

(viii) Need to supply adequate quantity of kerosene to Ranchi in Bihar

SHRI RAMTAHAL CHOUDHARY (Ranchi): Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, under Rule 377, I would like to inform you that there is acute shortage of kerosene oil in my parliamentary constituency Ranchi. This is a tribal dominated area and is quiet backward. The residents of this place use kerosene oil for all purpose including marriages, irrigation etc. The residents of urban areas use kerosene for cooking purposes. Due to heavy cut in supply of kerosene affected from January, the people are facing a lot of difficulties. The short supply of kerosene is causing a lot of inconvenience to the students because they are unable to undertake their studies as well as marriages ceremonies are also being affected.

I, therefore, urge the Government to make arrangements for the adequate supply of kerosene oil to Ranchi.

13.30 hrs.

The Lok Sabha then adjourned for lunch till thirty minutes past fourteen of the clock.

The Lok Sabha re-assembled after Lunch at thirty-five minutes past Fourteen of the Clock.

(MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER *in the chair*)

14.35 hrs.

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS (GENERAL),
1993-94

[English]

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: The House shall

now take up discussion and voting on the Demands for Grants under the control of the Ministry of Defence.

As has already been announced by the hon. Speaker yesterday, the Members willing to send their cut motions will send them within 15 minutes, indicating the Serial Number of the cut motions that they would like to move.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Chittorgarh): Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, to the best of my recollection, the last debate on the demands for grants of the Ministry of Defence was held in September 1991. That is amongst the other reasons underlying the crucial importance of this particular discussion.

I submit, Sir, that to better examine this very important Demand for Grant, we have firstly to identify the yardstick against which we are judging this Demand. Secondly, you have to attempt to specify some of the very special circumstances of today that confront the nation; and it is only against these two that we ought to, thereafter,

Motion moved:

"That the respective sums not exceeding the amounts on Revenue Account and Capital Account shown in the Fourth Column of the Order paper be granted to the President, out of the Consolidated Fund of India, to complete the sums necessary to defray the charges that will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1994, in respect of the heads of Demands entered in the Second Column thereof against Demand Nos. 16 to 22 relating to the Ministry of Defence."

Demands for Grants in respect of Ministry of Defence for the year 1993-94 submitted to the vote of Lok Sabha

No. of Demand	Name of Demand	Amount of Demand for Grants on Account voted by the House on 30th March, 1993		Amount of Demand for Grants submitted to the vote of the House	
		Revenue Rs.	Capital Rs.	Revenue Rs.	Capital Rs.
1	2	3		4	
Ministry of Defence					
16	Ministry of Defence	268,06,00,000	13,64,00,000	1330,30,00,000	68,21,00,000
17	Defence Pensions	396,45,00,000		1982,22,00,000	
18	Defence Services Army	1624,74,00,000		8123,67,00,000	
19	Defence Services Navy	192,81,00,000		964,06,00,000	
20	Defence Services Air Force	520,99,00,000		2604,92,00,000	
21	Defence Ordnance Factories	354,47,00,000		114,25,00,000	
22	Capital Outlay on Defence Services		915,61,00,000		4578,09,00,000

MR DEPUTY SPEAKER Shri Jaswant Singh thirdly examine the present Demand for Grant as indeed some of the long term trends of Defence expenditure that we have been following and the consequences of those Defence expenditures

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir I am mindful of the time constrain and I would only set out what would be the ideal way to assess this very important Demand for Grant I will endeavour to do so, but in the process of doing so and being mindful of the time that is available for this debate, I shall necessarily have to abridge my submission and take great many things as self-evident Wherever I do so however, I will specify and not state what is either contained in the Report of the Ministry of Defence or has been stated somewhere else or is likely to be taken up elsewhere

I do submit that as a proper yardstick of assessment particularly in the Ministry of Defence, as indeed also in the Ministry of External Affairs, we can only judge the functioning either of the Ministry of Defence or of the Ministry of External Affairs against stated and given objectives That is where my fundamental difficulty lies the second yardstick is that in examining the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence one ought to try and not to examine an individual year's Grant The attempt should be to identify a longer term perspective but because the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence is to be examined in detail, on a year to year basis that exercise too, of course, is important But in an important debate like this, the yardstick must be long term Now, Sir, what is my difficulty against these two stated yardsticks?

Firstly briefly I will have to resubmit what I have said in this House There is no articulated Defence Policy that the nation has Whenever this has been asked of the Government the Government has said that the tasks allotted to the three service headquarters are the policies of the Government I submit, Sir, that a disjunction

has to be made between a task and a policy Quite often the task of the Service Headquarters is really a self-adopted task and that self-adopted task moves from the service headquarter upwards to the Defence Ministry and flows down back on to the service Headquarters as the Governments direct I submit, Sir, that this aspect which I am pointing out that there is no document specifying or detailing the Defence Policy of the country is a matter of concern, a concern that has been voiced earlier also

Very briefly I wish to submit that there is then an absence of a sense of history, of strategic thought perhaps because of which an absence of timely decision making Let me point out why I submit, Sir, about the sense of history Since 1947 the nation is engaged in many conflicts Official history of only the 1948 conflict in Jammu and Kashmir has been released so far The official history not even of 1965 ops, leave alone of 1971 ops, leave alone the operations undertaken as OPS Pawan, has been released by the Defence Ministry There is a point in this Unless an official history is released the lessons of those particular operations cannot and will not devolve down The lessons will not be learnt and if the lessons are not learnt, a proper historical sense will also not develop And, in the absence of a proper historical sense there will be absence of appropriate strategic thought I do not wish to elaborate this point because the point speaks for itself There is then no formal examination of policy If there was a policy that existed, the formal examination of it would follow, because we engage at least in this annual exercise once a year But, in reality there has been any formal examination for example of the OPS Pawan? What are the lessons learnt out of OP Pawan and whether those lessons have devolved down to the three service headquarters and down to the unit level because OP Pawan was an exercise which has left many lessons I would be reverting to that in a minute

When I say no examination of policy, I have to go no further than to cite the hon Prime Minister Very recently while addressing the

Naval Commander's Conference it was reported that he mentioned the need for the establishment of an institution whether through Committee or otherwise but that the Defence Ministry ought to have an examination of this policy at the turn of this century. It is a different matter whether the hon. Prime Minister was really giving voice to a stray thought or he was giving voice to a formal statement of policy but if there existed a formal methodology for examination of policy, certainly for the hon. Defence Minister such a thing would not have arisen. Why do I say that there is no examination of the policy? It is because the figures speak for themselves.

I was discussing this with some friends the other day. Between 1980 and 1993 that is today, to the best of my ability to calculate and recollect properly there have been 13 Defence Ministers. I would be very happy to be proven wrong on this figure. For five and a half years in that period from 1980 to 1993 there was no Defence Ministers. I would be very happy again if I am proven wrong.

With very high regard for the great experience that the hon. Prime Minister brings to his office and with such distinction but I do submit in all humility that even the hon. Prime Minister with all the experience that he has cannot do justice to the Ministry of Defence if he holds it simultaneously with other responsibilities.

In these 13 years, from 1980 to 1993 we have had 13 Defence Ministers. For five and a half years there was no Defence Minister and I do submit that policy examination is amongst many other things which will in consequence suffer.

I need hardly point out that in these 13 years there have been roughly six Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Staff and six Defence Secretaries. But somewhere roughly on an average I find that the Defence Minister's tenure is about eight to nine months and the Chief's tenure is two and the Defence Secretary's tenure is about two. This is not a sufficient tenure for the factor of continuity that the Defence Ministry must have because I

started as a yardstick that the we must examine in the long term.

Why do I say long term? To me of course it is self-evident but it is best illustrated if I point out what is not being done. The Defence Seventh Five Year Plan was approved and it had already run three years of its life. Having run three years of its life the Defence Seventh Five Year Plan was then approved by the then Government with a clear definition that this Defence Five Year Plan is approved without any financial commitment. When I point out long term when I say that decision making is important then this certainly is not decision making. You approve a Defence Five Year Plan you approve it three years after it is run and then you say that this is without any financial commitment. What is the fate of the Defence Eighth Five Year Plan? To the best of my knowledge it is to run from 1990 to 1995. To the best of my knowledge the Defence Eighth Five Year Plan is yet not approved because if it is approved we do not know what its financial allocations are. And where are those financial allocations? What is the size of the Defence Eighth Five Year Plan further what were the actual achievements against the stated objectives of the Seventh Five Year Plan. These are the two yardsticks against which I have said, we have to examine the present Defence Budget. But I had also said that I would attempt to list not all but certainly some which to my mind are the special circumstances of today.

What are these? I call them the factors of compound uncertainties. The special circumstances today are the factors of compound uncertainty and the first uncertainty is about the nature of conflict which the Defence Ministry will have to contend with. But if it is true that conventional conflict what we have been examining it and our understanding of it has receded somewhat as a possibility then it is also true it has not entirely eliminated as a possibility. But what compounds the situation is that the nature of conflict creates difficulties for proper planning in the Ministry of Defence. Is it going to be open conflict? Is it going to be

unstated open conflict, a proxy war of low intensity or medium intensity? Or, is it going to be a combination of all these that the Defence Ministry will have to contend with? That is why I say that this factor of uncertainty about the nature of conflict is a factor that the Defence Ministry has to understand. It is not an easy assessment that the Defence Ministry has to undertake. But that really begs a question because if it is not an easy assessment, it is also not an assessment which the Defence Ministry cannot or need not undertake.

Sir, there is the second factor of compound uncertainty, which is the uncertainty about our security environment. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence has listed some of these. Very briefly, Sir, let me share my views with the honourable Prime Minister.

The end of the cold war is not the end of regional conflicts. And if the end of the cold war is not the end of regional conflicts, then therefore, defence preparedness given the complex nature of today's conflict, must continue. But there is a difficulty here and that difficulty is that the relative immobility or the relative predictability of response of the two blocs is gone. When the globe was divided into a system of blocs, then relative discipline prevailed but that is now not available as a factor of planning. This compounds the difficulties of the Defence Ministry. But at the same time it underlines the importance of something, that has to be done.

The third which is so obvious is that our neighbourhood is turbulent. But in the turbulence of our neighbourhood, there are two worries which the Annual Report of the Defence Ministry has perhaps not emphasised to the extent that I would have liked to have seen. Here I treat Afghanistan as a separate category. The continuing turbulence in Afghanistan has security consequences for India. I will not elaborate this further. The present phase that we are witnessing in some of the Central Asian Republics of former USSR their real status upon the demise of the former Soviet Union has consequences for the

nation's security. And because the linkages of Indian history with Central Asia are so ancient I do not have to even begin to identify how our security is directly affected by developments whether in Afghanistan or in Central Asia. There is another worry. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence has listed that. I am worried about the re-armament programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is possible that the Islamic Republic of Iran is undertaking its present re-armament programme to require some of the losses of the Iraq Iran war. But as the major buyer of military hardware to day and given the historical linkages between India and Iran, I am worried about the path of military preparedness, on which Iran is set. And I am also worried about the fact of international Islamic fundamentalism.

I have one more worry, which is that the People's Republic of China has extended its trade and other relations with Myanmar. The influence of the People's Republic of China in Myanmar today is not what it was even three years back. The People's Republic of China, to my knowledge, Sir, is negotiating with Myanmar for the long term leasing of port outlets into the Bay of Bengal from the Government of Myanmar. I would, therefore, be very grateful if the Government of India share what information they have in this regard with me because I do not think that an access of the peoples republic of China on to the bay of Bengal from a long term lease that they acquired through the Government of Myanmar is necessarily of benefit or consonant with the security interests of India.

There is another factor of uncertainty and that does not affect the matter of today's debate that uncertainty is about the internal and economic situation for the country. And the economic has a direct consequences on the Demands of grants of the Ministry of Defence. Then, the uncertainty about the production and supply of military hardware. I do not wish to elaborate this point because it is self-evident, yet dependence on the former Soviet Union, the drying up of those sources, the connected difficulties all these are real concerns. Here I

would leave a request with the hon Prime Minister in his role and function and responsibilities as the Defence Minister Do not engage in confidence building only through public relations There are some very real difficulties with the three point formula that President Yeltsin has presented to the country and whether it is to tell his factories to expedite the supplies when the factories are not really ready, or when all the supplies are not really concentrated in the Republic of Russia or to go in for production here in the country which as a time lag of its own or to go in for production out of the country in a third country these are all worthy of examination certainly But to the extent that the critical shortages of arms that we have, I do not think confidence is really built only through public relations There is then a question which I treat as the security issue The factor of unresolved nuclear uncertainty in the face of all round and no doubt unconscious but to me very unhappy degradation of our conventional forces in the face of a nuclear peoples republic of China, of a self-declared nuclear Pakistan, a nuclear Central Asia Kazakhsian we do stand exposed and I am compelled to voice this uncertainty because of just three illustrations Now, I would like to know from the Prime Minister as to who deals with the nuclear question? To the best of my knowledge the Ministry of External Affairs deals with the aspects of disarmament The Department of Atomic Energy deals with nuclear power The Ministry of Defence has nothing to do with the nuclear question Then, who deals with this question? the IDSA or the BJP and why do I point out this because there is a relevance to this?

The point I am making is that a reputed columnist writing in a journal of some repute in the U S A has cited what is he called the 1990 nuclear crisis What were the facts? About the moved into the months of March, April 1990, three infantry divisions were moved into the State of Jammu and Kashmir because the situation there had deteriorated One division was moved to the best of my recollection to the State of Punjab because Punjab mented

consideration of that kind then and the armoured had been moved to Mahajan ranges to the best of my recollection for field firing or training

15.00 hrs.

Pakistan completed misguided the situation missed it then And this is how it was described by that journal of United states of America a certain chain of events then took place the United States Deputy Security Adviser the then U S Ambassador to Pakistan and the then Head of CIA, Mr Gates, said that nuclear weapons had been loaded on to the F 16s in Pakistan pilots were at the ready and it was only a question of asking them to take off This has been in part rebutted at places It has not yet been reputed authoritatively by the Government of India I put it like this because it is a matter of very deep concern about the security preparedness of the country

When I recollect very well that a very eminent scientist a very eminent man who was the then Minister of State for Defence Dr Raja Ramanna who to the best of my knowledge spoke in the other House in the middle of May and he conveyed his distress at the developments but he also suggested what would be the response of the Government of India should such a path be adopted by Pakistan

I do not want to be flippant about this matter The hon the Prime Minister has suggested a certain course of action It is not in consonance with what Dr Raja Ramanna had said then What has happened? Where has this divide come from?

15.02 hrs.

(SHRI SHARAD DIGHE *in the chair*)

Why do I emphasise this I emphasise this because this matter has to be thought through This is a matter that can not be taken lightly This is not a matter that I refer to only because a certain U S journal has referred to it or a journalist

of some repute has referred to it. It is because it has the stamp of authority of certain functionaries of the Government of U.S.A. and which has not yet been denied officially, to the best of my knowledge, even by the Government of U.S.A. That is why it is necessary for the Government to come out authoritatively to think over this issue.

Here again I am not being flippant. With all due regard for the seniority and years of experience, if I suggest to the hon. Prime Minister that if seven tonnes of RDX can land on the coast of Maharashtra, what is to prevent some mad man in the near future to land a one tonne nuclear device also on the coast of Maharashtra?

That kind of nuclear profligacy, that kind of nuclear uncertainty today does prevail in the country's neighbourhood. That is why I emphasise this factor as a factor of uncertainty. I request the Government to think over this. It is after these yardsticks and these factors of uncertainty and security apparatus that I come to the factor of declining defence expenditure.

I am examining not just the Defence budget of 1993-94. I will really relate to just say roughly four to five years back, upto 1988-89. Here is a submission that I make that as a percentage of Central Government expenditure our Defence budget has declined from 16.3 per cent that it was in 1988-89 to about 13 per cent that it is today in 1993-94. Admittedly the Budget is higher in quantum terms. The total money available to the Ministry of Defence is more? But as a percentage of the total expenditure of the Central Government it has declined. I think that is percentage that worries me. Why does it worry me? Because, of course, as percentage of GDP also it has declined simultaneously from 2.8 per cent roughly. I do not have this year's figures to 2.1 in 1992-93 from 2.8 per cent in 1988-89. Now I am worried about this decline. If this decline was on account of reduced manpower, great of efficiency, reduced security threats to the nation, better security climate, greater economising, one would be happy. Who can

possibly advocate the continued high expenditure on defence when there are critical shortages in the country like health, drinking water or roads? All these are critical factors. I am not suggesting that a constantly ascending defence expenditure ought to be the aim of any Government in this country. Not at all. But I am for it that when we are declining from 16.3 per cent to 3 per cent in the last four or five years, this is against virtually a global trend because here again, I rely on figures that read and attempt to educate myself a best this runs counter to all the expenditure in the whole of Asia, it runs counter, of course, to our principal neighbours, but it runs counter also to the Budget of the people's Republic of China, which has gone up by 12.5 per cent. Now, if India is the only country which is experiencing a declining graph in defence expenditure and that declining graph runs counter to a trend that we are witnessing certainly in Asia and certainly in our neighbourhood and if all other factors have remained constant, security, force levels, manpower, expenditure, modernisation, if all these factors even if they had remained constant, Sir, even then the decline would worry me and I would request the Government of India and the honourable the Prime Minister to explain this because here again I could be well corrected. Why do I say this? For example, pay and allowances. If I combine pay and allowances and stores and let me just take the Army. The pay and allowances of the Army in the 1993-94 Budget are Rs 4,598 crores. This amount of Rs 4,598 crores is pay and allowances, and stores expenditure is Rs 3,267 crores. The total of these two put together is a total of Rs 7,865 by my simple arithmetic. Now pay and allowances, Sir, I am only talking in the context of the Army include auxiliary forces and civilian and stores expenditure incidentally includes petrol, oil, lubricants, it includes ordnance stores, it includes provisions, vehicles and related stores pertaining to maintenance. Now, if these two, Sir, pay and allowances and stores expenditure only of the Army are taken into account, that Rs 7,865 crores, that is roughly almost 75 per cent of the total allocation for the Army. It is a very great worry for me. It is worry about whose

aspects, I do not have to explain certainly not the implications of it to the hon Prime Minister. Look at the capital expenditure. I do not want to again go into detailed examinations of the capital expenditure because capital expenditure in other terms is the nations' investment for the future of its security because capital expenditure is synonymous with modernisation. I am very worried about Indian Navy. I am very worried about it. Because I have some of my handwritten figures here. I would be happy if I were corrected because it is only my own efforts. The actual bill for 1988-89 on capital expenditure capital expenditure just for the sake of my understanding, not because the other Members do not already know this, but, Sir, for my own understanding, the capital expenditure bill really comes out of the capital equipment that arrives because the equipment is worked out with credits etc. In 1988-89 the Navy had a capital expenditure of Rs 1026 crores. In 1993-94 it is Rs 1069 crores from Rs 1026 crores to Rs 1069 crores, the increase from 1988-89, not from last year, is only 4.19 per cent. On capital intensive service like the Navy you default on capital expenditure and unfortunately in capital expenditure it is, not like purchasing groceries, one cannot enter the shop and purchase a tablet of soap of one's own preference. Capital expenditure outlays are always long-term outlays. I am worried about the Navy's figures of capital outlay because someone has to pay somewhere. If you have altered the role and the concept of the Indian Navy, then we have a right to know and the nation has a right to know. If the inflow is not there, the Ministry of Defence cannot place orders, the Ministry of Defence cannot place orders because the budgetary allocations are not there. Vessels are not built overnight and if vessels are not built overnight, then capital outlays should be increased for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Sir, while participating in the General Debate on the General Budget, I had made some broad observations on the Defence Budget. This Defence Budget barely meets the essentials. It is not a Budget for development it is a Budget which will barely maintain the *status quo*. It is in

this evdving situation of uncertainties that the Ministry of Defence addressed itself to a mere maintenance of the *status quo*. This, I submit, can only be done at the cost of national security. I have a second observation to make and I would request the hon Prime Minister to explain this point. In the Ministry of Defence as a whole, all our services have today arrived at a situation wherein the inflow of the capital equipment is declining, but the budgetary outflow of capital expenditure as a whole is going up, because we are going to pay for the vast acquisition of capital equipment. The flow of capital equipment is declining but capital expenditure is ascending. It is the hitus. When seen in the light of what I have pointed out just now that as worn some I would like to give just two examples. If the main battle tank is to be introduced into the Indian Army, then the Ministry of Defence must be able to order for those tanks, it must be able to place orders and it must be able to place sufficient orders so that the pre-production trials are conducted to some satisfaction. If the orders are to be placed now, the moneys have to be found so that the tanks will become available to the Army when we intend them to become available.

Now, I have one more difficulty with this Defence Budget. I recognise that all Budgets cannot possibly be made with all kinds of contingencies, but there are some significant provisions that have not been made in this Budget. I submit that even a routine use of costs to the Ministry of Defence on account of what the Government has itself done in other respects, such as railway freight hike, the possibility of hike in petroleum prices etc., have not been included in this Defence Budget. This is a very big and strategic lacuna in this Defence Budget. The question of oil exists, this lacuna exists in the General Budget itself and if it exists in the General Budget itself, then it devolves and falls on the Defence Budget also. This is a major weakness that some of the provisions of increased prices, which are the consequences of what the Government's right hand is doing, have not been provided in the Budget of the Ministry of Defence.

There is no provision to the best of my knowledge and I would be happy to be corrected by the hon. the Prime Minister. I could have faltered in the exactness of my figure but from the rough calculation, that I have made the cost to the Ministry of Defence due to the unified exchange rate is going to be anywhere between Rs. 1200 crores to Rs. 1400 crores of additional expenditure. If it was the Government's decision to have a unified exchange rate, surely the Government could have provided for an additional Rs. 1200 crores to Rs. 1400 crores in the Ministry of Defence Budget so that this gap does not remain uncovered. By my calculation, at least Rs. 1200 crores to Rs. 1400 crores are unprovided for in the Budget of the Ministry of Defence.

I submit what are the consequences of this. The consequences are that you cannot cut in the Defence Budget yet keep placing simultaneously, more demands on the services and still maintaining the same Army, the same Navy and the same Airforce. Something has to give and in our case, what has given, I say, with utmost seriousness is the combat effectiveness of our Armed Forces.

Very briefly I will conclude by submitting that my single greatest worry is the state of preparedness and combat effectiveness of our Armed forces.

All great nations, I have subscribed to this all my life—I am not saying so because I am uttering something militarists, but I do passionately believe that all great nation have to have great military traditions. It is an integral of the nation core of being. In the evolution of great military traditions, it is the function of the Government of the day to ensure that the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces is maintained. What are the constituents of combat effectiveness? It is the state of equipment, state of training and the amount of welfare that you provide to your officers and other ranks, above all, it is the state of morale. I submit with all humility that profligate employment of the Armed Forces combined with constant *ad hocism* has eroded our combat

effectiveness. I again submit that Operation Pawan is a grim reminder of the lessons of 1962 which we are again not learning, which we are not recounting and that it is also a warning. I will not elaborate either of these two points.

But I do submit there are three or four things which I leave with the hon. the Prime Minister as suggestions or thoughts. It is for him to consider, a man very senior to me both in years, experience and in the great many decades of service that he brings to public life of our country. But if I submit these things to him, I am not submitting them in any combative form I am submitting these as distillation of my worries. Please reduce in the Ministry of Defence the time lag between decision-making and its implementation. Mr. Prime Minister, you cannot do it yourself. The Ministry of Defence is not a part time job. If I cited earlier the statistics, it is not to be little the hon. the Prime Minister as an individual but it is only to emphasise the importance of the job.

Secondly, I submit, do not appoint committees, commissions, enquiries, the findings of which you do not wish or intend to implement. Here, I am directly pointing to a committee that was appointed under the chairmanship of my good friend, a former Minister of State for Defence, Shri Arun Singh. That was the intention of the Government, not to implement what Arun Singh Committee has done. Do not repeat such exercise.

I have just one or two important questions to ask. I do wish to know who is responsible for the defence of the country. If we ask the Ministry of Defence, they will say that Service Headquarters are responsible. I am not being flippant or reactions when I ask this question, who is responsible for the defence of the country? By a process that we are witnessing today, if I were to ask this question, the question is thrown back at the doors of the Service Headquarters and it will bounce back.

I leave another thought with the Prime Minister. We are possibly the only democracy

in the World where the Chiefs of the Staff of the three Services, are not part of the Government. Of course, I am not going into the history of how this came about but we are possibly the only democracy where the three Service Chiefs are not part of the Government at all. Please reflect on this and rectify it.

I leave for the consideration of the hon. Prime Minister a fifth point, a plan of action for the Ministry of Defence. I appeal to my colleagues in Parliament that it is time that Parliament reflected upon demanding of the Government, whichever Government is in office, whoever is holding the responsibility, the Parliament must ask of that Government, a certification and a demand is to be placed on that Government, that the Government certifies to the Parliament about the combat worthiness of the armed forces. I make this demand in all seriousness, as something that this Parliament ought to adopt and expect of this Government. The Parliament is to demand of this Government, irrespective of which Government is in power, and such certification ought not to be provided by the Government unless they have themselves very deeply and very exhaustively examined what lies in such a certification.

My next two suggestions are repetitions but they bear repetition. Please reflect again upon the decision-making processes in the Ministry of Defence and streamline them.

Thirdly, please think about your nuclear policy and straighten it out.

Fourthly, in the uncertain days of today, there is no stinginess that we can afford so far as defence RD is concerned. Defence RD is your investment in self-reliance and in your future. Do not be stingy with that.

My final recommendation is that the time has come for the Government to reflect very deeply and to examine very closely the entire manpower policy, the Force levels that we are presently following and to come to the right

conclusion after examining these.

I conclude by sharing a thought. It is a Rajasthani quote. That when we in Rajasthan draw the sword out of its sheath, we do not draw it flippantly. In the same light, as a Rajasthani, I would like to share with the Prime Minister, a thought about our three Services, about our armed forces:

Do not blunt the sword of State,
Do not draw it from the sheath
unless you wish to employ it,
Do not wave it empty in the air,
Do not sheath it without its reward.

SHRI AMAL DATTA (Diamond Harbour). I beg to move:-

"That the demand under the Head Defence Services-Army be reduced to Rs. 1."

/Failure to have a smaller standing army along with a large reserve /(4)

"That the demand under the Head capital outlay on Defence Services be reduced to Re. 1"

/Failure to encourage domestic production of arms and discourage purchase from abroad/(5)

"That the demand under the Head Defence-Services Army be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to effect appropriate economy as per recommendations made/(24)

/Failure to develop the Main Battle Tank 'Arjun' to production stage/(25)

/Failure to develop the Light Combat Aircraft for the Indian Air Force/(26)

/Failure to build and maintain a strong Territorial Army/(27)

/Failure to build adequate and strong training Institutes for the defence personnel/(28)

[Sh Amal Datta]

/Failure to build an adequate and strong medical service for the army personnel /(29)

/Failure to establish and practice a progressive and enlightened research personnel policy /(30)

/Failure to build a proper monitoring structure for the various military works /(31)

Failure to use National cadet Corp to impart military training to a substantial number of youth / (32)

'That the demand under the Head Defence Services-Navy be reduced to Re 1

/Failure to formulate and apply a proper training policy in the Indian Navy /(33)

/Failure to institute proper inventory management system in the Indian Navy /(34)

/Failure to formulate a proper weapon acquisition policy /(35)

"That the demand under the Head Defence Services-Air Force be reduced to Re 1

/Failure to develop advanced Jet Training facility /(36)

/Failure to acquire the proper electronic surveillance system /(37)

/Failure to formulate and apply proper inventory management and control system in Indian Air Force /(38)

/Failure to institute proper induction and promotion system in the Indian Air Force /(39)

SHRI AJOY MUKHOPADHYAY
(Krishnagar) I beg to move

"That the Demand under the Head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re 1 "

/Failure to stop malpractices in Defence deals /(6)

That the Demand under the Head Defence services-army be reduced to Re 1 "

/Failure to recruit persons from the backward classes and minority communities in defence services /(7)

That the Demand under the Head Capital outlay on Defence Services be reduced to Re 1 "

/Failure to stop import of defence articles thereby reducing the employment potential of the country /(8)

/Failure to stop foreign multinational from entering the sphere of defence production thereby endangering the indigenous industries /(9)

SHRI HARADHAN ROY (Asansol) I beg to move

That the Demand under the Head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re 1 "

/Failure to stop malpractices in defence deals /(10)

/Failure to modernise and expand the defence production units with a view to generating more employment opportunities /(11)

SHRI HANNAN MOLLAH (Ukubena) I beg to move

'That the demand under the Head ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs 100 "

Need to increase indigenous defence production and to reduce import to achieve self-reliance in defence /(22)

Need to reject joint Naval exercise with US

PROF RAS SINGH RAWAT (Ajmer) I beg to move

"That the Demand under the Head Ministry of Defence be Reduced to Re 1 "

Failure to make effective efforts for making atom bomb in order to make the Indian Army sophisticated, powerful and self-dependent in all respect /(40)

Failure to protect the interest of ex-servicemen /(41)

Failure to stop malpractices in the purchase of arms aircrafts and other necessary items from various countries for defence needs of the country /(42)

Failure to make the nation self-dependent in field of defence production and research /(43)

That the Demand under the Head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs 100

Need to provide all the necessary facilities to the army personnel especially those posted in border areas /(44)

Need to impart compulsory military training to all the able bodied youths of the country and to introduce N C C scheme in schools and colleges /(45)

/Need to check widespread malprctices and irregularities in recruitment melas organised by the defence forces /(46)

Need to strengthen Air force and Navy by ensuring allround development /(47)

Need to check pilgerage of arms and ammunition from the Ordnance factory /(48)

/Need to avoid use of Army for civil purposes to curb communal disturbances and maintain

law and order /(49)

Need to raise again the Ajmer Regiment and the Merkada Battalion in the Indian Army /(50)

SHRI SUDHIR SAWANT (Rajapur) Sir I rise to support the demands for Grants of the Defence Ministry

At the beginning, I do not share the pessimistic formulation of Shri Jaswant Singhji when he talked about the combat effectiveness of the armed forces

I am certain that the Government has taken all necessary steps to ensure the security of this great nation and also provided the wherewithal for armed forces to cater for any sort of threat that might emerge in the near future a policy in the long-term perspective

Sir, the world has undergone a drastic change. In the post cold-war era, one did expect that the international situation, the security environment will be conducive to bringing permanent solution by formulating a collective security system under the United Nations. But the situation that has developed after the breakdown of the Soviet Union has brought about a situation, a security environment full of uncertainty and instability. This is mainly because of two reasons. The first reason is the lack of multi-polarity in the present world order wherein one military super power has emerged which is capable of dictating terms to the world over. The second is that after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, there is the rise in national and ethnic sectarian conflicts in the erstwhile Soviet Union wherein the large stockpiles of arms have been dumped, there is a brain drain and there is the emerging danger of transfer of nuclear technology to powers which can afford to buy that sort of technology. Thus in the short term and long term, the international security environment will be governed by two factors. One factor is purely the economic factor. The battle for market has been started. As the time passes by, this battle will become more vicious. Therein emerges the danger of the

developed countries going in for arms-twisting tactics in regard to the lesser developed countries to open their market. On the basis of this environment, the future alignments - various alignments - may be decided.

The second factor is the rise of fundamentalism. So, these two factors gain primacy at that point of time wherein the various alignments would be decided because, today, there is nothin which is in black and white. Everything is full of grey areas. As far as India is concerned, the collapse of the soveit Union has created a serious situation for our country so far as defence is concerned. So, on both these counts, whether economic or on the fundamentalism, there is a great cause of concern

The United States has initiated an initiative as far as disarmament in conventional arms is concerned. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council met and decided that there should be control in arms transfer. But the actions have not shown their sincerity. The passage of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly established the global arms register which requires all the Members of the United Nations to report their arms transfers and also to cater for the future reporting of procurement through production.

But what is essential in all these initiatives is the sincerity of the nation in reporting. But after these initiatives were taken by the Permanent Members of the Security Council, after the Iraq War, the United States had transferred 19 billion dollars of arms to 17 middle East countries. And also it extended guarantees to the Import Export Bank for arms transfer. So the actions of the United States do not go long with what the United States preaches. Also, the United States' President Mr Clinton has emphasised the arming of the Indian Ocean. This is a cause of great concern to the South Asian countries, the Middle East and basically the third world. This

is one factor which we will have to cater to when we own threat perception, on design of our Defence policy.

The second factor is Pakistan and its design. There was a talk of Operation Topak in 1984 under General Zia-ul-Haq and the basic concept of Operation topak though it was called an imaginary operation, but actions have been taken subsequent to the so-called formulation of that Operation Topak and what has happened in India today goes to prove that there is lot of truth in this Operation and its plan. Pakistan's basic design, basic foreign policy objective, the basic military strategy when it was designed, Pakistan opted for low cost option like the Britisher's rule of 150 years of dividing Hindus and Muslims and later creating Pakistan, was also Pakistan's design to create a permanent drift in this nation. Unfortunately, political parties in this country, namely, the Bharatiya Janata Party, RSS family has fallen under this trap. And I would say that Pakistan and the Bharatiya Janata Party together are leading this country to doom. (Interruptions)

DR. K.D. JESWANI (Kheda): Do not equate BJP with Pakistan. (Interruptions)

[Translation]

PROF. RASA SINGH RAWAT: BJP's name should not be linked with Pakistan. There is no other nationalist organisation like the BJP. (Interruptions)

[English]

MR. CHAIRMAN: That is sufficient. Now go on.

(Interruptions)

SHRI SUDHIR SAWANT: The Bharatiya Janata Party has cleverly practised pseudo-nationalism. When they talk of pseudo-secularism, what I find is that they are preaching pseudo-nationalism. Unfortunately, you may not be realising what you are doing. But your actions have helped Pakistan. Till 1987, the

situation in Jammu and Kashmir was not communal at all. But after you brought about this hydra of Ram-Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue (*Interruptions*)

Political considerations are fundamental to defence policy. That is why I have slightly digressed. But what I would say is that you provide Pakistan with a time-bomb. Pakistan utilised it very cleverly in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan succeeded in communalising the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

SHRICHETAN P S CHAUHAN (Amroha) All this started only in 1971 when they fought a war and when India defeated Pakistan (*Interruptions*)

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONICS AND DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN DEVELOPMENT) AND THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (SHRI RANGARAJAN KUMARAMANGALAM) It is not correct (*Interruptions*). There is nothing unparliamentary. You cannot tell a Member as to what he should speak and should not. You cannot stop a Member from saying what he wants to say (*Interruptions*).

[*Translation*]

SHRI K D JESWANI You should also ask your Member to speak with restraint (*Interruptions*).

PROF RASA SINGH RAWAT Mr Chanman, Sir, we are holding a discussion about the defence of the country. The hon Prime Minister is very much present here. You may please take the trouble of asking him as to how can we keep quiet in the matter that is regarding the defence of the country (*Interruptions*).

SHRI SUDHIR SAWANT We are talking about that only. I am talking about the policy of

Pakistan (*Interruptions*).

SHRI DAU DAYAL JOSHI (Kota) Speak in such a good manner that we should also feel like thumping the desk.

SHRI SUDHIR SAWANT I will do even that. Basically I am speaking about the Pakistan's foreign policy objectives and Pakistan's strategy and that is where Pakistan has succeeded, that where, thanks to our country and fomenting terrorism in the entire nation. It succeeded as far as Punjab is concerned and Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. But Pakistan's next design is to foment minority terrorism in this country. And that is where, we come to the Bombay blasts. So Pakistan has cleverly utilised the macro-terrorism. It promoted drug trade consciously. From 1984 to 1986, the turnover from drugs trade in Pakistan was 3.2 billion dollars. This, of course, is unofficial account. The drugs trade was promoted by Pakistan, which came via the Pakistan border and an international drug chain was kept when the western sea border of India was utilised to transfer drugs to the gulf and thereon to the final destinations in Europe and the United States. And this drug money was used to fund Punjab terrorists and that is why, for the last one and a half years, when Maharashtra Government took firm action against the terrorists in Bombay - Rs 220 crore worth of drugs were apprehended and 1,200 cases were launched against the narcotic traders, drug runners and Punjab terrorists - and that is what has resulted in the Bombay blasts because people like Dawood Ibrahim were set up in places like Gulf by Pakistan. And unfortunately, these people could get hold on some of these institutions of the State, where the underworld ruled the Bombay. And thanks, during the last one and a half years to the policy of our Government, the underworld is on the run in Bombay and this has resulted in what we have recently experienced. So, this is a sort of strategy which Pakistan is attempting.

One is the external threat against which we have to safeguard the border and the second is the internal threat. The Armed Forces have been

[Sh Sudhir Sawat]

given both these tasks of guarding the country against external and internal threats. And that is why when there is lot of talk about the use of Army in the internal security operations, I disagree with others. I agree that Army should be utilised as a last resort. But when required, it should be utilised and utilised effectively. And I do not think that it has any debilitating effect on the Armed Forces. It is the fallacy which is used as a propaganda issue. So there is no harm as far as I am concerned in using Army when it is required. Of course there are some other measures required to be taken to ensure that Army is not called again and again.

On the other frontier we have got China. China has got whatever designs that are available, but the reality is that India and China have to come together at a point in history if we have to survive because India and China together constitute the largest section of humanity. India and China together constitute a large amount of natural resources. We must resolve our problem and the problem is a minor problem. That is the boundary problem. This boundary problem can be resolved amicably. I am fully confident that by the initiatives taken by late Shri Rajiv Gandhi, this boundary problem can be resolved. But, here I would like to request our hon. Prime Minister that whatever way we venture to do, we must take decision should be unanimous. Otherwise, what has happened in 1958 and 1959 would be bound to happen again. If we go through the speeches of those stalwarts, in Parliament of 1959 and 1960 you will find that they propagated that they will fight till the last drop of blood. What happened then? The unprepared Army was put to fight against the well-prepared and well-disciplined war machine in a battle which could not be won. That is why, rhetoric and emotions should not give our decisions or our policies. We must design our policy taking all the factors into consideration and tell our armed forces to cater to all the threats.

I disagree with Shri Jaswant Singh when he

said that there is no defence policy. Basically, defence policy need not be articulated and it is not required that the defence policy should be made public. But there is a clear cut design as far as the force level is concerned, there are certain plans. There are long term plans and there are short term and long term threat assessment and threat analysis on the basis of which our forces have been told to cater to these things. That is why there is a defence policy, but there is a requirement of great coordination.

The National Security Council, the constitution of which was a long standing demand, is to basically evolve a security policy, a defence policy because defence is not only a matter that is confined to military. Defence involves the whole gamut of things on which consideration is required and the very important input to the National Security Council or evolution of a defence policy is intelligence. I am sorry to say here that our intelligence agencies are functioning in a manner which is not conducive to national interest. There are many hosts of intelligence agencies. Intelligence should be based on the principle of multiplicity of forces. The principle of intelligence is not multiplicity of intelligence. As far as intelligence is concerned in the design and the method of functioning, primacy is given to the cloak-and-dagger techniques. The reliance placed on human agent is totally against the national interest because as far as intelligence is concerned if you see in the border areas you will find that there are hosts of agents going around, same agent selling the same information to RAW, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence and the BSF Intelligence. What happens basically is that there is no coordination at the ground level or at the functioning level, thus, everyone is trying to take whatever he gets to Delhi, and from there, again it is percolated down. So, what is required today is the integration of intelligence effort. The functioning of joint intelligence Committee requires much to be desired. Various intelligence agencies have to give input to this committee. I would request that a Parliamentary Committee be established to oversee the functioning of

intelligence agencies as is being done in many States. A degree of openness is required in this regard. If this can be done, it will result in substantial saving in the Budget.

The next point that I would like to bring to your notice is about the state of armed forces. Arun Singh Committee has given certain recommendations. Today the basic requirement is that we must design our armed forces on the principle of having a small standing army and large reserves. The effective mobilisation scheme can ensure their effective functioning.

Today there are many unwanted elements in the armed forces. The manpower structure of the armed forces is inflated. At the time of Britishers the infantry battalion used to have four rifle companies. Today also our armed forces are based on the British pattern. It has to be changed. We have to become more professional because in our Indian army there are approximately 70,000 soldiers who are working as orderlies or backmen and about 50,000 working as waiters. Nearly 10 per cent of the manpower strength is not available to the defence forces. Our soldiers are doing minimum job. This has to be stopped because this is no longer a Maharaja army. This has to be a professional army. Some steps will have to be taken on this front. But this itself is not sufficient. We have to take an overall view of the whole thing.

The Air Force has its own method of supply, the Navy has its own method of supply. I suggest that the entire supply machinery in the Indian Army is to be streamlined so that there is difference in the peace time organisation and the war time organisation. We are discussing it in the committee of Home Affairs also.

The other problem is about the manpower. We cannot afford to increase the burden of pension on the armed forces. I would recommend that all recruitment in the paramilitary forces should be made through the armed forces. A soldier after having a service of 5 or 7 years in the armed

force, should be recommended to the paramilitary forces. This was agreed to by many Members. I think the service headquarters will accept this proposal. There is no question of giving pension. Only the professional cream need to be retained. After putting in 7 years of service as an infantry soldier he is not fit to continue in the army. The trauma which a soldier undergoes - like they serve in places like Siachen is only an experience seen to be believed. One cannot explain it. Now I come to another point that is in the entire civil service stream, in the entire public sector undertakings, the recruitment should be done through the Armed Forces Services. Those who had to work in these Forces in these Services, should have served in the Armed Forces. This is another principle under which we have to work, to generate discipline in the entire machinery of the administration.

I would like to make one other point that is about infantry. The infantry is the worst affected lot in the Indian Army and the Armed Forces in general. They have to serve in places like Siachen. Their three fourth's time of service goes in hostile borders and they have to live under sub human conditions. But they do not have any facility. Now when the infantryman goes to peace station, he again takes the rifle and goes for internal security work. The result is that, that person today is extremely affected and demoralised because of continuous demand on him. There are battalions who have been continuously on field for the last eight years. And that is why, I would request that there should be incentive. The Officers are commissioned from the Indian Military Academy. Only five per cent Officers opt for infantry. The people would gladly undertake the hardship in defence of the country, would gladly undertake the hardship in defence of the country, would gladly sacrifice their life. They should be given proper incentive. It takes 21 years for an Officer in infantry to take over the command. By the time, he is too old. Whereas in Air Force and Navy it is different. In Navy, it takes 14 years. In Air Force it takes 16 years and in Army it takes 21 years. This is something which should be sorted out.

(Sh. Sudhir Sawat)

I would like to speak on many more points. I think, the time is over. Last but not the least, I would request that the reporting system of these officers be reviewed because it has led to mere psychopancy. And the officers who have sacrificed for the organisation, who fought on the borders, who have been decorated, have been sidelined; whereas chocolate soldiers serving in peace station have been given promotions in the Indian Army. And this is a fact. In my last speech on Defence Budget, I had given an example. Fortunately the officers had been reinstated.

When we ask as to why this meritorious officer has been sidelined, they say "comparative merit". There can be no comparative merit as far as who are fighting on the border is concerned. The person who has fought on the border must be rewarded. It is not sufficient to give a good lecture during the discussions. His performance which has been seen on ground, in combat, is important. Hence, this entire reporting system in the Armed Forces should be reviewed. Also the Grievance Redressal Cell should be modified. The Officer has to report about the person who was aggrieved by him and the result is that the subsequent superior writes as per the junior officer. And that is why the Grievance Redressal system must be modified and the officers who are aggrieved should be allowed to complain direct to at least the Chief of the Staff of services.

I have come to the end of my discourse mainly because of time. I heard the speech delivered by Shri Jaswant Singh. I respect him greatly for his service. But definitely I am confident that the Government under the able leadership of Shri Narasimha Raoji has taken all appropriate steps to ensure that the defence machine is geared up. Unfortunately there are problems which are being thrown upon day in and day out by irresponsible elements in the Indian polity. But, I am certain that with the new Economic Policy, a new defence environment emerges, a

Defence Policy which is being designed, which is continuously being modified which would safeguard the interests of this country and help the country to travel towards the 21st Century where we can expect a great nation, a nation with economic strength, a nation which can project its own.

SHRICHANDRAJEET YADAV (Azamgarh):
Sir, I think we are discussing our Defence Budget at a very important time internationally and nationally both. It is also important and this is, I think, very fortunate that the Prime Minister at present happens to be himself the Defence Minister of India. This is high time, that our Government should give very serious thought to several important viable Defence Policies of India. Defence is one subject on which the entire nation almost is united. In a time of emergency, in a time of national security problem, this has been a great tradition of our country to speak with one voice. But, this is also has to be noted that during the last almost three decades, there was an arms race in the world and the two super powers engaged themselves in the most sophisticated, dangerous nuclear arms development and that led the world to a point of annihilation. The entire humanity at one point of time was seriously anxious the way the two super powers had entered into an arms development and also the competition has gone upto a point of star war, that was a period of cold war in which not only these two super powers and their people were having sleepless nights but the entire humanity was seriously concerned particularly the developing countries, the non-aligned countries. India very rightly in the very beginning after our independence took a position that we will be a non-aligned country, we will not join any warning tank, rather we will put our moral pressure and also we will work with those forces. We want peace and that there should be a world free from armaments. We took several initiatives in the United Nations Organisations for total disarmament. We were always oppose to nuclear weapons development. Our policy had a great support of almost the entire peace loving people of the world. But, unfortunately, in

our short history of 4.5 decades, after our freedom, we had some bitter experiences from our neighbours. We were the civtims of aggression. Perhaps in the very beginning because of our policy we did not want to spend our foreign exchange resources on the development of armaments and maintaining a large arms stock and we had to pay for that. One who will go through the debates of, this House will find that there was one time when almost the entire Parliament was against the Government and the Government was charged of neglecting, ignoring and not paying proper attention to strengthen our defence.

16.00 hrs.

But that was not out of a wrong understanding. It was out of a well thought-out understanding that India did not want to be an army power. India did not want to be a nuclear power. India did not want to maintain a large army and develop and spend its resources on armed forces. But after those expeneeces, we had to pay greater attention to strengthen our army and also to equip our army with modern armaments and very rightly the attention was also paid to research and development work in our own country so that India can be a self-sufficient country in its defence also.

But, today, I think the Prime Minister when he is heading this Ministry, he and his Government must give very serious thought to certian major policy issues. I would very shortly like to point out those major issues which require serious thought today.

A few years back our late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the former President of the Soviet Union signed an agreement here in Delhi and we said that we want a world free from nuclear weapons and violence. I think that was a right lead given to the entire world because the most haunting problem today is the nuclear weaponry, nuclear weapons-not that they have great destructive capacity but that they are most costly weapons also. We must have a proper

policy today.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Shri Yadav, just a minute. The hon. Minister wants to make an urgent statement regarding the air crash at Aurangabad. I will allow him. You may continue later.

16.03 hrs.

STATEMENT BY MINISTER

(II) *Crash of Indian Airlines Boeing 737 Aircraft near Aurangabad Airport on 26.4.1993*

[English]

THE MINISTER OF CIVIL AVIATION AND TOURISM (SHRI GHULAM NABI AZAD): The House is aware of the tragic accident to Indian Airlines flight IC-491 on 26th April, 1993 at Aurangabad.

The aircraft, with 112 passengers and 6 crew members, had just taken off from Aurangabad for Bombay. Before it could gain enough height, its wheel gear hit a high-rse truck, loaded with cotton, passing on the road close to the runway outside the perimeter wall at the eastern end. The landing gear of the aircraft broke off under the impact and the aircraft swered to the left. Thereafter it hit a power transmission line and crashed in the field at a distance of about 7 km' from the airport. The aircraft broke into pieces and caught fire.

While 63 persons including the pilot, the co-pilot and 2 other members of the crew have survived, it is a matter for deep regret that 53 passengers and 2 members of the crew lost their lives. 12 of the surviving passengers, who had sustained injury, were admitted to the local hospital; 3 of them left the hospital after first aid and the rest are recovering.

I visited the crash site along with senior officials of the Ministry and Indian Airlines and metsome of the surviving passengers, including