

Clause 3 was added to the Bill..

Clause 2— (Transitional provisions).

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There are some amendments to clause 3.

Shri C. Muthusami (Karur): Sir, I beg to move:

(i) Page 2, lines 4 and 5,—

for "Central Government and that Government".

substitute "High Court having jurisdiction in the State of court of action and that High Court" (1).

(ii) Page 2, line 8,—

for "Government" substitute— "High Court". (2).

(iii) Page 2, line 12,—

for "Magistrate of the First Class"

substitute "District Judge." (3).

(iv) Page 2, line 13,—

for "Presidency Magistrate" substitute— "District Judge". (4).

(v) Page 2, line 20,—

for "Magistrate of the First Class"

substitute "District Judge". (5).

(vi) Page 2, lines 20 and 21,—

for "Presidency Magistrate" substitute— "District Judge". (6).

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I shall put them all together.

Amendments Nos. 1 to 6 were put and negatived.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That clause 3 stand part of the Bill."

The motion was adopted.

Clause 3 was added to the Bill.

Clause 4 was added to the Bill.

The Schedule was added to the Bill.

Clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the Title were added to the Bill.

Shri F. A. Ahmed: Sir, I move:

"That the Bill be passed."

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The question is:

"That the Bill be passed."

The motion was adopted.

*DEMANDS FOR GRANTS, 1967-68

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The House will now take up discussion and voting on Demand Nos. 4 to 8 and 111 relating to the Ministry of Defence for which 7 hours have been allotted.

Hon. Members present in the House who are desirous of moving their cut motions may send slips to the Table within 15 minutes indicating the serial numbers of the cut motions they would like to move.

DEMAND No. 4—MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 54,14,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1968, in respect of 'Ministry of Defence'."

*Moved with the recommendation of the President.

DEMAND No. 5—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—ARMY.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 4,48,27,33,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1968, in respect of Defence Services, Effective—Army."

DEMAND No. 6—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—NAVY.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 23,97,33,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1968, in respect of Defence Services, Effective—Navy."

DEMAND No. 7—DEFENCE SERVICES, EFFECTIVE—AIR FORCE.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 1,07,02,00,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1968, in respect of Defence Services, Effective—Air Force."

DEMAND No. 8—DEFENCE SERVICES, NON-EFFECTIVE.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 17,00,00,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1968, in respect of Defence Services, Non-Effective."

DEMAND No. 111—DEFENCE CAPITAL OUTLAY.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 83, 68, 26,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1968, in respect of Defence Capital Outlay."

Shri N. Dandekar (Jamnagar): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, there are three cut motions in my name for disapproval of policy. I will refer to them in the order in which I propose to speak on them. The first one is No. 64: Failure to re-organise the naval forces into two separate fleets; the Eastern and the Western. The second one is No. 20: Failure to study and to draw lessons from the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965 and to undertake appropriate reorganisation, re-equipment and re-training of the Armed Forces for hostile operations on the Western Front. Lastly, the third one is No. 2: Failure to modernise both the management and the plant, tools and equipment of the older ordnance factories.

I would like to deal first with the question of reorganising the naval forces of India into two separate fleets. The main objective of the Indian Navy, as indeed of the Indian Armed Forces, is not aggression. Aggression is clearly not our policy; we are not an aggressive nation and we have no designs upon anybody's territory. Therefore, there is no question of our Armed Forces ever adopting an aggressive posture. Nor, indeed, in accordance with the policy hitherto adopted by the Government, is there any question of our Armed Forces having as their objective any participation in any system of collective security. I mention this here as an accepted basis, merely in order to avoid any sidetracking of the debate. The House knows my own views on that that we ought to participate in a system of collective security. But for the purpose of this debate, I am accepting the position of non-involvement

in any collective security system. That leaves the accepted objective of our Armed Forces, namely, that they are intended solely for the defence of this country. But I submit that the appropriate defensive posture for us is not one of supinely waiting for somebody else to attack us, or supinely waiting till we are "gheraoed" before we start taking action. I mention this because I have seen that during the course of Indo-Pakistan operations in 1965, there was an extra-ordinary instruction issue to the Navy that the Indian naval vessels should not operate north of a line due west of Porbander and that even south of this line the Indian naval units should not engage enemy vessels beyond 200 miles of the Indian coast. I suggest that is not an appropriate defence posture. The kind of defence posture that I envisage, as appropriate for the Armed Forces of any country and certainly of this country, is one of defence from strength. I may describe it as an aggressive defensive posture.

With this as the objective of our Armed Forces and of the Navy, one has to consider what tasks the Navy has to undertake in the east, that is to say, in particular, in the Bay of Bengal and in the Indian Ocean, east of Ceylon and south-east of Ceylon. When we are clear about the tasks to be performed, we will know what kind of naval set-up we need to have in that region. But before one goes on to describe the tasks or to describe the kind of naval organisation that we ought to have for the performance of those tasks, one must first consider what are the maritime geo-physical facts in the region and what are the geo-political facts in the current situation there because these, quite obviously, will govern the nature of the forces that we need for our naval defence.

To begin with, about the maritime geo-physical facts, the Indian coast-line extends over 3000 miles, cut into two by Ceylon. That is an important matter to which I will refer in a moment, but the point to remember is that it is not only a very long coast

line but it is a coast-line that is clearly cut by the intervention of Ceylon in between around which our naval forces would have to go to operate in the east if as of now, we have only a one fleet navy. Secondly, there is of course, the existence of a naval base in the south of Ceylon at Trincomalee. The third geo-physical fact of the greatest importance is that our Andaman Islands which are in quite a well-located position within 100 miles of the only two entrances from the east into the Bay of Bengal and into the Indian Ocean are today extremely poorly fortified. Finally, another important fact of life in connection with this question of defence of our east coast is that something like 60 per cent of India's overseas trade as well as 60 per cent of India's coastal trade is either terminating at the ports on the east coast or originating from the ports on the east coast. So much, SIR, about the geo-physical facts. The more important facts perhaps are the geo-political ones in relation to our neighbouring countries, both the near neighbours as well as the distant neighbours and their attitude vis-a-vis India.

First of all, we have Ceylon, a friendly country, but it could, as indeed it seemed it might when we had the conflict with China, come under the influence of possible enemies and deny shelter and supply to our ships in the ports of Ceylon and particularly at the naval base in Trincomalee. I do not go further to suggest that there could be possible offensive operations from Trincomalee, but I do suggest that we have to take into account the political situation that is possible, that indeed seemed probable at one time when Chinese influence was very strong in Ceylon, that necessary supply and provisioning facilities might be denied to us by Ceylon.

Our second near neighbour is Burma a very friendly country; but it is also one of the ultimate objectives of Chinese policy of exercising hegemony over Asia.

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Then, there is Malaysia, an exceedingly friendly country. And finally, there is Indonesia. I know that our Foreign Minister has been almost in ecstasies over the results of his visit to Indonesia, but I think he is forgetting that Indonesia was until quite recently, in fact, until the end of 1965 during the Indo-Pakistan conflict,—a hostile country with a fairly well equipped Navy containing a number of submarine units and is a country which though now friendly, could again become hostile in collaboration with or in support of either Pakistan or China.

The distant neighbours who are also important in this connection are Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The only point to remember in connection with these, from my present standpoint, is that they are the immediate objectives of the expansion of Chinese hegemony over South East Asia.

Beyond these countries lie Australia, New Zealand and Philippines, all exceedingly friendly, and beyond them again are Japan and Taiwan, also exceedingly friendly.

In between in the eastern waters, there is the British fleet, quite friendly, based today at Malaysia, and further on there is a more powerful American fleet, also quite friendly.

The relevance of this geo-political situation in relation to the naval defence of our country can be two-fold: first of all, in the light of who are likely to be our enemies, judged in a really cold-blooded assessment of the situation; and secondly if those are likely to be the enemies, what is likely to be the attitude of some of the countries to which I have referred? Looking at it that way, quite plainly, the two enemies that we have, the probable enemies, the possible enemies that we have to consider in this context, would be China and Pakistan, either acting separately or acting jointly or acting simultaneously.

Now in that kind of position, one has to ask oneself what would be the tasks of the Indian navy before we can consider how the Indian naval forces ought to be organized to do those tasks in that kind of situation. Sir, I have listed five principal tasks which the Indian navy on the east in the Bay of Bengal and in the Indian Ocean, would have to perform. In the first place, it would have to keep a strict and continuous watch on the entrances into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean from the seas beyond those two narrow entrances to which I referred earlier. Secondly, particularly during the time of hostilities either with Pakistan or with China or with both, the function of the navy would be to detect, hunt down and destroy any intruders coming into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean by those two channels. Thirdly and most importantly, if intruders did get in, the Navy would have the task of defending the Andaman Islands, and finally of course once enemy forces get beyond those lands, there would be the terrible and tremendous task of, on the one hand guarding the east coast of India, and on the other, guarding the commercial sea routes that pass over the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.

I would like to pause here for a while to consider what this involves in terms of even just that one consideration, namely, guarding the sea routes. Indian vessels today carry something like 40 to 45 per cent of India's overseas trade,— 50 per cent of the India-UK trade 40 per cent of the India-Continental trade, and 50 per cent of the India-Japan and Pacific trade, and about 25 per cent of all other trades; I am referring for the moment only to general cargo trade. As regards bulk trade with India, probably the Indian shipping carries today less than 10 per cent of the bulk cargo trade. Moreover, I said earlier, 60 per cent of the Indian overseas trade either originates from or terminates at the Indian ports on the east.

sees. This could involve a tremendous task in terms of defending the sea-lanes and sea traffic to this country, both when it is carried in Indian vessels and possibly also when it is carried in foreign vessels. Perhaps, the task of defending foreign vessels would not be so great, partly because they would enjoy, if they carried innocent traffic,—that is, did not carry contraband cargo,—legal protection, and would not involve much of a task for the Indian Navy. But in so far as the defence of Indian vessels is concerned particularly as Indian vessels would be carrying all the contraband cargo arriving in India, the task of defending the sea lanes for the safe passage of these vessels would be a very considerable one.

In this context, with these objectives, with these geo-political facts and geo-physical facts and with these tasks to be performed the question is: Can these formidable tasks be performed by the Indian Navy as at present organised? Today, virtually speaking, the Indian Navy consists of just one fleet which is based on the west Coast at Bombay and Cochin. In time of a scrap with an enemy, only a few vessels could perhaps be spared to go into the Bay of Bengal. I do not think it is much of a secret to disclose that during the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the bulk of our naval forces were centred on the west coast and there was hardly anything that went over to the east coast, though there were in fact suspicions of hostile submarine activity, but nothing specific turned up.

I submit that if this defensive task on the east coast is to be performed in the context I have indicated, it becomes urgently necessary to reorganise the entire Indian Navy into two fleets, one a western fleet and another an eastern fleet, the two operating under virtually separate commands but under the overall control, of course, of the Chief of Naval Staff.

Now, it may be said that this is nothing new, that this business of

splitting up the Indian Navy into two virtually independent commands and two virtually independent fleets has been under consideration since 1952. Possibly, it has been under consideration since 1948. I do not know. But I do know that it has been under consideration.

But this phrase 'under consideration' is one of those governmental phrases that are exceedingly elusive. I read once somewhere that when you get a reply from Government that the matter is "under consideration", it means that they have lost the file and they are looking for it and when they say, the matter is receiving their "active attention", it means that they have just found it, and of course, when they say it is under "active consideration" it means that they are wondering what the whole thing is about. Since 1952 or it may be since 1948, this question has certainly been "under consideration". But meanwhile, grave international developments have overtaken us. The situation in 1948 or even in 1952 or even in 1956 was totally different from the kind of situation that prevails today. I suggest that both strategically as well as tactically speaking, the problem is one of greater urgency now and cannot be disposed of merely by saying that Government have had this matter under consideration for a whole generation.

Now, granted, as I believe one must grant, that there is need for an immediate decision on this question of having two fleets, granted that we ought to have two fleets, what is involved? I know there is a good deal involved. It will involve a considerable amount of planning and a considerable amount of expenditure. But I think the Minister, and no doubt also the Finance Minister, know that in so far as the urgent requirements of defence are concerned, this House will not deny grants for the purpose. This House has been highly critical a number of extravagant schemes and extravagant expenditure, of a number of schemes—

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that any body would describe as cock-eyed. But this House has never been reluctant to vote all the money required for the purpose of the defence of the country.

In the brief time at my disposal, I can do no more than indicate the basic elements in this problem. What would be involved at the outset of course, is the establishment of a major naval base, and a dockyard on the east coast with dry dock, repair and supply facilities. The moment I say this, I remember that since 1952 at any rate, Government have had under consideration the building of a dry dock on the east coast. But 15 years have elapsed; they have not taken any decision, they have done nothing. To-day even for the merchant marine, the repair dry dock and turn-round facilities that are available on the east coast are so ridiculous that only a country like this could tolerate these. In fact, vessels built at Vizag have to go all the way to Calcutta, for inspection by the prospective buyer in dry dock with all that is implied in such a process. What is involved, therefore, in this question of constituting a second fleet in terms of basic facilities is the establishment of a naval base on the east coast, with a dockyard with dry dock, repair and supply facilities.

Now, Sir, I will venture to step where angles fear to tread, namely, to consider what we should be, in broad terms the composition of a fleet on the east coast. I have neither the technical knowledge nor indeed the information to be dogmatic about this. My knowledge is limited and my information is also limited, but it seems to me, on a general review of this question, that the essential elements of an eastern naval fleet would be at least one, perhaps two, aircraft carriers with the appropriate complement of four fast, well armed and equipped protective units for each of them. I say aircraft carrier because

today the concept of the naval warfare apart from that involving nuclear weapons and so on, has changed so much that static warfare is no longer, at any rate at sea the kind of thing one thinks of. What one wants is a fast and very powerful aircraft carrier with a very mobile kind of fleet air arm capable of quick operations all over the place; and of course, it has to have certain protective units accompanying it. From the actual fighting angle, I imagine what is required is a number of small, fast, well-armed offensive units composed of destroyers, corvettes and frigates poised to hunt down and kill enemy intruders, especially submarines. I do not anticipate, in the foreseeable years to come, any probable enemy likely to intrude into the Bay of Bengal and so forth with surface naval units. What we have got really to worry about is submarines.

That being the position I envisage for the eastern fleet, certain subsidiary questions arise. I do not know what the present position is,—I do not want to know,—but I do think that the question of fortifying the Andamans into a really first-class advance base should be very much to the fore in the Defence Ministry's calculations. What is really required is a well-equipped and heavily fortified advance base in the Andamans with a few highly trained units of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, which must be constantly watchful, always

on the alert, constantly undertaking combined exercises. Added to this would, I imagine, have to be a chain of air fields on the east coast of India from where long range land based reconnaissance air force units could constantly keep a look out during times of scrap or trouble for intruders coming in from the far eastern side. So Sir, just to summarise this particular part of my discussion about defence policy, I have no doubt whatever that there is need for reorganising the Indian Navy into two fleets

I believe the matter has been under consideration for quite sometime, with no results whatever. I believe the matter is one of urgency and cannot wait any more years before decisions are taken, because even after decisions are taken, a good deal of work has to be under taken, considerable amount of planning and so on. But I submit that so far as one can make out from the report of the Defence Ministry year after year, this does not seem to be a question that is under active consideration, or concerning which anything concrete has yet emerged.

I turn now to the other matter concerning which I have a cut motion namely, the Indo-Pakistan conflict. I know I treading here on difficult ground. I do not want, therefore, to talk about or to criticise or even to mention the outlines of the general strategy adopted by us or indeed of particular actions or the merits and demerits of those actions, but I do want to focus attention on just one aspect which in fact, troubled me a great deal during the Indo-Pakistan conflict and for months subsequent to it.

We worked out perhaps the most brilliant counter-offensive to the penetration which Pakistan made on the Akhnur sector. We attacked in a big way on the Sialkot sector and made considerable headway. And then we got stuck, we just got stuck there. I know that subsequently there has been a lot of whitewashing and mealy-mouthed statements to the effect that it was our intention only to occupy certain defensive positions, not to advance any further and so on. I cannot believe that those are true explanations, because I know for a fact that our armoured units really got bogged down; and they got bogged down so long that it was not possible thereafter to make any further advances.

I have tried to piece together over the last 18 months the causes of this, but as far as I could gather them. These causes I will presently mention. But

let me add my reasons for mentioning them is this, that I have grave doubts whether anything is being done to eliminate those causes.

For example, when our armoured units went forward, they did not receive either adequate air support in the battle, or air cover when operations came to a standstill.

Secondly, the infantry units which should have followed immediately after the armoured units were terribly long in coming, and this for the simple reason that although they were mobile they were mobile in trucks having tyred wheels, not track wheels. When a tank attack is made even a layman like me knows that the tanks do not advance on broad roads, they go cross country. They have to be followed for occupation of territory by infantry forces; but the infantry forces have to be conveyed in track vehicles, not vehicles with tyres. The result on the Sialkot front was that our advancing tank forces did not receive infantry support for I believe two days, possibly three.

The same difficulty arose in regard to the maintenance of supporting supplies. The logistics of the whole operation, I gather, was not something to be proud of. It was disgracefully inadequate, and if the forward armoured corps troops held their ground, it was entirely because of their personal bravery, their tenacity and the leadership they received from the junior officers up to the level of the officers that actually go into the battlefield. They held the ground not because they received adequate air support or air cover, not because the infantry followed up in time, not because the logistic position was adequate, but entirely because of their own capabilities.

Then, the artillery. I believe we are still functioning with artillery which is not self-propelled. I am aghast at this thought that the artillery had to be dragged to the place, had to be manoeuvred, had to be taken

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hither and thither by being dragged by some other vehicle. Our artillery is not even today self-propelled; and, of course, its range is limited as compared to the range of the artillery which is at the disposal and command of the Pakistani forces. Worst of all perhaps—I would like to say a little more about this—was communications. One could say, communications were practically a total failure during the Pakistan operations. I am saying that in all seriousness. I wanted to say this last year but I thought it was too close to the events and I would not have liked to say it then because of all sorts of possible consequences. But today, when we are very nearly two years away from the events, I believe I should be failing in my duty, with the knowledge that I have pieced together in the last eighteen months, if I failed to say that one of the gravest failures during those operations was the failure of communications. I will not go into the details of it. I have considerable knowledge of the details, but I have no doubt that the Defence Minister can get them from the signals and other appropriate wings of the Army and the Air Force; the reasons for the failure, the effects of the failure; and so on. The real fact is that there was considerable failure of communications between the operational units, the defence units and the commands.

Now, Sir, about the tanks themselves. The Centurions with which our armoured regiments are equipped are first-class tanks. Our people know them inside out and they are able to handle them with great competence. They stood by us in the face of the technically most superior Patton tanks. But one of the things I have been trying to find out during the last year or two is this: what is the degree of preparedness of our tank units? I will be very restrained in saying this; but I do want to say it, because I must warn the House about this. The information that I have gathered last year and which I have attempted to

check up is that if we wanted the tank squadrons to be ready at 24 hours notice for battle, not more than fifty per cent of the tanks in any squadron would be ready for battle at such short notice. It is not the fault of the men who maintain them. They are about the best maintained equipment because their lives depend on it. But they are the best maintained equipment within the limits imposed on them. But the whole logistics, again, of the supply of components and spare parts is all tangled up; all manner of papers going up and down with notes of somebody saying "no" or "yes" and so on. The fact is that if you were to ask, at random, the tank squadron commanders of the Indian Armoured Corps: how many tanks would be battle worthy at 24 hours' notice? I doubt whether more than fifty per cent of any squadron would be battle worthy. I know, nevertheless, if there was such an order tomorrow the men would limp into battle with their tanks and give a jolly good fight. That is their business and they do it remarkably well. But that is not good enough. It is true, as people often say: the best of weapons are only as good as the men behind them. But it is equally true that the best of men can be only as good as the weapons they have.

The fact is that there is a great deal in all the matters about which I have been speaking that requires to be put right urgently. That is why I have raised these issues. Had I any reasonable ground for believing that all these deficiencies that came to light during the Indo-Pakistan operations had been put right, that lessons had been learnt, that where equipment was defective, it had been put right and so on, I would not have raised these points. But with the information that I am able to gather together—it is very difficult business to get all this,—I thought I must say this. I talk of lessons to be learnt in terms of these matters; I am not talking in terms of the real conduct of war or in

terms of the actual tactics or methods. I am merely talking of the lessons to be learnt, in terms of the wherewithal with which to fight. Those lessons have not been learnt or if they had been learnt, little or nothing has been done about them so far.

श्री जगन्नाथ बाह्यादा (बाह्येदर) : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, मैं आपका धीर आपके द्वारा इस सदन का ध्यान अपने देश की उन सीमाओं की तरफ ले जाना चाहता हूँ जिन की तरफ ज्ञायद देश का ध्यान पहली बार उस वक्त गया जब पाकिस्तान ने हमला किया। वह राजस्थान की सीमा जो पाकिस्तान से लगती है उस क्षेत्र के लोग भ्रमसर यह कहा करते हैं कि मलाहो प्रेसीडेंट अध्यक्ष का जिसने भारत सरकार का धीर देश का ध्यान हमारे इस क्षेत्र की ओर दिलवाया। आप जानते हैं कि देश का सब से अधिक क्षेत्रफल और सबसे अधिक लम्बे क्षेत्र पर पाकिस्तान की फौजी का भ्रगर अधिकार हुआ था तो उस क्षेत्र में हुआ था। पूरा इलाका कहते हैं कि रेगिस्तानी है, सुनसान है, बीरान है लेकिन इसका यह मतलब नहीं होता कि उसकी सुरक्षा का उचित इंतजाम न किया जाय

एक भावनीय सबस्य : यह तो पुरानी परम्परा है।

श्री जगन्नाथ बाह्यादा : यह परम्परा नहीं है लेकिन मैं मुक्तिल बतलाता हूँ वहाँ की। जब पाकिस्तान का हमला उस तरफ हुआ, जब पाकिस्तान की फौजों ने उस क्षेत्र पर हमला किया उस वक्त उन सीमाओं की सुरक्षा का भार वहाँ की पुलिस, विशेष पुलिस, जिस को कहा जाता था, सगस्त पुलिस, उस के हाथ में था। फिर हमारी फौज पड़ोसी और हमारी फौज को किन-किन

इन्डियन, प्रमानवीय कठिनाइयों का सामना करना पड़ा, उसकी ज्ञायद आप कल्पना नहीं कर सकते। वहाँ न सड़कें थीं न रेलें थीं, न पीने का पानी था। वहाँ मिट्टी के ट्यूबों में, रेत के पहाड़ों में हमारे जवानों के पाँव फँस गये, हमारी ट्रकों फँस गयीं। बुलकिस्मती से उस वक्त हमारे उधर के खेतों में तरबूज लगे हुए थे वह तरबूज खा खाकर हमारे जवानों ने अपनी प्यास बुलाई है। लेकिन पीने का पानी वहाँ नहीं मिलता था। उस के बाद भी उस विशाल लम्बी चौड़ी सीमा पर सुरक्षा की पूरी व्यवस्था नहीं हो सकी। यही कारण है, श्रीमन्, की युद्ध बन्दी होने के बाद उसके बाद भी पाकिस्तान की फौजें जब इधर उधर उस सीमा में घुसती रहीं और जहाँ भी चाहा उन्होंने भ्रलग-भ्रलग जगहों पर कब्जा कर लिया तो संचार व्यवस्था न होने के कारण हमारे राजस्थान के उस वक्त के मुख्य मंत्री तक को पता भी नहीं पड़ा कि पाकिस्तान की फौजें हमारी किन-किन सीमाओं में कहां-कहां घुस आईं आई हैं और कहां-कहां उन्होंने अधिकार कर लिया है। राजस्थान की विधान सभा में जब प्रश्न उठाया गया तो वहाँ के मुख्य मंत्री ने कहा कि ऐसी बात नहीं हो रही है लेकिन उन्हीं दिनों जब इस सदन में प्रश्न उठाया गया तो मान्म पड़ा कि कि राजस्थान के एक बहुत बड़े भूखंड पर पाकिस्तानी फौजों ने अधिकार कर लिया है। मैं आप से से यह निवेदन करना चाहता हूँ कि इस सब हालत के तीन बुनियादी कारण थे। एक कारण यह था कि वहाँ हमारी न सड़कें हैं, न रेलें हैं, न पीने के पानी का इन्तजाम है और तीसरा कारण यह था कि संचार व्यवस्था नहीं है। बुलकिस्मती से हमारे सुरक्षा मंत्रालय का ध्यान तब से इस क्षेत्र की सड़कों, रेलों और पानी आदि के विकास की तरफ गया है लेकिन मैं यह बतलाना चाहता हूँ श्रीमन्, कि जो सड़कों और रेलों का

[श्री धनूत महाटा]

विकास बढ़ा हो रहा है या जो पानी का इस्तेमाल हो रहा है वह एक दम नाकाफी है बहुत कम है। इतिहास ने यह प्रमाणित किया है कि हमारे देश की यह सीमा बहुत अधिक अनरेगुल है, शत्रु को आमंत्रण देने वाली, है शत्रु को ललचा देने वाली है। जब तक हम आर्थिक विकास नहीं करेंगे और जब तक हम इस तरह की सीमा की रक्षा के लिये पूरी ध्यवस्था नहीं करेंगे, यह ललचाना या निर्मंत्रण हमेशा दुश्मन को रहेगा।

यह सड़कों की बात मैं आप की बतलाऊ। सड़के बननी शुरू हुईं, सुरक्षा मंत्रालय ने वह सड़के बनाने का कार्य राजस्थान सरकार को दिया। राजस्थान सरकार ने कहा गया कि यह सड़के नवम्बर, 1967 तक पूरी बन जानी चाहिए। राजस्थान सरकार ने कहा कि हम यह सड़कें बनायेंगे लेकिन आप यह बतलाइये कि इन सड़कों को बनाने के लिए हम जो मशीनरी क्रीएट करें वह कितने करोड़ रुपये की एक साल में बनाने की मशीनरी हम क्रीएट करें? यहां से राजस्थान सरकार को कहा गया कि करीब एक वर्ष में 7-8 करोड़ रुपये की सड़कें पूरी कर सकें इस तरह की मशीनरी आप क्रीएट कीजिये। राजस्थान सरकार ने वह मशीनरी क्रीएट की, अफसर इंजीनियर तैयार किये और वह सड़कें बननी तैयार हुईं। अब राजस्थान सरकार से कहा गया है कि हम सास के सिर्फ साढ़े तीन करोड़ रुपये सड़क बनाने के लिये दे सकते हैं, इस से अधिक नहीं दे सकते। बानी 8 या 9 करोड़ रुपये देने की क्षमता इस वक़्त राजस्थान सरकार के पास है, और वह नवम्बर तक उन सड़कों की पूरा करने की स्थिति में भी है, लेकिन सारी मशीनरी सारी मशीनरी बनने के बाद, बिजली इंजीनियर नियुक्त करने के बाद, सारे धादमी नियुक्त करने के बाद राजस्थान सरकार से कहा गया है कि हम केवल साढ़े तीन करोड़ रुपये इस वर्ष देंगे। इस तरह राजस्थान सरकार की बहुत मुश्किल है। या तो वह

नवम्बर तक सड़क बनाये, और अगर न बनाये तो पैसा कम होने से वह काम एक या दो या तीन साल आगे [जायेगा]।

मैं बतलाना चाहता हूँ कि इस वक़्त सड़कें जो राजस्थान सरकार बना रही है वह नाकाफी हैं। वह केवल दो या तीन बड़ी सड़कें बना रही हैं, और उन में से एक सड़क जकर सीमा के समानान्तर चलती है, इस के अलावा जहां सड़कों का एक जाल बिछाने की आवश्यकता है वहां पर केवल एक या दो बड़ी सड़कें बनाई जा रही हैं। मैं आप के द्वारा जो नितान्त और बहुत ही दबाव वाली आवश्यकता है सड़कों का जाल बिछाने की, उस की ओर सुरक्षा मंत्री जी का ध्यान दिलाना चाहता हूँ।

रेल केवल दो पूरी सीमाओं की ओड़ती है। एक जयपुर से पोकरण और दूसरी जोधपुर से पोकरण। पिछली लड़ाई के बाद केवल 60 मील की एक रेलवे लाइन तैयार की जा रही है पोकरण से जैसलमेर तक। जहां रेलों नहीं के बराबर भी वहां इस लड़ाई के तजुबों के बाद केवल एक 60 मील लम्बी रेलवे लाइन का बिछाया जाना एकदम नाकाफी है जैसलमेर से बाइमेर तक एक रेलवे लाइन सुरक्षा के दृष्टिकोण से बनाये जाने का प्रस्ताव था, लेकिन उस प्रस्ताव का क्या हुआ, कुछ पता ही नहीं चल रहा है उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, आप भी जानते हैं कि फौजों के लिये सड़कों से अधिक महत्वपूर्ण रेलें होती हैं। हिन्दुस्तान-पाकिस्तान युद्ध के बाद रेलों ने जो शानदार काम किया, वह सारा देश जानता है। जोधपुर का राइजर काम वहीं करता था पाकिस्तान के हवाई बहाज करते थे, राइजर को उन का पता नहीं चलता था, लेकिन रेलवे के बहादुर और उच्च कर्मचारियों ने कंट्रोल टेलिकोड के द्वारा बराबर जोधपुर के अधिकारियों को सूचनायें दीं। दुश्मन के हवाई बहाजों का

पता नहीं था, लेकिन जिस बहादुरी और मुस्वीदी के साथ, जिस सजगता के साथ हमारे कर्मचारियों ने हमारी उस सीमा की सुरक्षा में मदद की थी उस को हम ने बहुत ही महसूस किया है। फौजों के आने जाने और सामान पहुंचाने में रेलें बहुत मददगार साबित हुई हैं और आवश्यकता है कि उस क्षेत्र की सुरक्षा के लिये दो या तीन बड़ी रेलवे लाइनें और बिछाई जायें।

एक और विशेष समस्या की ओर मैं सुरक्षा मंत्री महोदय का ध्यान आकर्षित करना चाहता हूँ। राजस्थान के जैसलमेर जिले में एकरेन्ज खोला जा रहा है, फील्ड आर्टिलरी रेन्ज। वहाँ बड़ी-बड़ी तोपें दागने की ट्रेनिंग फौजों को दी जायेगी। यह आवश्यक है कि फौजों को अच्छी ट्रेनिंग दी जाये और इस ट्रेनिंग को देने के लिये जो बाहरी इलाका चाहिये शायद वह जैसलमेर और बाड़मेर जैसे रेगिस्तानी इलाके के अलावा औरकहीं नहीं मिल सकता। लेकिन करीब एक हजार बर्षों मील का जो यह क्षेत्र सुरक्षा मंत्रालय ने बनाया है उस की वजह से करीब 15 या 20 हजार आदिमियों और करीब डेढ़ लाख पशुओं को अपने अपने गांव को छोड़ने पर मजबूर होना पड़ेगा। सुरक्षा मंत्रालय ने राजस्थान सरकार को यह कार्य दिया है कि वह जमीन ली जाये। यह देश की सुरक्षा का सवाल है, देश की सुरक्षा के लिये यदि हम को अपना घर बार भी छोड़ना पड़े, अपना गांव छोड़ना पड़े, तो उस में एतराज नहीं होना चाहिये, और वहाँ के लोग देश की सुरक्षा के अह्म को देखते हुए, हमारी फौजों की ट्रेनिंग की आवश्यकता को महसूस करते हुए ऐसा नहीं कि अपने गांव नहीं छोड़ेंगे या अपने घर बार नहीं छोड़ेंगे। लेकिन उन की इस वैकल्पिक का बचका उन्हें देना ठीक दूर रहा, उन की वैकल्पिक के बचके उन का अन्वेषण

देना दूर रहा, उन के साथ इस प्रकार का बरताव किया जाता रहा है जैसे उन्होंने कोई अपराध या जुर्म किया हो। एक-एक परिवार की फाइल को निपटाने के लिये जैसलमेर के स्लेक्टर ने 60-60, 70-70 और 100-100 मील दूर से परिवारों के मुखिया की जैसलमेर तक दौड़ाया जैसे कि उन के ट्रांसफर हो रहे हों। उन के मुद्दावजों का सवाल आज तक हल नहीं किया गया है उन को गांवों से निकाला जायगा किन्तु किन्ना पैसा देंगे उन की जमीन का यह सवाल अभी तक हल नहीं हुआ है।

15.04 hrs.

[SHRI G. S. DHILLON in the Chair]

साथ ही साथ मैं बतलाना चाहता हूँ कि जिस प्रकार का वह क्षेत्र है उस में बहुत खामियां हैं। टेढ़ा-मेढ़ा रास्ता बनाया गया है, जिससे तोपों के आने जाने में असुविधा हो सकती है। एक तरफ रेलवे लाइन जा रही और दूसरी तरफ सड़क जा रही है। उस में अगर जरा सा परिवर्तन कर दें उनर और पश्चिम की तरफ, जो सड़क है जो रेल है उस को थोड़ा सा भागे सरका दे तो करीब 10,12 हजार आदिमियों के घर बार उन के मवेशी और उन के खेत बचाये जा सकते हैं। और इस से इस क्षेत्र में न कोई असुविधा होने वाली है न इस ट्रेनिंग में कोई बाधा आने वाली है। इस विशेष समस्या की तरफ भी मैं सुरक्षा मंत्रालय का ध्यान दिलाना चाहूंगा ताकि थोड़ा सा परिवर्तन कर के इस क्षेत्र को अधिक सुविधाजनक बनाया जा सके, और अधिक कंटिगुअस बनाया जा सके। साथ ही साथ 10-12 हजार आदिमियों को तकलीफ से बचाया जा सके।

इस के पश्चात् मैं धाय का ध्यान एक छोटी सी समस्या की ओर दिवाना चाहूंगा। जब पाकिस्तान ने हिन्दुस्तान पर हमला

[श्री भ्रमृत नहाटा]

किया था उस वक्त जैसलमेर जिले में एक गांव है भूट्टोवालों, उस पर पाकिस्तान से जो रेन्जर्स आये थे उस की इतला हमारी पुलिस भीर फौज को देने वाला एक बहादुर मुसलमान था। उस का नाम बीजल था। उसने आ कर इतला दी हमारे आर० एस० सी० को कि वहाँ क्या मामला है। मालूम हुआ कि पाकिस्तान के रेन्जर्स आये हुए हैं। मुकाबला शुरू हुआ। हमारे सशस्त्र पुलिस के जवानों के हथियारों के बारूद वाले कारतूस खतम हो चुके थे। तब उन्होंने उस बीजल से कहा कि दूसरे इलाके पर जो जवान और सिपाही हैं उन को इतला करो और हथियार लाओ। वह बीजल और उस का छोटा लड़का दोनों भागे और दूसरे इलाके में चले गये। वहाँ से जवान और हथियार को ले कर आये और दुश्मनों को वहाँ से भगाया। हमारे सुरक्षा मंत्रालय ने इस बीजल को उस की बहादुरी के लिये एक हजार रुपये के पुरस्कार की घोषणा की थी, लेकिन आज तक पता नहीं कि वह बीजल कहाँ है। पाकिस्तान वाले उसे भगा कर ले गये वह जिन्दा है या मर गया, पाकिस्तान के जेल में वह सड़ रहा है या मर चुका है, इस का पता नहीं है। उन ने भारत की रक्षा की है उस ने भारतीय सीमाओं की सुरक्षा के लिये अपनी जान हथेली पर उठाई थी इस लिये उस के लिये पुरस्कार की घोषणा की गई है, लेकिन उस की सुनधा के लिये और उस की जिन्दगी के लिये अभी तक कोई कार्रवाई नहीं की गई है। इसका तरफ भी मैं मंत्री महोदय का ध्यान दिलाना चाहता हूँ।

एक और विशेष समस्या की ओर मैं आप का ध्यान दिलाना चाहता हूँ। राजस्थान के इस रेगिस्तानी इलाके में जिस का मैं जिक्र कर रहा हूँ करीब 15 हजार जवान हमारी फौजों में भरती होते हैं। मेरा खयाल है कि पहले एक तहसील मीरगढ़ से जो मेरे चुनाव क्षेत्र में आता है, 7 हजार जवान

फौजों में हैं। वह एक ऐसा इलाका है जिस के बहादुर जवान हमारे फौजों में आते हैं। वहाँ के बहुत से बहादुर जवान युद्ध में काम आये। जब कोई फौज का सिपाही रिटायर हो जाता है तब उस जवान के परिवार के लिये, उस के आश्रित लोगों के लिये उन के बच्चों की शिक्षा के लिये और उन लोगों को जमीनें आदि देने के लिये प्रबन्ध किया जाता है। इस मामले में राजस्थान सरकार और केन्द्रीय सरकार ने समय-समय पर घोषणायें की हैं कि उन्हें जमीनें दी जायेंगी, रियायतें दी जायेंगी, पुरस्कार दिये जायेंगे, उन के बच्चों को मुफ्त शिक्षा दी जायेगी लेकिन मैं आप के द्वारा सुरक्षा मंत्रालय का ध्यान इस ओर दिलाना चाहूँगा कि हमारे इस क्षेत्र के जो जवान बहादुरी से काम का चुके हैं उन के परिवारों को यह शिकायत है कि जिन सुविधाओं की घोषणा, जिन रियायतों की घोषणा, जिन पुरस्कारों की घोषणा की जाती है उस पर भ्रमल बढ़ा नहीं होता, खासकर जमीन के बारे में और बच्चों की शिक्षा के बारे में। यह शिकायतें बहुत बड़े पैमाने पर की जा रही हैं। मैं चाहूँगा कि हमारे इन जवानों को जो सुविधाएँ दी जानी चाहिये और जिन की घोषणायें की जाती हैं, उन पर भ्रमल भी किया जाये।

Shri Ranjit Singh (Khalilabad): Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am constrained to remark, at the outset, that in forty minutes' time I have to expose the neglect of the vital subject which has taken place during the last twenty years. The way the Defence Budget has been presented puts one in doubt as to whether there are any principles formulated by the Government for the presentation and the formulation of the Defence Budget.

At the very outset, let me speak a little on the very question of the principles on which the defence of this country is based. For the purpose

of preparation of the armed forces for the defence of the nation, there is always a higher directive laid down by the Cabinet, a definite and a firm directive, given to the Services. In our country, this directive does not exist. This directive is known as the national war aim. This was also criticised in the NEFA Report that a higher directive was non-existing.

It is a great tragedy that even now there is no higher directive as formulated by the Cabinet and given to the services. In fact, the Government does not know—it is in a dilemma—whether we are at war or at peace with our two troublesome neighbours. The Government will probably deny that we are in a state of war with them.

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy (Kendrapara): Any way we are in an emergency all right.

Shri Ranjit Singh: What was our relationship with China in 1962, between 20th October and 15th November? Were we at war with China or not? If we were at war with China, when did we revert to peace? China has still got large chunks of our territory under their occupation. When did we revert to peace with China? What was our relationship with Pakistan between 5th August and 23rd September, 1965? We were at war with them. When the borders had been violated on both the sides, there was no question about the fact that we were at war with them. When did we revert to peace? There were cease-fire—in the case of China, our Government calls a unilateral cease-fire—is only suspension of hostilities so that peace negotiations may take place. A cease-fire is not an end to war and, certainly, no country with any dignity, accepts peace with its territory under foreign occupation. Therefore, our Government should have decided as to whether our national war policy was the liberation of the territory under foreign occupation. Similarly, a directive laying down the national war

aim should have gone to the armed forces.

The Government should have given to the armed forces a national war aim in the following manner: You will prepare for the liberation of all Indian territory under alien occupation. Then only, the armed forces would have the motivation to prepare themselves. We have no motivation at the moment and, therefore, the Government formulates the Defence Budget without taking into consideration the fact that we must liberate the territory that we have lost to the enemy, whether it is China or Pakistan.

Only a few months ago, I read a statement made by the External Affairs Minister in which he had said, "At the moment, we are not in a position to liberate our territories." He had obviously addressed that remark to China. It implied inherently that we will make an effort to get into position to liberate those territories. But the Government has not made that effort. Either the Ministry of Defence thinks otherwise or the External Affairs Minister was talking against the principles of his own Government. Therefore, the very basis for the Defence Budget does not exist, the principles on which the defence of this country should be founded. When we are in a state of war as we are at the moment, we have to give a directive to the army for preparation with an aim for all training in peace. Particularly the army says that they train in peace to prepare for war. That is not enough. There should be a firm directive from the Government because the greatest threat to peace—I cite a Swiss dictum—is to take peace for granted. Our Government has taken peace for granted even while fighting the enemy. It is no use going into the legal jargon whether we are at war or not. A war that lasted for twenty years from 1925, to 1945 between Japan and China was always referred to by the Japanese as the

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Mukden incident. There was no formal declaration of war when Pakistan violated our territories; yet, on the 5th August and again on the 1st September, 1965, the forces clashed and we occupied each other's territory; had there been a proper aim given to the army, there would have been an unconditional surrender of all Pakistani forces within 15 days. There has recently been another war, a war in which eight belligerent nations took part and seven of them were reduced to such a mockery by a small nation! There was no formal declaration of war at all. So, our Government have to decide whether we are at war or at peace with China and Pakistan. How can a nation having the slightest self-respect be at peace with people who are in occupation of our territory? So, I request the Government to give to the Armed Forces the motivation for their training that all their training, all their preparation, will be directed towards the liberation of our territories under foreign occupation and only when this directive is given, we shall be able to formulate a proper budget for defence. The indecision of the Government regarding this is hampering the motivation of our troops. Without this, an army can neither train itself well nor in times of war can it fight.

I will now come to the question of the preparation, rather than the preparedness, of the Armed Forces. I will deal with it in the following headings: its strength, its organisation, equipment, training, intelligence and above all, morale.

Let us first consider the strength of the army. What is the dictum regarding the strength of the army? The strength of the enemy or enemies that we are likely to face or are facing and consequently the extent of the borders that our army is called upon to guard. Here we have two enemies facing us. It is the evaluation of defence experts that in times of war, if China and Pakistan com-

bine against us which they are bound to do and are preparing to do, we shall be facing a total of 40 divisions. Knowing that we shall be facing a total of 40 divisions, we are preparing an army with a strength of only 20 divisions and the Government says that they do not have finances and asks how they could prepare an army of more than 20 divisions. If you have to fight a defensive war and if you cannot increase the strength of the army, at least think of increasing the strength of your auxiliary forces, which is the cheapest method of enlarging and extending the army in times of war. Again, I will cite the example of that country which has created military history very recently, namely, that of Israel. It had a standing army of 50,000 troops only, but within 48 hours, the strength of that standing army went up to 2,50,000. This was the state of preparedness of its auxiliary forces. It is this state of preparedness that we must have. But what are Government doing regarding the strength of the Army?

They have reduced the strength of the officers in the Army. They have got rid and are getting rid of more than 6,000 emergency commissioned officers most of whom have had battle experience. From the answers given on this subject, you know how much the House was exercised over the question of the release of these emergency commissioned officers, and it was said that we were giving them a very raw deal, and that in fact we are being unfaithful to those people who had served the country with their very life. But the answers given were so evasive, and I might say that the answers given were also not true in all cases; I do not say that the untruth was spoken deliberately by the Defence Minister, but he was probably misinformed; I shall accept that position because generally Ministers here are misinformed. Now, what is the type of answers that we have been getting regarding these emergency

commissioned officers? First of all, it is said by the hon. Minister in his reply that such turnover is necessary to keep the Army young. It had been pointed out by me then that we were getting rid of 2000 emergency commissioned officers; out of them we had selected 500 for regular commissions, so that the number comes down to 1500. We were getting rid of another 600 officers who were going on pension in one year, and the turnover of the Defence Academy and the OTS was only 1100 officers in a year. Therefore, in a single year we were further reducing the strength of our officer corps by 700. The Army is already working on a hard core of officers of 80 per cent strength only, and by reducing that strength further, we were weakening our units. But the Defence Minister had replied then that it was necessary to do so to keep the Army young. But, then, probably, as a result of that very question, Government got rid of the younger set of officers of the emergency commission and they extended the time-limit of officers who were to retire, by another two years. Is this the way to keep the Army young? Those officers whose services have been extended are incompetent officers, who have been thought unfit for promotion in the past twenty years. It will be improper to cite names here; otherwise, I could read them out in hundreds. But it is enough to say that this thing is taking place. On the one hand, to cover up a false answer, a misinformed answer is given; on the other hand, the time-limit of the older officers is extended. Is this the way the Ministry wants to keep the Army fresh? This is one aspect of the strength of the Armed Forces.

Then, I come to the auxiliary services. We have reduced the strength of the NCC, and we have done so on the recommendation of a single officer, namely the present director-general of the NCC. It had been decided by a committee after detailed study, that the NCC should be made compulsory in all institutions. But

when the scheme started in 1963 we were very much short of officers. It was in 1964 and 1965 that the scheme came to a slow progress. But in 1966 Government stalled the scheme without giving a fair trial to it; when the new director-general came, he told Government that he could not do it and, therefore, Government accepted his ruling, and that which had been decided by a committee and which had not even been given a fair trial was shunted and the NCC strength was reduced.

Then I come to the Territorial Army, the saddest part the Government have played in respect of it not only regarding its strength but also regarding its morale. The Territorial Army was instituted as a second line of defence in this country. In 1960, certain territorial army units, notably the artillery units, were embodied. From 1960 to 1962, they were kept in that position. In August 1962, orders came for disembodiment of these units—at a time when China was threatening. The Government themselves had adopted a tough posture vis-à-vis China, and at that time they thought of reducing this army by disembodiment of these units. Do you know when this disembodiment started? In October 1962 when the Chinese were advancing on our borders. Right through the war with China, from 20 October to 15 November, these territorial army units, amongst them a medium regiment and a field regiment, of which we were very short, were being disembodied. Jawans were sent home and in spite of representations from those units that 'we are at war now' and orders had gone out for reservists to report back, these vital units of the artillery were kept on being disembodied. And when the Chinese ceased fire, orders went that the jawans should be called back to the units and re-embodied!

Again during the Kutch operations in 1965, these very units were disembodied. While the disembodiment

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was proceeding, the Government stopped it again. Then came September 1965. In September orders were given that these territorial army units should again be disembodied. I was sent to Delhi by certain army friends to try and use my influence with certain of my friends in the Ministry and in the political parties to stop the disembodiment of these units. I pleaded with them, government officials as well as Ministers, that we were going to face a war very soon. But they said everything was under control. 'In Kashmir, everything is under control. We will not need the territorial army units'. In fact, one Minister went to the extent of saying, 'You army people panic for nothing. In Kashmir, everything is under control'. I went back, met my army commanders and told them what the situation was. They sent me again on the 1st of September. I came on the 1st of September. I saw Shri Dandekar and Shri Vajpayee. I wanted to see Shri Krishna Menon, but I could not see him. I wanted to see leaders of all shades of opinion and tell that at this vital moment the army was being reduced. These leaders grasped the purport of all that was happening, but they were helpless against the attitude of the Government. Even on the 3rd September, batches of the territorial army were put on the train to be sent home, when Jnuri had already fallen. On 4th September, orders were given to call back those jawans from their homes.

This was the state of the territorial army then. All this happened because it has been the policy of Government to send their rotten elements of the regular army promoted to the NCC and the Territorial Army. I will give examples. A Director of the Territorial Army sold a military rank, promoting a wine merchant direct from honv. Captain to the rank of honv. Lt. Col. and immediately after that took the job of General Manager in his factory. People on

the verge of retirement in the regular army are shunted on to the Territorial Army. So, in this way, these auxiliary forces have been raped by the Government, and there is a budget provision which clearly shows that there is to be a further reduction in these auxiliary forces. We cannot maintain a large army, and we do not want to maintain a large auxiliary force. Where is this nation being led to in regard to defence?

I come now to the question of equipment on which my esteemed friend Mr. Dandekar has already thrown much light, and on which I shall throw further light, because by good fortune I happen to have fought in the last war with Pakitsan, by good fortune I happen to have earned certain singular honours, and by good fortune I happen to be an expert in ballistics and small arms. So, I draw the attention of the House and the Minister to the drawbacks the army felt.

Good equipment means also good morale. During the last war, we were greatly helped by God, there is no doubt about it. For instance, I know that every time the First Armoured Division moved out for manoeuvres, only 50 per cent of its Centurion tanks reached the destination, the rest having breakdowns on the way, but when the First Armoured Division moved one of its units to Khemkaran, by the grace of God not a single tank broke down on the way, not a single tank had mechanical failure. So, it was the grace of God. Now, are we to rely only on the grace of God again?

The sorry state of equipment that we have is shown by the two examples that I give now. We started with a venture to make our own tank, the Vyjayanta. It was an excellent tank by all accounts, yet the fact remains that the gun of the Vyjayanta was far inferior to the gun of the Centurion.

The Centurion gun still remains the best gun of all tanks in the world. It fires an armour-piercing shot at the muzzle velocity of 4700 ft. per second, which is 1,000 ft. per second more than the Patton muzzle velocity. The Centurion tank which gave such a good account of the Indian Armoured Corps in Phillora and in Khemkaran . . .

Shri Randhir Singh (Rotak): Are they as good as Pattons?

Shri Ranjit Singh: They are much better than Pattons.

Again, naturally the gun remains, but it is also the man behind the weapon that counts, and our men were far superior to them.

The question of the wireless sets has already been elaborately told over here by Mr. Dandekar. Now I will give two examples to show how the army suffered due to lack of communications and breakdown of communications. When our forces were advancing for the capture of Sialkot and there was nothing left in Sialkot, their army had deserted it, the civilians had deserted it, it was only a question of going there to occupy it, because of the loss of communications two brigades could not place each other on the ground, and they delayed this the whole night trying to place each other's position, and in the morning came cease-fire. These wireless sets which we were using never functioned at night, at night they just failed to function, and even now the army is short of good wireless sets. We need wireless sets which are transistorised which we can manufacture in the country, but the sources are neither being tapped, nor are the finances forthcoming.

Then there is the question of rifles. Ichapore gave a very good rifle to the army, but it is a rifle that is still cumbersome to carry.

Mr. Chairman: He has already taken 30 minutes, the time allotted to

his party, but he is making quite an interesting speech, and I would not mind giving him a few more minutes.

Shri Ranjit Singh: In the matter of extremely vital equipment, we are still dependent on foreign countries. Take the question of HF 24. We started a division to manufacture fusillage over here and get the engine manufactured in Egypt. I do not know who gave this idea. But whoever gave this idea does need to be treated a little roughly both by the Government and by the people of this country. It was nothing short of misguiding the nation and placing the nation in a dangerous position. To have the engine manufactured by a nation whose technical knowledge is not as advanced as our own and to have the smaller thing, fusillage manufactured in this country is indeed something that does not tally with intelligence.

An hon. Member: Are we still manufacturing it there?

Shri Ranjit Singh: My information is that that factory has been razed to the ground . . . (Interruptions).

Shri Samar Guha (Contai): My short notice question on this matter had been rejected.

Shri Ranjit Singh: Now, the rifles that we are using weigh 10.5 lbs. By using calibre bullet .303, the carrying capacity of the soldier for bullets is not increased by using these rifles. The world has gone on to rifles with much higher velocity and with lighter body weight, and much smaller calibre to ensure that soldier is able to carry greater load of ammunition on his body. The tendency is to go in for 2 class with muzzle velocity of 3200—3700 feet per second. These rifles were being used by the Israelis and these are the latest rifles that America is using. It costs less than the present .303 rifles used by the Army; the wastage of ammunition is much less and the soldier can carry a much larger

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load of ammunition without increasing the weight. But a mere Rs. 10 crores to switch over to these rifles are not coming from the finance and therefore our fire power is stunted. The lessons of the last war as learnt by our defence forces are not being applied by the Government because of financial bottlenecks. For instance, we felt acute shortage of air defence equipment at the battle front itself. In the Central sector, while advancing towards Lahore we had no air defence arrangement. Not a single light ack-ack gun, anti aircraft gun, or machine gun in a full divisional front. The enemy aircraft came and we had no interception arrangements. It is under such circumstances that the morale of the Army breaks down. It is to be said to the credit of our forces that even under these circumstances we held our ground and did not run away like some other armies have done when there was no air superiority or air cover offered to them. And at the same time it was felt that we should have good anti tank defence for our gun areas. Our guns were exposed at times to the enemy tanks. It happened in Kashmir. One of our regiments had to leave its guns and come back because there was no anti-tank gun protection. It was recommended that there should be anti-tank defence in each gun area given to the divisional artillery and that it should be an integral part and each division should at least have one battery if not a full regiment of anti-aircraft guns. But what is the sorry state of affairs? We negotiated for the purchase of certain numbers of L-70 guns, which are quite good and modern enough to knock down the Pakistani aircraft, with France, but when our team went over there, because our team was stalled for financial reasons, financial red-tapism, when we went over there, we found that out of the 1,000 guns that had been ready for us, Pakistan team had already come and taken 600

away, leaving 400 rejected for our army. This is the sorry state of defence finance.

Now, I will give another example, and that is about intelligence. I will give examples of the faulty military intelligence which is still placing us in danger. We all know of the existence of the Ichhogil canal, but for four full days our armed forces could not approach the Ichhogil canal because our military intelligence—in fact there was no military intelligence—our civil intelligence had reported that the west bank of the Ichhogil canal was higher than the east bank. It commanded the entire east bank and contained the anti-tank defence. Unless we reconnoitered this position, and unless we neutralised this anti-tank gun positions, naturally, it would be suicidal for our tanks to advance. How much time does it take to find out whether one bank of the Ichhogil canal is higher than the other bank? There were thousands of pilgrims, thousands of tradesmen, going to Pakistan every day before the war and passing over the Ichhogil canal; why could we not send a military officer, disguised as a civilian, with a civilian passport, just to pass over the canal, peep out and see whether the canal had equal banks or one bank was higher? Our Government just did not think about it.

Mr. Chairman: The hon. Member's time is up.

Shri Ranjit Singh: I will take just five more minutes. I will give just one or two examples. The contribution that I am making is from my personal experience, and these are things still exercising the mind of our military commanders. I come now to the most important factor, and that is, morale. It is easy for the Government to say that our troops have high morale. That is not the question. Our troops, when they are engaged in battle with Pakistan, will always have a high morale. The question

is that morale sustainable under all conditions? If we give to the troops no motivation for the present, the harassment of their families continues here, do we expect that their morale will be sustainable under all conditions? If we give it bad leadership, do we expect their morale will be sustainable under all conditions? Judging from the morale of the Arab nations, just before the war, we would have thought that that army was capable of doing anything, but that morale was not sustainable under all conditions. Therefore, conditions must be created here and now, during peace-time, to see that the morale of the soldier will be sustainable under all circumstances. What are we doing now? Their family is harassed, and their people at home have no protection. There are States like Punjab and Rajasthan where the officers go round and find out the trouble of the soldiers' families, and set them right. The credit goes to Punjab and Rajasthan. But there are places here the soldier is the least consideration. There is an example which has come before me just today. A Colonel in a station in Madhya Pradesh had his daughter eloped, and the police refused to take out the first information report, only because the miscreant was connected with the police. Now, consider the morale of that Colonel. It is under such circumstances, when the morale of the army becomes anti-Government, that seeds are laid for military revolution which none of us would welcome, but which this Government, I am sorry to say, has sown.

Consider the economic bottlenecks that exist in the budget for defence. There is a reduction in the budget, on vital issues. For instance, we have cut down on stores by Rs. 15 crores. When what we provisioned when the vote on account was passed, and what we have provisioned now, there is a difference of Rs. 15 crores. In Rs. 15 crores, you could have raised a considerable number of fighter aircraft and

We are cutting down all these things, and at the same time, we are allotting priorities to the expansion of the Asoka Hotel. We are allotting priorities for building a 20 lakh auditorium, which will bring us two Gnat planes. If we think our borders are in danger and our country has to face the enemy, if the Government is determined that some day we must liberate those areas now under foreign occupation, then we must think of allotting priorities first and foremost to the defence organisation. For, nothing can subjugate the defence of the country. The present budget as formulated must be outright rejected, because it is not defence-conscious from the very beginning to the very end.

What is the remedy to all these? The Defence Minister will not understand; probably he cannot understand. The Government refuses to understand. Now, the only remedy is for a Standing Committee of Parliament to go into all these things to allot priorities and also to formulate the national war aims. Without a national war aim—in fact this Government is proceeding without any aim anywhere—they will proceed nowhere.

Shri Shanhi Ranjan (Pupri): You are giving a very good speech and we are listening to it attentively. Do not dilute it by mixing up other things.

Shri Ranjit Singh: You are more worried about dilution of the Government's reputation than the dilution of the defence preparedness of the country. It is not an aspersion on any political party. It goes to show that defence is a very technical matter, which cannot be handled by non-technical men.

Sir, I thank the House for the indulgence shown to me. I request that the entire defence policy should be reformulated. Even if it is done by a

[Shri Ranjit Singh]

we do not mind. But it should be realistic and take into account as to whether we have got enemies to face. If we are prepared for war, we will have peace. But if we are unprepared for war, we will go under foot when war comes.

Shri Shashi Ranjan: Sir, I wish to point out that there is no high military officer in the official gallery. Will you direct that the military officers should be called to be seated in the official gallery when the defence debate takes place? The gallery is meant for that purpose. Not a single officer high-up is present. This is a very sorrowful state of affairs. Does it mean that they consider our opinion to be insignificant?

Mr. Chairman: We are concerned only with the Defence Minister, not the officers in the gallery.

The Minister of Defence (Shri Swaran Singh): The convention always has been that anything outside the House is invisible and we should never take notice of it.

Shri Shashi Ranjan: Then, what is the good of having an official gallery? It can be wound up. We do not want it to be a show. Let all the members say whether they agree with me or not. The Minister should not talk like that; it is not in accordance with propriety.

Shri Swaran Singh: I think there is unnecessary excitement over this issue. The parliamentary convention has always been—we should steadfastly adhere to it—that the spokesmen of the Government in the Cabinet are answerable to the House and not the officers.

Shri Shashi Ranjan: But you have got to respect the wishes of the members here.

Shri Swaran Singh: I am sure the House does not at all agree with this

suggestion because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of democracy and it is parliamentary democracy that we are functioning under. We should never take note of the people in the galleries, whether it is the officers' box, press gallery or the visitors' gallery. We are concerned with the House only and here I am responsible for every one as far as defence matters are concerned. If the officers fail or others fail, I am responsible to the House and none of them is responsible.

Shri Ranjit Singh: The point raised by the hon. Member can be carried to this extent that instead of getting army officers here, some of us would be ready to discuss these matters with the army officers in the presence of the Defence Secretary and the Defence Minister.

Shri Swaran Singh: Although the desire is there, and I think it is well-intentioned, there are certain principles of democracy, certain norms, and once we slip from those norms and principles then it is inconsistent with either the spirit of the Constitution or the democratic principles. It is the Government spokesmen alone who are responsible to Parliament, and I would beg of hon. Members not to have their eyes on the permanent staff, whether they are civil, military, navy or air force officers. It is the Government's responsibility, and whatever instructions are given to the officers, either civil, military or navy, they are given by the Government and we are responsible to the House here.

Shri Ranga (Srikakulam): Sir, I entirely agree with what the Defence Minister has said just now. It would be wrong for us, Members of Parliament, to be turning our attention to whosoever sits there in the official gallery. We are not concerned about their presence at all. We are only dealing with the Ministers here. The

Ministers are responsible to the Parliament through the Cabinet. Therefore, I think, our hon. friends, who have come to Parliament either this year or in the last Parliament, will bear with the conventions of parliamentary life and respect at least, even if they do not bother about the Opposition, the interpretation given of the convention by their own ministers. If they are not willing to do so, we can only say we are sorry for these hon. Members (Interruptions).

Mr. Chairman: As the hon. Member still seems to be not convinced, let me tell him that I have been a Presiding Officer for so many years and never, even in the State legislature, any point was raised about the presence of officers in the gallery. It is absolutely a wrong point of order. Hon. Members may now move the cut motions to Demands for Grants relating to the Ministry of Defence, subject to their being otherwise admissible.

Shri S. Kundu (Balasore): I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1".

[Failure to provide proper and effective defence services on the north-east border of India from Raniganj to Jalpaiguri. (1)].

Shri N. Dandekar: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1".

[Failure to modernise both the management and the plant, tools and equipment of the older ordnance factories. (2)]

Shri E. K. Nayanar (Palghat): I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Handling the retrenchment and the resettlement of water carriers and sweepers by the authorities of B.E.G. and Centre Kirki, Poona—3. (4)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need for recognition of the trade union rights of the civilian employees of B.E.G. and Centre, Kirki, Poona. (5)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to remove the grievances relating to service conditions of the persons of B.E.G. and Centre, Kirki, Poona. (6)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Denial of the privilege of mutual transfer to certain employees of 512 Army Base Workshop, Kirki, Poona (7)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Delay by the Ministry of Defence in disposing the appeals preferred by the employees. (8)].

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Discharging employees under the rule 5 of the service conduct rules of the civilian employees in Defence. (9)].

Shri Ramavatar Shastri (Patna): I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Shri Ramavatar Shastri]

{Excessive expenditure on high officials in the name of general administration. (11)}.

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100".

{Need for more expenditure on the amenities of ordinary employees as against high officials. (12)}.

Shri S. Kumda: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced to Re. 1."

[Failure to raise Orissa regiment. (14)]

Shri Samar Guha: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced to Re. 1."

{Failure to organise guerilla army for the Himalayan region. (16)}.

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced to Re. 1."

{Failure in formation of para military border force. (17)}.

Shri N. Dandekar: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced to Re. 1."

{Failure to study and to draw lessons from the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965 and to undertake appropriate reorganisation, re-equipment and re-training of the Armed Forces for hostile operations on the Western Front. (20)}.

Shri Ramavatar Shastri: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100".

{Need to grant adequate pay and allowances to civilian employees. (51)}.

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Army be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to pay adequate attention to the amenities of Territorial Army personnel. (53)}.

Shri S. Kumda: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Navy be reduced to Re. 1".

{Failure to provide one naval base at Paradip Port. (61)}.

Shri Samar Guha: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Navy be reduced to Re. 1".

{Failure to set up a base in Andaman Islands. (62)}.

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Navy be reduced to Re. 1".

{Policy regarding recruitment in Navy. (63)}.

Shri N. Dandekar: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Navy be reduced to Re. 1".

{Failure to re-organise the naval forces into two separate fleets: the Eastern and the Western. (64)}.

Shri Ramavatar Shastri: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Navy be reduced by Rs. 100".

{Need to do justice to all States in the matter of recruitment to the Navy. (68)}.

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Navy be reduced by Rs. 100".

{Fall in the standard of living of Jawans in the Navy. (69)}.

Shri Samar Guha: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced to Rs. 1".

[Failure in further strengthening the Air Force. (70)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced to Re. 1".

[Failure to manufacture rockets for the Air Force. (71)].

Shri Shinkre (Panjim): I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced to Re. 1".

[Failure to give due attention to expansion of the Air Force. (72)].

Shri Ramavatar Shastri: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to give adequate representation to the people of Bihar in recruitment to Air Force. (73)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Services, Effective-Air Force be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to increase the amenities for air-men. (74)].

Shri S. Kundu: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced to Re. 1".

[Need to establish new defence based industries in Orissa. (79)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced to Re. 1".

[Need to improve the present proof and experimental centre at Balasore, Orissa, into a major one. (80)].

Shri Ramavatar Shastri: I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced to Re. 1".

[Retrenchment policy in ordnance factories. (81)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced to Re. 1".

[Need to improve the working conditions of workers of ordnance factories. (82)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced to Re. 1".

[Dependence on foreign countries in the field of defence requirements of the country. (83)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced to Re. 1".

[Lack of ordnance factories to manufacture latest weapons in sufficient quantity. (84)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to pay special attention to making the country self-sufficient in the matter of arms. (89)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to manufacture modern arms in the country. (90)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Retrenchment of ordnance factories workers. (91)].

"That the demand under the head Defence Capital outlay be reduced by Rs. 100".

[Need to pay adequate attention to the development of ordnance factories. (92)].

Mr. Chairman: The cut motions are now also before the House.

15.55 hrs.

[Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER in the Chair]

Shri D. C. Sharma (Gurdaspur): I congratulate the hon. Minister and the hon. Member who preceded me for making a very valuable suggestion. But while I listened to him, I asked myself one question, and this has been put not only by me to myself but by others also to themselves, and that is: Are we always to believe the experts?

President Kennedy lost Cuba—it is given in his biographies—in the first place, because he believed in experts, he took the advice of experts, and he was not able to win over Cuba. Next time, he turned a deaf ear to the advice of experts and he was able to do something. Therefore, I am always very careful about what experts say because I know that experts know less and less of more and more and they get lost in the jungles of details and they do not see the wood for the trees.

I was very happy to find that my hon. friend had taken some part in the last war that we fought against Pakistan and I was very happy that he gave us his first-hand experiences of that war. Sir, the Second World War was fought long long ago. I have not been a soldier but I have been very fond of soldiers, I have been very fond of reading books on strategy and tactics and I have been very fond of reading reminiscences of generals and soldiers and other persons. After going through all these, I can assure you one thing that no two persons have agreed about the reading of the situation then. Therefore, I submit, personal experiences are not always a very correct guide of national policy; personal experiences are not always the right kind of pointer to having a national policy in any field of national endeavour. But all the same we have a national defence policy. I ask myself one question: Don't we have a national policy?

An hon. Member: No.

Shri D. C. Sharma: You say, 'No'. The gentleman sitting there talked of a military coup; he talked of military officers; he talked of armed revolutions and all that. Therefore, you do not think in terms of national defence policy. I think in terms of national defence policy. I know what our defence policy is.

Here is this gentleman who is always capitalising on his being a *jat*. Why should he sit here? He must go to his seat. Otherwise, I will not speak. He must go to his seat... (Interruption).

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: He is not coming in your way.

Shri D. C. Sharma: I ask you: Why should this man sit here?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order, order. He is not blocking you in any way. Please continue your speech.

Shri D. C. Sharma: What does he know? I know *jats* are great people....

श्री रणधीर सिंह (रोहतक) : माननीय रक्षक अपने ज्ञापको क्या समझते हैं? मैं इनकी इज्जत करता हूँ लेकिन ये सिर पर ही चढ़ते आ रहे हैं।

Shri D. C. Sharma: I ask this man to go to his seat . . . (Interruption).

Shri Randhir Singh: I care a hang for him. Who is he to ask me to go? If he has no respect, I am not obliged to pay him respect.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I will request the hon. Member to resume his speech tomorrow. Whatever time he has taken now will be deducted.

16 hrs.

MOTION RE. STATEMENT ON EMERGENCY

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Now we take up the motion on the statement on