

[Shri A. M. Thomas]

February, 1954, arising out of Starred Question No. 581 by Shri Ajit Singh Sarbadi regarding sugar factories in Punjab, I had stated that the licence given to the Morinda Sugar Mills had been rejected because of three reasons which, I regret, were not correct.

The correct reply to Sardar Iqbal Singh's Supplementary Question should, therefore, be as under:—

"The licence granted for the establishment of a co-operative sugar factory at Morinda, District Ambala, has not been withdrawn."

DEMANDS* FOR GRANTS—contd.

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Speaker: The House will now take up discussion and voting on Demand Nos. 22 to 26 and 110 relating to the Ministry of External Affairs, for which five hours have been allotted. Hon. Members desirous of giving cut motions may kindly hand over the numbers at the Table within fifteen minutes. At what time shall I call upon the Prime Minister at the end? We will decide it later on. Hon. Members are already aware of the time limit for speeches.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr. Speaker, I beg to present the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of External Affairs. In doing so, I should like particularly to draw the attention of the House to the fact that the Ministry of External Affairs not only deals with external affairs but also with many important activities which might be called domestic in India. In fact, from the expenditure point of view, if we take the last year's figures—may I say here that all this is given in the booklet that the Ministry has prepared for the Members of Parliament?—the expenditure was Rs. 1,772 lakhs in round figures. Out of this Rs. 1,772 lakhs,

Rs. 1,167 lakhs were for activities unconnected with the External Affairs proper. For instance, there were the Tribal Areas, the NEFA, the Naga Hills and Tuensang area and there was a fairly considerable expenditure on the Assam Rifles, which really is an extension of the army, which deals directly with the External Affairs. This, naturally, is rather an expensive item. Then there is Pondicherry. Then there are contributions to numerous international organisations and International Armistice and Supervisory Commissions in Indo-China, expenditure on demarcation of boundaries etc. etc. The point I wish to make is that in effect the expenditure on External Affairs proper last year, according to the revised estimates, came to Rs. 605 lakhs, a trifle over Rs. 6 crores.

Now, I do not wish to say much about the quality and the extent of our work abroad and our missions abroad. It is rather difficult to judge these things. But we may make comparisons to some extent with missions of other countries, from the point of view of expenditure. That is easier to compare; quality is rather difficult. If we compare it with any important country, the rate of our expenditure is far less. I do not mean to say that whatever we spend, every rupee, is well utilized. I do not mean to say that there is no wastage on our side and there is no need for economy. Of Course, there is need for economies; there always is. There is always a tendency for wastage, if one is not vigilant. What I wish to submit is that compared to any country, our foreign affairs are conducted in a much, well, less expensive way.

In this connection I would also say that—I am not defending high salaries or anything—broadly speaking, the rate of payment to our staff abroad is far lower than what other countries give to their Heads of Missions and others employed in their offices. There

*Moved with the recommendation of the President.

again, I do not wish to generalise. What we may pay may be often inadequate to keep up a certain status which our Embassies and Legations are supposed to keep up. On other occasions it has been found that the money we pay them for this purpose is not fully and properly utilised. It is not spent. Therefore it would indicate that we are paying them too much. But these are rather rare cases. I am putting both sides of the picture to the House.

Naturally I cannot say that a large number of people employed in our foreign service are all of the same high level as we like them to be, but I do say that the quality of our Heads of Missions serving abroad is a high one compared to any diplomatic service that I know of. There are also people who are not so good and who do not come up to that standard. Naturally in a large Service we have occasional difficulties. We have to take some kind of disciplinary action. But taken all in all, I would submit to the House that our Missions abroad have carried out their functions with dignity and ability and, broadly speaking, at a much less cost than the diplomatic service or the missions of the major countries.

In this connection may I also say, although it is not part of external affairs, that in the NEFA two or three years ago we constituted a special cadre of political officers, who were specially recruited for that purpose. It is very difficult to deal with that situation and a very special type of officer was needed for it. It is a hard life. It is an isolated life—a life with practically no amenities of civilised existence, no people sometimes to talk to even and hard work. Therefore we require a very special type of person who likes that kind of jungle life and who is physically and mentally tough, who could get on and be friends with the tribal people he was meant to serve. So, we chose a number of people—our selection boards selected them—and I am happy to inform the House that most of these people

who were chosen, have done remarkably well.

I should like to mention here in this House that not only in our foreign missions but also in a case like the NEFA it is not merely the officer who counts but his wife also counts very much. People do not often realise that in employing an officer, we are really, in effect, employing two persons—the officer and his wife.

An Hon. Member: What about those who are bachelors?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: We do not have the wife always—that is true—but in fact we expect the wife to play an important part on the social and human side. I am particularly thinking at present of these officers' wives in remote and tribal areas, NEFA and elsewhere. Only recently I had a report of one officer and his wife. That lady in that remote area had done a very fine piece of work, apart from her husband doing well, because she had gone out of her way to deal with the tribal people, serve them, make friends with them, make friends with their children, play with their children and help them in many ways. She really created a much better impression than what any formal work by the officer would have done. So for these people, in these remote areas, I should like to put in a good word and I am sure the House will appreciate the fact that these officers in remote areas, NEFA, tribal areas, Naga Hills and Tuensang area deserve well of us because they are doing their work under very difficult conditions with marked ability.

It is about ten years now since we started building up our Foreign Service in our Missions abroad. There were a very few missions before independence. There was India House in London and there was some kind of representation in Washington and a few others mostly dealing with commercial matters or educational matters sometimes. When we started with our career after independence we had this whole wide world to deal with. We started as a country in a big way—I do not mean to say that we are a

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

big country, but we did not suddenly sort of creep in the international scene furtively. We came almost with a bang and people's attention was directed to our country. Many countries wanted to exchange diplomatic representatives with us. We were quite agreeable, of course, but it was no easy matter to do so, i.e., to build up the Foreign Service and to build up all the apparatus that goes with it. Foreign representation is not merely a question of good and educationally qualified men. It requires experience. Just as in the Army all the individual ability of a man is not quite enough to replace the experience of a General Staff which has inherited and accumulated experience—the experience of a General Staff cannot be produced by an individual, however brilliant he may be—so also in the Foreign Service of any country, the accumulated experience of a Foreign Office is a very useful thing, not perhaps quite so important, may be, as the General Staff in the Army, but it is important and this is regardless of the broad specific policy that you might pursue. This is a kind of background experience which helps one to judge a programme.

All hon. Members read a newspaper and come to some conclusions about some incident. I acting as the Foreign Minister, naturally have greater access to facts as they occur. It has often happened that I come to certain conclusions quickly but when I go deeper into it and find out the records in the Foreign Office as to how the problem arose and what had happened previously, I have to change my opinion—not on matters of high policy but on other matters—because there is the accumulated experience and facts. We started from scratch and gradually in the course of these ten years we have built up that experience and we are building it up.

We have now 41 embassies, seven high commissions, eleven legations—some of these are duplicated—28 con-

sulates and vice-consulates and sixteen commissions, special missions and agencies. Altogether we have 101 missions of some kind or other situated abroad apart from a considerable number of Indian Information Units abroad. Now, this is a fairly large number. I cannot, as I said, say that every unit, every person abroad is a brilliant officer. Naturally, there are various types. But, taking it all in all, they have preserved a fairly high level and there can be no doubt about it that they have a high reputation among the diplomatic personnel of the world.

As far as our relations with other countries are concerned, they are at a remarkably friendly level. Unfortunately, we have not been able to maintain the same co-operative and friendly level of intercourse with our neighbour country Pakistan. As the House knows, we have no relations with Portugal because of Goa. We have no diplomatic relations with South Africa. Also the reasons are known to this House. Apart from these, our diplomatic personnel are spread out directly or indirectly all over the world.

I do not propose to discuss at the present moment the question of broad policy or world affairs. I wish to refer briefly to some matters. Our broad policy in international affairs has, I believe, the cordial approval of a very large section of this House—not all—and of the country. There are criticisms, legitimate criticisms about particular aspects, emphasis, of some minor importance as to how things are done. But, the broad policy has had that approval and this approval of the House and of this country has naturally given great strength to the Government in carrying out this policy. Because, if we went abroad, whether to the United Nations or to other Chancelleries and put forward some policy which was a matter of dispute in this country in a big way, naturally, the effect we

produce would be very limited. I will not say anything about that broad policy.

At present, taking the big world questions, obviously, the most important thing is disarmament, which is likely to affect the whole future of the world as to what steps are to be taken. In this connection, many things have happened in the course of the last few months. The outstanding event in recent months or weeks has been the proposal made on behalf of the Soviet Government—not a proposal, but the decision—not to have nuclear test explosions. This has been criticised on the ground that having indulged in a vast number of tests, they can well afford not to have them for some time. That may be true. But, such criticisms can be advanced about any action taken. The major countries today, the United States and the Soviet Union, both probably have got a vast stock of atomic or hydrogen bombs. It is not necessary for them, from any point of view, to manufacture more, probably. Nevertheless, if they decided not to manufacture any more, it would be a great thing even though they do not actively require them. Therefore, a good step is a good step, however it might have come into being. We must welcome—and indeed the country has welcomed—this step of the Soviet Government in regard to stoppage of nuclear tests. In saying so, they have added a proviso or rather a warning that if others do not stop them, we shall resume them—more or less to that effect. I trust this contingency will not arise.

There has been a further development. It has been said on behalf of the Soviet Government that they are prepared for control and supervision. That is an important factor. Because, the real thing that comes in the way is fear and it has often been said that there can be no certain way of detecting an explosion. I am not a scientist enough to say whether that is right or wrong, because scientists

differ. The obvious course seems to be for the United Nations or some other organisation to appoint some scientist of high repute in these matters and ask him to find out how detection can be made certain if some kind of test explosion takes place.

Then, there is, on the side of the United States of America, a proposal made by President Eisenhower, the use of atoms for peace, that fissionable material should not be produced for war purposes, which is an important proposal. Here are all these proposals which, if taken together and acted upon together, would make an enormous difference to the present atmosphere of strain and fear in the world. I do not say that accepting any of these proposals means the solution of any major problem in the world. But, I do say that accepting them and acting up to them produces conditions which help in solving these problems of the world.

There is talk, as the House knows, of what is called the summit conference or high level conference. As far as we can judge,—I speak from no secret information, but from what is available to all Members of this House—the chances are that some such high level conference will be held in the course of this year. I have said often that while every country is interested in this matter, naturally, because the whole peace of the world depends upon it, the real two countries in whose hands lies the final issue of war and peace today are the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, any agreement must involve an agreement between these two apart from other countries. Any disarmament conference which leaves out one of them is no disarmament conference. It can produce no adequate results. Sometimes, India's name has been put forward for attendance, for participation in the high level conference. The question when put to us has rather embarrassed us. Always our reply has been that we do not wish to push ourselves into any

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

conference, but if our presence is wanted by the principal parties concerned and we feel that we can help, we want to be of help. These are world problems which affect us tremendously as they affect the whole world.

Only one thing more I should like to say about world problems and that is this. If the people are desirous of putting an end to this cold war, it seems to us that the approach should not be hostile, an approach of condemning your opponent. There is no doubt that countries differ in their policies, in their structures of Government, in their economic approaches. There is that difference. You cannot put an end to that difference by war, because you rule out war. Now, it is recognised that war will exterminate, not put an end to that difference. How then are we to approach? Surely, if we approach these questions with the mentality of war and with the language of war, then again, you are not likely to succeed. Therefore, while maintaining whatever opinions we may have in regard to our policy, while also it is natural for each country to think in terms of its security because no Government of any country can forget its security, while doing all that, yet the approach should be not a hostile approach, but a really friendly approach. Hold to your security, hold to your principles, but recognise the fact that we have to live in this world together in peace even though we differ from each other. We have to find a way to that, and the only way we can do it is by these peaceful methods, and not by thinking or action in terms of a cold war, which really means constant appeals to hatred, violence and fear. That, I think, is important because there is no other way of doing it.

Now, these are big world questions. So far as India is concerned, we are concerned with the world questions, but the questions of the most immediate concern to us are, if I may say

so, two or three—the matters relating to Pakistan, our neighbour country, Goa and, in a quite different category, the question of racial discrimination in South Africa and the treatment of people of Indian descent there who are mind you, not Indian nationals but who are South African nationals. The question of treatment of Indian nationals has not arisen in South Africa because there is no Indian national there. They are all of Indian descent who are South African nationals. Our interest in it is not only because we are against racial discrimination, but because there is a long history behind this, going back, I do not know, 50 or 60 years or more, and before independence and since independence we are intimately involved.

I will not say anything more about it except this, that in a deeper consideration of the world's problems today, there are many conflicts and many dangers, but probably something of, well, at least as much importance as any other matter is this question of racial conflict in South Africa. There are racial conflicts elsewhere in the world. There is not a racial conflict in that particular sense but something near or alike to it, in our own country when we suppress one people because they are called untouchable or depressed or this and that. Let us not imagine that our hands are clean in these matters. Of course, they are not clean, and we cannot merely condemn others without looking after our own house.

There are racial conflicts in the United States of America and elsewhere, but the thing that distinguishes the South Africa matter is this. In the United States of America efforts have been made—and made with growing success—to ease the racial problem. I do not say they have solved it, but the Government want to solve it, they try to solve it, they have succeeded, public opinion is helping, there is a progress in a certain direction; so

also elsewhere. But in South Africa it is the deliberate, acknowledged and loudly-proclaimed policy of the Government itself to maintain this segregation and racial domination. That is why the South African case is unique in the world. While there is racial trouble in many places in the world, and conflict, in South Africa it is the official policy, and if that is the official policy of a Government, well, that is a policy with which obviously no country, no person who believes in, let us say, the United Nations Charter—leave out other things—can ever compromise, because it uproots almost everything, whether it is the United Nations Charter, whether it is your ideas of democracy or anything else.

Then there are other matters which come up in questions here, about people of Indian descent in Ceylon. I will not go into that. It is a complicated problem. These problems become difficult, and they become more difficult, because of growth of population, unemployment, economic difficulties. You will find usually at the back of it there is some economic difficulty and unemployment. That is there. And the problem is, in the main, that of the Ceylon Government because these people, according to our showing, are not Indian nationals. Whether registered or not, we feel they are or ought to be Ceylon nationals. It is their problem. We are interested in it again because of past history. We are interested in the solution of this because we are friendly with the Ceylon Government. We are interested because of cultural contacts and all that. And it is unfortunate that it has dragged on for so long, but I would beg this House to remember that we should not be too eager to condemn any Government, or the Ceylon Government, merely because it has not solved it quickly. They have their difficulties, and they should realise our position just as we are perfectly prepared to consider their difficulties, but it is obvious that we cannot accept large numbers of people who have lived there, who

have been born there, and just ask them to walk across to India, or accept them as our nationals. Fortunately, in spite of this complicated and difficult problem, it is increasingly realised in Ceylon by the Government and others, and by us of course, that we should not treat it as a political problem or dispute, but as a human problem, because, ultimately, the welfare of large numbers of human beings is involved and I do hope that, however long it may take, it will be settled in a friendly way and to the advantage of this large number of human beings that are involved.

Now I come to this collection of problems and difficulties which represent Indo-Pakistan relations now. I do not propose to go deeply into this matter, and right at the commencement I would say that we can make a long list of our problems. There is Kashmir, there is canal waters, there is the exodus from East Pakistan, there is this question of displaced persons and rehabilitation, there are financial issues, and there are so many other matters. All seem to drag on. Sometimes some small matter is discussed and settled, some little progress is made, but by and large, none of our major problems go towards a settlement. It is most surprising because I think one thing that should be recognised by all of us, by every Indian present in this country, and I hope in Pakistan, is that the perpetuation of conflict or even any kind of a cold war between India and Pakistan is very bad for all of us and all of them. Whatever approach ours might be, except just the approach of an angry person which is not a good approach, whatever approach we might make, whether it is geographical, historical, cultural, past connections, present, future, it is patent that India and Pakistan should live co-operatively not interfering with each other's policies. They are independent countries; we may separate, we may become independent countries as we have done, but we cannot deny geography, we cannot deny history, we

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

cannot deny a hundred things which exist, the other facts of life of our countries, and so it is inevitable that we must come together, and we must live co-operatively and carry on in our own ways. We cannot force them—we have no desire to force them—to adopt any particular policy, even though we may consider their policy wrong. Now, these are the facts of life, as I said. And because of this it is terribly distressing that we cannot make much progress in developing what is natural and, I think, inevitable between our two countries.

And yet, there is one more hopeful factor, and that is so far as the common people are concerned, in India and in Pakistan. I believe that the old feeling of bitterness and suspicion and fear is infinitely less than it was ten or eleven years ago. That trail of bitterness which followed partition and these huge migrations most terrible killings has died down. It is only in the political sphere that passions can be roused or with the help of religion, sometimes these communal feelings may be roused whether in Pakistan much more so, or to some extent in India also; let us remember; it is no good our pretending that our hands are lily-white all the time, and our minds are lily-white, because they are not. We have made errors.

I believe that the major difference between Pakistan and India is not because we are better folk than they are—I mean the common people. We are the same lot. We have the same type of virtues and the same type of weaknesses and failings. But I believe that the major difference has been that we as a Government—and not only as Government, but I would say, leaders of parties, all parties or nearly all parties—have deliberately aimed at avoidance of conflict, by creating better relations with the people of Pakistan, while in Pakistan the leadership has not done that. I am not criticising them. I do not wish to criticise them and have a

match of mutual criticism. But circumstances in Pakistan have been such that, the very creation of Pakistan, that is, on the communal basis and all that, and the way it has continued, have been such that, unfortunately, they have been driven, the leadership there has been driven, to lay stress on conflict with India, on hatred of India, on carrying on the old tradition of the Muslim League which they inherited. Therefore, while neither of us is free of blame as a people, as a Government, we have at least tried to go the right way. That attempt has been absent from the other side. Again, I am not criticising any individual but circumstances, the circumstances which led to this Partition, the policy of the Muslim League and all that.

When you consider this unfortunate fact of the strained relations between India and Pakistan, curious strained relations—because, when you and I meet or anybody meets, a group of people from India meets a group of people from Pakistan, we are friendly, we hardly meet as strangers, as people of two countries; we speak the same language; we have common friends, common memories and a hundred and one things, and yet there is this tremendous strain which does harm to both of us—when you think of this, people tell you—some people say—'Oh, you go and settle this Kashmir issue, and all would be well.'—this is the normal criticism or advice offered to us in foreign countries—or 'Settle this canal waters issue.' Well, obviously, if we settled any issue which is in conflict, it creates a good atmosphere naturally. But I do submit to this House that all this, that the strain and the feeling of conflict between India and Pakistan is not due to the Kashmir issue, is not due to the canal waters or any other issue, but that all these issues are due to another essential conflict, something else. These are the outcome of that, not the origin of the conflict; of course, they overlap, and it is rather

difficult to draw a line between the two. But it does mean this, that if this type of approach, this type of anti-India approach, hatred of India, bitter dislike of India which is propagated in the press, in the statements of leading people in Pakistan, continues, and if that is the basis of their foreign and internal policy, then it just does not matter what you settle and what you do not settle, because that is the basis of policy. If by any chance the Kashmir issue was out of the picture as a matter of conflict, it will have, no doubt, a very good effect; I have no doubt. But unless that basic approach is changed, the thing will continue in other forms. That is our difficulty, so that I feel very unhappy about this matter, and it is no pleasure for me, no desire of mine, to say words, any words which might accentuate our difficulties. I do not like much that is happening in Pakistan. I do not want to criticise it. It is none of my business unless it affects me.

I read only in yesterday's paper—or was it the day before—a former Prime Minister of Pakistan openly saying that 'We must march Pakistan troops into Kashmir'. Now, what is this? Is this reasonable, sensible? Even if it is a reaction just in an angry defiant way, it is not good; it creates that atmosphere of bitterness and hatred and fear and cold war which we want to get rid of.

Shri Braj Raj Singh (Firozabad):
It is meant for consumption within Pakistan only.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It may mean that. But that is an important point. It creates that atmosphere in Pakistan and abroad.

All these years, hon. Members know that there are noted personalities in Pakistan who have made it their business—openly proclaimed—to train people to commit sabotage in Jammu and Kashmir State. In fact, forget the number, but at least a

hundred bomb outrages have taken place in that State; many people have been killed, and all that. This has been deliberately done there. How can one go towards solving a problem when that is the attitude—when *jehad* and all that is talked about? I do not think that is the attitude of the people of Pakistan as a whole. And I would not even say this; for, who am I to go about criticising the leaders of other countries? But I would say, we have got into such a tangle that the only positive policy of theirs is a negative policy, which is a contradiction in terms,—that is, a negative policy of hatred of India. And they go about repeating—some of them—that India will crush them and swallow them up, and that India is out to undo Partition. For anyone to think of that is foolish; for anyone to do it or try to do it would be criminal folly. And looking at it, apart from the larger viewpoints, from the stand-point of India and India alone, from the narrowest opportunist point of view even, it would be criminal folly.

Nobody wants to undo Partition. It will be terrible; we will go down; everything that we try, whether it is our Five Year Plan or whatever it is, the whole thing will collapse; instead of doing any good to anybody, the whole structure of our economy, the political and economic structure would suffer. The only way is for each country to go its way, and I hope, come nearer to each other co-operatively in thinking and action, of its own free will. That is the way—and retaining its independence and freedom of action.

Now, there are these two major problems. One is the canal waters dispute, dragging on interminably. Some of our best engineers are practically spending their lives, sitting in Washington, discussing this matter with representatives of Pakistan and the World Bank. We have spent vast sums of money just in these discussions. I do not know the figure, but it runs into crores, I think.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

We would have built a fine scheme or project or canal here or in Pakistan by the amount of money we have spent merely in talking. Talking is sometimes useful; naturally, it serves some purpose; it is better than quarrelling. Anyhow, here is this problem of canal waters which, essentially, it not a political problem and should not be considered as such. It is a human problem. We do not want to deny Pakistan any water that it can have. We do not wish to make the Pakistan peasantry suffer for lack of water. Obviously, we are not going to deny our own people what they need so badly. We are not going to deny something for which we have been preparing almost for generations, not to mention the last ten years or so, something for which people in Rajasthan, in parts of East Punjab and other areas have been preparing for generations. We are not going to wipe all this out because some people do not like it. Mind you, all these schemes are pre-independence and pre-partition schemes and you can judge them.

Anyhow, our approach—and I want this approach to be carried out—is a friendly approach to Pakistan, is a human approach to this problem. Let us do our best. It is no good Pakistan telling us 'Give us Rs. 1,000 crores'. It is fantastic—such huge figures being thrown about, as if any country can do that. But we do not want Pakistan to suffer; at the same time, it is obvious that we do not want ourselves to suffer at all.

Finally, take this problem of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Recently there has been a report by Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham had been here previously and all of us who have had the privilege of meeting him, respect him. He is a man beaming goodwill and good intentions, and it is really a pleasure to meet a man like that. He came here on this occasion and he was our honoured guest, although we had informed the Security Council when they passed that resolution, that we could not

accept that resolution, nevertheless, if Dr. Graham came, he would be welcome. So he came and he had some talks with us. In this report, he himself has stated the nature of our talks. I am not at the present moment going into this Kashmir question. It is too big and too difficult, and apart from that, this House knows very well what our position in regard to this issue is—what we have said in great detail in the Security Council and in India. And in this matter, I believe there are no two opinions in this House or in the country. There might be slight variations about emphasis, but broadly speaking, there is none.

The trouble, according to us, in considering this matter has been that from the very beginning certain basic factors and basic aspects have not been considered by the Security Council, and because of that, the foundation of thinking and action has been unreal and artificial, and all this tremendous lapse of time has occurred without achieving any result.

When Dr. Jarring came here representing the Security Council—that was before Dr. Graham came—he presented a brief report. In that report, the House may remember, there was a recognition of certain factors, certain developments, certain facts of life which could not be ignored. He merely hinted at them; he did not go into that matter; it was difficult. Anyhow, this is the first glimmering that you see of what the problem is today. You can consider this problem in terms of 1948 and 1949 or in terms of today. You cannot consider it all the time, every little phase in between. I say 1948 and 1949 because it was in those years that certain resolutions of the Security Council were passed, which we accepted. The very first thing in those resolutions was that Pakistan and India should behave in a certain way, that is, peacefully and not curse each other, not create conditions of conflict. The second thing was that

Pakistan should withdraw from the occupied part of Kashmir and so on and so forth. Remember, the basis of those resolutions was the recognition of the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State over the whole territory, that is to say, that the State was part of India and, therefore, Indian sovereignty. I am not going into that. Now, after that, much happened. A great deal has happened during these ten years, and even the papers that we have—I forget the exact number—run into 20, 25 or 30 volumes in connection with this Kashmir affair.

Now, we come to today. Keep—if you want to keep—those resolutions that we accepted, in mind; we do not want to go away from them. But remember that during all these ten years, the very first part of the thing has not been given effect to by Pakistan—neither the first, nor the second, nor the third—and all discussions begin in the Security Council ignoring all this, with something that is at the far end of the resolution, which was only to be thought of after everything else had been done.

Now, Dr. Graham has been good enough to put forward certain suggestions. One is that we should reiterate solemnly—‘we’ meaning India and Pakistan—what we had said previously: we should make a new declaration in favour of maintaining an atmosphere of peace. I was perfectly prepared to make it, and I will make it once, twice, three times, a number of times more. But with all humility—I submit again that I am prepared to make it—we drew Dr. Graham's attention to the type of declarations that were being made in Pakistan from day to day while he was there in Karachi. The declarations that were made there had no semblance of peace; there was the very opposite of it and all these bomb explosions organised from Pakistan are taking place in the Jammu and

Kashmir State. So nobody can object to what Dr. Graham has said. Let us have by all means declarations about maintaining an atmosphere of peace. But let us look at the facts, what is happening, what a former Prime Minister of Pakistan has just said, which is in yesterday's papers, and so on.

Then Dr. Graham said—the second thing—let us also declare that we shall observe the integrity of the cease-fire line. I do not think anybody has accused us during these ten years of a breach of that cease-fire line. There it is. We do not recognise Pakistan occupation on the other side as justified in any way, but we gave our word that we would not take any offensive action against it, and we have not done so. On the other hand, you see, what I have referred to several times, organised sabotage across the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

The third suggestion of Dr. Graham was about the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir State. Certainly, it is not up to us to withdraw; it is up to them to withdraw. It is not a question of our agreement to their withdrawal; we have been asking for their withdrawal all this time.

The fourth proposal was about the stationing of United Nations forces on the Pakistan border of Jammu and Kashmir State following the withdrawal of the Pakistan army from the State.

13 hrs.

Now, the proposal was or is for the stationing of U.N. troops, not in any part of Jammu and Kashmir territory, not in the part which is occupied by Pakistan now, but, these forces should be stationed in Pakistan territory proper. Obviously, Pakistan is an independent sovereign State. If it wants to have any foreign forces,

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

we cannot say, 'No' to it. We cannot prevent that. We, for our part, do not like the idea of foreign forces anywhere. And more especially in this connection we felt we did not see any reason why the U.N. Forces should sit in Pakistan on the Kashmir border. But, that is our opinion. It does not carry us anywhere because what is proposed is to be done in the territory of Pakistan. It is for Pakistan to agree or not to agree; we have expressed our opinion.

Then, finally, Dr. Graham suggested that the two Prime Ministers, that is of India and Pakistan, should meet under his auspices. Now, it has been our practice or convention always to be prepared to meet not only as Prime Ministers, but anywhere in any conflict to meet our opponent, to meet our adversary, to meet, of course, our friends also. So, there can be no difficulty and no objection on our part, or for me, to meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan. But Dr. Graham says that we should meet under his auspices; that is to say, the three of us should meet. That produces an entirely different type of picture. I need not go into it. Obviously, that is there.

First of all, it places us in a position of, let us say, equality in this matter with Pakistan. We have always challenged that position. Pakistan is an aggressor country in Kashmir and we are the aggrieved party. We cannot be treated on level. That has been our case right from the beginning.

Secondly, for the two Prime Ministers who meet, it would almost appear as if they have to plead with Dr. Graham, under whose auspices they meet, as advocates for certain causes which they represent. This kind of thing does not lead to problems being considered properly or solved. So, we told Dr. Graham that while we are always prepared to meet, this way of meeting with a third party present, even though the

third party may be so eminent as Dr. Graham, was not a desirable way.

I have ventured to say something about Dr. Graham's report because there has been a good deal of talk about it, and a good deal of criticism, rather ill-informed criticism, in the foreign Press on the subject. Anyway, it is open to our friends or those who are not our friends to criticize us. I make no complaint. But I do wish that they would realise our position in this matter and what exactly of Dr. Graham's report we rejected.

I told you the first point, broadly speaking, is to make a declaration of good neighbourliness. Nobody can oppose that and there is no question of its rejection. Our submission is that this thing has been totally lacking from October 1947 onwards and, even after we had made this statement, Pakistan has not. In fact, it is our primary case that the old resolution of 1948 the very first part of it has not been given effect to by Pakistan.

The second point is about the cease-fire line. There is nothing to reject there.

The third was about the withdrawal of Pakistan troops. It is none of our concern. We want that to happen. We do not reject the withdrawal of Pakistan troops.

The fourth was the placing of UN troops in Pakistan territory. Well, I have told you it is up to Pakistan to agree or not to agree. If they want our opinion we can give it.

And, lastly, this question of the two Prime Ministers meeting. If my opinion is asked for I would say that a meeting should take place. Any meeting can take place when, if I may use the word, the omens are favourable, when the atmosphere is helpful. Otherwise, it is not likely to do much good. But, apart from that, I am prepared to meet whatever the

omens may be. But, as I said, I do not think it is the right way to approach this question, to meet in the manner suggested by Dr. Graham, that is, under his Chairmanship, discussing this matter between us. So, that is the position.

Now, I should like to say a sentence or two before finishing in regard generally to the Demands for External Affairs. In the past, during these debates and sometimes during questions, many points have been brought out and many criticisms have been made; and we have profited by these criticisms at any rate, we have tried to profit by them and we welcome them. We are not afraid of criticisms and we welcome those criticisms; but I would say only one thing.

Sometimes an approach is made which entails, without much obvious good, a great deal of labour. For instance, after 2 or 3 years of effort, labour and concentration we formed the Indian Foreign Service B. It involved tremendous labour, all kinds of committees of selection and consultation with Public Service Commission and all that. I do not know—I forget that now—but probably 7,000 or 8,000 persons applied. I get complaint after complaint that so and so has been improperly rejected or so and so has been improperly chosen. It is not possible for me as the Minister to consider 7,000 applications. Some impartial committee has to consider them. Most of these came from people in service; they were taken in or they remained where they were. I suppose some of the persons who did not happen to get it or who were not chosen go about from Member to Member with their complaints. Then, I get long letters, letters of 3, 4 or 5 typewritten foolscap pages. I have them examined, of course; I send them answers. But, I would submit that it is impossible, when we are following these procedures greatly—I cannot guarantee that—that

absolutely 100 per cent correct decision is always made. Who can guarantee that? But we make a certain procedure where the personal element does not count or counts very little and when we go through this procedure if any obvious error takes place, one tries to correct it. But it is quite impossible for us to go after these 6,000 or 7,000 people continuously and repeatedly because they go and complain of something that might have happened to them.

DEMAND No. 22—TRIBAL AREAS

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 7,36,07,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1959, in respect of 'Tribal Areas'".

DEMAND No. 23—NAGA HILLS TUENSANG AREA

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 3,34,19,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1959, in respect of 'Naga Hills—Tuensang Area'".

DEMAND No. 24—EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Speaker: Motion moved:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 8,05,57,000 be granted to the President to complete the sum necessary to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1959, in respect of 'External Affairs'".