

(ii) No. 12/154/56-MT/Home dated the 27th March, 1958.

(iii) No. F. 12/37/57-MT/Home dated the 3rd April, 1958.

(iv) No. 12/25/52-MT/Home (1) dated 3rd April, 1958.

(v) No. 12/41/58-MT/Home dated the 3rd April, 1958.

[Placed in Library. See No. LT-837/58.]

12.23 hrs.

COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT

Sardar A. S. Saigal (Janjgir): Sir I beg to present the Twenty-fourth Report of the Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions.

12.23½ hrs.

MOTION RE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION—contd

Mr. Speaker: The House will now resume further consideration of the following motion moved by the hon. Prime Minister:

"That the present International Situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, Sir, I listened with care and due respect to the speeches made yesterday by various hon. Members of this House, more particularly to the eloquent speech full of feeling which my hon. friend, Acharya Kripalani made. Much was said yesterday and sometimes what was said appeared to be or might even have been intended to be in criticism of Government's policy. But excepting two hon. Members I think it is worth nothing that in spite

of odd criticisms of emphasis or of some particular minor aspect, the whole burden of the speeches yesterday was essentially acceptance of the policy of the Government. Two hon. Members who, I regret to say, have not yet been convinced of this policy from their various points of view are the hon. Raja Mahendra Pratap and Shri Brajeshwar Prasad. Perhaps, if I may respectfully suggest to them to confer together and try to convince each other, both might agree.

Now, in dealing with these matters we consider each particular question in some isolation, although no question can be isolated from this context of world conditions. Nevertheless, we cannot always be considering the whole world. We have to consider a question to some extent isolated from the rest. We may consider, on the other hand, the broad world situation, the background of it, why it has arisen and in what direction it is going. Both are necessary, i.e., a perspective of the situation, seeing the roots which have given rise to the present situation and the direction in which it is going and then a more detailed view. Probably we are likely to err in not taking that perspective view—when I say 'we', I mean politicians generally, whether they are in Government or outside—because we are usually so full of the troubles of the moment that we do not or we have not the time really to think of the distant future. It is well, therefore, that some of us anyway take that perspective view and look upon these questions from the ivory tower of an academician like Acharya Kripalani. It is important that we should not forget that viewpoint and I for one welcome what Acharya Kripalani said although I do not agree with some of the things that he said. But I can very well understand the pain and torment through which he must go and through which any sensitive person must go when he looks round the world today and sees how high principles are proclaimed and not adhered to and how in the name of peace something the very reverse of peace is done.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

He criticised Panch Sheel, or rather he criticised the inception of it—the occasion for its inception—and how it had been broken in various parts of the world by those who said they adhered to it. It is perfectly true that the ideals of Panch Sheel have been broken and are likely to be broken in future, just like every ideal that you put forward, whether it is truth or anything else, is often broken and denied. That does not make truth untruth. That does not make a good ideal a bad ideal, because the man who proclaimed it has broken it or has not acted up to it. If that was so, much that we do and what we say in this House or outside, all of us—and I am not speaking for any individual—will find great difficulty because the world is an imperfect world. We are imperfect. We cannot live up to our protestations; often enough we are weak or circumstances are against us. Then, are we to give up our ideals or the proclamation of the truth because we happen to be feeble specimens of humanity or the world is not prepared today? Maybe, the philosopher can examine the situation that way and say, "Well, the right thing was said but the world was not ready for it." Therefore, let us find some other way because after all whenever truth is proclaimed it is good, but at any time and more especially in a democracy you have to have not only the truth but the receptiveness to the truth, the capacity to face truth, the capacity to act up to the truth in the vast mass of people.

We talk about democracy a great deal today. In everything we are challenged. In the name of democracy, students say that their professors should go. In the name of democracy, children should decide what numbers count; what the elders should do. In the name of democracy all manner of things are said as if democracy was a mere counting of heads without any other principle, rule or standard of behaviour: a most

extraordinary way democracy is bandied about.

I am not dealing with democracy. What I am saying is, the real difficulty always in any human behaviour more especially in the behaviour of groups, societies, is that a high truth may be proclaimed, may be observed by the great man, call him what you will, a prophet or a great leader. But, that prophet, however great he may be will not succeed unless he can convince others of the truth. He can only convince them to the extent that they are receptive and prepared for it. Even so, he has to tone down because others can seldom be wholly ready for it. So, when you come down to the plane of action, when you come down more particularly to the democratic plane of action, you have always to see how far the people will go, how far the people will act up to a certain principle that you have laid down.

Anyhow, my point is that the fact that some countries have not lived up to their protestation does not weaken the force of a certain correct policy like Panchsheel. Panchsheel is nothing new. If I may say so respectfully, in an odd moment it struck me to apply that world. But there is nothing new about the idea itself. It is an obvious thing. It just fits in with our way of thinking, with the way we have grown up. Once it was applied, the mere fact that it somehow caught on shows that there was something real about it. The fact is that even people who do not accept it, people in other countries, other nations, statesmen and others, who, perhaps, do not particularly fancy the way the Panchsheel idea came into existence, nevertheless, they, all pay tribute to it. You see the force of an idea: how although it is not acted upon, yet, nobody dare deny it. I am not aware of a single country. They may not have acted up to

it. They may not have even proclaimed their adherence to it. But every one, when you ask the question, says that is the only way. That shows the utter strength, the rightness, of this idea. Indeed, if you examine it from the purely practical point of view and leave out high morality, there is no other way that nations can behave to each other. The other way is the way of conflict and if you avoid the way of conflict, this has to be done.

The hon. Acharya Kripalani said that Panchsheel was born in sin. According to the Christian doctrine, we are all born in sin—I do not know—and we try to get out of that. But, he said that because this was included in the Indo-Chinese treaty in regard to Tibet. This is hardly the occasion for me to go into the history of Tibet or what happened then or what action we took then and what other action we could have taken. But, I should like Acharya Kripalani to go into this a little more deeply. I can very well understand his sentiments, his feelings in the matter. But, to understand what the position has been in Tibet in the past, what it was on that particular occasion and more particularly what possible courses of action were open to us, I should like him to consider that, because, merely not liking something and expressing one's disapproval is surely not enough when you have to take positive action. I submit I cannot go into this story. I submit that Tibet, long long ago, before the present Government's regime was there, was always looked upon and considered by the world community as being under the suzerainty of China. At no time did any country, any foreign country consider it independent. They considered it as autonomous under the suzerainty of China. Indeed there had been internal trouble between Tibet and China. We had some trouble over this matter at the time of Chiang Kai-Shek, that is to say, when Chiang Kai-Shek was controlling the destinies of China.

Shri Ranga (Tenali): Did the Tibetans accept it?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am saying the world community. What I am suggesting is that we as Government of India always acknowledged the suzerainty of China whether it was before Independence or after. That was what we inherited and other countries also.

We came into the picture more particularly apart from our close contacts and cultural contacts which have been of long standing not in a particularly good way when Col. Younghusband, at the beginning of this century, on behalf of the British power in this country invaded Tibet and rather forcibly established positions there and gained certain rights for the then Government of India which really was an extension of the British Government. Those rights continued, a kind of special extraterritorial rights in Tibet of India which really the British exercised through India, keeping little armed forces here and there and all that which normally independent countries do not have.

Whether Tibet was free to act for itself or was functioning under the suzerainty of China, I do not quite understand how India or the British acting through India had a right to put their platoons, companies of troops at odd places in Tibet on the plea of protecting their commerce and this and that. That was the position. Naturally, when we became independent, we did not wish to have any extra-territorial rights in Tibet. We wanted, naturally, the Tibetans to function in freedom as they wanted. Anyhow, whatever others did, we did not wish to interfere in Tibet's life in that way.

Then came the Chinese revolution and the Chinese claimed suzerainty or even sovereignty over Tibet. They said, at any rate,—how far they gave effect to it is another matter—that Tibet was an autonomous region of the Chinese State, and they

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

acknowledged the autonomy of Tibet. In strict law, leaving out sentiment for the moment, there was nothing that could challenge that position from our point of view. We had acknowledged it before the communist period, in Chiang Kai-Shek's period, before Chiang Kai-Shek came into the picture. Whoever it was in China, they had continuously acknowledged that position. As I said, whether that was directly acknowledge or passively acknowledged that was the position that every other country acknowledged. Nobody had ever challenged that position. It is completely true that there have been periods in Tibet's history when Tibet itself had not acknowledged it. When Tibet was strong it did not acknowledge it. That is so. I am talking of our position in this matter. What position could we take up?

We took up a certain position and the messages then exchanged have been published, letters, etc. We hoped we could not possibly interfere. Neither in law or nor in fact can we interfere unless it is considered interference to deliver a strong speech of approval or disapproval. In these circumstances, I do submit that the action we took in regard to Tibet was the only logical, legal, constitutional and sensible action that a Government could take. I should like those gentlemen like Acharya Kripalani who feel about this matter to think about all these aspects and not suggest that any action that we took in this regard was either a wrong action in itself or was an action which led to wrong results. We cannot control the destiny of other countries, Tibet or any other. But the action that we took was not only the right action, but to the extent it did, it was a helpful action.

But, as I said, coming back to Panchsheel, we have to consider, and Acharya Kripalani no doubt has considered, whether there can be any

other policy of international relationship except the one indicated in those five principles. I cannot think of any other; the other is conflict and domination of one over the other. If that is the correct policy, then it is a good policy and it is a policy which should be proclaimed all the time even though some of those who proclaim it do not act up to it or practise it.

Acharya Kripalani said

Raja Mahendra Pratap (Mathura):
A world federation would be a better policy.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am in entire agreement with Raja Mahendra Pratap for once. When the world federation comes, no doubt it will be based on the five principles.

Acharya Kripalani said—perhaps he has misunderstood what I had said about this matter—he was talking about foreign forces going to another country, and he gave the example of the Spanish civil war. I am not quite sure that example was applicable, but I do not think I can say, or any one can lay it down as an abstract rule, that foreign force should never go. It is dangerous for foreign forces to go, they should not go, but there may be special circumstances. I entirely agree with him but I cannot lay it down as an abstract rule that they can never go. There may be some special circumstances when they may be invited, they may be asked to, there may be other circumstances, but there is this danger that while you may accept that as an abstract principle, in reality their going may sometimes be covered by some cloak which appears to give them some justification to go there, while really the motive might not be an entirely healthy one.

Then there was some reference to this summit conference that was proposed and Acharya Kripalani said that in any event India should not

have gone there because if India was there, she would have just rubber-stamped what other had agreed to, and he referred in this connection to Korea and Indo-China.

I do not think his history information about these is quite correct. If these Great Powers which are opposed to each other—the United States of America, the Soviet Union and other Powers come to an agreement, I do not say that necessarily it must be an ideal or good agreement. I do not say that. It is conceivable that while they are opposed to each other, they may come to an agreement which is not good for the small nations. I cannot rule that out. Nevertheless, in the present context, the dangers come from the conflict of these Great Powers. That will be another kind of danger, if it ever arises, when the great nuclear Powers come together and decide to control the rest of the world. In theory you may think of it, but that question does not arise today. If they agree, well, at any rate, whatever the other consequences may be, the present grave dangers would be avoided. If they agreed today to put an end to the production of nuclear bombs, I say it is a gain, a tremendous gain. If they agree to any kind of big disarmament, it is a gain for the world, it relieves the world. So, I would welcome that agreement, and if by any chance I have a say in the matter, I would try to bring about that agreement.

But why should Acharya Kripalani imagine that if we go there, we merely act as rubber stamps of anybody? That is not the reputation we have acquired in other countries or, I think, even in our country. Why should he labour under this unhappy impression. We may have been right or we may have been wrong, that is a different matter, but nobody has accused us yet of being rubber stamps anywhere. And why, may I ask, have sometimes our services been asked for, whether in Korea or Indo-China? And how does Acharya Kripalani imagine that we played the

part of rubber-stamp in either of those places I do not understand at all. As a matter of fact, in both of these matters, we played a rather distinguished part, though a distant one—sometimes but a distinguished part, and though I say it, I am prepared to add that but for that part there was for graver danger of war continuing. In fact, I think that in the past history of our international affairs, the part we took in Korea (it was a little less though it was there) and the part we took in Indo-China (it was also an indirect part but an important one)—these two events stand out in complete justification of the way we function. We do not push ourselves in, we do not shout, we do not wave flags, we do not denounce, but we try to help. Sometimes we have succeeded in helping a little, sometimes we have not, but we did succeed in these two, and it is surprising that these two incidents should have been brought up as examples not of success but of helpless failure.

Acharya Kripalani (Sitamarhi): May I say, Sir, that both in Korea and in Indo-China the net result is that the countries are divided between two spheres of influence and there is no likelihood of their coming together early?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, Germany is divided, Pakistan and India became divided into two parts. Acharya Kripalani apparently thinks that we should be able to put the world right, we should be able to solve the problems of the world, of Korea, Indo-China, maybe of Germany, maybe of other places. I have no such presumption. I do not presume that. All we could do in these places was to help in preventing dangerous developments, in preventing war. We did that. Take this country of Indo-China which had ruined after six, seven, eight years of war, and it might have been ruined still further. Well, our coming into the picture created a certain hope, gave time to think, a certain interval was created, and if Acharya Kripalani goes to these countries of Indo-China, he will perhaps

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

appreciate a little more of what those people think of India's efforts and India's services.

How can we put an end to the Korean problem? That simply means we should put an end to the basic problems, or one of the basic problems of the world today, this struggle between two mighty colossuses, mighty Powers or groups of Powers. It is utterly beyond our capacity. Who are we to say that we can do that? But we can, as any country can, big or small, make a difference by pleading for a right cause, provided the cause is right.

Sometimes it is suggested—one hon. Member suggested, I think it was Acharya Kripalani—that we should, the small countries of the world, small in a military sense, should band themselves together. Now, if that refers to what has been called a third force, well, it is almost a contradiction in terms, because numbers do not create a force—moral pressures, yes, but not a force. If you are thinking in terms of the great military powers of today, you do not make the slightest difference by militarily weak countries banding themselves together in terms of force, physical force; if it is in terms of moral pressure, certainly, I agree, but even in the case of moral pressure, if it takes the shape of banding together, the moral side rather goes into the background, and the physical side comes up, the third force side which again rather lessens that moral pressure.

Therefore, it is completely right that countries should come close together, countries of a like way or thinking should come close together, should confer together, should jointly function, whether it is in the United Nations or in other places in the world. That exactly has been the policy of India and of other countries, because we do not presume to call ourselves leaders; and we dislike being called leaders of Asia, leaders

of any group. We want comradeship with other countries, and on that basis, we have tried to work together, and we have been in the most intimate relationship with a number of countries, our neighbours, and even countries farther away. And we have done so—and that is important to realise—without breaking our friendly ties with other countries, because the other approach appears to be that we must become hostile to the other countries, and thus, gathering together a number of like countries, like us, that is, militarily weak, and other countries, and raise our voice in hostility to the great powers. That, I consider, is a wrong approach. Therefore, we have opposed the idea of a third force because it has no meaning except in terms of physical force, which we have not got, and also because the moment you talk in those terms, you adopt to some extent the cold war approach and language of hostility.

We can, and we do, criticise other countries' activities, whether in the United Nations or here, but we have always endeavoured to do so not in the manner of the cold war, not by denouncing. Who are we to denounce? Who are we to hold forth the light to others, we who have enough darkness in our own land and in our own minds? I feel ashamed of going out to the world and telling them what to do. For my part, and I am completely honest about this, I would rather that we were cut off from the world for a while and looked after our own affairs. We cannot do that. Physically, that is not possible, because we are a part of this world, and things happen in the rest of the world which affect us.

Two curious criticisms are made. One is sometimes that we are interfering too much. The other is—and that was made yesterday repeatedly—that we do not take the initiative in this matter and we allow the initiative to go into other hands. Shri

Khadilkar said that we had allowed the initiative to go to other hands. I do not know whether he expects us to be a knight-errant jumping out, taking initiatives all over the place. I do not propose to do so. Sometimes, we have taken the initiative, but even when we have taken it, it has been from behind the scenes, it has been quietly, modestly and without pushing ourselves forward, without shouting whether it is in the United Nations or elsewhere. So, I agree with him that on this present occasion, and often, we have deliberately not taken the initiative.

Here is this question of Western Asia, a highly important question in which many of our most intimate and friendly countries are involved, in which the future of the world is involved from the point of view of peace or war. We have, of course, been, as I said in the course of a statement I made the other day, in the most intimate touch with a large number of countries and their leaders, and given a great deal of thought in this matter, sometimes ventured to offer some advice confidentially. But we did think, and we do think that we should not throw about too much of directions to others as to how they should behave. It is not becoming; it is irritating to others. If quietly we can suggest something, we do so. But Shri Khadilkar would say, that is not taking the initiative, that is not marching ahead with a flag in hand, seizing the initiative. True, we have no desire to do that. We are a modest people, I hope, and we certainly are a modest Government, and we have enough problems of our own, and such influence as we have got in the world is because of our modesty, not because of our shouting. There are plenty of countries which shout, and there is a habit today of shouting and of directing and passing resolutions of condemnation of this or that. I do not think anything will come of this habit of condemnation, this reflex action from the cold war.

I realise that many things are happening in this world, and in this country indeed, which I do not like, which this House does not like. We try to the best of our ability to deal with the situation, sometimes succeed a little, and sometimes fail. In this matter of Western Asia, I really have nothing more to say than what I had said previously, except that any resolution that brought up in the United Nations, which does not clearly and specifically ask for or lead to the withdrawal of foreign forces cannot be accepted by us, because we think that is basic. I do not say that this by itself will solve the problems of Western Asia or of the Arab world, because they are very intricate, but that is the initial first step that should be taken together with such other steps as may be necessary. And our directions to our representatives there are therefore, to put this withdrawal of foreign forces in the forefront.

In this connection, may I say, when I refer to our representatives there, that one of the hon. Members here, Shri Joachim Alva, was pleased generally to criticise not our policies, but our persons, personalities in the Foreign Service, and by name, which is a very unusual thing, our permanent representatives at present in the United Nations, Mr. Arthur Lall? I regret that kind of approach of individuals who obviously have no possibility of answering such criticisms being mentioned there in this connection. Shri Joachim Alva is completely free, and I invite him, to criticise me because I am responsible not only for the policies that Mr. Arthur Lall pursues there, but for the fact of appointing Mr. Arthur Lall there; I am responsible for both. I accept that. He has every right to criticise in that way, and all I can answer is that I regret that I do not agree with him at all. He gave some other instances and asked: 'Why did our Ambassador in Moscow and our representative in Budapest not tell us, and give us previous information of Mr. Khrushchev, going to Peking or Imre Nagy's

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

trial and subsequent execution? Why did they not do that? What is your Foreign Service doing, when they cannot tell you beforehand? Well, I do not quite know what answer to give, except that Shri Joachim Alva's conception of a Foreign Service is very remarkable, and Shri Joachim Alva's conception of what other Foreign Services do also must be remarkable. Certainly, I want to say very clearly that it is not fair to say anything about one of our most distinguished Ambassadors, the one in Moscow, Mr. K. P. S. Menon, who has done very good work there, and our representative in Budapest, who has passed through a very difficult time, in the last year or two, and who has kept us, our Government, I believe, more informed of conditions there than probably—I cannot say, of course, about any Government—probably most Governments in the world. We have had more intimate and more detailed information,—and not now, but in the most difficult period,—of what has happened in Hungary, because of our representative there. And yet Mr. Alva ignoring all this makes these insinuations and allegations. I may tell the House that I made enquiries about this matter. Not a single Ambassador in Moscow knew about Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Peking; nobody in Peking knew that he had come there, except very intimate circles. Now this may stand to the credit of those who kept the secrets or not—that is another matter. Certainly our Ambassador either in Peking or Moscow was not alone in this. None of the others happened to know either, although I presume other Embassies have many sources of information which probably we did not possess.

13. hrs.

Shri Joachim Alva (Kanara): As a matter of personal explanation, I had made no personal attack on Mr. Menon or Mr. Rahman. I have got the highest regard for them. What I said was that there is a lacuna in our

foreign service: we do not know many critical things at critical times. That is all I said about our foreign service.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Unless Mr. Alva has some particular ideas of filling that lacuna, I do not know.

In regard to Indo-Pakistan relations, there is nothing more I can say. Some hon. Members said that they do not appreciate the idea of my meeting the Prime Minister of Pakistan; some other said nothing would come out of it. I do not know whether anything will come out of it or not. We are always in favour of such approaches, such meetings and I shall gladly meet him, not with exaggerated hopes, but nevertheless with some hope. I always have some hope of achieving some result. But apart from any hope that I may have about this meeting, or any other meeting, there is one particular policy to which I should like our Government and our country to adhere firmly, whatever happens, and that policy is, now, tomorrow, a year later or I do not know how long it may take, but ultimately, to have friendly relations with Pakistan. We are with the people of Pakistan and I do not want this bitterness which has subsisted in governmental circles more than among the people, to go down to the people. Apart from past history, apart from innumerable associations, we cannot get rid of geography; we cannot get rid of the fact that we are neighbours and will remain neighbours now, tomorrow and as long after as you can think of. Therefore, it is to our interest and their interest to cooperate, to live our individual lives, independent lives and to cooperate.

It is true as Acharya Kripalani reminded us—I think Machiavelli said it, maybe Chanakya also said it—of the theory that a country is inimical to its neighbour and is friendly to the country on the other side of the neighbour. That is the old doctrine of statecraft. You are inevitably

supposed to be hostile to the neighbour country, but with the farther country you have to be friends, because it might help you against your neighbour country. That, if it applied at all in its bad way, applied at a time when the world moved slowly. Now every country is the neighbour of the other country. There is no distance left in the world.

Anyhow our basic policy in regard to Pakistan has to be to win the friendship to Pakistan. I say so deliberately. Obviously, you do not win friendship at the sacrifice of your own country's interests. That is not friendship; that is only submission; that is only degradation, which does not bring friendship at all. So we have to protect and preserve our interests, but keeping in view this long term perspective which we hope may become a short term one. Otherwise our energies will suffer, will be wasted in this type of conflict. And what is worse, this kind of thing affects even our internal work and our internal thinking, as it must affect that of the people of Pakistan.

I said yesterday that it amazes me when I read in Pakistan newspapers reports about these border troubles in our eastern border. Hon. Members who often ask questions about these matters in this House might read some Pakistan papers for a while to find out how they are feeling about it. The feel just the reverse of how you feel, how we feel—that India is constantly creating trouble, India is committing aggression, India is firing all the time.

Quite apart from the facts, this is the picture that is put to the Pakistani people in their Press and in the statements of some of their leaders. Now if the people of Pakistan are affected by it, we cannot be surprised. But I do not want to say anything to encourage this false picture in the minds of the Pakistani people. We are repeatedly asked: "What are you doing in the eastern border. People are demoralised." I do not like that kind of thing. Our people are not demoralised, must not be demoralised

and it is wrong to have demoralisation if a few shots are fired. It is a hard world and if people get fired, get demoralised, get frightened because of a little firing, the sooner we get used to it the better, this kind of firing. It is true people are inconvenienced; it is true people are sometimes hit by the shots and die. But it is also true that we are adequately protecting our borders. Nothing is happening to infringe our sovereignty. There may be a disputed land of two hundred yards this way or that way and for a moment a police force comes in and is pushed out. This kind of thing has been happening. Let us not exaggerate this. It is a nuisance; it is annoying; it should be stopped. But let us not think that our territory is being conquered, or taken away by anybody, or that we cannot protect it adequately.

The Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri (Bengal): Can the Prime Minister hold out hope of any reasonable time by which these border disputes will be settled. It may not demoralise us in the sense of national demoralisation. I come from a border district, and if border demarcation is not finalised and these disputes go on endlessly, people there who are not aware of world developments, are bound to get demoralised on a limited scale.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I quite appreciate what the hon. Member has said. How can I give a date? I do hope that this kind of trouble will cease

But at the background of it all is a deeper disease as between India and Pakistan which breaks out in these various ways. I hope that will also become gradually less. But certainly I do hope that the troubles in the eastern border and the western border are somewhat of different types, because on the western border there are armies facing each other, broadly speaking. On the eastern border there are police pickets. There is no question of army movement. Sometimes press reports indicate army movements, etc., in Eastern Pakistan;

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

or if you read the Pakistan newspapers, Indian army movements on our side, Assam and West Bengal.

All these movements are small. A small company of troops goes there, and often enough, one movement takes place because news comes that from the other side there is a movement. But they are petty movements. Here on the western side, armies face each other. It is a different type of thing. But I hope that anyhow these eastern troubles would cease.

Before I finish, if you will permit me, I would like to say a few words in Hindi.

कल जो बहुत से भाषण हुये उनमें से एक भाषण श्री वाजपेयी जी का भी हुआ। अपने भाषण में उन्होंने एक बात कही थी और यह कहा था, मेरे खयाल में, कि जो हमारी वैदेशिक नीति है, वह उनकी राय में सही है। मैं उनका मशकूर हूँ कि उन्होंने यह बात कही। लेकिन एक बात उन्होंने और भी कही और कहा कि बोलने के लिये वाणी होनी चाहिये लेकिन चुप रहने के लिये वाणी और विवेक दोनों चाहिये। इस बात से मैं पूरी तरह से सहमत हूँ। आप यह तो जानते हैं कि दूसरी महफलों में यह बात चल सकती है और खाली दुनिया की महफलों में यह नहीं चल सकती है। कम से कम जहाँ तक हमारी वैदेशिक नीति का सम्बन्ध है, कभी कभी हम जोश में आ सकते हैं और कभी कभी धोखा भी हो सकता है लेकिन मेरी इच्छा यही रही है कि हम कम से कम बोलें कम से कम दखल दें। लेकिन मुश्किल यही है कि जब हम नहीं करते तो और साहिबान कहते हैं कि तुम तो ठंडे हो गये हो, तुम डर गये हो। श्री लाडिलकर साहब ने कहा कि औरों के हाथों में तुमने लगाम दे दी है, तुम्हें घुड़सवारी खुद ही करनी चाहिये। लेकिन मैं बिल्कुल सहमत हूँ और मैंने एक

बार कहा भी था शायद यहाँ कहा था या कहीं और कहा था कि कुछ दिन के लिये जो फारेन मेंक्रेटरीज बगैरह दुनिया के हैं कोई छः महीने के लिये चुप हो जाये तो दुनिया का बहुत भला होगा, दुनिया का बहुत कल्याण होगा, किसी को कोई हानि नहीं होगी।

एक बात उन्होंने कही थी और कुछ आचार्य कृपलानी जी ने भी इसकी चर्चा की थी कि यह जो शिखर सम्मेलन की चर्चा हुई उसका जो जवाब हमने जल्दी दिया उसमें कुछ लोगों पर यह असर हुआ कि हम बहुत लालायित थे उसमें जाने के लिये, उसमें भाग लेने के लिये। मैं बतलाना चाहता हूँ कि वाक़ात क्या हुये।

हमने बार बार कहा है और कई वर्षों से हमारी यही नीति चली आ रही है कि हमें अगर किसी कान्फ़ेस में अगर कही बुलाया जाय तो हमारी कोई खास इच्छा नहीं होती है उसमें जाने की लेकिन अगर हमारे जाने में कुछ लाभ की आशा हो और अगर लोग हमें बुलायें, सब लोग करीब करीब, तो हम जाने को तैयार हैं। उस वक़्त अगर हमें ग़ुंठे और कट्टे कि हम नहीं जायेंगे तो यह एक निकम्मी बात है। हो सकता है कि हमारे जाने में कोई लाभ न हो लेकिन इन्कार करना भी शोभा नहीं देता है। कोरिया के मामले में तथा इंडोचीन के मामले में हम इमीलिये फ़म थे और हमारे लिये न कहना नामुकिन हो गया था और न कहना खास तौर पर इमलिये भी मुश्किल हो गया था कि सब लोगों ने मिल कर कहा कि तुम आओ और दूसरा कोई देश इस काम के लिये तैयार नहीं था या मौजू नही था। मौजू से मेरा मतलब यह नहीं है कि यह मुल्क ही सबसे अच्छा है लेकिन हम उन सब बहुत कम मुल्कों में से हैं जिन पर थोड़ा बहुत बरोसा, दोनों पक्ष प्रकट करते हैं। तो इस तरह की

धीरे हो जाती है। इसी लिये हम कोरिया गये। इसी लिये हम इंडोचीन गये।

अब इस मामले में हमने अपनी स्थिति साफ कर दी है और जो सम्मेलन हुआ करते हैं या यह जो शिखर सम्मेलन की बात है इसके बारे में भी हम अपने विचार प्रकट कर चुके हैं। बात यह है कि इस शिखर सम्मेलन के बारे में मेरे पास श्री स्ट्रुश्चेव का तार आया था और ऐसे मोके पर तार आया जब कि हालत बहुत नाजुक थी और लड़ाई होकर कुछ शानि हुई थी। उस वक्त जरा सा इधर उधर कुछ हो जाता तो लड़ाई छिड़ सकती थी। मैं नहीं जानता कि लोंगो के दिमागो में क्या था लेकिन जब अंग्रेजी फौजे और अमरीकन फौज वहाँ भेजी गई तो जाहिर था कि उसका नतीजा भयानक हो सकता था और कोई बड़ी लड़ाई हो सकती थी और हो सकता था कि उसके जवाब में कोई और बड़ा जवाब दे दता। लेकिन मोच समझ कर शायद यह समझा गया हा कि हम इस कदम को उठा सकते हैं और लड़ाई नहीं होगी। यह एक जम्मा था। लेकिन उसी के साथ यह भी यान में था कि शायद हो जाये और उसके लिये तैयारी भी पूरी थी। अगर एक भी कदम जा भडकाने वाला होता उठ गया होता तो फिर यकीनन आप २४ घंटे के अन्दर पंचामो शहर बिल्कुल खत्म हो गये होते देखते। दोनों तरफ यह हालत थी और यहाँ तक नीबत आ पहुँची थी। जहाँ एक दफा लड़ाई का निश्चय हो गया, बटन दब गया तो फिर तो पहले से ही सारे नक्शे मौजूद थे और फौजो को मालूम था कि उन्हें यहाँ से उस शहर को जाकर खत्म करना है, यहाँ यहाँ एटम बम फेंकना है। उस वक्त सलाह मसिवरा थोड़ा होना था, उस वक्त तो बटन दबने की देरी थी और हर वक्त यह बोझा दिमाग के ऊपर था कि कहीं यह न हो जाये। उस समय श्री स्ट्रुश्चेव का तार मेरे पास आया और वह वही तार था जो उन्होंने दूसरे देशों को भेजा

था, जो बड़े मुन्क है, और उस तार में यह कहा गया था कि शायद, अधिक से अधिक दो या तीन दिन में कान्फ्रेंस हो और शायद जेनेवा में इस कान्फ्रेंस को करने का सुझाव दिया गया था। मैं बड़े पेच में पड़ गया। दो तीन दिन में तो वहाँ पहुँचना भी असम्भव मालूम होता था निवाय इसके कि उसी वक्त दूसरी सुबह यहाँ में चल देता। लेकिन दो या तीन दिन की जो चर्चा थी उससे एक असर होता था कि मामला गम्भीर है और मामला अगर कुछ गलत तरफ मुक जाये तो लड़ाई हो सकती है। मेरे कहने का मतलब यह नहीं है कि हमारे जवाब में मामले की गम्भीरता बढ़ सकती थी या कम हो सकती थी लेकिन हमारे पास वक्त की कुछ तंगी थी। इन बातों को देख कर मैंने निश्चय किया कि मुझे फौरन जवाब दे देना चाहिये। वैसे तो जवाब पहले से ही दिया हुआ था और उसको ही मैंने दुहरा दिया और वह यह था कि ऐसे मोके पर अगर सब लाग चाहें और समझे और अगर हम भी समझे कि हमारे जाने में हम कुछ खिदमत कर सकते हैं तो हम जाने को तैयार हैं। तो ये दोनों बातें पूरी होनी चाहिये थी। यह तो हमारा जवाब था और इसको मैंने दोहरा दिया। उसमें अगर किसी को सन्देह हुआ हो कि हम तैयार बैठे थे तथा वहाँ जाने के लिये लात्पायित थे, वह कोई ठीक मालूम नहीं देता है। मेरी कोई खास इच्छा वहाँ जाने की नहीं है और मेरी तबियत इन बड़ी बड़ी कान्फ्रेंस में बहुत खराब होती है। मेरी तबियत खराब होती इसलिये है कि जो ठग हो गया है वह ऐसा है कि अगर १०, १५ या २० घादमी मिलते हैं तो उनके पीछे २००, ३०० या ४०० सैनिकों के वर्गारह भी जाते हैं और उनके पीछे ५०० या ७०० तम्बीर खींचने वाले चले जाते हैं और मूवी कैमराज वाले भी होते हैं। ऐसे मोको पर मेरा दिमाग नहीं चलता है, कि हर वक्त प्लाश लाइट्स और मूवी कैमराज आपके पीछे चल रहे हैं और आप काम कर रहे हैं और दुनिया के मसले हल कर रहे हैं।

श्री जवाहरलाल नेहरू]

तो ऐसे मौकों पर जाने की मेरी कोई इच्छा नहीं होती है। हाँ, मैं समझता हूँ कि अगर चार आदमी मिलें, अलग बातचीत करें तो कुछ न कुछ गलतफहमियाँ दूर हो सकती हैं, कुछ लाभ हो सकता है एक दूसरे को।

पिछले दो चार पाच या सात बरस में मुझे दुनिया में फिरने का, दूसरे देशों में जाने का मौका मिला है और मैं बहुत सारे देशों में गया हूँ और उन देशों में गया हूँ जहाँ दो गिरोहों में बँटे हुये हैं और एक दूसरे के विरुद्ध हैं। दोनों जगह मैं गया हूँ और दोनों ही जगह मेरा अच्छा स्वागत हुआ है। जहाँ जहाँ भी मैं गया, हिन्दुस्तान के नाम की वजह से चाहे समझिये भारत की प्रतिष्ठा की वजह से समझिये, वहाँ बहुत अच्छा स्वागत हुआ और बहुत प्रेम से हुआ। मैंने देखा कि कितना हमारे देश का वहाँ आदर है फिर वहाँ का गवर्नमेंट की चाह कुछ भी गय हो और उस राय का असर भी लाया पर होता है, लेकिन भारत क्या कहता है इसका भी असर वहाँ की जनता पर होता है कम से कम इसलिये कि गलत या सही यह वहाँ विचार हुआ और लोग समझने लगे कि हम शान्ति और अमन चाहते हैं और हम गुस्से में आकर एक दूसरे को बुरा भला नहीं कहते। हम सोच समझ कर ठंडे दिल से बात करते हैं। इसलिये हमारा होना कभी कभी ऐसे गिरोहों में कुछ लाभदायक भी सिद्ध हो सकता है।

ये मेरे विचार थे जो मैं आपके सामने रखना चाहता था।

Shri P. K. Deo (Kalahandi): The Prime Minister has not enlightened this House regarding the absence of the Indian Representative at Baghdad when the military coup d'etat took place.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: The absence of the Indian Representative! Not at all. It so happened that the

old Ambassador had come away and the new Ambassador had not gone there. But that does not mean that our Representative was not there. The *Charge-d'affaires* was there, I should like to say that the *Charge-d'affaires* there functioned exceedingly well. I have already paid tribute to his work. He did his work very well.

Shri Joachim Alva: With regard to Mr. Lall I have made no such remark as the hon. Prime Minister said. I have great admiration of Mr. Lall. I know him very well. Yet we want a man, a very popular man of cabinet rank who can speak with authority about peace, our culture and patriotism. That is what I said. It is not right that when President Eisenhower steps down into the U.N. and when the Foreign Ministers of other countries are there, Mr. Lall should represent us. This is all that I said.

MOTION RE FOOD SITUATION

The Minister of Food and Agriculture (Shri A. P. Jain): Sir, I beg to move:

"That the food situation in the country be taken into consideration."

Hon. Members are aware that there have been debates on food in the State Legislative Assemblies and Councils. In Uttar Pradesh this subject has been discussed at length both in the Legislative Assembly and the Council recently. In West Bengal too this question has been discussed in the Legislative Assembly on the 26th July. These are the two prime States where the food situation is comparatively more acute. In some of the other States this question has been a very lively question and matter of debate in the Councils and outside.

We have also published a White Paper on the Food Situation. The Planning Commission have published