

[Shri K. K. Basu]

negotiations. The hon. Home Minister flew from here, I am told, to Shillong or Gauhati, the seat of the Assam Government, but he never tried to contact the people or go to the real spot where there has been so much trouble, as has already been pointed out, and where there has been a big movement among a section of the people who forms part of India. Therefore, we would urge our Government not to stand on prestige but to open direct negotiations with these people. There may be a small section who even today may be demanding a separate State. But I am sure, if the Government go forward and tell these Naga people, who have a peculiar problem of their own, that they are going to constitute it as an autonomous region with much more powers than provided under the Sixth Schedule, they will agree. It may be, as has been already suggested, made as one of the Part C States provided in the Constitution with much more autonomous powers. I am not going to suggest as to what it should be. What I am saying is that the Government should not stand on prestige but they should open direct negotiations.

We are very often told that people from outside are drafted to work in the administration of that area, when among the Naga people themselves there are people qualified enough. They are not taken into the administration of that particular area, because the Assam Government— whoever may be in charge of the administration—do not have confidence in those people. Do you mean to say that the peculiar problems of the area cannot be dealt with by the sons of the soil, when there are capable boys available who are qualified enough to work? I think our Government should not take the attitude which the Britishers usually took in dealing with the tribal people in NWFP and use bullets and police oppression.

I would, therefore, once again urge upon the Government not to stand on

prestige but start direct negotiation with a view to settling the problem. They naturally do not want an independent area. They are only trying to take the administrative unit with much more autonomous powers. Our friends opposite have been proclaiming our philosophy, forgiveness, tolerance and good living with other of having opposite views. But why today, because a small section—3 lakhs—of the people who are misguided, who have peculiar problems of their own, who are racially somewhat different from a great majority of the Indian people, are indulging in acts of violence for obtaining their demand, you are using force against them? If you take this military attitude and take military action, the tendency of separatism will grow. You should not stand on prestige. You should start direct negotiations. Ask them to surrender their arms and immediately declare a general amnesty as my friends have already suggested. Explore all possible measures so that this problem in the Naga Hills can be permanently tackled and solved, so that they may form a part of Free India and take their due share in the developing Free India, which all of us wish to develop.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, I have welcomed this debate in this House on the situation in the Naga Hills; not that that situation from a military point of view is a very grave one but because it is essentially the kind of problem in which the House and Parliament should take interest.

Now, it has been repeated many times that this should be treated as a human problem; some hon. Members have said: as a political problem and not as a military problem. Well, if we had treated it as a military problem only, probably, the results should have been quite different. It is because we have not treated it as a purely military problem, it is because we have issued all kinds of instructions, restrictions, limita-

tions and inhibitions to our Army and to the others not to treat it as a military problem that from the military point of view progress is not being as fast as it should have been. I believe that if we had treated it in a military way and did not succeed in winning the goodwill and co-operation of the Nagas, we would have failed utterly. There can, and there should be no thought that you can deal with a problem like this, or that you should deal with it, in the sense of merely by force of arms suppressing the people. That is not our attitude.

I should like this House to remember that they should look at this in the larger context of our general policy in these areas, not only in the Naga Hills but in the NEFA area and roundabout areas. Many of these areas, for the first time, were brought under some kind of administration during the last six, seven or eight years. Vast areas have been brought under some kind of administration. I do submit to this House that they will probably not find a parallel of this kind of administrative system spreading out so peacefully and with very few incidents. Why was that so? Because we have issued strict injunctions and directions, saying that we have to win over the people and that we have to seek their co-operation. We have to build, whatever we do, on their goodwill. There have been incidents, but very, very few.

There has been one major incident which, the House might remember, was a little over three years ago. In Acheinmore, in the NEFA area, in October, 1953, an officer of ours, with a number of troops, was going there, not to shoot or kill but for normal patrol work and inspection work. They were suddenly attacked, most unsuspectingly. The poor person was making a cup of tea in his camp, and the others were putting up tents. What was the result? 70 persons were killed—40 porters and 30 army personnel. It is a large number. This kind of thing naturally and normally produces strong reactions in a Gov-

ernment. But I doubt if any Government in the wide world would have dealt with the situation in the way we did. I must say that when we first heard of this incident, it made us rather angry. It made our army, naturally, a little angry. It was not just fighting, but it was sheer cold-blooded murder—people coming and suddenly surrounding peaceful people who were sitting down, and killing them in large numbers. Yet, immediately, we recovered from the first shock and surprise and anger, and naturally we took steps to send our forces there. But we told our forces that they must realise who those people are. It is no good going about killing them and burning their villages. Some hon. Member suggested that the normal thing in British times was to go and burn the villages. Of course, bombing does not kill anybody there because they are not living in concentrated quarters. So, it was said that you can simply burn their villages. But we said, 'No.' The place was very much interior and it was very difficult to reach the areas. It was not plain. We refrained from doing that. We took enormous trouble and after weeks of trail, some of our forces got there. It took us months and months to deal with the situation. We did deal with it and we dealt with it essentially in a peaceful way and ultimately we captured the people who were supposed to be guilty, but we handed them over to the tribal councils to judge.

I mentioned this incident of nearly three years ago to show how we have approached these matters. This particular incident has nothing to do with the Nagas as such. I am merely saying that we issue instructions to the forces, to the civilian officers and to our army, to deal with the situation in a peaceful way.

Last year, there was some trouble in the Tuensang area which is largely a Naga area. Now, it is all very well for the hon. Members—Shri K. K. Basu and Shri Kamath—to say, "You must deal with it in a human

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.]

way. Why do you send the army?" But then, what exactly is to be done when other people start killing? Do we send them messages of goodwill, or do we try to stop the killing? We got messages from the population of that area, asking for help. We got messages from the villagers and we got messages from the Government employees, teachers and others, saying "Protect us". What are we to do? Should we not give them protection? This happened in the Tuensang area. We had to send some of our forces with some rifles and the rest, quietly, without much fuss. Of course, it was easy enough to treat or deal with it differently, by military action or by the army. But we proceeded rather slowly, because we had the object of winning them over and not merely crushing them. Of course, we had to shoot some because they shot at us, but that is a different matter. So, the Tuensang problem was solved within a few months without too much fuss.

Now, when fighting was taking place in the Tuensang area, the Naga Hills were relatively quiet. That is, there was no major incident or acts of violence. There might have been some smaller incidents. At that time, Phizo had come to see the Governor and the Chief Minister of Assam. Actually, he issued statements, more or less mentioning his adherence to non-violence. But we found that while he said so and actually issued notices, he was actually organising for violence, at the same time. There is no doubt about it. It is absolutely true. He was encouraging the people and telling them that "I am doing this. It is a trick, just to give you greater chance to go ahead. Let us play this game here, and you carry on your activities there". This was the kind of thing they practised.

Now, I should like the hon. Members to have some idea of who the Nagas are. I should first like to say that the Nagas, correctly speaking, are not what might be called a tribe

or one group of tribes closely tied to each other. I do not know when the word 'Naga' came to be used. I have an idea that it is a British word, that is, in the British times, that word was used. It may or may not be correct—I am not sure. But their tribes are named differently—Acama, Ao and Angami. These are the names of major tribes. They do not call each other as Nagas. This is a word which you and I may use or the Britishers used. Perhaps, it was used rather in some kind of derision, because Naga means naked. It is quite likely that the Britishers used that word. But the biggest tribes are the Acama, Ao and Angami. If you go to this area, you will find that there is no common language, a common Naga language. Every few miles, over half a dozen villages, the language changes, or the dialect changes. You can hardly meet with one common language over a distant place, except in a broken kind of way.

Among the Nagas, of course there were, or there used to be, some tribes which might be called the dominant tribes, who are, militarily, stronger or tougher than others. The tribes which dominated the others received some tributes from the other tribes. So, there is a certain element of domination over the other tribes. There were some stronger tribes who claimed tributes, in the past, and if they did not get tributes, they took stronger action and stronger measures against the other tribes and forced them to pay tribute. This has been the position there. Then, our administration spread through in those areas.

Some figures about the Nagas might interest the hon. Members. I shall of course use the word 'Naga' as a generic term, because we are using this word in the records. The population at present all over the areas—not the Naga area alone—is a little over half a million. In the Naga Hills District, it is a little over two lakhs. In the Tuensang frontier division also, the population is slightly over

two lakhs. In the Tirap frontier division, it is 50,000 and in the Manipur State, it is 80,000. So, the total is a little over 500,000, which is spread out. In the Naga Hills itself, it is a little over two lakhs.

6 P.M.

Now, I confess that I heard about Nagas as such about 20 or 25 years ago, and I was rather attracted by what I had heard. Then came the case of that lady to which reference was made by Mr. Kamath—Rani Guidallo—who, parenthetically, after suffering a long period of imprisonment, was released many years ago; and, I am glad to say that proper arrangements were made for her to live in the house built for her—she built it herself and we gave her help—and we made as much reparation as we could for the misdeeds of the previous Government. Although I became interested, I did not know much about the Nagas then.

Mr. Jaipal Singh mentioned the sending of those people to see me. Ever since then I have come into contact with them on a number of occasions. Mr. Phizo and a number of his colleagues met me here; they met me twice. There was one occasion to which reference has been made by Mr. Keishing; he said something about an incident at Kohima, where, according to him, the Nagas came and were prevented from giving me an address, and therefore they became angry and walked away. The facts are not quite that. The facts are, I went to Kohima; to begin with, it was not a normal visit to Kohima. The Prime Minister of Burma had come over; flying across the frontier, he met me at Manipur, I think, and we were going to Burma a day or two later. I thought I might utilise that opportunity to go to Kohima. We went to Kohima and we relaxed. I suggested to the authorities there that some kind of a welcome might be given to the Burmese Prime Minister. He was our guest and the people gathered to say a few words. So, it was not a normal occa-

sion on which I go there. What I found later was that the Nagas there wanted to read out an address to me. The Deputy Commissioner told them, "You can hand it over to the Prime Minister afterwards; I cannot allow your reading it out to him at a meeting when the Prime Minister of Burma and others had come", so that, it is not correct to say that I refused to take the address. As a matter of fact, at Kohima on a previous occasion, a year before or so, I had actually met the Naga leader—Mr. Phizo was not there—discussed the matter with them and taken a long document from them just a year before. So, it is not true to say that I refused or even the Deputy Commissioner came in the way of the address being given to me. But, he did come in the way of that being read at the meeting. I did not know it at that time; I knew only later. Then, when U Nu and I arrived at the meeting place, these Nagas who were present, about a hundred or may be a thousand, got up and walked away. I was very distressed at this, not because of me, but here I had taken the Prime Minister of Burma, an honoured guest of ours, and for him to be treated so discourteously hurt me very much.

Now, much has been said. Mr. Basu talked about the atrocities of the military and Mr. Kamath about Cypriots and Kenyans. I do not know what justification they have for using this language; or, it was merely a phrase they are used to without much significance, I do not know. Then, Mr. Keishing referred to the burning of villages and shooting down of people. Obviously, in military operations and the rest, I cannot get up here and say that everything that is being done was as if we were sitting in a drawing room and that everything that was done can be justified completely. Sometimes mistakes are made. Sometimes apart from mistakes, wrong things are done by individuals. That is a different matter. I do submit that mistakes have been made and one of the most

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

regrettable mistakes which distressed us exceedingly has been in connection with the killing of Dr. Haralu. Apart from this, his sons, as the hon. Member said, are important officers of ours—assistant political officers here—and his daughter is serving with me in the External Affairs Ministry. It came to me as a tremendous shock when I came back—I was not here then—and we took immediate action in regard to it. We are taking action; in fact, courts of enquiry etc. are carrying on the processes. Military processes, I believe, are fairly thorough, but they take a long time. Undoubtedly, we should punish those who are guilty.

An Hon. Member: Hear, hear.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not saying that wrong things are not being done there by individuals or groups, whether by civil authorities or by the military. But, I do wish to remove this impression that our army or anybody else there is just playing fast and loose with lives and with burning of villages and the rest. Apart from our instructions which are very strict, the General Officers-Commanding and others have been constantly issuing instructions. Now, it is true that many villages have been burnt there. Our information is that a far greater part of the burning is done by the Naga hostiles. They themselves do it; that is our difficulty. Mr. Jaipal Singh talks about more and more regiments or battalions to be sent there. It is true, but why do we send them? Principally, it is in order to protect the people who are being attacked. It is easy to attack; a group of 10, 20 or 30 persons can go about and attack any village. But it is very difficult to send a garrison to every village. So, it is attempts of protection more than anything that has led to our sending troops in the Naga Hills as well as in the places adjoining them. So, I do submit that slight errors have been committed; most regrettable mistakes have been made. But, the general conduct of our forces

there has been certainly better than any other similar operation that I know. I do believe that Mr. Keishing is misled by reports he may receive, if I may say so, from Mr. Phizo's publicity department, because I get them too and they are the most fantastic tales one can imagine; completely it has no relation to truth at all. These things are not sent to him only, but sometimes, not frequently, they are sent abroad to foreign newspapers in America and elsewhere.

Shri Rishang Keishing: I want to submit to the Prime Minister that I never received anything from Mr. Phizo regarding the figures which I have given. I hope normal situation will be restored and the Government, as it is a democratic Government. *(Interruption.)*

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: He did not say that you were receiving it.

Shri Rishang Keishing: He said that I might have received reports from Phizo's publicity department.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I said that Mr. Keishing must have been affected by news emanating from Phizo's publicity department. I got the news too and many other Members get it.

Shri Rishang Keishing: The figures are unchallengeable.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Which figures?

Shri Rishang Keishing: Figures regarding the burning of the villages.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I do submit there are three types of burnings. Firstly, the Naga hostiles deliberately burn, because, after all, the tribes look at it from their point of view. They cannot, and any such group cannot, subsist for long unless they get help from the villages, unless they get food, money, etc. from the villages, if not out of loyalty, at least out of something imposed by fear. The result is they go about collecting money and food.

Now in the Tuensang Division there are at least one hundred defence societies of local people, Nagas and

others, formed for the protection of villages from hostile Nagas and when the hostile Nagas come local people fight them. We have given some arms to those local people. So also—I do not know the number—to some extent in the Naga Hills it becomes rather a civil conflict between Nagas and Nagas and our information is that sometimes villages are burnt in this process. The figure of Mr. Rishang Keishing may be correct, but I say that most of these villages have been burnt by the Naga hostiles themselves. Another way of burning is—after all they have only thatched roofs—when any kind of firing takes place between our forces and Naga forces, the firing itself sets fire to the villages. May be our firing sets fire to them. I believe that there were cases in the early days or some months back when, suspecting that some villages had been occupied by these hostiles our armed forces either directly burned them or their firing burnt them. But that has been completely stopped, so far as our instructions are concerned. Where there is firing of this kind it is very easy for thatched villages to catch fire. As my hon. colleague reminds me the Nagas fight, apart from guns, with arrows with burning heads. This is a thing which particularly sets fire to thatched roofs.

I do not for a moment say that there have not been mistakes made by the civil or the military, errors committed, regrettable errors committed; but both our approach to this problem and to a large extent in the carrying out of our directions by the army authorities have been rather remarkable for patience that is shown in the face of considerable provocation. I say provocation. Now any hon. Member can realise that it is very irritating to be sniped at, to get an arrow or gun shot suddenly while you are going along a road or passing through anywhere. Now it would be an easy enough problem to deal with armed forces, but the problem is of sniping, not everywhere, but at many places. This kind of

thing is irritating. It makes an average soldier or civilian rather angry. Nevertheless, our instructions are: exercise patience, because we want to win over these people.

Even now in an increasing measure we are utilising the co-operation of the Nagas. Quite apart from Naga officials and others, there are some Naga people in our Assam Rifles, some Naga regiments in our army. I do not mean to say they have all been crowded up there; they are in various places. But our definite instructions are that they must seek the co-operation of the Nagas in every way and seek to make it clear to the hostiles and others that we have inevitably to meet them. We have to meet a person firing a gun at us with a gun.

I do not understand what Mr. Basu and Mr. Kamath meant when they suggested to us that we should treat it as a human problem—yes certainly—and withdraw our army. I really am astonished that any person should make that suggestion, which means handing over large numbers of people there who have relied upon us for their protection, just, well, for their liquidation.

Shri Algu, Rai Shastri (Azamgarh Distt.—East cum Ballia Distt.—West): That will be very callous.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: That will be an astonishing thing for anybody to do, whatever be the consequences. That obviously cannot be done.

So that, I submit that the broad approach that we have followed is very much on the lines of what several hon. Members have suggested. Apart from mistakes made here and there, we propose to continue to follow that approach.

The hon. Member—I think it was Mr. Rishang Keishing—referred to the agreement which was made by the Naga National Council with Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Bardoloi. Now I do not accept his statement that that agreement has not been honoured. I do not accept that. He re-

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

peatedly said that it has been dishonoured. That agreement came up before the Constituent Assembly, or rather before the Special Committee of the Constituent Assembly. I was not in it. The whole of the Sixth Schedule attached to the Constitution was largely drawn up keeping that in view. It may be that the Sixth Schedule as a whole was not an exact reproduction of the agreement. I was not in that committee. I cannot speak with authority as to what happened there. But the whole object was to give autonomy to those areas and to allow them, or to help them to live according to their own ways.

Now it may be that one may say that the Sixth Schedule as it ultimately emerged did not go far enough, or was not satisfactory enough. I can understand that argument. Let us then consider the Sixth Schedule; let us amend it; or let us do what we like with it. It is up to Parliament to do whatever it likes.

Throughout this period this question has been raised. It has been raised off and on in the last eight or nine years. It is not something sudden that has happened now. As I said, on three occasions I met Mr. Phizo and at least once or maybe twice I have met other Naga leaders, that is to say the colleagues of Mr. Phizo. At least four times, or maybe five times, I have discussed this matter with them and pointed out to them that we are always prepared to consider any constructive proposal for amendment to the provision regarding these areas, but it is no good talking to me about independence. Certainly I have laid stress on that. It is no good talking to me about that. I consider it quite a fantastic idea for that little corner between China and Burma and India—a part of it is in Burma—being called an independent State.

Later it is true that when they wanted to see me certain conditions were attached. One of them was that I am not prepared to discuss inde-

pendence. This was condition No. 1. The second was: you must give up violence. This was before this major violence and other things, when petty acts of violence were taking place. As a rule, I am prepared to meet anybody: does not matter whether we agree or whether we disagree. But I was told that after each interview that I had had, the people went back and stated in those areas that they were going on the road to independence, because they met the Prime Minister. They go over the heads of the local government and local officials and generally try to strengthen their position there by reference to the interview they had with me. Their decision with regard to independence certainly came in my way. If they exploit interviews like that with me, should I encourage them? Even then I told them: I should be glad to meet you provided you make it clear that you do not demand independence. That is the position after I had met them four or five times in various places in various ways. Otherwise, there will be no difficulty in meeting them.

In fact, apart from me, the Governor—and the Governor of Assam, as you know, is our Special Agent, Government of India's Agent in regard to N.E.F.A. and the problems of N.E.F.A. and the problems of Naga Hills, although different, nevertheless, have a certain similarity and so the Governor has been taking great interest in these matters—often met the Naga leaders. He had a meeting with Phizo. The Chief Minister, last year, met him too, more than once I think. So, there has been every attempt on our part to meet them or to try to explain to them or to win them over from violence and all that. I do not mean to say that the Assam Government's policy or our Government's policy or every step that we took was absolutely correct or happy. We made mistakes, naturally. These petty mistakes do occur. But the whole objective before us was to win their minds and hearts and not to

terrify them or frighten them. It is true, as some hon. Member has said some time back about this policy—what is called Assamisation—perhaps it has been injudiciously pursued. But these are relatively minor things in this picture and the whole object was to deal with them directly, to establish conditions there which would lead to their progress and would allow them to lead their own lives without interference.

The one thing I was most anxious about was the establishment of basic schools there by their own people chiefly. As a matter of fact, a number of Naga boys had gone to Sabar-mati to spend some years there and they go back as basic school teachers. We wanted them to establish schools there because I thought it would help them.

The second thing was the community projects. I thought these two things were more suited to that place and the Nagas themselves can work them with a little help from outside. Then there are the major schemes, of course, like communications, schools etc. So, this has been our approach.

I have not referred to the military aspect. There is not very much to refer in it. But I will just say this. Our instructions to our military continue to be what I have just stated—that they must treat it as a human problem; and military cannot deal with a political problem. That is for us and we are prepared to deal with it and we do consider it as a political problem and a human problem, much less a military problem.

Then, some hon. Members referred to general amnesty. Yes, certainly there is the amnesty. There is a proclamation of amnesty. I do not understand this demand for general amnesty which some hon. Member has made. I do not know what he means by saying this should occur simultaneously as if when there is a general amnesty automatically and spontaneously everybody surrenders.

Shri K. K. Basu: We made the offer by saying.....

Shri Kamath: We simultaneously appeal to the Government and to the rebels.

Shri K. K. Basu: We should appeal to them.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Right at the beginning I have said that when amnesty was proclaimed there were some exceptions, exceptions I believe for persons who had committed murder or something. I have forgotten the phraseology: there were some exceptions.....

The Minister of Home Affairs (Pandit G. B. Pant): Heinous offence.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Heinous offences or something. There is still that proposal for amnesty for whoever surrenders. Although the period expires from time to time, we extend it. In fact, there it is. So, there is no difficulty about it. We are not out to punish any individual or any group there. We want them to settle down because it is no pleasure for us to have to deal with this problem and certainly it is no pleasure to see the great majority of the people living there lead abnormal lives, for naturally they are afraid on the one side of Naga hostiles coming and making them pay up or otherwise extorting things from them and afraid on the other side of fighting that takes place roundabout or some accidents happening or their villages burning—all kinds of things happen and nobody likes this kind of thing. The sooner it is ended, the better.

Does any hon. Member expect Government to invite the leaders of the Naga National Council and treat them as the leaders of, well, a different State and have a treaty with them. What exactly is the meaning of that, I do not understand. We are prepared to talk to anybody but not about independence; that is the sole qualification. If they want to come, they can come. But if they do something in the wrong way, instead of discouraging them, should we encourage them? That is what we found in the past and that is our difficulty.

[Shri Jawaharlal Nehru]

It is not a question of prestige. The Government of India's prestige does not come in dealing with the poor countrymen of ours. The Government of India is too big a thing for its prestige to suffer in these small ways.

There is the question of our not taking a step which is misunderstood, misinterpreted and which is criticised by our own colleagues among the Nagas, all those who are co-operating with us. Surely, the House will not expect us to betray all those Nagas who, in spite of difficulties, have co-operated with our officials and our civilians, who have looked to us for help and protection. We wish in the future more and more to bring in this element of co-operation with the Nagas there.

Now, with regard to the political aspect, an hon. Member said that Tuensang Division of the Naga Hill District should be made into a separate political entity. I think he added Tirap frontier tract too. These are political problems which we can very well consider. But we cannot consider them in this particular context because that will require a change in our Constitution, amendment etc. If necessary, we shall change the Constitution and I have no doubt that the House will agree to change it provided the right conditions exist and in this matter, naturally, we have to consult the Assam Government.

We cannot simply brush it aside because the main thing is the well-being of the people who live there. It does not matter whether you have one unit or two units. They should have a feeling that they can lead their own lives and they should have autonomy and they should be proud of being citizens of India.

Now, Mr. Jaipal Singh talked about ~~dividing~~ ^{dividing} division of authority between the civilians and the military there. I do not know how far the present

arrangements there have come in the way of efficient work. It was our desire not to go too far with the army. That led us to send our army in aid of the civilian power. It was easy enough to declare martial law or hand over the whole area to the military, but always we are thinking of not treating this as a purely military problem, the point that has been so much emphasised by hon. Members. So, we sent them in aid of the civil power. That is the present position. But, in effect, of course, the civil power functions in a very narrow way there; maybe in some centres it does, but in a very limited way. Naturally when the armed forces are functioning in the way they do and hostile elements are functioning, the civil power's activities are rather limited, but what the hon. Member Shri Jaipal Singh said is a matter worthy of consideration and we shall certainly consider it. I gather from my colleague the Home Minister that the chief function of the civil authorities there is really relief and rehabilitation. In fact, even the Army of course is doing that, and here I would say that the record of the Army and the civil authorities in regard to the building up of villages and giving relief is fairly creditable. It is an increasingly formidable record of help that they are giving.

Shri Jaipal Singh: The armed forces could do any job a hundred times better than the civil administration, whether it is rehabilitation, building villages or houses or whatever it is. They are much better and more competent to deal with the situation.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: That may be so. Is the hon. Member referring to this relief and rehabilitation or everything?

Shri Jaipal Singh: I am referring to everything in the light that the Naga situation is under discussion, not the whole of India. Anything I say relates to the Naga situation.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am inclined, if I may say so, to agree with the hon. Member that any kind of work of this type is likely to be handled much more efficiently by the Army than by the civil authority.

Shri Jaipal Singh: Hear, hear.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I have no doubt in my mind.

Shri S. S. More: But will they do it in a human manner?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: They will do it and they will do it in a humane manner too. I have no doubt about that and if I may say so, I was surprised to find that even in the field of the law the Court Martials of the Army are much more thorough than some of our civil courts.

Shri S. S. More: Have we suspended the Criminal Procedure Code everywhere?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: My colleague Dr. Katju, who is an eminent lawyer apart from being Defence Minister, tells me that he is surprised to find the high quality of the law in the Army.

Shri S. S. More: Now he has ceased to be a lawyer.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I have no doubt about that particular piece of work but—there is a big 'but' about it—in the short run that is good, in the long run that is not good. In the long run giving these activities to the Army produces certain results which may not be good, but that is not the fault of the Army.

One thing more. A proposal was made to send a parliamentary commission there.

Shri Jaipal Singh: With Shri More as the leader.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I must confess I do not quite understand what a parliamentary commission is going to do and where it is going to go. Wherever the commission goes, we will have to send a battalion round it to protect it, but I hope later a time may come when hon. Members of Parliament may be able to visit these areas.

6-34 P.M.

*The Lok Sabha then adjourned till
Eleven of the Clock on Friday the
24th August, 1956.*