3 P.M.

Then, I come to the ordnance factories. What have our ordnance factories produced? If we turn to page 16 of this report, we find that our ordnance factories have been working in conjunction with the railways, Chittaranjan locomotive workshop, the P. & T. and other private parties. They have been producing shot guns. What I say is that the ordnance factories were meant to supply our armies with necessary equipment. I find that the necessary equipment is not being produced in our ordnance factories. Coming to Bharat Electronics, it is said that one unit out of five has been set going at this time. Perhaps, the other 4 units will be set going after some time. The most distressing thing is about the Hindustan Aircraft Ltd. It is said : on page 19 :

> "On the purely commercial side, HAL will have produced 169 Rail Coaches and 300 Single Decker Buskits by March, 1956."

What I mean to say is this. Here are our ordnance factories, a mighty instrument, very big machines for producing the necessary armaments. But, I cannot understand why we are not able to produce the kind of armaments and the quantity of armaments that we want.

Then, I come to the Armed Forces Information Office. I think the record of the Armed Forces Information Office, as given in this report, is something which does not make me happy. I do not think it will make anybody happy. What is this Armed Forces Information Office? I know that they give some hand-outs to the press. That is very good. We also know something about hand-outs. It is said that one pamphlet is in the press, another pamphlet is being finalised and two pamphlets are under preparation. This is what is happening in this office. Three films are going to be released. Of course, they have a dramatic party also. I do not want that we should depart from the policy of neutralism : I am using it in the best sense of the word which we have adopted. We want to stick to that policy. We want to have a policy of non-alignment, non-involvement, if it can be called like that. We want that. But, I ask, does not neutralism require defence? Have we not to defend our neutralism? Even neutralism requires to be defended. I do not want that our Armed Forces, Air Force and the Navy and Infantry should be geared up to war fever, with all its excitement. But, I say, that we must adopt a policy of dynamic defence.

After reading the report, I find that there are three words which are favourites with this Ministry: (i) gradualism, (ii) under preparation and (iii) going to be finalised. I want to say that the defence of this great country should be dealt with in another way.

I would say that we have to look to the morale of our soldiers. I know, as every Member of the House knows that their morale is of the highest order. They are patriotic. They are all Indians. They are working without feelings of caste and religion. We are proud of our Armed Forces because in this country we are sometimes liable to be swayed by passions of casteism and other things. They can keep their head above water and they are not swayed by such things. I would say, as has also been said by so many friends, that we should give them adequate salary and adequate pensions. I know something has been done here by the Minister of Defence Organisation recently. When they go out on service to places where they cannot take their families, they have to leave their families behind. All these things have to be looked into and they have to be satisfied, because the morale of the army is of the utmost importance. What we need is this. We have first-rate men and first-rate traditions of martial qualities and discipline. Give our soldiers first-rate equipment; give them first-rate training. Our country will have an army which, without fighting with any other country, which, without embarking on any adventure of aggression, will be an army of which the whole world will be proud.

The Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru) : My colleague, the hon. Minister of Defence will, no doubt, deal with the broad issues raised in this debate and with the criticisms and suggestions made. I have intervened to draw the attention of the House to certain broad and basic principles of the line of defence and more especially, the problems that we have to face.

I have noticed in the course of the debate today, a certain anxiety, a certain concern about recent events, amounting almost to an apprehension, a fear lest India might be attacked by our neighbouring country and we might

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not be ready for it. The number of recent border incidents and more especially the fact that a great foreign country is giving military aid has led, no doubt, to this apprehension. It is perfectly true that the situation today in regard to the defence of India has been very much affected by this factor of military aid coming in from a great country and we have to view this situation, therefore, in this new light.

The hon. Member who spoke just before me asked us to give the latest equipment, best training and all that. What exactly does that mean? In nothing, I think, has there been such a rapid, such a great improvement in technology as in defence or in attack in war equipment. Of course, the latest example of that—the final example—is nuclear weapons, atomic bomb or hydrogen bomb. That is the final culmination of this process up till now. If you judge from that, it simply means this, that no country in the world, practically speaking, excepting the two great powers, adequately defended, because only they have enough of these nuclear weapons. One or two others have a little, but comparatively less, and others have not got it at all. How, then, does one judge of this adequacy of defence of a country?

Obviously, if some power which has nuclear weapons at its disposal chose to attack India fully, from the purely military point of view, we have little defence. It may be that from other points of view, we may yet be able to meet this menace of the atomic bomb, because a people that has vitality, that has strength and unity and a people that will not surrender whatever happens can never be defeated. I have often said, therefore, that the real answer to the atomic bomb lies in other spheres. I mention this because in the final analysis what counts is not your soldier of your military weapon, but the spirit of unity of the people, the will of the people to survive in spite of every difficulty and every menace, and it is well that we should remember that when we are considering other problems, whether it is States reorganisation or any other problem. When we quarrel about petty matters, when some of us come into conflict with some others, it is well to remember some of these basic propositions, to remember the kind of world we are living in today. It is a dangerous world. It is a world full of menace. It is a world which may well trip us up and push us down if we are not careful, if we are not vigilant, if we are not as prepared as we can well be. That is the background.

If I am confident about India, that confidence depends more on the spirit and unity of our people than on other factors. If that is weak, for me it just does not matter how many tanks you may put in somewhere, or how many aircraft. But, let us consider this matter from another point of view.

As I said, technology has developed so rapidly that if, unfortunately, there is a great war in the future, probably every book that has been written in the past about warfare, every weapon that was used during the last war and previously would be out of date. Judged from that point of view, we in India and nearly all the countries of the world excepting very, very few are completely out of date and there is no help for it in the present. We may gradually go forward. What is the equation of defence? In what lies the strength of a people for defence? Well, one thinks immediately about defence forces, army, navy, air force. Perfectly right. They are the spear points of defence. They have to bear the brunt of any attack. How do they exist?—the Army and Navy. What are they based on? The more technical you get, as armies and navies and air forces are getting, the base is the industrial and technological development of the country. You may import a machine or an aircraft or some other highly technical weapon and you may even teach somebody to use it, but that is a very superficial type of defence because you have not got the technological background for it. If spare parts go wrong, your whole machine is useless. If you cannot get it, if somebody from whom you bought it refuses to supply a part of it, it becomes useless, so that in spite of your independence you become dependent on others, and very greatly so, and that is what is happening today. From that point of view probably there are very few countries in the wide world that are really independent—that is to say from the point of view of being able to stand on their own feet against the military strength of others or from the point of view of technological advance. Therefore, apart from the Army, Navy, etc., that you may have, you want an industrial and technological background in

the country. Next comes, to support all this, the economy of the country. Because if the country's economy is not sound if the country, in fact, is not a relatively prosperous country so far its economy and people are concerned. It is a weak country. I can give many example to this House of countries which for the moment may have a good army as an army but it really is a superficial strength that they have because the army depends on outside factors, outside machines, outside economy, outside help, and therefore essentially it is a dependent country from that point of view, though it may be called independent. Then lastly, or fourthly, you depend on the spirit of the people. So, the equation of defence is your defence forces plus your industrial and technological background—I am not talking of equipment produced from abroad but the background which produces the equipment; thirdly, the economy of the country, and fourthly the spirit of the people.

Looking at the countries of the world, there are only two at the present moment which may be termed to be, from the military point of view, absolutely in the front rank. There are many other countries in between. Where do we come into the picture? Here we are relatively backward technologically and industrially, and yet, except for one country, except for Japan, probably more industrialised at the present moment than any country in Asia. I am leaving out the Soviet territories, and even in regard to China which is making great progress, I think it may well be said that at the present moment we are somewhat in advance in some ways, not in all ways, industrially considered. Certainly not in a military way. They have a huge army. We have a relatively small army. But I am talking about industrial development, not of other matters. We are, therefore, of the so-called under-developed countries, relatively more advanced in some matters. Take atomic energy. Probably we are in the first half a dozen countries of the world or somewhere near that—I do not exactly know; it is difficult to say. We are certainly leaving out the first three or four. We are in the next rank. These things are basic for laying the foundation of future strength and growth.

An hon. Member, I am told, said here: "What is the good of your Five-Year Plans? You must concentrate on defence." That is a grave statement to make. But the Five-Year Plan is the defence plan of the country. What else is it? Because, defence does not consist of people going about marching up and down the road with guns and other weapons. Defence consists today in a country which is industrially prepared for defence, which can produce the goods, the equipment. Otherwise, you simply depend upon other countries, buy some goods which goods become totally useless to you if some little bit, a little spare part is lacking and you cannot get it.

Therefore, the right approach to defence is—well, one obvious approach, of course, is friendly relations with other countries, to avoid having unfriendly relations which might lead to conflict. And therefore, some hon. Members in this House, not many, who talk in rather aggressive terms of neighbouring countries and want to take brave action sword in hand, serve no cause—certainly not the cause of this country apart from any larger cause of the world. It is one thing for us to be perfectly prepared, or prepared in so far as we can be for defence if somebody attacks, because, whatever our policy may be, however peaceful our policy may be, no one can take—no responsible Government can take—the risk of an emergency arising which it cannot face. That is true. But any kind of blustering attitude is neither becoming to a dignified nation, nor is it safe, nor is it appreciated by anybody in the world. It is a sign of weakness, not strength. Therefore, we must cultivate friendly relations, and we must cultivate and spread the feeling that no subject, no quarrel, is big enough for war to be required to settle it, or, to put it differently, that war today is and ought to be out of the question. Of course, by our saying it, we do not make war out of the question, because the other party may not look that way.

But what I mean is that all these national questions are rather tied up with international issues. If internationally it becomes more and more difficult for war to take place, well, the national question is affected by it. That is the broad approach. And it is our broad approach, therefore, in foreign policy or in defence policy—and the two are intimately allied—to have friendly relations with every country.

Then, we come to the second item, and that is that the real strength of the

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country develops by industrial development, by the capacity to make, if you like, weapons of war, whether it is for the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. That means general industrial development. And you cannot develop just a particular isolated industry without a background of industrial development. You cannot say, well, we shall have, let us say, a factory producing tanks without any other industrial development of the country, or a factory producing aircraft, because you require a large background of technically trained people. It is only then that that can take place. Therefore, our immediate object should be, both from the point of view of economic development and that of defence, to build up industry, and to build up heavy industry, which produces machines.

Now, it does not matter how keen you are, and how hard you work. That takes time. It may be, and the criticism may be justified, if you like that we ought to have started thinking in these terms even earlier. But the point is here we are today, and we are trying to think in these terms of building up heavy industry, iron and steel, machine-making, plant, or exploiting and producing oil.

Take this business of oil. Most of your machines will simply become completely useless without oil to run them. If oil is stopped, if we have not got enough oil in this country, well, there you are, you put your big machines, and tie them up, because there is nothing to move them about.

These are the factors. People seem to consider that defence is just training a man to walk up and down in a step with a gun in his hand. That is a very out-of-date conception of it.

Now, we come up against a grave difficulty. Let us admit for the moment that we are proceeding along right lines—we may speed up the process—those right lines being the industrialisation of the country, which is good from the economic point of view as well as from the defence. But industrialisation takes some time.

All the time, we have to think of two aspects. One is that the speed of industrialisation means a burden that we have to carry, the people have to carry, all of us. How far can we carry the burden? Either we slow down the speed or we increase the burden. That is one aspect of the problem which applies to all our Five Year Plans and the rest.

The other aspect is that it is all very well that you are going along the right lines you may be ready for this, let us say, ten years later. But what happens in between the ten years? You may be knocked down in the course of the ten years. And all your saying that 'We are not ready for an attack' will not prevent an enemy from attacking you, and waiting till you are ready for it. That is obvious. That is the difficult problem that every country has to face, to balance immediate danger with considerations of better security later on.

If you think too much in terms of immediate danger and concentrate on that, the result is that you are never getting strong enough tomorrow and the day after, because your resources are being spent not in productive ways, not in the growth of real strength, but in temporary strength which you borrow from others, which you buy from others. You get a machine from outside, or something. You get it, you use it, it does give you some temporary assurance, although it is not very great. But as I told you, if some part goes wrong, or somebody fails to supply you, there again you are helpless. That is the real difficulty.

And this difficulty has become even more real for us because of these recent developments, more especially the military aid that has come in fairly considerable quantity to our neighbour country. I do not myself think that there is any marked likelihood of war. In fact, I would very much doubt if any such war is at all likely to take place. And I am trying to think objectively, not merely because I wish it so, because one has to take a realistic view of these matters. Nevertheless, having said so, one cannot ignore the possibility of some emergency arising. And we are put in a very great difficulty. And I want to take the House into confidence.

[MR. SPEAKER *in the Chair*]

The difficulty is this, that if we lay too much stress on present-day assurance, which ultimately means the purchase of big machines of various types from abroad in adequate quantity, well, we undermine the economic progress that we envisage. It is a terrible problem for us to face, and for this House to face.

It is quite easy for some hon. Member to say, push away your Five Year Plan and do this. But that is almost a counsel of despair. We cannot sell tomorrow and the day after, because of our fears of today. At the same time, we have to provide for today. That is the problem. I do not pretend to give an answer to this problem here in this House, because it is not a problem—I do not mind—which arises today at this minute; the problem is there in its broad context, which we shall have to face from day to day, month to month. It has been thrust upon us. To a slight extent, the problem is always there with every country. But the problem has been thrust upon us rather forcibly and rather urgently by these developments of pacts and military aid and the rest.

I do not wish the House to think that we are unduly anxious about this problem, but naturally we are a little anxious, and we certainly are not complacent about it. I think we would be anxious undoubtedly, if we did not have the feeling of the spirit of the country, the unity of the country, and the assurance that, whatever our petty views might be in many fields, over these large questions there can be no difference, and we all have to pull together.

So this, in the final analysis, is the major problem: how far to ensure safety today we are to sacrifice and delay tomorrow's developments? This House will be considering sometime later during this session the Second Five Year Plan. In considering that, it will have to bear in mind this particular problem because if the advice of some hon. Members is adopted in regard to our defence, we shall have to throw overboard the Second Five Year Plan, if not completely, a good bit of it. So it is not such an easy matter for us to decide in this way, seeing only one part of the picture and not the other.

It is largely for these reasons—and if they apply to our country, presumably they apply to other countries also—that we have deprecated this business of military pacts and alliances and military aid being given. We would welcome civil aid for development of the country, which really strengthens the country ultimately much more than the other and which has no other implications to other countries concerned. But the way things have developed in Asia and elsewhere has been rather unfortunate and has brought this atmosphere of tension and fear in the train.

I have endeavoured to be perfectly frank to the House because this problem is troubling us, and it is not a problem to be dealt with in a small way here and there; it is a problem which extends itself not to a few days and few months but it goes on. We will have to face it from day to day, for the next year and the year after that. We hope that whatever decisions we arrive at from time to time we shall naturally communicate to this House, because other matters will be affected by those decisions; whether it is the Five Year Plan, whether it is some other scheme of development, they might well be affected. Therefore, we cannot proceed in this business without the fullest understanding, sympathy and support of the House.

Shri Kamath (Hoshangabad): The Prime Minister has made a very illuminating statement of broad principles with which, I am sure, the House is in agreement. He has rightly stressed that today war may become a total war. Since the Second World War and particularly after the atomic blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all war, in this atomic age to which the Prime Minister is fond of referring, tends to become a total war; and defence extends to and embraces the entire nation in every country, with events of war.

I can assure the Prime Minister that though Pakistan is strengthening herself with American guns and Indian butter —because I am referring to the economic aid policy of the Government, Pakistan's balance of payments position; we have given them rice and other things, and we have not insisted upon compensation so many times—the Indian people are neither afraid nor panicky, because they have got calm confidence in the strength of the Army which has faced crisis and trouble in Kashmir and on other fronts. We have to remember also that Pakistan has betrayed the spirit of Bandung in letter and in spirit and there is an alliance, an unholy, if not a criminal alliance—between Pakistan and the Portuguese imperialists in Goa. I have reason to believe that these border incidents, these raids, these skirmishes in the east and in the west and also on the Indo-Goan border are definitely a sign, and an outward symptom