

[Mr. Speaker]

necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1969, in respect of 'Capital Outlay of the Ministry of Education'."

17.48 hrs.

#### MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MR. SPEAKER: The House will now take up discussion and voting on the Demands for Grants under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs for which 6 hours have been allotted—we are keeping to the schedule; till now we have not lost.

Hon. Members present in the House who are desirous of moving cut motions may send slips at the Table within 15 minutes indicating the serial numbers of the cut motions they would like to move.

#### DEMAND NO. 13—EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MR. SPEAKER: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 14,94,31,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1969 in respect of 'External Affairs'."

#### DEMAND NO. 14—OTHER REVENUE EXPENDITURE OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MR. SPEAKER: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 16,71,13,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1969 in respect of 'Other Revenue Expenditure of the Ministry of External Affairs'."

SHRI M. R. MASANI (Rajkot): I rise to support cut motion No. 78, of which notice has been given by my hon. colleague, Prof. Ranga, and myself, which reads as follows:

"Failure of the Government to play an effective role in developing regional security arrangements for the defence of South and South-East Asia from Chinese Communist expansionism in collaboration with the countries of South-East Asia, Japan and Australia, the need for which has become more urgent in view of recent developments".

Before I come to the major topics with which I wish to deal, I would like to observe that in the last few weeks the results of our efforts in the international sphere have not been marked by distinguished success. We have had setbacks on many fronts. I will only give two examples. One is the failure of UNCTAD-II which met for several weeks in our own capital. This big mountain of a conference, which cost the UN so many million dollars—I do not know what it has cost the poor taxpayer of this country to have this big conference on our soil quite unnecessarily—this big mountain of a conference has brought forth a mouse, not even a mouse. Because it ended in abject failure as was accepted by the representatives of Brazil and many other countries on the floor of UNCTAD itself.

The other big failure was the fiasco of Mr. Bhagat's visit to Kenya. I do not have the time today to go into the rights and wrongs of the position taken by the Government of Kenya, the Government of Britain and our own Government in regard to the unfortunate people who have got caught in this conflict between three Governments and two sets of racialism. But the point I am on is this. It is quite clear that our diplomacy was heavy footed, that we were clumsy in the approach we

made and that our Minister should never have gone to Kenya unless the ground had been prepared and his visit was welcomed by Mr. Jomo Kenyatta and his colleagues. We unnecessarily exposed ourselves to a ridiculous situation. Another thing that marks the failure of our efforts was in our peculiar attitude. When our Minister was rebuffed by the Kenya Government, instead of realising that we are up against a new kind of racialism, black racialism which is sweeping all Africa today, we turned round to find a whipping boy and we turned back to our good old friends who have been taking whippings from us for the century of whipping they gave us earlier. Mr. Nirad Chaudhuri, one of our boldest and most independent commentators, has described this phenomenon in an article he wrote in the *Hindustan Times* on the 31st of last month:

"If the Kenya Government has insulted an Indian Minister, and through him both our Government and India, the party to get angry with should be the Government of Kenya and not the British Government. It is however our private habit to pass on our bad temper on to those who cannot stand up to us. We know that if we said something strong against Africans, they would not be discreet or soft-spoken but would give back more than they received. On the other hand, the British Government, if not the British people, would take it lying down. It was obviously this feeling combined with a desire to find a safety-valve for the anger of politicians, which made the Prime Minister hedge in regard to the British instigation behind the fancied snub at Nairobi."

I can go on like this, but I should like to confine myself to the major topics in the short time at my disposal. One is the draft Treaty Against

Nuclear Proliferation. That is a big issue facing this country and it is a crucial decision, whether or not to sign that treaty. Our Government seems to be altogether without a policy on this subject. On the one hand, it has quite rightly, accounted—and I give them my full support, my Party is with them on this—that we should not even attempt to produce nuclear weapons. We have given them support and our reasons for it when Lal Bahadur Shastri was our Prime Minister. We believe that it is neither economically nor politically feasible or desirable that we should make this attempt. Mr. Desai, our Deputy Prime Minister, has given the economic reasons in an article he wrote in March this year. He said that economically it will break us if we trying to enter this nuclear race because of its fantastic cost; it will not be possible for us to spare any funds unless we are prepared to be much poorer than we are today. How will that help us? Our people will die in poverty even before destruction by a bomb thrown by China". This is what he has said. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai himself explained that all that we can do today with our resources is to create a gimmick, a gadget which would be something lying in Trombay and which will satisfy our national age, but which it will be simply funny to do without the means to deliver it in Peking or Shanghai or Canton. For these and other reasons we agree with the Government that no attempt should be made to make the bomb. On the other hand, there seems to be difficulty in signing the Treaty and it looks as if we are going to have the worst of both worlds—neither have the bomb nor this treaty agreeing not to make it. Somebody has described our policy as follows: "India will not sign the treaty; it will not make use of the nuclear choice; it will not ask for or accept bilateral guarantees. And it will not look at the Security Council umbrella". It is very clear as to what we will not do. But the question is, what will we do? What does the Government

[Shri M. R. Masani]

stand positively upon, and in order to help it and the House to make up its mind not today but in the coming months, I would like to examine the pros and cons of signing the Treaty Against Nuclear Proliferation.

There are some arguments, which are cogent, against the signing of the Treaty. The first of these is that it would come in the way of the peaceful development of atomic energy. From what little I have been able to study of the Treaty and find out, I do not think that there is any reasonable basis for this complaint. Article IV of the Treaty is very clear. It gives the fullest liberty for the development of the peaceful uses of the atom. Article V even allows for an explosion which is very near the border line but the explosion must be done by a nuclear power on behalf of a non-nuclear power with the permission of the world authority. So, nothing is barred so long as it is done in concert with the world authority. There cannot, therefore, be the argument that signing it, comes in the way of peaceful development. And if it does, let minor amendments be made to put it right.

A stronger argument is this. That the Treaty is unfair to the non-nuclear powers because, while leaving the nuclear powers supreme to do what they like and to advance on the path of nuclear armaments, it puts constraints and restraints on all non-nuclear countries. This is a very correct argument. It is true that under the Treaty, the Super Powers are excluded from any measure of interference, inspection or control.

Now, I regret that the United States which, for over a decade had insisted that on international inspection for themselves and for the Soviet Union have given in on this point, to an utterly reactionary and out of date concept of her national sovereignty espoused by the Soviet Government. It is a matter of pity. I

have deplored it, but deplorable as it may be, the Treaty, in article VI and its preamble, does hold out the aim that even the nuclear powers are prepared to discuss submitting themselves to international discipline. Because of the Soviet objection that their national sovereignty will be infringed by any inspection, which is reactionary, the others have agreed. America has given in, and I deplore it. But they do say that we shall look forward to come to terms on that issue. Therefore, one can see it is a very halting and unsatisfactory step towards stopping nuclear proliferation, and I think we would all agree that we would like to see proliferation stop both in the interests of humanity and of our own country.

Another argument is that we may like to go in later for nuclear armaments to stop the Chinese communist threat and we should not tie our hand in this fashion. This again is not a very convincing argument because the treaty under article X opens the door to any country changing its mind for good reasons by giving only 90 days' notice. In three months, Sir, we can untie our hands from this obligation. Is there any one to suggest that it is too long a period for getting out of this solemn contract? That again is not a very convincing argument for not signing the Treaty.

Let us now consider the other aspect: what are the disadvantages of not signing it? The first is that we will isolate ourselves from the mainstream of the world. Today, as far as one can guess, there are only half a dozen countries who will be adamant against signing the Treaty and we should consider the kind of company in which we shall find ourselves if we take that step. These countries which are adamant are Albania, Cuba, Rumania, North Vietnam, North Korea and Communist China. I for one would not like to be found in that company either by

day or by night. The record of these countries and the kind of governments they enjoy or suffer from we need not discuss here. But I would not like to see the country of Gandhi, when the whole world advances in one direction, join this thieves kitchen on the other.

Then we shall lose the goodwill of both the Super Powers. In a righteous cause where principle is involved, I would not mind. If both the Super Powers are wrong, let us certainly take a consistent stand for world progress, peace and humanity. There will be the political disadvantage of annoying the big two. There will be economic hardships and handicaps. Certainly under Article V of the treaty, India will be denied the benefits of the co-operation of the nuclear powers in developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Today the United States is giving us nuclear fuel. If we do not sign the treaty, they will be bound to stop it. Canada has been a very friendly country to us in the nuclear field. All our advance has been made with the full participation and friendship of the Canadians. They have given generously to us. We have agreed that we will never use this for nuclear armament purposes. It is quite possible that the Government of Canada will take the line that our refusal to sign puts our pledge to them in some doubt. It need not be so. We may tell them that we will carry out our pledge to them, but we do not want to sign the treaty. They may accept it because they are friendly. But they may not accept it. They may say: "Your position is doubtful. If you are so clear, why don't you sign it?" So, we may even lose the Canadian support we have been getting over the last decade.

18 hrs.

Apart from the danger of annoying everyone, is it a desirable posture to take up that, when the great

powers are moving in one direction, we should come in the way? In a speech in this House on July 15 last year, I had argued—I am quoting:

"Our policies should be of trying to bring the two super-powers even closer together than they

are today, of helping the tendencies to cooperation while not encouraging the tendencies to quarrel. This means two things. Wherever the super powers are more or less in agreement, unless it goes against our vital interests, we should not come in their way and we should not antagonise them. But where both of them are quarreling, we should certainly not take sides, if it can be avoided, and we should try to sit quiet and use our influence to bring them together because that is what the peace of the world and our own interests demand."

In this case, the two super-powers are cooperating broadly in the direction. We may not be satisfied with the rate of progress, but to cut across what they are trying to do and to thwart this effort and join the company which I mentioned earlier, I do not think would be a very desirable political posture for our country.

Finally, we lose the benefit, by not signing the Treaty, of any nuclear guarantee that is attached to this Treaty. There is a draft Resolution attached to the Treaty which says that, with the consent of the Security Council, the nuclear deterrent will be used to protect any country that is attacked by communist China or any nuclear power. It is true that the Security Council is not a body which gives an automatic guarantee. There is Great Power veto; there are politics and there is diplomacy. I for one would have much preferred a guarantee free from the veto of the Security Council. It is not a very good guarantee; it is a very doubtful guarantee.

But who is responsible for this? I say our Government is responsible.

[Shri M. R. Masani]

By refusing to accept the offer made as far back as 1964 by the United States of a bilateral foolproof guarantee, if we were prepared to enter into that arrangement, we threw away a bilateral foolproof guarantee. Again last year, when Dr. Vikram Sarabhai and Mr. L. K. Jha went to Moscow and Washington, came back and reported publicly that the response was very favourable and both powers were inclined to give a parallel guarantee, though not a joint one, again we threw away the initiative. When I asked the Prime Minister last July what our Government was doing about it, she said: it is not for us to do anything. Then for whom was it to do something? Did she expect the USA and USSR to come to us on bended knees and say "Oh! Bharat Mata! Please condescend to accept our guarantee so that we may protect you"?

As a result of this waffling and indecisiveness, we have now lost our bargaining power and we have jolly well to take the guarantee that is offered, unsatisfactory as it might be. But even now, I would urge on the Prime Minister that in the few months that still remain before the Treaty comes up for signature, because it now goes to a Special Session of the General Assembly, during these few months, let us try for two things. Let us try to improve the terms of the Treaty to the extent that it is possible in the General Assembly from our own point of view. Secondly, let us still get from the USA and the Soviet Union some *quid pro quo* for signing the Treaty.

If we want conventional armaments which are not being given to us, let us get those conventional arms. If we want a particular kind of economic assistance, let us ask for it. If we want political support and goodwill, let us get it because that is how business is done at the international level. We still have a few months. Let us not pursue this path of neither having the bomb nor the advantages of not making the bomb.

Then, it is argued that Indian public opinion is hostile to signing the Treaty. I would like to question that. When we talk of public opinion, who do we mean? Is it really suggested that the peasants in India in our villages are greatly concerned as to whether we sign or do not sign the Treaty Against Nuclear proliferation? Does it really mean that the masses of our country are interested in this technical thing which is an abstract issue? The reality is that it is a handful of intellectuals and the elite in this country, a certain number of chauvinists, who are really interested.

I think Government themselves are responsible for not educating public opinion. Look at the Report of the Defence Ministry that was put before us a few days ago. It highlights the military threat from China. Nobody is more opposed to the posture of Communist China *vis-a-vis* India than myself. I and my Party stand for breaking off diplomatic relations with that bandit regime. But I say that the main threat from Communist China is political. It is not only military; it is a mixed one, if you like. We are stressing more and more the military threat and are neglecting the political threat which has already raised its head in Bengal and elsewhere—in Naxalbari which was a symbol of what is coming to this country. Nothing can please Mao Tse-tung and his lot more than our entering into a mad arms race with them which will ruin our economy, bring more starvation and deprivation and drive more and more people into the arms of their Fifth Column through that economic distress.

We have got probably six months or four or five months before the Treaty will come for final signature and I would suggest to the Prime Minister—let there be a small parliamentary Committee of serious students of this subject from all sections of the House to study this Treaty. Let them place before it as much

information as they think can be safely given to us. What is highly confidential they need not disclose to us. Let us that way educate ourselves and the country to the pros and cons of this matter in a purely pragmatic spirit. Let then the Government come before us—it is their obligation—and say whether we should sign or not sign the treaty. It is not my job or that of anyone on this side, who are denied the information, today to come out and say, "Yes, sign the treaty" or "Do not sign". I am not prepared to take either position at this stage. But a day will come when this Parliament will have to express itself if it is not done now. It is the obligation of the Government to come before us, educate us, give us the information and then face us with their concrete proposal.

In the remaining time that I have let me turn to another major aspect—that is the cut motion moved by us—the position in South and South East Asia. In the last two days that situation has undergone a dramatic change by the pronouncement made by the President of the United States declaring that there has been a cessation of bombing of over 90 per cent of the population of North Vietnam. In case anyone thinks that this means that the United States are selling out South Vietnam, I think it would be a mistake to get depressed and to come to that defeatist conclusion because one of the sentences in the same speech was:—

"We will not accept a fake solution to this long and arduous struggle and call it peace"

But the United States Government has done what our Government had been clamouring for for the last year or so. 48 hours have passed and I have been hoping that the Prime Minister as the head of our Government would come out with a clear call to the North Vietnamese Government to reciprocate and to announce de-escalation of some such

nature on their side. But there has been a deafening silence in so far as she is concerned. I hope when she replies to the debate tomorrow, she will make a call on the North Vietnamese Government, on whose behalf she had been arguing for the cessation of bombing, to show what they are prepared to do concretely in response to this 90 per cent acceptance of our demand.

The *Indian Express* in an editorial this morning put this matter clearly when it said:—

"What an honest middleman sets out to achieve is the greatest common measure of agreement. In effect, President Johnson has come 90 per cent of the way. It is India's plain duty, as Chairman of the ICC, to persuade Hanoi and Moscow to move 10 per cent in response."

The UK Government, within a few hours, made an approach to Moscow. If the Prime Minister does not come out with this kind of a clear call tomorrow, then I am afraid the sincerity of our Government in the appeals which it has been making for the cessation of bombing would be liable to be questioned as one that was partisan and not really activated by an equitable motive.

Now, what are the implications for this country and its defence of Mr. Johnson's statement? We hold the view that it was because of North Vietnamese freedom being sustained by the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Philippine and Thailand that Indonesia was able to avert a Communist take-over and which is today firmly a member of the free world in South East Asia.

Mr. Lee Kwan Yew, the Socialist Prime Minister of Singapore is, in my view, justified in his belief that the American war effort in Viet Nam has been giving Free Asians time to strengthen themselves against Chinese Communist aggression.

[Shri M. R. Masani]

Let us consider what is likely to happen if negotiations start. My fear is that the Viet Nam might go the way of Laos. Some years ago, President Kennedy sent Mr. Harriman—and he is the same Mr. Harriman who is now getting ready to negotiate in Viet Nam—to settle the civil war in Laos and this very naive gentleman advised the Laotians to neutralise their country and have a coalition Government with Prince Souvanna Phouma, the present Prime Minister, as the neutralist Prime Minister and two Vice Prime Ministers, one royalist and one communist, and they thought that that will solve the problem. What has been the result? The result is that one-third of Laos is today in the hands of North Vietnamese troops.

On 1st April, 1968, two days back, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the neutralist Prime Minister of Laos, announced in a radio broadcast in Vietnamese that there were 40,000 North Vietnamese regular troops on his territory and he condemned North Vietnamese aggression in his own country. In February, the Pathet Laos who are the counterpart of the Vietcong satellites on the other side attacked India and Canada as members of the I.C.C. for violating Laotian sovereignty! *Chor Kotwal Ko Dante*. Do we want Vietnam to be another Laos in another year or two? I want to ask the Government and the House this. If we do not, then the implications for our defence are that our job has become harder by reason of the recent developments in South-East Asia. The war in Vietnam had tied down a large number of Chinese Communist troops to the north of Vietnam. Now, they will be free to move to the Himalayas and put greater pressure on Burma, whose northern provinces are being eaten up like Laos by Chinese Communist troops, and on our own frontiers. The danger of encroachment is increasing as far as we are concerned. That is why intelligent Asian leaders

of South-East Asia have not rejoiced at these developments.

On 2nd April, Mr. Tunku Abdul Rahman said:

"I hope from this decision that the Americans do not mean to give up the fight to preserve democracy against communism. Vietnam is very important to the security of this part of the world."

Mr. Tunku Abdul Rahman has proved to be a very fine and loyal friend of this country. Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand said on 1st April:

"If the U.S. changed its Vietnam policy, its honour would be damaged and no one would trust the U.S. any more."

Even in distant Australia and New Zealand, there has been the concern at the weakening of the front.

Simultaneously, British Naval Power is withdrawing from the Indian Ocean, from Singapore and from the Persian Gulf. There is a danger of isolationism raising its head in the U.S. as a result of being left alone to shed their blood when countries nearer the scene of aggression were sitting quietly and comfortably at home.

The *London Economist* of December 30, 1967 said the choice before the American people was "whether they are essentially an east-ward looking people who will confine their attention to the relatively small part of the world around the Atlantic Ocean or whether they want go on carrying their responsibilities westward into Asia as well."

From what is happening I begin to fear that the choice is being made in the wrong direction and that the American Isolationism, which is raising its head, will say. "To hell with

Asia. We do not care what its people want to do. Let them go Communist if they like. We are not going to shed our blood any more. Let us confine ourselves to the Atlantic world, to Hemisphere defence as the isolationists would like to call it. That will be a very sad day for India and the neighbouring countries.

Therefore, somebody has to fill up the vacuum. I do not want outsiders to do it. The countries of South-East Asia and South Asia, surrounding the Indian nation, should be the countries to fill the vacuum. But how do we do it? Could we do it alone? Have we got the Navy? Have we got the Air Force? The answer is 'No'. Therefore, this vacuum can only be filled if we join hands with our neighbours, with Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand to secure our shores from the threat from the seas.

Unfortunately, far from taking a lead in this direction, we have been most backward and most laggardly in this situation. We have been looking down on other countries as inferior because, ten years ago they aligned themselves in defence of their security while we indulged in the folly that led to the invasion on our own country in 1962. We still go on behaving like Brahmins and treat the so-called aligned countries as Harijans. Which were these countries? Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan. These were the countries which made a choice. Rightly or wrongly, we disagreed with them, but are we going to carry on this theoretical, doctrinal quarrel for centuries? Is it not time now that, faced with a common threat, we stop this caste system and say: "Let us get together"?

In September, 1966, Mr. Lee Kwan Yew visited New Dehl. He tried to awaken our Government to their obligations. Unfortunately, he failed and, when he left, he told the Press that India was perhaps living in a dream world."

When the Association of South-East Asian nations was formed on the 8th August, 1967, we should have joined it, but we kept aloof. Now it is announced that Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia, neutralist countries, non-aligned countries, are going to join it. But we do not make any move. Why do we not take any interest while the other neutralist countries are dropping the caste system? How long are we going to carry on this Brahminism and treat every one else as non-Brahmins?

Our former Foreign Minister, Mr. Chagla, visited several countries of the region in May, 1967, and he promised to submit to the statesmen of those countries a scheme for a council of Asia. That was in May, 1967. After some time, when the other statesmen were asked: "Have you received the draft of the Council of Asia?" they said, "No, we have not heard from Mr. Chagla again".

On June 17, 1967, Tunku Abdul Rahman complained that he was still awaiting the contents of the proposal from India. He said, "He had promised to send me the details of the proposal, but so far there has been no new development".

The Ceylonese Prime Minister had the same story to tell. He said "So far as I am concerned, I have not heard anything about it".

In Singapore, on May 8, 1967, Mr. Chagla very bravely said that whatever assistance we can give to South-East Asia to resist Chinese communist expansionism we shall be glad to do so. Three months later, he told the Rajya Sabha that the Government's policy was not to enter into regional security arrangements with our neighbours in this region against China.

Now, let us not imagine that all these countries are waiting for us or that they are dying for us to join. That day is gone. Ten years ago, they would have been grateful to us for



[Shri M. R. Masani]

going to their rescue, but today they will accept us if we want to, and they do not care two hoots if we do not.

Mr. Chanchal Sarker, writing in *Hindustan Standard* of 11th March, 1968, after visiting all the countries of the region, including Indonesia, says:

"India has acquired an image abroad of a starving, indigent nation beset with violent internal disorders which would pull askew all Asian economic plan and suck in all the benefits."

We are not going to be greeted as great saviours and liberators, but still they want us. If we do not go, then it will be so much the worse for us and not for them, because they are getting together. Tunku Abdul Rahman recently visited Indonesia, the country of Dr. Sukarno, the pro-Communist dictator, which had threatened "Confrontation". He was received like a popular hero by the same country that had declared war on his country.

Indonesia is developing ties with Taiwan and South Korea. They know where the troops come from when they are attacked. They do not expect anything from us. Malaysia and Singapore are joining with New Zealand, Australia and Britain in a meeting in a few months to consider how the vacuum created by the threat of British naval forces to withdraw in 1971 can be filled. But why only five? Why don't our Government say; we are prepared to come in and play our proper part in the defence of our own India Ocean? I want to leave that thought with the Government and the Prime Minister. As I said, I speak in support of our Cut Motion and, unless she makes satisfactory statements on this subject and on the Vietnam issue, we shall press our Cut Motion when it is put to the vote tomorrow.

SHRI SRADHAKAR SUPAKAR: (Sambalpur): Within the limited time at my disposal I shall try to meet

some of the points raised by Shri M. R. Masani. He has raised many points, but to my mind the most important of these are (i) our alleged failure to handle the Kenya crisis, (ii) the usual tirade against our policy of non-alignment....

SHRI M. R. MASANI: No tirade.

SHRI SRADHAKAR SUPAKAR:... and (iii) our signing the non-proliferation treaty.

I shall take up first the recent developments in Kenya. This matter has been discussed in this House on two occasions previously. All that I wish to say is that this matter has been sufficiently discussed but still, again and again, allegations have been made that the Government of India failed in their duty to protect the people of Asian region who are residing in Kenya and who wanted to migrate to the UK. In this connection, I would like to ask what more the Government of India should have and could have done to protect the interests of the people of Asian origin in Kenya?

18.22 hrs.

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

It is well known that when the Government of Kenya passed the immigration law and the law of trade licensing, the Government of India advised the people of Indian origin residing in Kenya to accept the citizenship of that State, and to identify their interest with the interest of the residents of that country. But due to some reason or other, at that time, many people of Asian origin just chose to take the UK citizenship, and the reason why they did so is not very far to seek. At that time, as has been mentioned here previously also, there was persuasion on behalf of some British leaders to those people to accept the UK citizenship as a measure of safety. At that time also they had two alternatives, to accept the UK citizenship or to

come to India by accepting Indian citizenship. Between the three choices, the choice to remain there, the choice to migrate to India and the choice to migrate to the UK, they had some difficulty in making a proper choice. The people staying there, especially those who were making good profits and who were victims of racial discrimination in that country could not identify themselves with the people there; at least some of them could not do so. Of course, we must remember that more than 10,000 people have accepted Kenyan citizenship. But regarding the rest, the reason why they decided to migrate to the UK rather than come to India was that they were better off in Kenya and they had been better off in Kenya than the average citizens of India.

In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to a very interesting and illuminating article which appeared in *The Hindu* some time ago. Of course, it was before Kenyan Independence; at that time, many of these people of Asian origin, Indians as well as Pakistanis, were having a better standard of life there in Kenya than they would have had if they had come to India. I am referring to the article by Mr. Channan Singh in *The Hindu*, which appeared in 1960. It is stated that at that time also the average wage that was earned by the Asian people was much higher than that earned by the native people there, and it worked out to £570 per annum, which comes to about Rs. 633 per month. Is it possible for those people who were earning there something like Rs. 600 per month to come to India for a precarious job? When we compare the employment opportunities available in India and in the UK, can we blame them for preferring and accepting UK citizenship at that time? At that time, they never anticipated that such a situation would be created by the immigration law passed by the UK in the last week of February this year. All the trouble arose out of the fact that the UK in a panic tried to shut out these people of Asian origin

from going to UK, though the Kenyans have a fundamental right to go there because they hold UK citizenship rights. At that time, our Minister also tried to help by making a categorical statement in this House, on 29 February this year, not a day too late, I should say, where he emphasised the fact that the people of Asian origin holding British passports had a fundamental right to go to UK and the British Government should not have deprived them of their right to go UK, and they were their responsibility. There was also a statement that if under these circumstances the UK wants to prevent these people from going to UK of which country they are citizens, the Government of India might be compelled to revise the present regulations regarding the coming of persons holding British Commonwealth passports into India.

When a discussion took place in this House, it was stated by the Minister that after the Bill was passed in the House of Commons, the number of people who should be permitted to immigrate to the UK should not be confined to the paltry figure of 1500 per annum but should be at the rate of 15,000 per annum. Here I may read out from the statement of the hon. Minister made on 6th March, 1968.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: He may resume his speech tomorrow. Hon. Members, may now move the cut motions to Demands for Grants relating to the Ministry of External Affairs, subject to their being otherwise admissible.

श्री यशबन्त सिंह कुशबाह (भिण्ड) :  
मैं प्रस्ताव करता हूँ कि :

कि 'वैदेशिक-कार्य शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत  
भाग नं० 100 रुपये कम कर दिये जायें ।

[श्री यशवत सिंह कुशावाह]

42. [भारत को विदेश नीति पर रूस का प्रभाव होने के कारण भारत का सम्मान न रहना। (42)]

कि "बैदेशिक-कार्य" शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत मांग में 100 रुपये कम कर दिये जायें।

43. [विदेशों में रहने वाले भारतीयों के अधिकारों की रक्षा करने में असफलता। (43)]

कि "बैदेशिक-कार्य" शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत मांग में 100 रुपये कम कर दिये जायें।

44. [तिब्बत के बारे में गलत नीति। (44)]

कि "बैदेशिक-कार्य" शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत मांग में 100 रुपये कम कर दिये जायें।

45. फारमामा की राष्ट्रवादी चीनी सरकार के साथ राजनयिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित करने में असफलता। (45)]

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE (Calcutta North East): I beg to move:

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Deplorable record of working of our High Commission in London.* (62)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Mysterious project to set up an "international city" called Auroville near Pondicherry and Government's role in relation to it.* (63)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Implications of press report that the U.S. President did not receive an Ambassador in the usual manner for accreditation but directed him to*

*appear before him in a bunch with other envoys.* (64)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Failure to take up with the U.S. Government the widely reprobated issue of the C.I.A.'s nefarious work in India.* (65)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Failure to deal in a dignified manner with the problem of Asians in Kenya.* (66)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Continued failure to react in relation to the phenomenal political and moral implications of the diabolic U.S. aggression in Vietnam.* (67)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Lines of co-operation with Afro-Asian States in the struggle against the latest ghastly policies of apartheid.* (68)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Failure to leave the British Commonwealth.* (69)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[*Full diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic.* (70)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Setting up of a full-fledged embassy in the Peoples Republic of Mongolia. (71)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Need for initiating and sustaining friendly policies in relation to all our neighbour States. (72)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Need for fresh imaginative and courageous initiatives for securing friendly relations with Pakistan. (73)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Problems of recruitment of our diplomatic personnel and ensuring proper orientation in their work. (74)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Ways and means of terminating the present undesirable relations with the People's Republic of China. (75)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Need for improving our work in the United Nations and its agencies. (76)].

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced by Rs. 100."

[Generally unsatisfactory working of our missions abroad. (77)].

SHRI RANGA (Srikakulam): I beg to move:

"That the Demand under the Head External Affairs be reduced to Re. 1."

[Failure of the Government to play an effective role in developing regional security arrangements for the defence of South and South-East Asia from Chinese Communist expansionism in collaboration with the countries of South-East Asia, Japan and Australasia, the need for which has become more urgent in view of recent developments. (78)].

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The Cut Motions are also now before the House.

18.29 hrs.

#### EXPANSION\* OF TRADE WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

श्री कामेश्वर सिंह (खगरिया) : उपाध्यक्ष महोदय, एक बात सबसे मार्क की यह है कि सोशलिस्ट कंट्रीज के साथ ट्रेड में तो हम लोगों ने ट्रेडिशनल कंट्रीज पर डिपेन्डन्स कम कर दिया है, परन्तु मैं इस बात को कहना चाहूंगा कि पिछले अक्टूबर में प्रधान मन्त्री ईस्ट योरोपियन कंट्रीज गई थीं और वहाँ पर व्यापारिक समझौतों के बारे में बहुत सी बातें हुई थीं और समझौते भी हुए थे। मैंने कम्पनिकके में पढ़ा था। परन्तु अभी तक इस मामले में समझौते के बाद क्या कदम उठाया गया है जिससे हमारे व्यापारिक रिश्ते और सुदृढ़ हो सकें, तथा हमारे देश की एक्सपोर्ट ईस्ट योरोपियन कंट्रीज के साथ बढ़े, इस मामले में कोई बातचीत हुई या नहीं, इस का कोई पता नहीं चला। मैं इस बात को कहना चाहता हूँ कि अक्सर हमारे मन्त्रीगण विदेश जाते हैं और वहाँ से उनके वापस लौटने के बाद सारा मामला ठंडा पड़ जाता है। परन्तु शूकि इस मामले में प्रधान मन्त्री का हाथ है, इसलिये मैं जानना चाहूंगा कि अभी तक क्या हुआ।

अभी अभी हाल में बहुत चर्चा चल रही है कि रूस हिन्दुस्तान का बहुत सा रेल का सामान खरीदने वाला है। परन्तु जहाँ तक