

[Dr. Lanka Sundaram]

is carried out properly. With the result that we must make these here itself, and we must ensure that our defence and our foreign policy are not imperilled through lack of action on our part.

Finally, you will notice, Mr. Speaker, that the entire tenor of the 20 odd amendments given notice of hinges upon one point, namely, national consolidation and strengthening of defence. There is a very beautiful expression in French which when translated into English reads: "A Government of national concentration". I am making an appeal to the Prime Minister I am quoting his own words in his speeches at Dehra Dun and at Calcutta. The whole country is in favour of national unity. I beg of him to implement that policy. The country is behind him personally. It is likely that the country is not behind the Government in the larger, wider sense, in certain respects. But it devolves upon him to carry out, the policy into effect, the call he has made at Dehra Dun and Calcutta and also yesterday in this House. I have listened to the speech of my hon. friend, Mr. Mukerjee, and others yesterday and even today, to the speech of Mr. Deshpande. They are all ready to rally round the cause of our security. Our very existence is being imperilled. I am not a scare-monger, Mr. Speaker. But if the call which the Prime Minister has issued is put into effect, I am sure there will be a magnificent response from every man, woman and child in support of his policy, to declare to the world that the country is one and that it cannot be divided when the question of her survival and existence is involved.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** Mr. Speaker, Sir, the House was good enough to show me so much indulgence yesterday by the patience with which it listened to my long address and subsequently. But I feel I will not be justified in taking much more of its time. This is the last day of the session and much work has to be done. Nevertheless, I should like

to say a few words, more particularly with reference to what has been said by hon. Members.

Most Members in so far as foreign policy is concerned, or the present developments in this policy are concerned, have not really, in effect, challenged me. They may have emphasised some aspect of it or the other. That is a matter for gratification to me. I must confess, however, that when Mr. V. G. Deshpande said that he saw a silver lining in my policy, I began to feel some doubt as to whether I was quite right, because, normally speaking, we are far apart, and what he considers right, I consider wrong and *vice-versa*. However, there has been undoubtedly a very great deal of agreement on the broad lines of policy, and in fact, many of the criticisms that have been made have been made outside the matters that we were really discussing yesterday. Perhaps some hon. Members felt their style cramped because I had requested them to confine themselves to the two or three subjects which I had mentioned. Normally, sometimes when these debates take place, speeches roam over a wide field; they cover the entire world. And so, because we were supposed to confine ourselves more or less to particular matters, here was this slightly baffling and cramping effect.

My hon. friend opposite, Acharya Kripalani, whose words are always listened to with respect by all of us, had not caught up to the fact that we were discussing foreign affairs. He started discussing the Preventive Detention Act and all that. Now that is my difficulty, that in this changing dynamic world hon. Members opposite do not catch up to events. They still live in a past age, a good age—a very good age, but not of today—without attempting to face the different problems of today. The language, the arguments and the slogans and the reasoning of yesterday do not apply today. It is obvious. It is a patent thing. Yet the same old things are

said, the same old arguments are trotted out, whether they have any reference to the discussion or not. Normally speaking, one very favourite argument, when these debates take place, for hon. Members opposite, is the Commonwealth—the Commonwealth connection. Altogether they cannot get rid of them.

If instead of referring to it so much, they spend a little time in understanding what it is, perhaps our paths would be easier and their paths too. But, everything that is ill is traced to the Commonwealth connection. The Commonwealth connection may be good or bad. I think it is extraordinarily good; I stand by it. I still stand by it without agreeing in the slightest with the policy of any country in the Commonwealth or disagreeing with it. It is not that, but, when I am told, 'Oh, this has happened and that has happened because of the Commonwealth connection', it has no connection, no relevance because the thing might have happened without the Commonwealth connection or with it. You can discuss that matter independently whether it is good or bad, but don't say that a certain condition is caused by this.

However, I was very glad to find the hon. Member opposite, Prof. Hiren Mukerjee studying the Gita. And, I hope he will continue those studies and reach that part of it in which a question is put by Arjuna and Krishna answers it in noble language—that famous part:

स्थितप्रज्ञस्य क्व भाषा समाधिस्थस्य केशव ।

स्थितधीः किं प्रभाषेत किमासीत् ब्रजेत किम् ॥

I hope, all of us in debate or in the rest of our lives will remember these noble words and try to live up, to the best of our ability, to that ideal.

I do not propose to say much about the major subjects that we discussed yesterday; I have said enough. But, some points that were mentioned, not

really relating to those subjects, I shall refer to.

Acharya Kripalani complained that we do not consult other parties in regard to foreign affairs; and he said that in other countries foreign affairs is a national policy in which, to a large extent, all parties agree. Now, I am not personally aware of these other countries where in foreign affairs all parties agree, except in certain countries where other parties are not allowed to exist. But, normally speaking, there is a great difference. It is all right in the old days when foreign affairs was looked upon, if I may say so, from a narrower angle, but nowadays, when foreign affairs is entangled with economic affairs and other matters, that is the very subject on which parties disagree; whether it is any country in Europe, or even in England,—a country which shows a great measure of discipline in such matters,—there is a great deal of difference in outlook—not in everything of course—and indeed policies change when Governments change and even, to some extent, when foreign Ministers change. Perhaps, the hon. Member had in mind, what is often called in the United States of America, the "bi-partisan policy" of the United States. I am not competent to say what that "bi-partisan policy" is. I find it difficult sometimes to understand that. But, however, that may be, even in that bi-partisan policy, there are considerable differences as between one Government and the other. I only point out that it is not quite correct to say or to think that a nation, and the various groups and parties in the nation must necessarily have one policy. I should like to have it, not that I am opposed to it, but I ask hon. Members opposite whether all of them agree to any single policy. Leave out us, I put it to them. There are leaders of parties opposite and several parties; do they agree to any single policy in regard to foreign affairs? I would submit, they do not. In some matters they may agree, in others, they do not. In some matters they may agree, in others, they will disagree, but, by and

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

large, they have no single policy. I want to consult, undoubtedly, and one should consult, and in times of crisis or difficulty or when grave issues are being considered, it is right that the nation should hold together and that there should be the greatest consultations possible. I agree entirely; but, to say that in developing a foreign policy, one must take always into consideration a large number of heterogeneous ideas and proceed on the basis of consulting numerous groups with different viewpoints, would be to make foreign policy a question of debate between differing groups. As a matter of fact, that type of debate, while it may not yield results in times of crisis it is still more likely to create difficulty. If war is considered a time of crisis, it was said by Macaulay that while wars have sometimes been won by bad generals, it is not known in history that a debating society ever won a battle.

Now, it is suggested that we should reduce the conduct of these high affairs relating to foreign policy to frequent consultation and debate—not debate in this House I mean—I am all in favour of consultation as far as possible, but somebody must shoulder the responsibility for that policy; otherwise, we will find that nobody is responsible and the outcome will be a bit of this and a bit of that, without any coherence, without any logic and trying to satisfy all parties. It is better to have a slightly different policy, a coherent policy and not a policy without any coherence.

**Acharya Kripalani** (Bhagalpur *cum* Purnea): Sir, I am very sorry. I withdraw my suggestion. Let the foreign policy be one man's policy.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru**: Acharya Kripalani said that he is all in favour of the policy of non-alignment, but that we, who proclaimed it forgot it and do not practise it. I do not know what he had in mind. It is perfectly true that we happen to live in this work-a-day world and have to co-operate with our neighbours, our

neighbour in the street, our neighbour in the town and our neighbour internationally. We have not, as a nation, or as a Government, taken to *sanyasa* yet. We have to co-operate with the world; we have to give and take. We have to accept many things that we do not like just as others have to accept from us much they do not like. So that, to say that we must consider ourselves as irreproachable, as blameless, and guiltless and must not touch anybody who does not come up to the particular ideal of ours, whether right or wrong, is a different matter, and is not a realistic approach to anything. We go to the United Nations; all kinds of countries are represented there, and, in our heart of hearts, we like some of them more than others. We meet some parties, we go there, we confer and when we confer in the United Nations or anywhere else in any Committee, there are compromises. We do not say, 'You must take my word, yes, or no, or I go out'. Countries do not behave like that; even individuals, normally do not. So that, often enough, in these matters, whether in the United Nations or elsewhere, we have to compromise about many matters which come up. It may be true that when we support, the process of compromise, there is some danger, that we do not compromise too much; we do not go the slippery path; it may be so. But, there is no help for that; you have to face that and guard against that. You cannot say, 'I would not talk to anybody who does not take my word completely; or I go out'. Let me put it in a rather crude form. I say, I will only talk to people who talk my language, say Hindi. Of course, for a time, for a moment it may have a good effect. But, I may be cut off from the rest of the world, the entire world. Of course, my saying that is severe; but it comes to the same thing in regard to ideas. Suppose, I say I would not talk to anybody who does not hold my ideas, who does not accept my ideas. Again, I cut myself off, because there has to be communion of ideas, there has to be give

and take about it, there has to be an understanding in this dynamic, ever-changing world of today. Leave out the world; take your own country. The public of this country,—whether you take them in the North-East of India or right down in Cape Comorin, all kinds of conditions there are,—they are essentially identical, essentially the same. There is a very strong identity, uniformity in the whole of the country, but yet there is a variety, a richness of variety, which is a great thing. We welcome that richness of variety; we cannot drive anybody and everybody with a single stick, with a single idea. We have to adopt ourselves and we have to give them freedom to do things as they do. Therefore, in international affairs, we cannot take up this attitude, 'Oh, you must agree with me, or I would have nothing to do with you'. The result may be that you can sit in your isolated conditions separately and have nothing to do with others. That is not possible. Even if we wanted it, that is not a possibility. Today, we live in a world—whether you like it or not—we live in the beginning of the atomic age, of the jet planes, and all those kinds of things that rush us past at several miles a minute, and therefore, when we talk about agreeing to something, which may not be quite upto our way of thinking or something that we dislike, it may be—that often happens—that others agree to many things that we do but which they do not like. That is the only way to do things. The point is whether we agree to something basically wrong. Whether that upsets the basic policy that we pursue or other things which are of secondary importance in life. In foreign affairs, especially, what counts is what you place first. Priorities count, and it counts a great deal whether you give a certain thing the first place, or the second place or the third place. If you are always thinking in terms of something in the third order of priority, your first and second go overboard. Therefore, in order to take the first thing, which is most important, you have things to put away the

second and the third, in spite of the pain that it may cause you.

Acharya Kripalani said that we should not have gone to Korea and we should not have referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations. I find that the policies of many of my hon. friends opposite are normally a policy of negation—"what we must not do". Now, am I to argue in the year 1953 what we should have done or not done in the year 1947? Can we ever come to the present in our talks for the understanding of these problems. I can argue that point—what was done in 1947? After all, we are considering the situation today and that is, if I may say so, my difficulty, that hon. Members opposite cannot come to the present. They are so wrapped up in the past events. Let us assume for a moment that we committed not one but a hundred mistakes, 2, 5, or 7 years ago. What about it? We have to face the situation today, or else we shall never come to the present.

**Dr. N. B. Khare (Gwalior):** Rectify the mistakes, that is all.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** Now, hon. Members opposite asked about Korea. Why did we go to Korea? Was it to gain honour, glory and prestige that we went to Korea? We went to Korea because, if we did not go to Korea, the first thing was that there would have been no truce, no cease fire in Korea, the war would have gone on with all the dangers of that war expanding. Regarding our going or not going, I cannot speak, of course, with the prophet's certainty, but as we saw the problem then—and subsequent events have justified it—the only way at that time to get that Resolution through in the United Nations first, and subsequently between the two Commands, was for India to fill a gap, which no other country could fill. I am not talking in terms of any virtue of India but it is a factual statement that no other country was agreeable to fill that particular gap. If that gap was not filled, then the agreement did not come off. If that agreement did not come off, then the cease fire did not

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

take place and that terrible war went on. I am not going into the merits of the war—that presents a different story. Therefore we had to face the problem with the utmost reluctance. We accepted the job and I would accept it not once, but a hundred times again, because I owe a duty not only to my country but to others, and I was amazed to see, not only in this House, but for the last one month or two people say or write in the newspapers, "Call back immediately your troops from Korea". It surprises me that when they say these things, they do not consider the question with the least degree of responsibility. We are not a great military nation, nor a rich nation, but we have certain standards by which we act as a people, I hope as a nation. Because somebody says something, because President Rhee says something that we do not like, can we call back our troops and upset the whole apple cart, war or no war, massacre or no massacre? That is the height of irresponsibility. We are not going to do that so far as we are in charge of the affairs. We are going to discharge the work to the best of our ability. Our ability may be limited, but in so far as we can do it, we shall do it and we shall discharge it with fairness and impartiality.

Mr. Mookerjee thinks that most of the evils flow from our connection with the Commonwealth. Monazite being sent out of our country must have something to do with the Commonwealth! Foreign experts come here and Gurkhas are given *Khukris*. Let us examine these great charges.

"Monazite goes out and comes back in the shape of bombs." I have respect for Mr. Mookerjee, but very often his facts go wrong. We have plenty of monazite and we put a ban on its export, but we do sell it or exchange it for something that we badly require and we take something that we have not got,—something, let us say, even in connection with atomic energy. No country can make progress in this way. If we shut up our shop and do not supply anything that we have, lest

it might be used by somebody else, we don't get what we want. Therefore, that is where judgment comes in as to what we should give, to whom we should give, at what price and in what quantities. That is a matter of judgment. You have to consider the problem at every stage. We have given monazite to others and we have given to half a dozen countries very little quantities, sometimes in exchange for something which we badly needed for the very purpose of developing monazite. But merely to think that we are doing so under the pressure of somebody or just to make money out of it is completely untrue. As a matter of fact, if I may say so, hon. friends here from the Travancore-Cochin State will remember that we have had an argument with the Travancore-Cochin Government because we wanted to take over—and we have taken over—under the Central Government, in association with the Travancore-Cochin Government, some of these factories there of this type and the Travancore-Cochin Government has not been, to begin with, very forthcoming in this matter because certain private interests were involved. We did not want private interests to take charge of them and so we took them over in consultation with and in co-operation with the Travancore-Cochin Government. Therefore, sending of monazite has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. Monazite does go and we want it to go for a particular purpose and we think it is an advantage that it should go in exchange for something that we badly need.

We are not interested in, nor have we the capacity for making atomic bombs or using them. The question does not arise, but we are interested in the development of atomic energy for civil use and it is quite possible that in 10 or 15 years time, atomic energy might be used for civil purposes—as a tremendous source of power, easy source of power. When that comes in, it will upset entirely—not immediately but in the course of

time—the whole question of power supply.

**Shrimati Renu Chakravartty** (Basirhat): Can't we police exactly whether it is going for civil use or for bombs?

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** I do not know. I am not saying that. I am interested in atomic energy. Our developments are, if I may say so, in the initial stages. It is for the great nations to answer the question which the hon. Member put. She asked: "Are you policing it?" But I am saying that this atomic energy is a tremendous source of power and it is quite certain that it could be used for civil purposes. Though it is not an economical proposition today, yet, in the next ten or fifteen years, relatively in the near future, it can be used. Now, imagine what a tremendous difference it will make to our country? In a country like the United States of America it is not much needed for civilian use, because there are tremendous supplies of power there. They do not want much more. But in countries where power supplies are not so abundant, as in India and other under-developed countries, it will make a great difference. If we concentrate this power, we can carry it in a suit-case to the deserts of Rajasthan and convert Rajasthan into a fertile land; so that it does make a tremendous difference to under-developed countries. It is a new source of power. Just 150 years ago, the Industrial Revolution came and saved the world out of drudgery. We are on the eve of another greater revolution which will change the world, provided the word survives and provided wars did not destroy it, but it is a different matter. I am not particular about atomic power as such—our country is not interested—but I am interested in the science of it, because, when the time comes, I would be in a position to use atomic energy, and produce it. We do not want to compete—we cannot compete—with the great nations who desire it, but as a matter of fact, we are known to be among the select few nations where

good scientific work in the preliminary stages is done on atomic energy. We are the only country in Asia, at the present moment, which has gone ahead a little—there are some countries in Europe and, of course, in America. So, in doing this work, we use monazite, we preserve it and we give it to some persons who give us the know how to work it. We put up factories; they take the monazite and process and give it to us; the next stage is, we process it ourselves. So, it is not a question of giving something under pressure or to please somebody else.

Then, Mr. Mukerjee referred to foreign experts. Naturally, I cannot discuss the question of any individual expert, good or bad. But I do not understand this business, he objects not to foreign experts but to a particular nationality of a foreign expert. Obviously he does not object to foreign experts as such. Now it is quite clear that we want to develop our industries, our technique, our sciences. We want to develop them. Obviously, in developing them we want expert guidance. We may conceivably develop without expert guidance too; but only you will take ten times as much time; instead of two years, we would take 15 or 20 years for the same. It is obvious that every country has done it too. We want the best technical advice possible. Let there be no mistake about it. It is not patriotism or nationalism that counts in this matter. If we want a technical, expert man from abroad, we ought to get him from abroad—it does not matter whether your man is thrown out of his job or not. We cannot get a second-rate man for doing a first-rate job. Technically considered, you may have, although it is not good, a second-rate administrator, but you just cannot do it if you want a second-rate technical man to do a first-rate technical job. It would not be done, simply. Therefore, we must have the very best men,—we may make a mistake in choosing the man. But the sooner we get high-class technical experts, the sooner we can ask them to start the

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

plants. It is part of their business to train our people, and it is not a question of 'lecture' training, but training by experience in doing big jobs. We have undertaken in this country some of the biggest jobs that are being done in the world. There are the river valley projects. Some hon. Members have seen them, and often they have criticised them. That criticism may be right or wrong in a particular matter, but the fact of the matter is that they are magnificent jobs magnificently done, taken as a whole. Anybody who sees them realises it. It is not a question of argument. Anybody who sees them, whether he comes from any part of India, or from Russia or China, realizes that it is a magnificent job magnificently done, in spite of all the mistakes that have been committed.

Then, to do big things, we have to look and consider them in a big way and remove all trivial failings. You remember the bigness of the job. Remember that it requires courage to take up that big job. You do not do a big job in a pettifogging way. So, we will not entrust them to any persons who are not absolutely top-ranking. In that particular respect, from the point of view of experience, I am sure even in the present generation our engineers are very good; they have been exceedingly good; they are improving, that is to say, they are getting experience of these big jobs and they can do the biggest job, I am quite sure, after a few years' time. But, for the present, it does help us to have good experts from abroad. From the point of view of finance, sometimes it does not matter what you pay him, because he saves you so much. So, the question of foreign experts must be viewed in that light.

Now, about the Gurkhas and the *khukris*. Well, the *khukris* are light, shining instruments. They are hardly instruments of warfare now, much less in this atomic and bombing age. It is true that we allowed the export of a number of *khukris* to Malaya for

the Gurkhas there, because they are more as a part of their ceremonial attire just as the Sikhs have their *kirpans*. It was a private transaction in which we did not want to come in the way.

Now, Dr. Lanka Sundaram gave some facts which rather surprised me. I do not know where his information comes from about the happenings on the Indo-Tibetan border. He said that 100,000—or, I forget 50,000—troops are concentrated there. I have a few sources of information too, but I have not got that information. I should be very happy if Dr. Lanka Sundaram will supply me with some information on that subject so that I can verify it. I am in intimate touch this way and that way on the border, on both sides, and those figures which he mentioned, so far as I am concerned, are completely wrong, and far out from truth. I would like to say further that in a way, in the way in which Dr. Lanka Sundaram put it, there seems to be some connection with our talks with China which are going to take place in the course of the next week in Peking—some connection between them and the recent developments in regard to the proposals for U.S. military aid to Pakistan.

**Dr. Lanka Sundaram:** It was not my intention.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** It was not your intention, I know, but Members might have thought so. As a matter of fact, this question of our talks in Peking has been under correspondence for the last many, many months, and ultimately, I should think, about three months back, we suggested to the Chinese Government that we would like to have some talks with them and that we could have them either in Delhi or in Peking. Thereupon they agreed to Peking. We asked our Ambassador to come here. We have had talks with our Ambassador and now he has gone back: and one or two other officials of our Foreign Office are also going there. I think that before this year is out the talks will begin.

But they have no relation to any other problem, except these problems in regard to Tibetan trade, pilgrimage and such like problems.

Now, Dr. Lanka Sundaram also referred to some maps and Chinese claims to suzerainty, and the McMohan line and all that. I cannot speak for the Chinese Government, of course,—what they may have in their minds or not. But I know what has happened in the course of the last two or three years. Repeatedly we have discussed with them these problems, in regard to Tibet especially, because India has some special interests in Tibet, trade, pilgrimage, etc. At no time has any question been raised by them or by anybody about frontier problems. This House knows very well that I have declared here in answer to questions, in foreign affairs debates, repeatedly that so far as we are concerned, there is nothing to discuss about the frontier. The frontier is there: the MacMohan line is there. We have nothing to discuss with anybody, with the Chinese Government or any other Government about it. There it remains. The question does not arise. So our people have gone there not to discuss the frontier problem. It is not an issue at all to be discussed.

Dr. Lanka Sundaram also referred to some leaflet of the External Affairs Ministry in which something was said about an undefined border. Now I speak from memory: but, so far as I remember, that refers to the border with Burma. Especially in the Naga territory, there is an area which is not really defined and there have been vague talks with the Burmese Government. So far as the MacMohan line is concerned it was fixed long ago. It is true that having fixed it on the map, it is not fixed in the sense of putting down pillars and the like, there may occasionally be some doubt.

**Dr. Lanka Sundaram:** May I interrupt the Prime Minister, Sir. The memorandum I quoted was from Mr. Ramadhyani and the comment was of our External Affairs Ministry to the memorandum. This was submitted to

the Constituent Assembly and dealt with the Tibet-Assam border and the Burma border.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** I cannot say anything about that, though it is possible.....

**Dr. Lanka Sundaram:** It is in the Library, Sir.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** The gentleman is in the Library or the paper?

**Dr. Lanka Sundaram:** The paper.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** May be.

Well, since these days of the Constituent Assembly our Historical Division has given a great deal of thought to these matters and we know much more about it and this question has not troubled us at all. But as I said, there is a certain undefined area as between Burma and India and there were various proposals too for not merely defining it but also slight exchange of territory to adjust things. But they have remained where they were.

Several hon. Members have talked about our defence industries being speeded up. I shall be very happy to speed them up. In fact the progress we have made and we are making in regard to defence industries is very considerable. These big industries take some years, but it does not matter. Some are functioning, others are being built, others are, if I may say so, in the foundation-stone laying stage. I should like to go ahead faster. It is not merely—although that is an important consideration—a question of finance. It is a question of technical training. You cannot have these things for the asking. You have to grow into them to some extent. We grow faster than others, but we have still to grow. Ultimately it becomes a part of the industrial development of the country.

I entirely agree with hon. Members who say that we should not be dependent upon other countries. Of course, nobody can be utterly and absolutely, hundred per cent., independent. Some dependence for something

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

remains and should remain; there is no harm in it. But you must not be dependent to the extent of being enfeebled or unable to function properly because of that dependence. It takes time to build these things up, to build industry up. If you look to other countries, whatever they are, you will see that they took a mighty long time to reach the level they have done now. And I think that the progress we have made in this matter during the last five or six years is very far from negligible.

One thing I should like to say. Mr. Deshpande repeatedly referred to our going about with a begging bowl asking for aid of America or some other countries. Now, at no time has any of us ever gone with a begging bowl to any country—I want to make this perfectly clear—and at no time are we going to do it hereafter. We welcome aid on honourable terms, because it helps us to speed our process of change to industrialisation, whatever it is. But, normally speaking, aid has come to us: the initiative even has been on the other side. We have welcomed that; we have discussed it and we have agreed or disagreed, as the case may be, in regard to a particular matter. There is no question of "begging bowl attitude" which is bad for the giver and for the taker.

Also, I did not say that if Pakistan takes military aid that makes war inevitable. I made no such rash suggestion. What I said was that this kind of thing hampers peace. It comes in the way of peace; it is a factor against peace. It is not by itself so important as to bring war or peace, there are many factors which ultimately govern events.

I think, Sir, that I have dealt with most of the important points that were raised in this debate. I agree entirely with the hope expressed by many hon. Members about the unity of the country and the consolidation of the country. That is obvious. That is our purpose and that should be our effort.

Anyhow, apart from any crisis that might arise we have to do that. I do not want this House or the country to imagine on account of the various developments that have taken place, which should make us wary that something is happening which should create any kind of fright or panic. We have to be wary, we have to be vigilant and we have to be united and work together. And in working together, ultimately, it is not so much the number of armed soldiers that counts.

Some hon. Members have put forward amendment about compulsory military service. Now—if I may say so—if there was one special method which could be devised for the weakening of the country it would be compulsory military service. What does it mean—compulsory military service? I am not against it in theory or practice. But just look at it. If we divert all our energies to compulsory military service, it will have one good effect.

**Shri V. G. Deshpande:** I said compulsory military training.

3 P.M.

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** It may have one good effect, that many of our people would benefit physically by it. But all the money spent upon it will have to be diverted from somewhere. Inevitably it will have to be diverted from various economic activities that we are trying to carry on. Ultimately the strength of the country will depend more upon our economic progress, plus other things of course. If economically we are weak, then a vast number of people walking about in step will do no good to the country.

**Shri S. S. More (Sholapur):** Can you not link up the two?

**Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:** Not two but many things. That, the hon. Member will realise, is the object of a National Plan—linking up various things and giving priorities. The

whole object is linking up various things. The Plan may be deficient, that is a different matter. But that is the whole object of the Plan.

A nation's security depends on many factors. In the first place, defence forces—They are obvious of course. Secondly, industrial potential capacity of the country which keeps the defence forces going. Otherwise defence forces are useless. Thirdly, the economic capacity of the country. And, fourthly, the morale of the country. That is the equation for the defence of a country. And the last two or three are more important even than the first, although the first has to be there.

I am grateful to the House, Sir, for the indulgence with which it has received my motion.

श्री पी० एन० राजभोज (शोलापुर—  
रक्षित—अनुसूचित जातियों): मैं एक सवाल  
पूछना चाहता हूँ।

अध्यक्ष महोदय : अभी सवाल पूछने  
का समय नहीं है आर्डर, आर्डर, नो सवाल।

श्री पी० एन० राजभोज : यह हमारें  
ऊपर बहुत अन्याय हो रहा है।

**Mr. Speaker:** I am now proceeding to put the amendments and hon. Members, as I call their names, will please say whether they want their amendments to be put to the House or whether they want to withdraw them.

**Dr. Lanka Sundaram:** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 1).

**Shri Raghuramaiah (Tenali):** I press my amendment (No. 4), Sir.

**Dr. Ram Subhag Singh (Shahabad South):** I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 6).

**Shri Syed Ahmed:** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 7).

**Shri S. V. Ramaswamy (Salem):** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 9).

**Shri N. Somana (Coorg):** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 11).

**Shri P. N. Rajabhoj:** I press my amendment (No. 12). May I speak, Sir?

**Mr. Speaker:** No.

**Shri Jethalal Joshi (Madhya Saurashtra):** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 13).

**Mr. Speaker:** Coming to Shri V. G. Deshpande's amendment (No. 14) I find that certain parts of it are clearly out of order. Clause (d) is out of order. Then sub-clause (ii) of clause (g) is out of order; also sub-clause (iv) of clause (g). So those portions will be deleted.

**Shri Sarangadhar Das (Dhenkanal—West Cuttack):** I press my amendment (No. 15).

**Dr. Ram Subhag Singh:** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 16).

**Pandit K. C. Sharma (Meerut Dist.—South):** Sir, I beg leave of the House to withdraw my amendment (No. 17).

**Shri T. K. Chaudhuri (Berhampore):** I am pressing my amendment (No. 18).

**Shri N. Sreekantan Nair (Quilon cum Mavelikkara):** I am pressing my amendment (No. 19).

**Mr. Speaker:** Coming to Shri U. C. Patnaik's amendment (No. 20) I am inclined to hold that the whole of it is out of order, for the simple reason that what he suggests is beyond the scope of the present motion.

**Shri V. G. Deshpande:** Sir, before my amendment is ruled out of order may I make a submission about its admissibility?

**Mr. Speaker:** The matter is very clear to me. There is no use taking up time over it. I will now put the