Parliament of its right. But the rest of the world knows—we are not happy that it knows, but it is a fact that the rest of the world knows. I want a categorical answer from the Defence Minister about this disclosure which first appeared in a Bombay paper, and we were all worried. We have nothing to do with the ethics or politics of any paper. But when a matter touching upon the defence of the country is involved, we all get necessarily agitated and concerned. It was said that the photostat copy of a certain map pointing some of our new airstrips, which

were being built, including where the new radar installations will be put up, was made available. It is now denied by one Ministry that any such map was made. I would like to know from the Defence Minister whether the map existed or not and whether it was smuggled out or not. If it is so, why do you try to protect anybody by saying that they are not existing? Whose purpose is served by these interruptions, I do not understand. We can all be together, I think, in having an interest in security, in seeing that no potential enemy knows anything about our country.

I should now like to come to another aspect. From the Defence Minister's statement, certain pertinent points arise. Mr. Chavan's statement, pinpointing this extraordinary state of unpreparedness of this country, says that there were no arms even for training, much less for defence; there was no proper orientation; there was no transport; there were no proper roads, no equipment, no intelligence, no leadership, no command. All these elements which make up the complex pattern of the apparatus of modern defence were missing. Nothing was available, which forms the fighting arm of the country. Only, we had a very active Defence Minister and a very expensive Defence Ministry! In spite of these vital deficiencies, each of which would have destroyed the fighting capacity of any army, our soldiers fought valiantly and bravely at Walong and Chushul against a foe, against an adversary who was better equipped and had every advantage in inclement weather and in an unaccustomed terrain. That is a matter on which the whole nation can be legitimately proud. It only shows that basically our armed forces are sound and are capable of great deeds of heroism and sacrifice in the honour of our country, provided they are properly led and properly equipped.

The report admits an extraordinary state of unpreparedness so far as the

defence of the country is concerned. How did it come to happen? The Prime Minister, whenever an occasion came, was assuring the country how thoroughly we were prepared. Some Members have already referred to it. Those words were ringing in my ears, because I took comfort when he told us that the House need not be anxious. I remember in reply to a question of mine in April, 1962, he said—the next day it became banner headline, because everybody was happy to have this assurance from his lips—when I asked, "What is your overall estimate? Where do we stand with regard to this danger?", he said, "Broadly speaking, generally speaking, the military balance has tilted in our favour". That was said in April, 1962. May I read out the whole thing? He said,

"We have always attached a great importance to NEFA border for various reasons and we have succeeded in protecting it adequately."

How well it was protected till the hour of trial came! Till then it was very ably protected. Time and again we were having these assurances:

"Nobody is left unconnected with the base and therefore weakened. Everything is being done. If I may make a broad statement, I think the situation has broadly changed progressively in our favour."

This is another statement.

I must be fair to the man principally charged with our defence. It will be the height of impertinence not to refer to the assurances given by the then Defence Minister. The then Defence Minister told the Rajya Sabha:

"With regard to explosives, for the first time, this country is likely to be self-sufficient."

Shri Krishna Menon, in the Lok Sabha debate on 9th April, said:

"Therefore, to say that Government is oblivious of these

matters, that it shows lack of concern, that there are no shoes, no warm clothing, to say such a thing is improper."

Every time an anxious enquiry was made by this side—of course, I have to draw a line somewhere here—either we were ridiculed or a false kind of statement was made that everything was all right.

May I now ask, who perpetuated this tremendous fraud on this country that the country was prepared to take up any enemy from any quarter? Now, they come round and tell us—three different pleas are advanced: (a) We did not have the money; (b) we were taken by surprise; and (c) the army command was Sandhurst-oriented. I want to raise four pertinent questions today. Who underestimated the Chinese menace? Who kept on telling the country that the country was prepared? Who was responsible for the state of complete unpreparedness later on discovered? Who then struck a posture of impregnability, of being almighty in face of this unpreparedness?

I will take up the question of money now. Mr. Chavan has referred to it yesterday and made my task easy. He said, it is true we return money year after year, but every Ministry does that. Is that an adequate explanation? Is the responsibility of other Ministries as onerous as that of your office? Is it the same thing to us that the money is returned because a factory was not built and money is returned because a strategic road is not built? Are these two things on a par? For nine years, money was being returned at the rate—I have calculated it—of 7 per cent of the grants that were voted by this House, on an average. But that is not my charge. The main thing is, again and again, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister and every spokesman and everybody who takes up the responsibility on himself of defending the Prime Minister, tells us that we had to make a choice between prior-

[Shri Nath Pai ]

ities for defence and for development. When did they come to this House? When did they come with a blueprint, with a White Paper giving the details of their requirements? When did this House commit the crime of saying "no" to them? When did we reduce even by a single naya paisa the demands of the Defence Ministry? This remains perhaps the only Parliament in the world where every grant of the Defence Ministry has been voted unanimously for not one year but for 17 long years. But still they will come round and tell us that we do not have the money. Did you ask for it? Did we deny it? Were you ever short? But the plea is raised. What a sense of gratitude and fair-play to this House which has been so co-operative with the Government in these matters!

Now, there is this plea about being taken by surprise. 12 years of warnings are not sufficient for this Government to be awakened to its sense of duty. The Prime Minister said, in a quotation which I referred to earlier, that we were seized of this question from 1950. May I now ask a few questions? Can this plea of the Prime Minister made in the House that we were taking note and living up to it since 1950 be reconciled with the present claim of the Government that we were taken by surprise? Was not the warning given by the rape of Tibet a warning to this country? Were not the outrages committed at Kinzema, Longju, Bara Hoti and Chip Chap Valley enough warnings to us? Was not bloodshed caused in the Chip Chap Valley when Karan Singh and his brave soldiers were ambushed a warning in 1959? Were not there the writings of Mao Tse-tung? Did we completely forget the first message he sent to the then chief of the Communist Party, Mr. Ranadive: "We hope before long your country will be liberated"? What did it mean, sending a message to the then chief of the Communist Party, after the Republic of India is proclaimed, saying "We hope your country will be liberated

soon"? Have not we read that Mr. Mao Tse-tung in one of his writings said that China will reclaim her old territories of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, and China will resurrect itself? Had he not been telling us how he proposes to do it? And, what about the maps which were being changed demanding greater and greater chunks of our national territory? Were these not warnings? After 12 years of every possible manifestation of the enemy's evil intention towards this country, after 12 years of his mounting enmity, of his increasing bellicosity, this Government has the cheek to turn round and tell us that we were taken by surprise by the suddenness of the enemy's attack. Do they expect the Chinese to announce their intention with a beat of drums as we are used to announce the arrival of our leaders in the villages? The Chinese had done everything possible to warn us.

The truth of the matter is that this Government did not understand, did not realise, did not grasp the true dimensions and the magnitude, the true significance and the meaning of the menace posed by Chinese expansionism. The reasons are very simple. They are intelligent people; among the most intelligent people in the world we can rank some of them. But what happened then? Why did they in spite of all this allow themselves to be so miserably misled by Chinese professions of friendship? The reason is very simple. They were the victims of their own slogan. They were prisoners of their own political preferences and prejudices. They were paralysed by their pusillanimity, they were hypnotised by their credulity, by their gullibility. It was the failure of our political leadership from which flow our military failures. These military failures were inescapable corollaries to the political myopia and jaundice from which our leadership was then suffering. The Government had no military appreciation of the danger, of the challenge from China. They failed to ask themselves the most obvious questions and

adopt the most elementary precautions and measures. They never asked themselves what anybody could have asked themselves.

How was the average Indian, when this development took place, reacting? When the tragedy of Karan Singh and his jawans was known, I know how an average Indian felt, how a typical Indian felt. He felt the shame of it, he felt the anger of it, he felt the challenge of it. A very young poet of Mahabubnagar has put this in these two lines—pardon me Sir, for quoting my mother tongue:

“अभिमान धरूँ वनिदान करूँ  
 ध्वज ऊँच ऊँच चढ़ूँ  
 उत्तुंग आतुंचा उत्तर गोमा  
 इंच इंच लड़ूँ”

Those leaders who used to inspire us have ceased to inspire us any more but it would have been wonderful if we would have found an echo of it, of what an average Indian was feeling, in the minds, in the hearts of some of our leaders. But even that was denied to us. The Government, as I was saying, did not understand the Chinese menace. It never asked this simple question: what are the enemy's aims and objectives, what is his economic potential, what is his industrial potential, what is his strategy, what are his techniques, how long can he wage a war and how long can he hold the war. Logistically it is possible to make out replies to all these questions and prepare adequately. But there was no military appreciation and there was therefore no preparation.

Then what happened, I would like to ask. The results known to us. Did not the army headquarters order an exercise in 1959? Did not the Eastern Command carry on, what is called, an army exercise? What were the conclusions of? What were the inferences drawn? What were the lessons drawn? What were the demands that these army exercises made assuming that the Chinese would

have attacked? Whether the Chinese would attack or not was left to the political leadership to decide. But the army men recommended that if the enemy attacked our forward positions would crumble and ultimately Tawang was bound to fall. They also suggested how they could prevent it. What happened to those recommendations? Who filed it as irresponsible, rubbish non-sense? Who pigeon-holed them and who caught us napping? We want answers to these questions. This is not witch-hunting for us, this is our legitimate right to know. We want to know what happened? How were we caught napping? How were we submitted to this humiliation of being beaten so easily?

When Namka Chu fell—may I take your indulgence, Sir—I do not know if the agony and anguish of this humiliation was felt by our leaders as keenly as an average Indian was feeling when the tragedy of Namka Chu river went like a shudder piercing the heart of India. A young poetess puts it in these words. These are the words of the soldiers massacred there.

“We die unsuccoured, helpless,  
 We were your soldiers, men of  
 bravery and drive,

Yet we die like animals, trapped  
 in a cage with no escape,

Massacred at will, denied the dig-  
 nity of a battle,

With the cold burning flame of  
 anger and resolution,

With the courage both of the  
 living and the dead,

Redeeming the un-redeemable  
 sacrifice in freedom and integrity,  
 This is your inheritance, this is  
 our unwritten epitaph.”

This is what happened at Namka Chu. Was it necessary it should have happened? Four committees went through the problem of the Chinese threat and tried to warn the country.

[Shri Nath Pai]

No preparations were made, and it is no surprise that we came to the debate, to the defeat to which we were submitted.

They say that we were unprepared. May I ask one question? Is it not a fact that the late Dr. Rajendra Prasad after his tour of South East Asia and, particularly, of Japan, gave a warning to the Government regarding the intentions of China? Was it heeded? Was it taken into consideration? Did we try to act upon it? The truth of the matter here again is that we were not prepared because we did not want to be prepared, we did not like to be prepared, we were afraid of being prepared, we were afraid that our preparations will provoke the Chinese. And, that was the main hindrance, fear of provoking China by being prepared for our defence. Added to this double-mindedness regarding China was this concern about world peace. The Government was constantly suffering from this anxiety that a Sino-Indian conflict may somehow trigger off a world conflagration. Our Government had done well in preventing many a flare-up in quite a few parts of the world. The pursuit of peace was a legitimate aim. But we should have always remembered that this pursuit of peace near at home was rewarded by the unrelenting, treacherous enmity of China. We said that if we want to preserve peace we must be ready for war. We remembered this truism in relation to our policy with Pakistan. But when it came to China we were hypnotised into inactivity by our concern that this may somehow bring the whole world into the holocaust of nuclear war. This was deceiving ourselves; this was battering ourselves, that is, that what we do to defend our border somehow could bring out on the head of the world a whole world war, a nuclear war.

What was happening was that somehow a once vibrant....

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member's time is up.

Shri Nath Pai: I would claim a few minutes more with you because I would like to say something about the other statement also. I was talking so far about the first statement that Shri Chavan made and you would like me to take some note of the other statement too. But I will be very brief now and try to conclude.

I was saying as to what happened to this once vibrant, vital leadership. May I say in all humility that one gets the impression—all the time I began to get it and feel worried when from the lips of the hon. Prime Minister I heard that not a blade of grass grows there on the Himalaya.

इमां सागरपर्यन्ताम हिमवत् विध्यकुंडलाम्

That is how my forefathers and his forefathers sang about this land and when we heard that this prayer is to be put to ridicule by saying "not a blade of grass grows", it came as a shock. What happened was that there was a thrombosis of the will on the part of some of our leaders. There was a thickening of the emotional arteries and that was the cause of all the mischief, all the misfortune and all the tragedy that befell our country. It was this thickening of the emotional arteries and this thrombosis of the will on the part of our leadership.

Now I will turn, having said this, to the future. Shri Chavan has made a statement regarding our preparation also. I would like to ask a few questions. After eleven months of negotiations and after a dozen delegations the fact remains that we do not have a single interceptor plane worth the name which is an addition to what we had before the invasion came. He has made a good beginning, but I must say this. Let us not deceive ourselves with the illusion that massive aid is coming from anywhere. We will have to depend on ourselves. But we must be here again careful of insidious propaganda regarding self-sufficiency. This plea of self-sufficiency

can be seductively tempting and we must beware that we do not fall once again into the trap of being unprepared in the garb of being told that this is self-sufficiency. We must get in the meanwhile arms and weapons wherever we can get them from subject, of course, to our national self-respect. We want nobody's favour, nobody's charity but what we can afford we must try to get from every where and every corner. That should be the policy with regard to it.

Regarding the whole defence apparatus, I would like to plead with the hon. Defence Minister that we must have a new approach to the entire Himalayan belt. Too long we have neglected that belt. Now we must try to infuse new life and new spirit. The people in that area must not be treated as we have tended to treat them so far. The Verrier Elwin philosophy must be abandoned whatever the loyalty of the hon. Prime Minister to that philosophy. It has done great damage to this country. These people must be integrated into the rest of the country. They must be invited to join in this mighty adventure of defending their and our common motherland. That will be one aspect.

It is my estimate—I claim no authority at all to be a military expert—that on an average if we want to meet significantly, purposefully and meaningfully the twin challenge from China and Pakistan, we shall have to make the sacrifices even if it may mean a tightening of the belt for raising at least 14 to 16 combat ready divisions. Then only we will be able to give a meaningful reply to the machinations of the Chinese and their new allies, the Pakistanis.

May I say that it is absolutely necessary that we give up our pathetic belief that by talking the language of reasonableness we will bring China to the path of sweet reason. You and I believe and worship at the shrine of the Buddha and of Krishna. The enemy believes that power speaks through the barrel of the gun and

that war is a continuation of politics by other means. He worships at the shrine of Clausewitz and Machiavelli.

I will conclude by saying this only. Let us try to recapture the spirit of November 1962, the spirit of defiance in the face of defeat, the spirit of unbending will, the spirit of an unbreakable resolve to fight unto victory is won. Let the hon. Defence Minister remember this thing. Let him not allow himself to be deterred and detracted by insidious propaganda. He is facing a chastened India but an awakened India. This nation now is ready to make any sacrifices provided the sacrifices are demanded to redeem the tarnished honour of our country and not to bolster and sustain in office and authority proved incompetence. Let us refuse to follow the mirage of, what is called, the Colombo proposals. Let us remember that beyond, what is called, the actual line of control, lies also India. We must try to redeem these lost territories. We must endeavour to extend the writ of the Tricolour to these lost territories.

This is the summons of history and to those who will have the courage, the vision to keep this trust with destiny, this country will give everything. It will give money, arms and, perhaps, the most precious thing in its possession, its sons and daughters.

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee** (Ratnagiri): Mr. Speaker, Sir, while recognising the unquestionable right of Parliament to examine all policies and actions of Government, I submit that this right does not go to the extent where hon. Members of this House can question the internal organisational functioning of the executive. Unless they can substantiate their word with authoritative and official documents, such words have no meaning. I appreciate your ruling that in the House the standard of this debate, the trend of this debate has gone down to such an extent that we have singled out individuals on flimsy and uncertain evidence. I would

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expect hon. Members of this House to recognise the dignity of this House and only use such evidence as they can substantiate and produce with some authority.

13.28 hrs.

[MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER in the Chair]

We are debating the statement of the hon. Defence Minister on our NEFA reverses and his later statement of the 9th September regarding our defence preparedness. Are we competent, on the information available to us, to assess the performance and responsibility of persons who have undoubtedly played a very significant role prior to our reverses in NEFA? With emphasis I would say 'Not; definitely not'. We are concerned in this debate with (a) the policies, performances and decisions of the Government as a whole with regard to the defence of this country; (b) the Government's plans and policies for future defence preparedness; and (c) with the problem of whether or not the Government is today settling about in the right way to provide an efficient and well-equipped defence force for the future security of our country. Therefore I consider that it is the function of Members of Parliament to comment and debate on this and this alone.

The statement of the hon. Defence Minister refers to the military inquiry. He has stated quite clearly the scope of this military inquiry. It pertains to the actions and conduct of the officers and jawans in NEFA. I would like to know whether one can assess and apportion responsibility to the people in the field without linking up such responsibility with the chain of things which go behind the orders or the conduct which they are responsible for on the field of action. I have met friends who had been in the NEFA action, whom I have known for a long time, and I can guess a little of their feelings and their reactions, and it is of them

that I think now, and of the hundreds of others, some of whom I have visited in hospitals, and I would like to say a few words for them now. One of these, a young captain in an Assam hospital said to me 'You are a Member of Parliament. Go and tell them about us'. So, I hope, this will be my small contribution towards ensuring the future success of these men.

Before I go into the more important aspects of the subject under discussion, I would like to refer to a few of the remarks made by my hon. friend on the opposite side of the House, for whom I have some respect, and for whose intelligence also I have respect. He mentioned yesterday that there should be Indianisation of the minds of officers. Secondly, he said that there should be greater mixing between officers and jawans, the officers and the other ranks. I can only say to my hon. friend that he is labouring under a gross misconception. I can say with some knowledge that the sense of patriotism and nationalism in the Armed Forces and other ranks is of the highest order, and it is of the highest order I have ever come across in any country. As an example of this, I would like to say from personal experience that if anyone helps and looks after the widows and children of the men who have died in the Armed Forces, it is the Armed Forces themselves. In the Air Force—I know that similar conditions exist in the Army—there is a benevolent fund. There are schools, and there are maternity centres. These are subscribed for by the other ranks and by the officers. Is this not love of their country and love of their people?

As for greater mixing between the officers and jawans, I do not know if my hon. friend knows that not only do the officers who are young enough to take part in games like foot-ball, hockey and other things play with the jawans and the other ranks, but the wives of officers also do a considera-

ble amount of welfare work in the maternity centres and schools.

**Shrimati Renu Chakravartty** (Barrackpore): What happens in the club and the mess?

**Shri S. M. Banerjee** (Kanpur): What about the club?

**Shri Ravindra Varma** (Thiruvella): The hon. Member opposite seems to be more interested in clubs than in defence.

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee**: I am referring to the jawans. I am not referring to the officers.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath**: The hon. Member said that there was mixing.

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee**: I am referring to the mixing between the officers and jawans and the role played by even the families of officers.

There is another point that I would like to bring out. Perhaps the House is unaware that there is a school here in the Safdarjang area, in the Race Course Air Force Camp where the officers' children and the jawans' children are educated together. Would you say that this is not social integration between officers and jawans and officers and airmen? I hope that in the future there will be a chance for a greater mixing of parliamentarians with the service personnel.

This inquiry, I submit, was undertaken not only to review all past failures but to ensure our future success. Now, what does success mean to the Armed Forces? It means only one thing, namely victory. And what is it that is at stake. It is the life of the jawan and the life of the officer. It does not depend upon the money that you spend; it does not depend upon the money that this House sanctions or the country sanctions, but depends upon only one thing; it depends on the heightened sense of national glory and patriotism, and the only

people who can give it to these men is you and I and the whole country.

I would submit to you that I have seen wounded men, limbless men who are sent out with a small pension. There is no further recognition of their valour and their heroism. There is no attempt made to resettle or re-employ or rehabilitate these men. Do you except these men to give up their lives just because this House and the country are able to give enough money towards it? You will have to give more than that. You will not only have to infuse them and inspire them with national glory and a sense of heroism and patriotism, but you will have to be prepared to give your sons, and you will have to be prepared to give your husbands. I would like to know how many of us are doing that. I do not like reference being made time and again to the fact that we have sanctioned so much money, and the question being asked the army has not done any better. Sir, victories do not depend upon the money that you spend. Therefore, I would like to see in this country at least some amount of effort made towards the care and rehabilitation of the wounded, as I have seen in other countries. And I would like to see in this country some amount of appreciation given to the men of the Armed Forces, not the ones who are high-ranking officers, but the ones who are invalided out, the ones who are limbless, and the widows and the children of the men of the Armed Forces. Give them some recognition, and show them some appreciation. Then only you will infuse them with some kind of heroism and some kind of patriotism. You cannot say just because you have poured some money, that you have a right to their lives.

I say again that the standard of heroism and patriotism among our officers is the highest I have seen in any country.

The Defence Minister has made a reference to our defence preparedness

[Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee]

and has assured us that he will give his special attention to the training, equipment, and the increase in the strength of the Armed Forces and so on. I would like to say here that I notice that there is no reference at all to the overall departmental re-organisation of the defence organisation. I do not mean the service headquarters or the service organisation, but I mean the service headquarters and the service organisation together with the Defence Ministry. I say that the Defence Ministry's strength has increased in proportion to the Armed Force's strength. I do not know whether that is a good thing. In other countries, the tendency is towards centralising authority. In our country, it seems that the tendency is towards diffusing authority. And when it comes to the point, there is always a tendency to pass on the file, and for Peter to blame Paul. Even now, when our country has faced this failure, we are not prepared to apportion responsibility. Why not? Why are we not prepared to apportion responsibility? Why do we stop at the first hurdle? If we cannot have clarity of thought, if we are not prepared to delegate responsibility, if we are not prepared to apportion responsibility, then I do not think that we can ....

**Shri Sham Lal Saraf** (Jammu and Kashmir): Responsibility for what? I want that the hon. Member should be clear about it.

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee**: Responsibility for the failures which occurred in the NEFA debacle.

**Shri Morarka** (Jhunjhunu): It is clear now?

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee**: The inquiry refers to the military reverses in NEFA.

**Shri Nambiar** (Tiruchirappalli): This House should take the responsibility.

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee**: The Defence Minister said in his reply yesterday in the Upper House that if the inquiry was intended to fix responsibility for the disaster, its whole nature would have changed. I beg to differ from him. I consider that unless you apportion responsibility, we cannot go any further. I would request him, therefore, not to balk at the first hurdle. It is necessary for him and for the service headquarter to apportion responsibility.

I think success depends on two things. One is the will to be successful and the other—a very important thing—is that there should be an efficient organisation. I am sure we have the will to succeed. The Defence Minister has also assured us that he will personally see that able leadership is provided in the armed forces. I do not think training in leadership is necessary so much as the ability to spot leadership, to bypass routine methods of promotion, if necessary, as it happened in the last war when the Battle of Britain and so on was won by young people. It may be necessary to bypass the routine procedure of promotions and to put a man who is fit for the job in the right place, and, what is more, delegate authority to him, give the right of decision to him, and if he goes wrong, then apportion the responsibility.

Therefore, the first thing is that there should be able leadership in the armed forces. If you are going to have able leadership, you must also delegate responsibility. You must be able to give them the right to decide. And when the man makes a mistake, he takes the rap.

The second thing is that there should be efficient organisation of the overall defence organisation, which means not just our forces, but the Defence Ministry as a whole. There should be not more co-ordination but more centralisation of authority, so that when we want to find out who

has gone wrong somewhere, we will not have to search for him.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** The hon. Member's time is up. There are 18 Members from the Congress Party alone who wish to speak.

**Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee:** In conclusion, I would just put two points to the Defence Minister. First of all, the inquiry should not be limited to the conduct and performance of the officers and jawans on the field only. It should be a comprehensive inquiry. I would like to know if he has done this. I do not want to know the findings, but I would like to know whether it is a comprehensive inquiry which included the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. Secondly, I do hope that he has apportioned responsibility wherever necessary.

With these words, I express my general support of the Government's policy.

**श्री रघुनाथ सिंह (वाराणसी) :** उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, मेने इस प्रस्ताव को जब सदन के सम्मुख नोटिस के लिय रक्खा तो श्री चह्वाण ने जो सुन्दर स्टेटमेंट १३ पृष्ठों का दिया है मैं उस के एक एक शब्द और एक एक लाइन को बहुत गौर से देखने लगा। लेकिन बहुत गौर से देखने के बाद भी इस में एक चीज हमें नहीं प्राप्त हुई। जहां तक सेना का सम्बन्ध है, आर्मी, नेवी और एअर फोर्स यह तीन शक्तियां हैं, लेकिन इस डिफेन्स प्रिपेयर्डनेस में कहीं भी नेवी का नाम नहीं है।

**श्री अन्सार हरबानी (विसौला) :** नेफा में नेवी क्यों नहीं भजी जाती।  
 (Interruption).

**श्री रघुनाथ सिंह :** इट इज ए मैटर आफ प्रिपेयर्डनेस, नाट नेफा। इसलिये इसका सम्बन्ध हमारी तैयारी से है। सुरक्षा की तैयारी से है। श्री अन्सार हरबानी

को इसे समझना चाहिये। इस का सम्बन्ध सिर्फ नेफा से नहीं है और हर वक्त समा-लोचना करना ठीक नहीं होता।

मैं इसलिये नेवी पर अधिक जोर देना चाहता हूं कि आज से दो वर्ष पहले चीन इस विश्व में पांचवीं सामुद्रिक शक्ति था लेकिन आज वह विश्व में चौथी सामुद्रिक शक्ति है। हमारी सामुद्रिक सीमा करीब ३ हजार मील लम्बी है। इस सीमा के साथ साथ हमारा एक्सपोर्ट और इम्पोर्ट ६६.५० परसेन्ट केवल समुद्र द्वारा होता है। इसलिये हम को अपनी सुरक्षा व्यवस्था को दो दृष्टियों से देखना चाहिये। एक तो सामुद्रिक सीमा की रक्षा दूसरे अगर युद्ध आरम्भ हो जाय तो कैसे हमारा एक्सपोर्ट और इम्पोर्ट ट्रेड जारी रहेंगा। दूसरे मुल्क हम को किस तरह से सहायता दे सकते हैं।

जैसा मैंने कहा, अगर आप सन १९६० के फिगर्स को देखेंगे, जो कि प्रकाशित फिगर्स हैं, छिपी हुई चीज नहीं है, तो रूस का प्रथम स्थान था, अमरीका का दूसरा स्थान था, इंग्लैंड का तीसरा स्थान था, फ्रांस का चौथा स्थान था और चीन का पांचवां स्थान था। सन् १९६० के बाद एक दूसरी चीज सामने आई और वह थी पाकिस्तान और चीन की सन्धि। जैसे जैसे पाकिस्तान और चाइना में सम्बन्ध बढ़ता गया, चीन ने अपनी नाविक शक्ति क्यों बढ़ाई, इस और हमें थोड़ा सा गौर करना चाहिये। सन् १९६० में चीन के पास ४०६ यूनिट (जहाज) थे। लेकिन सिर्फ दो वर्षों के अन्दर, हालांकि चीन को फार्मोसा पर हमला नहीं करना था, किमोय आइलैंड पर हमला नहीं करना था, कोई समस्या उस के सामने नहीं थी, लेकिन सन् १९६० में ४०६ यूनिट थे सन् १९६३ के अन्दर उन की तादाद हो गई ७७७ यूनिट। करीब करीब दूनी तादाद हो गई। उन्होंने अपनी सामुद्रिक शक्ति

[श्री रघुनाथ सिंह]

करीब करीब दूनी दो वर्ष के अन्दर बढ़ाई है वह किस के खिलाफ ?

इसके विपरीत हमें यह विचार करना चाहिये कि हिन्दुस्तान के पास क्या है। जो पब्लिशड आंकड़े हैं उन को देखने से पता चलता है कि हिन्दुस्तान के पास करीब ५० यूनिट हैं, पाकिस्तान के पास २७ यूनिट हैं और चाइना के पास ७७७ यूनिट हैं। अगर चाइना और पाकिस्तान की शक्ति एक हो जाती है, तो उन के यूनिट हो जाते हैं ८०४, अर्थात् दुनिया में वह तीसरी नैवल पावर हो सकती है, और वे हमें बड़ी अच्छी तरह से चैलेन्ज कर सकते हैं।

इसके बाद में आप का ध्यान आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ कि चाइना ने अपनी शक्ति कैसे बढ़ाई है। कुछ उस के उपर भी आप गौर करें। दो वर्षों के अन्दर उस ने जो शक्ति बढ़ाई है उस में सबमैरीन आदि का कितना भाग है इस को देखिये। सन् १९५७ में उस के पास १३ सबमैरीन्स थीं और आज २४ हैं, सन् १९५७ में उस के पास ५२ टारपीडो बोट्स थीं और आज १५० हैं। उस के पास सन् १९६० में एक भी सर्विस क्राफ्ट नहीं था, आज उस के पास ३५० हैं। गन बोट्स ४८ के स्थान पर आज ९९ हो गईं। इस प्रकार अगर हम देखें तो हमारी सामुद्रिक शक्ति पाकिस्तान और चीन के अनुपात में ६.५ प्रतिशत है। हम को विचार करना है कि क्या हम इस तरह से अपनी रक्षा करने में समर्थ हो सकेंगे।

मैं आपका ध्यान नेवी आफिसर्स और सोल्जर्स की तरफ आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ।

इस समय हिन्दुस्तान के पास कुल १६,००० नौसैनिक हैं, जिनमें १,४५०

अफसर हैं और १४,५५० रेटिग्ज हैं। पाकिस्तान के पास ७०० अफसर और ७००० रेटिग्ज हैं, और चाइना के पास आफिसर्स और रेटिग्ज ४८,००० हैं और मेरीन आफिसर्स और मेरीन मैन—जो कि एक दूसरी यूनिट है—२८,००० हैं, अर्थात् चाइना के पास इस समय ७६,००० आफिसर्स और सी सेलर्स हैं। अगर चाइना और पाकिस्तान मिल जायें तो उनकी मिली हुई शक्ति ८३,७०० सी आफिसर्स और से सेलर्स की होगी जब कि हिन्दुस्तान के पास केवल १६,००० आफिसर्स और रेटिग्ज हैं। अगर मैनपावर की दृष्टि से देखें तो चाइना और पाकिस्तान की मिली हुई शक्ति के मुकाबले हिन्दुस्तान की नेवल शक्ति १८ पर सेंट है।

मैं नौशक्ति की उपयोगिता की तरफ ध्यान आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ। आखिरकार चाइना और पाकिस्तान की सन्धि क्यों हुई। पाकिस्तान जानता है कि बिना सामुद्रिक शक्ति के वह ईस्ट पाकिस्तान की रक्षा करने में असमर्थ है। वैंस्ट पाकिस्तान से ईस्ट पाकिस्तान कारगो, सोलजर्स, टैंक प्लोट कैसे जा सकते हैं जब तक कि उसके पास सामुद्रिक शक्ति न हो। पाकिस्तान के एक जनरल ने कहा है कि अगर हम हिन्दुस्तान पर उस वक्त हमला कर देते जब कि चीन ने हिन्दुस्तान पर हमला किया था तो ईस्ट पाकिस्तान हमारे हाथ से निकल जाता। यह उनकी एक लाइन बहुत महत्वपूर्ण है।

पाकिस्तान समझता था कि अगर उसने उस वक्त बिना चीन से समझौता किए हुए हिन्दुस्तान पर हमला कर दिया तो ईस्ट पाकिस्तान उसके हाथ से निकल जाएगा। लिहाजा इस कमी ने उनको बाध्य किया कि वे चीन के साथ सन्धि करें क्योंकि ऐसा करने से उनके चीन की नेवल पावर से सहायता मिल सकती है। पाकिस्तान

जानता है कि अगर उसने हिन्दुस्तान पर हमला किया तो समझौता होने की सूरत में चीन उसकी सहायता के लिये आवेगा ताकि ईस्ट पाकिस्तान में वे वेस्ट पाकिस्तान में सामंजस्य रहे अगर उसकी सहायता ही सके और उसमें हिन्दुस्तान कोई रुकावट न डाल सके। इसलिये मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि हमारे सुरक्षा मंत्री जी को इस तरफ भी थोड़ा ध्यान देना चाहिये।

हमारे मिलिटरी के बड़े-बड़े एक्सपर्ट हैं। उनका विचार है कि आज नैवी की जरूरत नहीं है। उनका दिमाग उसी लाइन पर काम कर रहा है जिस पर कि एलाइड पावर्स का दिमाग अगस्त के १९४३ पहले काम कर रहा था। उस वक्त हिटलर भी यही समझता था कि एयरफोर्स सब से बड़ी चीज है। इसी प्रकार से यू० के० और यू० एस० ए० भी यही समझते थे कि एयरफोर्स सबसे बड़ी चीज है, और उसके बाद आर्मी है। लेकिन सन् १९४३ में जब रूजवैल्ट और चर्चिल साहब मिले तो उन्होंने कहा कि ऐसे काम नहीं चलेगा। हमारे सुरक्षा उत्पादन मंत्री श्री रघुरामैया साहब जानते हैं कि उसके बाद तीन वीक्स में अमरीका में एक डैस्ट्रायर तैयार होने लगा, दो वीक में एक लिबरटी शिप तैयार होने लगा और ६ महीने के अन्दर उत्तरी अफ्रीका में मोरक्को के पास एलाइड फोर्स ने लैंड किया और ६ महीने के अन्दर रामल को भ्रमना पड़ा। जर्मनी इटली की भी रक्षा न कर सके।

इटली में कैसे लैंड किया गया? नैवी से। फ्रांस में कैसे लैंड किया गया? नैवी से। हिटलर ने भी यही सोचा था कि हम एयरफोर्स से काम चला लेंगे, लेकिन हिटलर ने अपनी आखिरी बसीयत में क्या लिखा है वह पढ़िए। क्या आपने कभी यह सोचा है कि हिटलर ने क्यों और बड़े बड़े लोगों को छोड़ कर एडमिरल डानिट्ज को अपना सक्सेसर बनाया। हिटलर ने अनुभव किया कि जरमनी की हार का

सब से बड़ा कारण उसके पास नैवी का न होना था और नैवी न रहने से दूसरे मुल्कों से सम्बन्ध नहीं रह सका, और जब दूसरे मुल्कों से सम्बन्ध नहीं रह सका तो न कोई मदद आ सकती थी और न सामान आ सकता था, फल यह हुआ कि जरमनी धीरे धीरे सिंक करता गया। लिहाजा हिटलर ने अन्तिम समय में अपनी गलती को महसूस किया। जब वह आत्म हत्या करने के लिए तैयार था तो उसने एडमिरल डानिट्ज को भार सौंपा कि वह ही जरमनी की रक्षा कर सकता है।

मैं आपसे कहना चाहता हूँ कि यह विचार कि नैवी का स्थान सुरक्षा में नहीं है सही नहीं है। नैवी का स्थान है। इसलिये हिन्दुस्तान के लिये नैवी का महत्व है कि अगर हिन्दुस्तान को कहां से मदद मिल सकती है तो वह समुद्र के मार्ग से ही मिल सकती है। हमारे वेस्ट में पाकिस्तान है, ईस्ट में पाकिस्तान है, नार्थ में चाइना है। जमीन के रास्ते किसी तरफ से भी हमको मदद नहीं आ सकती। अगर हमारे पास नैवी नहीं होगी तो रूस और अमरीका हमारी मदद करना भी चाहें तो वह मदद हमारे पास तक कैसे आवेगी, अगर हमारे पास कोई सामान कम हो जाए तो वह कैसे आवेगा?

इसके अतिरिक्त हमारे एक्सपोर्ट और इम्पोर्ट का ९९.५० प्रतिशत व्यापार भी समुद्र के द्वारा ही होता है। अगर हमारे पास नैवी न होगी तो हम उस कनवाय की रक्षा कैसे कर सकेंगे। इसलिये मैं आपसे कहता हूँ कि हमारी वह अवस्था न हो जो पोलैंड की हुई थी। चैम्बरलेन ने कहा था कि हम पोलैंड की रक्षा करना चाहते हैं, लेकिन उस समय लाइड जार्ज ने कहा कि आप पोलैंड की रक्षा तो करना चाहते हैं लेकिन करेंगे कैसे क्योंकि आप पोलैंड तक पहुंच नहीं सकते। इसी प्रकार अगर दुनिया के और मुल्क हमारी सहायता करना भी चाहें लेकिन अगर उस

[श्री रघुनाथ सिंह]

सहायता को हमारे पास तक पहुंचाने का कोई उपाय न हो यह स्थिति नहीं होनी चाहिए, जैसी कि पोलैंड की हो गई थी।

मैं आपको बताना चाहता हूँ कि दुनिया के जिन मुल्कों ने नैवी की उपेक्षा की वे समाप्त हो गए हैं। उदाहरण के लिए स्पार्टा को आप लें। स्पार्टा बहुत बड़ी पावर थी लेकिन उसके पास नैवी नहीं थी। लेकिन एथिन्स के पास नैवी थी इसलिए वह बढ़ गयी। रोमन्स कैसे बढ़े? नैवी के कारण, अंग्रेज हिन्दुस्तान में कैसे आए? नैवी के कारण। १७ वीं शताब्दी में मराठों के पास जितनी नैवी थी वह गोआ की लड़ाई में समाप्त हो गयी। उसको उन्होंने बढ़ाने का प्रयत्न नहीं किया। उन्होंने पानीपत के मैदान में दुश्मन को रोकने का प्रयास किया। हमारे मिनिस्टर साहब के दादा साहब भी पानीपत की लड़ाई में वीरगति को प्राप्त हुए थे। तो मैं उनम कहना चाहता हूँ कि पानीपत की लड़ाई आप लड़े, अहमदशाह अबदाली को आपने रोकने की कोशिश की कि आगे न बढ़े। लेकिन समुद्र को आपने खुला छोड़ दिया और उसका परिणाम यह हुआ कि यहां अंग्रेज आए, फ्रांसीसी आए और आप उत्तर भारत में अहमदशाह अबदाली को रोकने में लग रहे। अब हमें आगे ऐसी नीति अपनानी चाहिए कि हमारी सामुद्रिक कमजोरी से चीन फायदा न उठा ले।

दूसरी बात आप मुनिए। पाकिस्तान का खतरा तो है ही। इंडोनेशिया भी अर्ध कम्युनिस्ट शक्ति है। आपने मलयेशिया को स्वीकार किया है और उसके स्वागत समारोह में भाग लेने के लिए अपना आदमी भी भजा है। लेकिन आप देखें कि अगर चीन, इंडोनेशिया और पाकिस्तान हमारे खिलाफ मिल जाते हैं तो हम कहां रहेंगे। आपका सारा समुद्र खुला है और किसी भी तरफ से हमारे यहां दुश्मन

लैंड कर सकता है। और जैसा कि आप नेफा के लिए कहते हैं कि हमको मालूम नहीं था कि इधर से चीनी फौज आएगी, उसी तरह आप कहेंगे कि हमको मालूम नहीं था कि समुद्र की ओर से भी फौज आएगी। मेरा कहना है कि जैसे आप पानीपत में लड़े उसी तरह समुद्री सीमा का भी ध्यान रखना चाहिए। ऐसा न करने से अंग्रेज आ गए और उनके हाथों में राज्य चला गया। इसी लिए मैं कहता हूँ कि आपको इतिहास से सबक लेना चाहिए।

एक बात मैं और कहना चाहता हूँ कि अब लैंड बेसेज का महत्व नहीं है। पोलेरिस और नाटिलस पनडुब्बियों के आविष्कार के बाद लैंड बेसेज का महत्व नहीं रह गया है। अब मिसाइल्स सबमैरिन्स पर से छोड़े जा सकते हैं इसलिए लैंड बेसेज का महत्व खत्म हो गया है।

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** The hon. Member must keep an eye on the clock.

**Shri Raghunath Singh:** The motion is in my name. I must be given some time.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** Fifteen minutes each.

**Shri Raghunath Singh:** But I am the Mover of the Motion.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** You are the Secretary of the Congress Party.

**Shri C. K. Bhattacharyya (Raiganj):** Raghunath Singhji is in the midst of his emotion.

**श्री रघुनाथ सिंह:** अभी कुछ दिन पहले पाकिस्तान से एक कानफेंस के बारे में स्यूज छपी थी। शायद उसमें अमरीका भी शामिल था। पर इसका ठीक पता नहीं है कि अमरीका शामिल था या नहीं। उच्च कानफेंस में कहा गया कि बे आफे बंगाल

में हमारा नेवल बेस कहाँ हों, क्योंकि सीलोन तो दूसरा देश है और एंडमन और निकोबार हिन्दुस्तान के पास हैं। तो उस कामफरेंस में कहा गया कि हमको लैंड बेस की जरूरत नहीं है क्योंकि हमारे पास सबमैरिन हुए तो हम उन से चिटगांग की रक्षा कर सकते हैं और ईस्ट पाकिस्तान की रक्षा भी कर सकते हैं। क्योंकि मिज़ाइट्स वहाँ से छोड़ सकते हैं। इस वास्ते मैं कहता हूँ कि हमें इस बात का प्रयास करना चाहिए कि हम अपनी सबमैरिन्स की ताकत को बढ़ायें।

14hrs.

आखिर में मैं एक बात और कह देना चाहता हूँ। अपने बौर्डर्स की सुरक्षा की व्यवस्था के हेतु हमें इजरायल का जो नहल सिस्टम है, उसे अपना लेना चाहिए। वहाँ का सिस्टम क्या है? नहल सिस्टम यह है कि जितने भी बौर्डर एरियाज़ हैं वहाँ पर उन्होंने ऐसे आदमियों को आबाद किया है, ऐसे नौजवानों को ट्रेड किया है जो खेती भी करते हैं और जो साथ साथ सैनिक भी हैं। मैं चाहता हूँ कि इस और हमारे डिफेंस मिनिस्टर महोदय ध्यान दें और काश्मीर उपत्यका से लेकर शक्ति तक, जो सिंधु नदी की घाटी है, दिल्ली से सब्जी वहाँ जाती है और वहाँ बहुत ही महंगे दामों में मिलती है।

इसी तरह सीमेंट जो यहाँ पर ६ रुपये या ८ रुपये बोरा है, वहाँ वह सीमेंट का बोरा शायद ८० रुपये पड़ता है। यदि यहाँ कोई सब्जी चार आने सेर हम खरीदते हैं तो वही सब्जी वहाँ दो रुपये सेर बिकती है। यह एक अननंचुरल एकोनोमी है। इससे चार चलने वाली नहीं है। इसके लिए मेरा निवेदन है कि एग््रीकलचरल मिनिस्टर और डिफेंस मिनिस्टर को आपस में सहयोग करके ऐसी आबादी वहाँ पर बसानी चाहिए कि हमारी फौज को जिन्न चीज की जरूरत है वह चीज वहाँ पर उत्पादित की जा सके। अगर इजरायल जैसे रेगिस्तान में समान चीजें पैदा हो सकती हैं तो मैं नहीं

समझता कि सिंध नदी की बैली जो कि करीब २५० मील की बैली है और जिसके कि ठीक किनारे किनारे सड़क जाती है और जहाँ पर आबादी भी मौजूद है वहाँ पर सैनिकों के लिए आवश्यक चीजें क्यों नहीं पैदा की जा सकती? इसके लिए जरूरी है कि एग््रीकलचर मिनिस्टर और डिफेंस मिनिस्टर को आपस में सहयोग करके वहाँ पर ऐसा उत्पादन उन बसे हुए लोगों से कराना चाहिए ताकि हमारी सैनिक आवश्यकताओं की वहाँ पर पूर्ति हो सके।

**श्री हरि विष्णु कामत :** क्या आप की गवर्नमेंट इजरायल से सहयोग करने के पक्ष में है ?

**श्री रघुनाथ सिंह :** मैं इजरायल से सहयोग चाहता हूँ या नहीं यह राजनीतिज्ञों की बाते हैं। मैं तो डिफेंस मिनिस्टर और एग््रीकलचर मिनिस्टर के बीच इस बारे में सहयोग की आवश्यकता के लिए कह रहा हूँ ताकि बौर्डर एरियाज़ की व्यवस्था ठीक कर सकें।

आखिरकार गुरुगोविंद सिंह ने सिकखों की फौज क्यों बनाई थी, वह इस वास्ते बनाई थी कि पंजाब पर हमेशा बौर्डर से अर्थात् अफ़गानिस्तान की तरफ से हमला होता था? उन्होंने जितना भी एग््रीकलचरिस्ट्रस क्लास था उन सब को हथियार दे दिये और कह दिया कि अगर अफ़गानिस्तान की तरफ से कोई विदेशी फौज आती है तो उनमें वे हमारी तरफ से फाइट करें और पीछे हम भी तैयार रहेंगे। लिहाज़ा आप देखेंगे कि पानीपत की लड़ाई के बाद अफ़गानिस्तान की तरफ से कोई हमला नहीं हुआ। हमारी एक फौर-मिडेबुल फौज और एक वालियेंटरी फौज वहाँ पर काइम हो गई थी। इस वास्त में निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि फाइनेंस मिनिस्टर साहब एग््रीकलचर मिनिस्टर साहब से इस मामले पर विचार विमर्श करके ऐसा कोई उपाय करें कि इस बौर्डर एरिया पर हमारी भी एक ठोस फौज तैयार हो जाय। जो लोग वहाँ रहें

[श्री रघुनाथ सिंह]

वह वहीं पैदा करके खायें पियें और अपनी जरूरत का सामान भी वहीं पैदा कर सकें। बहुत खाली जमीन वहां पर पड़ी हुई है। बेआवाद जमीन काफी पड़ी है और अगर उसे हमने इसी तौर पर बेआवाद पड़ा रहने दिया तो कोई भी वाहरी ताकत की फौज आ सकती है। इतन बड़े बौर्डर की आप तार घेर कर और फौज रख कर या हर एक स्थान पर सैनिक तैनात करके उसकी सुरक्षा नहीं कर सकते हैं। इस वास्ते हर एक गांव को आपको आर्म करना चाहिए और ऐसी व्यवस्था करनी चाहिए ताकि उनकी आवश्यकताओं की पूर्ति हो सके, उनकी आमदनी हो और वे लोग वहां बौर्डर पर आवाद होकर देश की रक्षा कर सकें।

अन्त में मैं अपने रक्षा मंत्री को धन्यवाद देते हुए यही कहता हूं कि यह जो बात कही जाती है कि चीनी जब पहाड़ से नीचे उतर आयेगे तब हम उनसे फ़ाइट करेंगे, यह पालिसी बिल्कुल ग़लत है। मराठे लोग क्यों फ़ाइट कर सके? उत्तर हिन्दुस्तान की हिस्ट्री है कि जब भी कोई विदेशी फौज जमुना नदी को पार कर गई है तो सारा देश विदेशी फौज के हाथ में चला गया है। लेकिन राजपूत और मराठे लोग शताब्दियों तक क्यों लड़ते रह सके? उसका कारण यह था कि उन के पास पहाड़ था। पहाड़ में आवाद थे। वहीं से लड़ते थे। एक नैचुरल डिफेंस उन के पास था। आप उस नैचुरल डिफेंस को चीन को देना चाहते हैं। यह पालिसी ग़लत है।

मैं आप को हिन्दुस्तान की एग्जाम्पिल देना चाहता हूं। जब सिकन्दर का भारत पर आक्रमण हुआ तो उस समय चन्द्रगुप्त मौर्य ने कहा कि हम सिकन्दर का यहां बैठ कर वेट नहीं करेंगे बल्कि हम आगे बढ़ कर सिन्धु नदी के पास सिकन्दर को रोकेंगे। चन्द्रगुप्त मौर्य और चाणक्य फौरन वहां से फौज लेकर आग खाना हो गये। इसी तरह से जब ने भारत पर आक्रमण किया तो स्कन्दगुप्त

ने हूणों का यहां दिल्ली में वेट नहीं किया बल्कि वे वाल्हीक जाकर उनसे लड़े थे। इसी तरह शशांक ने शकों से कैसे भारतवर्ष की रक्षा की? उन्होंने इसके लिए वेट नहीं किया कि जब शक लोग दिल्ली आजायेंगे तब हम उनसे फ़ाइट करेंगे बल्कि उन्होंने उनको पंजाब के पहाड़ों में जाकर रोका। जब भी आप किसी फौज को मैदान में आने देंगे तो उतना हिस्सा तो आप उसे पहले ही दे देते हैं। वहां वह जबरदस्ती बैठ कर अपना क़िला बना सकती है, और वहां के रिसोर्स को इस्तेमाल कर सकती है। इसलिए यह पालिसी कि जब वह उतर कर आयेगे तब हम लड़ेंगे, ठीक नहीं है।

मैं आप को अलाऊद्दीन खिलजी की एग्जाम्पिल देना चाहता हूं। जब मुग़ल लोग तुकिस्तान से आने वाले थे तो उसने दिल्ली में बैठ कर उनका वेट नहीं किया बल्कि उसने जाकर मुग़लों को पेशावर में रोका, पंजाब में ही उनको रोक लिया और उनको अंदर नहीं घुसने दिया।

चंगेज़ खां ने ईरान वगैरह सब को ले लिया लेकिन मुग़ल हिन्दुस्तान में नहीं आ सके और करीब ४०० वर्ष तक नहीं आ सके। इसी तरह से आप देखें कि जब मुग़ल लोगों के हाथ में पावर आई तो केवल पश्चिम की तरफ से हमला नहीं हुआ क्योंकि अफ़गानिस्तान को उन्होंने अपने हाथ में रखा। हुमायुं से लेकर औरंगजेब के वक्त तक चूँकि अफ़गानिस्तान उनके साथ में था इसलिए कोई भी शत्रु की फौज उधर से हिन्दुस्तान में नहीं आ सकती थी। वहीं पहाड़ में बैठ कर फ़ाइट कर सकते थे। इसलिए यह पालिसी हमारी गवर्नमेंट की ग़लत रही कि शत्रु पहाड़ से उतर कर मैदान में आ जाय तब उससे लड़ेंगे। इस पालिसी को भविष्य के लिए त्याग देना चाहिए।

श्री लहरी सिंह (रोहतक) : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, नेफा रिबरसैज के बारे में यह खयाल कर लेना कि वह चंज खत्म हो गयी, सही न होगा। वह खत्म हुई न समझी जाय। हिन्दु-स्तान की तवारीख के अन्दर आने वालों नसलों और औलादों के सामने नेफा रिबरसैज की चर्चा हमेशा के लिए कायम रहने वाली है।

नेफा रिबरसैज के बारे में जो रिपोर्टें दी गई हैं वह नामुम्किन हैं और उससे कोई नतीजा नहीं निकलना सिवाय इसके कि जो खामियां, जो कमजोरियां, जो गलतियां और जो लापरवाही वहां हुई है जिसकी वजह से यह नेफा रिबरसैज हुए, उस की सारी की सारी जिम्मेदारी इस गवर्नमेंट पर और डिफेंस मिनिस्टर पर है। अब यह कह देना कि इट इज ए डैंड हीस, ठीक नहीं है। इट इज नोट ए डैंड हीस, इट इज स्टिल किंग। गवर्नमेंट को इस तरह से बुरी तरह चीनियों के हाथ पराजित होकर यह नहीं कहना चाहिए कि नेफा रिबरसैज के लिए गवर्नमेंट और डिफेंस मिनिस्टर जिम्मेदार नहीं हैं। ऐसा कह कर टाल देना कि कोई ऐक्शन नहीं लिया जायगा, काम चलने वाला नहीं है। आने वाली नस्लें इस बात को भुला नहीं सकेंगी। इस के लिए गवर्नमेंट और डिफेंस मिनिस्टर की पूरी जिम्मेदारी है।

जहां तक हमारी फौज का ताल्लुक है वह बहुत बहादुर फौज रही है। उसका पिछला रेकार्ड शानदार रहा है। अंग्रेजों के वक्त में भारतीय फौज ने जर्मनी को हराया और जापान का कामयाबी के साथ मुकाबला किया। अब यह दूसरी बात है कि हमारी फौज ने ब्रिटिश इम्पायर को कायम करने में उनकी मदद की। लेकिन जहां तक भारतीय फौज की बहादुरी का सवाल है वह बहादुरी में किसी से कम नहीं रही है। लेकिन उस बहादुर फौज को इस मौके पर डिफेंस बर्दाशत करनी पड़ी क्योंकि ग नमेंट को पालिसी गलत रही। नेफा के

मोर्चे से जो हमारे भाई पंजाब में आये वे कहते हैं कि हमें रंज और अफसोस तो इस बात का था कि हमारे पास ऐम्पूनीशन नहीं था और हमें अपनी बन्दूकें बगैर ऐम्पूनीशन के चलानी पड़ीं। अब ऐसी गड़बड़ वहां पर क्यों हुई? इसके बारे में रिपोर्टें सबसे पहली बात तो यह कहती हैं कि वहां पर न ठहरने के लिए इक्विपमेंट था और न ही औपरेजंस के लिए इक्विपमेंट था। अब इतनी भारी गवर्नमेंट, जिसका कि एक तरफ पाकिस्तान दुश्मन हो और दूसरी तरफ चीन हो, उसकी ऐसी डील कि सैनिकों के पास जरूरी ऐम्पूनीशन और इक्विपमेंट ही न हो, दिल को बड़ा धक्का और सदमा लगता है।

फिर चीन का हमला कोई अचानक हो गया हों ऐसी बात भी नहीं थी। चीन के आक्रामक इरादे १९५६ से साफ तौर पर प्रकट हो चले थे जब कि उमने सीमा पर हमले करने और हमारे बौर्डर्स को एनक्रॉच करना शुरू कर दिया था। क्या यह सरकार सो रही थी? पालियामेंट बराबर सरकार को चीन के खतरे से सावधान करती रही है। सन् १९५६ से उनकी शत्रुतापूर्ण कार्यवाहियां शुरू हो गयी थीं और चीनी बढ़ने लगे थे और हमारी सीमाओं का अतिक्रमण उन्होंने शुरू कर दिया था, सरकार को पूरी तरह से इनको जानकारी थी और उसने रिपोर्टें में इसे साफ तौर पर स्वीकार किया है, एक तरफ चीन और दूसरी तरफ पाकिस्तान का खनरा बराबर रहते हुए भी रिपोर्टें में यह चीज आना कि वहां पर जरूरी इक्विपमेंट नहीं था या ऐम्पूनीशन नहीं था, कितने शर्म की बात है। आखिर इस गफलत और कोताही के लिए कौन जिम्मेदार है? इसकी पूरी जवाबदेही इस सरकार पर आती है। एक बड़ा मुल्क जिसका दुश्मन हो, उसकी शत्रुतापूर्ण गतिविधियां बढ़ रही हों, इमिजिएट डैजर सामने मौजूद हो और सरकार इस तरह से सोती रह जाय कि हमारे फौजी लांगों को जरूरी साज सामान और हथियार बगैरह न मिल पायें, यह बड़े अफसोस और शर्म की बात है। इस सब के लिए इस

[श्री लहरो सिंह]

सरकार के अलावा और कौन जिम्मेदार हो सकता है ?

इस के साथ ही मैं यह अर्ज करूँ कि सन् १९५७ से लेकर सन् १९६२ तक १३१.६८ करोड़ रुपया डिफेंस में बचता रहा है। सन् ५७ में पार्लियामेंट ने जो रुपया दिया वह बचा और इस तरह से आगे भी दिया जाता रुपया बचता रहा। इस तरह से १३१.६८ करोड़ रुपया बचता रहा है। वह रुपया किस लिए था ? वह रुपया आम्ब्रं, एम्प्लूनीशन और आर्डिनेंस फ्रैंक्टीरीज के लिए था, लेकिन वह रुपया खर्च नहीं किया गया। और फिर कहा जाता है कि डिफेंस मिनिस्टर और इस गवर्नमेंट का क्या कुसूर है। क्या यह पार्लियामेंट का कुसूर है कि वह बाकायदा रुपया देती रही है, लेकिन आये साल उस को सरप्लस दिखा कर वापस किया जाता रहा और इस तरह १३१ करोड़ रुपया वापस कर दिया गया ? इस का नतीजा यह हुआ कि न एम्प्लूनीशन खरीदा गया, न आम्ब्रं खरीदे गए और न आर्डिनेंस फ्रैंक्टीरीज कायम की गई। मैं आप को बताना चाहता हूँ कि खानदान मुगलिया की आखिरी हुकूमत का यही हाल था कि कहीं छोड़े नहीं थे और कहीं जूते नहीं थे। यह गवर्नमेंट वही नमूना पेश करती है और फिर कहती है कि हमारा क्या कुसूर है।

जहां तक इस लड़ाई का ताल्लुक है, वह लड़ाई समुन्दर की नहीं थी, बल्कि हिमालय के बार्डर की लड़ाई थी। हमारी चौदह स्टेट्स में जितना भी इंजीनियरिंग स्टाफ था, क्या वह सब उस पहाड़ी इलाके में सड़कें वगैरह बनाने के लिए नहीं लगाया जा सकता था ? लेकिन हमारे फ्रौजियों ने आ कर बताया कि हमारे अफसरों के पास नक्शे भी नहीं थे कि हम ने किधर जाना है। न तो हम ने सड़कें तैयार कीं और न मैप्स ही तैयार किये। यह गवर्नमेंट कुम्भकर्ण की नींद सोती रही है, जब कि दुश्मन सड़कें

बना रहा है और वहां की चप्पा-चप्पा जमीन का मालिक है। इस हाउस में गवर्नमेंट ने और डिफेंस मिनिस्टर ने बड़े नाज के साथ कहा कि हम फुली प्रिपेयर्ड हैं, लेकिन उन्होंने इस मुल्क की नाक कटवा दी और इस मुल्क का प्रिस्टेज खत्म हो गया। यहां की फ्रौजों की यह ट्रेडिशन थी और उन के बारे में यह कहा जाता था कि वे पीछे हटना नहीं जानतीं। मैं अर्ज करना चाहता हूँ कि यहां के जेनेरल खराब हो सकते थे, लेकिन हमारे जवान, हमारे सिपाही खराब नहीं हैं।

हमारे पास नक्शे नहीं हैं, रोड्स नहीं हैं। और अब गवर्नमेंट ने इस बारे में क्या किया ? वह दो चार अफसरों को प्रासीक्यूट कर रही है और वह भी ठीले तरीके से। इस गवर्नमेंट में यह बीमारी आ चुकी है कि जब कभी किसी चीफ मिनिस्टर, किसी डिफेंस मिनिस्टर या किसी आफिसर के बारे में यह कहा जाये कि वह करप्ट है, खराबों कर रहा है, तो उस के खिलाफ एक्शन लेने का एक पर्सनल मैटर सा बना दिया जाता है। रोड्स न होने की वजह से हमारे कितने नौजवान मारे गए ? त्रिगेडियर होश्वारसिंह, शैतान सिंह—मैं कितनों का नाम लूँ ? उनकी आत्मा कैसे ठंडी होगी ? उनकी आत्मा एक ही शकल में ठंडी हो सकती है कि जो लोग हमारी हार के जिम्मेदार हों, चाहे वह डिफेंस मिनिस्टर हो, कोई जेनेरल हो या और कोई हो, उन को डोंक में खड़ा किया जायें और उन का बाकायदा प्रासीक्यूशन किया जाय। अगर ऐसा न किया जायेगा तो हमारे देश में डेमोक्रेसी कैसे रहेगी ? आज हमारी फ्रौजों का हाँसला पस्त हो चुका है। आज होता यह है कि जो भी आदमी नजदीक से नजदीक जा कर कोई गलत रिपोर्ट भी दे दे, उसकी बात को मान लिया जाता है और उस को ज्यादा अहमियत मिल जाती है।

न नक्शे हैं, न रोड्ज हैं और न एक्विपमेंट है, यह किस की जिम्मेदारी है ? पैराग्राफ २७ में जिम्मेदारी के बारे में बहुत बर्बाद हुई आवाज में कहा गया है :

"That brings me to the next point which is called the higher direction of operations. Even the largest and the best equipped of Armies need to be given proper policy guidance and major directives by the Government, whose instrument it is."

इस के आगे कुछ नहीं कहा गया । यह नहीं बताया गया कि गवर्नमेंट का जो फ़र्ज था, वह उस ने किस तरह पूरा किया ।

जहां तक आज की तैयारी का सवाल है, उस के बारे में मुल्क में बिल्कुल तसल्ली नहीं है । उस के बारे में ग्राम आदमी को भी खदशा है और फ़ौजों को भी खदशा है । इस रिपोर्ट के पैराग्राफ १९ में कहा गया है :

"It was at higher levels that shortcomings became more apparent. It was also revealed that some of the higher Commanders did not depend enough on the initiative of the lower Commanders,..."

इसका मतलब यह है कि ब्रिगेड लेवल तक तो ठीक था, लेकिन ब्रिगेड लेवल से ऊपर—और ब्रिगेड लेवल से ऊपर जैनेरल होते हैं—बड़ी शार्टकमिग्न थी । यह क्यों हुआ ? अंग्रेज ने अफ़सरों की भर्ती और प्रमोशन के लिए सिर्फ़ मेरिट को ही सामने रखा, लेकिन पार्टीशन के बाद जो रीक्यूटमेंट हुई, उस में या तो मिलीटरी अफ़िसरों ने बड़ी तादाद में अपने रिश्तेदारों को लैफ़्टिनेंट्स की शकल में रखवा या मिनिस्टर सिफ़ारिश करते रहे कि फ़लां को लैफ़्टिनेट ले लो ।

श्री श्यामलाल सराफ़ : क्या माननीय सदस्य ने भी ऐसा किया ?

श्री भागवत झा आवाज (भागलपुर) : माननीय सदस्य भी तो मिनिस्टर थ ।

श्री सहरी सिंह : मेरे आदमी तो हमेशा मरते रहे हैं, काश्मीर को बचाने के लिए मरते रहे हैं ।

श्री श्यामलाल सराफ़ : मुझे पता है ।

श्री सहरी सिंह : अब कहा जाता है कि बड़ी तैयारी हो रही है । लेकिन अगर फौज को वाकई ताकतवर बनाना है, तो अस्सी फ़ी सदी सिपाही भर्ती किए जाने चाहिये जो कि आगे चल कर कर्नल और जनरल बनें और बीस फ़ी सदी को डायरेक्ट अफ़िसर के तौर पर भर्ती किया जाय । आज सौ में से अस्सी तो बाबूसाहब भर्ती किए जाते हैं, जिन में सिर्फ़ यह खूबी होती है कि वे अच्छी अंग्रेजी बोल सकते हैं । पहले तो फ़िज़िकल फ़िटनेस और इन्टेलिजेंस देखी जाती थी, लेकिन अब फ़िज़िकल फ़िटनेस को उड़ा ही दिया गया है । अब तो एक ही चीज़ रही है कि अंग्रेजी बोलना आता हो । मैं यह अर्ज करना चाहता हूँ कि जिस जैनेरल की वजह से यह हालत हुई, उस की तरक्की के सवाल को लेकर तीनों सर्विस चीफ़्स ने अपने इस्तीफ़े पेश कर दिये थे । उन्होंने गवर्नमेंट के सामने अपने इस्तीफ़े फेंक दिये थे और कहा था कि अगर इस किस्म के आदमी को जैनेरल बनाया जायगा तो यह फौज नहीं चल सकती है । लेकिन उन बेचारों को कौन सुनता था ? उन तीनों चीफ़्स ने जो प्रोटेस्ट करना था वह कर लिया और आख़िरकार उन को अपने इस्तीफ़े वापस लेने पड़े । लेकिन गवर्नमेंट की पालिसी का नतीजा मुल्क को नेफ़ा की रिवांसिज़ की शकल में भुगतना पड़ा । अगर उस जैनेरल को तरक्की न दी जाती, तो आज हिन्दुस्तान को शर्म से अपना सिर नीचा न करना पड़ता । लेकिन उस को तो प्रैस्टीज का सवाल बना दिया गया था—कहा गया था कि डिफेंस मिनिस्टर यह चाहते हैं ।

[श्री लहरी सिंह]

इसलिए यह जरूरी है कि तरक्की के लिए मेरिट्स को देखना चाहिए। पिछले पांच सात साल में मेरिट्स का खयाल नहीं किया गया है, बल्कि जो आफिसर ज्यादा नज़दीक थे, उन को ही तरक्की दे दी गई। अगर मेरी यह बात ग़लत है, तो सवाल यह है कि क्यों चीफ़ आफ़ दि आर्मी स्टाफ़ को रिज़ाइन करना पड़ा। ट्रिबून में एक ब्रिगेडियर ने यह लिखा है कि फ़ॉज में जो बड़े आला अफ़सर थे, गवर्नमेंट की तरफ़ से उन को रिटायरमेंट के लिए फ़ॉर्न किया गया। वड़िया से वड़िया कम्पोज़िट अफ़सरों को तो रिटायर होने के लिए फ़ॉर्म किया जाय और किसी और जेनेरल को प्रॉमोशन दी जाय और फिर हिन्दुस्तान चाहता है कि हम चीन और पाकिस्तान का मुकाबला करें !

अब भी जो भर्ती हो रही है, उस के बारे में मैं मिनिस्टर साहब को कहना चाहता हूँ कि यह ठीक है कि आदमी का इन्टेलिजेंट होना जरूरी है, लेकिन महज़ अंग्रेज़ी बोलने वालों और किसी तरह से इम्प्रेशन करने वालों को अगर अफ़सर बनाया जाएगा, तो उस का नतीजा यही होगा कि जब तोपों की दनादन होगी तो वे जेनेरल हास्पिटल में आ कर सोयेंगे। बताया जाता है कि वहां पर जवानों ने कहा कि बाबू जी, क्यों भाग रहे हो। हमारी तरफ़ के एक सूबेदार-मेजर थे। उन्होंने कहा कि क्यों भाग रहे हो, यहीं मरना है। वे लॉग तं आखिरी दम तक लड़ते रहे, लेकिन कमांड करने वालों का पता नहीं था। जर्मनी और इंग्लैंड में अस्सी फी सदी तरक्कियां सिपाहियों से की जाती हैं। हमारे ब्रिगेडियर बुद्धसिंह और हांशियारसिंह भी सिपाही भर्ती किए गए थे। लेकिन आज अस्सी फी सदी अंग्रेज़ी बोलने वालों और शानदार शकलो-सूरत रखने वालों को अफ़सर बनाने का नतीजा यह है कि जब बन्दूक और तोप चलती है,

तो वे 'खुदा हाफ़िज़' कह कर चल देते हैं। इसी वजह से हमारी रिवांसिज़ हुई।

इसलिए मैं आपकी मार्फ़त मिनिस्टर साहब को पुरज़ोर तरीके से कहना चाहता हूँ कि जिस तरह जर्मनी, इंग्लैंड और दूसरे कंट्रीज़ में किया गया है, वैसे ही यहां भी यह तरीका अवतिहार किया जाये कि सौ में से अस्सी को दो साल के बाद तरक्की दे दी जाये। अफ़सरों के पास इन्टेलिजेंस और दिमाग के साथ साथ दिल होना भी जरूरी है, ताकि वे तोपों की गड़गड़ाहट और हवाई जहाज़ के गोलों की आवाज़ को वर्दाशत कर सकें। उन को लड़ाई की साइंस का भी तजुर्बा होना चाहिये। जहां उन में दिमाग होना चाहिए, वहां दिल भी होना चाहिए।

जहां तक भर्ती का ताल्लुक है, उस में एक और नुक्स आ रहा है। पंजाब को स्वोर्ड-ग्राम कहा जाता है। उस ने हमेशा इस मुल्क की हिकाज़त की है। खानदान मुग़लिया के वक्त से पंजाब में भर्ती होती थी। आज इस देश में नेकुलरिज़्म का डिंडोरा पीटा जा रहा है, लेकिन पंजाब में हर एक जगह यह हो रहा है कि राजपूतों और जाटों के तगड़े और एफ़िगेंट लड़कों को कहा जा रहा है कि तुम्हारी भर्ती नहीं होगी, अब फ़लां कौम की भर्ती हांगी और उस कौम वाले आगे आये नहीं हैं। आज सरकार की तरफ़ से इस तरह के तजुर्बे किये जा रहे हैं। जब हमारी एक सैकुर स्टेट है, तो जो तगड़े से तगड़ा, एफ़िगेंट आदमी ही, उस को भर्ती किया जाये। लेकिन आज पंजाब में भायूसी छा रही है। हजारों की तादाद में तगड़े लड़के आते हैं, लेकिन उन को कहा जाता है कि अब फ़लां इलाके में, फ़लां स्टेट में, फ़लां कौम में भर्ती हो रही है। यह बात नहीं होनी चाहिए। जो फ़र्स्ट क्लास रहा ही, जिस की हिस्ट्री रही ही, जो तगड़ा और एफ़िगेंट ही, उस को भर्ती किया जाये। अगर ऐसा नहीं किया

जायेगा, तो दिखाने के लिये तो बेशक सरकार छः सात डिवीजन तैयार कर ले, लेकिन मेरा खयाल नहीं है कि हिन्दुस्तान की फौज पाकिस्तान और चीन को दोबारा मुकाबला कर सके, क्योंकि अंग्रेजी बोलने वाले कर्नल वगैरह लड़ाई न होने तक को खूबसूरत वर्दी वगैरह पहन कर चलते हैं। लेकिन जब दनादन होगी, तो वे कहीं नजर नहीं आयेंगे। यह एक बड़ी जबर्दस्त वार्निंग है और इसको याद रखना चाहिये। मैं यह नहीं कहता कि अंग्रेजी न हो। वह होनी चाहिये। लेकिन इस से भी ज्यादा जरूरी यह है कि हिन्दी हो। ज्यादातर फौजी जो होते हैं वे हिन्दी समझते हैं। उनको समझने तथा समझाने के लिए जनरलों को, कर्नलों को हिन्दी आनी चाहिये। अगर उनको हिन्दी नहीं आती है तो वे इनको इम्प्लुएंस नहीं कर सकेंगे। उनके लिए बड़ा मुश्किल हो जाएगा। उनके साथ कांटेक्ट करना बड़ा मुश्किल हो जाएगा। मैं कहूंगा कि जहां अंग्रेजी हो वहां हिन्दी का होना और भी जरूरी है ताकि सिपाहियों में आप जोश भर सकें।

आज यहां बिल्कुल उलटी बात हो रही है। आप मेरे साथ चल कर देखें कि जिन लोगों ने हिन्दी बनाई है, उनके जो लड़के आते हैं, टूटे कटटे और तगड़े लड़के आते हैं उनको नहीं लिया जा रहा है। राजपूतों, मराठों, डोगरों, गुज्जरो के कितने ही तगड़े लड़के आते हैं लेकिन तजुबों के नाम पर उनको नहीं लिया जाता है। सैक्युलर स्टेट का नाम दे कर दूसरी जगहों पर, दूसरी नौकरियों में तो आप कुछ करते नहीं हैं, लेकिन यहां पर इन में आपने इस तजुबों को करना शुरू कर दिया है। आपने जमीनों पर सीलिंग भी लगा दी है और जिन सिपाहियों के पास थोड़ी-थोड़ी जमीने थीं, उनसे वे जमीनें भी छीन ली हैं। आप कहते हैं कि आठ एकड़

लोग जमीनें नहीं रख सकेंगे, चार एकड़ या दो एकड़ या एक एकड़ ही रख सकेंगे। सैक्युलरिज्म इस हद तक आ चुका है कि नौकरियां जो दूसरी होती हैं, उन में यह होता नहीं है, इसको उन में लाया जाता नहीं है लेकिन जब भरती होती है वहां इसको आप ला कर खड़ा कर देते हैं। आप कह देते हैं कि जाटों की भरती नहीं होगी, राजपूतों की भरती नहीं होगी, मराठों की भरती नहीं होगी। यह जो तरोका आपका है यह बिल्कुल गलत तरीका है। अगर आपको कोई तजुबा करना है तो वह आप बाद में कर सकते हैं। आज जरूरत इस बात की है कि कंट्री को तैयार किया जाए। जब तक तमाम कंट्री तैयार नहीं हो जाती है, तब तक आप इस तरह का तजुबा न करें। लड़ाई का डर, मौत का डर और तोपों की दनदनाहट हर कोई बरदाश्त नहीं कर सकता है। इसको वही बरदाश्त कर सकते हैं जो सख्त काम करते हैं, वही बरदाश्त कर सकते हैं जो सख्त पेशे करते हों और सख्त तरोके से रहते हों। यह जो बारूद आप भरते जा रहे हैं यह फोका है। वैसे ही आप लोगों को खड़े किए जा रहे हैं। यह कौम का सवाल है, मुल्क का सवाल है। जहां पर कौम का और मुल्क का सवाल हों, वहां इस तरह की बातें नहीं उठाई जानी चाहियें।

आप कहते हैं कि आप आटोमैटिक राइफल बना रहे हैं। यह ठीक है। लेकिन क्या इन से ही लड़ा जा सकता है? क्या लड़ाई के लिए और कई बातों की जरूरत नहीं है? क्या आपके पास काफी और अच्छी सी० आई० डी० है? इसके बिना आप नहीं जान सकते हैं कि दुश्मन कितना ताकतवर है, उसकी क्या हालत है। साथ ही साथ आप देखें कि आज लड़ाई एयरफोर्स की है, मिसाइल

[श्री लहरी सिंह]

की है, दूसरी चीजों से वह लड़ी जाती है। आप आटोमैटिक राइफल्ज पर ही न बैठें रहें। आपके पास क्या ग्रन्थे और बढ़िया हवाई जहाज हैं? लोहिया साहब ने ठीक ही कहा था कि हमारे प्रधान मंत्री साहब तो दोनों गुटों के धंदाजे लगा रहे हैं, इस गुट के और उस गुट के। मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि रूस से आपको एक पैसा नहीं मिला है और न ही मिलने वाला है। कोई आर्म्स भी आपको मिलने वाले नहीं हैं। आपको इन सब चीजों को इंग्लैंड और अमरीका से ही लाना पड़ेगा। वही आपको देंगे। वहाँ भी आप सोच रहे हैं लें या न लें। जो कुछ आपने लिया है वह भी दिल से नहीं लिया है। आप कहते हैं कि आप मिग विमान बनायेंगे। छोटी चीजें भी जो आप बनाते हैं ठीक नहीं बनाते हैं। मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि मिग हवाई जहाज भी नहीं बन सकेंगे और अगर बनेंगे भी तो तब बनेंगे जब दुनिया की सड़ाई खत्म हो जाएगी। आप ने डिढोरा पीटना शुरू कर दिया है कि मिग विमान आप बनाने जा रहे हैं। यह उसी तरह से है जैसे जब अम्बर चर्खा ईजाद हुआ था तो कहा गया था कि अब तो मांचेस्टर बन्द हो जायेगा। ये मिग वगैरह कुछ नहीं हैं। आपका नान-एलाइन्मेंट होता रहेगा। आपको चाहिये कि अमरीका से, एशिया से, जहाँ कहीं से भी हो ज्यादा से ज्यादा हवाई जहाज हासिल करें। मैं तो यह कहता हूँ कि बन्दूकों तक ही आप अपने प्रयत्नों को महदूद कर लें। हवाई जहाज अगर आपने बना भी लिये तो भी क्या होगा इसको आप देखें। आज कितनी कंज्यूएलटीज हो रही है, इसको आप देखें। नया हवाई जहाज आपने अगर बना लिया तो और भी कुछ आप खो बैठेंगे। इस तजुबे में आप और भी खो बैठेंगे।

ग्राखिर में मैं इंटेलीजेंस के बारे में कुछ कहना चाहता हूँ। रिपोर्ट के ग्राखिर में कहा गया है कि हमारे जनरल भी खराब हैं, गलत तरीके से हमारे डिफेंस मिनिस्टर ने काम किये, गलत तरीके से लोगों को रिटायर किया। बहुत से ट्रेटर्ज क्रिएट कर दिये आर्मी में। आप देखें कि आर्मी में इनाम किन लोगों को दिये गये, तरक्कियां किन लोगों को दी गईं। इनाम उनको मिले जिन्होंने कोठरियां बनाई, जिन्होंने क्वार्टर बनाये, जिन्होंने भारत सेवक समाज के लिए काम किया, मिट्टी खोदी। दुश्मन हमारे ऊपर बैठा था और यहां यह काम हो रहे थे। उन को ज्यादा तरक्कियां दे दी गईं जिन्होंने ज्यादा क्वार्टर बनाये।

इंटेलीजेंस का यह हाल था कि हम पर जब हमला हुआ तो हमें मालूम भी नहीं था कि दुश्मन की पोजिशन क्या है, उनके पास क्या है, उनका बिल्ड-अप कैसा है। मैं एक दो सैनटेंस पढ़ देना चाहता हूँ :—

"Thus our troops had no requisite knowledge of the Chinese tactics and ways of war, their weapons, equipment and capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy helps to build up confidence."

ग्राखिर में जो लिखा है :

"Collection of intelligence was not satisfactory. Thus a clear picture of the Chinese build-up was not made available."

और आगे लिखा है :—

"There is no doubt that a major overhauling of the intelligence system is required."

जिस मुल्क की इंटेलीजेस न हो, जिस मुल्क को यह भी न मालूम हो कि दुश्मन की ताकत कितनी है, उसकी कितनी फौज सामने है, उस मुल्क का क्या हाल होगा, इसको आप समझ सकते हैं। क्यों आप अपनी एम्बेसी को वहां बिठाये हुए हैं? यहां की सारी खबरें तो वहां चली जाती हैं, यहां की एक एक बात वहां चली जाती है, तुम्हारे दफ्तरों की एक एक बात वहां चली जाती है, लेकिन वहां की एक भी बात न आये, यह कितने अफसोस की बात है। जिस मुल्क की इंटेलीजेस भी तैयार न हो सकी हो, वह क्या कर सकता है। मुझे एक खबर मिली है, मुझे पता नहीं कहाँ तक यह सच है और उसको मैं आपके सामने रखना चाहता हूँ। आप इसका पता लगा सकते हैं। चीनियों ने बहुत ही चालाकी से काम किया है। उन्होंने अपनी कुछ औरतों को भेज दिया कि जाओ और भेद साओ। वे एक एक्सचेंज में आ गईं और बहुत सी बातों का भेद ले कर चली गईं। यह बात मुझे फौजी ने बताई है और माननीय मंत्री इसकी सचाई का पता लगा सकते हैं। उनकी इंटेलीजेस में लड़कियां लगी हुई हैं, उनकी एम्बेसी लगी हुई है, यहां के भी कुछ लोग लगे हुए हैं लेकिन जहां तक हमारी इंटेलीजेस का सम्बन्ध है, हमारी एम्बेसी एक कोने में वहां बन्द पड़ी हुई है, उस में कोई ताकत ही नहीं है। मैं पूछना चाहता हूँ कि इंटेलीजेस का न होना, आर्मी का न होना, अच्छे जनरल का न होना, रोडज का न होना, अच्छे हथियारों का न होना, क्या इस पार्लियामेंट का कूसूर है? कूसूर सिर्फ किसी मिनिस्टर का ही हो सकता है, डायरेक्टली उसी का हो सकता है, उसी को चार्जशिट किया जा सकता है, उसी पर इंडिक्टमेंट है और उसको डाक में खड़ा किया जाना चाहिये। यह कहना कि पंडित जी को

गुमराह किया गया, कोई मानी नहीं रखता है। सरदार पटेल जो एक बार कह दिया करते थे, उसको पूरा कर दिया करते थे। उन्होंने कहा हैदराबाद में यह हो और वह हुआ। उनकी बात लोगों को जंच जाती थी। प्रधान मंत्री जी ने कहा कि जाओ, चीनियों को निकाल दो लेकिन कुछ नहीं हुआ। पंडित जी सौ तकरीरों दे लें, लोगों को पंडित जी पर यकीन नहीं होता है। एक तरफ तो उन्होंने कह दिया कि एनक्रोचमेंट को खत्म कर दो लेकिन बाद में जब वह बात नहीं होती है तो कुछ जंचता नहीं है। मैं प्रधान मंत्री जी की इज्जत करता हूँ लेकिन मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि इस तरह से लोगों में एंथ्यूजिज्म पैदा नहीं होता है। नारा आप लगाते रहें लेकिन नारे से कुछ होता नहीं है। अच्छाई इसी में है कि उचित रीति से और सोच समझ कर ही आप कुछ तबदीली करें।

श्री भागवत झा आजाद : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, नेफा के सामरिक कटु अनुभव को और उस पर की गई जांच रिपोर्ट को देखने के कितने ही पहलू हैं। पहला और स्वस्थ दृष्टिकोण तो यह होगा कि हम देखें कि अपने इन कटु अनुभवों के बाद, अपनी असफलताओं के बाद हम भविष्य में अपनी फौज को किस प्रकार सुव्यस्थित करें, इसका संगठन किस प्रकार से करें। दूसरा दृष्टिकोण यह है जिस को ले कर हमारे प्रकाशवीर शास्त्री जी ने इस वाद-विवाद को प्रारम्भ किया है या चौधरी लहरी सिंह जी ने जिस का जिक्र अपने भाषण में किया है। उन्होंने कहा है कि भारत सेवक समाज ही हम ने पैदा किया है। मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि जिस देश ने भारत सेवक समाज जैसी संस्थाएँ पैदा की हैं, उस देश ने चौधरी लहरी सिंह जैसे विद्वान भी पैदा किए हैं जिनको मिग विमान फौजदारी

## [श्री भागवत झा आजाद]

और प्रम्बर चर्खे में कोई फर्क नजर नहीं आता है। यह कैसे कहा जा सकता है कि कुछ पैदा नहीं हुआ है। बहुत कुछ पैदा हुआ है। प्रश्न केवल दृष्टिकोण का है। कुछ सज्जन हैं जिन्होंने अपनी आंखों पर चश्मा लगा रखा है और उनको नेफा की असफलताओं में अपनी फौज की पराजय का ही रूप दिखाई देता है। मैं समझता हूँ कि नेफा की असफलताओं को पराजय का रूप देना और अपने जवानों के बारे में यह कहना कि चीनी लड़कियों के साथ वे चुम्बन में थे, यह कहना कि हमारी फौज के बहादुर जवान, हमारी फौज के बहादुर अफसर शराब पीते हैं, हमारी फौज के बहादुर लोगों के साथ...

श्री लहरी सिंह : गलत कह रहे हैं माननीय सदस्य। मैंने यह कभी नहीं कहा।

श्री भागवत झा आजाद : उन्होंने यह कहा है कि सुनने में यह आया है कि चीनियों ने अपने यहां की औरतों को भेज दिया हमारी फौज में और हमारी फौज के आदमी उनमें मग्न हो गए। मुझे अफसोस के साथ कहना पड़ता है कि माननीय सदस्य इस तरह की बातें हमारी फौज के बारे में कह कर उसका मनोबल नहीं बढ़ा रहे हैं।

मैं यह कह रहा था कि इस रिपोर्ट को देखने का एक दूसरा रूप है, एक दूसरा दृष्टिकोण है जो स्वस्थ दृष्टिकोण है। यह ठीक है कि हमने गलतियाँ की हैं, हमें असफलता का सामना करना पड़ा है, हमें कटु अनुभव हुआ है। लेकिन जैसा हमारे प्रतिरक्षा मंत्री ने बताया है इस रिपोर्ट का एक उद्देश्य है और वह यह है कि किस प्रकार से इन असफलताओं के आधार पर हम अपनी फौज का,

चाहे वह पहाड़ी युद्ध हो या मैदानी, चाहे वह जवानों के सम्बन्ध में हो या अफसरों के सम्बन्ध में, चाहे वह सामरिक अस्त्रों के सम्बन्ध में हो या दूसरे अस्त्रों के सम्बन्ध में हो, किस प्रकार से संगठन कर सकते हैं, इसको देखना चाहिये। जो रूप इस वाद-विवाद को पिछले दो तीन दिनों से दिया जा रहा है, उससे तो यही ध्वनि निकलती है कि हमारे विरोधी दलों के मानन्य सदस्य यही चाहते हैं कि किसी व्यक्ति का सिर उड़ा दिया जाए। दुर्भाग्य तो यह है कि उन्होंने कोई इतिहास नहीं पढ़ा। अगर उन्होंने इतिहास पढ़ा होता तो उन्हें मालूम होता ऐतिहासिक द्वितीय महा युद्ध में या उस के पहले प्रथम महा युद्ध में जब लायड जार्ज ने "गैली पोल कैम्पेन" में चर्चिल को अग्रकार के गर्त में भेज दिया तो उस के बाद भी इंग्लैंड की जनता ने द्वितीय महायुद्ध में उसे अपना नेता बनाया, और नेता बनाने के बाद दो साल तक इंग्लैंड के गणतंत्र को, जब उसके साथ में अमरीका था, जब उसके साथ रूस का अधिनायक तन्त्र था, उसके प्रधान मंत्री चर्चिल को अपनी पराजय को सिर्फ पराजय नहीं बल्कि युद्ध के विध्वंस को हाउस आफ कामन्स में कहना पड़ा। दो साल तक उस भयंकर स्थिति में जब इंग्लैंड की हार पर हार होती गई, जब हिटलर ने नाश्ते के वक्त हालैंड को लिया और उस के बाद खाने के वक्त डेनमार्क को लिया, जब फ्रांस की मैजिनो लाइन बारह घंटों में टूट गई, उस वक्त भी हाउस आफ कामन्स के अन्दर चर्चिल की सरकार में अविश्वास प्रस्ताव नहीं पेश किया गया। इंग्लैंड की जनता ने, हाउस आफ कामन्स ने वहां की फौज को, वहां की आर्मी को शराब पीने वाला ड्रंकड नहीं बतलाया, वहां की जनता ने अपने जवानों पर यह लांछन नहीं लगाया कि वे विदेशी औरतों

के साथ थे । लेकिन किया क्या श्री प्रकाशवीर शास्त्री ने ? क्या किया श्री लहरी सिंह ने ? क्या किया श्री नाथ पाई ने ? श्री नाथ पाई ने कहा, हमारे सामने हन्होंने यह कहा, कि वहां के जवानों ने कहा कि उन्हें जानवरों की तरह से मारा गया । मुझे उन के कहने पर दुःख है । हमारी फौज ने यह नहीं कहा कि हम जानवरों की तरह से मारे गये । हमारी फौज ने कहा कि हम बड़ी बहादुरी के साथ मरे । कविता बनाने वाले श्री नाथ पाई को यह बात मालूम नहीं । मैं कहना चाहता हूं कि सब से बड़ी हानि इस देश को हो रही है पी० एस० पी० के इन महान मस्केटियरस से, इस देश को हानि हो रही है प्रकाशवीर शास्त्री से । यह हानि हो रही है इस देश की जनता के मनोबल की, इस देश के फौज के मनोबल की और इस देश के लोगों. . .

श्री मोहन स्वरूप (पीलीभीत) :  
देशभक्ति के ठंकेदार तो आप हैं ।

श्री भागवत झा प्राजाप : आप समझिये । द्वितीय महायुद्ध में होर बेलिश को जो इंग्लैंड के रक्षा मंत्री थे, वहां के सूचना मंत्री मँकमिलन को, जो कि वहां के सूचना मंत्री थे, सरकार से हटना पड़ा था । शायद माननीय सदस्य ने इतिहास नहीं पढ़ा, महायुद्ध की कहानियां नहीं पढ़ीं । उसी समय में एक नहीं, दो नहीं, तीन नहीं, बीसों कमांडरों ने अपने स्थान छोड़ कर नये आदमियों को स्थान दिये । लेकिन इंग्लैंड, अमरीका या रूस की जनता ने इस तरह नेफा जैसी रिपोर्ट पर सिर्फ एक, दो, तीन डिवीजनों को नहीं, सम्पूर्ण फौज को गालियां दे कर अपनी जनता के मनोबल को नहीं तोड़ा । यह किसी ने नहीं कहा, कब कहा प्रधान मंत्री ने, कब कहा रक्षा मंत्री ने, कि मुझ से गलतियां नहीं हुईं ।

इस रिपोर्ट में कहा गया है कि हमारे पास सामरिक अस्त्र नहीं थे । यह भी कहा गया है कि यहां पर, विरोधी सदस्यों का कहना था कि जो सामरिक अस्त्र थे वे फ्रंट्स पर नहीं थे, मोर्चों पर नहीं थे । लेकिन यह कहना झूठ है । यह कहना कि उन के पास जूते नहीं थे, यह झूठ है । श्री नाथ पाई ने बड़े जोर जोर से कहा कि तुम कांग्रेस वाले कहते थे कि जूते नहीं थे, तुम कांग्रेस वाले कहते थे उनके पास अस्त्र थे और हमारे इन चीजों के नहीं होने की बात पर डिफेंस मिनिस्टर ने कहा कि यस, यस, यस । कहां कहा डिफेंस मिनिस्टर ने 'यस, यस, यस' ? डिफेंस मिनिस्टर ने कहा कि हमारे पास ओवर आल इक्विपमेंट की कमी थी लेकिन यह कहना कि वहां सामरिक अस्त्र नहीं थे यह झूठ है । इस पर मुझे वह बात याद आ जाती है जो कि हिटलर कहा करता था । हिटलर ने कहा कि एक झूठ को सौ बार दोहराओ तो वह सच होगा । हिटलर ने कहा कि देश की आर्थिक स्थिति को तोड़ दो, ब्रेक दि एकानमिक स्ट्रेंथ, हिटलर ने कहा कि देश के मनोबल को तोड़ दो और उसके बाद फौज पर दखल हो जायेगा । मेरी यह निश्चित राय है कि हमारे यह विरोधी सदस्य चाहे व पी० एस० पी० के हों, चाहे जनसंघ के हों चाहे प्रकाश वीर शास्त्री के रूप में हों, यह इस देश की जनता के मनोबल को, यह इस देश की फौज के मनोबल को, यह इस देश के नेहल को, उस जवाहरलाल के नेतृत्व को जिस नेतृत्व का डंका सम्पूर्ण संसार में बजना है, तोड़ना चाहते हैं । कोई भी देश युद्ध के वक्त में अपने नेतृत्व को नहीं तोड़ता । अगर किसी देश में युद्ध के वक्त में नेतृत्व नहीं था तो उस ने लीडरशिप को क्रिएट किया, उसे बनाया । लेकिन यहां पर हमारे बहादुर आदमी, जो मिग और अम्बर चर्खे के फर्क को नहीं

[श्री: भागवत झा आजाद]

जानते हैं, चाहते हैं कि इस मनोबल को तोड़ दिया जाय। यह नहीं हो सकता। इसलिये यह कहना कि ऐसी बात कहीं नहीं हुई यह सरासर गलत है। गणतंत्र कभी भी अपने देश की जनता के मुख से रोटी छीन कर बराबर हथियार नहीं बनाता। यही इंग्लैंड ने किया, यही अमरीका ने किया, लेकिन जब गणतंत्र के अन्दर अमित ताकत जागती है तो उस ताकत के जगने के बाद कभी ब्रिटेनर जैसे, मुसोलिनी जैसे, आदमियों को शरणा नहीं मिलती है।

हिन्दुस्तान के ऊपर चढ़ाई हुई नेफा और लद्दाख में, यह बात सच है, हमारी असफलताये प्रारम्भ में हुई, लेकिन कौन इतिहास का विद्यार्थी यह नहीं जानता कि आक्रमण को, इन्वेडर को प्रथम सफलता मिलती है, कौन इस बात को नहीं जानता कि आज तक जितने महायुद्ध हुए, चाहे प्रथम महायुद्ध हो चाहे द्वितीय महायुद्ध हो, या आगामी न्यूक्लियर वार हो, उन में जो पहला आक्रमक होगा उस को स्वभावतया पहले सफलता मिलेगी? यही सफलता यहां मिली। लेकिन आज ल. भू. भूल रहे हैं विस्टन चर्चिल के यह शब्द कि: डिमाकैसी लूजेब दो बॉटल नाट दो वार हम ने एक महान हानि उठाई, लेकिन हम ने आज तक हथियार नहीं डाले, लेकिन यह बात कह कर, इन सारे जुल्मों को यहां कह कर कि हमारी फौज के अफसर अपने देश के नक्शे बेचते हैं, यह कह कर कि हमारे देश की फौज के अफसर शराब पी कर सीक्रेट्स बेचते हैं, यह कह कर कि हमारे देश में कुछ है ही नहीं, हमारी असफलताओं को पराजयों की संज्ञा दे कर, यह कह कर कि शैतान सिंह और होशियार सिंह की आत्मायें क्या कहती होंगी लोगों के मनोबल को तोड़ा जा रहा है। मैं इस प्रश्न का जवाब देता हूँ प्रकाशवीर आम्बी को कि शैतान सिंह

और होशियार सिंह की आत्मायें यह कहती होंगी कि हमने बहादुरों ने लड़ाई लड़ा लेकिन इस प्रकार की बातें कह कर हम मृत आत्माओं के ऊपर कलंक का टीका लगाया जाता है। इस देश की हजारों विधवाओं के आसू प्रकाशवीर आम्बी के जवाब में यह कहेंगे कि हमारे महान पतियों ने देश के लिये स्वाभिमान के लिये इतना त्याग किया लेकिन आज संसद् में बैठ कर इन तमाम जवानों को, इन तमाम अफसरों को, इन तमाम आदमियों को डरपोक कहा जाता है और उन के सिर पर कलंक का टीका लगाया जाता है।

श्री यशपाल सिंह (कैराना) : डरपोक नहीं कहा गया, यह बिस्कुल झूठ है, यह गलत बात कही जा रही है।

श्री भागवत झा आजाद : मैं जानता हूँ कि ठाकुर यशपाल सिंह ने नहीं कहा। अभी आप के एक मित्र ने कहा कि हमारे जवान जानवरों की तरह से मरे। आप अभी तुरन्त आये हैं, इसलिये आप सुन नहीं पाये। उन्होंने हालात को बतलाया। हमें ख़शी है कि अपोजीशन में अभी ऐसे बहादुर आदमी हैं जो कहते हैं कि यह बात गलत है। मैं भी यही कह रहा हूँ कि सारी बातें गलत हैं। आक्रमक को हमेशा पहले सुविधा रहती है। इस लिये हमारी फौज के सम्बन्ध में, उस की तैयारी के सम्बन्ध में, जो कुछ कहा गया गलत है। यह बात मैं मानता हूँ कि हमने अपनी प्रायोरिटीज को, हम ने अपने उस दबाव को किसी और रूप में देखा। यह सब कोई करता है। मगर सब जानते हैं कि कोई भी आदमी अपने पड़ोसी को शुरू में ही जल्मी मान कर नहीं चलता है। कोई भी राष्ट्र अपने बगल के राष्ट्र को अन्यायी मान कर नहीं चलता है। किसी ने आज तक नहीं किया। श्री नाथ पाई ने कहा कि १७ साल तक पार्लियामेंट ने डिफेंस बजट

पास किया, लेकिन श्री माधु पाई यह क्यों भूलते हैं कि जिस समय यह बजट सदन में रक्खा गया, उस वक्त सिर्फ डिफेन्स का पहलू नहीं था। सम्पूर्ण धाम और व्यय का जो लेखा इस सदन के सम्मुख रक्खा गया उसमें डिफेन्स भी था, उस में इरिगेशन एंड पावर भी था, उसमें स्वास्थ्य भी था उसमें कम्प्यूनिटी डेवेलपमेंट भी था। किसी सदस्य ने आज तक नहीं कहा कि इरिगेशन एंड पावर का बजट काट कर, स्वास्थ्य का बजट काट कर, कम्प्यूनिटी डेवेलपमेंट का बजट काट कर, ओ डिफेन्स ५०० करोड़ का है उसे ७०० करोड़ का कर दो। मैं आप से इसका एक उदाहरण चाहता हूँ। हाँ, उदाहरण यह है कि आचार्य कृपालानी ने, बि. घेंट आचार्य ने, कहा था कि, डिफेन्स पर सीलिंग लगाओ। इस का उदाहरण है इस सदन के सामने।

श्री श्री न. स्वर्णर जो रुपया यहाँ से मंजूर किया गया था वह भी तो वापस किया गया अधिकांश।

श्री भागवत झा आबाद : मैं यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि जिस समय सदन में माननीय सदस्य नहीं आये थे उस समय जब यहाँ पर बजट पास हो रहा था उस में कहीं नहीं कहा गया। क्यों? इसलिये नहीं कहा गया कि इस देश ने यह चाहा कि हिमालय पहाड़ के उस पार के पड़ोसी से हमारा मैत्री सम्बन्ध हो। हम आज भी इस बात पर जोर देते हैं कि सामरिक तैयारियों के बावजूद भी असैनिक हल खोजने का प्रयास होना चाहिये। कोलम्बो पावर्स ने जो प्रस्ताव रले आज उनका समर्थन करीब करीब सारा संसार कर रहा है। और रूस ने भी कल बहुत स्पष्ट शब्दों में कहा कि चीन आक्रमक था, और चीन से रूस ने कहा है कि कोलम्बो प्रस्तावों के आधार पर हिन्दुस्तान से बात करो। इसलिये मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि सामरिक तैयारियों के साथ साथ हिन्दुस्तान

को अपनी नीति के अनुकूल दूसरी प्रकार भी इस समस्या के हल को खोजने का प्रयास करना चाहिये। लेकिन इसका यह अर्थ नहीं होता कि हमारी सैनिक तैयारियाँ न हों। जैसा कि मैंने पहले कहा इस मामले में इस संसद् की जवाबदेही है और सरकार की भी जवाबदेही है। लेकिन यह कहना सही नहीं होगा कि इसमें किसी व्यक्ति विशेष या किसी कमांडर विशेष की गलती थी। हमारे भूतपूर्व प्रतिरक्षा मंत्री श्री कृष्ण मैनन प्रतिरक्षा मंत्री नहीं रहे लेकिन वे जीते जागते इस सदन में सदस्य की हैसियत से बैठे हैं लेकिन फिर भी उनका भूत लोगों के सिर पर चढ़ कर बोलता रहता है। यह चीज कोई हिन्दुस्तान के इतिहास में ही नई नहीं हुई है, इस प्रकार की परिस्थितियाँ अन्य देशों में भी आयी हैं और लोगों को अपने पदों से हटना पड़ा है। इस सम्बन्ध में मैं होर बैलिशा, मिस्टर ईडन, मैकमिलियन आदि के नाम गिना सकता हूँ जब कि द्वितीय महायुद्ध में बहुत से लोगों को अपनी नीति के अनुरूप जब सफलता नहीं मिली तो वे चले गए। लेकिन आज जो यहाँ लोगों के सिर पर जीवित इन्सान का भूत नाचता है इसका कोई इलाज नहीं है।

मैं यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि इस संसद् ने बार बार इस बात पर बल दिया है कि देश की आर्थिक व्यवस्था को सुदृढ़ करो। उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, बोकारो, दुर्गापुर, ऐसे इस्पात कारखाने कुछ वर्षों में बनाए जा सकते हैं, लेकिन इस्पाती इन्सान बनाने में समय लगता है। हिन्दुस्तान की आजादी के बाद इस देश में उन इस्पाती इन्सानों को बनाया गया जिन इन्सानों ने एक स्वर से आक्रमणकारी के खिलाफ आवाज उठायी और उसको हिमायल के उस पार भेज दिया। मैं समझता हूँ कि आज जो तैयारियाँ हो रही हैं वे ठीक हैं।

[श्री भागवत झा आजाद]

अब मैं अपने वक्तव्य को समाप्त करते हुए एक दो विषयों पर और प्रकाश डालना चाहता हूँ ।

रक्षा मंत्री ने हमारी सामरिक तैयारियों के विषय में अपने वक्तव्य में बतलाया कि हमारी आर्डनेन्स फैक्टरीज में दुगना गोला बारूद बनने लगा है और आटोमैटिक वैपन्स बनाए जा रहे हैं । और भी तमाम बातों का उल्लेख किया । हमारे एक माननीय सदस्य ने सिकन्दर की बात कही, पुरु की बात कही, समुद्रगुप्त की बात कही । लेकिन वे भूल जाते हैं कि आज की लड़ाई घोड़ों और फौज की लड़ाई नहीं है । आज सबसे महत्वपूर्ण लड़ाई एयरफोर्स की होती है । यह ठीक है कि हमारे मित्रों से हमको कुछ अंशों में सहायता मिल रही है, जिसका इतना ढोल पीटा जाता है, तो मैं सरकार से जानना चाहता हूँ कि हमारे मित्र हमको आटोमैटिक वैपन्स के अलावा और क्या सहायता कर रहे हैं । अगर आज हमको अपनी फौजी ताकत को मजबूत करना है तो हमको सुपरसानिक जेट्स की सहायता मिलनी चाहिये । अगर हिन्दुस्तान को चीन से फँसला करना है, तो वह नेफा और लद्दाख की बर्फीली घाटियों में नहीं होगा, वह होगा पीकिंग, ल्हासा और दिल्ली तथा कलकत्ता के मैदानों में । इसलिये हम अपनी सरकार से जानना चाहते हैं कि क्या उनको अपने इन मित्रों से सुपरसानिक जेट मिले हैं । अमरीका ने अपने मित्र अयूब खां को, जब वह वहाँ पर गए तो, एक सुपरसानिक जेट्स का स्क्वाडरन प्रजेंट किया । हम जानना चाहते हैं कि क्या हमको पैसा देने पर भी हमारे वे पाश्चात्य मित्र सुपरसानिक जेट्स देने को तैयार हैं ? क्या वह इंग्लैंड जो आज चीन को कामेट जेट एयरक्राफ्ट दे रहा है, हमको भी देगा ? हम रूस को भयवाद देते हैं कि उसने हमको

मिग वायुयान दिये और उनको बनाने का उपाय भी बतला रहा है । यह ठीक है कि हमको अपनी हर प्रकार की तैयारी करनी चाहिये और अपने डिफेंस को इम्पूव करना चाहिये, लेकिन जब हम चीन जैसे जालिम आक्रमणकारी का मुकाबला कर रहे हैं तो हमको अपनी एयरफोर्स को मजबूत बनाना चाहिये, और मैं अपने डिफेंस मिनिस्टर से पूछना चाहता हूँ कि क्या हिन्दुस्तान की सरकार ने अपने पाश्चात्य मित्र इंग्लैंड और अमरीका से सुपरसानिक जेट्स की मांग की है, और अगर मांग की है—तो चाहे पैसे के बदले में ही सही या किसी और रूप में सही,—उनको क्या जवाब मिला है ।

मैं अपने वक्तव्य को समाप्त करते हुए कहना चाहता हूँ कि हमारी तैयारियां ठीक हैं और नेफा रिपोर्ट के आधार पर हमको कारंवाई करनी चाहिये । लेकिन साथ साथ अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय पृष्ठभूमि में हमें सामरिक तैयारियों के बावजूद असैनिक हल की भी खोजने का प्रयास करना चाहिये । हमको दोनों तरफ से बढ़ना चाहिये । यह ठीक है कि हमारी नीति नान-एलाइनमेंट की और शान्ति की नीति है, लेकिन इसका यह अर्थ नहीं कि हम दुश्मन के सामने घुटने टेक दें । अपनी नीति के अनुरूप हम तैयारियां करें और साथ साथ असैनिक हल ढूँढ़ने का प्रयत्न भी करते रहें ।

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** Shri Hanumanthaiya

**Shri Sheo Narain (Bansi):** Sir, I come from the Nepal border. We do not get a chance. We are not able to catch your eye. We are being neglected here.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** Order, order—  
Shri Hanumanthaiya.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya** (Bangalore City): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the speeches so far made by the Opposition party Members are rather an extension of their speeches on the no-confidence motion. This is a debate which centres round a report searchingly submitted to this House for discussion. We ought to have concentrated on the lessons that we have learnt from this NEFA debacle and made suggestions to ensure victory for our armed forces and India. Very eloquent speeches were made by brilliant speakers of the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra Party and the P. S. P. They are all speaking about issues that are dead. They invariably bring in a few names whether the occasion warrants it or not. Mr. Menon's name is very often used, and by the Members of the Opposition parties very often abused.

When discussing this report, which pointedly shows to us our sense of shame, the sense of defeat, we ought to be in a mood of repentance and devotion to duty, and we have to do things in a way that ensures victory. That psychology ought to make the speeches impartial.

If I wish to speak impartially on this subject. I do not resort to arguments which can be employed on either side according to the inclination of the speaker. I want to quote facts and figures. Shri Prakash Vir Shastri and Shri P. K. Deo of the Swatantra Party repeatedly quoted that Shri Menon had surrendered about Rs. 130 crores which was earmarked for defence expenditure. Sometimes figures lead, sometimes figures mislead. I have had to do something with budget-making for a few years. I know these figures have been quoted in a misleading manner. I will show you how it is.

The expenditure on defence budget has not been fully utilised. The explanation is that purchases could not be made in time because there are

official procedures to be followed and there are necessary delays which we have to take into consideration. These things do always happen. When we have to acquire land or purchase arms and other things, the money does not disappear if we do not spend it in that year. We repeat the same figure in the next budget for this very same purpose. Therefore, if about Rs. 20 crores is not spent in a particular year, say, in the year 1957-58, that Rs. 20 crores is carried to the next budget and like that it goes on year after year. If we add Rs. 20 crores which lapsed in one year, to the next year allotment of the very same figure of Rs. 20 crores it would look like 40 crores for two years, though it is actually Rs. 20 crores.

**Shri S. M. Banerjee:** It might have happened in Mysore.

**Shri Kapur Singh** (Ludhiana): This kind of thing does not happen. Perhaps in Mysore it happens.

**Shri Sham Lal Saraf:** But all that money did not lapse in one year.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** If you wait for my explanation you will see the reason behind it. I am not interested in criticizing you or defending anybody. I am merely stating facts in an impartial manner. Therefore this Rs. 130 crores lapse has not gone to waste nor has it been surrendered. It is a question of manipulation and adding figures. If the Defence Ministry issues an official communique as to how much money was earmarked for a particular purpose and in what year it was spent and if you give a correct picture, it would certainly not be Rs. 130 crores; it may be less than half that figure or even nil.

You say it is Shri Menon who surrendered this amount. I am sorry, that word ought not to have been used. The difference between the budgeted figure and the actual expenditure is in the very nature of budgeting. It applies not merely to Defence but to every Ministry. Let

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hon. Members look into other ministries' figures and they will invariably find that the budgeted figure is not spent and that some money lapses. It is not a question of surrender. Because of difficulties pertaining to procedure in spending or that proper care has to be taken in spending, money is not utilised in a particular year and is utilised in the next year.

**Shri Surendranath Dwivedy** (Kendrapara): Lack of proper planning also.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** Take for example, previous 10 years' figure which I have got. If my hon. friends argue that for the last five years because Shri Menon was the hon. Defence Minister Rs. 130 crores had been surrendered—that word is incorrectly used; it has been utilised in subsequent years—from 1950-51 to 1956-57, in six years, when non-controversial figures were Defence Ministers more than Rs. 100 crores lapsed like this. Let us remember that then the military budgets were not as big as was the case in subsequent years. Therefore this lapsing is not the particular fault of one Defence Minister. It has been happening throughout.

**An Hon. Member:** In other ministries also.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** It had been happening in this Ministry all along the budget-making process. It has been happening in other ministries also. Therefore to get into a mood of personal rancour and attribute all sorts of motives to a particular person is not the kind of psychology that ought to pervade our minds in this hour of crisis.

I am particularly anxious and I have a premonition that the Chinese will again attack. The very people who expected the Chinese not to attack India said that they placed faith in Chinese friendship rather wrongly and they confessed that they were deceived. Let us not be deceived again

The other day an old and respected Member of this House who is not very much in the limelight, Shri V. B. Gandhi, very slowly but very cogently argued that China will again attack. Let it be noted that China will attack. Therefore, whether we belong to the Congress Party or to any other party, we ought to become so serious as to forget the fault of one another and concentrate on the big effort that we have to make in order to win the war against China that is certain to come.

Regarding responsibility also, the Opposition parties' Members say that everything is right with the army and everything is wrong with the Ministers and politicians. In their anxiety to throw blame on the Government or on the Congress Party they may say so. But in their cooler moments they will see that that charge can be levelled against them also when in years to come they become the Government.

**Shri Kamalnayan Bajaj** (Wardha): No chance.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** To say that everything is right with the army, and that everything is wrong with the Ministers or the Government or the Treasury Benches is ultimately to subvert the foundation of democracy.

**Shri Surendranath Dwivedy:** Nobody has suggested that.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** The army at all levels might have done better or might not have done better—I am not an expert—but the report itself makes it clear that there were several deficiencies. I meet as a common man many a soldier or jawan as you say, in Hindi, who was on the front. They are bitter against their officers, the lowest ranks of officers, that is, the Captains, Lieutenants and such others. They say that they never gave the inspiring lead that ought to have been given by the immediate officers. It is easy to blame men at the top. I do not defend them either. We have to

hold them responsible because, after all, power is vested in them. But to put a veneer on all our jawans and officers by saying that they are the best of individuals and to say that only the people in the higher ranks are the worst sinners is a way of argument which I cannot appreciate.

The army that has been trained, as has often been described by the hon. Prime Minister and the hon. Minister of Defence now and previously, was trained in the British ways. As you know, methods of warfare, equipment, strategy and all these things change from year to year, from war to war and this army was not trained upto, what is called, the standard of warfare required for the occasion. If there was any rigidity, I can tell you it was not at the stage of the Minister but at the stage of the permanent officers who are in the Army. They have been accustomed and acclimatised to a particular way of training, command and psychology and they thought that any advice from the higher quarters was interference. They had the hardihood to take their cause to politicians and plead that it was interference from higher quarters. To plead all the time that advice or guidance by the Government as interference is to sabotage the very system of army work. Most of you know that the greatest Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, who won the war for Britain and the allies, not only did the Prime Minister's work but was also day-to-day taking keen and deep interest in the deployment of the army, in strategy and in every method of warfare. It is said and I believe it is true that he was the guiding mind behind the who strategy of war. If some Ministers who are Members of this House come upto that expectation, we ought to congratulate them instead of condemning them in the name of interference.

**Shri Ranga:** Question. It has yielded very bad results. What is the good of comparing our Minister to Mr. Churchill?

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** Then what is the good of my comparing you to Mr. Harold Wilson?

15 hrs.

**Shri Ranga:** I did not ask for it. That is a cheap jibe which is unworthy of my hon. friend.

**Shri Hanumanthaiya:** I shall only quote two passages for the guidance of the Defence Ministry from *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery*, and then I shall conclude my speech.

The real lacuna, as is admitted in the report, is want of leadership. Field-Marshal Montgomery says that the leadership is the most important element in commanding an Army. And he defines the term as follows:

"My own definition of leadership is this: 'The capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence'."

As to whether the present leadership has come up to that expectation or not, it is not for me to pass a judgment on it today. It is for them to search their own hearts. After all, we judge and compliment not merely because a particular Defence Minister goes and another comes in his place; we are not made of that stuff. We wait for the day to congratulate a Minister when he actually secures victory against the enemy.

Then, about the work of the commander or the leader as he puts it, Field-Marshal Montgomery says:

"The troops must be brought to a state of wild enthusiasm before the operation begins."

If propaganda goes on that they have no shoes, they have no food, and thus we get them to a rebellious spirit, making them feel that 'there are people in the country who will defend us even though we run away and even though we become prisoners of

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war and even though we disgrace the name of the Fourth Division of the army, that is not proper; that is not the kind of psychology that we have to encourage in the Army.

Lastly, the Army, and any Army for that matter, ought to get inspiration to fight. I have no time to quote instances from our history. But I can quote again Field-Marshal Montgomery. It is all very well to send Dilip Kumar and Vijayantimala for the edification of our troops, but that is not inspiration; it is only entertainment. What does this General who has fought battles and won an immortal name say? He says:

"Finally, I do not believe that today a commander can inspire great armies, or single units, or individual men, and lead them to achieve great victories, unless he has a proper sense of religious truth; he must be prepared to acknowledge it, and to lead his troops in the light of that truth. He must always keep his finger on the spiritual pulse of his armies; he must be sure that the spiritual purpose which inspires them is right and true, and is clearly expounded to one and all. Unless he does this, he can expect no lasting success. For all leadership, I believe, is based on the spiritual quality, the power to inspire others to follow."

**Shri Frank Anthony** (Nominated—Anglo-Indians): I feel that most of us in this House agree with many of the sentiments that have fallen from the Defence Minister. As he has told us, this NEFA inquiry was intended to bring out the mistakes and deficiencies of the past and to ensure that they would not be repeated. I agree with him when he says that there should be a need, and there is a need, for a proper perspective for our not saying or doing anything that might give information to the enemy or that might demoralise our own fighting men. I sincerely hope that we are really on

common ground on the need for learning the lessons of the past. But, quite frankly, I have my reservations in this matter. I have grave misgivings, because I feel that a Government that is not prepared to admit its crucial mistakes, but on the other hand shows a readiness to cover up those mistakes is not likely to learn any lessons from the past. And although the Defence Minister was perhaps a little more forthcoming than his predecessor, I feel that Government should have been more forthright with this House and with the country. What little has been vouchsafed to us was a grave indictment of the Government.

There was the admission of overall shortage of equipment, the admission of lack of proper roads and transport, of an unsatisfactory intelligence organisation. These admissions by themselves are especially a grave indictment of the former Defence Minister. Perhaps, some of the things that I might say of the former Defence Minister may sound a little bitter, but let me say at the outset that I am bitter, and I am resentful against the former Defence Minister, not for any personal reason; I want to pay him this personal tribute that unlike most of the other Ministers, he had a certain definite capacity for hard work, and he was one of the few Ministers who when I sent a case or a problem, dealt with it promptly, and in most of the cases that I sent to him he dealt with them very satisfactorily. My resentment is purely on principle.

It had become a habit with the former Defence Minister deliberately to keep this House and the country in the dark. Whenever we asked for information, however innocuous, and however advertised it was in the world press, he was in the habit of fobbing us off with supercilious and rather dyspeptic replies, suggesting that we were ignoramuses while he was the sole repository of all knowledge and capacity in defence matters. I had

occasion over and over again to criticise him for this supercilious habit. And the few admissions that have been made in this rather cryptic statement have been sufficient to show that the repeated categorical assurances—I would not elaborate them—of the former Defence Minister about our having not only adequate but increasingly adequate defence preparations, I am sorry to say, were repeated categorical untruths intended deliberately to mislead this House and the country.

I am not unduly worried by some of the deficiencies that have been pointed out in the statement. I am not unduly worried by the reference to the failure of certain middle-aged officers. I am not condoning anything, but I say this that in any Army, particularly in an Army which has functioned over a fairly long period of peace, you will find these deficiencies, middle-aged officers, and people who become soft, or who have degenerated, if I may use that expression, into pot-bellied pen-pushers. They are known as pot-bellied pen-pushers; there is a special name for them in the Indian Army, and they are known as Agra brigadiers. And it is UP which has the palm for producing pot-bellied pen-pushers or otherwise. And in the best regulated Army, there will be deficiencies of leadership at all levels, at unit levels, and at higher levels, particularly in peace-time Armies; they tend to become soft; they tend to become decorative, and when political leadership has no rapport with the Army and has very little military thinking, they tend to be diverted to peace-time pursuits. And did we not see the debilitating spectacle of fighting troops being diverted to building houses, and the officers, allegedly fighting officers—I have used the word 'allegedly' advisedly because they were favourites at the political court,—being decorated for building houses?

What I feel is this, that the most vital part of the report, the part which deals with political directions and with political misdirections, the part

which does not impinge remotely on security, and whose publication would have fortified the morale of the nation, the part which would have vindicated our fighting men, has been deliberately withheld from this House merely because its disclosure would have been a damning indictment of the former Defence Minister. That is why I am resentful. I believe the whole Indian Army today is resentful, and bitterly resentful, because in order to cover the guilt of one man, the former Defence Minister, there has been a gratuitous tarnishing of the image of our incomparable jawans, there has been a gratuitous tarnishing of the image of our senior officers. Some of them would be a credit to the best armies in the world. I think the Defence Minister said that the defects were most apparent at the higher levels; and it was quite clear that by the 'higher levels' he meant Major Generals and above. I am sorry that he should have given the impression of a sweeping indictment. It was neither fair nor just. Most of us know who the two Major Generals were. The communists, of course, have run true to form. Their whole technique is to demoralise the country, to demoralise our army, to damn our Generals to save their political henchmen. They damned personally one of the Major Generals. I do not know him personally. I know of him. I know this that he had one of the finest records in the Indian army. That by itself is not a guarantee that he would make a good General. How do you expect even the best of Generals to get on top of this tremendous confusion? And they had to do it in the space of a few hours.

What I want is this, that this House and the country should not spell out the notorious failure of the Operational Corps Commander into a sweeping indictment of all our Generals. His failure was there. It was a notorious failure; it was an expected failure.

**Shri Ranga:** Expected?

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I will tell you.

I say it was his failure. But perhaps in a sense—I am talking of the Corps Commander—it was not so much his own failure as the crime of the former Defence Minister. And I say it advisedly. I say this because I have some knowledge—I cannot disclose it to this House, because I am often, very often, consulted professionally by people in all ranks of the Army—and I know a good deal of what has happened in the past. But I know this also that Shri Krishna Menon played havoc with the senior ranks of the Indian Army. He sought steadily to purge the Indian Army of its best fighting Generals because they had too much self-respect, they had too much moral courage to submit to his political dictation. He sought deliberately to create around him a caucus of courtier-politician officer who would do his political bidding. He sent of the Army—I could give the names, but I do not want to—some of our finest fighting Generals, when they should have been kept. Some were virtually compelled to resign. I could name them, because I know some of their cases, but I won't.

As I said, he played utter, absolute, havoc with the senior ranks of the Indian Army. And not only the senior ranks of the Indian Army. He was known to intervene in selection right down to Lt. Col. level.

As a senior parliamentarian, I do not want to refer personally to anyone. But I say this that his appointment of the former Chief of the Army Staff was a deliberately nepotistic political appointment. He might have been an exceedingly good person as an individual. But it was known throughout the Indian Army that he had nothing of the image of some of its former fighting Generals. He was put there because it was known that he was ineffective, it was known that he would be completely ineffective, to withstand the manipulations of Mr. Krishna Menon.

But the greatest crime of all was the appointment of the Operational

Corps Commander. I regret to say it that over and over again palpable untruths were relayed to this House. Over and over again, we were told that this General had a fine fighting record. I regret to have to say it, but then I have to repel palpable untruths. Throughout the Army, he was known, as the Army knows, as 'Khacchar Corps General'.

**Shri Sham Lal Saraf:** Question.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I know a good deal. I do not want to go into details.

**Shri Sham Lal Saraf:** I know much more.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I know a little more than you.

His whole experience was that of a supply and transport officer. He was known in the military messes as an officer, as one of the few senior officers who had not heard a short fired even in anger.

**Shri Balkrishna Wasnik (Gondia):** On a point of order.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I am not giving way.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** It is a point of order. Let me hear him.

**Shri Balkrishna Wasnik:** The hon. Member is using the names of Generals.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** He did not mention any name.

**Shri Balkrishna Wasnik:** He referred to the Corps Commander.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** He referred to the rank.

**Shri Balkrishna Wasnik:** He had already mentioned the name and then the Speaker had to take exception to it.

**Mr. Deputy-Speaker:** No names may be mentioned.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I have not mentioned the name. Unfortunately, others have. They have either con-

demned him by name or sought to defend him. I know quite enough. You will be surprised if I mention names and facts.

**Shri A. N. Vidyalkar** (Hoshiarpur): He pretends to know more than he knows.

**Shri Frank Anthony**: I know a little more than you—certainly which end of the rifle to hold when using a rifle.

As I was saying, this unfortunate man was more sinned against than sinning. My hon. friend, Shri Hanumanthaiya, just said that morale of any army depended on its leadership. I agree with him. As soon as the appointment of this unfortunate, unfit, inexperienced General was made, the whole morale of the Indian Army plumbed to the depths. They expected it—every mess in India expected the reverses which we suffered in NEFA. Why didn't they have reverses when our officers were much less experienced? Did we have reverses in the Kashmir campaign? They faced and overcame the most impossible, almost impossible, logistic conditions. Why even in Ladakh did they fight, and fight to the death? Why this debacle in NEFA?

I have tried to give you some of the reasons. As I said, the elevation of this General was part of the Krishna Menon plan to create a caucus of politician—Generals around him who would do his political bidding. I blame him more than these unfortunate Generals.

We have to be thankful to the Chinese for many things. But one of the things we have to be thankful to them for is this, not only that the Chinese attack created this tremendous national upsurge but that it led to the virtual dismissal of Shri Krishna Menon, because I believe that if Shri Krishna Menon had continued in office for any further length of time, he would have succeeded in destroying the whole Indian Army. He would have demoralised it from top to bot-

tom because he had already injected into the army for the first time this pernicious political virus.

I say that the most serious question that emerges from this whole inquiry is this. If it was merely chronic incompetence, you get it in the best regulated nations. If it was merely gross negligence, that also happens. If it was merely the pretensions of a megalomaniac who saw himself in the role of a diminutive Hitler, that also sometimes happens. But the question that is being asked today is: was it much more than any or all of these things. Was it deliberate sabotage?

I say this, that as long as the Government chooses to shroud this part of the report which refers to political interference as a decisive cause of the NEFA debacle, this charge will persist—this charge of deliberate sabotage. I say this: the report itself indicates sabotage. The Government knew as early at least as 1957 that China constituted a major military threat to this country. Yet there is the admission that there was no slant in our training for a war with China. There was no slant in our training so far as the requisite knowledge of Chinese tactics was concerned. There was no training to our troops for fighting at high altitudes, when it was axiomatic that if we had to fight the Chinese we would have to fight them at high altitudes.

I have often been asked my reasons for this sudden, unexpected withdrawal of the Chinese. Many of us have given different reasons. I have given an amalgam of reasons. I do not want to be unfair to Shri Krishna Menon, but my reasons have been not only this tremendous national upsurge, not only the aid that was being rushed to us by the Western democracies, but perhaps most of all it was because Shri Krishna Menon was sacked from office. I say this, that his sacking from office came as such an unexpected shock to the Chinese, that it upset all their calculations for a military cake-walk into India. The Chinese may

[Shri Frank Anthony]

have continued to be able to rely on the Indian Communists to sabotage the war effort in the country, they may have been able to continue to rely on the Indian Communists supplying them with vital military intelligence, they may have been able to continue to rely on the Indian Communists to confuse and demoralise our people, but they could not depend on sabotage at the very heart of our war effort. That, in my opinion, was the dominant reason: the sudden, unexpected sacking of Shri Menon was the dominant reason for the sudden, unexpected withdrawal of the Chinese.

Many questions remain to be answered, and they confirm this charge of sabotage. Why did the Prime Minister, apart from the sheer indiscretion of it, proclaim somewhere outside the country that he had given orders to the Indian troops to drive the Chinese out? Obviously he could only have done it if he was misled by the former Defence Minister as to the strength and concentration of the Chinese troops. What is the good of trying to fob off the blame on to our intelligence organisation? I had read long before the Chinese attack repeated warnings in the press of the Western democracies of increasing Chinese concentration, of increasing logistic build-up. How could they then pretend not to know the strength of the Chinese concentration? They must have known of this tremendous concentration of Chinese troops. What was the reason for sending a handful of our troops, leave the equipment aside, admittedly unacclimatised, and I say this categorically, against the advice of our Generals, to take on the Chinese at an impossible height, knowing they were hopelessly outnumbered, knowing that the only result would be that they would be overrun and perhaps massacred? What was the reason for issuing the Indian jawan 50 rounds of ammunition? What was the reason, above all, for superseding the advice of his Generals? I say this and I will not accept any more *ipse dixit* by way

of denial that he did not supersede the advice of his Generals. I say that he superseded their advice, that he hamstrung his Generals at every step.

I have here a cutting from a weekly newspaper, which is not very well known, but it is not being refuted. It levels such grave charges against the former Defence Minister that if they were untrue, he would have it prosecuted.

**Shri S. M. Banerjee:** Which is that paper?

**Shri Frank Anthony:** I am reading it out. It is probably one of your papers, it is bound to be, it is not one of mine. It is the *Flame* dated 18-5-1963. (Laughter) My friends laugh as if this is less reputable than the *New Age*. If it is an irresponsible rag, still it gives information which damns the former Defence Minister. Why does he not prosecute them? I will help him to prosecute them, as I am prosecuting the *New Age* today. This is what it says:

"Lt. Gen. Kaul in a long statement to the Defence authorities is reported to have placed the responsibility for the NEFA reverses during the last fall on the former Defence Minister, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon.

"Lt. Gen. Kaul, it is learnt, has accused Mr. Krishna Menon with interfering directly in the strategic deployment of forces as well as the military tactics that were employed to meet the Chinese invasion.

"From Gen. Kaul's version it would appear that the military commanders had abdicated all their powers and initiative to Mr. Menon who from his air-conditioned office in New Delhi was moving the army divisions with the greatest ease.

"It is also understood that Gen. Kaul has further affirmed that

whatever he and his junior officers did was on the direct and clear instructions of Mr. Menon. Gen. Kaul has explained the Army withdrawals as the result of Mr. Menon's orders, it is learnt.

"Lt. Gen. Kaul is reported to have asserted that but for the unnecessary interference from politicians the Indian Armed Forces would have held back the Chinese marauders and given them a tough fight."

I shall place this on the Table of the House. I am morally certain that the reason for Government covering up this Report, inadequate as it may be, is that it exposes that the real decisive reason for this NEFA debacle was not only political interference, but that it was deliberate political sabotage.

**Shri Manabendra Shah** (Tehri Garhwal): The function of the enquiry committee was of a restricted nature, to quote paragraph 4 of the report, "I had made it clear that the underlying idea in holding this enquiry is to derive military lessons. It was meant to bring out clearly the mistakes or the deficiencies of the past, so as to ensure that in future such mistakes are not repeated, and such deficiencies are quickly made up." This is restrictive, but not restrictive as Shri Gupta said yesterday. I do not agree with him. It is restrictive, and rightly restrictive, because it was not their function to see whether in the circumstances prevailing then, the defects that were pointed out were defects which were deliberate or due to the force of circumstances existing then.

15.27 hrs.

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Therefore, in order to have a proper appreciation of the report, it becomes very necessary for us to understand the circumstances prevailing then. That is the only way in which we can do proper deliberation. It is only then that Government can really take corrective steps.

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I cannot go into all the defects pointed out in the report, but I shall take up some of the more important ones. One defect pointed out is governmental interference. This may be true, but we have to appreciate that the Defence Headquarters and the Government are concerned with the strategy that has to be adopted in the whole country, having with them the necessary information about all our borders. The Government is also concerned with the steering of the war in such a way that there are no serious repercussions in the rest of the country, and the Government has to keep in touch with the international pulse. In the sudden emergent situation that befell us last year, it was necessary for the Government here and the commanders in the field to be in constant touch with each other. It was especially necessary because the events took place in quick succession. Therefore, though I would not say that it was excusable, yet I do appreciate that in that position it becomes a little difficult to demarcate the permissible extent of the political interference or the interference from army headquarters. It will be noted that non-cohesion was only in the NEFA area. That further proves what I have been pointing out. In fact, I would even go to the extent of saying that perhaps the local commanders were impelled to take constant advice from the Centre due to the suddenness of the attack, the magnitude of the attack and the quick succession of eventful events that took place there.

Local strategy and national strategy have to go hand in hand. We cannot allow local strategy to sway the national strategy. Yesterday, I think Shri Shastriji pointed out that we were laying too much stress on the national strategy. In this regard I would like to quote the example of Korea where national and local strategies clashed and national strategy had to overrule local strategy. MacArthur had pushed Koreans right up to the Chinese border. Local strategy

[Shri Manabendra Shah]

demanding that they should attack China but President Truman held that national strategy did not demand that. If what Mr. Shastri said yesterday is to be done, we should have chosen and attacked the Chinese at their vulnerable points. That would be to forego the interests of national strategy at the expense of local strategy and instead of trying to confine our area of activities, we would have been inviting a broader area of activities which would have gone entirely contrary to our national interests or national strategy. I am trying to point out that national strategy is important and we have, therefore to see that political authority is respected and obeyed by the commanders.

The other point that is often referred to is about not taking proper precautions beforehand. I hold that precautions had been taken in the circumstances prevailing then. It is an accepted principle that before any fighting is done we must take the political precautions. That was done by negotiations and discussions. If, however, one party chooses to do Pear Harbour, no matter how much precautions we take, those precautions will always be inadequate. Similarly, one can say that even if precautions of this nature were being taken, why were we not properly prepared? For that. I say that preparedness is not an abstract thing; it is nothing by itself. It is a combination of certain things such as: political policy, objectives of Government, balanced development or lopsided development, state of economic growth, etc. All these are considerations that have to play their part. Was the Government to lend her energies solely for aggressive designs or pursue that which we have put in our Directive Principles of the Constitution? Mao said in 1938 that "political power comes out of the barrel of the gun;" we say that it comes through the "ballot box." In 1937 he said that "historical experience is written in blood and iron";

we say that it is written by "love and peace." He said again in 1937 that the "first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy"; we say that "we have to co-exist even with the enemy and try to mould his thinking in the right direction." This policy of ours has been endorsed, approved and applauded by the whole of this House. Therefore, the tempo of our preparedness has to be studied in this context. I hold that the Government did the right thing in not creating a psychological war or the psychosis of war. If we had done that this very House would have objected to it. They would have never tolerated it. Now, when we are really in trouble, they are organising petition marches and want us to scrap our Plan.

The other point that has been raised is the lack of talent of generals. How are generals made? There are peacetime generals; there are wartime generals. I think all our generals are peacetime generals as in the last war most of our present time generals were junior officers. Wartime generals are made and recognised when the country is at war. Is it not a fact that even in United Kingdom whose history is full of wars they find their generals by means of trial and error. Is it not a fact that in their Middle east sector General Alexander, after two changes, was found to be a suitable general and he continued to conduct fighting there. That did not mean that the other two were incompetent. In fact these two earlier generals went on to hold important posts to the full satisfaction of their Government. Therefore, it is not desirable for us to run down our generals, day in and day out. Let us not make a political issue or a political capital out of it. Let us not demoralise our generals because that also demoralises our soldiers because then they feel hesitant to respect them and obey impli-

citly their commands. We have to see the situation then prevailing. Then only can we make proper criticism. I think this is the only proper approach by the Government for taking proper corrective steps. Merely taking technical corrective steps is not enough.

Before I conclude I would also like to touch the question of defence preparedness. I had been from time to time bringing to the notice of Government certain steps that should be taken for preparedness. I am glad to note that some of them are already implemented: light arms, radar net work, etc. There are certain other matters of a secret nature which I have brought to their notice and which I will not deal with now. Today, I would like to touch the guerilla warfare, for two reasons. Firstly, we are facing experts on guerrilla warfare. To quote Mao himself;

"The guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti Japanese struggle, but will be world wide."

Secondly the terrain in which we will have to face the Chinese is best suited for such warfare. Initiative seems to be always with the Chinese as they are aggressive and therefore apart from the terrain the problem of having many roads is solved. Lack of roads is one of the points raised by Shri Shastri yesterday. It will be an asset if we introduce guerrilla warfare. That would also be a good reply to the Chinese threat in numbers. Guerrilla warfare as was known in the past was "arming the people as a defensive measure" against the invader. Though it was supposed to be a weapon of the weaker side, it was a potent force as the sympathy and backing of the local people existed. The communists, especially the Chinese, gave it a new twist. They combined guerrilla warfare with subversive war. The other technique adopt-

ed by them is the limited aggression: take a small bit of land and quickly offer negotiation, just as they did now. A very prominent leader on the Opposition side was saying that the withdrawal of the Chinese was due to Russian influence. I do not discount that in toto. But perhaps it was part of this game of limited aggression because the aim as I see it is to keep the pressure and force us to divert our attention from economic development to defence with the result that a situation may arise where they can raise subversive forces and sympathisers. This game was being played with us also. I think the Government are aware of it because they created the border districts for their quick and accelerated economic development. I think it is incomplete; It cannot be complete unless we also introduce guerrilla system of warfare coupled with the conventional armed forces.

श्री शिवमूर्ति स्वामी (कोप्पल) :

अध्यक्ष महोदय, नेफा इनक्वायरी और अवर डिफेंस प्रीपेअर्डनेस, इन दोनों मोशंस पर पिछले दो रोज से इस सदन में बहस चल रही है ।

भारत देश पर चीनी आक्रमण को चीनी इतिहास की पृष्ठभूमि में देखना चाहिये । सन् १९४९ में चीन में वर्तमान कम्युनिस्ट रैजिम पावर में आई । पावर में आने के चंद महीनों के बाद ही कम्युनिस्ट चाइना ने जो नक़शा प्रकाशित किया उसमें हिन्दुस्तान की ५०,००० वर्गमील भूमि को चीनी भूमि दिखलाया गया था । उस नक्शे को देख कर ही हमें चीनियों की विस्तारवादी मनोवृत्ति का परिचय हो गया था और यह पता चल गया था कि हिन्दुस्तान के एक बड़े भूभाग पर उनकी कुदृष्टि है । सन् १९५० में जब चीन ने तिब्बत पर हमला किया और उसको अपने पंजों में जकड़ लिया उसी दिन से हमको जाग्रत हो जाना चाहिये था और चीन के बढ़ते हुए हमले से हमको अपनी रक्षा के लिये पूरी तैयारी कर लेनी

(श्री शिवमूर्ति स्वामी)

चाहिए थी। तिब्बत जब तक एक बफर स्टेट के रूप में हमारे और चीन के बीच में विद्यमान था तब तक हमें उतना खतरा नहीं हो सकता था लेकिन जिस दिन से उन्होंने तिब्बत को कम्युनिस्ट चाइना का अंग बना लिया उसी दिन से हमारी गफलत छूट जानी चाहिये थी। लेकिन यह बद-किस्मती की बात है कि यह गवर्नमेंट और इसके बड़े नेता तब भी नहीं जागे और हम अपने को इसी भुलावे में रक्खे रहे कि चीन का हमारे ऊपर हमला नहीं होगा और हमने उससे दांस्ती जमाने की कोशिश की। चीन के साथ हमने पंचशील के आधार पर मैत्री स्थापित की और उसके साथ बैठ कर हिन्दी, चीनी, भाई-भाई के नारे लगाये। हम उसकी आक्रमणकारी नीति को तब भी न समझ सके। जिस पंचशील को आधार बना कर उनके साथ हमने मैत्री संधि पर हस्ताक्षर किये उसमें एक वाक्य यह था "म्युचुअल रिस्पेक्ट एंड इंटीग्रेटी"। लेकिन मैं यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि जब तक चीनी हुकूमत अपने उस नक्शे को जिसमें उसने भारत भू भाग की करीब ५०,००० वर्गमील एरिया को चीनी प्रदेश दिखलाया था, उसको बदलने और ठीक करने को तैयार नहीं थी, तब तक इस तरह पंचशील के समझौते पर चीन के साथ हस्ताक्षर करना बिल्कुल बेमानी था। लेकिन हमने अपनी गलती से, अपने भोलेपन से, अपने सादेपन के कारण हिन्दी-चीनी भाई भाई का नारा लगा कर उनके साथ बैठ कर दस्तखत कर दिये हालांकि चीनी नक्शे में हिन्दुस्तान के काफ़ी बड़े सीमावर्ती भूभाग को चीनी प्रदेश दिखलाया हुआ था। इतिहास इस बात का गवाह रहेगा कि हमारी सरकार गफलत में पड़ी रही, चीनी पालिसी को उसने गलत समझा और उसका नतीजा यह हुआ कि जब २० अक्टूबर को गये साल चीन ने भारत पर बड़े बेमाने पर हमला शुरू किया तो

हमारी साइड उसका मुकाबला करने के लिए तैयार नहीं थी और परिणामस्वरूप हमें हार खानी पड़ी और शर्मिंदगी उठानी पड़ी। यही नहीं कि वह हमला कोई एकदम से और पहला हमला था। उसके पहले सीमा वारदातें काफ़ी होती रही हैं। खुद संरक्षण मंत्रालय द्वारा प्रकाशित पुस्तिका "लीडिंग इविट्स ऑफ इंडिया-चाइना रिलेशंस, १९४७ टु १२ जुलाई, १९६२" में यह प्रकट किया गया है कि चीन द्वारा अतिक्रमण की तक्ररीबन ११८ घटनायें हुई हैं। उसमें आखिरी डेट १२ जुलाई, १९६२ है। पहली अतिक्रमण की घटना उन की १३ अगस्त, १९५० से शुरू होती है और आखिरी १२ जुलाई, १९६२ को होती है। अब अगस्त, सितम्बर और अक्टूबर इन तीन महीनों की घटनाओं की भी अगर हम उसमें जोड़ दें तो ऐसी घटनाओं की संख्या करीब १५० के हो जाती हैं। अब इस पुस्तिका को देख कर कोई भी इसी नतीजे पर पहुँचेगा कि चीन की असली मंशा भारत पर हमला करने और उसके सीमांत देशों को हथियाने की थी और इसलिए ऐसा मानना कि २० अक्टूबर का हमला कोई एकदम और एबरप्टली हुआ गलत बात होगी।

यही नहीं, मैं बतलाना चाहता हूँ कि चीनी हमले का उद्देश्य महज़ भारत की कुछ जमीन ही हथियाने का नहीं था। कुछ मैदानी जमीन और पहाड़ी इलाका ही छीनने की उसकी मंशा नहीं थी। चीन का दरअसल भारत पर हमला करने का क्या मक़सद था उसे मैं अपने लफ्जों में न रखते हुए इंडिया-चाइना बोर्डर डिस्प्यूट, एडिटड बाई राणा सत्यपाल, की किताब में से कोट करना चाहूंगा कि उन्होंने इसके बारे में क्या लिखा है? वे अपनी उस किताब में यूँ लिखते हैं :—

"With this enemy on our borders, the enemy which is a living

threat to our independence, security and economic development, the enemy which is working on a plan to isolate India in Asia, the enemy which is jeopardising the freedom and independence and existence of the smaller nations of Asia, India cannot be complacent. With this enemy in the East, America and other Western countries cannot be at peace in the West. With such an expansionist comrade in the camp, Khrushchev cannot avert a nuclear war and keep the bloc intact. Communist China is the enemy of the human race, the enemy of humanism, the enemy of the world, the enemy of the democratic institutions, the enemy of the working classes...."

कम्युनिस्ट चाइना की नीति स्पष्टरूप से तानाशाही और विस्तारवाद की है। वह अपना प्रभुत्व बढ़ाना चाहता है। उसका विश्वास प्रजातंत्री सिद्धान्तों में बिल्कुल नहीं है और वह चीन में हिन्दुस्तान अगर पूरा नहीं तो उसका काफ़ी बड़ा हिस्सा मिलाना चाहता है। ऐसा हवाब चीन देख रहा है। चीन यह नहीं देख सकता कि उसका कोई पड़ोसी जनतंत्री सिद्धान्तों पर चल कर और स्वतंत्र नीति अपना कर प्रगति करे। उसके दिल में भारत के प्रति एक जलन पैदा हो गई है और इसी वजह से वह हमला करके हमारी ज़मीन छीनना चाह रहा है। चीन के असली रूप के बारे में अब भारत को कोई धोखा या मुग़लता नहीं रहना चाहिये। चीन के भारत पर हुए आक्रमण को बौर्डर वार ही नहीं समझना चाहिए बल्कि यह समझना चाहिये कि वह भारत के प्रजातंत्री ढांचे को जड़ से ही नष्ट कर देना चाहता है और इस तरह से अपने साम्राज्यवादी और विस्तारवादी इरादों और मंसूजों को पूरा करना चाहता है।

इतना ही नहीं मैं आपको बतलाऊँ कि १४ मई, १९६२ को हमारे प्रधान मंत्री

खुद चीन को क्या लिखते हैं? उनको ख़त लिखते हैं कि हम अक्साई चिन सड़क का चीन द्वारा सिविलियन यूज़ करने के लिये राजी हैं। हम उस वक्त भी उनकी असली मंशा और नीयत को नहीं समझ सके और इस तरह का उनको ख़त लिखा था :—

"They also once again suggested on 14th May, 1962 that the Indian and Chinese forces in the Western sector should withdraw behind the alignment claimed by China and the international boundary of India respectively. They were willing, too, to permit the civilian use of the Aksai Chin road by China. The Chinese Government, however, rejected this offer."

इसके अतिरिक्त जब चीन ने तिब्बत पर हमला किया और उसको अपन अधीन कर लिया तो हम चुप रहे और हमने तिब्बत पर चीन की प्रभुसत्ता स्वीकार कर ली। यह हमारी दूसरी ग़लती थी। राजेन्द्र बाबू ने तिब्बत की आज़ादी का सवाल उठाया था लेकिन हमने चुपचाप तिब्बत का हरण स्वीकार कर लिया और इस आशा में स्वीकार कर लिया कि चीन से हमारी दोस्ती ज़मी रहेगी। हमने चीन के ख़तरे को उस समय भी नहीं समझा।

भारत चूँकि एक शांतिप्रिय देश रहा है। शांति की उसकी बेसिक नीति है और उसी को ले कर उस ज़माने में गांधी पीस फाऊंडेशन की कान्फ़ेंस हुई थी और उसमें यह कामना प्रकट की गई थी कि दुनिया में सब लड़ाई झगड़े समाप्त हों और सर्वत्र शांति स्थापित हो। लेकिन शांति की बात चीन को कभी अपील करने वाली नहीं थी और इधर हम शांति का ढिंढोरा पीटते रहे और उधर वह आगे बढ़ता रहा। हमने चीन के असली स्वरूप को पहचानने में सख्त धोखा खाया और उसी का परिणाम यह है कि हम ने काफ़ी बड़ा हिस्सा अपना खो दिया है।

[श्री शिवमूर्ति स्वामी]

इस बारे में रैंडियंस पेपर अपने ४-८-६३ के एडिटोरियल में इस तरह से लिखता है :—

"Those who know well this problem are quite aware that its history goes back to 1953, when Sino-Indian pact was finalised and India gave way to China to establish its upper hand on the North Eastern borders and allow a perpetual foe to creep into our own doors. Moreover, India committed the serious blunder in the identity of a friend and a foe. Our leaders remained in sweet illusion about Communism and Chinese people without taking trouble to penetrate into their temperament..."

अब इससे ज्यादा साफ मैं चीन के इरादों और नीतियों के बारे में नहीं बतला सकता। एक बड़ी अखबार नहीं बल्कि कई अखबारों ने इसी तौर पर लिखा है। इनी बारे में इंडियन ओबज़र्वर अपने जून २४, १९६३ के ईश्यू में लिखता है :—

"Our Prime Minister is very kindhearted. He is extremely generous to the faults of his friends. He seems to have overlooked the harm that has been done to the country on account of Krishna Menon. But let it be understood that the verdict of the history will be different, if a person responsible for the terrible setback to our country, instead of being punished, continues to enjoy the confidence and respect of our great Prime Minister."

आगे जो हमारी तैयारियां हो रही हैं उनके बारे में दो, चार शब्द कह कर अपना भाषण समाप्त कर दूंगा। हमें उनको अपनी सीमाओं से बाहर खदेड़ने के लिए दृढ़ संकल्प लेते हुए अपनी तैयारी करनी है। हमें इसकी सावधानी बर्तनी होगी और

हर संभव तैयारी करनी पड़ेगी कि हमारी इंटेंग्रेटी कायम रहे, और हमारी सीमाएं सुरक्षित रहें।

नेफा रिपोर्ट से पता चलता है कि वहां पर जवानों को जरूरी सामान मुलभ नहीं था, उनके पास लड़ने के लिये जरूरी हथियार और गोला बारूद नहीं था। यह सब हमारी गफलत और असावधानी की बातें अखबारों में भी छप चुकी हैं। हमें ब्रिगेडियर होशियार सिंह और मेजर शैतान सिंह आदि फौजी जवानों के खून को व्यर्थ न जाने देना होगा। उन्होंने अपना जीवन इस मातृभूमि की रक्षा के लिये होम कर दिया। अब डिफेंस मिनिस्टर और ऊंचे फौजी अफसरों का यह आदेश देने पर भी कि पीछे हट आओ उन्होंने पीछे हटना पसन्द नहीं किया, मोर्चे, पर डटे रहे और देश की रक्षा को खातिर बलिदान हो गये। उन्होंने कहा "हम लड़ेंगे मरते दम तक" और वे तीन चार दिन तक लड़े उसी थी नाट श्री के साथ—

वे उन्हीं मामूली हथियारों के साथ तीन चार दिन तक लड़े। लेकिन सरकार उन को एम्प्युनीशन और खाना कपड़ा भी सप्लाय नहीं कर सकी क्योंकि उस के लिए सप्लाय कनेक्शन ही नहीं था। इस गलती को हम किस तरह भूल सकते हैं? लेकिन मैं प्रार्थना करना चाहता हूँ कि जो कुछ भी गलतियां हुई हैं, ऐसा इन्तजाम किया जाय कि वे दोबारा न हों।

माननीय मंत्री, श्री चव्हाण, ने जिस दिन अपना पद सम्भाला उस दिन से ही मुल्क में और हमारे वीर सैनिकों में एक बिलकुल दूसरी हवा पैदा हो गई और चीनी फौजे भी पीछे हट गई। उन के पीछे हटने के दो कारण हो सकते हैं। एक कारण तो यह है कि दुनिया की तमाम औपीनियम हमारे

पक्ष में थी और दुनिया की मारल सपोर्ट हम को मिली, जिस की वजह से चीन आगे नहीं बढ़ सका था । मैं माननीय मंत्री से यह कहना चाहता हूँ कि संरक्षण की मुख्य नीति यह होती है कि जो भी लड़ने के लिए आते हैं, हमेशा उनको एन्गोड रखिए । या उन को एकदम दूर कीजिए । चीन के पास हमारी जो बीस पच्चीस हजार वर्ग मील जमीन है, उस को वापस लेने के लिए हम ने १४ नवम्बर को शपथ ली थी । लेकिन हम देखते हैं कि उस के बाद उस शपथ को, उस बचन को, पूरा करने की कोशिशों में धीरे धीरे कमी होती जा रही है । लोगों को भुलावा दिया जा रहा है और उस को दाद से भी लोगों को दूर रखा जा रहा है । कहा जा रहा है कि अभी तो वे बार्डर पर ही हैं । वे नेफ्रा के तीन-चौथाई हिस्से तक आ गए हैं । लेकिन उस को वह लाइन आफ एक्चुअल कंट्रोल ही कहते हैं । मैं यह जानना चाहता हूँ कि उन्होंने जो बीस पच्चीस मील पीछे हटने की बात कही थी, क्या उस पर उन्होंने ठीक तौर पर अमल किया है । क्योंकि उनके दिमाग में लाइन आफ एक्चुअल कंट्रोल कोई दूसरी ही है । प्रधान मंत्री कहते हैं कि वहाँ पर उन की सिविल पॉस्ट्स हैं, लेकिन मेरा अन्दाजा है कि वे वहाँ पर और भी रास्ते बना रहे हैं और उन की खूब तैयारियाँ हो रही हैं । अगर आईन्दा भी पहले की घटनाएँ होंगी, तो यह सरकार उन के लिए मुल्क के सामने जवाबदार होगी ।

मैं प्रधान मंत्री से यह अनुरोध करना चाहता हूँ कि वह समझें कि वह सिर्फ चन्द मील जमीन को वापस लेने के लिये नहीं आए हैं । इस महान प्रजातंत्र का नेतृत्व करने के लिए वह केवल एक पक्ष के समर्थन से सफल नहीं हो सकते हैं । इमर्जेंसी में केवल एक पक्ष की हुकूमत ताकतवर नहीं बन सकती है । जब तक

वह सारी नेशन को अपने पीछे न ले, तब तक केवल एक पक्ष की सहायता और समर्थन से या इमर्जेंसी की ताकत से हमला-आवर को हटा देना नामुमकिन है । वह हर एक पक्ष को विश्वास में ले कर, हर एक को कन्सल्ट कर के हर एक को साथ लेने की कोशिश करें । इस प्रकार की परिस्थितियों में इंग्लैंड में भी एक नेशनल गवर्नमेंट कायम की गई थी । मैं यह नहीं कहता कि नेशनल गवर्नमेंट में हर एक पक्ष को लेना जरूरी है, लेकिन मैं राष्ट्रीय सरकार उस को कहता हूँ जिस के दिल में देश भक्ति है, जो देश के हितों को सर्वोपरि रखती है । इसलिए मैं निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि इमर्जेंसी के वक्त तक पक्षों की दृष्टि से न सोचा जाये, पक्षों को भुला दिया जाये । अगर यह देश बचा, तो कांग्रेस भी बच सकती है, पी० एम० सी० भी बच सकती है और कम्यूनिस्ट पार्टी भी बच सकती है ।

मैं चाहता हूँ कि विश्व में भी एक हुकूमत हो — एक वर्ल्ड आर्डर हो । लेकिन कम से कम इमर्जेंसी के जारी रहने तक, चाइनीज के इस देश से निकाल दिये जाने तक, ख़दा के वास्ते, परमात्मा के वास्ते कम्यूनिज्म को नेशनलिज्म के साथ लगा कर नेशनलिज्म को कम न किया जाये । मैं प्रधान मंत्री से अनुरोध करूँगा कि वह "नेशन एबाव पार्टीज" को दृष्टि से काम करके हिन्दुस्तान को एक महान देश और प्रजा-प्रभुत्वशाली बनाने के अपने इबाबक पूरा करें । वह सब को विश्वास में लें, सब को कन्सल्ट करें, क्योंकि एक राष्ट्रीय सरकार बनाने से इस मुल्क की ताकत बढ़ सकती है, जब कि एक पक्ष, एक कम्यूनिटी और एक प्राक्सिस की दृष्टि से मांचने और काम करने से देश को नुकसान होता है । यह प्रार्थना करके मैं अपना भाषण समाप्त करता हूँ ।

श्री किशन पटनायक (सम्बलपुर) :  
 अध्यक्ष महोदय, मैं श्री चव्हाण की इस

[श्री किशन पटनायक]

भावना की कद्र करता हूँ कि ऐसी बातें नहीं कहनी चाहिए या करनी चाहिए, जिन से दुश्मन का हौसला बढ़े और हमारे सैनिकों का हौसला पस्त हो। लेकिन मुझे यह कहने में दुःख है, कि श्री चव्हाण ने कल शाम को राज्य सभा में जो भाषण दिया, उस में दिये गये तर्कों से हमारे सैनिकों का या हमारे देश का हौसला नहीं बढ़ता है।

मंत्री महोदय को यह तय कर लेना चाहिये कि उर्बसोभ्रं में हमारी जो बड़ी भारी पराजय हुई, उसका कारण वह बताना चाहते हैं या नहीं। अगर वह बताना नहीं चाहते हैं, तो उन को यह बात साफ़ साफ़ कह देनी चाहिये, क्योंकि इधर-उधर के कारण बताने से सिर्फ़ सेना का ही नहीं, बल्कि देश का भी हौसला पस्त होगा, इस में कोई शक नहीं है।

इस पराजय के लिए उन्होंने हमारी सोलह साल की आजादी के ऊपर—और उस ढंग से हमारे संविधान पर भी—दोषारोपण किया है। उन्होंने हमारी पराजय का एक कारण यह बताया है कि हमारी आजादी सिर्फ़ सोलह साल की है और इस लिये हमारी सेना पक्की नहीं है। यह बिल्कुल ग़लत बात है, क्योंकि जिस दृष्टि से हमारी सेना सोलह साल की है, उसी दृष्टि से चीन की सेना भी चौदह साल की होगी, तीस साल की नहीं। अगर अमरीका से मुकाबला करना हो, तो हम कह सकते हैं कि हमारी सेना सोलह साल की है, लेकिन जब चीन के साथ मुकाबला है, तब हमारी सेना को सोलह साल की कहना ठीक नहीं है। श्री चव्हाण भी जानते होंगे कि हिन्दुस्तान में सोलह साल की बच्ची भी मां बन सकती है। लेकिन उस में अगर वह सफल नहीं होती है, तो

उस से अंदाज़ लग सकता है कि उस को चलाने वाला नपुंसक है।

दूसरा कारण उन्होंने यह बताया है कि चूंकि हम एक प्रजातंत्र हैं इसीलिए आक्रमण के सामने हम झुक जाते हैं पहली बार और उतनी तैयारी नहीं कर पाते हैं जितनी कि एक तानाशाही देश कर पाता है। सरकार का हमेशा यह तरीका रहा है कि जब देश की आर्थिक प्रगति नहीं होती है, तब भी यह बात कही जाती है और जब सैनिक पराजय होती है, तब भी यह बात कही जाती है। मैं समझता हूँ कि हमारे देश के जो सब से अच्छे गुण हैं, आजादी और प्रजातंत्र, इन दोनों के ऊपर इस तरह आरोप लगाना बहुत ग़ैर-जिम्मेदारी की बात है।

हमारी जो पराजय हुई है, वह कोई मामूली पराजय नहीं थी, बहुत बुरी तरह पराजय हुई। इसलिये उस के कारण जानने के लिए देश भर में बहुत उत्कंठा है और उस के कारण ठीक ठीक बताना सरकार की जिम्मेदारी है।

उत्तर-पूर्वी सीमांत आंचल में इतनी भारी पराजय हुई और ऐसी पराजय हुई कि कभी कभी लगता है कि वहां लड़ाई हुई ही नहीं थी, सिर्फ़ भगदड़ हुई। हमारी सेना सिर्फ़ भागने लगी और वह भी रोज़ाना औसत तीस मील की रफ़्तार से। यह जो बात हुई है, इस के पीछे क्या रहस्य है, इसका क्या कारण है, इसको हमारे प्रतिरक्षा मंत्री ठीक ठीक बतायें।

16 hrs.

दो कारण हो सकते हैं। एक तो यह कि पहाड़ी इलाकों की ठीक ढंग से रक्षा करने के लिए हमारे मन में हमारी

सरकार के मन में, इच्छा थी या नहीं। प्रधान मंत्री हमेशा इन इलाकों को कम महत्व देने आए हैं। अपनी भावनाओं में और अपने कथनों में भी। लद्दाख को उन्होंने पथरीला कहा है और लांगजू को एक छोटा सा स्थान कहा है। केवल प्रधान मंत्री के ही यह मन की बात नहीं है, हिन्दुस्तान के पड़े लिखे लोगों के मन में भी शायद ऐसी ही एक भावना छिपी हुई मालूम पड़ती है, छिपे हुए ढंग से वह बनी रहती है। यह उर्वसीअं एक पहाड़ी इलाका है और वहां के आदिवासी पहाड़ी हैं। इस लिए ऐसा मालूम होता है कि हमारे मन में, हमारी सरकार के मन में, उन के प्रति उतनी सहानुभूति नहीं है जितनी कि मैदानों के लिए या मैदानी इलाकों में रहने वाली आबादी के लिए, ऊंची जाति के, मध्यम वर्ग के बड़े लोगों के लिये है। यह जो एक सन्देह हमारे मन में पैदा होता है इसका निराकरण हमारे रक्षा मंत्री को करना चाहिये, ऐसा मेरा उन से अनुरोध है।

दूसरा कारण यह हो सकता है कि उर्वसीअं में जो हमारी सेना काम कर रही थी, हमारी जो सेना लड़ रही थी, उसको कैसे आदेश दिये गये थे? क्या उसको लड़ने का आदेश दिया गया था या भागने का? ऐसा लगता है कि सिर्फ भागने के ही आदेश दिये जाते थे। कहीं भी ठीक ढंग से लड़ाई नहीं हुई है और चौकियां छोड़ छोड़ कर हम लोग चले आए। किसी चौकी के गिरने से पहले ही उसको खाली कर देने के आदेश भी दिये जाते रहे हैं। उदाहरण के लिए मैं बतलाना चाहता हूँ कि बोमदीला १८ नवम्बर को गिरा लेकिन उसको १७ नवम्बर की शाम को ही खाली कर दिया गया। इस से यही अंदाजा लगता है कि हमला होने के पहले ही हमारी सरकार तय कर लेती थी कि यह गिरने वाला है, इसको इसलिये छोड़ दिया जाना चाहिये।

सिर्फ नाम के वास्ते वहां कुछ लड़ाई हो जाती थी। लेकिन वास्तव में जो लक्ष्य होता था वह खानी करने का होता था, भाग जाने का होता था। मैं चाहता हूँ कि सवाल के इस पहलू पर भी-रक्षा मंत्री कुछ रोशनी डालें और बतायें कि इन सेनाओं को दिल्ली से सरकार द्वारा क्या आदेश जाते थे। चौकियों की डट कर रक्षा करने के आदेश जाते थे या नाम के वास्ते लड़ कर, उनको छोड़ देने के आदेश जाते थे।

तीसरी बात हमारी सेना और सेना के अफसरों के चरित्र की है। इस के बारे में कांग्रेस के भी एक सदस्य, श्री भवत दर्शन, ने कुछ कहा है। उन्होंने कहा है कि हमारी सेना में जो अफसर लोग हैं, उनके रहन सहन का ढंग सब उनकी भाषा आदि, को बदलना बहुत जरूरी है। एक कहावत मुनी है कि अंग्रेजों की लड़ाई ईटन और हैरो में जीती जाती है या जीती गई थी। लेकिन हमारे यहां यह सही बात है कि हमारी लड़ाई जो है वह हैदराबाद के या खड़ग-वासला के सैनिक कालेजों में हारी गई है। इन कालेजों में जिस ढंग से प्रशिक्षण होता है, जिस ढंग से अफसरों को पढ़ाया जाता है, उससे यह उम्मीद करना कि देश की रक्षा करने के लिये वे अपनी सारी जान लगा देंगे, व्यर्थ है। हैदराबाद के स्टाफ कालेज में एक छात्र पर तीन हजार रुपया माहवार खर्चा होता है। इस से आप अंदाजा लगा सकते हैं कि उनका रहन सहन और विलासिता किस स्तर पर होगी। उनकी जो क्वालिफिकेशन होती है वह तो सिर्फ ठीक ढंग से बोलने या अच्छी ड्रेस पहनने और सामाजिक क्लबों में और मिलन स्थलों में ठीक तरह से, अदब कायदे से बातचीत करने तक ही महदूद होती है, सीमित होती है। मैं यह नहीं कहता हूँ कि ये अफसर जो होते हैं वे व्यर्थ ही होते हैं या इन के दिलों में

[श्री किशन पटनायक]

देश प्रेम नहीं होता है। लेकिन केवल मात्र देश के प्रति प्रेम होने से ही देश की रक्षा नहीं हो जाती है। देश के प्रति प्रेम के साथ साथ देश की खातिर जान देने की तैयारी और उसकी खातिर लड़ने के लिए तत्पर रहना, इन चीजों की भी जरूरत होती है। मैं चाहता हूँ कि रक्षा मंत्री इस के बारे में भी हम को एशयोरेंस दें कि इन पद्धतियों में वह परिवर्तन लायेंगे।

सैनिक कालेजों में अंग्रेजी भाषा के ऊपर बहुत अधिक जोर दिया जाता है। अंग्रेजी के ऊपर इतना जोर नहीं दिया जाना चाहिये। अफसर बनने के लिये यह तय कर दिया जाना चाहिये कि ७५ प्रतिशत सैनिक अफसर तरक्की से, छोटे स्तरों से तरक्की कर के बनाये जायेंगे और केवल २५ प्रतिशत कालेजों के छात्रों में से लिये जायेंगे। इस ढंग से हमारी पालिसी में परिवर्तन आना चाहिये।

एक आखिरी बात कह कर मैं समाप्त कर दूंगा। प्रतिरक्षा मंत्री से मैं एक प्रश्न पूछना चाहता हूँ। कल राज्य सभा में भाषण देते हुए उन्होंने दो चीन की बात की है। उन्होंने कहा है कि चीन दो हैं। उन के इस कथन से क्या हम यह अंदाजा लगाये कि सरकार की नीति में, सरकार के दृष्टिकोण में कोई परिवर्तन आ गया है और क्या ज्ञान का उदय हो गया है और क्या इस पर सरकार अमल करने वाली है कि दो चीन को हम मानें, या वह सिर्फ एक चीन को ही मानेगी?

अध्यक्ष महोदय : अनरेबल डिफेंस मिनिस्टर।

श्री किशन पटनायक : अध्यक्ष महोदय

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अध्यक्ष महोदय : और वक्त नहीं मिल सकता है। किसी दूसरे माननीय सदस्य को मैं नहीं अब बुला सकता हूँ।

श्री किशन पटनायक : सलिए मैंने जल्दी खत्म कर दिया कि आपने मुझे कहा था कि हमारे ग्रुप के ...

अध्यक्ष महोदय : मैंने कहा था। लेकिन वक्त नहीं रहा है, इसलिये माफी चाहता हूँ।

**The Minister of Defence (Shri Y. B. Chavan):** Mr. Speaker, Sir, I am indeed grateful to this hon. House for discussing in detail the two statements that I submitted before this House. I had an opportunity to reply to the debate in the other House, where some of the points were so closely common that I may be pardoned if I am required to repeat some of the points.

I can say that when I submitted these documents I was also not very proud of them. As some of the Members say, it was a sad document. I can say I also submitted these documents to this House with a very heavy heart, and I find that these documents were discussed not only in these two Houses but since they were published they have been discussed in different presses, and I think it has been good for the country to have discussed these documents. Really speaking that was the purpose of having this enquiry made and that was the main object of sharing some of the important conclusions of this inquiry with this House and the country.

What I have found is that there is very grave concern over the problems of defence in this country. It is very natural. Even today when I heard the speeches I sensed that. Some of the speeches were very constructive; some of them were

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very emotional and some of them, admittedly, were very bitter, but I must grant them all that behind all this emotion, behind all this bitterness and behind all the constructive criticism for the defence of the country.

When this document was placed here the main idea was to consider a certain situation in an objective manner. From my own personal experience I can say one thing. I have worked for eight or nine months and I cannot say that I have become an expert in defence problems, but I have started knowing something about them. I find that in this country of ours, fortunately or unfortunately there is very little background or knowledge about the defence problems. Either there is some wishful thinking about them or there is some romantic idea about the defence problems. It was therefore necessary to assess a certain experience which was a major experience for our army and for our country in the rather furious and rushing events that took place last October-November.

When I say "our major experience", I do not mean to say that our army leaders or officers had no experience of war. I made that point yesterday and it was rather misunderstood by the last speaker who spoke. I mentioned the period of 16 years. It is only since independence that the Indian Army is being directed with a certain political purpose of our own. It became an instrument of the Indian people since 1947. So, the experience that the army had last year was, really speaking, the major experience. Of course, they had some experience before, as I said, of the Police Action in Hyderabad, of a similar action in Goa and, perhaps, of a more important nature in Kashmir. But the type of experience that our army had last October-November was a major experience from one point of view and it was essential that this

experience must be properly assessed. So, though I made a reference to the bitterness and the emotional attitude about it, I must claim and I must plead for objectivity which is necessary to examine this report because its main purpose is that.

Its purpose is not merely to try to hold somebody responsible. I think, we are rather too near the history to hold anybody responsible. Let us not have an attitude of sitting in judgment like historians; let us leave the whole matter for the future historians to apportion the blame. My hon. colleague, an hon. Member on this side, Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee, said that blame must be apportioned. At some time somebody will sit in judgment and the historian will try to apportion the blame. That is a different matter; but today our present duty is not merely to sit in judgment over anybody with a view to hold anybody responsible or punish anybody because we are not at the end of our journey, of the trouble. The journey has perhaps only begun. We are in the process of defending our country. Somebody had referred to what had happened as a defeat. Certainly it was a reverse, but I do not think the Indian nation is defeated; I do not think the Indian nation will ever be defeated. It is a reverse of a campaign; it is a reverse in a battle.

Even there I must try to correct some of the impressions that even my statement made. I did say that the higher commanders' deficiency became apparent. Here I must make one correction in the impression that was created though that was not what was in my mind. The battles that were fought in Ladakh were certainly fought well and there the higher command had done its duty very well. Even in the eastern sector, in the Wa'long sector, our army has done well and some of the hon. Members tried to hold one particular General responsible for it. He was also responsible for certain well-conducted battles in the Wa'long

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sector. It is not enough that we hold anybody responsible. I am not holding a brief for any individual. If at all I am to hold a brief, I must hold a brief for the defence of the country.

I am only looking at it from this point of view. Please do not understand that I am trying to reply to this debate only in the spirit of replying to it or to explain away everything. I am trying to put my feelings or my thoughts about it. So, the main attitude is as to what lessons we should learn from this inquiry and what lessons this nation should learn from the experience that we had in the last campaign. That is where we try to put them in as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.

Government has not tried to shirk its responsibility. Some of the hon. Members did make a mention that Government asked the aggressors to be thrown out. I think that was certainly Government's duty to give instructions to the army for that. If Government had not done that, the Government would have failed in its duty. It is the very purpose of the Government to exist and it is for that purpose that the Army is supposed to be its instrument.

**डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया** (फरुखाबाद) : ऐसा हुकम ऐन मौके पर नहीं दिया जाता। जब उल्टे थप्पड़ मार कर भगाये जाते हैं, तब ऐसा हुकम नहीं दिया जाता।

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I hope, my hon. friend, Dr. Lohia, would just listen to me. It is not a fact that Government told them, "Go on this day and do this or that". It was certainly left to the army commanders to do that as soon as possible and when they were ready. On that account, I must say, there was no political interference at all of any nature whatever about the detailed conducting of the campaigns that took place anywhere.

I think, it is not fair to hold any individual Minister or even the hon.

Prime Minister responsible for it because it was the nation's policy. This was accepted not by Government but by this House and by the entire country. That policy was to have peaceful attitude towards all the neighbouring countries. Some people try to make fun of Panchsheel now because it suits them. But the whole country accepted Panchsheel as our ideal. We did nothing wrong in accepting that as our ideal. It has certainly happened that one of our neighbours has turned out to be treacherous. Her intentions now appear to be some sort of expansionist intentions. Now it would be our duty to face it. It is in such circumstances naturally that a democratic country with peaceful objective certainly suffers initial reverses.

I entirely agree with Shri Indra-Gupta when he said yesterday that that is what had happened not only to a peaceful country, like India, but to mighty empires during the Second World War and even to a great military power, like Russia. That is what happens. What has happened in this campaign I take it as an initial reverse. It does not mean that the Indian Army is defeated or that the Indian nation is defeated. But if, at the same time, we do not want to repeat the same mistake, certainly we must study as to what was wrong with the whole thing.

Hon. Members have said that we have tried to hide something. Frankly I can tell them that consistent with the public interest, as it is understood . . .

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** Public?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Please do not misunderstand the word 'public'. Consistent with security considerations, at least we have made an attempt with the full consent and approval of the hon. Prime Minister to share all major conclusions with this House and the country. We

have certainly said that there was no chance of China starting an offensive against India. That is there, and that certainly was the attitude or certainly was the judgment of the situation in the country and the international situation then. That was not hidden. That was explained, and that was accepted by this House also on many occasions. So, I would suggest that it is not fair to say that something is being concealed from anybody. Something that the country should know or something that this House should know has been given out, with a view not merely to frighten ourselves, not merely to demoralise ourselves or to demoralise the Army or to demoralise anybody; but really speaking, to learn lessons from it and correct those deficiencies and correct those mistakes and see how we can strengthen our own approach in this particular matter, because it is through such experience, and it is through such appraisals, or self-appraisals or self-criticisms, if I may call it like that, that the country can build its own defence concepts or defence strategies.

Defence strategies are not born out of any wishful speech on that side or any brave speech on my side. Defence strategies or defence concepts of a country grow out of economic capabilities, technical developments and development of science and the morale of the nation. So, the first thing is economic capabilities which we shall have to see. Then we shall have to see technological development, then we have to see scientific development, and finally we have to see morale also. As far as morale is concerned, I think that India certainly stands, as compared to other countries, as good as any other country. My own explanation why China is going back to this and I have always explained it the other way. For instance, Shri Frank Anthony has given one explanation. I can give him another explanation. If we look at the history of India, in a way, the history of India for the last one

thousand years, if I may say so, is a history—one cannot say that in all respects—of aggressions over India, and whenever there was aggression against India, India was found to be divided. Possibly, China misread Indian history and they thought that history was going to repeat itself when there was an aggression. But they forgot that the India of 1962 was not the old India, but it was a new Republic India, the people's India. When the Chinese Army started knocking at the door of India, the Indian people stood one with a resolute determination to resist the aggression, and I think that it is this determination on the part of the people of India that made China go back. That is my explanation. I know that there are other military explanations also for that. I do not want to go into them. An important complex cannot be oversimplified by one explanation, but I would certainly like to give this explanation. If it is acceptable to my hon. friend, Shri Frank Anthony, he may possibly accept it.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** That is one of the reasons.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It is one of the important reasons.

As regards the other statement that I made about our defence preparedness, I would submit that that statement is, really speaking, supplementary to the first statement. Shri Indrajit Gupta said that some hapnazard explanations had been given about the corrective actions. I would request him to read the second statement along with the first statement, and he will find the answer to every deficiency that is pointed out in the NEFA Inquiry Report; every deficiency which is pointed out there has been answered in the statement on defence preparedness.

Here, I would like to answer a small point made by my hon. friend, Shri Raghunath Singh. He devoted the whole of his speech to just one

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point, and that was that no mention had been made about the Navy. Of course, I do not want to underestimate the importance of the Navy or the Navy's preparation in the context of our defence preparations. In the long range, we shall have to take a realistic view and do whatever we can do, looking to our own economic capabilities; that is a different matter. But this statement on defence preparedness was in view of the report of the NEFA inquiry, and naturally, my hon. friend would not expect me to take the Navy on the Himalayas.

I would like now to refer to some of the specific points made by some of the hon. Members.

Shri Prakash Vir Shastri made a point about the surrendering of large amounts of the order of Rs. 132 crores. That was the information that was given. So, certainly, I accept the figure of Rs. 132 crores. But I must say that I endorse the speech of my hon. friend, Shri Hanumanthaiya who has made a very good point, that those who have experience of these budgets can certainly say that the amount was surrendered, but the whole arithmetical calculation and the summing up or the totalling up of it does not give a correct picture. The amount which is surrendered this year naturally is provided for in the next year for the completion of a certain work. So, if you just total up the whole amount for ten years, the whole thing looks rather absurd.

**An Hon. Member:** It is six years' accounts.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** That will be rather an illogical way of looking at the question. Certainly, some percentage may be surrendered. I am taking this opportunity to explain this point. This year the House was kind enough to give me a bumper sanction of very huge amounts. I cannot give a guarantee that I would not surrender any amounts. For, it depends on many factors.

For example, in the statement on defence preparedness, I have mentioned about our new production factories. There, we have certainly arranged and planned and certainly implemented to whatever extent we can the rupee expenditure, in developing the local sites or trying to develop water supply and other matters that we need for them. But, ultimately, it depends upon what aid we are likely to get or what foreign exchange we can afford to spend to get the manufacturing plants needed.

My hon. friend, Shri Nath Pai asked how it was that so many missions had gone, and he asked what they had done. That only shows our intention of getting help from wherever we can. We have not shown any inhibitions about it. We have gone to the West, and we have gone to the East, because we are in such a situation when we must get help from every friend, from whichever friend can help us, but we cannot expect all the friends to give us all that we want; they have their own political difficulties or whatever other difficulties there may be; so, we must accept gratefully whatever they give, and try to get more if we can. Therefore, it should not be misunderstood that we are not making any efforts, because many missions have gone. But I can tell my hon. friend that many missions have gone, no doubt, but many missions have also succeeded in some matters. While it is true that they have not succeeded one hundred per cent—it is difficult to succeed one hundred per cent in getting aid from others—they have succeeded in some matters. But, certainly, I would submit that in strengthening our defence apparatus it takes a long time to prepare; it cannot be done overnight.

**Shri Harj Vishnu Kamath:** The hon. Minister should himself go and try.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** If necessary, certainly, I shall not hesitate to go, not that I am very keen to go anywhere.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** That would be for a national purpose.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** But I must mention one thing that though we are getting all help, let us not forget one thing. Here also, I must take an objective view of things. As far as defence production is concerned, as far as the defence requirements are concerned, we are not going for aid for everything. There is a considerable base of production here in our country, of our own, in certain matters, as for instance, in regard to general stores etc. Certainly, for sophisticated weapons or some sort of weaponry and ammunition etc. we have to go in for aid, and the necessary machinery to produce those things; naturally, we have to do that.

I must say here, whatever criticism may have been made by other people that it would be unfair and ungrateful on my part, if I did not make a mention of the fact that we must recognise the work in this particular field of my predecessor, Shri Krishna Menon, that it was he who for the first time gave emphasis on organising the local production in this country, as far as the defence preparation was concerned. It would be an ungrateful attitude if we do not recognise that. I am saying this, because, as I have said, I am taking a sort of objective attitude about this matter. It is necessary that we must recognise that he did it. Certainly, in the field of aeronautics, we have got a certain production base. In the case of transport also, I can say that the production of the Shaktiman and the Nisan trucks has solved our problems of transport to some considerable length. So, we must give credit where credit is due.

My hon. friend, Shri Frank Anthony said that he was bitter; if he wants to be bitter, he can be bitter, but since he belongs to a profession where he seeks to get justice done where justice is due, he must not deny that justice in this particular case also.

I was rather intrigued by a statement made by my hon. friend, Shri Nath Pai, about some theft of some map. Well, we have got all sorts of maps. He asked me whether there existed such a map. We have got valuable maps, important maps, secret maps, but I have no information that any such map was stolen by anybody. If he has any information, I am prepared to meet him confidentially and get that information. Then I will certainly inquire.

At the same time, he also made another remark which, I must say, hurt me—rather it should hurt everybody here—that there is a 'China Cell' in every department, in every Ministry, here.

**Shri Nath Pai:** I think it caused hurt to some other friends also because they were whining at me. I was quoting from an article by a very distinguished columnist writing in the *Sunday Telegraph*. His writing is extremely friendly except for some uncharitable references to an individual here. He quotes that a pro-China lobby in the Defence Ministry, a pro-China lobby in the External Affairs Ministry is holding this view. There are other quotations which I can submit to him. I did not mean anything else. (*Interruptions*).

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** When a statement like this is made by an important Member like him, it creates a wrong impression in the country; it demoralises the nation, and I do not want that to happen. That is my intention in replying to that point. I want to assure him that there is no such thing. How can there be such a cell functioning in the Defence Ministry or any other Ministry of Government? It cannot be.

**Shri Frank Anthony:** In your Party, you have got a China lobby (*Interruptions*).

**Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad:** You are the greatest China lobby here (*Interruptions*).

**Mr. Speaker:** That should not happen.

**Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad:** He says 'Your Party has a China lobby'. He should not have made that remark.

**Shri Surendranath Dwivedy:** It is addressed to you.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** You have gone on record as being the greatest China lobby. He said you are, Sir.

**Mr. Speaker:** If he was referring to me, I accept it! Members should try to restrain themselves.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Shri Prakash Vir Shastri asked why we have got Chinese here to teach the Chinese language, why we have not sent our people abroad for training in that language. I can tell him that we have sent our officers for the study of Chinese language to countries wherever we can get them trained. In our own country also, we have got certain facilities for the study of the Chinese language. We have certainly some Chinese also as instructors, and there is nothing wrong in that. But then somebody has got a wrong impression that the Chinese instructors are part of the military intelligence directorate. That is not true. We have got, for example, one Chinese professor from Shantiniketan to teach Chinese. There is nothing wrong in that. If there are Chinese who want to come and help Indians to know their language, with all security care and precautions being taken, I think there is nothing wrong about that.

He made a very important point. That was about the mess attitude of the army officers, that means a certain class attitude, a distinction between the army officers and the jawans—I think that is what he had in mind. I can tell him and assure the House—I assured the Rajya Sabha yesterday and I would like to repeat it here—that we did certainly inherit

this tradition from the British army, but steps have already been taken, and we have taken more care about it; because we find that the Chinese particularly try to emphasise in their indoctrination efforts with our prisoners of war this particular point. We have issued a series of instructions to see that a new pattern of relationship between the officers and the jawans is developed. Of course, it will take some time. But I am sure that the present army leaders are very keen to have that new democratic attitude established gradually but very firmly.

Another point that was raised was about the production of rifles at Ishapore. I think I have answered that in my statement on defence preparedness. By the end of this year the maximum capacity of the Ishapore factory, which is 2,500 per month, will be reached. Unless it is expanded or we have another plant, it cannot be increased, but it should not be supposed that it is the only production. Bolt action rifle will also be produced, 5,000 a month, even after that.

Shri Bhakt Darshan made a few points, and he was naturally concerned about the contribution of the hill areas in this defence preparedness. I entirely agree with him that the hilly parts from which he comes have got military traditions, and not only that area. I have gone into the statistics, and I have found that nearly one-fifth of the entire new recruitment to the army is from the hill areas. I hope he does not expect us to leave the entire defence of the border areas only to the border people.

श्री भक्त दर्शन (गढ़वाल) : मेरा मतलब आप समझे नहीं। सारी सेना में नहीं, माउन्टन डिवीजन्स में स्पेशली उन्हें प्रार्थमिकता दी जाय। यह मेरा आशय था।

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I think he will concede my point that the hill areas have more than enough representation when I tell him that one-fifth of the

newly recruited jawans are from the hill areas.

Another question asked was what we are doing about helping experienced jawans to get into permanent and emergency commissions. That is an important point, because these jawans or JCOs who have, really speaking, gone through the thick of battle, possibly have got more battle toughness, and if they are made officers, possibly we will get the right type of leadership that the army requires. We have gone into this matter, and I have mentioned in my statement on defence preparedness that we have expanded the facilities at the Nowgong School where these commission trainings are given. I may tell him that nearly one-fourth of the permanent commissions and emergency commissions have gone to these JCOs and the people from the ranks. That shows that we are rather more careful about it.

The qualities of leadership are something very important as far as the country is concerned, and these qualities cannot overnight be inculcated, because they cannot be imparted merely by training. They certainly are cultivated through certain experiences, and it is the intention of the Defence Ministry to see that we hold exercises from time to time through the Army Headquarters to test the qualities of leadership of the different people, so that we can have proper personnel to lead our army if and when a crisis comes, or if at all it comes. That was one point which I wanted to mention as far as Shri Bhakt Darshan is concerned.

The same point was made by Shri K. C. Pant in his speech. He also made another point that there should be demarcation between civil and military intelligence, but at the same time very fortunately he says there should be co-ordination. I can assure him that demarcation is obviously there, and co-ordination is the one thing we are emphasizing more in the intelligence performance.

About intelligence, I may say it is not merely getting information. Intelligence, really speaking, is quite different from information. In the army jargon intelligence is defined as information which is properly evaluated from the military point of view. Information becomes intelligence only when it is properly assessed and it gets certain military value. From that point of view, the military intelligence organisation will take a long time to be reorganised. It requires the right type of personnel, the right type of training and the right type of equipment too.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** And you started late also.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** And we have started late also. So, it will take some time. So, I can only assure the hon. Members that in this particular line we have certainly learnt a lesson, rather a costly lesson, but we have learnt it very well now, and I do not think we can afford to make any further mistake in this particular line. Shri Indrajit Gupta made one point: We are making semi-automatic rifles and using them in the Himalayas while the Chinese made use of automatic rifles. I do not know whether he had more information than I; possibly he has, but my information is that the Chinese did not have automatic rifles; they had semi-automatic rifles. The Chinese had a very peculiar military technic; sending waves of man-power. That is where they are more strong. Superiority in numbers--that was one of their points. Yesterday, I mentioned their three military advantages which they exploited completely superiority in numbers; the terrain from which they operated was rather advantageous to them; and thirdly, the aggressor has naturally certain initiatives; he can choose the place and time and everything.

**Shri Hem Barua (Gauhati):** We are tired of these arguments; they are repeated in season and out of season.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I am not saying that these are the only reasons; I am saying that these are some of the reasons and I am replying to the point of Shri Indrajit Gupta.

**Shri Indrajit Gupta** (Calcutta South-West): My point was that if the Chinese were equipped even with semi-automatic weapons, we were equipped mainly with breach bolt action rifles. Why did the statement say 'our weapons were adequate'?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** Where did I say 'adequate'? I am giving the view of the military people. That rifle is less rapid but it is good for aiming; it consumes less ammunition. It is rather more useful. Certainly we have got adequate numbers of that also but the mistake was that we could not take them to the right place in the right time. That was our main difficulty because of the suddenness of the whole situation. I was telling about the other point: the Chinese were not using automatic rifles. From the experience in this type of warfare, semi-automatic rifles are more useful because they have the necessary rapidity and fire power and at the same time they do not waste ammunition.

These are some specific points made by some hon. Members. If the whole report is looked at from the objective point of view ...

**Dr. M. S. Aney** (Nagpur): The report is not before us.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I mean the statement wherever I have mentioned the word 'report'. I was saying that the attitude and approach to defence cannot be a divisible approach. There cannot be a Government approach to defence and an Opposition approach to Defence; there cannot be a Congress approach and any other party's approach.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** There should not be.

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** It can only be a national approach to defence. Therefore, I request the hon. Members to take this report in that objectivity so that instead of trying to divide or demoralise us it will give the necessary strength which is what we need at the moment. Really speaking, the report is aimed at creating that confidence and awareness in the Army and in the circles where policy decisions are taken so that the deficiencies may not be repeated again. That is my whole approach and I would request the hon. Members to look at this report from that point of view.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** On a point of information, may I ask the Defence Minister whether the question of responsibility for the NEFA debacle has not been dealt with at all in the original report or it has only been omitted from the statement which is a drastically expurgated edition of the report?

**Shri Y. B. Chavan:** I can say that if he looks to the terms of reference which I had given, he will see that the enquiry was not for fixing any responsibility as such. So, that was not the question. It is not that the report has arrived at any conclusions as such which I have not given to the House.

**Shri Hari Vishnu Kamath:** The Prime Minister's assurance was different.

डा० राम मनोहर ल० शा० : एक परिपत्र दिल्ली सरकार की तरफ से उर्वसीग्राम के सेनापतियों को भेजा गया था कि जब कोई जगह गिरने वाली हो तो उसे खाली करो, आसन्न पतन वाला परिपत्र। यह कब भेजा गया था? क्योंकि उस परिपत्र का मतलब ऐसा निकाला गया कि १५ से १८ नवम्बर तक लड़ाई सिर्फ डेढ़ दिन बालांग में हुई, केवल इधर उधर छुट पुट गोलीबारी हुई और जग

खाली कर दी गई। तो परिपत्र कब भेजा गया? किस ने भेजा, जब तक इस के बारे में सफाई नहीं होगी तब तक देशद्रोह का शक मन में बना रहेगा।

श्री यशवन्तराव चव्हाण : परिपत्र की बात तो मैंने आप से पहली दफा सुनी। जो इंस्ट्रक्शन पहली गवर्नमेंट ने दिया था, जो कार्रवाई करनी है, वह करनी है। वह रिस्पॉसिबिलिटी गवर्नमेंट ने ले ली है। लेकिन ऐसा कोई परिपत्र देने के सम्बन्ध में मुझे पता नहीं है।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : अध्यक्ष महोदय, इस परिपत्र का पता लगना चाहिये। मंत्री महोदय नहीं जानते कि क्या हुआ था। उस वक्त यह परिपत्र भेजा गया था। शायद वे अंग्रेजी ज्यादा समझें, उस परिपत्र में इमिनेन्ट फाल का शब्द लिखा हुआ था, इवक्वेशन शब्द लिखा हुआ था। उस परिपत्र के कारण १५ से १८ नवम्बर तक जगहों बार बार खाली की गई। खाली वालांग में डेढ़ दिन लड़ाई हुई थी.....

अध्यक्ष महोदय : वह तो कह रहे हैं कि इस परिपत्र के बारे में उन्होंने पहली बार सुना। उनको इल्म नहीं है, उन्होंने यह जवाब दिया।

डा० राम मनोहर लोहिया : बड़े अफसोस की बात है कि रक्षा मंत्री भी न जानें कि क्या हुआ पहले।

Mr. Speaker: For discussion under rule 193, there is no motion. I shall put the second one to the vote.

श्री भक्त दर्शन : श्रीमन्, मुझे अन्त में कुछ कहने का अधिकार है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : इस में जवाब की क्या जरूरत है?

श्री भक्त दर्शन : अगर आप इजाजत दें तो केवल एक मिनट में अपनी बात कह दूंगा।

कल मैंने ६ सितम्बर के वक्तव्य के सम्बन्ध में यहां पर जो प्रस्ताव रखा था और उस में प्रतिरक्षा मंत्री जी को हार्दिक बधाई दी थी, आज उन्हीं के वक्तव्य के सम्बन्ध में उन्हें और डबल बधाई देना चाहता हूं।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : सिर्फ बधाई जवाब में देना चाहते हैं?

श्री भक्त दर्शन : श्रीमन्, एक दूसरी बात मैं यह कहना चाहता हूं कि उन्हें आज चूंकि बहुत सी जनरल बातें कहनी थीं, इसलिये जो बहुत से अन्य छोटे छोटे मुझाव दिये गये हैं, अवकाश मिलने पर, मुझे आशा है कि वे पूरी तरह से उन पर ध्यान देंगे।

इस के बाद मैं यह कहना चाहता हूं कि इस सदन में इस वाद-विवाद के सिलसिले में बहुत सनसनीदार, बहुत सनसनीखेज भाषण हुए। मैं समझता हूं कि अब यह विवाद समाप्त हो जाना चाहिये, और गड़े मुँदें उखाड़ने का काम खत्म हो जाना चाहिये। आज से हम को समझना चाहिये कि सब दलों और सब व्यक्तियों को मिल कर माननीय प्रधान मंत्री जी के हाथों को मजबूत करना है।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : बस। आप ने एक मिनट मांगा था। वह हो चुका।

Mr. Speaker: I am putting the Motion: the question is:

"That this House takes note of the statement made on the 9th September, 1963 by the Minister of Defence on 'Our Defence Preparedness'."

The motion was adopted.

Mr. Speaker: The Home Minister wanted to make a statement. He is not here. Shri Kanungo.