

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : The result* of the division is : Ayes ; 83 : Noes : 43. The motion is carried.

The motion was adopted.

[*The Motion of Demands for Grants which were adopted by the Lok-Sabha, are reproduced below—Ed.*]

DEMAND NO. 62—MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 19,82,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1970, in respect of ministry of Information and Broadcasting."

DEMAND NO. 63—BROADCASTING

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 9,93,82,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1970, in respect of 'Broadcasting.'

DEMAND NO. 64—OTHER REVENUE EXPENDITURE OF THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 5,39,81,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1970, in respect of Other Revenue Expenditure of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting."

DEMAND NO. 122—CAPITAL OUTLAY OF THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 4,31,70,000 be granted to the President

to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1970, in respect of Capital Outlay of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting."

15.05 hrs.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : The House will now take up discussion and voting on Demand Nos. 1 to 5 and 103 relating to the Ministry of Defence for which 8 hours have been allocated.

Hon. Members present in the House who are desirous of moving their cut motions may send slips to the Table within 15 minutes indicating the serial numbers of the cut motions they would like to move. They will be treated as moved if they are otherwise admissible.

DEMAND NO. 1—MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moved :

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,47,58,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1970, in respect of 'Ministry of Defence.'"

DEMAND NO. 2—DEFENCE SERVICES EFFCTIVE-ARMY

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moved ;

That a Sum not exceeding Rs. 6,45,45,54,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st

*The following Members also recorded their votes :—

AYES : Shri J. K. Choudhury, Dr. D.S. Raju and Shrimati Sharda Mukerjee.

NOES : Sarwashri Samar Guha, Ishaq Sambhali, Mohammed Ismil, Ranjit Singh and Bheri Sanker Sharma.

[Mr. Deputy-Speaker]

day of March, 1970, in respect of Defence Services. Effective—Army.”

DEMAND NO. 3—DEFENCE SERVICES EFFECTIVE—NAVY

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moved :

“That a sum not exceeding Rs. 39,09,79,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1970; in respect of ‘Defence Services’ Effective Navy.”

DEMAND NO. 4—DEFENCE SERVICES EFFECTIVE—AIR FORCE

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moved :

“That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,64,76,33,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1970, in respect of ‘Defence Services, Effective—Air Forces.”

DEMAND NO. 5—DEFENCE SERVICES NON-EFFECTIVE

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moves :

“That a sum not exceeding Rs. 27,33,33,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1970, in respect of ‘Defence Services, Non-Effective.”

DEMAND NO. 103—DEFENCE CAPITAL OUTLAY

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moved :

“That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,09,18,33,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st

day of March, 1970, in respect of ‘Defence Capital Outlay.”

SHRI S. K. TAPURIAH (Fali) : I rise to oppose the Demand of the Ministry of Defence. It may sound ritualistic to do so, but the inefficiency and mishandling of our country's affairs by this Government has also been a continuing affair.

Having said this. I wonder what one can really say about the functions of this Ministry because its entire working, so far as this country is concerned, is shrouded in mystery behind the favourite cliché of Government it is not in public interest to give the desired information.’ We understand the importance of security, this Government does not have the monopoly in patriotism. Information given to the House need not necessarily be more dangerous to security than certain information which they try to contain in themselves. It is not that information is withheld only one vital matters but even such information regarding acts of commission and omission of this Government is also kept back because, if divulged, it could be embarrassing to Government.

We do not know since when public interest demands shielding of inefficiency and mismanagement. Even answers to questions which have no bearing on strategic issues are evaded, delayed or denied by another phrase ‘The information is being collected.’

During the last two or three years, answer to certain questions like drainage at Palam cantonment, idle machinery of the Border Roads Organisation, number of employees in ordinance factories, have all been delayed on the ground that the information is being collected. If Government do not know how many men they employ in ordinance factories. I do not know what they know about what they produce, in what quantities and at what prices. Even follow-up questions arising out of reports of the PAC, Public Undertakings Committee etc. are not answered. Here also the same cliché is used.

I would like to give an example by quoting from the report of the Public

Undertakings Committee. Speaking about inefficiency of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. the Committee say :

"The Ministry have stated that estimates of the cost of production from sub-assembly, details of raw materials and profitability have not yet been worked out in the case of the three factories of the Mig complex. These estimates had also not been included in the project reports."

I ask, is it not the height of inefficiency, and sheer callous indifference to public funds that they embark on projects without even going into the preliminary question of working out the cost? It is this sort of thing which makes us wonder whether it is not their own inefficiency that they are seeking to hide by non-disclosure. Is it not for this reason that they are trying to deny us information?

I asked a question after this report was published whether they had since worked out the cost and the answer given to was that it 'could not be answered for reasons of security.' When we know that they had not worked it out, why should they try to hide it? Only when comparisons could be made, one can say whether there had been improvement later on or not..... (Interruptions) Let alone people who are the ultimate masters of the funds so recklessly spent by these persons, even the elected Financial Committees, such as the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Undertakings Committee are denied insight into the working of this ministry and the factories handled by them.

15.11 hrs.

[SHRI GADILINGANA GOWD *in the Chair*]

The PAC says that the reply of the HAL shows that the complexities of producing sophisticated aircraft HF 24 had not been properly visualised by the German engineers of the HAR and says further that "the Committee are unable to understand as to what were the factors that contributed to the formulation of

such unrealistic targets". This shows what they have been trying to hide. It is high time that the hon. Minister Shri Swaran Singh substituted the cliché 'it is not in public interest' by another saying, 'it is not in the interest of this Government's desire to continue in power'. It will cover all their mistakes and we shall also resign ourselves to their inefficiency and not say a word about that. I know that the HAL have a good infrastructure and also the capacity to develop further. The mistake they have committed is that they have gone into too many types and have been changing them too often. Probably they have not trained up from the beginning stages engineers, from the drawing board stage. The capacity in machinery exists and if they decide on one or two or three types of planes and start from scratch in the next ten years, I am sure good aircraft can be produced and they can assist the defence of the country. While on this subject, I should like to know what has happened to the report submitted by Mr. Subramaniam on Aeronautics. Will this report ever see the light of the day or will it also be denied to the public on strategic grounds?

While on this subject of sharing information, I do say that it is all the more necessary now because if we all know the subject and if we all share information we can probably avoid mistakes and errors. Anybody can make errors of judgment—even the hon. Minister. Does he deny that his was the long voice of opposition in the Cabinet during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965 which opposed the opening of a second front on the ground that this might harm our image abroad?

This matter is only an error of judgment; I do not deny. That is exactly the reason why we want to know more so that we can avoid those errors. To err is human. Does he not make mistakes? Then let him admit that he is not human.

I also oppose these demands because the Government has failed to prepare the country fully to defend itself by its own resources and production in the face of a concerted attack. It has failed to economise in its expenditure and failed

[Shri S. K. Tapuriah]

to control wastage of our scarce resources and it has been wrong in setting up priorities. The demands presented here do not impart any new dimensions to our defence strategy. I plead for economy in defence expenditure. When I speak of economy, it should not be mixed up with curtailment of expenditure but stoppage of wastage and getting 100 paise worth of material, goods and services for every rupee spent, and not forty or 60 paise worth as we seem to be getting now. We pleaded for this economy in the past.

But always our plea was twisted because the Minister has always the last say during the debate to say that we want curtailment in expenditure. We never meant that. Our point for economy was vindicated, as the recent report of the PAC says, that in the last year alone, Rs. 52 crores were saved. That saving could be made in one year, in this budget of Rs. 100 crores, and I know the methods of working of this Government, and we would still urge that there is much scope for economising and seeing that with the limited resources that we have, the Government should give its first priority to save what we can save and to what better use we can put that money.

Examples of wastage can be given, as many as you want. I need not here present all the gems contained in the report of the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Undertakings Committee, but I would like to mention the point about gliders. The PUC Report says :

“The target of gliders had to be curtailed to 105 gliders against 300 in December, 1965. Till that date, HAL manufactured only 55 gliders and out of those only 37 were delivered. The Committee cannot escape the conclusion that the then management at the Kanpur deivision made no serious efforts to keep up the schedule of delivery. It is regrettable that even after three successive revisions, the estimate of cost of glider were unrealistic.”

They never have heard what costing is, and they never bother about it. The report continues ;

“Equally disappointing is the fact that the machinery, tools and stores worth Rs. 26.30 lakhs had to become surplus to the requirement of HAL consequent to the reduction of demand from 300 to 105 gliders only.”

Similarly, we can give the example of Shaktiman trucks; They never reached the target which they set for themselves. Even when they scaled down the target, they could not achieve it. These trucks cost more ; though the trucks manufactured in the public and the private sectors are not exactly the same; they are somewhat similar and they cost more than what the collaborators have agreed to.

I can give one more example of the indifference to the public funds. Take the manufacture of weapons and the related ammunition. The report says :

“A project to manufacture a weapon and the related ammunition was sanctioned in April, 1959. With a mistaken deference to security considerations—”

They do not tell us what the weapons were, but circumstantial evidence offered should make it fairly easy for venturing a guess on it. The report says that the total investment of Rs. 8 crores has been made in three instalments, but the results achieved so far suggest that production is five years behind schedule. The first order of 60 units was completed in August, 1967, as against the original stipulation of April, 1962. The hope of turning out four per month as planned in the beginning is expected to materialise only in the current year. This will involve, however importing ‘all’ sub-assemblies, since the project is not evidently in a position to produce even now. Mean-while, the short fall in supplies had to be made good by imports, costing another Rs. 5 crores.

There is as much delay and difficulty over the ammunition for this weapon. The problem is this. The propellant is not available in adequate quantities while a satisfactory fuse has still to be developed. The result is that India is producing onl

5,000 rounds a month, half the targeted rate, and that too with an imported fuse. Will the Government tell us who tripped and where ?

Wastage occurs also due to the delay in purchases which are made through the DGSD. In our defence establishments in the manufacturing programme, sometimes, you have to go out for components or the raw materials, and they have to be purchased where time is of the essence and the consideration is not just money only. The DGSD gets bogged down by its rules and red-tape. It lets you down at that stage, and we have to suffer. I ask, could we not evolve a policy on defence requirements, that the defence requirements are purchased directly and not through the DGSD ? This system exists the United Kingdom also, where excepting for aircraft all other purchases are left to the concerned Ministry to purchase them directly at the price which they consider best. What I am pleading for is only that for all defence requirements, the Ministry of Defence should be allowed to purchase them directly. If we ask the Defence Minister what should be given topmost priority, I am sure he would evidently say security of our country. We all share that view.

But we get worried when we see around us people working in the manner they do and when we see national security becoming the play thing of political warlords. How otherwise could they explain the splitting up of the MIG factory into two units, situated more than 1,000 KMs. apart from each other ? Why was Koraput chosen ?

Was it not done under pressure from the then Congress ministry in Orissa ? Is it not true that no survey was made of the location ? Is it not true that no minister visited the site before it was approved, This division having its two units at different ends of the country adds to the cost, leads to wastage and is more time-censuring,

Coming to planning for defence. I want to ask whether we are really self-sufficient to defend ourselves ? in the eventuality of a prolonged war all by our-

selvas ? I would agree that improvements have taken place since the days of Mr. Krishna Menon's lamp-shades and stoves manufacturing ordnance factions, and we are now making arms and ammunitions in our factories. But are our factories working at full capacity ? Are they producing at optimum cost ? Do we have the wherewithal to sustain a major military conflict ?

We have go only two known enemies. Before we discuss our strength, let us have a quick look at our enemies' strength. One is Pakistan, about which the Report says—I do not know whether we should quote this report ; it starts with an Errata—I do not know how far it is true. It says :

“It has doubled the strength of its army and considerably increased the size and striking power of its Air Force. Its Navy has also been significantly expand. It is in fact obvious that this force cannot be maintained within its announced defence budget of Rs 245 crores.”

We also know from other sources that since 1965, when US stopped direct arms aid, Pakistan has acquired military equipment valued at well over 700 million dollars from various countries.

Regarding China, our second aggressor, I quote a paper from the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses :

“It will take a significant time interval to close the gap in the sense of India reaching an appropriate deterrent equation with China.”

China's annual defence expenditure is estimated to be Rs. 5625 crores, which is about 5½ times more than what we spend. Even if I possibly rule Pakistan out seeing its one difficulties at present, I am not ruling China out, which is a nuclear power and which is spending 5½ times what we spend. Are we fully prepared and can we face an attack ? Are we self-sufficient ?

40 per cent of our defence outlay is spent on salaries etc. of the forces. I am

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not grudging that. But only men cannot fight. They have to be provided with materials. The production in our public sector factories of the Defence Ministry is Rs. 175 crores. It is an improvement from 1963-64, when it was only 119 crores. But is this production of Rs. 175 crores enough? Inputs in our factories are maintained at steady levels, but capital expenditure is coming down. That is what is worrying me. The capital expenditure has come down from Rs. 31.07 crores in 1967-68 to Rs 30.07 crores in 1968-69 and it is estimated to be Rs 26.07 crores in 1969-70. This means that production capacity worth only about Rs. 4 to 5 crores is added every year. The gap in our requirements is so big that if we add to the production capacity, we cannot be self-sufficient by ourselves. Our resources position being what it is, the Government has to do two things : Firstly it should declare a war on waste, cut down expenditure and economise. Secondly, set proper priorities of what you would make yourself and what you would allow others to make. While we talk of this question of production we have also to bear in mind that we cannot fight, a modern war with old weapons. Strategy changes, methods of war change and what used to be our national barriers, our friends and defenders are no more there. We have been reading in history what they used to say of Himalayas as our national barrir on the north and the three oceans we have to safeguard us. But in modern warfare they have no meaning at all. Modern war means sophisticated weapons and they are really very expensive.

If I can give an idea of how expensive a war can be, I would like to take the House back to the days of Second World War when during the Peak days of war United Kingdom used to spend an amount equivalent to Rs. 6500 crores and United States of America at that time, fighting a war 3000 miles away from her, used to spend an amount equivalent to Rs. 45,500 crores. If you make an allowance for how the prices have gone up and multiply it by five it will come to 30,000 for U. K. and 200,000 for USA and the sum of Rs. 1100 crores we are spending

a year is too small and we will not be able to sustain ourselves. I do not think we can defend ourselves for more than a week. Whatever production capacity we may have and whatever may be our stockpile, we have a capacity to sustain ourselves only for a week, in the case of a concerted war.

In that case if we want to divert or change-over all our civil factories to make defence equipments in case of an emergency, can we hold our own? I would say, no, because in our country today we have only about 1,00,000 machine tools. What can 1,00,000 machine tools do? The production capacity of the entire engineering industry in our country working at full capacity is only worth about Rs. 5000 crores. How much of that production will be to fight with (*Interruption*). My hon. friend here probably does not understand this. These princes, they are so far away from people that they do not know the strateg required and the ammunitions required to fight war. Only by men we cannot fight. Nor can they fight with the fists or bamboo sticks. If paisa was dirty Sir, I am sure they would not have continued their fight for their privy purses. In any event, if we take all the resources available and the capacity in our country and put it to use still we cannot manufacture goods and equipments to last us for more than a couple of months.

Sir, I do not want to give an impression that we are not prepared. Improvement, as the Minister said, has been made, but improvement and self-sefficiency are two different things. In a school there are four examinations in a year. In the quarterly examination a student may get one mark, in the half-yearly examination he may get three marks, in the three-quarterly he may get seven marks and in the final he may get twelve marks. He has improved a lot but still he fails and he is not promoted because he has not got the minimum required marks. The same is the case here. Our production has gone up. You have improved because instead of lamp-shades we are trying to make tanks and other things. But you have not improved enough to make our country strong enough.

If it is carried a little further, how for with our old tanks can we continue during the war when we have been making up to now only 20 to 25 tanks. If you take the case of ammunitions, with an army of eight lakhs even if fifty rounds are fired by each soldier you require 40 million bullets daily. Do we have the capacity to make that? We do not. During the last war our housewives were good enough to keep the morale of the country up by knitting sweaters, but I am sure spite of their best intentions they would not be able to help us by making bullets in their houses. This means we will have to take help probably from other sources. We have done on the past. How do we carry on now? This involves also the External Affairs Ministry and last time the Minister said that we should not mix it up. I would not like to go into the details of that but could we ask one question? It is not a fact that after our conflict with Pakistan all of a sudden USA stopped arms aid? Now we are putting all our eggs in one basket that is Soviet Union. Could it possibly not happen again?

Now we have not been able to prevent Soviet Russia from giving arms to Pakistan, how will we be able to persuade them if, God forbid, another conflict takes place, to continue their assistance to us?

The Minister may again tell us while replying that this is what we have been manufacturing. Well, you may have very strong teeth. But it is a question of stocks so that the pipeline can be fed. You may have strong teeth today but your paws are weak, you have strong muscles but blood does not flow through your veins. In that connection I would like to ask, if he can take us into confidence, what steps he will take for securing foreign aid, what steps he would take to make reasonably sure that again, in case of difficulty, we are not to be blackmailed by one country or two countries. Why do we not shop all around the world for good which we can pick up from any place we want so that in times of emergency we need not depend on one or the other?

I would also request them to change their pattern of management. Defence does not necessarily mean only taking strategic decisions in times of war. It is not a war Ministry; it is a Ministry of Defence. It means defence production. When they are holding charge of so many factories, so many institutions where production goes on, why don't employ management experts, those who know that production is, those who know what production control is, what raw material control is and what management technique is and not merely the political system. I may possibly agree with a political man being the Minister, and here I am not making any insinuation against Shri L. N. Mishra or Shri M. R. Krishna, but why not have your second tier or third tier, when you have a three-tier system of administration, someone who knows the job, who has very good background and experience of production control and raw material control, who is not just politicking but doing the job for which the people of India are paying?

We have seen how in the United States experts have been brought in as Defence Secretary, what economies they have brought in and how they have been hailed all over. When I say this it is not my view alone: it is also shared by the Government of India, because the Government have sent to the United States a team of experts from the Defence Ministry and ordnance factories to study the methods of production controlling expenditure, bringing in economies etc. I would like to know what were the recommendations given by them which came back after their studies and training course. Have you implemented any of their recommendations? And how are you going to modernise your system of computers to bring in better methods and to discard older red-tape that might be continuing?

While on the subject, I would like to mention one word about research. Though we have been spending a huge amount of money, I am sorry that the report mentions only Rs. 13 crores for research. It is high time that we stepped it up. If we have to double our own

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needs, if we have to cut down collaborations if this country of 53 crores of people have to make our own goods with our own designs by our own people then we must have more and more outlay on research.

Since 40 per cent of our expenditure relates to salaries, amenities etc. it means that every year even if we keep the same number of people in the army, navy and air force, the expenditure will be going on. This is something which we cannot curtail. In that case, to make us more effective, cannot we possibly have a smaller army with better mobility, with better equipment so that instead of all your money every year being eroded into paying this you keep only a part of it which can defend you with better equipment ?

Lastly, why do you not confine yourself to production of strategic goods and why do you not decide the priorities in which you would like to make your investments ? I can possibly understand a little bit of your hesitation in trying to give orders to private firms at large but for things which are not of strategic importance—say, trucks, tractors, earthmoving equipment—why should you go on spending your scarce resources instead of trying to farm them out to private firms?

SHRI GEORGE FERNANDES (Bombay South) : The cat is out of the bag.

SHRI S. K. TAPURIAH : There is no cat ; it is only in your mind.

You make the strategic goods yourself ; that you probably cannot give to outsiders. This gentleman here is afraid and says that we cannot trust others. Who gave him the certificate that he is the only patriot around ? Nobody has given him that certificate yet. Just because there are a few people who have a fear in the mind that given to the private sector it might be abused, then probably next they will start pleading that we should stop all education because once a child is taught to read and write he may start writing abuses !

Orders given to the private sector were only worth Rs. 24 crores. That is for you to decide. As I said, during the last two emergencies you tried to switch on to the private sector to get your requirements. The Minister after looking after the ordnance factories, knows that tooling, preparations, equipment take time and you cannot turn these overnight. So, why do you not give a small percentage—it might be as minute as you want—to the private sector factories for your components and spare parts, the idea being that they have the tooling right with them so that in the case of an emergency they do not go out hunting for drawings to prepare the toolings and overnight they can switch over to manufacture what you want ?

SHRI GEORGE FERNANDES : Nothing will be given to the private sector.

SHRI CHINTAMANI PANIGRAHI (Bhubaneswar) : If you do not give contracts to the private sector, he may commit suicide.

SHRI S. K. TAPURIAH : I do not have an abusive mind ; I wish well to everybody, including you.

I will make one request to the Defence Minister. He should assert himself more. I do not know why the Minister of such an important thing like defence allows himself to be relegated to the position of number four or number five in the Cabinet or if it goes alphabetically, as I hear it is done sometimes, God knows where in the tail he is. But it is such an important matter which concerns all other matters and I request him that he should assert himself more. He should be more vocal and more intervening because what infrastructure we build in our country, whatever industries we allow what licences we give, ultimately they should with our limited resources have a bearing on our defence strategy and defence requirements should such a time arise. This is my request to him.

I would hope that he replies to some of these points, specially about the criti

cism that has been made in the three Committees' reports, and takes us into confidence and tells us something more about it. Probably that way we will also have more confidence and trust in him and we can work better in building ourselves strong.

श्री इसहाक सम्भली : महोदय, यहां डिफेंस पर डिस्कसन हो रहा है और कांग्रेस बेंचेज बिलकुल खाली पड़ी हुई हैं।.....
(अवधान)

श्री रजधर सिंह : एक एक सवा लाख का बैठा है।

MR. CHAIRMAN : Hon. Member may now move their cut motions.

SHRI MAHANT DIGVIJAI NATH (Gorakhpur) : I beg to move.

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government in not deciding to promote the next junior Officers in place of the three retiring Chiefs of Defence Forces. (2)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1

[Failure on the part of the Government for not setting up a Defence Board on the lines of Railway Board. (3)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government in not creating a post of C-in-C and field Marshal. (4)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Discrimination between Territorial and Regular Army. (5)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Rs. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government for not giving any preference to N. C. C. Cadets at the time of selection to Commissioned ranks. (6)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[No provision for flight training for N. C. C. (7)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Poor Defence Intelligence Service. (8)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government in not equipping the Defence Intelligence Service with latest instruments. (9)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government to check the Pakistan spy ring in Defence Departments and factories. (10)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government to check the Chinese spy ring in Defence Departments and factories. (11)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to check the rebel Nagas from crossing the eastern border. (12)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to produce Nuclear weapons. (13)]

[Shri Mahan Digvijai Nath]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure in production of Hydrogen bomb and its anti bomb. (14)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government in not following a tooth for a tooth and a nail for a nail policy towards the enemies. (15)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Dependence on foreign arms aid. (16)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government for not setting up more ordnance factories in the country. (17)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government in not taking proper and due action against the Chines for constructing Lhasa-Kathmandu military road. (18)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government for not connecting the national highways in North and Eastern Zones with Defence headquarters. (19)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Poor conditions of military hospitals. (20)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure in setting up of military hospitals, fully equipped with latest instruments and X-Ray plants, at

all the district headquarters in the country. (21)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1

[Need the promotion of Military doctors at par with other ranks. (22)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure on the part of the Government in not providing equivalent posts to all the released Emergency Commissioned Officers. (23)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Prevailing corruption and favouritism in the matter of promotion of J. C. Os. (24)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to make proper arrangements for imparting training to each and every recruit in the Army, Navy and Air Force. (25)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to give compulsory parachute training to all the defence personnel. (26)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Disparity in pay and allowances and other concessions between Territorial and Regular Army. (27)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Poor maintenance of Defence colleges in the country (28)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to exempt the children of

defence personnel studying in schools and colleges from tuition fee. (29)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Misuse of national Defence Fund. (30)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to uproot corruption prevailing in the Soldiers, Salors and Airmens Boards in the country. (31)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need to curtail expenditure on officers messes. (32)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Poor maintenance of military farms in the country (33)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Mal-administration in military farms. (34)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to establish more shipyards in the country. (35)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1,

[Failure to build more warships in the country (36)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to build submarines and troyedoes in the country. (37)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need to increase the number of fleets in Indian Navy (38)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1

[Dependence countries for purchasing of ships and warships. (39)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[High expenditure in U. K. (40)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need for the expansion of H.A.L. Kanpur. (41)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need for the expansion of H. A. L. Bangalore. (42)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need to manufacture all types of aircraft required for the Air Force, in the country. (43)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Manufacture of Migs in the country. (44)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need for conducting more Defence exhibition in the country. (45)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Manufacturing of more power radars in the country. (46)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need for provision of better equipment and facilities to the personnel posted in forward areas. (47)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Shri Mahant Digviya Nath]

[Need to raise the mountain army to face the Chinese challenge. (48)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need to raise Guerilla Army. (49)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need for use of dogs in the army to locate the enemy positions. (50)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to check and uproot the Pakistan spy ring in ordnance factories (51)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to check Chinese spy ring in ordnance factories in the country. (52)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need to bring about improvements in the manufacture of Gnat fighter aircrafts. (53)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Manufacture of Jet and Supersonic engines in the country. (54)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Need to bring about more improvements in Vijayanta Tanks and to make it more powerful. (55)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Manufacture of helicopters in the country. (56)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Nationalisation of all the seven public undertakings manufacturing arms and ammunitions for the army. (57)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Poor production of tanks. (58)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Need to construct all the airforce aerodromes underground (59)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Poor show of military strength on Republic Day Parades. (60)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Favouritism in the matter of promotion to higher ranks. (61)]

“That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re.1.

[Equal pay for equivalent ranks in all the three Wings of Defence Forces. (62)]

SHRI GANESH GHOSH : (Calcutta South) I beg to move :—

“That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1-.”

[Profiteering by big business houses in India from defence orders. (63)]

“That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1-.”

[Undemocratic and anti-people policy in the matter of defence of the country. (64)]

“That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1/-.”

[Lack of precaution against leaking out army secrets to foreign agencies by certain officials. (65)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Use of Territorial Army against democratic movements (66)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Favouritism prevailing in the N.C.C (67)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Demobilisation of qualified personnel of the Emergency Commission without providing alternative suitable jobs. (68)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Ban imposed on circulation of several progressive journals and publications in the Army, Navy and Air Force. (69)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Failure to abolish contract system in Defence Establishments. (71)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Failure to reduce disparity between the facilities and benefits given to jawans and the army officials. (72)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1 -."

[Failure to take steps against defence officials keeping contact with the C.I.A. (73)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1/—."

[Victimisation of defence employees* for participating in the one day token strike on 19th September, 1968. (74)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1/ "

[Failure to curtail defence expenditure which is affecting the economic development of the country. (75)]

"That the demand under the head ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1/—."

[Failure to publish Henderson Committee's Report regarding the NEFA debacle despite repeated public demand (76)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1/—."

[Discrimination shown by the Defence Department in providing jobs to people of different States in the defence department. (77)].

SHRI MAHANT DIGVIJAI NATH :
I beg to move:—

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Lack of proper arrangements in Military Hospitals. (92)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Supply of poor diet to the patients in Military Hospitals. (93)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Unsatisfactory and not upto the Marking working and training of

[Shri Mahant Digvijai Nath]

mountaineering Institute, Darjeeling. (94)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Poor performance and training at Mountaineering Institute, Uttar Kashi (95)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Need to establish a Mountaineering Institute at Gorakhpur. (96)]

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Posting of military by rotation in forward areas particularly in North-Eastern regions. (97)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Need for more Naval exercises with the help of friendly countries. (98)].

"That the demand under the head ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Need to have more exercises of the Air Force. (99)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Need to provide more military exercises for the Army. (100)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Failure on the part of the Government for not giving preference to martial races at the time of selection in defence forces (101)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Need to take steps to maintain high moral of military. (102)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Manufacture of conventional weapons in the country. (103)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100—."

[Failure in manufacturing powerful ground-to-air guided missiles. (104)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100/—."

[Need to manufacture powerful air-to air guided missiles. (105)].

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to manufacture powerful air-to-ground guided missiles (106)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to manufacture underground missiles (107)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100

[Need to have own air umbrella against any foreign attack (108)]

SHRI GHNESH GAOSH : I beg to move :

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to increase benefits for the retired Army Jawans and disabled persons (109)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to increase travelling allowances for jawans (110)]

That the demand under the head ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Inadequacy of family quarters in the Army, Navy and Air Force establishments for the jawans and lower cadres in the Defence forces (111)]

That demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to improve medical facilities in the Army Hospitals (112)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence by reduced by Rs. 100.

[Secret relations maintained by Army officials with reactionary political parties (113)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need for appointment of Pay Commission for fixing higher salaries for jawans and lower cadres in the Defence Departments (114)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Bureaucratism prevailing in the Defence Department (115)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to mark India self-reliant in the matter of defence production (116)]

SHRI LOBO PRABHU (Udiki) : bag to I move :

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Expenditure of Rs. 0. 84 lakhs on monorail in Ordnance factory since 1955, which has not been brought so far into use (125)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Expenditure on expansion of Ordnance Factory to manufacture tail units in a capacity of 4800 units, the production was 240 in 1964-65 and 967 in 1968-67 (126)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100

[Manufacture of same stores in two different factories, in one of which there was an extra cost of Rs. 6. 6 lakhs in 1965 (127)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100

[Manufacture of certain stores in Ordnance factories which according to audit were available in the market at Rs. 8.78 lakhs less (128)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100

[Avoidable rejection which totalled Rs. 42. 45 lakhs in five Ordnance factories (129)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Backlog of incomplete orders which totalled Rs. 25.4 crores in 1965-66, involving cancellation costing Rs. 1.50 crores due to absence check on feasibility of production (130)]

[Shri Labho Prabhu]

That the demand under head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Rs. 6.5 lakhs spent on mooring gear which is lying idle since 1964 as the mooring berth was given up (131)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Rs. 1.52 lakhs spent on line of type replacement for aircraft, which was found unnecessary leading to cancellation of the contract with compensation (132)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Rs. O. 59 lakhs spent on Hit indicators by the Army even after they had been found unsuitable by the Navy and Air Force (133)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100

[Rs. 37.25 lakhs value of stores landed in respect of which on claim was made (134)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Rs. 1.08 lakhs cost of helicopter and Rs. 2.19 lakhs cost of two aero engines rendered unusable without proper storage (135)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Rs. 63.26 crores worth of stores condemned as obsolete in 1966 of which only Rs. 4. 68 crores have been sold (136)]

That the demand under the head Defence-Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Excessive purchase of new vehicles when 617 one ton trucks, 4066 jeeps and 1,650 motor-cycles are held beyond authorisation (137)]

That the demand under the head Defence-Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Rs. 11.19 lacks spent on 8 overhead reservoirs for which there is no use (138)]

That the demand under the head Defence-Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100

[Rs. 101 lakhs spent on a subsidiary Ammunition depot since 1963 without it being still ready while the ammunition is lying under tents (139)]

That the demand under the head Defence-Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100

[Rs. 11 lakhs paid to surplus drivers while private transport of Rs. 19.05 lakhs was employed from failure of assigning vehicles (140)]

SHRI BHOGENDRA JHA (Jainagar) :
I beg to move :

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Rs. 1

[Failure to make arrangements for a common mess for Jawans and officers (153)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1

[failure to appoint representatives of Jawans on Court Martial (154)]

That that the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1

[Failure to make the country completely self-reliant in the matter of armaments (155)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to reserve the quota of promotion for Jawans as Officers at a minimum of fifty per cent. (156)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to increase suitably the pensions of retired army personnel. (157)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to provide proper education to the children of Jawans. (158)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to make provision for democratic, social and secular education for the Jawans and Officers. (159)]

That the demand under the head ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to give preference to the people having belief in democracy, socialism and secularism in the direct recruitment of Jawans and Officers. (160)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to effect the necessary increase in the pay and allowances of Jawans. (161)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to amend the discriminatory rules of discipline and punishment in

respect of the same type of offences committed by the Jawans and Officers. (162)]

SHRI SHINKRE (Panjim) : I beg to move :—

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Failure to check growing partiality and provincialism in the recruitment of army personnel. (163)]

that the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1.

[Need to make proper use of natural resources and geographical conditions in the country for the training of all the three wings of the defence forces. (164)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to start a Military Academy in Goa taking into consideration the climate and geographical features there. (165)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to transform Goa into a Centre for the training of Army, Navy and Air Force. (166)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to establish one Naval Dockyard for the construction of ships for the Navy. (167)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to expand and provide the port of Marmagaoa with all the modern sophisticated apparatus. (168)]

[Shri Shinkre]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to transfer the Naval Base from Bombay to Goa. (169)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to transfer the Air Base from Santa Cruz Bombay to Goa in view of the vulnerability of the former base, from Pakistan. (170)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to establish an Ordnance Factory in Goa. (171)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Need to expand the Naval Station "I. N. S. Hansa" and transform it into Naval Base of the Western Fleet. (172)]

SHRI S. M. BANERJEE (Kanpur) :
I beg to Move:—

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Question of reaching a state of self-sufficiency in the matter of Defence Production. (173)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Stepping up of production in Ordnance Factories. (174)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Oil loading of some work-load in farm of private sector. (175)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Working of H.A.L. at Bangalore and other places. (176)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Working of Garden Reach Workshop and Mazgaon Dock. (177)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Adverse effect of Government orders, merger of D.A. in pay on categories of employees with particular reference to employees working in Defence Establishment in Ichapore (West Bengal). (178)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure of the Government to reinstate those employees who were discharged or suspended on account of taking part in 19th September, 1968 strike (179)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure of the Government to reinstate workers discharged under Presidential orders. (180)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

Failure of the Government to reinstate victimised employees discharged for Trade Union activities. (181)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure of the Government to provide equivalent jobs to discharged

Emergency Commissioned Officers.
(182)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Shortage of work-load in clothing
factories. (183)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Fall in wages of piece workers in
Ordnance Factories. (184)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure of the Government to con-
struct adequate number of quarters
for other ranks and civilian employees
in Defence establishments. (185)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Introduction of Bonus Act for
Defence workers. (186)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Shifting of Equipment unit under
D.G.O.F. from Calcutta to Kanpur.
(187)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Appointment of Wage Board for
the civilian employees in Defence
establishments. 188]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure of Government to treat
the canteen employees as Government
employees. (189)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Brutal firing by D.S.C. Sepoys in
Gun and Shell Factory in Cossipore.
(190)]

SHRI OM PRAKASH TYAGI
(Moradabad) : I beg to move :—

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure to take back the Indian
territory grabbed by Chinese and
Pakistan. (197)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure to check the entry of Pakis-
tani infiltrators into Kashmir. (198)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure to set up defence posts on
all Indian Islands. (199)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure to strengthen Navy in view
of possible foreign danger. (200)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure to manufacture Atom Bomb
in view of the danger of an Atomic
attack from China. (201)]

That the demand under the head
Ministry of Defence be reduced by
Rs. 100.

[Failure to fill the vacuum caused as
a result of withdrawal of British
military bases from Singapore. (202)]

[Shri Om Prakash Tyagi]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to impart compulsory military training to our young men and women in view of the hostile postures of Pakistan and China and their collusion and military strength. (203)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to check the entry of Chinese trained and armed hostile Nagas into Nagaland. (204)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to end dependence on foreign know-how in respect of military hardware. (205)]

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to make the country self-dependent in Arms and Armaments. (206)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to provide adequate pay and diet to Jawans. (207)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to provide sufficiently nutritious diet to vegetarian Jawans and Officers. (208)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to provide special facilities to Army personnel posted on the borders (209)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to check corruption and pilferage in stores. (210)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to make intelligence department in Armed Forces effective. (211)]

That the demand under the head Defence Service, Effective-Navy be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Lack of a strong Naval base in Andaman Nicobar. (212)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Laxity in manufacturing aircraft engines. (213)]

That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Failure to achieve self-sufficiency in manufacturing aeroplanes. (214)]

SHRI S. M. BANERJEE : I beg to move :—

That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100.

[Off loading of some work-load in favour of private sector. (231)]

MR. CHAIRMAN : The cut motions are also before the House.

DR. D. S. RAJU (Rajahmundry) : Mr. Chairman, while I rise to support the Demands of the Defence Ministry I would like to make a few observations and a few suggestions for the serious consideration of the Ministry.

Defence is very complicated subject and to contribute in a substantial and

important way to defence, we should think of our foreign policy also; otherwise, it will be unrealistic.

The essence and aim of our foreign policy is to make friends wherever possible; to promote our interests, trade and otherwise and to see that no foreign country makes any aggression on us. If our foreign policy had succeeded, naturally there would not be any difficulty and any necessity for making defence budgets because we would not have any enemies then. But we did not succeed and perhaps no country ever succeed in making friends with everybody in the world.

This naturally takes us to the subject of pacts. We made pacts with many countries, particularly with China and Pakistan. Our experience has been very disappointing. The Panch Sheel which we made with China had lulled us into a false sense of security and that was the reason why we were unprepared in the year 1962 when China committed aggression. The Chinese aggression has been a blessing in disguise, and it has many political and military consequences. Politically, we were unprepared for it; we did not expect it; we put too much trust in the Panch Sheel agreement, and that was the lesson for us to learn. Militarily also, our troops were not equipped, were not ready; there were so many deficiencies, and that was the reason for the debacle. As I have said, there were many lessons for us to learn, and if we could benefit by them, it would be a great blessing. Indeed, we did benefit from this debacle. If this had not happened, perhaps, we would not have fared well as we did when Pakistan attacked us in the year 1965. I would even go to the extent of saying that if we did not profit by the experience of Chinese aggression, there would have been difficulties for us, and I would not have been surprised if Gen. Ayub Khan had pushed us from Delhi and sat in Delhi even temporarily. Fortunately, we had an able Defence Minister at that time, Shri Y. B. Chavan. He did take full advantage of the Chinese debacle and rectified many of the defects, plugged many of the loopholes and improved the organisation and equipment of the army. The result was that we

were able to deal with the Pakistan aggression in the year 1965. After that, our present Defence Minister, Shri Swaran Singh, an equally able person, has further improved the defence strength of the army.

The strength of the defence of the country depends not only on the armed Forces—Army, Navy and Air Force—but also, in the present context upon the whole nation. The whole nation forms the base of the pyramid. We can say that the armed forces form the apex, the warhead, of it.

Effective defence depends not only upon the armed forces but also upon our industrial resources, our agricultural resources, the spirit of the nation, and the philosophy of the nation. All these factors come into operation. There are certain priorities. The defence budget is put down at 3.46 per cent of the gross national output. I must confess that this is inadequate for the reasons which I am going to mention a bit later. We have got a big coastal line extending to some thousands of miles and the two immediate neighbours Pakistan and China, have not ceased their aggressive attitude for the last 20 years. They are in the same frame of mind as they were 20 years ago.

As my hon. friend has just now said and as our Defence Minister has also mentioned in the report, Pakistan is making frantic efforts to buy equipment from almost all the countries in the world. Their fighting power has improved and their armed forces also have improved. Apart from this, the Chinese postures are also the same. China, we must remember, is potentially a great country with about 750 million people; culturally and racially they are one country, they have one philosophy, *i. e.*, Communism, one religion, *i. e.*, communism. They may burst on their seams on any day, if not today; a few years later perhaps, mostly towards South East Asia. Now they are engrossed in their own internal situation—the Russian border incidents and also their Cultural Revolution, which have diverted their minds, as soon as the issues are settled, they may turn towards India.

[Dr. D. S. Raju]

Sir, now coming to the Army, as I have said our army in the present conditions, in the present set-up of things, I feel it is inadequate. How can we garrison this big coastline in addition to guarding our frontiers? I do understand that the modern trends are to have more sophisticated equipment and less of the Armed forces. That is true. But are we adequate in our equipment, sophisticated equipment and latest equipment? I do not think we are quite sufficient in that respect. Are we very good in the transport system? I do not think even that is perfect. The modern trend is improved transportation. There is a great revolution in combat mobility, as they call it.

Foot soldiers, animal transport and even mechanical transport are getting obsolete. Now the trend in the whole transport system is air-lifting, the troops from place to place. In a big country like ours air-lifting is very important and it is very economical also in the long run. If you can lift a battalion at a particular point of time to the front line, it is equal to lifting a Brigade later on. Tactically and strategically it is a very important step. You can dispense away with all this cumbersome wheel and motor transportation. Even trains, bridges, railway lines and tracks may be destroyed by enemy bombing in which case air transport is the most important avenue for support. Besides it was an experience in 1947 when one battalion which was lifted to Srinagar could save the whole situation. This is a very important lesson. Even in the last War in the Malayan jungles all bridges and animal transport were completely destroyed. It was the air transport that could supply food, equipment and material. Apart from that, I would like to mention about the helicopters which are a very important element in airlifting. So far they were derided as only sitting ducks. But now the experts are Changing their opinion. This has become a multi-purpose instrument. They could throw bombs and fire rockets, and they can lift and carry troops weighing upto 25 tons and they are very good. They can land on an airstrip in jungle clearing.

Now you will be surprised to know that the casualties. In the recent War which is going on in Vietnam are very low. Out of 10,000 sorties only one helicopter was lost in spite of heavy ground fire. They are very good for transporting casualties right from the front line to the base hospitals. Now if you read the statistics of World War I, about 10% of the wounded people died. In the Second World War the number of casualties went down to 5.

MR. CHAIRMAN : Hon. Member's time is up.

SHRI NATH PAI (Rajapur) : Let him speak. He is speaking well. Once in a way we hear such speeches from that side.

15.49 hrs.

[MR. SPEAKER *in the chair*]

DR. D. S. RAJU : In Korea the casualty rate was brought down to 2.5%. In Vietnam war, where these helicopters were used, the casualties rate has been brought down to 1%. That is the importance of helicopters. They are very essential for our air force and the patients can be immediately transferred from the front line to the base hospitals. No casualty clearing stations are necessary except the front line First Aid stations.

Then I wish to say something about the Navy. Battle-ships, cruisers, and destroyers are getting obsolete. They are sitting ducks. They are out-dated. Once they were thought to be masters of the sea. But our policy is that we are not going to be aggressive. We are not going to attack any other country. I hope we don't do that in the future.

We can defend our borders with the midget submarines and torpedo boats. We can manufacture them with much less cost. They are cheap and economical and have better manoeuvrability also. In respect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour only 9 midget submarines completely crippled the eastern American fleet stationed at Pearl Harbour. Our coast-line can be defended by these midget submarines and torpedo boats. It takes years to build the battle ship, cruisers

and destroyers. Crores and crores of rupees have to be spent and it takes also years and years to build them. So, these midget submarines and torpedo boats can be built.

I am happy that my hon. friend who spoke before me spoke about research and said that not even 1 per cent of the Defence Budget is spent on research. research is very important.

In foreign countries like America or England, they are spending much more for research in respect of Defence. It is a question of life and death struggle for them. But for us, it is a pastime; we don't take a serious view of these things.

India has got very eminent scientists like Narlikar's and Khorana's and if only we could give enough encouragement and enough resources, I am sure, we will be in a better position compared to foreign countries.

I am happy that when our Minister while releasing a plane in Bangalore said that our defence policy is to make our country self-sufficient. How can you fight a major war with borrowed equipments? It has got inherent difficulties; a number of complications will come in. If a certain part is not available the whole machinery cannot be used. If a screw is missing the whole machinery will be rendered useless.

There is one other point which I wish to submit. It is the weapons which have changed the course of history. During the last war the atom bombs brought the war to a successful end. If these bombs were not used, Japan would have fought the war 2 or 3 years more. They had got a land army of 4 millions yet. Therefore, weapons are very important.

श्री श्रीकार लाल बेरवा (कोटा) : अध्यक्ष महोदय, डिफेन्स पर वादविवाद हो रहा है और सदन में कोरम का यह हाल है। इस पर हम 1,000 करोड़ रु० खर्च करते हैं। सदन में कोरम तो होना चाहिये।

MR. SPEAKER : The bell is being rung...

Now there is quorum, He may continue.

DR. D. S. RAJU : Hare I would like to quote what the late Churchill had told parliament that if only Hittler had prepared enough V1 and V2 rockets and started the war, he would have won it in six days instead of waging it for 6 years and losing it. This speaks of the importance of modern weapons.

I could quote so many instances from military history which highlight the importance of weapons. At the time of Napoleon, one Robert Fulton had constructed a steamship and presented it to Napoleon. But Napoleon ignored it. If had accepted it and made use of the new invention, perhaps he would have destroyed the British Navy which stood between him and world conquest. If that had happened, the history of England would have been different; there would have been no British Empire perhaps.

The most important question which is worrying the country is that of the manufacture of the atom bomb. It is a very complicated subject. Much can be said for and against—no doubt about it. The whole Parliament should assess the situation and think about it carefully.

I would like to say one thing. One Theodore Taylor, who first produced the atom bomb, has made a statement which appeared in the papers that the scientific and technical know-how is now common knowledge and everybody knows about it; with 10,000 dollars for the materials required, one could make a bomb in any basement workshop. These materials are available all over the world, uranium 235 and plutonium.

This is a very serious situation. Our leaders should take note of it. As to whether it is necessary or not is a different thing. That should be thought out. But it is very cheap to make and many countries could make the bomb.

Lastly about civil defence, which is a very important thing. If you do not make the bomb, at least let full advantage

[Dr. D. S. Raju]

be taken of the knowledge available on civil defence to preserve and protect our country. We have now palatial buildings all over the place. Has it been considered that there should be at least one concrete underground cellar which could protect the occupants from falling bombs and so on.

Then what about fire fighting services? These are not being made available.

I would also suggest that there should be an alternate seat of Government. Delhi is very close to the frontier. We cannot put all our eggs in one basket. It is only 250 miles from the border. I would therefore request Government to take serious note of this and consider having another seat of government somewhere in Central India, Madhya Pradesh or some suitable place.

Now China is preparing for an atomic war. This is evident to most people who know. For the last ten years, they are burrowing into hills and valleys to hide their essential equipment in case of need. They are trying to keep their essential things, documents and so on in underground cellars so that they may be safe against atomic bombing.

These are some important points Government should consider.

SHRI FRANK ANTHONY (Nominated-Anglo-Indians) : The Defence Ministry's Report this year has given us more information than it has been the practice to give us in the past. But I say this—and I have said it before—that there is still a dangerous convention in this house that is hardening into a rule of keeping this House essentially ignorant of the basic reorganisation requirements in defence. And the unfortunate part is that by keeping this House ignorant, we only delude ourselves. Pakistan knows, the Americans, with their sophisticated intelligence, know the strength of our forces, their deployment, our weaponry and so forth.

16 hrs.

I remember a very senior General telling me that on one occasion he was

playing golf with the American military attache and the latter gave information about the strength of our armed forces, their disposition, the weapons they were using, the rate at which we were producing and not producing, the lack of standardisation and so on. He was amazed.

From that American, that senior General received more information than he had ever been aware of. We persist in behaving—I say this with respect—more or less like adolescents in the matter of security. Unfortunately as the hon. lady Member along side of me just mentioned there has been a tradition in India of the civilians, including the legislators, not taking on intelligent, an informed interest in matters of defence. Before Independence there was the convention—it was understandable—on the part of the Government to keep its subject people ignorant of defence preparations. I should say this that during the second world war the National Defence Council of which I was a Member was given more information than our present National Defence Council today of which also I am a Member. I say this with regret that there is no meaningful discussion in our National Defence Council. The proceedings are superficial; the information given is equally superficial.

I am sorry that so few Members are here today. This house has betrayed the trust which it owes to the country. We are final custodians of the security of India but we have been more and more prepared to surrender our minimum duty to the professionals. I do not say anything against professionals; they are good soldiers and they are paid to be good soldiers. But they tend to be conservative; they tend to have their professions if not mental arteries hardened along conventional lines. As someone rightly remarked, war is too dangerous a business to be left to the Generals. Over and over again we have seen how events have overtaken us; in 1962, in Kutch and almost in the Indo-Pakistan conflict, but for the gallantry of our jawans, our young officers and our incomparable pilots what would have happened? And the less said about our so called intelligence section

the better because there has been not only a shoddy failure but a shameful failure.

I feel that the time is long over due when the Members of this House must insist on greater participation in matters relating to defence. We want to know something about what the reorganisation, if any, is on the top, what in fact are we producing and whether we are standardising our equipment and how we are moving toward self sufficiency. We want to know whether their is any defence strategy. These are the kinds of things we want to know. I sincerely ask Members to support my request; if we cannot have a Commission let us have a high powered Committee consisting of some knowledgeable Members of this House. It is a vital matter, because of complacency with regard to defence there is the usual cliché of security which is used as a cloak for dangerous secrecy. What happened in the sixties? Jawaharlal Nehru castigated me violently one day when I said that we were utterly unprepared. When I read from the American Papers showing that the Chinese were preparing to attack in Nefa he accused me of being a neurotic. There were the same anodyne remark, the same complacency that every thing in the defence garden was perfect. We should now know how utterly unprepared we were militarily then; our soldiers lacked training and equipment and even ordinary clothing. We know what happen. Units taken from Poona and Goa were sent; they did not have sufficient number of 303 rifles : they had ordinary canvas shoes.

We are almost in the same position today so far as secrecy is concerned. I concede that we have improved vastly; that was why our showing was so much better in the Indo-Pakistan conflict, I am commenting on the attitude of the Defence Ministry. Even today they will not release Henderson Brook's report which let them down lightly. It was not deep; it was not incisive. Even then they are afraid to release it.

And that is why I feel this House must say to the Defence Minister : this secrecy, this complacency, these anodyne

remarks, we are not prepared to put up with these any longer. It is the strength of an open society to bring it mistakes out into the open. I do not say there is not a certain security element so far as defence is concerned, but we must bring our basic mistakes out into the open and we must face them and, above all, we must learn from them. Do not let us continue to behave like an immature nation, lacking self-confidence. As soon as somebody said this has happened in defence, you say, "Oh, it affects the morale of the country, "as if the morale of the country consists in painting an ultra roseate picture. It does not.

What is happening in America today? The PEUBLO incidents—you know about it—it is being discussed in full view of the public. At one time, I use to defend practically every army officer who was facing a courtmartial. Now, I have not got the time ; I am too busy in other legal matters. But today also, when defence personnel are in trouble, they come to me. As it happened, practically in every case, at the appeal stage, the cases of officers who were removed or dismissed went through my hands, including, in the appeal stage, the only senior officer who was sentenced to imprisonment for cowardice during the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

I recieved information which perhaps no Member of this House has ever seen—some of it was good and some of it was bad : and this is what I want the House to know. We did extremely well ; but also we mind our mistake. I want to know this : who is going to look at and who has looked at our mistakes? If you have read Russel Brines he has told us in his book on the Indo-Pakistan conflict that Ayub Khan, after the conflict, retired 11 Generals and 39 Colonels from the Pakistan army because they failed. As far as I could make out from the records I have gone through in my professional capacity, we retired three Major-Generals, about 10 Brigadiers and about 25 Lt. Cols. It requires an investigation—not for the purpose of witch-hunting, I want to know why. I want to know why, for instance, so many of our Brigadiers were found wanting. Yes, I can understand in times of battle people with good

records are found wanting even in the best regulated armies. But why were so many of those Brigadiers found wanting and removed from command? Some had very good records: they had been Brigadiers General (staff)—a crucial appointment. They had been through staff college; they have attended the National Defence College. Some of them undoubtedly were properly removed, but I cannot help feeling that some of them were made scapegoats. They were made scapegoats, not only the Brigadiers but the Lt. Cols. because of the incompetence of the Divisional Commanders, of the Generals at the top. Why was it that 11-Corps did not do as well as they should have done? From the records I have seen, they could have and should have done better than they did. Five out of 11 Brigadiers in 11-Corps were found wanting.

I am open to correction: from the records I would say that no less than nine of our battalions—in 11-Corps—broke, I agree that in the best armies, regiments break including the British Army, when a lot of them broke and ran in Burma, Gallipoli and places like that. But in one case that I went through, they broke not because the men were really wanting—it was a battalion with a fine records—but the recruits were new. They had received no collective training; they had not even been trained to use their 30-Brownings. They had not even seen our own tanks! Under those conditions, any regiment anywhere in the world would have broken. When the Pattons came at them, with their 1800-yard guns, they broke. I want to have a Committee, with Members of this House associated, to look into this: why some of our regiments broke and why so many of our Brigadiers were found wanting.

From what I can see, many of our Generals were incompetent; they had no capacity to co-ordinate; they lacked resilience. They had no capacity to plan tactics, and, like Krishna Menon, they started interfering with the local commanders, with the result that many of the local commanders failed, and they were made scapegoats. As I said, we made these mistakes.

Then while some of the Brigadiers were undoubtedly made scapegoats, others who were palpable failures because they knew the Generals above them were decorated. In one case that I went into, the conflict was between the senior officer who was court-martialled for cowardice and the Brigadier, and the reply of the senior officer was, "If I am a coward, then this Brigadier is the greatest coward that the Indian Army has ever produced." Two of the three battalions under him broke only because he panicked. That gentleman was mentioned in despatches. I won't mention the names. I am mentioning this to show how unfairly decorations were given, and how people who were failures, were decorated, and how people who did not fail were made scapegoats. I may mention one name in this brigade; you may know it: the third battalion—the Jats with their commanding officer, Lt.-Col. Desmond Hayde inscribed in blood and valour—the epic of Dograi. He is an Anglo-Indian; I have never seen him. But as a senior General told me, here was probably the greatest epic of the conflict; here was a gallant battalion, with 33 per cent casualties, led by this gallant officer. But he did not get a decoration for Dograi. Who gets the decoration? That is the irony of it. The Divisional Commander who was sitting 25 miles away in the Khasa distillery—I do not say he was participating in the amenities of the Khasa distillery—he got the Mahavir Chakra for being 25 miles away. But the Battalion Commander who led his men through a hail of fire and of death got no decoration. He got the Mahavir Chakra for gallantry in a previous action.

What I am afraid of is this. During the war, I quite understand you cannot advertise these things, because it may demoralise our people. But we are far away enough now to take a hard, objective look, at what happened during the Indo-Pak war. Many of the Generals you decorated undoubtedly deserved it, but the army knows that several of your Generals who were completely incompetent. We got a glimpse in NEFA not only of the incompetence, but worse of some of our senior Commanders. That was the time when Krishna Menon was filling the army with his favourites at the

top. But in the Indo-Pak conflict also several of our Generals fail. I want to know why they failed, why our Brigadiers failed and why so many of our regiments made a poor show. Ayub Khan was at least a soldier. He took a hard look and removed 11 Generals. But who is there in India to take a hard look? The Defence Minister will probably say, "You are casting aspersions on the army." Is he going to get the Generals to take a hard look? I cannot give information of cases which I am conducting in the higher courts at the moment. But as one judge remarked, did you expect this from Generals? Are you going to expect some of these Generals to take a hard look? They have wasted interest in white-washing their own incompetence—some of them, not all. The time is long overdue and we must have some kind of committee consisting of members of this House to go into this matter.

There is need for minimum reorganisation. I agree that conditions in India are such that we are not able to organise our forces on the Canadian pattern. They have not got an army, Navy and Air Force. They have got a single armed force. In India, we have inherited the British tradition of different arms with an almost jealous resistance on their separate identities. Even in Britain, there has been a minimum of re-organisation.

The Defence Minister will say, we have got the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is a nominal committee. There is nothing like what they have got in Britain or America.

It is all right if your chief of Army Staff is good. We are continuing the tradition of the British Commander-in-Chief and we repose in his person absolute and uninhibited authority. But he has no command. The Defence Minister will say, he is assisted by the Vice-Chief of Staff and Principal Staff Officers. I am open to correction. He writes confidentially. How are they going to act as equals so far as he is concerned? As far as I am aware, in Britain and America, the person who corresponds to our Chief of Army Staff is a senior among equals. If we have an inept Chief of Staff, as we had

when Krishna Menon was appointing his favourites, we face disaster. We have no in-built protection, as the British and American systems provide. If we have an inept Chief of Army staff, there is nobody to set it right. But if we have the system that you have in Britain and America you will have the other senior general in that Committee asserting themselves and preventing a disaster overtaking the country.

It is bad—I am not pointing a finger at any; I think the new Chief of Army Staff comes to it with a first-class outstanding record, but I am talking in terms of principle—to allow the Chief of Army Staff to have the tremendous authority of Commander-in-Chief because it leads to arbitrariness on the one hand and at least the possibility of nepotism on the other. If he is weak, as the Chief of Army Staff was weak at a certain time then he becomes a creature of the Defence Minister and you get a Defence Minister like Krishna Menon interfering right down to Lieutenant Colonel level. I do not want the Defence Minister to raise his hands in horror and say, why are you making these allegations. I cannot even tell him. I addressed, not so long ago, a whole set of senior officers. They told me frankly that there is a considerable amount of resentment about the way promotions are done in the services. I am not talking only of army but also of the Air Force. Increasing complaints from the Air force have been received of people who were condemned as junior officers but have now got senior post. Many of their appointments smack obviously of communalism. These are things that are being talked about by the service people themselves. I would ask the Defence Minister to have a close look at this.

Khera—those of us who have read his book will remember, said in his book that there is no matrix of integration in the Indian Army; there is compartmentalisation and proliferation of Agencies with the result of increasing proliferation of expenditure. I am not against the career prospects of the officers being improved. You may have more Lieutenant Generals if you like, but what I object to is this definite opera-

tion of Parkinson's lay in our army. We have a weakness in our country for empire-building. They demand linguistic States so that there could be more Chief Ministers with their courts of Ministers. Now you have the demand for Telengana. The whole process is due to the weakness for empire-building. In the army today we have this growing weakness of growing private empires established, especially in the ancillary services like the EME and Ordnance establishments and also the Signals. They immediately acquire vast interest in swelling their strength so that they can have more officers of higher rank. I do not want to be misunderstood. I only say that this has to be looked into. I do not want any of the career prospects to be interfered with.

Take the case of the EME, Senior generals in the Indo-Pakistan fight told me, why have an EME unit attached to each brigade, why don't you have a short of an EME base and you know where they will be needed. It would immediately eliminate huge unnecessary expenditure and also cut down expenditure. It would also increase the fighting effectiveness of our forces.

Sir, one of the first priorities for re-organisation is a so called intelligence system. I know the defence Minister will say that there is a certain amount of coordination. It is only a ritual. As far as I hear—again I am open to correction—each arm has its own intelligence section—Army, Navy and Air Force—and I think they are presided over by a person more or less of the rank of a Joint Secretary. But there is no coordination and we know there is no real integration. We know how objectly the failed in NEFA. They did not even know that the maps issued to the army showed routes which were non-existent. What happened in Ichhogil Canal in the Lahore Sector? We did not even know that Ichhogil Canal was a tremendous fortification and the whole area there was virtually a Maginot line. That is another matter. Were our casualties of about 400 officers and 10,000 jawans justified? All this has to be gone into. I say that we paid dearly because of our abject failure so far as intelligence was concerned in the Lahore Sector.

I agree that it was not. Pakistan talks and applies the function to its soul that Lahore was our objective and we failed objectly. I know that Lahore was not our objective. I was one of the members of Shastriji's Committee which was meeting constantly and he had immediately made it clear that Lahore was not an objective because politically, militarily it was not worthwhile. But I cannot help saying this that while Lahore was not the objective, on the Lahore front we certainly did not achieve even the limited objective that we had set before ourselves.

I want to say this. I know that my suggestion for re-organisation, the appointment of a committee for having a hard look at the various defence facts, will be resisted by his Generals, it is to be resisted by them. But I do not want the Defence Minister to take his cue from his Generals. All the re-organisation that is taking place in the democratic countries—and we can only look to them for certain examples—that has been done at the instance of well informed civilians, the legislators. The Generals have never been primarily responsible for re-organisation in the armed forces. I would ask the House to join with me in asking for the appointment of such a committee.

We have nothing now. Our National Defence Council is, as I said, extremely perfunctory. The Consultative Committee is even more perfunctory. I think it is a duty which we owe to the country and to ourselves. Let us have a look at the many facts. It will take me fifteen minutes to enumerate them. For want of time, I am not able to do so. As Khera has underlined in his book, there is no cost consciousness in the army; nor is there any financial discipline. He put it at a conservative estimate that at least ten per cent of the present expenditure could be saved without affecting the security of the country or defence potential. That ten per cent comes to Rs. 110 crores and I am sure every hon. Member will agree That Rs. 110 crores are no mean saving.

SHRI RANJIT SINGH (Khalilabad) :
Sir, I agree with most of what Shri Frank Anthony said just now. Our defence is in a bad state and the shift in the Soviet policy

has further jeopardised our defence system and at the moment we are placed in such a dangerous situation *vis-u-ais* our enemies, especially Pakistan, that we must take a second look at the entire defence set up of our country. Just at the moment let us compare ourselves with Pakistan. What do we have and what do they have? So far as the strength of the armed forces is concerned, in 1965 we had a definite edge over them in infantry almost an edge over them in armoured corps and definitely an edge rather a superiority of 2 : 1 in the air force. Now they have doubled their army and they have vastly increased their air force. What is the situation as of today? Pakistan has more divisions that we could put up against them even after thinking out our lines from our eastern and northern defences. Now where is the superiority that we are maintaining which the Defence Minister talks of? and tank for tank they have got more although they have the same number of regiments as we have got now, because their regiments have more tanks than we have.

The situation being what it is, let us take a look at what we are doing about all these things. So far as our defence production is concerned, something has been brought out already in the report of the Public Accounts Committee. But there are other things that alarm us. For instance, take our production programme of tanks, Vijayanta. It may not be in the national interest to give the figures; So, I will give the percentage. We are 35 per cent behind the schedule, which is a very alarming rate of retardation. So far as our weaponry system is concerned. I have pointed out in this House previously also that we are tied down to Russian weapons with the result that in time of war we will not have ammunition.

Our Defence Minister some time back had spoken about stock-piling. Stock-piling involves a tremendous effort. Does the Defence Minister know that for one week's war we will require a million shells for all the Russian tanks and the Russian guns that we have. For a two months' war we will have to stock-pile for two full years. Having tied ourselves down to this weaponry, it is

imperative that we get out of this snare now because it is closing tighter and tighter every day and in the event of a conflict with Pakistan it will be in Soviet Russia's hand to decide as to who should win. If they switch our tap off we are lost and if they switch off Pakistan's tap they are gone. Let us now take a firm decision to stand on our own legs. It is our own choosing that we have got into this snare.

In 1965 when we had broken Pakistan armoured might and almost destroyed half of their Army and their morale fully our Defence experts and our Generals assessed that Pakistan will take three to four years before they can recoup and get ready for a second round against us. We had three, four years at our disposal to become self-sufficient. Instead of putting all our efforts behind Vijayanta, which is a far superior tank as compared to the tanks which the Russians have given us, we started purchasing from Soviet Russia, because the Defence Ministry and our Government had political reasons to purchase those weapons. They did not have military experts' advice in regard to the purchase of those weapons. We are now in that snare and we should soon get out of that and make a final effort to stand on our own legs.

Our friend, Mr. Frank Anthony pointed out the alarming state of affairs regarding our defence preparedness. What is the basic cause for all these things? Primarily, I would say that the basic cause is the lack of defence knowledge and utter lack of defence consciousness amongst our leaders and a sample of that is just over there before you. We have reached a state, as Mr. Frank Anthony pointed out, when it is too dangerous to leave defence entirely in the hands of Generals alone, but at the same time, defence is too complicated a matter to be left in the hands of un-knowledgeable Ministers and politicians. Therefore, let us strike a balance and that is why a Committee is necessary. A Committee is necessary because defence is too complicated a matter to be handled by one man especially a man who is to perform so many other duties

[Shri Ranjeet Singh]

apart from looking to the Country's defence needs. The time when the Congress booking window opens for distributing tickets, for two or three months the Defence Minister cannot just be seen in the Ministry of Defence ; he is very busy sorting out people to whom he is going to give tickets for elections. Even now, he is to keep running for the Punjab politics, for Haryana politics, etc. and in almost all these politics he has got a finger in every pie, just as he is capable of having something to do with every Ministry now and then. It is not his fault that he has not got the time. It is the political set up of the country that no Minister can or has got time for his job. That is the whole tragedy of this country. Therefore, I will request that the Minister in his own interest for helping him, in the interest of the country and in the interest of the country's defence should accept the proposal for at least a Commission on Defence, if not a standing committee which he has previously rejected when we moved for it. Such a Commission could go into all the aspects of Defence preparedness, including our strategic thinking, including tactical failings, and including also our different organisations and our weaponry system, because the state of our defence is really appalling.

Take the question of unit by unit strength. We are supposed to have six RCLs, the best of the infantry anti-tank weapons, Sir, an RCL is the weapon with which Abdul Hamid knocked down three Patton tanks. These RCL weapons are being used by most advanced countries even as their best and most effective anti-tank infantry weapons. We are supposed to have six of them per infantry battalion but the All India average today is $2\frac{1}{2}$. Is this not an alarming state of affairs that we have so far as equipment is concerned ? Mr. Frank Anthony pointed this out and at that time I could see the Minister shaking his head. I have never understood what his shaking of the head means—'yes' or 'no'. He was possibly contradicting Mr. Anthony's statement and was meaning that we were no longer short of personnel equipment like boots, belts and things like that.

But the alarming fact is that we are still short of these things, not because the country is not capable of producing, but because the organisation is so topsy-turvy that things do not reach their destination in time.

Another alarming state exists in our Air Force. We have got 40 per cent serviceability of our aircraft except the latest purchases. Can an Air Force stand in a battle with such a high percentage of un-serviceability ?

Then, let us look at the turn-around time. Turn-around time is the time taken by the aircraft when it returns to the base, refuels and reloads and goes back. This time is known as turn-around time. In advanced countries the turn-around time is 10 minutes. In Israel it is eight minutes, in Sweden it is five minutes. And what is our turn-around time ? It is an hour and a half. Why is it $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours ? This is not because our pilots are not efficient, our airmen are not efficient, but the thinking is very retarded somewhere in the set-up from the top to the bottom. The greatest retarding factor about turn-around time is the lack of tractors, ordinary agricultural tractors. We are supposed to have them at the rate of 15 per squadron, but our average comes to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per squadron. I do not know how we can go on like this ? (*Interruptions*) They think that when they have given 2½ per squadron, that is enough. (*Interruptions*) We are producing these tractors in our country. It is just a bottleneck in our thinking, in the consciousness of the whole affair, that is retarding our defence preparedness.

Take, for instance, our Navy. Recently they held an exercise and they invited a great many people ; I think, all the military advisers from different nations went there to see the performance of our INS, Mysore. What happened ? The target had been indicated and the order to fire had also been given. The safety checks had also been gone through. And they kept on waiting for the shot to come out. Five minutes had passed. Within five seconds the shot should have come out. Everybody was wondering what was happening, whether it was a count down for a guided missile that was

taking place. Eventually, after full five minutes, the guns boomed. Why did this happen? It was because there was a defect in the gunnary system, there was a defect in the guns, there was a defect in the whole ship. And with these ships, we are supposed to fight? We are supposed to guard our coastal line? The Defence Minister has often spoken that there is no vacuum in the Indian Ocean. I can say that there is a great vacuum in our defence which certainly the thin body of our Defence Ministry cannot fill.

I must come to certain points which Mr. Anthony has raised, because he has seen things from a detached angle, and I have seen them by getting into them.

MR. SPEAKER: You must give some time for Mr. Jai Singh also.

SHRI RANJIT SINGH: I have taken only ten minutes.

MR. SPEAKER: No; you have taken thirteen minutes.

SHRI RANJIT SINGH: We know that, in your benign way, you will give him 20 minutes. (*Interruptions*)

I must say that no enemy could destroy our Armed Forces in the way we ourselves are destroying them. (*Interruption*) I stress that no enemy could destroy our Armed Forces in the way we ourselves have tried to destroy.

Now, take the four-year rule. They have brought a rule that the officers from Col. to Major General, after they have completed four years, will go out into the Civvy Street if they have completed 48 years of age, 48 years of age is not an old age, Sir. You know what you were at 48 years of age, a young handsome and energetic person. That means we shall lose almost all our experienced officers. A hundred are going out—one hundred of them, this year. We, shall lose almost all our officers who had the experience of the Second World War and who had experience of Kashmir and who had commanded upto brigades and battalions in 1965. This is an alarming state of affairs. Who is going to give experience to the rest of the Army? These people are being wasted out. All this is due to the fact, as our friend Mr. Anthony pointed

out, that our Defence Ministry is not adopting a hard objective line. They are permitting a few vested interests to do what-ever they like. This is again due to lack of defence thinking. How can you have defence thinking? Recently the post of Secretary for Defence Production fell vacant. Whom did they select? The Secretary for Health. Now he has tried to learn as to what is meant by EME. what is the difference between an electrical engineer and a mechanical engineer, what is the difference between gun and rifle. However in this dark picture we do have a silver lining and the silver lining is that for once somehow our Defence Ministry has woken up to the fact that there is need to put in more effort for indigenous defence production. They are hindered by vested interests. Take one case. For Instance, in 1962 we decided to build up our aircraft production programme. We wanted to assemble the Gnats. Because we did not have the types of aluminium sheets that we wanted for the fusillade we gave licences and crores of rupees worth of foreign exchange to the private sector companies—one is the House of Birlas and the other is J. K. Juggilal Kamalapat to import the machinery and install it—for the purpose of manufacturing these sheets and supply them to the Kanpur Aircraft manufacturing unit. They have installed the machinery but there was no agreement with them. They are not supplying to the Defence Ministry. They are supplying to the black market. These vested interests stand in the way of defence preparedness.

At the same time I would add another thing. We considered whether we should bring it in the House. If we do not bring it in the House the House will be in the dark. Corruption in the Armed Forces is increasing at an alarming rate and the basic reason for that is that proper types of commanders are not being selected. What in the criterion for selecting commanding officers. We are haranguing at the time of selection of the Chief of Army Staff. We say this man is good and that man is bad from the time we select a man to command a battalion he should become fit to act as chief of Army Staff if only one more thing is put in. That is additional experience. So, our selection system is faulty. That is why

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we are facing all these difficulties. That is why there is corruption and our commanders demand to be pleased by the inferior commanders and the inferior commanders are always engaged in the game of "Please they the bosses". That is why this entire system is crumbling and that is why we plead with you again, we plead with the Defence Minister to let us have a Commission. I know you will not agree to the Committee because the committee will impinge upon your private domain. Let us have a commission to go into all aspects of our defence preparedness.

Lastly our foreign policy requires definitely a military backing. Let the commission tell us as to how much military backing the foreign policy requires and let us have that military backing by all means ensuring only one thing. Let us have it at the minimum cost.

SHRI CHINTAMANI PANIGRAHI (Bhubaneswar) : Defence of the motherland, and defence of its territorial integrity, is the foremost task of our Government. It is really inspiring and encouraging that the Defence Minister has clearly put before the House in this year's report the awareness of the problems of defence that the country faces today.

The Defence Minister in his report has also stated that they are aware of the urgency of building up a strong, modernised and well equipped Indian army to face any eventuality in two fronts. What is the new strategy of war? What is the new strategy which the Indian army is expected to face in the coming year? From our little experience which we have gained during last two conflicts (and the present state of international changes which are taking place, keeping in view the changes in Soviet Union, China and Pakistan) we can safely say that the country needs to prepare for limited wars. In this new strategy of limited wars we have to see whether the army is being well equipped and whether the army is being modernised. We shall have to look into this aspect.

Sir, due to the grace of this House or maybe, of you, Sir, I had occasion to visit some of the Establishments of Defence and also I had occasion to meet many of

those people who are in the Army. I had got an insight into the ways the Army is working. I am not going into the details. That is not necessary here.

But I would like to say something on the question of modernising and equipping the army. The Defence Minister has said in his report that we are now converting ourselves to post-1960 equipments. But, Sir, we are now reaching the year 1970. Therefore, it is necessary to look ahead. It is good that from 1952 we have gone to post-1960. That is true. But we have to remember that the weaponry with the nations of the world is changing very fast. We should not satisfy ourselves merely with post-1960 equipments but should also think ahead of 1970 and 1975 as well. We must be looking ahead and in this connection I would like to suggest some improvements.

I have talked to a number of army men. To have the atomic bomb itself is not such a great thing as people are discussing. From the army point of view, from the army morale point of view, from the point of view of nation's confidence, I would plead with the Minister whether atomic weapons (not Bombs, I say, but atomic weapons) can be used in limited quantities. This can be used in the form of land mines. The cost of the delivery system is more not of the atomic bomb itself. But, in the present situation, as it is, we can expect any atomic war from China. Therefore the delivery system is not so much necessary. I am all in favour of atomic weapons in limited quantities which can be used without delivery system but in the form of land mines etc. to safeguard our frontiers like the Himalayan frontiers. I hope that will be taken into consideration.

Three or four years ago the Army Headquarters were much ahead in their thoughts regarding the defence needs of the country. Then the Defence Ministry was lagging behind. But now we find a new situation. Today the Defence Ministry is very much aware of the immediate necessity of modernising and equipping the army and going ahead with the five-year plans for increasing combat preparedness but what has happened to Army headquarters, I don't know. The Army headquarters as it is today is lagging

behind and the Defence Ministry is going ahead. I think there is something wrong in the Army headquarters which needs to be looked into immediately. I do not want to go into what things are happening there. It requires examination. It must be gone into.

How can we proceed ahead with the immediate and long-term defence needs of our country? The Minister has said that they are going over to the post-1960 equipments and all kinds of things. But I would like to bring one point before the hon. Minister. In the Half-an-Hour discussion he said that Soviet Union has pledged to give more and more weapons to Pakistan.

This is a matter of grave concern to us. Four years ago, the Pakistan army had its weapons from Britain, U.S.A. and some other countries including China. We were depending on the Soviet Union. Today, for the first time, both India and Pakistan have built up their defence with Russian equipment. This is a matter which needs to be seriously considered. When we are going to face both China and Pakistan and when, as the Defence Minister has admitted, Pakistan has doubled its army, at this point of time is it desirable for us to depend only on one source of supply, a source which is common to both India and Pakistan?

During the three years since we achieved that great victory in the conflict with Pakistan, we could have multiplied our armaments production to make us independent of all foreign sources of supply. Whatever answer may be given the fact remains that we have lagged behind in this respect. We thought that Pakistan had lost the battle and it would take her at least five or ten years to make up for the losses and we could sleep a little. I wish we had done more than we have done in this respect.

We must also learn the lessons from the course of the war in Vietnam. Here is a small nation which for the last three or four years has been fighting the American military might. Latest reports say that they have downed 3,000 planes so far. Should we not take a lesson from the defence strategy and the fighting

spirit displayed by these brave people against the foreign aggressors? I hope our army commanders and Defence authorities will draw necessary lessons from this. What is real could do in six or eight hours against another power should also provide us necessary lessons in respect of offensive strategy.

With regard to the navy, there also we need much more improvement. Many of our warships are obsolete. The naval arm should be equipped with long-distance aircraft capable of spotting out and destroying hostile intruders in the surrounding ocean. The importance of the navy in guarding the surrounding oceans increasing as things are changing. Therefore, we cannot be complacent so far as the navy is concerned.

Coming to defence production, the potential must be geared up to cope with the ever-changing requirements consequent upon scientific discoveries. Every day new weapons are being forged. Even in respect of conventional weapons of which we are proud—we are preparing only to fight with conventional weapons—we shall have to modernise more and more, keeping our armed forces equipped with the latest and most up-to-date weaponry.

I have visited some of the establishments. But I have found there a class barrier which is not conducive to the morale of the army. There is a barrier between the aristocratic officer class and the common jawans of the army. This must be looked into and remedied. This is causing resentment among the jawans. I have met and talked to them. We are facing two enemies, the Pakistanis and Chinese. We went to the border at Nathu La. The spirit of comradeship fighting for a common cause has to be engendered. We shall have to change the whole atmosphere. The psychology of comradeship should be there between the officer and the jawan; they should have the feeling that both are fighting to safeguard the integrity and honour of the country in an equal measure. In this great task, everybody's sacrifice is of equal importance.

What have we done to improve the effectiveness of the Indian Army as a

striking force? When an enemy attacks our frontier is it possible that we can strike the enemy back within hours? I know that so far as the methods of our army are concerned they have not yet developed as an effective army with immediate striking power. There is again the question of mobility. I feel we must have a separate air borne division. You cannot depend upon trucks and mechanised transport only. The terrain in Nathula and some other places is such that more and more helicopters are necessary. for increasing the mobility of the Indian Army. So separate air-borne divisions are necessary. The whole civilian industries should be so scientifically organised so that they can in a short time change their peace time production to war time production of things such as armaments, etc. If I can cite an instance during the second world war in Germany the lip-stick industry could immediately be switched on to produce some kinds of armaments; the tube industry could help in the production of shells. I think that we cannot stock-pile weapons for long years. Suppose you want three million shells. You cannot stock-pile them because they will become less effective if they are stored for long. In Pakistan, during the Indo-Pakistan conflict 30% of their shells were found to be defective because they were all stock-piled. During our conflict with China and Pakistan also we had to use armaments which were stock-piled. That is why I say whenever we face a conflict our entire national economy should be so arranged as to be geared up to face the challenge immediately even if it is in two or three fronts. That has not yet been tested.

We must have a long range programme for the production of weapons and equipment spread over five or six years. The hon. Minister hinted at the Five Year Plan.

I shall be concluding in one or two minutes. We find in some countries for instance the Soviet Union, civilian air-craft are designed in such a way that in peace time they are used for passenger traffic but are immediately convertible for war service when such a need arises. We must keep in view all these things. Our

air lifting capability is weak and it needs improvement. In conclusion I may say that I am reminded of a nursery rhyme which runs as follows : for want of a nail the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe the horse was lost; for want of a horse the rider was lost; for want of a rider the battle was lost. We have improved our position compared to 1965. The morale has improved. We are producing some of our equipment and our factories are working well. But we have to make more efforts. For instance we wanted to produce 9,000 Shaktiman trucks. We produced 7,000 in 1967-68 and only 921 were produced in the ordinance factories. A lot of unutilised capacity remain to be used. Similarly in other ordinance factories also the full capacity is not used. I now turn to the sophisticated equipment. Unless the army is trained to use them it is no use. Pakistan had modern sophisticated equipment but they did not know how to utilise that. Therefore they failed. It is no use simply importing mechanical things and sophisticated arms. Therefore, the Defence Ministry should take steps to train these people in these items.

Last, I take the case of the ex-servicemen. Their conditions are very pitiable. This must be looked into. I will again express my gratitude to the hon. Minister that he has been kind enough to give the benefit to Chilka. I was fighting for the last so many years to have a naval training centre at Chilka. I can only say that he has realised that it is a good place, and he has agreed to my request. I feel that the Defence Ministry, whatever it has done, is going ahead. It must look into the future programmes also.

With these words, I fully support the Demands for Grants of the Defence Ministry.

SHRI JAI SINGH (Hoshiarpur) : Mr. Speaker, Sir, I shall be a little more deliberate and constructive in my criticism. Therefore, I appeal to you to be a little more indulgent towards me and allow me little more time.

MR. SPEAKER : It depends on the points you make.

17 hrs.

SHRI JAI SINGH : The constituency which I have the honour to represent is part of an area which was declared backward a long time ago. There is no indication of a conscious effort having been made to improve the lot of the people in the area during the last 22 years. There are still many villages where human beings and cattle still continue to depend upon the unlined village pond as their only source of drinking water. For this reason the population of these villages continues to be in a state of perpetual ill health.

Except for a small urban population living in a few small towns, of which Hoshiarpur with a population of about 50000 is the largest, the rest of the population lives in the villages. The land holdings are small and the chief means of livelihood are agriculture and service. An appreciable number of servicemen and ex-servicemen belong to the constituency.

A large number of promising youngmen from the area used to join the armed forces with great enthusiasm, as service in the armed forces had almost become a tradition with them. This is now no longer so because of three basic reasons :

(a) Progressive decrease in security and recognition while in service, and facilities and assistance to ex-servicemen for resettlement in civil life. It is no exaggeration to state that on return to civil life many ex-servicemen have been forced to adopt questionable methods just to make both ends meet. They have become a law and order problem.

(b) Discrimination by the Government in pension increments to junior commissioned officers and other ranks, increments being determined more by the dates on which they left the service than the prevailing cost of living. Ex-servicemen of this category who left the service several years ago, are finding it extremely difficult to keep body and soul together in these days of rising prices, and their miserable plight is a distressing sight. They are in need of immediate help.

(c) Government not restoring to the INA personnel pay and allowances as promised on the floor of this House.

The conditions prevailing in the area should be well known to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Minister of Health and Family Planning, and Works, Housing and Urban Development and the Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation, who toured the area canvassing support for the Congress candidates during the recent election. I hope they have all realised that the administration has been less than fair to their fellow countrymen living in this area, and would soon take some determined steps to better their lot.

This kind of treatment is poor advertisement for the armed forces. It has certainly not helped in the maintenance of discipline, morale, and leadership at the usually high level, on which so much will always depend during active operations. Man is the most important munition of war. If the Defence Minister would carefully examine what I have just stated, he should not fail to detect the basic cause of many incidents of a very grave nature during the active operations in 1962 and 1965, which it would be foolish to deny and dangerous to ignore. I reinforce my argument by stating that there was not the slightest suggestion of any such occurrence during the active operations in 1947-48 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere. I should also remind the Defence Minister that at that time the armed forces had just been partitioned and shortages in personnel, arms, equipment and so on were equally serious if not worse.

I shall take this opportunity to state that the responsibility for the debacle in 1962 was not that of the armed forces alone. I emphasize that unless youngmen are convinced that service in the armed forces gives them adequate security and recognition while in service, and adequate facilities and assistance for settlement in civil life, when they leave the service, quality shall continue to suffer.

Considering that over 50000 servicemen leave the service every year,

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the resettlement directorate as at present organised, is unable to tackle the problem with a reasonable hope of success. It is little use taking shelter behind the argument that re-settlement of ex-servicemen is chiefly the responsibility of the State Governments. For a correct assessment of the problem and the resources available a conference of all the State Governments should be called periodically under the auspices of the Defence Ministry. The Central Government should then make a determined effort to first resettle as many ex-servicemen as possible in the central services in a planned manner. I think to start with a Deputy Minister in the Defence Ministry should be placed in charge of the Resettlement Directorate.

The State Governments should also be encouraged to give adequate facilities and assistance to ex-servicemen. Take the case of the Punjab, which makes a substantial contribution in man-power to the armed forces. Even though the state has made a serious effort in this respect, its resources are but small. According to the Industries Minister of the Punjab, out of about 4000 crores invested in the public sector upto date, the share of the Punjab has not exceeded 5%. If the Punjab is given its due share of heavy industries, additional opportunities will have become available to ex-servicemen also.

As regards the officers, I recommend that in future the minimum educational qualification for direct entry candidates for combatant status officers in the armed forces should be raised to graduate of a recognised university. This is calculated to better the officer's chances of resettlement in civil life after leaving the service.

Before I pass on to the next part I would like to state that being disciplined ex-servicemen do realise that even peaceful demonstrations by ex-servicemen at this critical juncture are not desirable. But, their patience should not be considered to be inexhaustible.

I will now deal with the Army, Navy and Air Force. The role of the Armed Forces is to defend the territorial integrity

of India and to give aid to the civil power when such aid is requisitioned.

India has a land frontier of about 15,168 KMs. I am aware of the reorganisation which has taken place in our Armed Forces. I would like to make a few suggestions for their more efficient functioning.

Although the Army has expanded considerably, and is now extensively deployed, the duties of the Chief of the Army Staff remain unaltered. I submit that his burden has become too heavy. This could be best lightened by the introduction of the Army Council system, same as in the United Kingdom. This will enable the Chief of the Army Staff to devote more time to the operational fitness of the Army, and the Defence Minister will have greater opportunities of discussing all important matters direct with the members of the Council. The system is also calculated to considerably reduce patronage and favouritism at all levels, and thus serve public interests better. I do hope that the civil officers of the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Army Staff do not oppose this progressive step on the ground that it tends to diminish the authority and stature they enjoy at present.

Additional obstacles have sprung up on the Indo-Pak border in the States of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir in the plains. This seems to have given rise to a feeling that in future no major operations are likely to take place in these areas. This view has no validity. My information is that there has been very considerable increase in the number of armoured and artillery units in the Pakistan Army. For this reason and also because some of our Mountain Divisions may also have to operate in the plains at short notice, it is essential that we are at least equally strong in armoured and artillery units.

Some of our armoured fighting vehicles have now been in service for quite some years. We have also imported arms and equipment. To ensure that all imported arms and equipment in service are maintained at a satisfactory level, it is

necessary that adequate replacements and spares, and special lubricants are held in stock at all times. Urgent steps must also be taken to stockpile all imported ammunition for a minimum of 90 days at contract rates, in addition to a plentiful supply for training. It has to be conceded that unless we begin to manufacture the imported items in India, we would be dependent for these on the country of origin for their normal life, which would be between 10-12 years. Lastly, promises of flying these arms, spares, equipment and so on at short notice in case of necessity should not be taken at their face value.

We are the only major army in the world today without its own air component. Even the Pakistan Army is ahead of us in this regard. Although the performance of our Air Force in 1965 was good, there was a feeling that our Air Force did not excel the Pakistan Air Force in its secondary role of immediate direct support to the Army. Air support was not available for a whole day when we crossed the Wagah border. I am aware that the Air Force was not at all blameworthy for this, and the reason was some wishful thinking on the part of the Government, same as in 1962. All the same, the absence of air support on that day did lead to quite a few avoidable casualties, and no one can afford to ignore unnecessary casualties.

For immediate direct support, air component for the Army manned, operated, maintained and commanded by its own personnel is long overdue. Generally speaking the duties of this air component would be immediate close fire support, air spotting for artillery, evacuation of seriously sick and wounded and communication. Aircraft for this role would have to be comparatively lighter, slower and capable of flying at low and medium heights only. In addition, this type of air' craft must be able to operate from hastily improvised air strips in the field. For close fire support, aircraft armed with rockets should be quite suitable. The initial cost, maintenance and the training of pilots for this type of aircraft would be much cheaper than the high speed sophisticated aircraft nec-

essary for the primary role of the air force.

Then I come to the Indian Navy. The coastline of India is about 5,689 kilometre. The role of the Navy can be security of our coastline, security of our island possessions of Andamans, Nicobar and Laccadives and free and uninterrupted flow of trade across the Indian Ocean. With the present complement of ships, facilities and equipment, the navy may be relied upon to provide reasonable security to our coastline and some protection to our island possessions. According to the present indications, in about ten years, by when the navy shall have received additional craft, facilities and equipment, it should be able to discharge the two roles with greater efficiency. However, I doubt if in the foreseeable future the navy can, by itself, ensure the freedom of the seas at all times for our merchant fleet. The active co-operation of powerful allies will be necessary for this role.

The recent statement of the Deputy Chief of the USSR Navy that a powerful Pakistan navy would be a good pre-condition for peace in the Indian Ocean demands careful consideration. It is quite possible that Pakistan will receive from the USSR some naval craft, including submarines, in return for certain facilities for the USSR Navy operating in the area of the Indian Ocean.

The Defence Department of USA has estimated that by 1975 the People's Republic of China should have 12 to 15 nuclear submarines.

It would be in our best interests to keep the Indian Ocean free from tension. But the hard reality is that we do not possess the strength to ensure this. The navies of USA and USSR are competing with each other for world domination, Geographically speaking, USA is better placed in this regard. In addition, USA already possesses several facilities in East and South East Asia.

In 1971 the British withdrawal from South East Asia will throw additional responsibilities on the navy. We shall be guilty of disregarding the lessons of history if we allow ourselves to forget the

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role of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the second world war at the threat which haunted us from this area in 1965.

Now I come to the air force. The air force has two roles at present. The primary role is achievement and maintenance of air superiority, strategic bombing, tactical bombing of large enemy concentrations, defence of the homeland and special missions. The secondary role is that of close support to the army and the navy.

At present the equipment of the air force is too varied and causes serious difficulties in training, maintenance, provisioning of stores and so on. The steps indicated in the report for reducing the types of aircraft in the service are welcome.

I have already put forward certain arguments in favour of the army having its own air component and the air force confining itself mainly to the primary role. For its primary role it requires very expensive and highly sophisticated aircraft capable of flying at great speed and at great heights. In addition, it takes a long time to train pilots for this type of aircraft. These aircrafts are costly to maintain and consume large quantities of fuel at lower heights. For these reasons, aircrafts eminently suited for the primary role are unsuitable and uneconomical for the secondary role.

Now I come to the Defence policy. The defence policy of a country has to be synchronised with its foreign policy for the simple reason that when freedom is threatened help from friendly countries becomes necessary. Help is always on reciprocal basis, and no war can be brought to a successful conclusion without allies. No country can go it alone these days.

The policy of Panchsheel and non-alignment, which we followed till 1962, failed us. Today large areas of our sacred soil are in the illegal possession of hostile countries and we stand humiliated.

What is the precise meaning of our present policy of non-alignment? If it means that at present we do not consider

it necessary to make treaties for armed assistance, but wish to remain free to take all measures necessary for our security and the advancement of our national interests, adopting a steady course of equal friendship with all countries whose help we are likely to need in time of serious difficulties, then, at this juncture I have no serious difference with non-alignment. I realise that a sudden change in this policy at this juncture is liable to cause grave dislocation and confusion in many spheres. But, when this yardstick is applied to the non-alignment which we seem to be practising, it becomes difficult to understand why we have allowed ourselves to move so far away from the western democracies, creating an impression that we are almost anti-west. These countries gave us substantial help in 1962, and have about the same system of Government as ourselves. Besides, in these countries, there is hardly any power struggle likely to result in unpredictable changes and sudden reversal of policies. It becomes difficult to understand why we continue to depend so much upon the U. S. S. R. and its associate countries of Eastern Europe, when none of these countries gave us any substantial help in 1962, and when the U. S. S. R. is now openly encouraging Pakistan, and continues to supply her arms far in excess of her defensive needs, in spite of our pleadings. The U. S. S. R. is also interfering in our internal affairs. Why have we not yet fully realised the possible consequences of the U. S. S. R. becoming so increasingly friendly towards Pakistan?

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : The hon. Member should conclude now.

SHRI RANJIT SINGH : This is his maiden speech. Please give him ten minutes more and he will conclude.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : I am very generous. He has to conclude now. He is a born disciplinarian.

SHRI JAI SINGH : Why have we failed to correctly assess the factor of sea power by not readily grasping the hand of friendship offered by Japan, and the countries of South East Asia. The Defence Secretary of the U. S. A. has reape-

ted to the Senata Foreign Relations Committee that the People's Republic of China is likely to test an intercontinental ballistic missile within 18 months and also have a stockpile of 20-30 of these missiles by 1975.

We have not been successful in our attempt to obtain a nuclear umbrella for ourselves. The People's Republic of China is well on its way to becoming a super power. There are sufficient indications that Pakistan has acquired sufficient knowledge regarding the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In the circumstances, the possession of nuclear weapons by us as a deterrent has become a sheer necessity. There is no question of an arms race or competition. It is simply facing hard realities and keeping up with the times. Less costly methods of manufacturing nuclear weapons have been discovered and our own scientists should not find it too difficult to discover these methods for themselves. In any case, no price is too great for the preservation of freedom.

Over dependence on the U.N. O., too much idealism and excessive attachment to sentiments have not been helpful in maintaining our security or advancing our national interests. The U. S. S. R. on whom we have been relying so much can no longer be relied upon to the same extent. The shifting necessities of time must be recognised and a change in our foreign policy is now called for. We should re-establish cordial relations with the western democracies and remove the impression that we are anti-west; improve our relations with all countries of South East Asia, Japan, Australia and New Zealand; take all steps to become self-sufficient in all equipment and stores for our defence requirements and until this is achieved, take speedy measures to ensure adequate stocks of all imported defence equipment and stores; and without further delay take in hand the manufacture of nuclear weapons with a built-in delivery system.

I now conclude by stating that we are likely to come up against difficult situations demanding sacrifices and exertions on our part. The Ministry of Defence has a great responsibility in this re-

gard. If the Defence Minister makes a promise to speedily (a) re-build the country's moral and martial vigour, including nuclear capability for the Armed Forces; (b) provide sufficient means and adequate facilities to servicemen, ex-servicemen and the civilian employees to improve their lot; and (c) exercise greater control over the use of public funds and better care of public property, then, I recommend that the demands of the Ministry of Defence be passed in full.

SHRI S. M. BANERJEE (Kanpur) ;
At the outset I must congratulate our jawans who are doing an excellent job for the country; apart from doing their own job, they have come to the rescue of the civilians in situations like floods and drought.

I am one of those who seriously believe that we should not effect economy at the cost of our national security. Naturally I want to support the Demands of this particular Ministry. But, at the same time, extravagance should be avoided. As a member of the Public Accounts Committee, who has gone through the various audit paras..., I have come to the conclusion that there is a good amount of extravagance in the Defence Ministry, and if the several reports of the PAC and the Audit are considered seriously and objectively, I am sure this Ministry can save nearly Rs. 100 crores without having any retrenchment in the defence establishment or without reducing the size of the army. I would request the hon. Minister to give a serious thought to this and see that extravagance is avoided, if not stopped.

Then, I would like to mention another instance. As the members know, the Office of the Director-General, Ordnance Factories, is in Calcutta. Since long ago when Mr. C. C. Desai, presently an hon. Member of this House, was the Director-General, Munitions Production, the ordnance factories were being managed either by the D. G., M. P., or by the Director-General, Ordnance Factories. During the time of Second World War, in 1941-42 there was a Directorate by the name of Directorate of Leather Manufactures. Suddenly the Defence Ministry has taken a decision to bifurcate the DGOF.

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organisation. At present it is bifurcated into two. That is the Equipment Unit having leather and clothing factories under it and it is being shifted from Calcutta to Kanpur. I would have welcomed this because formation of any unit in Kanpur will give employment potential to my people in Kanpur. Still I oppose it. I oppose the bifurcation because it is not in the interests of economy or in the interests of the efficient working of the DGOF organization. Because some officers wanted to be promoted to DGOF or any other higher post they suggested this bifurcation. In all humility and sincerity I suggest that the shifting is wrong. Recently the DGOF Organization thought that all departments cannot possibly get accommodation in the building 6, Esplanade East Calcutta, a huge five-storeyed building which they have taken. a big house in Park St. at Rs. 45,000 per month. I speak subject to correction. It may be Rs. 46,000 even. That organisation known as Equipment Unit is having its office there. Now suddenly paying Rs. 45,000 per month for that particular office and then again spending Rs. 30 to 40 lakhs for constructing news buildings in Kanpur, is it economy? I would like to put this question to Shri Morarji Desai when he talks of economy and tightening of belt and talks of freezing of wages. I would like to ask a question of the Finance Minister through you whether in the interest of economy this is essential or not. I would like to request the hon. Minister for Defence Production. I am happy he is well. I wish him all good health. He should apply his mind, he should call a meeting of the various officers and experts whether it is necessary or not. An agitation is going on in Calcutta. They squatted before this office—500 employees who are going to be uprooted completely from Calcutta. There are no houses in Kanpur, not a soul can get a quarter. No building is there in Kanpur. At present one of the officers who has been made ADG is having his office in his own quarter. That is the state of affairs. I do not know why this Equipment Unit is being shifted to Kanpur.

Much has been said about our danger from our neighbouring countries like

Pakistan and China. We are overestimating Pakistan all the time. I am surprised whenever our members speak in this House they give a feeling to the country that we are the weakest country in the world. That is surprising. Why should they feel this inferiority? Did we not defeat Pakistan in 1965? Some hon. Member said that we had ammunition only for 7 days. Somebody said it is 15 days. I have seen myself after the cease-fire how we have defeated Pakistan hollow and they were on their heels. Now a crisis is going in Pakistan. Certain misguided missiles of West Pakistan are facing the guided missiles of East Pakistan. Politically misguided missiles or guided missiles—they are all in a soup. They are facing Mujibur Rahman and other leaders who want the Pakistan Government change its attitude. Do we not find a great change in East Pakistan? Have we lost confidence in the people? We see there is a will for unity, a goodwill for Indian people from a section of Pakistan. Why should we always create a war psychosis and say we should always be prepared for war? China is unpredictable. We cannot say what China will do. But about Pakistan we should be firm about it and we should find out ways and means to have negotiations with Pakistan and settle our disputes without talking of war. War psychosis can be created in a country. Can we afford to have that luxury? America can do it. One of the war psychoses was the manufacture of huge arms and ammunitions. They have to find a Vietnam or a North Korea or any other place to dump their arms and to sell their arms.

Have we reached that stage? I am happy that in India the ordnance factories have reached a particular stage of development. I must congratulate the workers of the ordnance factories for achieving a state of self-sufficiency in the matter of the conventional weapons. I am now talking of conventional weapons. We have reached a stage of self-sufficiency in these conventional weapons but the question is: Is that enough? That is certainly not enough.

My hon. friend Shri Tapuria has said that some of the items can be manu-

factured in the private sector. But what was our experience during the year 1962 after the Chinese aggression? What was our experience in 1965 after we started our conflict with Pakistan? It was our sad experience that the contractors did not give us the good materials. Even the quilt which has been given to our army-men has not been filled with cotton but with something else. They played with the lives of the people of the nation, with the lives of the jawans who lost their lives in Ladakh and NEFA where they were fighting the Chinese soldiers. They were manufacturing such quilts and other things with some type of sub-standard materials. This is the sad history of the contractors in our country.

In foreign countries like USA it is only the private sector that is doing it. But what happened in England? In Royal Ordnance Factories they manufacture things intended for civilian consumption in such ordnance factories.

I listened to the speech of my hon. friend Shri Frank Anthony. Generally he is frank, but today he was not so. He criticised the ex-Defence Minister Mr. Krishna Menon. He may have any amount of grouse with Mr. Krishna Menon but the country will never forget Mr. Krishna Menon because he had laid the foundation-stone of a solid defence production in our country. In the Defence Ministry who started the programme of the manufacture of Shaktiman trucks? Whose plan was that? Shaktiman trucks were produced in thousands. The Tatas and Walchands were saying that Shaktiman trucks could not be used on the road. But during the Chinese aggression and during the Pakistan aggression it was the Shaktiman trucks which were used, the Shaktiman trucks and Nishan trucks which were used on the road, and which helped us a lot.

The ordnance factories can manufacture everything. There is no doubt about it. The value of production of ordnance factories has gone up to Rs. 170 crores. But it is not enough. We have to produce more in ordnance factories. We are giving 10,032 items to the private sector, which can be manufactured in

the ordnance factories. It is said that the Railway people are giving some work to the private sector. But, why should not they give it to the ordnance factories? At the moment there is no work for the clothing factories. Why should they not place their orders with the ordnance factories, instead of with the contractors? There are various such factories which are on the verge of closure. Why cannot the Railway authorities give such work to ordnance factories? They will give it to the contractors so that they may have a share of certain things.

I see no reason in it. I would request the hon. Minister to put his foot down and see that no work is given to the private sector at the cost of the ordnance factories. He should take up this matter in the Cabinet and ensure that departmental requirements are met this way. Ordnance factories first, private sector after-wards—that should be the policy. No ordnance factory should suffer at hands of the private sector.

Then I am somewhat disappointed by the performance of four ordnance factories, at Chanda, Bhandara, Trichi and Ambajhari. I have seen all these. Unfortunately, it seems at Ambajhari there is chaotic wastage of public money. I who have faith in the Defence Ministry's efficiency am forced to say this.

Then at Chanda, what did we aim at and what is going on now? Huge machinery which was supplied wrongly, taken wrongly, is now rotting to rust. This is not fair to the country. A committee should be appointed to probe into this and see that this factory starts production at the earliest.

The factory at Trichi is very important. We have sent very good technicians there from the Small Arms factory at Kanpur, because there they are to manufacture sophisticated small arms. The buildings have come up, hostels are ready, workers have been properly trained, but unfortunately, there is no work, no production, today. I say every paisa should be utilised, every man-hour should be used and work

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should proceed as planned, specially when we have trouble from both sides, Pakistan and China.

SHRIMATI ILA PALCHOUDHURI (Krishnagar) : What about trouble in the ordnance factories ?

SHRI S. M. BANERJEE : There is no trouble there.

I congratulate the Defence Minister on the performance of the Avadi tank factory in a very efficient manner. Some people may criticise our tank. I have seen the ordnance factory. Although we should do more and produce more, I must say that we have done a nice work there.

Then there should be proper co-ordination between the DGOF, DME and DOS. We should also convert the army workshops, base repair workshops into manufacturing units. They are not meant only for repairs and they should not be doing the repair work only indefinitely. There should be co-ordination between these organisations to ensure the maximum output by conversion of these repair workshops into production units.

I am happy that HAL has turned out 1000 aircraft. They are doing very well in Bangalore. But what about the Kanpur plant ? I am sorry to say that the Avro 748 was a scandal. Now they are giving some Avros to IAC. Previously the Government of Indonesia wanted it. But we could not manufacture it. Ultimately, when we manufactured, it weighed 10,000 lbs. more. Does it put on flesh more than that planned in the specification ? This requires a thorough probe.

I would also request the Minister to see that the service conditions are also changed. There is trouble there. 24 boys are sacked. Whatever orders apply to the Defence Ministry should automatically be applied to them. This is necessary to avoid any conflict with the working class.

Coming to industrial relationship, generally it has been good. But when

I came to know about the brutal Cossipore firing, I could not believe it. Why should our defence officers behave in this fashion ? We have an industrial council ; we discuss things there. We make every effort to preserve amicable relationship.

For every matter we go to the Secretary, Joint Secretary and even to the Defence Minister and the Minister of Defence Production. So I was shocked that this brutal firing was resorted to by the DSC under instructions from some officers of the factory, not army officers. This was highly irregular. Now that he has ordered an inquiry, I hope the truth will come out.

The rule regarding these people being on active service cannot be quoted in support of the firing. He quoted that rule which was there in 1962 after the Chinese aggression.

“In exercise of the powers conferred by section (9) of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), the Central Government hereby declares that all persons subject to that Act, who are not on active service under clause (i) of section 3 thereof, shall, wherever they may be serving, be deemed to be on active service within the meaning of that Act for the purpose of the said Act and of any other law for the time being in force”.

After the withdrawal of the Emergency those orders were changed. I request the hon. Minister to lay on the Table of the House those instructions which were issued subsequently after the withdrawal of the Emergency. Those three sepoys should be handed over so that justice can be meted out to them in a court of law. I must congratulate the people's Government of West Bengal for showing before the entire country that an officer, even if he is class I, who gets the other employees shot, will also be handcuffed and brought in the street as any other criminal. This will avoid further clashes. In the same factory the General Secretary of the Union was dismissed under the President's Powers. Extraordinary steps had been taken. I

request the hon. Minister to see that he is reinstated. I also request him to see whether the orders issued by the Home Ministry had been implemented or not. Till today several men of the Cordite factory at Aravankadu, the small arms factory Kanpur, the H & S factory Kanpur, the Ishapur Rifles Factory, the Dehradun and Cossipore Factories and the units of MES and COD in Delhi have not been reemployed. The P & T have taken practically all their employees back. We do not know what has happened to the Defence Ministry. The employees went on strike because of the call given by the J.C.A. They followed their Federation. The Defence employees acted under the leadership of the All India Defence Employees Federation and my respected friend Mr. Joshi is its Vice-President and we fight only in self-defence. We say that these employees should be taken back as early as possible. Let there be no bitterness left; let there be no Cossipore incidents. Even the incidents arose because people were not taken back and they were agitated; that was one of the main reasons.

Shri Shukla gave two assurances in the House. It is really a sad commentary that he had to yield before the executive, the bureau ultimately and has to come and make a statement in the House. I am happy that the Speaker has kindly referred the matter to the Assurances Committee and I hope the Committee will go into the matter carefully.

I am happy that the hon. Defence Minister had not withdrawn the recognition from the unions but show-cause notices have been issued to them. If there is no J. C. M. and no permanent negotiating machinery before us what shall we do? Does he think that people should function as underground Nagas have done and create trouble so that he can call them all and say: come on Chief Kughato, or whatever name it is. I and Mr. Joshi do not behave as Naga hostiles. We want to talk with them. He talks to me as Mr. Banerjee Member of Parliament. But who made me a Member of Parliament? It is those

defence employees. I was dismissed from service in 1956. Within one year they elected me as a Member of Lok Sabha; they did it thrice. Am I to forget those people?

About apprentices I have to say that there are thousands of apprentices and they are all loitering in the street. Those young boys who have come from the industrial and the technical institutes should be suitably graded according to their qualifications. That has not been done.

Then, the merger of dearness allowance is there. It has affected many of them. Many of the employees in the Defence Department have been adversely affected. I would request the hon. Minister to take up this matter with the Ministry of Finance.

Coming to the Emergency Commissioned Officers, let me say this. These people fought the Pakistan battle. They fought against Pakistan, but they are rotting on the streets today. Ambition was raised in their hearts but what is their position now? I request the Minister to see that all of them are reinstated.

Then, about the assurances given to the INA personnel, I may just read out the letter written to me by the General Secretary of the Azad Hind Fauj Association, Delhi—Capt. L. C. Talwar—in which he says:

“I am sending herewith a copy of the statement released in a Press Conference on the 26th March, 1969, on the issue of storation of forfeited pay and allowanrees due to the INA personnel which care long outstanding.

Although assurance was given by the Defence Minister in the Parliament in 1967, yet the Government has not fully implemented its commitment. The Government is offering only fractional amount and that too partly in cash and partly in the shape of 10 years National Savings Certificates, which many of the INA personnel have refused to accept.”

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This is shameful. I would request the Government to see, if they have any respect for Netaji, if they have any respect to his sacred memory, to that great soul at least they implement these assurances.

During the emergency, some colleges were taken over in Assam by the Defence Ministry. Some Principals were taken in and the Cotton College especially was taken over. Some houses were acquired in Assam, but the people do not get even the rent for them. This should not be done.

Lastly, I would request the hon. Minister to see that the defence employees as such should be given the benefit of these councils; let the entire machinery be revived. Let the JCM be revived; let the negotiating machinery be revived. If that is not done, it will become difficult for him. These employees support the Defence Minister in all these matters, but whenever there is firing and lathi charge, if such things continue, we shall fight without the least consideration that we are serving in these departments, and whenever we fight we shall fight in self-defence and not with a view to tarnishing the face of the entire country or the defence forces.

With these words, I give my conditional support for the Demands, conditional in the sense that after the Cossipore incident, I wanted the Defence Minister to resign, but it has not been done. I request him to go to Calcutta and see the conditions now in Cossipore. I request him to have talks with the Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister of West Bengal and know how firing took place. Let him go there at least now. I request him kindly to see that the reinstatement order is issued at the earliest. That is my submission.

प्रतिरक्षा मंत्रालय में राज्य मंत्री (श्री ल० ना० मिश्र) : उपाध्यक्ष जी, कुछ साथियों ने हमसे कहा कि रक्षा मंत्रालय में हिन्दी की अवहेलना होती है, आपको हिन्दी में बोलना चाहिए। इसलिए मैं हिन्दी में ही बोलना चाहूँगा।

मुख्य विषय जिसकी यहां पर चर्चा हुई है, उसका उत्तर तो रक्षा मंत्री जी देंगे— मैं तो दो-चार बातों की ही चर्चा करना चाहता हूँ। जैसे कि ग्राइनेन्स फैक्ट्रीज, डिफेन्स प्रोडक्शन, पब्लिक सेक्टर ग्रैंड-टेकिंग, डिफेन्स स्पलाईज तथा इंडस्ट्रियल रिलेशन्स। इन्हीं तीन चार बातों के ऊपर मैं कुछ कहना चाहूँगा।

जहां तक डिफेन्स प्रोडक्शन का सवाल है, रक्षा उत्पादन का सवाल है, मुझे कहते हुए खुशी होती है कि इस साल जो उत्पादन हुआ है वह पिछले साल से ज्यादा हुआ है बहुत सी चीजों में, लेकिन कुछ चीजों में हम पीछे भी रहे हैं। उनके कारण मैं बाद में बतलाऊंगा। लेकिन कुल मिलाकर पारसाल के मुकाबले में हमारा प्रोडक्शन बढ़ा है। हमने नयी-नयी चीजें भी बनाई हैं। ग्राइनेन्स फैक्ट्रीज में पहले नेवी और एयर फोर्स की चीजें नहीं बनती थीं लेकिन हम लोगों ने उनको भी बनाना शुरू किया है और बनाया भी है। आप जानते होंगे कि ग्राइनेन्स फैक्ट्री में जो मान्डटेन-गन बनाई गई है वह कितनी अच्छी है—वह मिनटों में खोली जा सकती है और काम में लाई जा सकती है। इसके अतिरिक्त वहां पर फील्ड गन भी बनाई गई है जिसको कि हाल में ही हम प्रोडक्शन में लाना चाहते हैं। एक बहुत पावरफुल, मजबूत और काम की वह तोप बनने जा रही है। इसी तरह से ग्राइनेन्स फैक्ट्रीज के काम का जहां तक सवाल है, उसका विस्तार हुआ है, नये-नये कारखाने लगे हैं और मोडर्नाइजेशन भी हुआ है और नये ढंग से बनाये गये। लेकिन जैसा माननीय बनर्जी तथा अन्य सदस्यों ने भी कहा, मैं मानता हूँ कि ग्राइनेन्स फैक्ट्रीज, डी० जी० प्रो० एफ० आर्गनाइजेशन बहुत बढ़ा हो गया है और एक आदमी के सिर पर 29, 30 कारखानों का भार रहता है जिस से वह काम के साथ पूरा न्याय करना भी चाहे तो भी नहीं कर सकता है।

इसलिये हम डी० जी० ओ० एफ० आर्गो-नाइजेशन को रीआर्गोनाइज करने की सोच रहे हैं। अब यह काम रीजनल बेसिस पर हो या फंक्शनल बेसिस पर हो इस बारे में अभी कोई अन्तिम निर्णय नहीं ले सके हैं इसलिए मैं अभी इस बारे में कुछ भी निश्चित कहने की स्थिति में नहीं हूँ।

श्री० स० मो० बनर्जी : डिफेंस प्रोडक्शन बोर्ड बनायेंगे ?

श्री० ल० ना० मिश्र : जी नहीं। उस को रीआर्गोनाइज हम करना चाहते हैं। मेरी राय में रीजनल बेसिस पर अच्छा हो सकता है, पूना में, कानपुर, जबलपुर और कलकत्ता में हो। कलकत्ता पर से भी भार उतारना चाहते हैं। माननीय सदस्य को इस बारे में एतराज है कि जनरल स्टोर की चीजें उठाकर कानपुर में लायें। आर्गोनाइजेशन के लोगों को कलकत्ता से कानपुर लायेंगे। चूंकि कलकत्ता पर बहुत भार है इसलिये वहां काम ठीक नहीं हो सकता इसलिये कानपुर में लायेंगे जिससे डीसेन्ट्रलाइजेशन हो डी० जी० ओ० एफ० का। इस तमाम डीसेन्ट्रलाइजेशन के पीछे एक ही भावना है कि काम ठीक से चले। इसलिये मैं माननीय सदस्य एस० एम० बनर्जी की मदद चाहूंगा इस चीज में हमारा साथ दें जब हम री-आर्गोनाइजेशन करना चाहें डी० जी० ओ० एफ० का। यह काम आशा है दो, तीन महीने के अन्दर कर डालेंगे ताकि आर्डिनेंस फ़ैक्ट्रीज ठीक से चलें।

अब मैं थोड़ा सा पब्लिक अन्डर टेकिंग्स के बारे में कुछ कहना चाहता हूँ। माननीय तपूरिया जी ने एच० ए० एल० की भर्त्सना की और कहा कि काम ठीक नहीं हो रहा है। मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि उस का काम बहुत उत्तम रहा है। इस साल में जितने इन्होंने टार्गेट फिक्स किये थे, वे सभी लक्ष्य एच० ए० एल० बंगलौर ने पूरे किये हैं, सिर्फ एक

आध जहाज को छोड़ कर के। पारसाल मैंने कहा था कि एच० ए० एल० से मुझे संतोष नहीं है। लेकिन आज हालत यह है कि उस को स्ट्रीम-लाइन किया गया है, उसका पुनर्संगठन किया है। एक बनाया है मिग डिवीजन, एक कानपुर में एवरो का और तीसरा बंगलौर का। तीनों में अलग अलग मैनेजिंग डायरेक्टर दे कर, कानपुर में मैनेजर दे कर बोर्ड को स्ट्रीमलाइन किया है, डीसेन्ट्रलाइज किया है ताकि जो लोकल अफसर हों उनमें काम करने का इन्सेन्टिव हो। इस के अलावा एच० ए० एल० ने और प्रगति की है। जैसा माननीय बनर्जी साहब ने कहा हजारवां जहाज माननीय रक्षा मंत्री जी ने उड़ाया। इस के अलावा ऐक्सेसरीज, स्पेयर पार्ट्स आदि की हालत आज पहले से बहुत अच्छी है। मैं आप की अनुमति से श्री पी० सी० लाल, जो चेयरमैन हैं और जो एयर चीफ होकर आ रहे हैं उन को भी धन्यवाद देता हूँ चूंकि उन्होंने हिन्दुस्तान एरोनाटिक्स में क्रान्तिकारी परिवर्तन लाया है। कहा गया है कि एच० एफ० 24 बनाया कि नहीं, हमने जितने कहे उतने बनाये कि नहीं, जितने मिग बनाने थे उतने बनाये कि नहीं, इस बारे में मैं इतना ही कह सकता हूँ कि हम लक्ष्य से कम सिर्फ एक मिग 31 मार्च तक नहीं बना सके। लेकिन पहली या दूसरी अप्रैल को जो अन्तिम लक्ष्य था उसको भी पूरा कर दिया है। इस के लिये हम को कर्मचारियों को बधाई देनी चाहिये, आलोचना नहीं करनी चाहिये। जो अधिकारी और मजदूर इन कारखानों में काम करते हैं उनकी हमें हिम्मत बढ़ानी चाहिये।

दूसरी बात पब्लिक सैक्टर अन्डरटेकिंग में भारत इलैक्ट्रॉनिक लिमिटेड की आती है। इस साल उन की प्रगति अच्छी हुई है। वह नये ढंग से राडार बना रहे हैं, ट्रांस रिसेविंग सैट्स बना रहे हैं, और भी भिन्न भिन्न प्रकार के राडार बनाना चाहते हैं ताकि

[श्री ल० ना मिश्र]

राडार के मामले में हम स्वतंत्र हो सकें।

स्वतंत्र पार्टी के सदस्य कह रहे थे कि पब्लिक सैक्टर ग्रन्डर टेकिंग्स में हम घाटा उठाते हैं। मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि ज़रा आप रिपोर्ट को देखें। सात हमारी पब्लिक सैक्टर ग्रन्डरटेकिंग्स हैं। छः में मुनाफा हो रहा है, और किसी साल 43 परसेंट, किसी साल 40 परसेंट, इस साल 39 परसेंट एक्सपेंशन हुआ है। इसलिये हरगिज घाटा नहीं है और किसी भी प्राइवेट फ़ैक्ट्री से आप मुकाबला कर लीजिये। आप देखिये कि किस तरह से चीजें होती हैं। इतना राज होते हुए भी स्वतंत्र दल के लोग कह डालते हैं कि घाटा हो रहा है, अच्छी चीज भी उनको बुरी नजर जाती है।

प्रागा टूल है, जो दूसरे का बच्चा हमने लिया यह जितना अच्छा होना चाहिये था उतना नहीं हो सका, यह ठीक है कि यह पुरानी बीमारी है और उस में जितनी प्रगति होनी चाहिए उतनी प्रगति नहीं हुई।

अब आप मझगांव डाक्स लिमिटेड को लीजिए। मझगांव डाक्स पब्लिक सैक्टर ग्रन्डरटेकिंग है। हमने एक फ़िगेट बनाया है और इस तरह के तीन फ़िगेट बना रहे हैं। जो हमने फ़िगेट बनाया है उसमें सवा करोड़ रुपये के हमने देशी पुर्जे लगाए हैं। दूसरा फ़िगेट जो हम बनाने जा रहे हैं उसमें देशी सामान की लागत लगभग 5 करोड़ रुपये की होगी। इसके अलावा मझगांव डाक्स में समुद्र में जाने वाले जो जहाज हैं जोकि अंडमान की तरफ जाते हैं, उसके भी आर्डर मिले हैं। ऐसा एक जहाज हमने बना लिया है और एक और जहाज बनाने का आर्डर मिला है। शिपिंग कार्पोरेशन से भी हमको जहाज बनाने का आर्डर मिला है।

इसी तरह से गार्डन रीच वर्कशाप के नाम को भी अगर आप देखें तो उसमें कोई

घाटा नहीं है, कोई नुकसान नहीं है। गार्डन रीच का बड़ा भारी कम्पीटीशन प्राइवेट सैक्टर के साथ है। उस हालत में सी गार्डन रीच आगे बढ़ रहा है और वहाँ पर ट्रेजर बनाए जा रहे हैं और दूसरे सामान बनाए जाते हैं जो कि दूसरी दूसरी इंडस्ट्रीज में काम आते हैं। इस तरह से उसको वह सपोर्ट करता है। हमारी डिफेन्स इंडस्ट्री है गार्डन रीच की वह अच्छी हालत में है और मझगांव डाक्स की भी अच्छी हालत है।

गोम्रा शिपयार्ड अभी हाल में लिया है। उसकी अच्छी हालत उतनी दूर तक नहीं आई है क्योंकि अभी साल डेढ़ साल से उसको हमने लिया है। हम आशा करते हैं कि एक दो वर्ष में गोम्रा शिपयार्ड भी दूसरों के मामले में आ जाएगा। इसलिए जो आर्डनेन्स फ़ैक्ट्रीज है या पब्लिक ग्रन्डर-टेकिंग्स है, इम लोग पीछे नहीं रहे हैं।

एक बात और है जिसके विषय में चिन्ता होनी चाहिए और वह है रिसर्च और डेवलपमेंट की। रिसर्च और डेवलपमेंट पर यहां पर चर्चा हुई और रिसर्च और डेवलपमेंट के बारे में कुछ माननीय सदस्यों ने कहा कि अनुसंधान पर खर्च करना चाहिए, विकास पर खर्च करना चाहिए। हम लोग भी इसको जगह देते हैं और अनुसंधान और विकास के लिए हमने काफी धन दिया और इन 10 वर्षों की अवधि में आप जानते होंगे कि रक्षा मंत्रालय ने रिसर्च और डेवलपमेंट पर क्या काम किया है।

एक माननीय सदस्य : एटम बम पर भी अनुसंधान हुआ है ?

श्री ल० ना० मिश्र : एटम बम नहीं बनाया है। रिसर्च और डेवलपमेंट की रिपोर्ट आप पढ़ें। आपके नौजवान लोग हैं, पढ़ें लिखें लोग हैं, होशियार लोग हैं, उन्होंने कुछ चीजें बनाई हैं। उनको मैं पढ़ना

चाहता हूँ ताकि आपको तसल्ली हो। इन नीजवानों और अफसरों और साईटिस्टों ने कितना अच्छा काम किया है। 18, 20 चीजें बनाई हैं। मैं सुनाना चाहता हूँ। इसके बजट प्रोवीजन को आप देखें, इस साल 15 करोड़ रुपये हैं। पहले पांच करोड़ का था। तो वे चीजें हैं :

Mountain gun and its ammunition, semi-automatic rifle, anti-tank grenade, anti-tank mine, air burst anti-personnel mine, mine clearing device, a rocket for use by aircraft with high explosive war-head various types of escape aid and power jettisoning cartridge for the Air Force, signal cartridges and drill mines for the Navy, various types of propellants and explosives and a large number of instruments which are used in conjunction with weapons.

Our R. & D. Organisation has also developed propellant charges to meet the requirements of the Equatorial Rocket Launching Station at Thumba. In the field of electronics, the important examples are the field artillery radar and its simulator, a local warning radar system, an improved version of trans-receiver for field communication, a repeater field telephone, a channel doubling unit and so on.

इस तरह से 29, 30 चीजें ऐसी बनाई गई हैं। अगर वे लोग न होते तो बाहर पर हमें भरोसा करना पड़ता और इम्पोर्ट करने पर चीजें मिलती भी या नहीं, यह कहना भी कठिन है।

रिसर्च पर हमने पारसाल कहा था कि मिसाइल बनाने के लिए हम खोज कर रहे हैं और सदन को यह जानकर खुशी होगी कि इस बात में भी हम लोग आगे आ गये हैं और एक विदेशी कम्पनी के साथ हम समझौता कर रहे हैं और एक मिसाइल का कारखाना पब्लिक सैक्टर में खोलेंगे। एक फोरेन कम्पनी के साथ हम लाइसेन्स के आधार पर मिसाइल का कारखाना खोलना

चाहते हैं। यह रिसर्च की बात मैंने आपको बतलाई थी।

श्री एस० एम० बनर्जी : वह फोरेन कन्ट्री कौन सा है ?

श्री ल० ना० मिश्र : इसको छोड़ दीजिए।

श्री एस० एम० बनर्जी : अमरिका ? (व्यवधान)।

श्री ल० ना० मिश्र : इसको छोड़ दीजिये। मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि जब तक समझौता न हो जाए, तब तक यह पब्लिक इन्ट्रेसट में नहीं है कि उसका नाम यहाँ बताया जाए। समझौता होने दीजिए।

एक बात और है। डिफेन्स सप्लाइज की चर्चा श्री एस० एम० बनर्जी ने की और कहा कि प्राइवेट सैक्टर में यह काम न दें। इनके साथ में एकदम सहमत हूँ कि यह काम पब्लिक सैक्टर अन्डरटेकिंग में हो, चाहे वह डिफेन्स में हो या सिविल में। लेकिन हम कुछ आगे जाएँगे और जो चीजें हम आर्डनेंस फैक्ट्रीज या पब्लिक अन्डरटेकिंग्स में नहीं बना सकते हैं, उनको प्राइवेट सैक्टर से लेंगे। आज हालात ऐसे हो गए हैं कि सारी चीजें हम इन आर्डनेंस फैक्ट्रीज या पब्लिक सैक्टर अन्डरटेकिंग्स में नहीं बना सकते हैं।

18 hrs.

इसलिए हम चाहते हैं कि प्राइवेट सैक्टर से हम सिर्फ वही मदद लें जहाँ पर कि हम को इम्पोर्ट की जरूरत हो। इम्पोर्ट सब्सटीट्यूशन में हम प्राइवेट सैक्टर को सिर्फ उस हालत में लेना चाहते हैं जब कि आर्डनेंस फैक्ट्रीज वाले जो हमारे कारखाने हैं वह उसको नहीं बना सकें या तो उन की क्षमता नहीं होगी या उनकी शक्ति नहीं होगी तब ही हम प्राइवेट सैक्टर में जाना चाहेंगे। आप जानते हैं कि सन् 1962 में

[श्री ल० न० मिश्रा]

जब चीन की लड़ाई हुई और हमारी हालत खराब हुई उसके बाद वह डिपार्टमेंट उन्होंने लगाया। यह इस लिए लगाया गया कि इस की जरूरत समझी गई कि देश में जो शक्ति है, क्षमता है उस का लेखा जोखा होना चाहिये लड़ाई के वक्त में और जरूरत पड़े तो प्राइवेट सैक्टर या पब्लिक सैक्टर में उस सामान को बनवा सकें। यह बात सही है कि आर्डिनेंस फैक्टरीज या कुछ अपनी यूनिट की कौस्ट पर इसे नहीं देना चाहते हैं लेकिन हम उन्हें बनवाना चाहते हैं मैं कहना चाहता हूँ कि जहां भी इस देश के इंडस्ट्रियलिस्ट्स हमारी मदद कर सकें इस चीज में मैं उनका स्वागत करता हूँ। उन को मदद करूंगा इस चीज में अगर वह हमारा काम कर दें। उन को मैं एकोनामिक आर्डर्स दूंगा। रिपीट आर्डर्स दूंगा। हम चाहते हैं कि इस देश में 20-25 घर बन जायें इंडस्ट्रियल हाउसिंग बन जायें जो कि हमारे डिफेंस में मदद करें। उन पर हमारा क्वालिटी कंट्रोल रहेगा। उन को हम आगे आने देना चाहते हैं उन्हें रुकावट नहीं होगी। हम अपनी क्षमता को जानते हैं और अपनी आर्डिनेंस फैक्टरीज में जिस चीज को हम नहीं बना सकते हैं उस चीज को हम प्राइवेट सैक्टर में बनाने के लिए देंगे। आज क्या होता है? अगर प्राइवेट सैक्टर में उसे नहीं देंगे तो वह चीज योरोप से खरीदनी होगी। अब जापान, युगोस्लाविया आदि देशों में हमें एक चीज जिसकी कि जरूरत होती है तीन, चार लाख की हर साल हम बाहर से मंगवाते हैं और जाहिर है कि अगर हम उसे इस देश में बना सकें या बनवा सकें तो यह देश के लिए अच्छा होगा और उस से विदेशी मुद्रा की भी बचत होगी और उतनी ही दूर तक हम अपनी डिफेंस सप्लाइज को बढ़ावा देना चाहते हैं। जहां पहले डिफेंस 5-6 करोड़ के आर्डर्स प्लेस करता था यहां उस ने 14-15 करोड़ के

आर्डर्स प्लेस किए हैं इस शर्त पर कि वह हमारे साथ कम्पीट नहीं करेंगे। हमारे साथ उनकी कोई प्रतियोगिता नहीं होगी। जो चीज हम नहीं बना सकें, जिस चीज को हम इम्पोर्ट करते हैं, प्योरली इम्पोर्ट सन्सटी-ट्यूशन के नाम पर हम डिफेंस सप्लाय को बढ़ावा देना चाहते हैं।

अन्त में मैं बनर्जी साहब ने जो वहां पर काम करने वाले मजदूरों की हालत की चर्चा की उस पर आना चाहता हूँ। मजदूरों के साथ हमारी हमदर्दी है मैं जानता हूँ कि जो मजदूर वहां पर काम करते हैं आज वह परेशान हैं और उनकी तकलीफें हैं। यह ठीक है कि मजदूरों की हालत में सुधार होना चाहिये। लेकिन मैं बनर्जी साहब से कहना चाहूंगा कि उन्होंने वेज रिपोर्ट देखी होगी और जो उस वेज रिपोर्ट ने सिफारिश की है उससे हम ज्यादा वेज अपने कुछ मजदूरों को दे रहे हैं। जो एच ए एल है या मैजागोन डीक है और वह जो आर्डिनेंस फैक्टरीज हैं उन में वेज बोर्ड ने जो सिफारिस की है उस से हम उन में अपने मजदूरों को ज्यादा वेजेज देते हैं। कहीं कहीं तो हम 50 परसेंट से ज्यादा देते हैं। लेकिन उस मजदूरी से भी मुझे संतोष नहीं है और मैं उनकी मजदूरी अगर हो सके तो और भी बढ़ाना चाहता हूँ। मैं श्री बनर्जी से आग्रह करूंगा कि वह वहां पर शान्ति बनाये रखने में मेरी मदद करें। एक शान्ति-मय ढंग से मजदूरों के साथ हमारा व्यवहार हो और शान्ति से वहां के काम को चलाया जाय तो ठीक होगा।

काशीपुर में जो कुछ हुआ उस से हम सब को तकलीफ पहुंची है लेकिन वह चीज फिर नहीं होने देनी चाहिए, ऐसी घटनाओं को रोकिये। इंडस्ट्रियल रिलेशंस अगर हम ठीक तरीके से बनाये रखेंगे तो हमारा सब काम ठीक से चलेगा और कोई शिकायत नहीं होगी। मैं तो बनर्जी साहब, श्री मेलकोटे और जोशी साहब से कहूंगा कि हम जो चीजों

को इंट्रोड्यूस करना चाहते हैं, एक तो हम पेपमेंट और आउटपुट वेसिस करना चाहते हैं। आप जानते होंगे कि जितने भी प्रगतिशील देश हैं, रूस हो यूगोस्लाविया हो, सब जगह एक मिनिमम वेज फिक्स हो जाती है उस के बाद आउटपुट पर पेमेंट होता है। वही चीज हम करना चाहते हैं।

दूसरी बात मैं यह निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ और हमारी यह गवर्नमेंट की पालिसी है, योजना है कि हम वर्कर्स पार्टिसिपेशन इन मैनेजमेंट को लाना चाहते हैं और उस में हम आपका साथ चाहते हैं। आप एक कंस्ट्रक्टिव ढंग से उस में हमारी मदद कीजिये ताकि वर्कर्स उस में हिस्सेदार बन सकें और अभी उन में और मैनेजमेंट में जो वसीय दायरा है उस को हम कम कर सकें।

मैं और ज्यादा न कह कर सिर्फ इतना ही कहना चाहता हूँ कि यह दो, तीन साल हमारे पीरियड आफ स्टैब्लाइजेशन होने वाले हैं। इस में हम अपने को एक्सपैंड करना चाहते हैं, अपनी क्षमता को बढ़ाना चाहते हैं जो क्षमता हमारे पास है जो कंपैसिटी हमारे पास है उस से हम पूरा फायदा भी उठाना चाहते हैं। और नये नये हथियार हम बनाते जा रहे हैं। ट्रेडिशनल हथियार हम बना चुके हैं। हम उसमें सेल्फ-सल्फिशेंट हो चुके, अब बाकी चीजों में हम सेल्फ-रिलायंट होना चाहते हैं। अब सौफिस्टिकेटेड वेपन्स बनाना चाहते हैं, आधुनिकतम हथियार बनाना चाहते हैं। इसमें हमको दो तीन साल लगेगे। हम परम्परागत हथियारों को ज्यादा एक्सपैशन न करें, लेकिन हम जितना काम पूरा कर चुके हैं, जितने हथियार बना चुके हैं, कम

से कम उन से पूरा काम लें, यह हमारी कोशिश है।

श्री अ० सि० सहगल (बिलासपुर) : सबमैरीन्स के मामले में कितना काम हुआ है, क्या इसका कोई लेखा जोखा है ?

श्री ल० ना० मिश्र : वह कल बतला दिया जायेगा।

SHRI S. M. BANERJEE : I wanted to know one thing. We said something about the employees who have lost their employment in 1968 strike.

उन के लिये क्या किया है ?

The letter that has gone from the Ministry is to be implemented.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : He has intervened. I am sure all the other points that are left out will be dealt with by the Defence Minister.

श्री जार्ज फरनेन्डीज : मंत्री महोदय ने लेबर पार्टिसिपेशन इन मैनेजमेंट का जिक्र किया। इस पर दस-बारह वर्षों से बहस चल ही है। क्या आपके पास कोई योजना है इस पर अमल करने के लिये ? आप कहते हैं, कि यह करना चाहते हैं, वह करना चाहते हैं।

श्री ल० ना० मिश्र : हम इसको अब लाना चाहते हैं। 10-12 वर्षों से बहस नहीं चल रही है, और पहले से चल रही है।

श्री जार्ज फरनेन्डीज : सन् 1958 से चल रही है।

श्री ल० ना० मिश्र : फर्स्ट फाइव इअर प्लान से चल रही है। लेबर वालिसी में ही लेबर-पार्टिसिपेशन की बात थी। अभी तक ऐसा नहीं किया जा सका, लेकिन अब हम करना चाहते हैं।

श्री जार्ज फरनेन्डीज : सन् 1952 से चल रही है...

SHRI S. M. BANERJEE : Does he want that destruction should take place ? That is not a problem.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Mr. Banerjee, I am surprised to hear this. He has yielded when I called him in order to meet some of the points that were raised by hon. members. Some of them—at least a major portion of the points—he has dealt with. As you know, a comprehensive reply will be given by the hon. Defence Minister tomorrow. You may not be here. Whatever points were raised have been practically covered in the reply given by the hon. Minister. So, no more questions please.

श्री बाजं करनेन्डीब : अगर बाद में पूछा जायेगा तब आप ही कह देंगे कि जब चर्चा हो तब पूछिये। काशीपुर वाला मामला भी इसी कारण हो गया।

श्री एस०एम० जोशी (पूना) : रिप्लाई आने के पहले ही हम सूचित करना चाहते हैं कि मंत्री महोदय ने इसके बारे में आश्वासन भी दिलाया था, जहाँ तक मेरी जानकारी है ऐश्वोरेस कमेटी में यह आश्वासन अब डिफेन्स मिनिस्ट्री उस को पूरा करेगी या नहीं ?

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : It will be done. Now, Mr. Inder J. Malhotra.

SHRI INDER J. MALHOTRA (Jammu) : Mr Deputy-Speaker, Sir, up till now in the Defence debates many hon. friends have brought in various technical aspects—the re-organisation of the Armed Forces and some other general suggestions for their better deployment.

There have also been some suggestions regarding the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In that respect, I would only like to comment that I am not aware whether our country has got sufficient resources to manufacture in large quantities the nuclear weapons and in good quality as also their proper utilisation. I would request the hon. Defence Minister to say whether all these things are these or not. He should clarify these

in order to remove this misunderstanding which is being created in this country as to why, in spite of the fact that our country has got all the resources at its disposal for manufacture of nuclear weapons, they are not doing any thing. I would request him to clarify all these things.

18.10 hrs.

[**SHRI GADILINGANA GOOD** in the Chair]

I would now come to the aspect of general defence policy or defence preparedness of the country, about which very little has been said today. I would start from the report which the Ministry has presented this year, where the very first sentence says:

“India’s defence policy is principally directed towards safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

There can never be two opinions about this, not only in this country but in any other country also. What I am concerned most is, whether it was a confrontation with the Chinese or a confrontation with Pakistan in 1965, after the Tashkent Agreement, how our foreign policy and defence policy have been implemented to the best advantage of this country. This is my concern.

In this very report, the Defence Minister admits that there has been a complete failure in the implementation of the Tashkent Agreement because Pakistan never made any efforts to implement it sincerely and honestly. Sardar Swaran Singh has been associated not only with this Tashkent Agreement but also with the other negotiations regarding the problems which are existing between India and Pakistan. He has, therefore, got the full background. I would very much like him, when he gives the reply, to say categorically where and when Pakistan did not implement the Tashkent Agreement and if this going to be the attitude of Pakistan, what is going to be our policy in the future as far as Tashkent Agreement is concerned.

In my opinion, under those circumstances, probably we acted in a big haste. We relied too much on the role which the Soviet Union could play after the agreement was signed in getting it implemented. But, unfortunately, the role and the attitude of the Soviet Union changed absolutely after this Tashkent Agreement. It was not proper at all on the part of the Soviet Union, which played a very significant role in bringing India and Pakistan together to the negotiation table and in having this Tashkent Agreement, to come out and give arms aid to Pakistan.

What is the situation today? After 1965, Pakistan has increased its armed strength and Pakistan has been going all around the world to buy arms from and part of the world, wherever they can get. In the past, Pakistan was getting arms from western nations and from China. Now, the Soviet Union has also come forward to give arms aid to Pakistan.

It is a well known fact—and I am sure the hon. Minister knows more than what I know—that, after the 1965 aggression by Pakistan, Pakistan has never rested for a day. It is in my knowledge that, in the Sialkot Sector, a canal has been built just like the Ichhogil Canal in the Amritsar Sector; pillboxes have been built in the Sialkot Sector also. I do not know how far you can rely upon the statement now made by the new President of Pakistan, Gen. Yahya Khan, that he wants to have a peaceful settlement with India of all the existing problems. Whenever any Pakistani leader speaks about the problems existing between India and Pakistan, the number one problem in their mind is always Jammu & Kashmir. With a heavy heart I have to point out that, during the last 20 years, unfortunately the foreign policy and the defence policy of the Government of India has not been positively helpful in consolidating the Jammu and Kashmir State and in solving that problem with Pakistan. I would like to ask a very straightforward question. When you say that our defence policy is only to defend our borders, have you defined our borders? Where are our borders? Do you mean

to tell me that the Aksai-Chin area or the area which is now being occupied by China is not an Indian border? Or the area now occupied by Pakistan, part of Jammu and Kashmir State, is it not the Indian border? If by Indian border you mean the present ceasefire line existing between India and Pakistan and the present ceasefire line existing between India and China, then you come out boldly and make a goodwill gesture to Pakistan. You say, 'Let us sit at the negotiating table. We are prepared to solve this problem at the present ceasefire line'. Why do not you say that if you have got this in mind?

We, the people of Jammu & Kashmir State have suffered and have made sacrifices for the last 20 years. Not only the people of Jammu and Kashmir State but the people of India want to know 'Today what is your categorical policy towards Pakistan and what is your categorical policy towards China?' If as we always say, we also want a peaceful solution of the existing problems between India and Pakistan and there is an offer from the new President of Pakistan, then invite him, sit on a table and decide whatever your policy is. If your policy is otherwise, if you still claim as this Government has been claiming for the last 20 years that every inch of the area occupied by Pakistan is Indian territory and we will get it back some day and every inch of the area occupied by China is Indian territory and we will get it back some day, when will this some day come? That is what the people of this country want to ask this Government to-day.

I will be failing in my duty if I do not pay my tributes to the Jawans and Officers who have been defending this country in very difficult conditions starting from Ladakh to Nagaland. I am happy to point out that as far as the relations between the people living at the border in Jammu and Kashmir State and the Army officers and army jawans are concerned, they are excellent. They are exemplary. There are so many examples. As the Kashmir border villages where the civil authorities, the State Government, have failed to provide proper medical facilities or special facilities to the

[Shri Inder J. Malhotra]

people who are living right on the border, Army officers and jawans have always come forward to help them and provide them not only medical facilities but other facilities also. Whenever people have suffered during the floods, the army has come forward for helping the people. If there had been some difficulty in getting food rations right on the border, to my knowledge, not only once but so many times the Army officers and Jawans have come forward to give rations to these people from their own rations. This is a very happy situation which is prevailing at our borders because unless this kind of atmosphere prevails on the border, it becomes very difficult not only for the Army to function and to defend our borders properly. (Interruption) I quite agree with Mr Panigrahi that this kind of atmosphere should not only continue but there should be improvement in this.

Now another problem towards which I would like to draw the attention of the hon. Defence Minister. The people of Chamb and Jaurian area suffered the heaviest losses during the 1965 conflict They were put in the refugee camps. Afterwards they were given financial help and other help and they were asked to resettle in that very area. They have got certain problems. By and large the people's morale is very high. Each and every family has gone back to that area to settle there. I would only like to point out to the Defence Minister that we are satisfied about the defence arrangements in that area. I would still like to impress upon him that efforts should be made to tighten our security because even to-day cases of cattle lifting and border incidents are there. If such instances continue to frequently naturally the people's morale goes down. I would say therefore that more attention should be given to such areas where the people were fighting with the Pakistanis during the 1965 struggle and where now the people have been asked to go back and settle.

In Rajouri-Poonch sector the compensation cases are pending for the last 7 or 10 years and I would draw attention to this particular aspect and I would like to recall that the hon. Minister himself visited this area before and certain

representations were made before him that compensation in such cases should be expeditiously decided.

There is another problem also to which I wish to refer to. This is the problem of interrogation centres. It is true, people from both sides of the border cross the border and they go across to the Pakistani-occupied territory; then again they come back to Rajouri area. From the security point of view every individual who crosses the border must be properly interrogated after he comes back. If he is undesirable and he is unauthorised and he is entering our territory he should be sent back. The interrogating centres should not become centres of vindictiveness. If there is some local dispute between two parties they go either to the army authorities or to the Intelligence people and that man is hauled up that Intelligence people and that man is hauled up for that interrogation. What I suggest is, the senior officers should be instructed to see about the working of these interrogation centres, so that these centres should not become centres of harassment to the people.

Now, I would plead with the hon. Minister for giving better emoluments as far as our lower ranks and jawans are concerned. I can appreciate and I quite agree that some senior officers are posted at the borders and when they are in such active areas, certainly orderlies or other assistants must be provided for them. But I certainly fail to understand why when an officer is posted to Delhi in the Army Headquarters, even after 20 years of independence, our jawans are attached with these officers as orderlies. They are forced to do such jobs as cooking, the children to the school, taking the children for play etc. This kind of practice should stop. The officers are in a position to engage their own private servants. They should not therefore be given these jawans to work as orderlies.

With these words I support the Demands.

SHRI DATTATRAYA KUNTE (Kolaba) : We are discussing the defence needs of our country. Our Defence Mini-

ster has time and again told us of our preparedness to meet any aggression at any time. If one looks at our eastern borders, the position is this. I am not talking of the mainland now. But if we look into the position which we face in the 240 islands in the Andaman/Nicobar islands, it will be seen that what he has stated will be completely a myth. There are not even ordinary roads there; there are no means of communication, no means of transport, from one island to another. Not only that. Till recently, the local government had to depend on a private contractor who has been making a lot of money out of private trade at the cost of the local people. As I said, there are no roads and no ports.

We must remember that Great Nicobar, the southernmost island of the group of islands is only 85-100 miles from Sumatra as against a distance of 800 miles from that island to either Calcutta or Madras. What are the arrangements made there for protection in case there is any attack ?

In the short time, the Japanese had occupied those islands, they made better arrangements than we have been able to make during the last 20 years of occupation of these islands. We must be really thankful that the British allowed us to have these islands because they were not part of the old India, but had been occupied by the British.

In these circumstances, when one hears talk of our preparedness and sees conditions as they exist in these islands, one would really come to the conclusion that either Defence Minister does not know what is the lie of our defence or he is living in a paradise different from our ordinary people.

Again in these eastern waters, we have to find out whether we have sufficient naval strength or not. We are being told that something is being done in the Nantori islands in the near future. What that 'near future' is has not yet been defined. Though there is a very good natural harbour there which is large enough to accommodate not only our navy but

the whole of the British Navy, we are not doing anything there.

There is another thing. We have trouble on our northern border. We have the Border Roads Organisation. What is it doing ? They give us good reports, big reports, saying that this is being done and that is being done. But what did we find ? When the great floods came on the Teesta in October, till January the Bailey bridge was not constructed. Putting up the bridge is a matter of 48 hours. It only means that the material could not be transported for a period of three months from the bases to the place where it was to be constructed.

Then in this organisation, the boys who work in it do not get woollen clothing. The food they get is mainly vegetarian and the pay they get is very paltry. Do you want these boys to work at high altitudes, 10,000, 12,000 and 14,000 ft. in biting cold when the temperature even during daytime in some places is minus 3 degrees, under such conditions. They are working there, not doubt. But what do you expect from them if you do not feed them and look after them properly ?

Then there is considerable machinery with this organisation which is in great disarray. First of all, there are only two bases where repairs can take place, one at Tezpur and the other at Pathankot. A large amount of machinery is lying idle, unutilised. Many of them are cannibalised and therefore not available for use at all.

On top of this, after crores of rupees have been invested, they do not have even an inventory of all this machinery. If this is the state of our Boarder Roads Organisation, how could one claim seriously that we are prepared for any eventuality ?

There is another thing. In these border areas, we have stationed our army units and are asking our jawans and officers to be away from their families. But we are never trying to make any attempts to integrate ourselves with these border roads areas and those people there.