

## GENERAL BUDGET 1995-96 - DEMANDS FOR GRANTS

### Ministry of Defence — Contd.

[English]

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Before we take up Item No. 10 in today's Order paper, I have to inform the House that a list indicating the serial numbers of cut motions moved by the hon. Members yesterday has been put up on the Notice Board. Hon. Members who were present in the House and who could not move their cut motions yesterday may move their cut motions by sending slip at the Table within 15 minutes indicating the serial number of cut motions they would like to move. Those cut motions only will be treated as moved.

A second list showing the serial numbers of cut motions treated as moved will be put up on the Notice Board shortly. In case, any Member and any discrepancy in the list, he may kindly bring it to the notice of the officer at the Table immediately.

The time allotted for this subject is eight hours. Congress - 3 hours 45 minutes, BJP 1 hour 43 minutes, CPI(M) 32 minutes, Janata Dal 20 minutes.

Now Shri Jaswant Singh

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Chittorgarh) : Mr. Deputy Speaker Sir, I must say that this discussion is starting on a note that does not cheer me. In the last five years the Demands for Grants for Defence have been taken up only twice. After a gap we finally got an opportunity here to consider Defence. It was slated for yesterday. I need to say all this to take it out of my system. Defence, having been nudged out because of other parliamentary business - I shall not comment on that other parliamentary business - today, we are unable to commence the discussion at the appointed time. While I was sitting here and reflecting on it, I wondered why it is that we did not either take up Defence, or were unable to commence Defence discussion on time. It is because in Defence there are no votes, or consideration of matters relating to Defence directly does not influence anybody's vote? If that be the attitude that we bring to bear on as vital a subject of national survival, not just simply national good, as Defence, and then if we treat as casually as we are treating Defence, then please permit me to say that this lack of concern is bordering on irresponsibility.

SHRI A. CHARLES (Trivandrum) : It is only Friday's mood.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : I do not think I am reaching the hon. Members if they are still talking about Friday moods. If we do not demonstrate, if we do not display the required commitment to this national cause, if we in Parliament do not provide the leadership, then I do ask of all of us here, how do we expect our Armed Force to actually lay down their lives, to die? Here we are unable to give up our Friday ease. I find it necessary to

say all this. I am not singling out any other person than the Minister for Defence. I do believe that after a gap of time - with due respect to his seniority, his years, his status, the fact that he is the Leader of the House, I give due regard to all that; but having done all that I do charge that - if the Leader of the House, the Minister of Defence, finds it inconvenient to be present in the House, the Minister of Defence, finds it inconvenient to be present in the House when the Demands for grants of the Ministry of Defence are to be taken up, then we will have such neglect and we will continue to have it. Then will not as Members of Parliament, be subserving the purpose which we are required to subserve, which is to provide guidance and leadership and direction to the executive.

SHRI SUDHIR SAWANT (Rajapur) : At the current moment the Prime Minister is attending the Chief Ministers' Conference on TADA.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : This is really begging the question. If it is Chief Ministers' Conference, why are discussing this? Tell us that Defence is not on your priority. However, of what good my saying all this? If I were to point out to my good friend, the hon. member from Maharashtra, Shri Sudhir Sawant that this Conference is actually over, it will be too small a point it will be belittling the issue. I do not wish to score small debating points on this particularly.

Let me proceed. I wish to make a submission to you, Sir. This discussion on Ministry of Defence has been very badly fractured. We have been inserted, as a matter of convenience or inconvenience, between a fixed time limit of Private Members' Business. This is Friday afternoon. We are unable even to put across our view point in the time available. We will be fractured again. Please tell us, are we to continue at 5 o'clock or are we to continue on Monday because accordingly I will tailor my submission or intervention that I have to make.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : You can continue.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : I want to know whether the debate will continue hereafter because at 3.30 p.m. the House will have to give up all its business to take up Private Members' Business. Are we thereafter going to continue at 5 o'clock or are we going to continue on Monday? ... (Interruptions)

SHRI A. CHARLES : 35 minutes are still left and the whole time allotted to BJP is 40 or 45 minutes.

SOME HON. MEMBERS : No. It is on hour.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : Sir, when we take up Defence Demands for Grants, I tell myself that this subject is coming up after a gap of time; therefore, it merits an approach and it merits my applying myself to what our continuing worries are and what are some of the additional worries. What we are engaged in currently when we are examining the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence is, I think, essentially an old point which gets repeated every time.

We are engaged in examining that central core of concept and policy around which the entire structure of the Defence Ministry's Demands for Grants have been created. Secondly, we are also engaged in considering the implementation of that policy or that concept. If there is not to be a policy, or if there is not any concept, then, necessarily the implementation would be faulted from the very beginning. Thirdly, thereafter only, we are considering the wherewithals, of this Defence of the country, of its implementation. And the wherewithals actually are the Demands for Grants. Still we are in essence discussing national security.

I will revert in a moment to what national security is all about. But even as we do so, I am persuaded to think that this examination of the Ministry of Defence is an examination, to my mind, of seven critical deficiencies in the Ministry, and the consequences of these seven critical deficiencies. I do believe and hold that there is a deficiency of policy and concept. The first deficiency is about concepts; the second is about policy of national defence, policy for manpower and policy for equipment. The third deficiency, to my mind, is the deficiency of leadership, of morale and of direction. The fourth deficiency, which is a demonstrated empirically measured deficiency, and has been so demonstrated over the past almost six years now, is this deficiency of budgetary support to national defence. The fifth, is the deficiency of the combat and deficiency in the combat support systems of the armed forces proper. The next deficiency is about clearly and sufficiently encouraging support to research and development in defence. And finally, the seventh deficiency is the deficiency in missile and nuclear policies and their execution.

Now, if I were to elaborate on all these, I know that I will not have time. So, I have distilled out of these seven deficiencies some particular aspects. I will concentrate on them.

I will broadly and very briefly treat the question of concept and national security. I will thereafter examine defence expenditure. And in defence expenditure, I will explain what is it in essence that we are examining. Thirdly, I will address myself to defence manpower policy or absence of policy in the management of that manpower, including training and welfare.

15.00 hrs.

Then I will take up the deficiencies of the four defence support elements, defence equipment policy, missiles in national defence and the nuclear question in national defence. Thereafter I will share some views that I have, about an elaboration of the national security environment.

In considering national security which I do not have to elaborate too much we are examining much larger, protean concept, much more holistic than simple national defence. When we examine national security, we must accept that firstly, in today's world, aggression takes many forms which are not simply of military aggression. The absence of military aggression should not delude us into thinking that so far as the security of the nation is concerned, the ability or the will or the intent to cause harm to the nation is also absent. This is the common-enough difficulty and fallacy that we harbour. Often in national security, broadly I say that there are what I call the political aspects, the politicized aspects and what I treat as the 'completely apolitical aspects. Economic, industrial, internal aspects and the Ministry of Home all contribute to national security. But in each of these, there can be a political input, a political view point; and indeed that is how all nations function. But when it comes to the Ministry, of Defence and the Armed Forces and the contribution of Ministry of Defence or Armed forces to the totality of national security, then that has only one criterion of judgment, and it is 'national good'. It is not a partisan political consideration that governs the examination of our Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces or their contribution to the totality of national security. The only yardstick to apply in examining the effectiveness of the Ministry of Defence is, 'are they able to preserve the infallibility of India's honour, India's good name and India's prestige internationally'. To reduce it simply to the guarding of a geographically finite and a defined border, to my mind, is to reduce the totality of a very noble task that the Armed Forces perform.

I am rushing the points, Sir, because I know that my time has got greatly compressed. It is here that I submit after due consideration that because there is an absence of policy, even in this apolitical aspect of national security in the Ministry of Defence, what follows out of that, is not simply avoid; I submit that what follows is not a hollow, what follows because of an absence of a policy is in fact, 'confusion'. I do not wish to cite, I do not wish to quote anything from it, I simply refer.

I had the distinction and honour of chairing the Committee on Estimates which examined defence force levels; and it is now a matter of record in that Committee's report, where the then Defence Secretary himself has clearly and unequivocally said that there was an absence of defence policy; there is an absence of sufficient discussion on that defence policy and if there is that absence of defence policy, it is a matter of that Committee's report that needs to be read; and only the first few chapters or first few pages of it will suffice. Why am I labouring on this point? It is because I submit

that unless we are clear that in the preservation of national security, there is a component of national will and in the boosting of, the creation of or the inspiring of it, lies the function of national leadership. And all this inextricably linked with nationalism and I submit four propositions, therefore, to you. And I request the hon. Members to reflect deeply on these four propositions. Firstly there be divergent concept of nationalism, there will inevitably be conflicting notions about patriotism. Secondly, as moral is to the physical, so it is 3 : 1, therefore, national morale, in consequence, will suffer and we are currently the victims of it. Thirdly, this, in turn, will result in an enfeebling of national will and if national will be weak, then with what spirit shall we meet the national challenges? There are consequences of this great lacuna. From national security, I am coming back to national defence. Please recognise that for national defence, the consequences of all this are direct and damaging. Our unformed fraternity, the Armed forces are confused by your vacillation; they are confused by your partisanship. The turbulence that we generate politically transfers itself directly to them and this worthy fraternity, then has to bear the consequence of it, even if they do not speak of it. And much more damagingly, as I said briefly earlier, when there is a void of policies or concepts or of leadership where policy or percepts are to be, what follows is not simply adhocism but what follows is disorder, lack of direction and a lack of purpose. and when your combine disorder and lack of direction and purpose with the requirements of national defense, then you can cogitate for yourself what the consequences will be.

Now, Sir, from this, I go to Defence expenditure I told myself early that I could go into Defence expenditure at various levels of examination. I could do an arithmetical examination of defence expenditure, or I could try and share my views with this House. When we consider Defence Expenditure, about what is it that we are really addressing ourselves to? At one level, of course because that too is an important aspect - we are examining a constant downward incline of the graph of Defence expenditure. so, Defence expenditure actuals of 1988-89 became the Budget estimates in 1993-94, that is, roughly about Rs. 19,00 and odd crores. This has registered an annual average growth rate of around 8.2 per cent. At 8.2 per cent, it was lower than the inflation growth rate. Simultaneously, there was a decline in rupee value. Therefore, in totality, the Defence actuals and the gross Defence allocation have a downward incline. You can use any of these three yardsticks. The consequences will be the same. As a proportion of the Central Government expenditure, the outlay on Defence reduced, in the same period from 16.3 per cent to 13

per cent, further Defence expenditure has reduced from roughly 2.8 per cent of our GDP to around 2 per cent of our GDP now. Now, you can argue this statistically one way or another. I am not going to elaborate this point because facts stare at me. What are the consequences of this? There is one major and, to my mind, unacceptable consequence which has an adverse effect on the combat effectiveness of our armed forces.

I will elaborate this subsequently. For the present, let me state that force level have been constant. Security challenge are variable, but increasing. This decline in budgetary allocations can only affect adversely. And that too, affect adversely, firstly, combat effectiveness; secondly, modernisation; thirdly, training and fourthly, the welfare of the Armed force.

Now, having said this, it is equally important to recognise that at another level when we examine defence expenditure, we are seeking out of this defence expenditure, at least, three criteria. First is accountability of that expenditure. You have failed us on that account and you repeatedly continue to fail us. Secondly, it is the cost effectiveness of what we spend on defence. I am not convinced that what we are spending on defence is cost effective. I will elaborate this point very shortly. Thirdly, efficiency in expenditure. I charge you that you are today failing even in maintaining efficiency and I will explain, how and why. But before doing that, indeed for doing that, I find it necessary to explain briefly. In defence expenditure, firstly, we are seized of the aspect of quantum. All this time we have been of the quantum only of defence expenditure. It has a certain size. Now, this quantum is subject to two influences. One is internal influence. The economy of the country does not permit the quantum that we require. This is the objective reality of the country, as it is. So, quantum is the demand. Quantum is not a fixed demand. Quantum is not something that I can send a bearer and say, "No, this ought to be. This will have to be the quantum of the Budget." I recognise the reality. There are also external influences just as there are internal influences on quantum. You may deny it. But the evidence is on the ground the evidence is with us, here. There are external influences. The World Bank, the IMF and the entire global community are crying, "Cut down your defence, cut down your defence." That is an external influence. The ability of the Government to stand up against this external influence is a matter of your moral authority, your political authority, your ability to stand up for the country.

So, let us leave quantum aside for the moment and let us come to the quantity of defence expenditure, because quantum is something that, as I have just

pointed out, the essentially about variables. What is quality of defence expenditure? How are we spending the quantum that we have? This is my query; this is not an audit enquiry. Is every rupee getting us the 100 paise worth? I might be wanting thousand. But I get only 500. Am I spending that 500 exactly for the 500 worth, not as an auditor, not as a Comptroller and Auditor General but in the quality of that expenditure. It is therefore, when I say this, I am talking about fundamentals; I am talking about approach and I believe and say this with great sadness that I can here consider this whole business of quality of expenditure either as expenditure by the Defence Ministry component of the Ministry of Defence or as expenditure by the Armed forces proper. All these years, we have been concentrating on expenditure by the Defence Ministry proper.

I think, it is time to apply ourselves to see that if we need accountability, if we need efficiency, if we need cost effectiveness what is happening in the fraternity of the Armed forces.

Because of this cohabitation with the insidious influence that is pervading the country, has their approach also got corroded? This is a very serious issue and if we do not address ourselves to it, we will not get the quality of expenditure, that were seeking. I say this in great sadness that our approach to expenditure in matters connected with the Ministry of Defence, is now permissive. We are witnessing repeated phenomena of laxity and casual waste and I will give specific example.

I would give one particular example, because it is topical and it explains itself from the point of view of quality of expenditure. It is really not a worthy debate and to my mind it is fruitless and it goes by various names. It goes by the name 'teeth versus tail', or it goes in the name of 'fat versus lean' and so on. I prefer to call it 'combat element in the Armed Forces versus support element of the Armed Forces'. I think the whole explanation of 'teeth versus tail' is a misnomer. It is outdated and we should have put it away five years ago. Any way, if you persist with it, that is the only reason why repeat it. In combat versus support, in any case, the example of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy are not really the examples to take. The example that has to be taken is the example of the Indian Army. I do not have access to the latest figures. On rough estimates, I think the Indian Army is roughly two-third combat and one-third support. I think it varies between 68 to 70 per cent — 68 per cent combat and 32 per cent support or you can round it off and say that the Indian Army has 70 per cent combat element and 30 per cent

of support element. I don't think the problem lies there. I think it is an excellent ratio. And there are very few Armed Forces in the world that have this kind of a ratio of two-thirds combat and one-third support elements. But the question really is this. In these combat versus support elements of the Army, of this 68 or 70 per cent of the combat component, I leave it for your consideration, hon. Minister of State, you have to apply yourself and see in this two-thirds, whether there is waste of manpower, whether waste of expenditure is there, whether there is misemployment of manpower, whether they are wrongly employed or ineffectively employed. I do not wish to elaborate this point and I leave it at that.

Why is this happening? I think the attitude in the Armed Forces has become flabby. It is being corroded by the cohabitation to which the Armed Forces have been subjected to. I think the purity of spirit of the Armed Forces is slowly being sullied by the corrosive consequences of the highly politicised and political civil service. A great many in the Civil Service are men of great distinction and great ability. But the present spirit of the Armed Forces is such that is very saddening to see what is happening. Sir, if we permit this to continue, a lot of things suffer. In the quality of expenditure, training suffers, housing suffers and even routine modernisation suffers.

I do not wish to give small examples. But when I had the privilege of wearing uniform, it was unheard of that an officer's wife would be able to take a car and go away where she liked to go. Today, when I travel in Delhi, when I come to work here, I see such things so often. It is a small point. But it is a distressing aspect of the laxity that seems to have come into the Armed Forces. Where has this laxity come from? When I say these things, I say it not with any great anger but I say it much more in sadness. This laxity has come because of the permissiveness of the rest in the Civil Service and in the political class. That permissiveness has crept into the Armed Forces, too.

I consider it my duty to point this out. If we do not wake up and recognise the deleterious consequences of this permissiveness, well will do ourselves a great wrong.

The next point that I would like to refer to is manpower. I recognise that we do not have a national manpower policy. I do not expect a national manpower policy, from you. I do not expect that you would be able to formulate a national manpower policy, and certainly not on the basis of the report which yet again, I had the distinction of preparing on behalf of the Estimates Committee, but really as a vital necessity, a need in this national security mix, we do not have a national manpower policy. Let me just illustrate what I am saying

when I say national security mix. Earlier, I started by saying that national security mix is a much larger mix. The Minister of Home provides BSF and CRPF and various other para military force. The Ministry of Finance provides financial support. The Ministry of Industry and other Ministries provide telecommunications and so on. The whole endeavour of the nation goes towards national security.

Let me give examples to illustrate what I mean by an absence of manpower policy in this national security mix, covering only the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home. Firstly though for the Armed Forces. It is, by now well enough known — and I do not have to elaborate the point or even illustrate it — that we are currently afflicted with the problem of low intake particularly in the officer ranks. After the low intake in the officers rank, what distresses me even more greatly is that the preference of these newly commissioned young officers is not for the combat element of the Army, but it is for the support element! If it is not for the combat element and it is for the support element, then somewhere there is something rotten, somewhere there is a moral decline, and some where something is very wrong. And if we do not address ourselves to the root of that wrong, we are not raising a Force that will answer the challenge to the nation in the manner and fashion that it ought to and with the required spirit. This is another worrisome aspect of it.

I do not have the statistics at the moment. There was a period of my parliamentary career, when I used to try and obtain all these statistics. Now, I have given up! I do not have the statistics on the high number of statutory and non-statutory complaints in the Armed Forces. I am alarmed at that high number. I am alarmed at the high number of court cases that we are witnessing today in the Armed forces and from the Armed Forces to the civilian courts and challenges against court martial and so on. And it is not simply that, there are even challenges against promotions and that too, promotions of very senior ranks. Something is really very wrong somewhere. When I say something is very wrong, this one aspect always comes to my mind.

The second aspect as to why there is no national manpower policy in the Armed Forces is because each of the components of the national security mix adopts an isolated and independent manpower policy

Each component then adopts its own style. Each beings to do so competitively and that reduces itself to absurdities. The BSF begins to ape the uniforms of the Army and the Army does not know where to go.

Sir, I believe, this is an aside and at times I have shared it with a number of very senior officers in the Army and I had said seriously, the more colourful the

Austro-hungarian armies became, the less their fighting spirit became. These days when I see a variety of peacock hued *kamarbandhs* and all kinds of things that are being worn, I do, at time, stand still and reflect : Is all this finery being put on really to replace something which is lacking? This competitive adornment, I find it abhorrent. The greatest adornment of a soldier is simplicity. Where has simplicity gone? Why is all this happening?

Take the example of BSF. When I say it is competitive, I also say it is independent. I am illustrating my point. I am given to understand - it does not matter whether my figure is entirely accurate or not accurate - the BSF is now a 200 plus battalion organisation. 200 plus battalion! They are an integral of the national security mix. They have their own manpower policy. BSF have now got an artillery, they have got an Air wing; I am informed, they also want a Naval wing!

The CRPF has gone up from, roughly 90 to 180 battalions. It has doubled. What are we doing?

Sir, take the third example.

SHRI SUDHIR SAWANT : They are creating their own Army.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : This is precisely what I am saying. When there is no manpower policy related to national security; you do not have a national manpower policy. I know that this Government has not the ability for it. But at least for national security, for Heaven's sake - if not for Haven's sake but for the nation's sake - have a national policy, have a manpower policy. When you do not have it, this is what you have: Puposki's private armies are springing up everywhere; BSF is multiplying to 200 battalions, CRPF is multiplying from 90 to 180 battalions. I do not know, what we are doing?

Sir, I do wish to dwell a little on Rashtriya Rifles. But I do not think, I have time now.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Private Members Bill shall have to start at 3.30 P.M.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : Then, perhaps now is the time for me to stop. I will continue on Monday.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : You can continue for two-three minutes more.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : Sir, I was saying something about Rashtriya Rifles. Though I had no executive authority, those who had were for good enough, when the concept of Rashtriya Rifles first came up, indeed, some of the distinguished civil servants who are now present in very high office in the defence Ministry and earlier did consult me on this. I gave my view.

Sir, I have to apologise to my distinguished colleague and my senior who is currently the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence that I disagree with his report on the Rashtriya Rifles. This I do not say in disrespect. I say it because I genuinely disagree. The original concept of Rashtriya Rifles was altogether different. There is now, therefore, taking place a fracture between the concept and the execution. It was originally conceived that when you constitute - if I recollect right, the first phrase used for Rashtriya Rifle was 'Federal Guard'; and 'Federal Guard' was then translated to become Rashtriya Rifles. The original concept was that this element would be taken out apart and it would not be on attachment; it will be a separation. It will be a transfer of other ranks; the officers will continue; their uniforms will be different; their badges of ranks will be different; and their role will be internal security. Having formed the *Rashtriya Rifles*, the Army will, thereafter, not even be called in for internal security. That was the concept. Now, what have we done? We have fudged that concept. Simultaneously, there was an understanding that, given the fact of the continuity of the security environment, once you have taken out an element from the Army, created a *Rashtriya Rifle*, made it a separately uniformed, separately attired organisation; it will not be an attachment and it will be a transfer. Another very important point - I do not know because I have not examined it in details - is that the men that they transferred from the Army to the *Rashtriya Rifles*, like the BSF, would serve till the age of 58 year.

This is one of the necessary earlier thoughts about the *Rashtriya Rifles*. You abandoned that. You make it transferred. You milk existing units to send on transfer to *Rashtriya Rifles*. By milking these units you debilitate these units. And the ethos of the *Rashtriya Rifles* does not evolve of course, I accept that it will take some time to develop. So, a very peculiar hybrid, which is neither here nor there, comes into being. And most damagingly the Army is still continued to be called for internal security duty. There is no guarantee that the *Rashtriya Rifles* will suffice. I am not entering into the debate whether *Rashtriya Rifles* is a part of the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Home Affairs. That is a separate aspect of the debate altogether. Where should the Budgetary allocation of *Rashtriya Rifles* go to, Ministry of Home or MOD? The other corresponding requirement then was that the force level of Army, the manpower of the Army will then become a fixed point. I feel, that because we have created this hybrid, we are not going to be satisfied with this ever growing animal called *Rashtriya Rifles* and the Army is certainly not going to be content with its present force level and with

its present size. Every now and then they will come up with the demand that they need so many more infantry battalions or infantry divisions.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : How much more time do you want because we have to take up the next item at 15.30 hours.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : I will take a minute to conclude this point. The only sentence that I wish to add is that so far as manpower is concerned, I have simply illustrated it. There are aspects of manpower like, training and welfare which still remain to be covered and those I cannot cover in the time that is available to me. Therefore, I request that I may be permitted to continue on Monday. Thank you very much.

15.31 hre.

SHRI SUDARSAN RAYCHAUDHURI : I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to encourage indigenous Research and Development in the Defence related technology and instead inviting multi-nationals in this field causing growing alarm for India's national interest./ (1)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to initiate effective rehabilitation programmes for ex-servicemen./ (2)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to stop practice of sending Indian troops abroad in the so-called peace-keeping operations./ (3)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1"

/Failure to scrap Indo-US joint defence exercises eroding India's national interest./ (4)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to resist foreign pressure for scuttling India's Agni and Prithvi development programmes./ (5)

[Translation]

SHRI AMAL DATTA (Diamond Harbour) : I beg to move :

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to set up National Security Council./  
(6)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to set up a proper organization for Defence Planning instead of a Directorate only to collect and collate requirement of different services./ (7)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to Plan for Joint and integrated action by more than one service./ (8)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to effect sufficient economy to raise resources for modernisation of Defence forces of the country./ (9)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

Failure to learn the lessons of the Gulf War and apply the same./ (10)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to acquire sufficient naval crafts to replace the old ones./ (11)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to effect proper inventory control in the ordnance Depots thereby causing enormous waste./ (12)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to organise proper training in the Defence services for both officers and men./ (13)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100"

/Need to replace the old weapon system in the Indian Air Force./ (14)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to impart proper training to the combat pilots./ (15)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to improve the surveillance system for all the three services./ (16)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to improve the communication command and control system in all the three Defence services./ (17)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to gear up indigenous research and development of weapons and other systems./ (18)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to plan for electronic warfare and execute the same./ (19)

SHRIMATI MALINI BHATTACHARYA (Jadavpur) : I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure of the Government to get the complete information in regard to Bofors Gun deal from Sweden in spite of long time./ (40)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Need to alleviate the plight of ex-servicemen owing to non-implementation of one-rank pension scheme./ (63)

SHRI YAIMA SINGH YUMNAM (Inner Manipur): I beg to move :

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to organise a line of defence of the area bordering with Myanmar and Bangladesh./ (41)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to recruit more women in the Army, Navy and Air Force./ (42)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to strengthen the Defence line on the Eastern part of the country particularly at Moreh./ (52)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to keep/maintain vigilance on the North-eastern region of the country which is most vulnerable./ (53)

SHRI M. RAMANNA RAI (Kasaragod) : I beg to move :

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to expedite and complete the work of Naval Academy at Ezimala in Kerala even after 12 years are over./(45)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to recruit women in the Defence Service in proportion to their population./(46)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to produce hightech electronic weapons needed for the Defence establishments./(47)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to avoid Defence purchases from U.S.A./(50)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to avoid joint defence exercises with U.S.A. as its aim is world domination and which is against the interest of India./(51)

[Translation]

SHRI JANARDAN MISRA (Sitapur) . I beg to move:

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to encourage indigenous research and development in the field of defence technology./(48)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1"

/Failure to make available more funds for Missile Development Programme/(49)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to chalk out effective programme to rehabilitate ex-servicemen/(54)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to make available more funds for Arjun tank research and development programme/ (55)

[English]

PROF. SUSANTA CHAKRABORTY (Howrah) : I beg to move :

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced to Re. 1."

/Failure to modernise the Indian Air-Crafts fleet./(62)

SHRI GIRDHARI LAL BHARGAVA (Jaipur) : I beg to move :

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to replace the old weaponry system in Indian Armed Force./(66)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to strengthen armed forces to meet any probable danger from Pakistan/ (67)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to amend service conditions of defence personnel/ (68)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to raise compensation given to the families of departed soldiers/ (69)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to make available of adequate accommodation facilities to defence personnel/ (70)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to recruit more women in all the three wings of Defence Services/(71)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to collect complete information in regard to Bofors Gun deal/(72)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to chalk out effective programme to rehabilitate ex-servicemen/(73)

"That the demand under the head Ministry of Defence be reduced by Rs. 100."

/Need to make available more funds for Arjun Tank Research and Development programme/ (74)