


# THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES

Volume V, 1940

*(19th November to 27th November, 1940)*

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## TWELFTH SESSION OF THE FIFTH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1940



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# Legislative Assembly.

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# LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Tuesday, 19th November, 1940.

The Assembly met in the Assembly Chamber of the Council House at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. President (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim) in the Chair.

## STARRED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

### (a) ORAL ANSWERS.

#### ISSUE OF ONE RUPEE NOTES.

**156. \*Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** (a) Will the Honourable the Finance Member state (i) the value of one rupee note which they have put in circulation, and (ii) the total number of notes they printed till 1st November, 1940?

(b) Are these notes issued by the Government of India or by the Reserve Bank?

(c) If by the former, what is the paper currency reserve behind it?

(d) Where and in what form is the reserve kept?

(e) On what terms are these one rupee notes transferred to the Reserve Bank?

(f) Will Government lay these conditions on the table? If not, why not?

(g) Are Government under obligation to change one rupee note for a metal rupee? If not, why not?

(h) Is there a legal obligation for the holder of the Reserve Bank five-rupee notes to accept five notes of one rupee each?

(i) In case the answer to part (h) be in the affirmative, how does the Honourable Member explain the monetary policy of the Government of India with reference to one rupee notes, five rupee notes and silver coins?

(j) Will Government pay in full one rupee for a note which is defaced to the extent defined in Reserve Bank Act?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (a) (i). Rs. 646 lakhs up to 25th October, 1940.

(a) (ii). It is not the practice to publish information in regard to reserve stocks of currency.

(b), (c), (d), (h) and (i). I invite the Honourable Member's attention to the press communique issued on the subject on the 24th July, 1940, and the replies which I gave to supplementary questions on the 11th.

(e) and (f). These notes are delivered to the Reserve Bank in accordance with the provision contained in sub-section (3) of section 36 of the Reserve Bank of India Act as amended by the Currency Ordinance, 1940, against payment of legal tender value.

(g) No. These notes were issued to supplement the stock of metallic rupees so as to relieve the inconvenience felt by the public, and making them convertible into rupee coins would defeat their object. They are, however, convertible into smaller change.

(j) Government of India, Finance Department Notification No. D/C.-1124-F., dated the 12th August, 1940, lays down the rules under which *ex gratia* refunds are permissible.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I know if the Honourable Member can tell us something about the effect of the Defence of India Rules against the hoarding of rupees, and whether Government have been able to get a large number of rupees de-hoarded by their action?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** The effect of the action was to relieve the immediate pressure, and also there has been a great deal of cessation of hoarding, and the tide may be said to have now turned.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I know, Sir, whether the Honourable Member will make an effort, with regard to the working classes, about whom I complained last week, to distribute to those employers who make a specific application for metal rupees for distribution amongst workmen, at least in those centres where there is some kind of complaint?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Every aspect of the question is constantly before us, and I am making every effort to meet all the difficulties which have arisen.

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai:** May I know, Sir, if these paper notes will be in circulation only during the present emergency or even after the war?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Our present intention is merely to use them during the emergency.

**Mr. T. S. Avinashilingam Chettiar:** May I know the answer to clause (d), because I could not follow it.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I invited attention to the communique which dealt with this point.

**Mr. T. S. Avinashilingam Chettiar:** As we are not aware of the contents of this communique, may I know what is the reserve that has been set apart, and where is it kept?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I stated that it is not the practice to publish information in regard to reserve stocks of currency, but I can say that the reserves are held in India.

**Mr. T. S. Avinashilingam Chettiar:** The Honourable Member is confusing the question. I want an answer to sub-clause (d).

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (d) asks where and in what form is the reserve kept, and it relates to the paper currency reserve behind the rupee note. The point of referring to the communique is that the communique explains the status and character of these notes and shows that it is not necessary to maintain a reserve behind them.

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** The Honourable Member said that these notes are convertible into smaller change, and I take it he means silver change. Do the Government of India undertake the obligation to supply smaller change in adequate quantities or only to a limited extent?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** The Government of India endeavour to maintain enough small change in circulation to enable all reasonable demands for change to be met.

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** I am asking, Sir, about their legal obligation.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Yes, there is a legal obligation; I think I am right in saying that there is a legal obligation to supply small change in return for these, if demanded.

**Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** With reference to part (g) of my question; are Government under obligation to change one rupee notes for metal supees,—I don't mean small change; if not, why not?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** No, Sir, they are not under obligation.

**Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** Why not?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** The answer is that they have not been made convertible, and the reason is this. As I explained the whole object of this note was to relieve a situation of a character which would not have been relieved if these notes were made convertible again into metallic rupees.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I know, Sir, whether the figure given by the Honourable Member includes the amount issued by the Government to the Reserve Bank, or only the amount in the hands of the public?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** The question was the value of one rupee notes which they have put in circulation. That means the amount which has actually been issued.

#### ISSUE OF ONE RUPEE NOTES.

157. **\*Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** (a) Will the Honourable the Finance Member please state whether the one rupee notes were specially prepared for the occasion, or they were prepared on some previous occasion?

(b) Why have Government not put water-mark on these one rupee notes?

(c) Is it not a fact that these notes could be forged comparatively more easily?

(d) Do Government propose to issue a statement for the information of public showing the distinction between real notes and forged ones?

(e) Do Government contemplate to destroy these notes when they come back to the Reserve Bank?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (a) and (b). The attention of the Honourable Member is invited to the press communiqués on the subject issued on the 24th July and the 29th September.

(c) and (d). No forgeries likely to be mistaken for genuine notes have yet been noticed, and the issue of such a statement is not considered necessary at present.

(e) Rupee notes which are torn, defaced or excessively soiled will not be re-issued.

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*Press Communiqué.*

As a result of large withdrawals of rupee coin from circulation in recent months for hoarding, much inconvenience is being felt by the general public owing to the scarcity of a suitable medium of exchange of smaller value than the Reserve Bank note of lowest denomination, namely, rupees five. Requests have been pouring in from all parts of the country to issue notes of smaller denomination, as was done in the last war, and it has been decided to supplement the stock of rupee coin by one rupee notes issued on the authority of the Government of India, and an ordinance has just been issued authorising such issue and providing that such notes will for all purposes be the equivalent of rupee coin. They will be legal tender to exactly the same extent as rupee coin and, not being bank notes or currency notes, can be issued by the Reserve Bank of India in exchange for their bank notes to satisfy a demand for rupee coin.

2 The silver stocks of the Government of India, apart from the coin held by the Reserve Bank of India, are ample. Of these, however, a large amount consists of the proceeds of Queen Victoria coin which has been withdrawn from circulation in the last few years and which would, in the opinion of Government, have to be recoined before being fit for issue. In view of the expansion of war activities, however, there has been an exceptionally large demand for small coin which shows no signs of abatement, and Government consider that priority should be given to supplying such coin which are a necessity to the poorer classes for their day to day transactions and which are not used for hoarding in preference to coining rupees merely to satisfy the selfish instincts of the wealthier hoarder. While every effort is being made by Government to re-mint as quickly as possible rupee coins from the bullion in their possession, the output of the mints is for this reason at present limited and it is necessary to introduce a substitute as a temporary measure.

3. These notes are being printed at the Government of India Security Printing Press, Nasik Road, but as it will take some time before adequate supplies are available, Government propose to make a start by the issue of notes which were prepared to meet a contingency of another nature in 1935, but which proved unnecessary at the time and which have since been held in stock so as to be available if required. These 1935 notes are printed on paper bearing as a watermark the head of His late Majesty King George V, and are  $3\frac{1}{4}$ " by  $2\frac{1}{4}$ " in size. They contain a representation of the rupee coin on both sides and bear the signature of Mr. J. W. Kelly, who was Controller of the Currency in 1935, when they were prepared. The new Nasik notes are exactly similar except that they do not have the same watermark. They are printed on the paper used for Post Office Cash Certificates.

4. Owing to the large number required, the rapidity with which they had to be prepared and the difficulty of obtaining suitable paper in adequate quantity, it has been found necessary to make the rupee notes to be issued initially smaller in size than the rupee notes issued during the last war so as to obtain the maximum number of prints on each sheet, and it is the intention of Government to replace the smaller notes with notes of larger size as soon as possible. The public can co-operate in this if they will limit their use of coin and notes to reasonable monetary purposes and discourage the senseless habit of hoarding. The new notes which will be issued some time later will be  $4$ " by  $2\frac{1}{2}$ " but in other respects similar in design. They will bear the signature of Mr. C. E. Jones, Secretary to the Government of India in the Finance Department.

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*Press Communiqué.*

The fact that the recent issue of one rupee notes bearing the head of His Majesty King George V and the date 1935, was printed on two different kinds of paper, with different watermarks and minor variations in the printing of the numbers, has apparently led to misapprehensions as to the validity of the notes, both of which are now current in India and Burma.

In order to remove these misapprehensions the differences between these notes are here clearly explained:—

The first series bearing the prefix letters A, B, C, and D, has the portrait head of His Majesty King George V, in relief watermark appearing on the left of the note facing right when viewed from the front.



The second series bearing the prefix letter E, and subsequent letters is printed on paper with a watermark consisting of a five pointed star surrounded by the words "Govt. of India". This is an all-over watermark, i.e., it does not appear in any special position with reference to the printing.

The second series is numbered with serial numbers of the same style as those appearing on the Reserve Bank of India notes, whereas the first series includes 3 slightly different styles of numbering, all of which are of a smaller type than that appearing on the second series.

Some notes of the second series have been bound in booklet form between sage green covers, the upper cover bearing in black the Royal Cypher GRI surmounted by the Imperial Crown. Notes detached from these booklets will be found to have a perforated left hand edge.

FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

Simla, the 28th September, 1940.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** Will the Honourable Member tell us the steps he has taken in order to replenish the rupee coins in the hands of the Government.—I want to know whether any arrangements have been made for extra coinage by getting out new plants or in any other way to meet the deficiency of rupee coins?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Yes, Sir, steps are being taken to meet that deficiency.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** Can the Honourable Member give us some information on this point?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I am in a position to state that the mints are working very hard.

**Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** With regard to part (e), may I know if Government contemplate to destroy these notes when they go to the Reserve Bank?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Yes, Sir, that is what I stated, —if they are torn, defaced or excessively soiled, they will not be re-issued.

**Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kasmi:** How long do Government propose to keep these notes in currency, and when do they propose to print new notes of one rupee?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** The issue of newly printed notes depends on the way in which notes which have been issued stand up to the wear and tear. There is a constant supply of new notes going out and old notes being withdrawn and destroyed.

**Mr. Sri Prakasa:** What is the average expectation of the life of such notes?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** That, Sir, is a subject on which it is very difficult to come to a precise conclusion; we have to depend on actual experience.

**TOTAL WEIGHT OF SILVER BULLION AND SILVER COINS IN THE POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT.**

**158. \*Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** (a) Will the Honourable the Finance Member be pleased to state the total weight of (i) silver bullion and (ii) silver coins in the possession of Government on 1st April, 1939 and on 1st November, 1940?

(b) What is the cause of depletion, if any?

(c) Where is the bullion kept, in India or America?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (a) and (b). The attention of the Honourable Member is invited to pages 228-229 of the Central Appropriation Accounts (Civil) 1938-39 which give the stock position on the 31st March, 1939. Copies of this publication were distributed to Honourable Members during the last Budget Session. The figures for the 1st November, 1940, are not available.

(c) Except for a small stock in London the bullion is kept in India.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I know if any attempt has been made to add to the bullion stock of the Government in view of the rush on the silver coin since the war began?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Yes.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** Have Government made considerable purchases in England or in America or where, and may I know if the Honourable Member is in a position to give any information as to the quantity they have so purchased?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** It is definitely not in the public interest to give any detailed information on that point.

**VALUE OF DOLLAR SECURITIES REQUISITIONED BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FROM PRIVATE HOLDERS.**

**159. \*Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad:** Will the Honourable the Finance Member please state the value of the Dollar Securities which the Government of India have requisitioned from private holders?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** The question of requisitioning these securities is still under consideration.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I ask the Honourable Member if he can give us the quantity of such securities in India, and whether the figures which he may give, if he gives any, will include securities held in Indian States?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I am afraid I cannot give him information on the first point. I can say, as regards the second point, that steps have been taken to ensure that as far as possible corresponding action is taken in Indian States.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I know on what basis, when these securities come to be requisitioned, Government propose to pay up the present holders?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** At a price not less than the market value of the securities.

**Mr. K. Santhanam:** May I know if the Honourable Member has considered the desirability of having some dollar securities as assets in the Issue Department of the Reserve Bank of India?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** This is a point which the Honourable Member raised in his speech the other day and which I hope to be able to deal with in the course of my reply.

**Mr. K. Santhanam:** Thank you.

**DIFFERENT SCALES OF PAY FOR OFFICERS OF THE PREVENTIVE SERVICE AT CHITTAGONG AND CALCUTTA.**

**160. \*Shaikh Rafiuddin Ahmad Siddiquee:** (a) Will the Honourable the Finance Member be pleased to state if Government are aware that the pay and scales of the Officers of the Preventive Service at Chittagong and Calcutta are different, although the nature of work, risks of service, and fitness and educational attainments of the Officers of both the Offices are the same?

(b) Will the Honourable Member please state whether Government are aware that the Officer of Chittagong Preventive Service are not allowed any lift to Inspectorship and Apprenticeship, although in Calcutta 50 per cent. of the vacancies in the Appraisers' rank are filled up by promotion from the Preventive Services?

(c) If the answers to parts (a) and (b) be in the affirmative, will the Honourable Member be pleased to state if Government are prepared to remove this distinction?

(d) If the answer to part (b) be in the negative, will the Honourable Member please state the reasons thereof?

(e) If the answers to parts (a) and (b) be in the negative, will the Honourable Member be pleased to state the actual practice in promotion and also the scales of pay for Officers in both the Custom Houses?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (a) The scale of pay for Preventive Officers in Calcutta is slightly higher than in Chittagong; but the responsibilities in Calcutta are greater, the work is more arduous, the cost of living is higher, and recruits are usually better qualified.

(b) Two posts of Inspectors (including the Chief Inspector) are open to Preventive Officers in Chittagong though with a view to improving the efficiency of the Department it has been found necessary to post an officer of the Calcutta Preventive Service as Chief Inspector at Chittagong during the last seven years. There is at present only one post of Appraiser at Chittagong Custom House and as the requisite experience cannot be obtained locally it has been the practice to appoint to the post an Appraiser from Calcutta.

(c) No.

(d) The existing arrangement is considered necessary in the interests of efficiency.

(e) Does not arise.

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai:** May I know if there is a way up for these Preventive Officers in the other Customs Offices also, or that there is only in Calcutta and some in Chittagong?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** As far as I am aware, it is not the practice for these officers to be transferred to any other ports.

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai:** But is there no way up? Have they to die on the pay that they get?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I have already replied to the question of what will happen to the Preventive Officers. I have indicated what posts are open to them.

#### LICENCES FOR PREPARATION OF AYURVEDIC MEDICINES FROM NATURAL FERMENTED INGREDIENTS.

†161. **\*Bhai Parma Nand:** (a) Will the Honourable the Finance Member please state whether it is a fact that no rules have been framed by the Excise Department in Delhi Province for providing licences to private individuals or Ayurvedic firms for preparing Ayurvedic medicine by natural fermented ingredients which very often result in producing more than 20 per cent. alcohol?

(b) Are Government prepare to issue instructions to give licences to *bona fide* Kavirajs for the preparation of Ayurvedic system of medicines?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (a) No rules of the kind mentioned have been framed in the Delhi Province.

(b) Not at present.

#### ISSUE OF INSTRUCTIONS *re* ENTRIES IN "CASTE" COLUMN OF THE CENSUS RETURNS.

†162. **\*Bhai Parma Nand:** (a) Will the Honourable the Home Member be pleased to state whether it is a fact that the conference of the Census Superintendents held at Delhi on the 22nd February, 1940, recommended to the Central Government that the column of caste be retained in the returns of the forthcoming census as heretofore?

(b) Is it also a fact that in response to the representations by the *Jat-Pat Torak Mandal* of Lahore, the Government of India issued a circular sanctioning the entry of 'Nil' or 'No-caste' in the Census Returns of 1931 in the case of those who did not believe in the caste system? If so, are Government prepared to issue similar instructions to the census enumerators this year?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** (a) I would refer the Honourable Member to the Press Note dated the 10th June, 1940, a copy of which is laid on the table of the House.

(b) Yes. Under standing instructions the answer given to the question will be recorded. No further instructions are, therefore, required.

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†Answer to this question laid on the table, the questioner being absent.

*Not to be Broadcast or published before June 14, 1940.*

**PRESS NOTE.**

**THE EIGHTH ALL-INDIA CENSUS WIDER EXAMINATION OF MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD.**

**QUESTIONS FRAMED.**

*Problem of Reproduction Rates.*

A wider examination of the means of livelihood aspect of which examples are partial dependency, labour, contribution by members of the household, unemployment, educated unemployment, seasonal and temporary unemployment, will be included in the Eighth All-India Census, to be conducted under the supervision of Mr. M. W. W. M. Yeatts, Census Commissioner, in the spring of 1941. An attempt will also be made to meet the question of associated employment or organised industry.

In reply to the question dealing with the means of livelihood vague terms such as 'service', 'writing' or 'labour' will be avoided. For example in the case of labour it will be specified whether it is labour in the fields or in a coal mine or jute factory or cotton mill or lac factory or earth work, etc. In the case of agriculture an attempt will be made to distinguish between persons who do not cultivate personally, who cultivate their own land, who cultivate rented land and who are hired labourers. If a person makes the articles he sells he will be entered as "maker or seller" of them.

In past years industrial information was secured by a separate schedule of considerable complexity. For reasons of economy and facility this was given up in 1931 and its place taken by a question bearing on organised industry. The difficulties occasioned by this question, particularly in its way many translated forms weakened the value of the answers received; which, in any case, for reasons of economy were not tabulated. The form of question now put ("If you are employed by some one else, what is his business?") has been chosen so as to ensure the maximum degree of understanding on the part of the enumerator.

The determination of the number of children born to a married woman and her age at birth of first child represents an approach to the important matter of reproduction rates. This determination is of value to any country, particularly to those of stationary or declining population, but also, and perhaps no less so, to those such as India. An attempt was made at the last census to achieve this information by a purely optional enquiry. The only satisfactory way, however, of using the census to help to this end is to secure simple and acceptable questions which can be asked as part of the general census scheme. The questions have been so framed that they will be susceptible of answer by the husband or father. Women will not be cross-questioned at all.

The guiding principle in all the questions is that they are such as will pass the filter of the enumerator's understanding. If he is able to understand the questions he puts then he will be able, or at any rate he will be more likely, to extract a satisfactory and intelligible answer.

The following questions have been framed.

1. Name.
2. Sex.
3. Race, Tribe or Caste.
4. Religion,
5. Married, unmarried, widowed or divorced.
6. Age.
7. Number of children born to a married woman.
8. Her age at birth of first child.
9. Are you wholly or partly dependent on any one else?
10. If so, means of livelihood of person on whom dependent.
11. Do you employ (a) paid assistants (b) members of household? If so, how many?
12. Are you in employment now?
13. (Only to those who reply in the negative to question 12), Are you in search of employment?

To those who reply in the affirmative the further question will be put.—How long have you been in search of it?

14. Means of livelihood in order of importance.

15. (Only to be asked in regard to means of livelihood of a person shown as partly dependent against question 9 or any subsidiary means of livelihood returned by other persons against question 14).

Does this means of livelihood exist throughout the year? If not, for what part of the year?

16. If you are employed by some one else what is his business?

17. Were you born in this district? If not in what district?

18. Mother tongue.

19. Other Indian languages in common use.

20. Can you both read and write? If so, what script do you write? Can you only read?

21. How far have you read? Give any examination passed.

22. Are you literate in English?

HOME DEPARTMENT;

Simla, June, 10, 1940.

#### TENDERS INVITED FOR THE PRINTING OF THE FAUJI AKHBAR.

†163. \*Bhai Parma Nand: With reference to the reply to starred question No. 522, on the 26th March, 1940, will the Defence Secretary kindly state:

- (a) if the cost of printing in Simla is higher than that at Delhi, and whether this fact was disclosed by the rates which were offered by various firms in connection with the tenders for printing of the *Fauji Akhbar*;
- (b) whether the rates offered for the printing of the *Fauji Akhbar* at Simla are being paid for the printing of the paper at Delhi;
- (c) what the cost was per issue and the number of copies printed of the monthly supplement referred to in part (d) of the answer given on the 26th March, 1940;
- (d) if he proposes to invite fresh tenders for the printing of the *Fauji Akhbar* as well as its bi-weekly supplement in Delhi; if not, why not;
- (e) if the supplement is distributed by post under the supervision of the printers and, if so, what check there is to see that they use only one kind of paper and that they print all copies neatly;
- (f) if he is aware that picture blocks in several Indian papers, e.g., *Statesman*, *Hindustan Times*, *Illustrated Weekly*, etc., are printed on paper made in India, yet they are not blurred; and
- (g) what the difficulties are in calling for fresh tenders and what the reasons are for holding that the printing of 99,000 copies of the bi-weekly supplement of the *Fauji Akhbar* is not a new piece of work in view of the reply given to part (a) of the question No. 522 on the 26th March, 1940, to the effect that the printing of the supplement was not contemplated at the time the tenders were asked for for the weekly edition?

†Answer to this question laid on the table, the questioner being absent.

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** (a) It is understood that the cost of printing is slightly higher in Simla than in Delhi. No tenders have recently been called for.

(b) Yes, in view of the general increase in the cost of printing since the outbreak of war.

(c) (i). The cost per issue was approximately Rs. 100.

(ii) Numbers of copies were approximately 11,200 monthly.

(d) No, it is not proposed to invite fresh tenders. Tenders were last called for in 1938, and the printer's work is considered satisfactory and his terms reasonable.

(e) Yes, but the printing and general production are under the constant supervision of the Editor and his staff.

(f) Yes, Government are aware of this fact.

(g) There is no reason to call for fresh tenders as Government are satisfied with the work of the present printer. The printing of the Supplement is not a new piece of work because most of the matter in the Supplement is also included in the *Pauji Akhbar*, and the type-setting, which involves most of the labour of printing, cannot, therefore, be considered as a new piece of work.

#### ALLEGATIONS OF BRIBERY AGAINST THE MANAGER OF THE MEDICAL STORES DEPOT, LAHORE.

†164. **\*Bhai Parma Nand:** (a) Will the Defence Secretary please state if serious allegations of bribery have been made against the Manager of the Medical Store Depot, Lahore Cantonment, by several subordinates of his office?

(b) Were these allegations definite and related to specific matters? If so, did the Department hold any enquiry? If not, why not?

(c) Is it a fact that this particular Manager was transferred to Madras Depot in September, 1937? If so, why was the transfer cancelled?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** (a) and (b). One complaint, which is believed to be pseudonymous was received. Two registered letters were sent to the address given by the sender asking him to substantiate his charges which were in no way specific. These letters were returned undelivered. No further enquiry was, therefore, made.

(c) A transfer to Madras in 1939 was cancelled because a new officer was placed in charge of the Lahore Depot and it was not desirable to make two changes at the same time.

#### REPATRIATION OF MR. L. N. KHANNA'S WIFE AND DAUGHTER FROM SUDETENLAND, GERMANY.

†165. **\*Bhai Parma Nand:** (a) Will the Honourable the Home Member please state if he has received any application from Mr. L. N. Khanna of Bombay for the repatriation of his wife and daughter who are at Goblonz, Sudetenland, Germany? If so, what steps have been taken by Government to get them back to India in exchange for the German ladies repatriated from India?

(b) Will the Honourable Member please state the number of German ladies repatriated from India, since the declaration of war, and the reasons why Mrs. Khanna and her daughter were not repatriated in exchange?

†Answer to this question laid on the table, the questioner being absent.

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** (a) Yes. On receipt of Mr. Khanna's application His Majesty's Government were addressed. They have made every possible effort to effect the repatriation of Mrs. Khanna and her daughter through the good offices of the United States Embassy in Berlin but so far without success.

(b) The number is 89. The Government of India have no information of the reason why Mrs. Khanna and her daughter have not been permitted to leave Germany.

#### ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION ENABLING INSURANCE COMPANIES TO BUY DEFENCE BONDS.

**166. \*Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi:** Has the attention of the Honourable the Finance Member been drawn to a letter which appeared in the *Statesman* of 4th October, 1940, regarding legislation to enable Insurance Companies to buy Defence Bonds? If so, will the Honourable the Finance Member please state whether Government propose to take any action?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** (i) Yes.

(ii) Government do not consider any action necessary. There is nothing at present to prevent Insurance companies investing in Defence Bonds. Government see no advantage in the suggestion. It would mean legislation to permit insurance companies to make fictitious entries in their accounts showing on the one hand a higher interest income than is actually realised and balancing it on the other hand by a corresponding addition to expenditure. Though the net result would be unchanged, it is clearly objectionable to include unreal transactions in the accounts of insurance companies.

#### PUNJABI DETENUS CONFINED IN THE DEOLI DETENTION CAMP.

**167. \*Sardar Mangal Singh:** (a) Will the Honourable the Home Member please state the number of Panjabee detenus now confined in the Deoli detention camp?

(b) How many of them are being treated as "A" class, "B" class and "C" class prisoners?

(c) Has any allowance been granted to them personally, or for their dependants?

(d) Will their cases be examined periodically for releasing them?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** (a) The Government of the Punjab have sent 73 security prisoners to the Deoli Detention Camp.

(b) There are only two classes of security prisoners. 18 of the 73 are in Class I and 60 in Class II.

(c) No allowance has been granted by Government to the persons detained. The question of granting allowances to their dependants in cases of real necessity is one for the Provincial Government to decide.

(d) This is a matter for the Provincial Government.

**Sardar Mangal Singh:** Will the Honourable Member please give us an estimate of the total expenditure in regard to their diet per day?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** I should require notice of that question.



**Mr. Abdul Qaiyum:** Is it a fact that the Provincial Governments invariably refuse to give allowances, because, otherwise, it will cease to have a deterrent effect?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** No.

**Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi:** Are they detained under the orders of the Provincial Government or of the Government of India?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** The prisoners to whom this question relates are detained under the orders of the Provincial Government.

**Mr. K. Santhanam:** May I know if Government have rendered any advice to the Provincial Governments in the matter of giving allowances to these detenus?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** Certain principles have been indicated, namely, those mentioned in answer to part (c) of the question.

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai:** Does the Honourable Member know that these Provincial Governments have been periodically examining for the purpose of releasing or not?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** Not so far as I am aware.

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** May I ask whether the Government of India have made any rules regarding the treatment of detenus, and if so, will they place those rules on the table of the House?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** Certain orders have been passed as regards the treatment of detenus in the charge of the Government of India, *viz.*, those in Deoli. As regards Provincial Governments, they have been following more or less the same rules but they have a certain amount of discretion to meet local requirements.

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** May I ask whether those orders will be made public?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** I will consider that.

**Sardar Sant Singh:** May I know if these detenus are under the provisions of the Defence of India Act or under the provisions of any other Act?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** The prisoners to whom this question relates are detained under the Defence of India Rules.

**Sardar Sant Singh:** May I know if it is a fact or not that the Government of India exercise a vigilant eye over the proceedings that are taken under the Defence of India Rules?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** Yes, to some extent. The Government of India keep themselves generally in touch with action taken under those rules.

**Sardar Sant Singh:** What is the method by which the Government of India keep themselves in touch with the Provincial Governments in the matter of the application of these rules under the Defence of India Act?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** The Provincial Governments report their action periodically.

**Sardar Sant Singh:** Have the Government of India any discretion to overrule the decisions of the Provincial Governments in this matter?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** The Government of India would not ordinarily overrule the discretion of a Provincial Government in matters concerning provincial administration.

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** May I ask whether the Government of India allow the use of the Deoli Camp only for the detenus from the Punjab or from other provinces also?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** The Deoli Camp is used for detenus from other provinces also.

**Sardar Sant Singh:** May I know if there is any case so far in which the Government of India overruled or reviewed even the decision of the Provincial Government in the matter of detention of person under the Defence of India Rules?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** If the Honourable Member means to ask whether the Government of India exercises appellate functions, the answer is "No".

**CONDITION OF HEALTH OF MASTER MOTA SINGH, BABA BASAKHA SINGH AND OTHERS DETAINED IN DEOLI DETENTION CAMP.**

**168. \*Sardar Mangal Singh:** (a) Will the Honourable the Home Member please state the condition of health of Master Mota Singh, Baba Basakha Singh and others, whether they have lost much weight since they arrived in Deoli Camp?

(b) What arrangements have been made for their treatment in the jail?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** (a) The health of the security prisoners is good, and a number have put on weight since their arrival in Deoli.

(b) Adequate medical arrangements have been made inside the Camp for their treatment.

**Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi:** May I know what they are suffering from? Has the Honourable Member any information?

**The Honourable Sir Reginald Maxwell:** I have no information about their individual diseases.

DESIRABILITY OF RECRUITMENT OF INDIANS OF ALL CASTES AND CREEDS TO THE INDIAN ARMY.

169. \*Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh: Will the Defence Secretary please state:

- (a) if the Government of India have declared from time to time since June last that the Indian Army was thrown open to all castes and creeds of Indians and provinces in India;
- (b) if, in spite of such declarations, men were not recruited from Bihar and Bengal till the end of July and the Bengal Provincial Assembly gave expression to their grievances in a resolution passed on 27th July last; whether their complaints have been attended to;
- (c) if the Provincial Governments of these Provinces made any representations to the Government of India for men of their Provinces being enlisted in the regular army; if so, what the reply given to the Governments of these Provinces was;
- (d) if the Maratha Brahmins in Central Provinces and Berar were selected either for emergency commissions, or as privates in the regular Indian Army till very nearly the middle of August last after the first declaration of the army having been thrown open to all castes and creeds was made; whether Government are aware that the recruiting officers in the Central Provinces and Berar openly said that their instructions were not to enlist the Maratha Brahmins; whether such instructions were issued by Government; and
- (e) whether there is any direct recruitment of Indians to an Indian Field Artillery regiment, and if Marathas and Maratha Brahmins are directly admitted to it; if any or both of them are not so admitted, what are the grounds for not doing so?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** (a) No. There has never been any need for any such declaration. No bar exists to Government recruiting any class or creed. Those classes actually recruited are those which experience has shown to provide the best bulk supply of military material, and as the army expands the number of those classes is increased.

(b) It is true that the Bengal Provincial Assembly passed a resolution on the subject. Recruitment from Bihar was carried out to some small extent before the war and recruits are now being taken in increasing numbers from that Province. Recruitment from Bengal was started by the end of May and in both Provinces the Indian Territorial Force has been substantially increased, and in both battalions have been embodied.

(c) There has been some correspondence with the Provincial Governments of Bengal and Bihar on the subject of recruitment and those Governments are aware that their wishes are being met to the fullest extent which is practicable at present.

(d) Emergency commissions have always been open to Mahratta Brahmins, but none qualified before August, 1940. They were not recruited to the ranks until early September.

(e) Yes, there is direct recruitment of Indians to the Indian Field Artillery. Mahrattas are being taken into the Indian Artillery, but not Mahratta Brahmins up to the present.

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai:** May I know from the Honourable Member if there is restriction against the people of any province and especially if there is any restriction against Sind, and whether people are being taken from Sind or not?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** There is no restriction whatever against Sind. If the Government decided to raise a regiment, division, or army corps, from Sind, there is nothing to stop it from doing so. As to the numbers which have actually been taken, I refer the Honourable Member to the statement I laid on the table on the 7th November last.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** With reference to part (e) of the question, the Honourable Member said that Mahratta Brahmins are not being recruited. May I know whether there is any restriction on the recruitment of Mahratta Brahmins to the Indian Field Artillery?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** None whatever. They do not happen to be recruited at present into that arm of the service but I cannot say what may happen later.

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai:** May I know when new recruitment has taken place, whether people from Sind have been taken?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** I have already answered the Honourable Member's question.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** What was exactly the nature of the complaints made by the Bengal Government and to what extent and how they have been removed?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** I cannot say that the Bengal Government made complaints. The Bengal Government is most anxious that its province should give any possible assistance in the prosecution of the war.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Was there any complaint from the Bengal Government as well as from the Government of Bihar as regards restrictions so far as recruitment in their provinces was concerned?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** Both provinces are very anxious indeed for more recruitment.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Will the Honourable Member place the correspondence on the table?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** I cannot place the correspondence on the table, but I can inform the Honourable Member that the Provincial Governments were most anxious for the increase of recruitment in their province.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Are persons other than Mahratta Brahmins directly recruited to the Field Artillery?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** Yes.

#### QUOTAS OF CANDIDATES FOR EMERGENCY COMMISSIONS AND AS PRIVATES FOR THE ARMY FIXED FOR DIFFERENT PROVINCES.

170. \***Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Will the Defence Secretary please state:

- (a) if any quotas of candidates for emergency commissions for the army and privates for the regular army are fixed for different

provinces; if so, on what principles; how many have been selected for commissions and recruited as privates from each Province; and

- (b) the number of persons from the Central Provinces and Berar selected for emergency commissions and as privates for the regular army since August last; of these, how many are Hindus, Marathas and Maratha Brahmins?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** (a) No quotas of recruits for the regular army are fixed for the various Provinces. Quotas of candidates for emergency commissions are fixed according to military districts and not Provinces. The basis on which quotas for military districts are allotted are (1) the population of the district and (2) the number of *prima facie* suitable candidates who have registered their names. With regard to the numbers who have been selected for emergency commissions and who have been enlisted in the regular army from each Province, I refer the Honourable Member to the answer given to starred question No. 18 on the 7th November.

(b) On the assumption that the Honourable Member means August of this year, nine persons have been selected for commissions of whom five were Hindus, three of these being Mahratta Brahmins. During this period 397 were enlisted of whom 387 were Hindus, 114 were Mahrattas other than Brahmins and 45 were Mahratta Brahmins.

**Dr. F. X. DeSouza:** Is it a fact that when the Indian Christians presented themselves for interview for emergency Commissions, the Sergeant called upon them, if they were of a dark complexion, to prove on the spot that they were Anglo-Indians and not Indian Christians; and if they failed, they were promptly sent away?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** The happening of anything of the kind is most unlikely, but I cannot see how it arises from this question.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** May I know if a large number of selected men, after their preliminary selections and after their medical examination, are kept waiting for months by the military authorities before they are finally taken?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** It is not correct. They are never kept waiting at all by the military authorities. They may be kept waiting owing to the lack of vacancies at the moment.

**Mr. Manu Subedar:** Is that not due to the fact that there are quotas and restrictions based on communal and other considerations in the army?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** No. The quotas have nothing to do with communal considerations. They do not enter into the matter in the slightest possible degree.

#### SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR EMERGENCY COMMISSIONS AND AS PRIVATES FOR THE ARMY.

171. \***Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Will the Defence Secretary please state whether Government are prepared to consider the proposal of associating with the authorities concerned a member, or members, of the Provincial War Committees in different Provinces at the time of selection of

candidates for emergency commissions and as privates for the regular army at the recruiting centres in the Provinces? If not, why not?

**Mr. C. M. G. Oglvie:** As regards emergency Commissions, Provincial Governments have been asked to co-operate in the work of preliminary selection. There is no need to ask for further assistance as regards other ranks.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Will not the work be easy if honorary officers are asked to assist in the recruitment of privates?

**Mr. C. M. G. Oglvie:** There is no need to ask them to assist any more than they do already. The system of honorary recruiting officers has been found in practice to bring the non-official element closely into touch with the recruiting machine and to give excellent results.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Is it not suitable and advisable to associate the honorary members with the stipendiary recruiting officers.

**Mr. C. M. G. Oglvie:** The honorary recruiting officers are there and they are doing excellent work.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** What about the stipendiary recruiting officers.

**Mr. C. M. G. Oglvie:** They are doing excellent work also.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Do the honorary officers co-operate?

**Mr. C. M. G. Oglvie:** I am quite sure, they do co-operate.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Next question.

#### KNOWLEDGE OF HINDI AND ABILITY TO WRITE IT IN URDU OR ROMAN SCRIPT FOR RECRUITMENT TO INDIAN ARMY.

172. **\*Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** (a) Will the Defence Secretary please state if it is a necessary condition of qualification for a recruit to the Indian Navy that he must be able to know Hindi and be able to write it in either Urdu or Roman script?

(b) Are Government aware that such a condition will disqualify persons of the Bombay Presidency who have naval traditions since centuries from being recruited to the Indian Navy?

(c) Are Government prepared to add at least 'Deva Nagari' to the above condition as one of the characters alternative to Urdu or Roman scripts in which Hindi could be written?

**Mr. C. M. G. Oglvie:** (a) A recruit for the Royal Indian Navy must know Hindustani and be able to write it either in Urdu or Roman characters.

(b) No. As the boys taken know a certain amount of English they are in all cases familiar with the Roman script.

(c) Government find it impracticable to give instruction on Naval subjects in more than two scripts, namely, Urdu or Roman.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** I have not had a definite answer to part (b) of my question. Will the Honourable Member read it out again?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** I said, "No. As the boys taken know a certain amount of English, they are in all cases familiar with the Roman script."

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** Is the Urdu script the script of the majority of the population in this country?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** No, Sir, I do not suppose it is, but it is generally widely known in all the Provinces and a variation can be made from it by substituting Roman for those who do not know it.

**Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Is the Honourable Member aware that in Western India, that means the Bombay Presidency, Urdu is neither their mother tongue, nor are the characters natural to them as they learn Devanagri and speak Marathi whether they be Muslims or Hindus?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** As I explained, the difficulty has not in practice arisen. The boys who are taken are either capable of writing in Roman or in Urdu. They can choose which they like.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Next question.

EXPANSION OF THE 10TH (NAGPUR) BATTALION, UNIVERSITY TRAINING CORPS.

173. \***Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh:** Will the Defence Secretary please state:

- (a) if the Central Provinces and Berar Government had issued a press note either in July or August last, to notify the decision of the Government of India to permit expansion of the 10th (Nagpur) Battalion, University Training Corps; whether this expansion was sanctioned by the Government of India and, if so, whether it was on the distinct understanding that the unit was to carry out its training without any increase to the present authorised instructional staff and without the issue of additional arms and equipment; whether this expansion has been carried out; if not, why not; whether Government will explain how this can be done with the restrictions imposed and referred to above;
- (b) if expansions of the Battalions of other Indian University Training Corps were sanctioned on the same conditions; if so, which those Universities are and what the results achieved by these Universities are; and
- (c) if Government are prepared to raise the University Training Corps of all or any of the Universities in India to the status of the O. T. C. at British Universities and to enlarge the scope of the University Training Corps so as to include all arms of modern defence forces?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie:** (a), (b) and (c). A statement is laid on the table:

*Statement.*

(a) Towards the end of June 1940, the Government of India sanctioned a 50 per cent. increase in the existing establishments of all University Training Corps, which included the 10th (Nagpur) Battalion, University Training Corps. A copy of the Government of India order was sent to local Governments concerned and it is possible that the Government of the Central Provinces and Berar may have issued a Press note on the subject. This increase in establishments was sanctioned on the distinct understanding that the units should carry out their training without any increase in the present authorised instructional staff and without the issue of additional arms and equipment. This unit has expanded beyond the previously authorised establishment. Extra instructional staff and equipment are not essential to enable a unit to be expanded, as additional parades can be held and training carried out with the same staff and equipment.

(b) Yes, the orders mentioned in answer to the first part of the question applied to all Indian University Training Corps. The authorised establishment of other ranks in the University Training Corps and the actuals on 1st October 1940, are as follows:—

Units.	Establishment of other ranks.	Actuals of other ranks.
1st (Bombay) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	955	624
2nd (Calcutta) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	956	439
3rd (United Provinces) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	956	866
4th (Lahore) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	956	460
5th (Madras) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	956	846
7th (Patna) Company, U. T. C. . . . .	239	158
9th (Delhi) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	477	152
10th (Nagpur) Battalion, U. T. C. . . . .	477	395
11th (Karachi) Company, U. T. C. . . . .	239	239
12th (Dacca) Company, U. T. C. . . . .	114	111

(c) Government are not at present prepared to alter the course of training prescribed for University Training Corps, which, as in England, is intended to provide the essential ground work of military training, which must precede any training in more specialised branches. In any case it is not possible to divert mechanized equipment and instructional staff which are required for the needs of the fighting forces to units which are not liable for military service.

MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT.

ALLEGED OCCUPATION OF THE MUSLIM *Idgah* AT BURHANPUR BY THE MILITARY.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): With regard to the motion for adjournment by the Honourable Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to discuss an urgent matter of public importance, *viz.*, "forcible occupation by the Military of the Muslim *Idgah* of Burhanpur in the Central Provinces", I understand that the Governor General, while reserving discretion to exercise his powers of disallowance in respect of this motion, does



not consider his affirmative consent to be required to the moving of the same. When did this forcible occupation by the military take place?

**Maulana Zafar Ali Khan** (East Central Punjab: Muhammadan): On the 15th. I will read out the telegram which I received the day before yesterday . . . .

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Is there any objection?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie** (Defence Secretary): Yes, Sir. I have also received the telegram, which Maulana Zafar Ali Khan is alluding to, myself. Inquiries were at once issued and an answer has since been received which says that the Idgah was not occupied by troops. The troops, on the other hand, were assigned by the local civil authorities a site, which they duly occupied. This site was in proximity to the Idgah, but did not impinge upon it in any way.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Does that satisfy the Honourable Member?

**Maulana Zafar Ali Khan**: Sir, I should like to place before the House . . . .

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): No, no. The Defence Secretary says that the Idgah has not, as a matter of fact, been occupied.

**Maulana Zafar Ali Khan**: Sir, unless a commission of inquiry has been appointed, how can we say? Here is a definite statement from responsible quarters, and this statement is:

“Military allowed to violate sanctity of *Idgah*, pitch tents inside and march past round city, playing music before mosque while Muslims offering evening prayers.”

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): That is a very different matter. The motion only refers to the occupation of the Idgah.

**Maulana Zafar Ali Khan**: Were tents pitched or not within the precincts of the Idgah?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie**: No.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): The Government Member denies the correctness of the facts stated in the motion, and I have to accept the Government Member's statement unless there is any proof to the contrary. I, therefore, disallow the motion.

**Maulana Zafar Ali Khan**: I should like to ask the Honourable the Defence Secretary whether in case of these allegations being true, any action would be taken?

**Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie**: Most certainly, Sir.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): The House will now resume consideration of the following motion moved by the Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman: ●

"That the Bill to alter the maximum rates of postage under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, to increase the rates of the taxes on income imposed by the Indian Finance Act, 1940, by a surcharge for the purposes of the Central Government, and to increase the rate of super-tax payable by companies, be taken into consideration."

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney** (Nominated Non-Official): Mr. President, Sir, when the House rose yesterday I was referring to the abundance of fine specimens of manhood in India who are thirsting to help England, but cannot do so as they cannot be adequately equipped. The Congress, in stating that it represents India which it certainly does not, says that the people are not with Government in this war, that we can, with our money, buy our soldiers to fight for us, and one Member, I believe it was Mr. Gadgil, castigated the Government for engaging what he called hirelings, namely, the Gurkhas. Sir, such reflections are not only hurtful but insulting to at least two great fighting communities in India who have been singled out for castigation and dubbed as mercenary soldiers. I am sure the House joins me in flinging back this insult into the face of that Member who indulged in those tactics for the purpose of deceiving the world and particularly the enemy countries. They know what they and India owe to the gallantry of the Sikhs and the Gurkhas and it is very wrong to call them mercenary soldiers. Why belittle the soldiers of your own country when one day, when you administer this country, you will have to use them in your own defence? These men are not mercenary soldiers. Sir, we know that martial India, call it Punjab India if you like, is wholeheartedly with the Government to support England in this war and this is no mercenary help. But we want the whole of India to be with us, and that is why I appealed to the Congress in the earlier part of my speech.

**Dr. P. N. Banerjea** (Calcutta Suburbs: Non-Muhammadan Urban): Hear, hear.

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney**: I am so glad to hear my friend, Dr. Banerjea, say, "Hear, hear", and I do hope he will come with us into the lobby.

**Dr. P. N. Banerjea**: Yes, when the proper conditions come.

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney**: In this connection, Sir, I could not understand my Honourable friend whom I have sanctified in this House from Sardar to Guru Sant Singh. He seemed rather unintelligible when in one breath he demanded the resignation of the present Government at once, and its substitution by Indians. I have no doubt at all that this has got to come one day, but Guru Sant Singh, (who I believe is or was an aspirant for the expanded Viceroy's Council) in the next breath said he, as a Sikh, admitted that, as a community and in the interests of discipline, the Sikhs must fight to win this war. Now what on earth did he mean? Yesterday his Irish bull was when he said to the Government Benches: "wait till your eyes are opened and then you will be able to hear us". Holding these views I hope to see him in the "Yes" lobby with his Party.

**Sardar Sant Singh** (West Punjab: Sikh): But this Government must go: they are unimaginative.

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney:** I quite agree with you, they are unimaginative. Today, I submit, Indians, in common with other countries in this world should have had a well-equipped and modern army. I will go as far as to say that we should have a modern army of about two millions. This we would have possessed had the Government, I mean, the predecessors of the present Government, I do not mean the present Government, shown the political sagacity and the foresight needed some years ago when Germany and Italy were arming themselves to the teeth, or even when war was started 15 months ago. Sir, I know that in the present Defence Department and we have had evidence of it today. We have our friend, Mr. Ogilvie, who is over-anxious that all parts of India should participate in the new defences of India, and it is idle for any one community to complain that they are not allowed to take part in the army. I know that Mr. Ogilvie is a man who is very alive to this matter; he is more than prepared to satisfy the communal needs of India. If there is one friend of India anxious to protect her defences, it is our friend who sits there representing the army, the Defence Secretary, Mr. Ogilvie, and may I add, he is entirely excluded from any castigation or criticisms I have made on the predecessors of this Government. Had the Government erected our own factories, we could have equipped not only our own army but a greater part of the British army. And what is more, the situation in Egypt, in the Far East and in the Middle East would not have been so precarious as it is today. We would have made the Italians run, a pastime in which they seem to have specialised on battle fields. Instead, we have a loyal India but a powerless India playing a spectatorial part, on the waiting list, as it were, and not an active part: looking on while our comrades in England are being murdered in thousands by the brutal German Air force. I know the Government reply will be: "We have to obey the Higher Command. We have no money and where are we to get it from? When we raise our defence estimates, this House, particularly the opposite Benches, demand us to reduce it." But why don't the Government demand from this House money to increase and improve our war defences? Let them try this for the Indian Army and I am sure every Member of this House will support such a proposal. The day has come when India, in common with all other countries, must adequately defend herself, as we have our enemies too near our borders to remain powerless as we are today. I repeat, Sir, if we had our own steamers, our own Navy and our own Air Force, there would have been no need for England to attenuate her already strained forces in England to prop up Egypt, Greece and others in the Mid East or in the Far East where we have had to suffer those indignities in the past from Japan. India would have done it and done it as well. I am not saying this, as I said just now, as an indictment on the present Government, but on those who preceded them and who showed a clear absence of political foresight and sagacity. I shall not prolong this agony for it affords me, an ultra loyalist, no pleasure. On the contrary, I look on the past shortcomings of the Government with pain and shame—*pain* on account of the unequal struggle England is today forced to fight in her homelands, and *shame* because we have not been considered fit to join the forces till the time came when sheer necessity forced you to admit your errors. It is to pay for these unfortunate errors of the past that we are now called

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upon to foot additional money for the long delayed defences of India. I shall willingly consent to this payment because it is essential for victory and for our protection. My second reason for indulging in this diatribe against the Government is not because "I told you so", as my friend, Mr. Asaf Ali, said, for I also have told the Government so. In the year 1924, I go back longer than any Members in this House except my friend, Mr. Joshi, I told the Government not to ask India to pay for its Frontier defences, for it being an Imperial defence the expenditure on it should be shared by the Government of Great Britain. In 1936 also 1938-39 and even in last April I called upon the Government to improve our air and our naval forces. But Government turned a deaf ear to these appeals. Even the Aeronautical Training Centre in Delhi has gone bankrupt for want of help from Government and I hear Government have bought it at a very cheap rate. I have criticised Government in the hope that it will never be repeated; that the Government will realise, if they trust India as they must, India will respond in a thousand-fold measure. I also hope that out of this chaos, this monsoonic fight against time, this defence against an emergent situation, this drain on our finances, a new order will be born, an order like the one which is being developed today in England, the upliftment of the underdog, when Peer and Commoner, sleeping under the shelters of the bowels of the earth, are being drawn nearer to each other and understanding each other better, and are together destroying those hidebound social compartments which have been the curse of England and which, with impunity, have been practised on the underdog in India and have all but ruined India and alienated much help and sympathy from the Government.

Sir, I hope when the dark war clouds disappear and the trumpet call of victory is sounded, as assuredly it will be, we shall see that rainbow—a rainbow symbolic of the new order for India, a rainbow, if I may liken it to one of human pigment, the various shades of colour, which, as they run in contiguity one with the other, from its ultra red to its ultra violet ends, each one representing the varying shades of colour of the different nations of Dominions forming the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as these colours are indivisible one from the other and are equally important to form the component whole, so do I hope that each Dominion of the British Commonwealth will be treated as co-equals and not with the brand of inferiority or feelings of mistrust which we have experienced for some time past. That is the new order I envisage and which I feel sure every one in this Honourable House is keenly desirous of seeing as an illuminant, a meteor, guiding the future re-assembled and re-constructed India with all communities on an equality of status and treatment, marching hand in hand to the promised land—that *Nirvana*, a brighter, a nobler and a happier India and forming, if possible, a more radiant jewel than she is today in the Crown of our beloved King who is both King and Emperor of that Commonwealth whom we are so desirous of serving.

Before I sit down, Sir, I submit that as this war is likely to be a long one, and irrespective of what it costs us, India must at once be made an effective base. To do this we must be able to produce our own motor engines for all purposes, to build aircraft, to make our own cannons and anti-aircraft weapons, our tanks and last, but not least, to build our own ocean-going ships. These are absolute fundamentals and urgently necessary. Today there is only one country in the world which holds the key

to these requirements and that country is Britain. America is too occupied in her own defences to help India, while Australia, Canada and South Africa are manufacturing their own war needs and helping England. In the name of India and of this Honourable House, I respectfully call upon Great Britain, still the unconquered nation of the world, to give immediate attention to this vital necessity and not to expend all her resources on factories which in England are built and working today only to be blown to smithereens tomorrow by the German air force. Some of her factories must at once be moved wholesale to India as models where there is more safety from bombs and where there is a large reserve of recruits and cheaper labour as also materials. This is possible today with the seas open to us. Tomorrow may be too late.

Sir, may I, in all humility, make an humble appeal to my Muslim friends. My Honourable friend, Mr. Jinnah, the well-known leader of the Muslim League will still remember the telegram I sent to him a few months ago that I was with him to the last ditch. I am still prepared to be with him to the last ditch. But is he with me to the last ditch? This is a serious occasion in the solemnity of which I find myself bankrupt in words with which adequately to express myself. The 90 millions Muslims in the words of my Honourable friend, Sir Syed Raza Ali, who have never refused to co-operate with the Government are, as in the past, destined to play a great and abiding part in the destiny of India. Remember what is before us. Remember the important issue that is before this House today. The whole world is looking upon the result of today's decision and remember what is expected from such an important and loyal group like the Muslim community today. You are called upon to execute by your vote a sacred duty. As one who is prepared to stand with you to the last ditch—I am not going to teach you what your duties are, I am incapable of doing it—I appeal to my Muslim friends to realise that sacred duty, a duty which can be fulfilled only by voting and not by remaining neutral. Sir, if it is their intention to remain neutral, I shall regret such a decision. If so, my Honourable friend, Mr. Jinnah, will tell the House why the Muslim League prefers to remain neutral. I am not here to discuss that, nor am I here to argue with him. He knows his own business. But I appeal to him, the accredited leader of the Muslims, one of the most brilliant Muslims India has ever had, to realise that on their shoulders lie a great and serious duty and the whole world is looking to them either to support the Government or, by their neutrality to allow the Opposition to win. The Muslims know who are against them. They also know that England has never forsaken the cause of Muslims. Thousands of Muslims are today fighting on the battlefield in Europe—they represent a great community which has never non-co-operated with England and whose loyalty still remains unstained. They realise the motives underlying the forces that are operating today to defeat this Bill. It is no use saying that by not voting they will not help the opposite party or embarrass government. You may throw the two parties, Congress and National Congress into one camp, but of what value will that be to you while it will be of serious import to government and I beg of my Honourable friends to exercise their vote, be it that side or this side, but please do not remain politically impotent. I again beg of you to vote. I do not argue with you to cast your vote one way or the other. Let history not say that the Muslims did not today discharge their duty seriously. There is no need in my opinion to persuade such sensible and veteran legislators, there is no need to ask such a loyal body of Indians as the Muslim League. But in my

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capacity as the leader of a minority community which has suffered at the hands of the Congress, I ask my Muslim friends to remember all these points, and put them in the balance and if they find they weigh against them, why not give their vote on the side which will go in their favour.

Sir, let the Congress say what they like. A majority of them, I am sure, seriously do not believe what they say. They have no faith in their conviction. What they do and say is all at the bidding of the High Command. I want the Government and the world, including enemy countries, to realise that India is whole-heartedly behind us, though we, like other parts of the world, have our fifth columnists. I want Government to go right ahead and certify, if necessary, and as fast as they can to go on with the defences of India. Why waste your time in granting commissions to examine whether one or two officers have received increased pay. This is not the time to listen to wails, even from the mathematical expert of this House. This is the time for action. This is the time for quick movies. Otherwise as sure as night follows day, you will miss the bus.

Sir, despite what the Congress says or wants, despite the result of today's voting, I say India is ready to do her best to fight the enemy wherever and whoever he may be.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): The Honourable Member has already spoken for more than twenty minutes. He promised to take only ten minutes today.

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney**: Sir, I shall now conclude by adding: If England fails us and her Empire, and if the Government of India fails us in our pressing demands, she will do so at her own peril. Sir, I look forward to the day, I hope near at hand when the war is over and the roar of the bombs and cannon are heard no more and when the silence of peace and happiness replace what is today an inferno, yes, Sir, I look forward with confidence to that day, when England and her Commonwealth of Nations will, in victory, together raise their voices and sing 'God save our Gracious King' and 'Rule Britannia'. Call her 'Imperialists' or anything you like—still she will even be our Mother country, England to whom, speaking for my own community, we must and we shall ever be loyal and ready to serve. Sir, I support the Bill.

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai** (Bombay Northern Divisions: Non-Muham-  
12 Noon. madan Rural): Sir, it is for good reasons that after an absence of some 18 months, I stand before this House in order to be able to express our view as to the issue which has now been raised by means of this Bill, small in itself, but importing a very large controversy. Had it not been for the fact that it involves those issues, we would still have continued, notwithstanding all comments, our attitude of protest with which we marked our abstention from the proceedings of this House ever since the month of August last year.

It was on the radio, Sir, that for the first time we heard that a Finance Bill or a Supplementary Finance Bill had been introduced in this House and that its express purpose was to find at least a part of the money required for what the Finance Member described as extra-war effort and extra-war expenditure. The issue, therefore, having been directly raised, it

became our bounden duty not only to be present here, but to do our best, and speak in the name of those whom we represent. not merely in this House or the other, but from the point of view of this question of India's duty of participation in this war effort. It is for that reason that immediately I heard on the radio the purpose and object of the Bill, I thought it my duty to call all my colleagues here in order that, with their support, I may be able to state our case before this House, not merely within the narrow precincts of this place where, it is said, privilege rules, but to the wider atmosphere and the wider audiences which now can be reached throughout the length and breadth of this world within less than a few minutes; and no Ordinances and no Criminal Law Amendment Act and no gagging of the press will prevent our voice reaching the ears of the people of this world. At all events we would have done a duty to conscience by explaining our attitude, not in a spirit of bare justification, but in a spirit of reason, whether it prevails or it does not do so. It is for that valid reason that I make no apology whatever for attending this House after such a long absence and putting the strain of coming post-haste on many comrades who have come from far south and far north, and far east and far west, which alone will explain, if any doubt exists here, the representative character of the pronouncement that we in our humility presume to make before this House for its acceptance.

During the course of the debate that has taken place, there have been pictures given of Heaven in Heaven and Heaven on earth, and appeals have been made to hopes and fears and flatteries and cajolings, but there is no place for any of these. Each one must conceive it his duty, according to the best of his light and to pursue it in a spirit of interminable firmness. I am not, therefore, saying that the view that we take is necessarily the right one, and, therefore, I will not, in the course of the remarks that I propose to make, question the sincerity of any individual person as to the view that he holds. But a criticism and analysis of the ideas that go behind it or the motives that furnish it must not be mistaken for a criticism of any *bona fides*. I say this for this reason that the apologists for the participation of India in the war have resorted to what you may call different types of personal criticism, to Congress criticism, to ministerial criticism; and also to a possible hope for India in the future. It is a very wide range; at the same time, it is not my desire that beyond a reasonably limited time I propose to occupy the House. The fact remains, however, that the introduction of this measure, whatever may be the view of those who thought this an opportune time to produce it, was a most unwise thing to do. The first and foremost reason is that it was claimed, at all events until this issue was put forward directly, that India was participating in the war,—a declamation for the purpose of the consumption of the world. And if they wanted to keep up that illusion they might have been wiser if for a mere two crores of rupees they had not brought up this Bill for this express purpose. And it is still more unwise, having regard to the fact that by reason of events which have occurred, if not entirely, the very debate in the House of Commons on India's contribution to the war effort has had to be wisely postponed. So long as they alone spoke, it was quite easy to represent to the world that India was with them in this war effort; but as soon as others were allowed to speak or to express their opinion, a different tale would have had to be heard. From that point of view, I submit, Sir, that it was extremely unwise, except or unless it be that they believed that like other measures during the absence of the Congress, of which

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Mr. Griffiths spoke, perhaps there would be a vote of the House and there would not be a word heard here except Hallelujas the best of which was exhibited only a few moments ago. It was on that hope or in that belief probably that it was intended to test, as a thin end of the wedge, whether any propaganda value can be created by a measure of this character. It is unfortunate from the point of view of the objective; it is fortunate from the point of view of those like me who have had at least an opportunity in this House to be able to say what, I believe sincerely, equally sincerely with others, India thinks of this war.

As soon as the war was declared, no doubt by reason of the constitutional right which the Governor General had, within a few hours of the declaration of the war in England, it was stated by the Governor General that India was at war with Germany. Of course, no longer is Germany the only enemy, but that was the state of affairs at the time the war was declared. And notwithstanding the fact that this right was exercised as a matter of right of a subject race and over a subject race by a dominant power, still in this House there are those who argue that this is not an imposed war. The only apology which Mr. Griffiths offered to this House was, in the language which he used, "What use would it have been had the House been consulted in the month of September?" The Congress was absent from the House, and, therefore, in his language, the representative character of this Assembly did not exist. While trying to give an explanation, he yielded more than he intended to do. He first yielded what is perfectly right—that without the presence of the elected members or at all events a large number of elected members, the House was unrepresentative; and so it was; and it is said that that was a good excuse for not consulting India. It is perfectly right that constitutional privileges and rights exist; but it is always the part of wisdom to exercise such rights discriminatingly, and this brings me to the reason why we have abstained from the proceedings of this House for the past year. Before we decided on this course, the Indo-British Pact was before this House. It was rejected by the vote of this House. A Bill was brought in with a view to give effect to what the British Government thought was the proper agreement to make in the name of India, despite the vote of India; and it passed through the usual stages of a rejected Bill and a recommended Bill, and ultimately became law, merely by the exercise of that prerogative, and we then felt—and I expressed it from this very place—that if our only use in this House is, in so far as executive matters, external affairs and defence are concerned, that we are useful when we agree, and that we are useless when we disagree, you may have the powers, but that does not mean that they are always to be exercised whenever you are defeated; and we felt then that apart from a few legislative measures which could not be certified, the British Government had adopted an attitude of implacable opposition to our using the powers which they possess, and that they wished to govern this country as if there was no other section in the Government of India Act except the wide irresponsible powers of executive which they possess. If that use was to be made of the constitution and if the vote of the House were to be a mockery, then we felt that after remaining for a sufficiently long period here, we had, in so far as propaganda value was concerned, served our purpose. It was for that reason that we did not think it worth while to spend our time any longer here, and now we have come only, as I



said, because we feel that the issue raised is one on which we feel it our duty to express an opinion, the opinion of those whom we represent.

On the declaration of the war by the Governor General in the name of India, a statement was made, so far as we were concerned, by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress; and by that statement we have always stood; and it is not a statement in the name of any party, in the name of any side, in the name of any section. If the war is a war to defend the *status quo*, the imperialist possessions and the colonies and vested interests and privilege, then India can have nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue is democracy and a world order based on democracy, then India is intensely interested in it:

"The Committee are convinced that the interests of Indian democracy do not conflict with the interests of British democracy or of the world democracy. But there is an inherent and ineradicable conflict between democracy in India and elsewhere and Imperialism and Fascism. If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions, establish full democracy in India and the Indian people must have the right to self-determination."

We took up that position then, and having taken up that position by that position, we have stood since. And we said further:

"The Working Committee, therefore, invite the British Government to declare it in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged, and in particular how these aims are going to apply to India and to give effect to them at present."

Therefore, from the very time that the war was declared, imposed war as it was, we are still waiting to see the reaction to our statement . . . .

**An Honourable Member:** What is the date of that?

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai:** The date of that is the 12th September, 1939. So that, immediately on the issue being considered by those whom I have the honour to represent, we took up an intelligible—at least I hope it is intelligible—and a definite position as to the terms and circumstances under which alone, even if this was an imposed war, we shall make it our own. We began with the fact that it was an imposed war. No amount of argument can get rid of the fact that it was an imposed war, for whatever poor apology might be offered for the declaration of war by Britain and for involving us in the declaration of war—and I do take note of the fact that after that it was followed by the dominions—the fact remains that Ireland is not at war and is neutral: the fact remains that by the skin of their teeth one of the parties in the South African Parliament succeeded in getting a vote against neutrality: so that it does not require any examination of the constitutional position of the statute of Westminster in order to see that in fact and in practice what is called the British Commonwealth of Nations, eliminating of course England herself, have elected of their own free will to join or not to join according to the dictates and the requirements of their own policies. While therefore this was an imposed war, which on the very ground that it is an imposed war we want to resist, we were still not unmindful of the fact that if this war was going to be, not in order that England may defend India as her property—if that is the war, undoubtedly there is no man in this House who can get up—not even the European—and say, "Yes, this is your war: take part in it." The position and problem

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therefore, is extremely simple. The problem is that unless it is made India's war, it is impossible that you will get India's support. By that position we stand today, as we stood on that day.

Considerable discussion thereafter took place: declarations of policy were made from time to time; and it would occupy the time of the House too long if I took them all over the historical background, of which a few glimpses were given by the Honourable Mr. James. But he asked at the end of it all "The Viceroy made you an offer, made India an offer—I take it. But you wanted them to part with power." And he said in the last sentence, "What use was going to be made of that power?" Now, Sir, in so far as this political issue which I do not wish to dilate upon has been made one of the arguments during the course of this debate, I cannot possibly avoid it at the risk of being misunderstood. It is a curious commentary that the Members who spoke on behalf of the Government barely referred to it. It was reserved for the representatives of the defenders of England in India to raise the issue in a more definite way. True, one must not take notice of anything, as we are told. Why should you think of the past ill deeds, misdeeds or defaults,—and now you must fight. But says Mr. James,—that is perfectly true, you must fight. Therefore, it is not the British Government alone, but the representatives of Britain in India get up and say: "Oh, you want power, you want to bargain with us? This is not the time for bargain; you won't get it." If racial arrogance ever went any further, it was this, for it was not the Government that was speaking. It was the representatives of Britain in India who said: "Oh, we want to retain power, and you be our instruments in fighting the war"—an extraordinary bargain of which I make a present to those friends. He says: "We retain the power and you as our instruments fight the war." If that is the bargain, I reject it off hand in every manner possible. What is the good of telling us that this is our war except by fear mongering, to which I shall come in a few moments, or by painting a picture of heaven on earth,—that some day it will come true. Neither of those arguments has any value in view of the past experience in Indian history. It is not a matter of comment. I am not reflecting on anybody's *bona fides*; but, after all, man would not be a man; man would not be a wise man if he did not profit by experience. In the last war India gave her wholehearted support, including Mahatma Gandhi, including myself. I went about lecturing with my friend, Sir Thomas Strangman. A million and half men, seven hundred million pounds were provided, and at the end of the war, we know what happened. And yet, the same phrases were used as are used today, the same hopes of maintaining the freedom, of bringing it back; the freedom of small races or subject races; the same abuse, deserved or undeserved, of the Huns, and yet they hugged each other at the Treaty of the Versailles. These abuses do not deceive anybody. This wild thing ceases to be wild as soon as you make peace when it suits your interests. Therefore, it is a very poor argument indeed to tell us that this is a war of civilization against darkness. If civilization means India's perpetual subjection, it is not civilization to me, and if it is not civilization to me, it is enough for me to say: "It is you and your civilization, you defend it", because your civilization means—"Yes, you raise up a picture in poetry of good things either from scriptures or from poetry or from philosophy. Having got that picture you drew the

trick, which is usually known as a missionary's or juggler's trick." The missionary generally raises a picture of heaven making you believe he has given it to you by the mere fact that he has raised a picture, whereas a juggler gets up and says. "Here is all earth, now you see a mango tree, you see a mango, why don't you eat it." Excuse me, this method of approach or even quoting the Bhagavat Gita, which you do not understand, will not be of any avail. I thought suffering chastened the heart. At least that according to the Book of God. But suffering has mostly made you more astute and less likely to give in. If power is not given to me, you may be quite certain that not merely shall we not assist, because it is not given, but because you must realise that without power you cannot implement your responsibilities. What you want is, you retain the power, you become the hewer of wood, and I drive the bullock and sit on the cart. Those days, it must be remembered, are now gone. The position, therefore, is, we want to make it quite plain to this House and to the world that it is sheer hypocrisy to say you praise democracy. Who objects to it? Of course, I yield to none in my praise of democracy. But whose democracy? Your democracy, my democracy or the joint democracy. If it is your democracy and my subjection, then it is a hypocritical phrase. If, on the other hand, it is a joint democracy, we are always willing as equal allies to fight this war, as the very statement made within a week of the declaration of the war shows that there has never been any backsliding on the part of India, but at the same time you cannot make a cat's paw of India time after time, time after time. A time must arrive when they must realise that we can only fight if it is a fight for your freedom as well as mine. But if you think that the Sikhs who defended the battle of Marne last time are also going to do the same thing at your bid, you may purchase them. You may think it is a very hard world which says they are mercenary, but that is the only way in which one can describe them. Either a man fights voluntarily for his own country or freedom, or he fights for somebody else's freedom, at least with my money. Now, what is the dictionary meaning of a man who fights for somebody else except mercenary? You may put up righteous indignations and everything else, but the description is quite apt and right. Unless every Indian thinks he is defending his own country, his own freedom, the only alternative is he is fighting as mercenary. It is not a phrase, it is a fact. These are not phrases. These are facts. What you want is phrases; what you want is principles. No amount of declamation, no amount of getting eloquent over them, no amount of quotations will get rid of the fact that declamation cannot possibly take the place of action, and unless the British policy, or as we invited them so to do on the 12th August last year was to be reversed, we must remain where we are, and they must do their best to fight.

Then, it is said: "Oh, but this is a purely political argument; it is wrong to bargain at a time of stress like this. How can we ever make, in the language of Mr. Amery, such a radical change in the constitution of a country during the course of the war?" You can argue so long as you can afford to argue. That is my value of phrases of this kind. I need hardly remind the House, for these are historic events which will go down, that when stress comes, you not only can change a constitution, but you do something which was never even dreamt of, share with another country yourself all your possessions and your liberty. That is the offer, as Mr. Churchill said, with which he went to France three days

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before she collapsed. If that could be done, the change of constitution in India could not be done. Indeed it could not be done, because it was not intended to be done.

And now let us deal with the question that has been raised as to the effect: "Oh, but forget the misdeeds of the past, trust the future, and why argue about it; we are in difficulties, all of us, or both of us, and what will happen to you if we are defeated." That is the fear argument, as I call it.

Now, I want the House to analyse briefly the elementary ideas underlying this fear argument. The question is, is India's war effort, to which you now invite us—if it exists it does not matter because there is nothing to invite us to,—if in addition to war effort, India's moral co-operation has any value, the question is, has it any effective value? Is it going to make all the difference, according to our estimate today, between Britain's success and Britain's defeat. If it has that determinative value, has it ever occurred to those in Britain or to my friends who represent them here, that it has all that value, what would you not give us to take it? If it is going to turn the balance, as I said, what would you not give to take it? Supposing a people, one-fifth of the human race,—and in the language of the Honourable the Finance Member: "When the war began, India's main assets were an enormous supply of man power and an abundance of raw materials." If it is going really to turn the scale of the war, supposing India for a moment were an independent country—you have waded many small countries with no resources and with very doubtful credentials—and supposing India were a free country and came and made this offer of an alliance to you and said: "We believe it is a war for democracy. We love freedom, you love freedom. Let us join hands and fight", would any statesman in England, however diehard he may have been, have dared to consider or waited to consider, much less rejected such an offer? In other words, you reject an offer by India merely because India says: "We can only offer an alliance as a free country." The crux of the matter is there. No. What you want to do is, in the language which we used at the commencement of the war that this is still a war to fight for the *status quo* so far as India is concerned—if it is going to be *status quo* so far as India is concerned, we do not wish to rely on any promises whatever. Promises may be very *bona fide* given, and yet we have the experience that they are not kept. It is for that reason that after long waiting, after long discussion, after many consultations, at least the Congress put forward an offer of joining in the war effort even on a lesser basis in so far as the immediate issue was concerned, and we said, if you form a national Government in the Centre and put upon them the responsibility for the purpose of India's defence and such further action as may be needed in so far as the protection of democracy is concerned, India was prepared to co-operate. Many of my friends have mistaken this as if it was a Congress demand in the sense that it was for the benefit of the Congress that the demand was made. No doubt, it was a statement on behalf of the Congress but I trust it is recognised and realised that what was demanded was a national Government and the phrase which came out was not a phrase unknown to the Secretary of State himself. In fact, a few days before the demand was made, at all events, the proposition was formulated, Mr.

Amery, in a generous mood, of course, trying to describe his expanded or intended expanded Executive Council said: "We want in India a National Government"—and these are his very words—"like the one we have in England". All right, that is precisely what we want. Do you mean it? Or you call an apple something else, you call a stone an apple, and say: "Why don't you take it? We have offered it to you." If Mr. Amery meant what he said, that is precisely what we asked, and there should have been no difficulty in doing so. It is not a democratic majority in Government that we asked. We did not say: "Eliminate the figureheads and that will leave us 103 or 102, and then we will form a Government out of them which has a majority." We never said such a thing. That might have been the Congress demand, that might have been a question of Congress Government, but we said: "What we mean, all we demand is a National Government like the Government you have in your own country. It will reflect every single representative of this country, for, after all, if, under the Constitution of 1935, elections have any meaning, it certainly is this, that there is not a single man or woman who has a right to vote, who is not represented by one or other of my Honourable friends in this House, apart from the nominated officials and nominated non-officials." So that what we demanded was a very simple, easily flexible, workable arrangement. We wanted no revolutionary change during the course of the war. What we wanted was a test: "It is within your power to bring about that national effort which you desire for the purpose of India's participation in the war." What was the result is known to everybody. And, now, apart from the Congress, apart from those who spoke, every single individual representing public opinion has realised that what Britain wants is that we should lend our name, we should lend our moral support, we should place all our material resources and that we should be their instruments in carrying on this war and popularising them; in other words, that we should work for our masters. That demand I am quite certain will not be met and cannot be met. Then, it is said: "Well, never mind that. Power is not to be given, but the fear theory still remains." As to fear theory, if our assistance is decisive, it is up to you to make any sacrifice if you call it sacrifice. It is very easy for a man to say: "Oh, I have responsibilities created by myself by the conquest of this country." "Well, you have those responsibilities, but you also shed those responsibilities if you care to." But if the keeping of the responsibilities means: "Oh, yes. I have got your house, but you are not yet agreed when the house is given back to you, as to which one will be occupied by one brother or sister or anybody else, and, therefore, I prefer to keep the house." That is the argument as the man in the street understands it. The man in the street is not clever, is not astute, but he is shrewd enough to understand what that offer actually translated means. The offer actually translated means this: "We do not wish to give it, we want to make a camouflage to give it, and if you are taken in, well and good, and if you are not, we shall carry on." Well, you carry on, you carry on at your peril. No doubt, you may carry on at my cost against my will, but at least I will not sell my soul, I will not sell my mind, and I will not sell my country. Those are the things that I will not do. For you, you may say, you may flatter yourself, as indeed one of the speeches showed, that "India is with us." All right, if India is with you, why say anything else? But I will read to you what those in England think

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whether India is with you. This is what the *Daily Herald* says as regards the way in which India is with you. That is the message that the *Daily Herald* gave at London on November the 7th. It is talking of the failure of the Governor General to invite the co-operation of the Indian people. At the end it says:

"All discussion of India's contribution to the war is overshadowed by the breakdown of the Viceroy's negotiations with the Congress. Members of Parliament must make it plain to Government that Parliament and the people want a new effort, made, if necessary by new methods, to reach an agreement. Their message to the statesmen of both sides should be: try yet again to build the bridge across the gulf which to the delight of our enemies lies darkly between you."

That is the appreciation of British statesmen and British journalists and anything against it is of little value, because if they did not realise its reality and its gravity, they would not have given the warning which they have done even at this last hour and as for my friend the Leader of the House, it is not for me to compliment him, for indeed he needs none. He is all courtesy. His speech was well documented, well docketed, as indeed it was bound to be, with his usual industry and skill. What did he do. He says: "I will tell you where I agree with you. If you want to tell the truth, I agree with you. If you want self-government, I agree with you" and he calls it the background of an agreement. If it were not for him that was speaking, it would be very difficult to believe that such an argument would pass muster. I agree with you in everything that you want and having agreed with you so far, now you must not want anything more. I agree with you in everything. I will give you chapter, quotations, Bible, everything else included and what more do you want. He says: "You are a very greedy person, Mr. Desai and now you must walk into my parlour and assist me." That is the argument, broadly, baldly and correctly analysed. We cannot fall into such a snare. Of course he was there to defend a lost cause and why should he not do it to the best of his ability. I have every admiration for that but at the same time, I wish to present to those who do and can understand what is the net result of that argument. He then gave six principles and they were hastily written down, as if merely stating them were the same thing as putting them into force. He said: "You want self-government. Yes, I agree." It was a distribution of self-government sweets in this House. He ought to have known better and the country knows better. Merely saying that you agree with all I want is not the same thing as giving me all I want. The next thing he said was: "Don't remember the misdeeds of the past. As a good man you should forget it. There is only good man on one side and bad as I am, let me have what I have." That is the next argument that was used in the course of a lucid speech but the argument was as fallacious and fictitious as it was lucid. That was the background. It is the biggest wrong committed for all time. It can be learnt from any book purchased in a bookshop. That is the background and the foreground. Then when you come to the actual ground, he says "nothing doing". That is the speech that he delivered and then he said: "Oh, but India is assisting. What about the young men who are enlisting and who are anxious to be enlisted whenever we put up a notice." He says: "If they are Congressmen, there is nothing more to say. If they are not Congressmen, they are against you, India is against you." That is the dilemma he put forward. Have you heard such a specious argument before—because a few men come and apply for jobs, therefore India is

assisting him in the war as a participant and a willing and equal participant. It is only he who can dare to put forward such an argument but the position there is quite simple.

My friend, the Commerce Member, said: "Oh, the Corporation of Madras rejected the proposal for a fund by two votes", and that Mr. Satyamurti did this, that, and so on." I have no desire to go into any personal acrimony of any kind. He says that the *Madras Mail* came out with an appeal and collected much money. Shall I say and present to him and to the Government that it represents the tinsel patriots created by the Madras Government. Their parentage is enough to show where they stand. It is perfectly useless to tell me that an Anglo-Indian newspaper put out some sort of appeal. He says, to that appeal there was some response, and that was India's answer to the call for contributions. It is the argument of a clever journalist, and if he were one, he would certainly be employed as the Minister of Information and Propaganda. But, as a Commerce Member, surely he ought to have shown a better sense of humour than that, because he certainly ought to have seen that it is no use telling me that Mr. James contributed a pound, if he did. It is extraordinary how for want of argument in a lost cause you should be driven to this. Don't do it. As you said, I am serving a master but are you serving any less. Is that a fair argument? You say: "You have got a master. You have an organisation and a High Command and everything else". When you say that, do you mean to tell me that you don't do it. Do you mean to tell me that there should be as many opinions as there are men for any effort, for any cause. Do you mean to tell me that if the Commander-in-Chief in England said that the army in Egypt should march one way, all the soldiers should individually resolve as to which way they are to march. You must distinguish between masters and masters. A self chosen organisation is one proposition. A well paid service is another proposition. Therefore we should not have entered into that kind of argument. It is wrong to do so. I appeal to him. Let us by all means serve a cause for the time being which you are called upon to do but do not let us come down to the level of an argument which does not respect either of us. I want you to respect yourself and I expect, as a courtesy, that you respect me. That is the position of the true protagonists of the Government and nothing more and however specious their speeches may be, they cannot deceive the country.

Then, I come next to another argument *ad hominem*, which is justified up to a point. Quotations were given without giving names, keeping it as a sort of surprise. I have seen this sort of thing at Port Said where a man covers something with a piece of cloth and slowly brings out a chicken. We were treated to a large number of quotations, thus rousing the curiosity of the House as to where they came from. Ultimately we were told it was from Satyamurti, from Munshi, from somebody else, and, of course, on top of all that, there was Mahatma Gandhi's statement; but perhaps my Honourable friend is aware, that he had the sympathy which he expressed on the very first interview he gave the next day after the declaration of war. Nobody has gone back upon it. If you mean that sympathy can be evoked merely by appealing to sentiment, without your doing anything on your part, then I think it is a grave mistake but not only that: I go further. I wish to give you a quotation so that you may understand. There is no inconsistency in politics if you find that your

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very best appeal or your very modest demand does not meet with a response. What is the good of making long quotations. Things said when the war was first declared were rightly said. There is no inconsistency in saying that you will not do what you pretend you want to do. You say you are fighting for democracy. All right. Prove it. Here is India waiting for democracy to be established in this country, and at that time I tell you "Yes. I think it is a just war." Have I, in giving credit to you for honesty, made a mistake? It is an extraordinary way of quoting things! A man talks to me. I tell him, "yes, I believe you; I think this time at all events you will be right, but I ask you to say that you should make that declaration and you also should implement it now as an earnest"—because now, without an earnest, there is no bargaining, Mr James. No, it is not a contract, in which he says: "I promise, promise, promise" and ultimately the promise is never fulfilled. No. It will only be either a real bargain or nothing—no illusions, no delusions, no promises in which there should be any grievances"—so that we honestly believe. And are we to be blamed for giving you the credit that you meant it too? We gave you the credit for what you meant and I think you meant it. Discussions took place for months past and in the end we realized that you did not mean what was said—that you were only fighting for maintaining what you described as the *status quo*, for maintaining the subjection of India and the colonies and of all vested interests and privileges. We said: "destroy these and we are with you". Maintain these and you cannot expect us to fight for you—so that supposing they say: "it is a good thing to fight in this war", is it an offence, do you say that we should have distrusted you at the very time, that we were foolish in not believing that you were cheating us even then? Why should you put any such blame upon us? We thought you were going to do it. We thought you meant it and we gave you credit for it and we said, "good things"—and of course you do not do it. The respect for Mahatma Gandhi, after all, does not disappear because he disagrees with you. Of course you may or may not agree with him, but I hope you will have to maintain that respect for him. This is what he said on February the 17th, 1940, in the *Harijan* after making every effort to see that this war for democracy is applied and implemented in this country, and he said this:

"The Builders of the British Indian Empire have patiently built its four pillars—the European Interests, the Army, the Princes and the Communal Divisions"

and, after going over the whole of the arguments and all the declarations which were made by the Viceroy and everybody else and including the subsequent statement (in the Lords) by Lord Zetland, he said this:

"If it is fairly correct, the issues are quite clear. Between the two the Nationalist and the Imperialist—there is no meeting ground."

Sir, you may be proud to call yourselves "Imperialists", so you are, to hold in bondage a race of men fully one-fifth of the human population. Indeed it is an object of pride but don't you make a mistake about it. That is our quarrel with you. Imperialism must necessarily involve—of course you try to find another phrase, the "commonwealth of nations", but as I have always said, that means that, "your wealth is yours and mine is yours too". So far as I was concerned, Imperialism has always meant—I learnt a little bit of it and taught it too—that necessarily, in the structure of imperialism, there will be different components, there will be inferior sections whose resources are at your disposal—and it is that which



we wish to destroy; and therefore although you call yourselves by another name, you won't change your facts. Either we have a common freedom to fight for, or we have no common freedom to fight for. So Mahatma Gandhi says:

"The more the nationalists try to deal with them as if they were problems for which they were responsible, the firmer must they become."

Then follow words which I think should appeal to every man who believes in any vision, in any sincerity, in any moral uplift or moral effort:

"I cannot conscientiously pray for the success of British arms if it means a further lease of life to India's subjection to foreign domination, I write this last sentence with a heavy heart."

**The Honourable Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan** (Leader of the House): On a point of explanation, Sir, the bulk of those quotations were from speeches made during May, June and July of 1940—more than three months after this declaration.

**Mr Bhulabhai J. Desai:** I do not know that that is an explanation but I will leave it at that if my friend wants it. I will tell him this that even after these—I will explain the matter in a few moments, I do not wish to take longer than I intend, some of the quotations were undoubtedly afterwards and it took a lot of time to go through them but I will give the substance and the answer too. Even after writing this sentence, he did not believe that it was his part at all events not to embarrass the British Government in its efforts without of course co-operating in it, because the first act of non-co-operation was the resignation of the Congress ministries; on that there was no hesitation, we did not wish to take any part in it, we did not wish to be responsible for it, and we did not wish to be mere instruments.

Then, it is true that even after this disappointment knowing that there was no question of co-operation left, still he did not wish to embarrass the Government, and at the time when these statements were used and they undoubtedly hold good today, you may believe it or not, it is his desire not to embarrass, but, as he put it, and as I am here today to endorse it before this House, a desire not to embarrass must not end in self-extinction. You cannot exploit my desire not to embarrass you to the extent of my suppressing myself altogether. I cannot be a willing instrument, because I do not wish to embarrass you. In fact the true case is that you embarrass yourselves by not meeting the other side in the manner in which you ought to reasonably and honestly and if you really mean it, sincerely mean it. Therefore, you cannot use the other man's goodness as a cloak for other people's hypocrisy. Being a pacifist, of course, he never loses faith in human nature. It is a failing of a man of faith that he continues to have faith. But that failing must have limits in its application to human life and politics. That is how this statement came to be made. Sir, we have been twitted on the question of non-violence and all the rest of it; I think it is all permissible in a game of argument, but I can only deal with the more salient parts of the argument and leave the rest to be analysed by the arguers themselves. It was said, "Oh, you are non-violent fellows." Well, I think they have all forgotten that in every organisation in the world, including England, the numbers must be large in every country,—there is Lansbury, Maxton, hundreds of others, there must be heaps of men who are pacifists and in every organization

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there are pacifists who have conscientious grounds for opposing the war, so there are others again who on political grounds, amongst us for example, who think that this war cannot, having regard to the attitude of Britain, be anything else but imperialism. That is the ground on which they oppose the war. There are others who believe that you can shed imperialism during the war because "shedding imperialism" only means, "giving up the power"—and Mr. James is unwilling to give a new name, because that is the part which he arrogates to himself.

The successor of Thomas Roe might have talked a little less and in a more humble way. But they do not do it because of the British privileges and the British interests. But that is quite wrong. I wish to assure him that they can still play the game if they intend to do it. And, therefore, there are those of us who say: "Yes, we have the responsibility, but can we ever go and enthuse the people of India and say that this is our war and therefore we must ask our sons to go and die and the last pie that we have we should give?" How can you enthuse any people by saying that a Leader in a certain Assembly told me that this is his conviction that it is our war, and therefore you must give every help. Have you ever heard such a thing? Can you ever create national enthusiasm by these means? National enthusiasm can only be created by acts and not by promises. Therefore, the bulk of us say: "Yes, if National Government is formed, we shall undertake the national responsibility." It does not require any argument to prove this statement. But my friend, the Britisher, argues as if I was asking merely for the National Government and giving nothing in return. I was undertaking the responsibility which you wanted to put upon me. If you, therefore, feel that it is your war and you can still carry it on by exploiting the Indian people and the young persons who are looking for commissions, then I make a present of that war contribution to you, because I am an humble, helpless individual who cannot stop it, according to you. But inasmuch as it is our duty to persuade our people as to where we stand, you and I must confess the truth. You and I cannot merely be asked to depend on vague promises and wait for their fulfilment when new conditions may arise. I do not wish to take the thing to its logical conclusion. What will happen to us if Germany comes? Those who argue this give small thought to what they say. They have not realised that if they are defeated and Germany comes, they are defeated too. In that case, they will have to look after themselves instead of looking after me. They say: "What will happen to you if Britain is defeated?" I ask: "What will happen to you if you are defeated?" That is one of those arguments which has always puzzled me. The *Times of India* stated it some 14 months ago without understanding it. If you are defeated, then you are defeated and then your liberties are gone and along with them mine too. Therefore, let us not argue things in that strain. It is a wrong appeal to fair politics; it is entirely erroneous and is entirely uncalled for. Say that it is our common war if you can dare say so. Say: "It is your war as much as mine because your liberty as much as mine are in jeopardy." We have a very good Indian proverb. I ask my children to manipulate the grindstone and the Poles, the Czechs and the Greeks are going to get the flour. That is not the lesson which my grandmother taught me. My friend went over the whole geography and mentioned so many countries. He also said: "After all, we went to Munich and surrendered." I have no objection to it. It was practical

politics for England. She was not prepared to fight. It is not for me to say whether she should fight or not just as it is not for me to say when and how they will make peace. If I am a participant in the war for something which belongs to me, then it is all right. What happened at the end of the last war? In the League of Nations, which was a still-born child and which has now fortunately ceased to exist for all practical purposes, India was asked to sign the Treaty of peace. But as soon as they reached London, a declaration was made saying that the Treaty was not to apply as between the independent power and the subject Dominions. They immediately realised that we were signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and we could then have carried on our questions between us and England. But they said: "Don't you make that mistake? This is a Covenant between independent nations and you are a subject nation."

Sir, we have realised everything that has been done in the name of form and false system, and, therefore, we were vigilant when this war was declared. We also realise now that if India is to be compelled to make a war effort, in other words, if her manpower and resources are to be exploited, then care will be taken, in the words of Sir Henry Gidney, that the markets in India would still be preserved for the British products. Our industry must be so organised that the present disorganised industry of England, having now been thrown over to munitions, when it comes back to its original condition and has to make a living will still have to make goods to be sold here. It does not matter as to who sits in the seat of power. The policies are governed by those who still want to make India a cat's-paw and exploit it. And so long as that continues, no amount of peroration, no amount of poetry, appeals and flattery are going to help you. This is certain. You may say that the people in England are going to assist us. I do not know in what form they are going to assist me but I am prepared to accept it. But if you go and tell the world that the Indian people and their representatives are with you, then you are wrong. You are not stating the truth and you are not entitled to make that declaration. As I said, it is a case in which fear won't do; it is a case in which even flattery won't do. I have told you already and I would like to repeat it if I may that it is no use telling me that if Britain were defeated, what will happen to us because the hypothesis itself answers it. It is you who are defeated. Of course, I have remained defeated all the time. Therefore, it is no use telling me what will happen to me. God will look after us. Let us, therefore, realise the things in a more careful manner. Very often I am told: "Why don't you realise the realities of things?" If by that you mean the poignant reality of my continued subjection, then I am fully conscious of that reality and I make a present of that reality to my friends who ask me to look at it. It is too real, it is too painful, it is too poignant, it has gone on too long and I am not prepared to look at it. My desire is not, as I said, to enter into a personal argument. But those who ask us to look at realities and say that India is not ready and she cannot defend herself, do they seriously ask me to believe that these two crores of rupees are seriously intended for the purpose of aiding the war effort of Britain? Do you seriously tell me that? Britain is spending 14 crores of rupees a day.

**An Honourable Member:** Eleven crores.

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai:** That is what they say. If you like, let it be 11 crores or even 9 crores, but if you calculate it properly, it is really 14 crores. My arithmetic is generally correct. When they are spending 14

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crores a day, do you mean to tell me that these two crores of rupees during four months are going to aid to the war effort? Certainly not. This is an absolute camouflage. It is merely intended for world propaganda in order to say that India is also assisting in war effort. It is intended for nothing else. England could give two crores. My friends could put up two crores. They have got many crores and they are all mine. Why don't they put up these 12 crores if you want them for the war effort? In that case, there will be no Finance Bill and there will be no trouble. But the truth is that this money has nothing to do with the war effort. I am one of those who understand propaganda a little. I read the papers and hear the Radio every day. Even a 50 rupee or a 500 rupee donation is to be heard on the British Radio. Why, the reality is not so much the actual money, but there is grim reality for us. You make a poor country poorer, and that is not playing the game. If you can spend 14 crores a day, surely you can spend two crores more. That is nearly one-seventh of the expenditure. I fully appreciate why it is you want these two crores. It is only raised in the hope that it will serve as a sort of propaganda that so far as the Indian people are concerned, they are with us in the war. Of course, we are helpless and unprotected, I fully realise that we will not become protected in a few weeks or a few months. It is no use telling me what will happen then. It is not my desire to take very long time of the House. I will only say this, that whatever my friends may assert, the fact remains that Egyptian Parliament has sat, the King's speech has been read and nothing further has been heard. There was a question raised about the declaration of war by Egypt. Four Ministers who were for it resigned and nothing happened since. The Prime Minister is dead. May his soul rest in peace, why or where or how, I do not know. But the fact remains that Egypt has not declared war. The fact remains that Turkey has not declared war. The arguments which you want to weigh with other friends have an untrue foundations and an unreal foundation. All the Muslim world today is neutral and rightly so. It is no use telling us in this country that the Muslims are with Britain in this war. It is untrue and will remain untrue until the contrary has been proved, not by statements but by acts of these high politicians. If my friends would examine this with the idea of enlightened self-interest as they appeal to my enlightened self-interest, they have a chance. But so long as they maintain their present attitude we shall certainly not be able to support by way of token or otherwise a measure of this kind in India to test the question of India's participation in the war. We shall, Sir, fight as Allies with such power as we have got, but we shall not fight as instruments. I oppose the Bill.

The Assembly then adjourned for Lunch till Half Past Two of the Clock.

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The Assembly re-assembled after Lunch at Half Past Two of the Clock, Mr. Deputy President (Mr. Akhil Chandra Datta) in the Chair.

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**Mr. M. S. Aney** (Berar: Non-Muhammadan): Sir, the debate on this motion has been going on for about four or five days in all and this is perhaps the sixth day; and during the course of this debate various points of

view for and against the Finance Bill have been lucidly brought out by speakers from different sides. Yesterday my Honourable friend, Sir Cowasji Jehangir, introduced his speech with a remark that it was very difficult to follow a brilliant speaker like Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. I think he will agree that my task is still more difficult than the one which fell to his lot. The speech that was made by the Leader of the Opposition, which we have listened to with rapt attention, was an extraordinary performance, and it is rather difficult for a man of my mentality to make any effective contribution to the debate after such a brilliant performance. However, I have to do my duty. One thing which I want to bring out at the outset is this. I am going to put forth a point of view which I believe the House will be pleased to give careful attention to. It is said that when the Leader of the Opposition gets up he has a definite point of view and he has, therefore, to stand as an advocate for that point of view and place his view before the other Members of the House; and while the Leader of the House stands up he is also equally accused, and rightly accused, of standing up to a particular point of view which he has to defend, whether he likes it or not. I stand here in a different position and my position is this, that there are men who may not be wedded to this point of view or that point of view, but there is also a commonsense point of view from which things can be looked at and correct conclusions can be arrived at. It is from that point of view that I want to approach this question; and let me say at the outset that having carefully considered the whole situation purely from the point of view of the man in the street, if it is possible for such a man to take a detached view as far as possible, I came to the conclusion that there is no go for me but to record my vote against this Finance Bill.

Sir, in the first place I belong to a Party which for the last six years that it has been in existence in this House has always opposed the Finance Bill. It has taken its stand as regards all money Bills and Finance Bills on one important ground. Apart from the merits of a particular Bill it has challenged the right of Government to come with a taxation measure before this House so long as the executive is not made responsible to this House. That has been the stand taken by my Party all along. Honourable Members may be very well aware that it was not only with regard to Finance Bills but even other Bills like Income-tax Bills which are intended to levy taxation that I took my stand and many of the Members of my Party stood behind me on that ground. So, I first want to say that in the present Bill also the position is this. Government have come before this House with a demand for certain crores of rupees required for the additional expenditure to be incurred for the purposes of the war. They have to incur a good deal of expenditure but they only want to make by way of taxation a provision of six crores only by means of this Bill. This money which they want to raise is ostensibly for the purpose of spending for defence purposes. But have we as a matter of fact got any control over the money that will be spent? It is well-known to those Members of the House who are aware of the procedure and the law that governs us that defence expenditure formerly used to appear in the demands for grants somewhere. It had some place, at least nominally, in order to enable Members to raise a discussion directly over defence questions in this House; but only a year after the new Government of India Act came into existence those who are in power thought it wise to eliminate the demand for defence altogether and compelled this House to raise a discussion over it by moving a cut in the demand for the

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Executive Council. Defence expenditure is regarded as expenditure charged on the revenues and not expenditure to be met out of the revenues. An artificial distinction is made in the Government of India Act as regards expenditure,—expenditure charged on the revenues covered by section 68-A or something like that is not put up for the consideration or vote of this House at all. They are to be incurred and met by His Excellency the Governor General and it is only expenditure which is to be met out of revenues that is to be considered by this House and for which demands for grants are placed before this House. As regards demands which the Governor General, not the Governor General in Council, and the Crown Representative holds in his sole discretion, he is not to consult this House. If that is the position, as it is undoubtedly the position under the Government of India Act to which very loyally the Government of India adheres and sticks and does not want to make a departure from even by way of any convention whatsoever, I want to know with what face they can ask us to pay any money for an expenditure of this kind.

What is this Bill going to do? This Bill asks us to contribute six crores of rupees. For these six crores of rupees, I ask my Honourable friend, why does he not place a supplementary demand for grant for our consideration? He will reply that it is not necessary for him to do it, and that would be an easy reply because he can spend money on defence purposes without taking us into his confidence in any form at all. And I am sure he is not going to bring up a supplementary demand for grant at all before this House. That being his attitude and the attitude of Government as a whole, I think this House will be justified in telling Government that if they can incur this expenditure without the consent of this House or without taking the House into their confidence, they can assume the sole responsibility for raising the necessary money for this expenditure. There is nothing wrong about it. The war even may be a justifiable war,—I have to say nothing about that. But if this House has to give any money for the prosecution of this war, Government must be prepared to make the necessary modifications in the Government of India Act, either by way of conventions or by way of alterations, to enable this House to have a complete view and picture of the expenditure and a right to give their vote on that expenditure in that particular form.

In this connection I also want to bring to your notice, Sir, one point which constitutionally appears to me to be of some importance. That point is this. It is under section 67A of the Government of India Act, which says:

"The estimated annual expenditure and revenue of the Governor General in Council shall be laid in the form of a statement before both Chambers of the Indian legislature in each year.

The proposals of the Governor General in Council for the appropriation of revenue or moneys relating to the following heads of expenditure shall not be submitted to the vote of the Legislative Assembly, nor shall they be open to discussion by either Chamber at the time when the annual statement is under consideration unless the Governor General otherwise directs:"

Then comes the list of items which are not to be put to the vote or open to discussion; and this list includes, as I have just stated, the expenditure for defence also. But that is a provision made for the purpose of making any demands at the time of the Annual Statement. If, during the course

of the year, extra expenditure on those items is to be made by the Government and they want to get more money from the people, there is no provision here, in my opinion, preventing them from placing those demands before this House for consideration. It may be said that the provisions in regard to supplementary demands laid down in Legislative Rule No. 50 are to this effect:

"An estimate shall be presented to the Assembly for a supplementary or additional grant when—

- (1) the amount voted in the Budget of a grant is found to be insufficient for the purposes of the current year, or . . . . .

Provided that when funds to meet proposed expenditure on a new service can be made available by re-appropriation a demand for the grant of a token sum may be submitted to the vote of the Assembly . . . . .

- (3) Supplementary or additional estimates shall be dealt with in the same way by the Assembly as if they were demands for grants."

Probably they would like to take shelter under this sub-clause (3); but in my opinion this only refers to the question of procedure; it does not refer to the question of putting them in the form of grants for voting at all. In the Government of India Act of 1935, under section 87, there is a special provision which lays down that the rules which prevent certain kinds of expenditure to be placed for the vote of the House will also apply to supplementary grants, but that section is not one of those which is extended during the transition period at all. Therefore, you have to rely only upon this legislative rule, and there is no other corresponding section in the old Act excepting this little sub-clause (3) of rule 50. I submit, that whenever they have to ask for additional expenditure even for purposes of those subjects which are otherwise excluded from discussion and vote during the course of the year and not in the form of an annual statement, then they cannot avoid placing them for the vote of this House: otherwise they must wait till the end of the year and take advantage of that section and bring in the form of an annual statement, to avoid the discussion or vote of this House. But if they come during the year I think I am right in insisting that not only should a Finance Bill be brought, but the demands for grants, in which the money raised is going to be spent for certain purposes, ought to be brought before the House, and if they do not do that, in my opinion, they are not observing the procedure laid down here strictly. The prohibition extends only to the demands for grants made in the course of the annual statement. Even in that case the Governor General has the discretion to direct that any expenditure of that class may be put to the House in the form of a demand for grant, but for the purposes of any other statement they make during the course of the year in the form of a supplementary demand those excepted items cannot be avoided from the operation of being discussed here and being voted upon here. That is what I understand to be the state of the law as it is. As it was perhaps found unsatisfactory, the new Government of India Act has provided a clear section that those clauses which relate to the expenditure on those items will also extend in the case of supplementary grants: that is the specific section; but there is no corresponding section in the old Act; and this legislative rule in my opinion does not go so far as to include that case. However, that is a point which I want to bring to your notice. What I mean is this: that it is necessary for the Government to take this House into confidence in the matter of expenditure which is to be incurred out of the revenues raised by this Bill. It may be said that there are certain statements made in the

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Finance Member's speech but that is not asking the House to vote on it: it is only giving an indication as to how Government intend to spend the money later on; but if they want it they ought to have come, in my opinion, with a supplementary demand for grant, which they did not do; and that is another reason why I think that I should not like to vote for this.

Then there is another point which I would like to urge. It was rightly stated by some friends that so far as the present declaration of war is concerned, the House was not taken into confidence at all: India was involved in this war and war was declared for India, probably not by the Government of India but, automatically, by the fact that it was declared by England against Germany. Whether the Government of India or the Governor General was consulted or not is a matter with which I am not concerned; but one fact is certain, that this House, at least, was not taken into confidence. In this connection I want to bring to the notice of the House a very important point which I believe the House will consider very carefully. The world war, in which if India is involved, will require one thing, *vis.*, that the war will have to be fought by the Indian Army and Indian troops, and it cannot be fought outside the borders of India unless troops are sent out of India. The Government of India will have to take troops out of India to fight the war if India is involved in the war on account of this declaration. Now, the Government of India, in a moment of sanity, committed themselves to one decision, and that decision is this, that whenever they will have to send an expeditionary force out of India, they have made a statement to the effect on the floor of this House to which I shall presently invite your attention, that they will consult this House before taking that step. That was the statement made by the Defence Secretary on the 8th September, 1935, in this House, in connection with an adjournment motion which, I believe, was moved by my Honourable friend, Pandit Nilakantha Das. This is the statement:

"After what the Foreign Secretary said this morning, I think I can explain the whole position of Government in a very few sentences."

"It is perfectly true, that over a year ago, speaking in this House on the Indian Navy Bill, I said that with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, I was authorised to announce that . . ."

I would have read even the statement of Lord Zetland on this point, but I think this will suffice for the present."

"It is the intention of the Government to consult the Indian Legislature, so far as possible, whenever any question arises of lending the Indian Navy to the Admiralty for operations other than in the defence of India."

Later on "that undertaking applies by implication equally to the Indian Army as well as the Indian Navy."

Now, Sir, one thing is quite certain, that if the war is to be fought beyond the borders of India, and India is expected to take an active part in it, Indian troops will have to be sent out. There is a commitment here that Indian troops will not be sent out of India for the defence of the Empire, out of this country, without this House being consulted as far as possible. I say that every time the Indian troops are sent out, even in the present war, every time they are sent outside the limits of India, the Government are committing a breach of faith. Have they ever taken care to consult this House? Or is it at all possible for them to consult this House every time before sending out troops outside India when the



war is actually going on? In order to avoid this anomaly, the best thing for the Government to do was to consult this House, to consult the Members of this House, to consult the different Parties of this House, before declaring the war, or before any declaration of war was made. If the Government had got our consent in the first instance, before the declaration of war, then all the steps which they would have taken as a result of the declaration of war for the active prosecution of the war would have been regarded as steps taken with our full consent. That consent would have been implied, but in the absence of any such consent of the Members of this House to the declaration of war, it is clearly a breach of faith, on the part of the Government, unless they can prove that the war is meant for the defence of India. This is the crucial point,—that is to say, the troops cannot be sent out unless this House is consulted each time. That is the anomalous position in which they find themselves today.

Sir, while I am on this subject, I should like to make a reference to the extension of the borders or the frontiers of India for purposes of defence. It is well-known that a Committee presided over by Lord Chatfield some time before made its Report. That Report of course is a sealed book to us,—but some statement regarding financial arrangements based on the recommendations of that Report was once made on the floor of this House. That Report contained, it is said, a very important statement to the effect that for the purposes of strategic defences of India, the Indian borders can extend up to Suez in the West and Singapore in the East. We have extended now as far as that. Sir, if Lord Chatfield and his Committee are called upon to write a Report today, probably they might extend the strategical borders of India to Gibraltar in the West . . .

**An Honourable Member:** To Dover.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** My friend says Dover itself,—and to the shores of Japan probably, in the East, and at this rate I do not know how far beyond they will extend. This is an extension made for the sake of employing Indian troops, possibly at India's cost, for defending these strategic positions, without which not only India cannot be defended, but even the Empire cannot be defended. The very extension of India's borders to Singapore on one side and to Suez on the other means, to my mind, nothing but involving India in any war that may be waged for the sake of preserving the British Empire, against the aggressors who may be equally good or bad, but this is what this extension means. In fact, that Report has as its basis the central idea how to utilise and exploit the Indian Army and Indian resources for the purpose of defending this Empire in case any trouble arises in the near future. And the trouble that was apprehended has really come into existence now.

Now, with regard to the extension of the borders of India, I want to point out one thing. When you extend the borders of my country, is it not necessary to obtain a formal consent of this House, because India will not any longer be limited by the old geographical boundaries, namely, the Himalayas on the North and Cape Comorin in the South or the tribal areas in the North-West and Burma on the East. India has expanded, it has grown fat,—that is what I am told. We become fat or lean or thin or thick, according to the prescriptions of certain doctors, or may I say quacks, at Whitehall. We become like that. If an

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important addition or extension to India's territorial existence is made, it was very necessary that the Report on the subject should have been formally placed before this House for its consideration. An important document like that was never placed before us; we are never taken into confidence at all. Meantime, I may say another thing. While they were thinking of extending the borders of India beyond Suez on the one side, and Singapore on the other, at the same time in the interests of some persons,—I do not know who they are,—they were also thinking of taking away certain parts of India and treating them as no longer parts of India. Burma was taken away on the East side and Aden was taken away in the West. Today we are supposed to defend Suez without Aden being a part of India, and defend Singapore without Burma being a part of British India. In whose interest are these curtailments and extensions made, may I know? Are they in the interest of the people of India or in the interest of the people of Burma? Are they being made in the interest of the Indian nation at all?

**An Honourable Member:** They are making it geographically.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** In the interest of geography; British geography. Now that kind of thing that is going on indicates, to my mind, that certain things are being planned with an ulterior purpose, and that purpose is being kept entirely away from us, and about which no formal or informal discussion takes place in this House, because Reports of important Committees are never placed before the House. Under these circumstances, it is really difficult to say that the war that is now being waged is waged in the interest of the defence of India itself, that it is being waged for the sake of India itself, and if a case to that effect is not made out, then Government must land themselves in a terrible position. That means they are taking up a most unconstitutional, illegal, or in a way untenable position, in-as-much as they are sending out Indian troops out of British India without the consent or concurrence of this House. That illegality is being perpetrated every day. Government may have the power to dispense with all the constitutional procedure, they may issue Ordinances and other laws, but under the law as it stands at present, they cannot get over the position easily and send out troops outside India without the consent of this House. At least as a matter of ordinary commonsense, or prudence, they should have consulted this House, and having failed to do so, I feel they committed one of the greatest blunders of their life.

Now, my Honourable friend, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, the Leader of the House, who is undoubtedly a very brilliant speaker, a very able Leader,—I listened most attentively and carefully to one of his best speeches in the House when he spoke the other day,—gave a number of quotations from statements made by some of my Congress friends both outside and inside the House,—every quotation was rightly applauded and punctuated with loud cheers by those Benches,—and I felt a good deal of uneasiness in my mind, not because I was loathe to appreciate the debating skill of my friend, but I thought that his abilities were being used to get a petty debating advantage or to score a debating point here, and that he could have better utilised his knowledge for a much

higher purpose in advising the Governor General to take a more statesmanlike view in regard to the declaration of the war itself. If there is any intelligence in the Intelligence Department of the Government of India,—I know there is an Intelligence Department,—but I do not know whether it has sufficient intelligence at all,—if there is any intelligent Intelligence Department in the Government of India, they should have known in time what the reactions were in India immediately after the declaration of the war. At first, from the statements made by Ministers in England soon after the declaration of the war, people here thought that there was something nobler and some better ideal for which England was fighting. My friend, the Leader of the Opposition,—I would have liked him to be the Leader of the House,—in fact he would have become so had he consented to do something a few months ago,—my friend, the Leader of the Opposition pointed out that there are severe reactions in this country, and if you had taken time by the forelock, if you had exercised a little prudence, you would have avoided the present position in this country. But it seems to me that the Governor General either does not want to take anybody into his confidence about these matters or he is singularly lacking in good advisers. They could have seen that that was a time when India was being governed by popular ministries in 11 provinces, seven of which were controlled by my Congress friends and at least two of which were more or less in the control of my Honourable friend, Mr. Jinnah, or the Muslim League,—I would not like to use personalities, let me say, of the Muslim League. The majority of the Members belong to the Muslim League if I mistake not, and the remaining two, more or less, would have followed the same course, either this way or that way. The first thing that the Government of India should have done immediately after the war was declared was to have sent for the Premiers of the Provinces—they were autonomous Provinces, it was loudly proclaimed that they were autonomous Provinces, I am sure so long as the federal structure has not come into existence there was nothing to control them in the Central Government except the theoretical control of the Governor General. They were autonomous Provinces. Any war effort that would have to be made or was bound to be made in the provinces would have to be made with their co-operation and with their sympathy. Otherwise, their efforts would have failed. This much the Government of India and their advisers could have easily known or seen if they had a little imagination in them. With that situation in the country, with the general tendency to appreciate what was then declared as war aims—democracy is at stake, the liberties of smaller nations are at stake, so on and so forth—with that knowledge the Government could have easily thought of convening a conference of the Premiers of the various provinces and asking them also, if necessary, to take with them the leading members of the Working Committees of the two or three organisations which would have been more or less connected with them, they should have sat at an informal conference and come to a certain plan and then declared war in the name of India, and the position today would have been entirely different from what is the misfortune of my Honourable friend, the Leader of the House, or the Government of India to see. That golden opportunity was lost. They did not think of doing anything of the kind. They napped and only woke up to find that it was rather too late. I am reminded of a Pouranic story in this connection. It was stated that a certain number of devotees wanted to go and have a *darshan* of God Vishnu in Vaikunth. They managed to find

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a passage to go up, in some balloon or some aeroplane they might have got up in those days. They got there and they found that the doors were closed. But there were two watchmen of the Gods. Among the Gods also there is a hierarchy, some are watchmen, some are sweepers, and so on.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah** (Bombay City: Muhammadan Urban): They do not believe in democracy!

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** No. It is one absolute monarchy in which every religion believes. Those watchmen—I am using this profane word, I pray God will forgive me for the use of this term, because there is no better term that can be used—those watchmen told them, “You have come here. The doors are closed. They will be opened early in the morning after sunrise.” They said to themselves that the morning might come sooner or later, and so they thought of remaining awake the whole night. The result was that by the time it was morning the cool breeze of the heavenly garden was gently blowing which lulled them into sleep. They had a little map and just at that time the doors were opened, they were kept open for some time, but they were asleep. And when the doors were again closed, there was a little jarring noise by the moving of the hinges and this woke up the devotees from their sleep. They found the doors closed, and asked the watchmen when the doors would be opened. “How long are we to wait?” “You will have to wait another day”, and a heavenly day means a good many hundred years of a man’s life. (Interruption by Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad). You can make calculations. You deal in infinities. I find that it is the same case with the Ten Virgins. In that parable it is stated, “Well, they reached there and they were told, ‘Thou art too late.’ Thou canst enter now”. The story of the Government was something of this nature. When they wanted to consult the Indian public opinion there was already a good deal of suspicion arising about their aims. There were statements, the generosity of which first appealed to the imagination of the people—because, after all, the Indians are more imaginative than material, and, therefore, their first impulse was to respond to the generous statements that were made. Later on they cooled down and gradually thought that there was more noise and less substance in the words that were being uttered all round. In this state of things the Government were trying to consult and carry on negotiations. (Interruption.) The position was this. We now know what the state of the negotiations is. I think that the Government of India have really lost a very good opportunity of reconciling Indian public opinion and they could have been successful in doing so had they taken the proper step, the right step at the proper time. Unfortunately, they did not take it, and today the result is that there is a strong feeling in the country, at least in very important sections of Indian public life, to oppose,—if not to oppose, at least not to support the war operations. That is the position in which you find yourself reduced. It is due to lack of imagination, lack of statesmanship, lack of taking initiative at the proper time, lack of will to do anything substantial in the interests of the people of this country.

Having said that about the so-called intention of the Government and their failure to take the people into their confidence at the time of the

declaration of the war, I may also say a word about what my Honourable friend, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, has stated. I am sure Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar is too intelligent not to understand what the position of the Dominions is at present in the matter of declaration of war and peace. But in the course of his zeal to support the cause (Interruption). . . . you can characterise it as you like—he went on to say that even in the Dominions it was only a formal affair and so on. I can only bring to his notice a passage—I have not got the quotation here with me now, but I will give the substance of it. Those who have read the papers during the last two or three days might have seen it—Dr. Farriedale Keith the other day wrote an article in some newspaper which is quoted in some of the morning papers. He pointed to the example of Ireland—he calls it Eire. He stated:

“Under the existing system they can remain neutral and we see how neutrality constitutes a severe danger and a menace to England at a time when the war is going on. Profiting by that experience, when the new constitution for India will have to be made, take care that you insert a clause by which they will not be able to declare neutrality when war will be declared by the British Government.”

By implication—why, by implication, it is a clear statement coming from the highest authority on constitutional law that exists now in England, that the Dominions have got the right either to go in for war or not to go in for war. I do not know whether they have got the power to join Germany or not, that I cannot say. But this much at least is perfectly clear that they are not bound to join the war if they like. Now, Sir, with those rights already conceded to the Dominions under the constitution and those very rights denied to India, India really feels that a very invidious distinction is being made in her case. It is perfectly true that constitutionally the Government of India have no obligation whatsoever to consult this House or consult Indian public opinion on the matter of the declaration of war. Even the Government of India is not required to be consulted by the British Government but the Government of India, representing the people of India, in the absence of a responsible legislature here, must itself plead for the people of India and should have told the British Government: “If you really want us to work enthusiastically and energetically for the sake of mobilising Indian opinion in favour of this war, then it is necessary that all these petty and invidious distinctions which exist under the constitution should by convention at least disappear”. That is a step in the right direction and that bold step should have been taken by the Government of India and they should have told His Majesty’s Government: ‘I do not think I can declare war immediately within a few hours. I think it is meet for me to take into confidence Indian public opinion and the various ministers who are running the administration under the Act passed by you and on whose co-operation you have been loud in your praises till yesterday’. They could have taken that stand. That one little step would have been construed as a generous gesture. It would have reconciled public opinion to a certain extent and probably the demand which you now consider extravagant may not have come forth and matters might have been settled and reconciled on very moderate terms, if I may use that commercial phrase.

**An Honourable Member:** Cheaper terms.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** My friend with his expert knowledge in the art of bargaining has supplied the proper phrase. But that opportunity was missed. After all is said and done, what is the situation now? The war has come. We have to fight it. The enemies are knocking at the gate, —somewhere near Suez or Alexandria or somewhere there. That is said to be our frontier. What are we to do? At this time, my friend, the Leader of the House, says: 'Well, Mr. Aney, you are a reasonable man. It always pays to be a reasonable fellow. This is a time of war and you must vote for this Bill. After all, the money will be spent, even if you don't vote it. Why then don't you take the credit for voting it?' I want to tell him one thing: Even as a war measure, I cannot vote for it. I realise the difficult position in which we find ourselves. I realise the danger with which we are faced. I realise all that. In spite of it, the protest that we have been making all these years against such measures as this has had a meaning about it and if there is any time when that meaning ought to be brought home more forcibly and pointedly to the authorities and the powers that be, the war time is the proper time for us to do so. The meaning is this. You are ruling a discontented India. You are ruling an India which refuses to be under perpetual bondage or in a perpetual state of slavery. It claims a right to be as free as you are. That is their attitude even while you are engaged in war. That is a matter which must be borne in mind and for that reason, although it is a war measure, I cannot give up the attitude which I have been taking since I entered this House as a member of the Swaraj Party. From those days to this day, I have taken one attitude as regards the Finance Bill. I say: 'No, we are not satisfied with the constitution. You must do something. You must make your executive responsible to this House and restore confidence among the people of India'. You must bear that in mind so that when the pressure of this public opinion will be brought to bear upon you, you will know what to do at the proper time. If matters fortunately end satisfactorily for you and for us both, then you will remember that there is a point which has got to be tackled and which you cannot afford to neglect. It is the existing state of things which has created a tremendous difficulty for you to get the necessary co-operation of the people of this country. Unless that difficulty is realised by you now, in a time of difficulty, I do not think there is any hope of this question ever being satisfactorily solved by you at all in times of ease. All the inconvenient points which one has to go through in times of difficulty are forgotten. Ease has got a softening tendency, to whitewash all that was wrong and all that was inconvenient.

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai:** They say "Forget our misdeeds".

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** For these reasons, we are justified in recording our vote against the Bill even though you say that this expenditure is intended for war purposes and it is not an ordinary Finance Bill.

Having said that, I want to say one or two words about my own attitude towards the war operations themselves. I have stated here that my attitude to this Bill is intended to assert the constitutional right of the people of India. I have stated outside that after all we are in

the midst of war and, therefore, the nation must make an effort to prepare itself for our defence. I feel, I may be wrong, my friends on the Congress Benches may not agree with me, that the Indian people have got to prepare themselves for the defence of India in co-operation with the present Government, whether they like it or not. All I desire to say is that I can not ask people not to co-operate with the Government in this war. It is a mistake. That is however, a matter which stands on a different footing. The constitutional position is this with regard to the vote given in this House. By means of the vote recorded in this House, I want to protest in the name of the millions of electors in the constituencies which have sent us here. They are anxious that they want to record as their considered opinion by means of the vote of their representatives that they are not satisfied with the existing constitution, and they are reluctant to sanction any money for the sake of expenditure for this war. The efforts outside stand on a different footing and about that I do not want to make a long speech. I only want to say this. I am not, unfortunately, a whole-hearted believer in that extreme form of non-violence which one has to subscribe to before one can join the army of Satyagrahis. Well, with all my respect for Mahatma Gandhi that great man who has launched the struggle and whose efforts have created a new India, I have to inform him that so long as I cannot conscientiously subscribe to those terms I feel myself unable to do my humble duty in the struggle in which he is engaged.

**Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad** (United Provinces Southern Division: Muhammadan Rural): Do I understand it correctly, that you are a fifth column man of the Congress inside the House and a fifth column man of the League outside the House?

**Mr. M. S. Aney**: I am going to say something about the League also.

**An Honourable Member**: He said it in joke.

**Mr. M. S. Aney**: It does not mean that I am going to say any thing disparaging. I may be any columnist. My point is this. It is a matter of great pain to me, on account of my long association with that great man whose blessings I have enjoyed all these years and whose blessings have undoubtedly contributed to whatever little status I may have in the public life of this country, that I have to disagree with him this time. I am conscious of all that. It is with a great deal of anguish and pain that I feel that I am unable to subscribe to his present policy and to all that he has laid down that a true Satyagrahi should do. I am unable to do it at present, as I can not properly even understand it. If one day light dawns on me and I see it is right, I may be able to do it. Today I cannot conscientiously do it. I only hope with great diffidence, that the attempt he is making may with the blessings of God end well. Otherwise it is likely to create a situation which it is very difficult to contemplate with equanimity. It is fraught with dangerous potentialities for the future of India. That is the situation in which we find ourselves, but I am not here to expostulate at length on that aspect, that is not my business here; I am only concerned with the Bill before the House and I have given my reasons, particularly for the attitude that I have adopted today. I

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ask my friends who have listened to me with patience that if they find that there is any grain of good reason in the arguments advanced, they should carefully consider the whole position and fearlessly record their vote with me; if not, they should vote as they deem proper.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Mr. Deputy President, I rise to take part in this debate not without a certain amount of sorrow,—and this is a moment which I think we all realize is a grave moment. Sir, we have heard various speeches in the course of the last six days. There have been essays, sermons, lectures,—historical, moral and religious. I am an ordinary mortal, and I am not going to enter into all those eruditions and disquisitions that have taken place in this House. Sir, let us confine ourselves to our path, the humdrum path of politics and of a Legislature.

Now, as I visualize and survey the entire situation, it can be divided into three parts. The first part is the past, the next is the present, and the next is the future. Now, Sir, dealing with the past, is any good purpose going to be served by our indulging in bitter charges and accusations and controversies over the past? Is this the moment for us to accuse each other, to abuse each other, and say, "these are your wicked deeds", and the other side says, "these are your follies?" Is that going to serve any good purpose? It only adds more to the bitterness; it only makes a problem which is so fraught with complexities and difficulties more difficult and goes further and further away from a point where a solution may be found. I am not going, therefore, to indulge in the past. We know it, we understand it. Now, it has been said—I may state it very shortly—the first and the foremost ground was that the Government of India did not consult us with regard to the despatch of troops abroad. Of course, we know the somewhat peculiar convention that has been established. We are informed—if you call that consultation, it is informal no doubt, we are told that His Majesty's Government had decided to send troops abroad to such and such a place. If you call that "consultation", you may do so, I am not complaining at present. We are told that that was enough for us to say to the Government, "we are not going to have anything to do with it". Sir, that is a thing of the past, we cannot alter it now. Are we going now at this moment to sit down and say that we are going to overhaul, recast, the entire Constitution of this country—and mind you, this is a very important factor, the Constitution of the country? We were told that we were not consulted about the declaration of war. Well, there has been a lot of constitutional and legal controversy. I am not going to say, "this side is right" or "that side is wrong"; but surely, we all know, I think my Honourable friend, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, knows perfectly well, that the position of the Government of India is totally different from the position of the dominions of the Westminster variety—totally. Why pretend, and why let Mr. Griffiths say—as he did, I think it was a very unwise remark indeed when he said that the moment the Congress Party was not here, the House ceased to be a representative one. Well, do you realize what you are saying, *vis.*, that then the rest does not count? What did you mean?

**Mr. P. J. Griffiths (Assam: European):** I meant that a part cannot represent the whole.



**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Of course not, if a large portion goes out, but that is obvious. But is that a justification for saying that the Government, therefore, did not think it advisable to consult this House? Why not? That is not the reason, Sir. The reason is that the Government of India have got no power; that is the real reason, and this House has got no power to say, "We will not declare India as a belligerent". We have not got the power. However bad it may be, however much we may resent it, it is a fact, a constitutional, legal and physical fact that, India is in the possession of Great Britain and a dependency. You cannot get away from it. Can you contend for a single moment that this Government here have got the power, and even His Excellency the Viceroy, the representative of the Crown, has he got the power to consult this Legislature, and, still better, abide by the decision with regard to the declaration of war? Then, why pretend? Why pretend this? We know you cannot do it, and there is an end of it. War has been declared. Very well. Well, now, as I say, I do not want to discuss the past history, I do not want to discuss past deeds; I know war was declared, and whether India liked it or whether India did not like it, whether India is willing or unwilling, India is in it,—and that is a fact. Now, I ask the Honourable Members of this House that that is what we are face to face, and that is the present. Now, what are we to do? Sir, it is a pity really that arguments should be advanced on the one side, and arguments should be advanced on the other side which have no reality. Again, what has been done now? That is the question. Well, if the Government tell me, and if they want to put fear into my heart by advancing the argument that, if England is defeated, what will happen to us, then all I can say is that I do not want England to be defeated. I have never said so. But might I not say that if England is defeated, who will lose more? You or I. If England is defeated, then England not only loses its liberty, its freedom, and not only it may come under the heels of the Nazis, but nothing is left to you. Might I not say to you that you are in a greater danger than I am? Is that going to help us? You may, for the purpose of propaganda to the unwary and ignorant, say: "Oh, if England is defeated, what will be your position? Your liberty, or even aspiration to liberty or aspiration to responsible Government, your religion, your churches and your mosques will be demolished." It may be so. But is that going really to do the trick, or it is not open to the retort which I mentioned just now? Another argument is, and that is particularly aimed at the Musalmans of this country, the Muslim countries are in danger. Of course, they are. Nobody disputes it. But, as I said, a Government has got to think really in a responsible manner. Can you by these arguments and propaganda succeed? Of course, you can do a lot by propaganda, but there are certain things which you cannot carry out from fear. Therefore, the position is this. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, I venture to say, and, without any fear of contradiction, that from the very beginning, we have not put any difficulty in the way of the Government. We have not embarrassed the Government in any way from the very commencement. From the 4th of September, 1939, right up to the 29th of September this year, which is one year, we have put no difficulties of any kind whatsoever in the course of the negotiations.

Let me shortly take this House, as quickly as I can, through important events. After the Representative of the Crown had interviewed a

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large body of the leading representative men of India, suddenly I was summoned jointly with Mr. Gandhi and Babu Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Congress, in October 1939. In October, I did not know, nor, I believe, did Mr. Gandhi or Babu Rajendra Prasad know, but a proposal came from him. What was that proposal? You all know it, I think. I will put his proposal in a few sentences. So far as the provincial field was concerned, it was entirely in the hands of the two major Parties, namely, the Congress and the Muslim League, and if we could come to some adjustment in the provincial field, he was prepared to expand his Executive Council. The number of the Executive Council is not limited or defined under the Statute. It is an unlimited number. He conveyed to us that, in the expansion of his Executive Council, he would be prepared to meet us to the utmost extent he could. What was the result of it? I hope Honourable Members will not misunderstand me in any way. I did not say that it was getting all as the Congress wanted, nor was it getting all that I or the Muslim League wanted. We were not satisfied and they were not satisfied with regard to their demands. We were not satisfied with regard to what we were asking. But the point is this that I stated there and then, on my responsibility, that we were willing to consider the proposal. Unfortunately, Mr. Gandhi there and then rejected it. He won't look at it. There the matter broke down for the time being. In February, again,—I do not know exactly what happened, I can only say what appeared in the newspapers—the Orient Club speech of the Viceroy conveyed to Mr. Gandhi that there was a germ for an honourable settlement. Another effort was made in February, but it also met with the similar result. What happened from February onwards, I do not know. Now, I am talking of the British Government, because, after all, the Representatives of the Crown has really got to carry out the instructions from His Majesty's Government. Evidently, there was a lull. Why, then, blame the Muslim League? I hear from very many gentlemen, some of them are Members of this House, and some are not, "Plague on your both houses". Then, what happened after that? After that, we thought that the whole business had gone to sleep. But in the interests of India—and I have said this repeatedly—it is the duty of every Indian to see that India's defence is intensified for the protection of our own homes and hearths in case of danger. We passed a Resolution, I think, in June. I will just read one small paragraph of that to show what we said:

"The grave world situation demands serious efforts on the part of every Indian for the defence of his country and the Working Committee calls upon the Government of India to prepare the country in an organized manner to meet every eventuality. The Committee is constrained to state that the proposals for the defence of India indicated in the statements of Their Excellencies the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief as well as the statements of some provincial governors are wholly inadequate to meet the urgent requirements of the situation. The committee therefore authorises its President to enter into negotiations with His Excellency the Viceroy with a view to exploring the possibility of devising prompt and effective measures to mobilise the country's resources for the purpose of intensifying war efforts and the defence of India. The Committee is of the view that unless a satisfactory basis of close co-operation is agreed upon on an all-India basis and not province-wise between the Government and the Muslim League and such other parties as are willing to undertake the responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of imminent danger, the real purpose and object will not be served and achieved."

Sir, this was on 17th June. Then, I imagine something happened, and this had a wholesome effect. I do not know, but I can only say

that immediately this Resolution reached the headquarters, a move was again made. With what result? With this result that, unfortunately the Congress position remained the same. I shall presently deal with our attitude towards the Congress when I come to deal with that. But that is how we stand. The Congress position stands the same.

My Honourable friend, Mr. James, made an excellent speech, and he came very near it, just as he said, we came very near it. The principle he has accepted, as he correctly described it. What is the principle? Co-operation with authority in the Government at the Centre and in the provinces. That is accepted. Then, he says to me: how do you now make your position clear to us? I will read a short extract from his speech as it was reported in the Press:

"He (*that is, Mr. James*) understood that the Muslim League have moved very closely to the acceptance in principle of the statement made by His Majesty's Government subject to various reservations. But he should like to know whether that was final."

What is final? The principle is accepted.

"Would they throw away the principle for the sake of details."

We accept the principle, but it may be completely destroyed in the execution of details, or it may be reduced to a zero. In this matter, when you make distinctions, the principle can be reduced to nonsense. In other words, may I give you an example? I want your help. I am in danger, and so are you. We will not apportion the degree of danger between us both. We both are in danger. I want to throw into the pool all the resources I can, and I say, let us both face together the peril and the danger. Let us both sink or swim. All right. I say to you, well, I am willing to share in the peril and the danger, but what about my having a voice in the assets that I bring into this pool, leave alone the share in the victory. As I am bringing into the pool, must I not have some share, some voice, some say as to how it is going to be used. Oh! no, I will use that as I like. Then, when I am obdurate and say that I want really a proper share, some proper voice, then you say, "I will take you as my partner". So you will also have a voice and a share and a say in the matter. What will be my share? I will give you two jobs to your representatives. What is going to be the total number of the Controlling authority? I cannot tell you. Who else is coming into this controlling authority? I cannot tell you. What will be the portfolios? I cannot tell you. It means really, to put it shortly, I will have you as my partner, but I will give you only one pie here. In that case, why do you want my partnership? I ask Mr. James as a man of business, if this is business. Then, again, Mr. James says:

"The Muslim League, however, has made their position clear with regard to the prosecution of the war."

I am very glad we have made our position clear. Then, Mr. James continues:

"Mr. Jinnah in his speech on the 14 day declared whatever be the misgivings of the British Government in the past, in the interest of India, it was the Muslim's duty . . ."

—that is not quite correct—

"to support and co-operate with them now in order to protect their hearths and homes."

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Then, when I asked him to read on, he said: "I have not got the rest of it. Sir, I do not want really to waste the time of the House over these matters. But it is important. I think Mr. James, if he had read the whole of my speech, would not have ended by this remark. He says this:

"His only object in referring to the speech was to make clear that the Muslim League party leader's speech on the Finance Bill was awaited to see how he implements that duty to which he alluded in the *Id day* speech."

May I appeal to Mr. James to turn on that side and not on my side and ask them how they are going to implement that principle which you have rightly said was accepted by the Muslim League? And what I said on the *Id day* was this:

"We are convinced that in the interests of India, whatever may have been the deeds of the British Government in the past, we should support and co-operate with them as we are now in the same boat. And in order to protect our homes and hearths we must make every preparation in the event of the war coming to the Indian shores. The Muslim League has always made it clear that we are willing to give men, blood and money, but the British Government does not want our co-operation with real authority . . . ."

—I repeat those words, "with real authority",—address those Benches next time—

"in the Government and the offer that they made is merely in name by way of sharing authority. That is the difficulty in our way to get Muslim India in giving whole-hearted support in the prosecution of the war. Perhaps Government are not meeting us reasonably because they are afraid of the Congress or it may be that they are not prepared to trust us."

I will add one more reason now. Or it may be, as the Honourable the Leader of the House said, England is having a stronghold now, and we cannot possibly prevent or help very much the war efforts of the Government of India, and, therefore, there is no need for it. Then, I continued:

"But these are only my guesses. God only knows what is the real reason, why they are not meeting us in a satisfactory manner."

That, Sir, has been our position from the very beginning, and that is the position today. We are now asked to vote supplies. Sir, so long as this war goes on, and so long as the Government of India have got to carry on the war efforts, it is obvious that you cannot do without money. We have got to be thankful that the demand is only for six crores just now. But we cannot scrutinise and examine, and we have really no means of knowing how you will spend it or what commitments you have made. We have no voice, no say, no share, no look-in and no control as to what you have done or what you will do. We have a number of complaints,—there may be a foundation for them or no foundation,—as to how the Supply Department is going on, how the Army Department is going on, how this Department is going on. There is suspicion and distrust, and people are wondering what you are doing. I ask you, Sir, even at this grave critical moment, if you are really in earnest, if you are really serious, if you really want our hand of co-operation and friendship, take it on an honourable basis. If you had, as Mr. Amery in his speech said, the purpose of expansion of this Executive Council, and of having the representatives of political organisations in the executive, you will restore the confidence of the public. You will then find that those very

representatives, both on the floor of this House and outside, would be free to explain to the people what is going on. But now it is a sealed book completely. And what does Mr. Amery say:

"The Viceroy's offer on the other hand presents to the Indian leaders an opportunity of taking an effective and important part in the Government of India and bringing their influence to bear on the conduct of the war without prejudice to their several positions. They will have committed themselves to nothing except working together in the present emergency for the safety and good of India and for the common cause in which they all believe."

That is really the position of the Muslim League. Can you expect us to vote supplies in the expenditure and use of which have no say, no voice, no share, no authority, and no control? I cannot understand how Honourable Members can possibly make one speech after another appealing to sentiments and lecturing and essaying. I ask the Treasury Benches, I ask the European Group, why do you not put your heads together and bring some sense in those who are now in power? There is my Honourable friend, Sir Henry Gidney, who was so eloquently appealing to me. He said, he sent me a telegram that he would be with me to the last ditch, and he again reaffirms that he will be with me till the last ditch. But by his speech he has already sent me to the last ditch. Let us get into the first ditch and let him face those people there instead of appealing to me.

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney:** I have faced them.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** You did not. Why do you not tell them?

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney:** I have.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Why do you not say it on the floor of this House?

**Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Gidney:** I have.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** No; you did not. I was here throughout your speech. Sir, it has become a fashion to give a lecture to the weaker party, and you can afford to lecture the weaker party. <sup>4 P.M.</sup> Now, I say, and I say again to Mr. James: "Remember our Resolution was rejection of that specific offer. The doors of the Muslim League are still open. But we cannot really possibly vote supplies in which we have no lot, no share."

Then, I am told—and this is their last argument, a forlorn argument—all the others are platitudes for supporting the Government—what will happen and all that—but the last is this: that if we allow this Bill to be defeated—and of course the Congress are absolutely determined to defeat you—what will be the impression abroad? In the first instance, if the Congress succeeds in defeating you, it is not my fault; it is the fault of your Constitution; and you have enacted this Constitution; you have been carrying it on this wooden, ante-diluvian Government for decades now, and you cannot have it both ways. It is your Constitution, it is of your making. But I am told "But it will have a bad impression abroad." When you say bad impression abroad, where and what will be the impression? Let me tell you, Sir, that those who want to create that impression

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have worked it out mathematically. Even if you win by a few votes, even if the Muslim League was to go into your lobby, they have already informed those abroad that the majority of the elected members are against it; and which fool is there in America, which fool is there in Germany who does not know your Constitution, who does not know the nature and character of this Assembly? Who is the man who will be so much upset that you will lose the war, because this Finance Bill was rejected? Let me, for the sake of argument, assume—assuming that it will be an embarrassment—I do not think so, and I think you are exaggerating, and you are attaching too much importance to it—but even if it was to embarrass you, how can you expect me to support you? Mind you, I do not say that I am satisfied with the acceptance of the principle, but it is not a question of my being satisfied. Nobody is going to get 16 annas, and specially, believe me, when you are in the grip of danger, it is not wise for one party or the other to put up extraordinary demands, because that is not business, and that is the very reason why we have never said a word that you should agree to give me "Pakistan" before I support you: and believe me, whatever my friends of the Congress Party may say, we have finally determined that that is our only goal; and we will fight for it and die for it. Make no mistake about it. Democracy is dead—democracy of Mr. Desai's kind. We may be less in numbers, and we are; but we could give you, I venture to say, and perhaps you do not know it, but I do, and I am not saying this by way of a threat, but by way of information to you, that we can give you hundred times more trouble than the Congress can give you if we so determine; but we do not want to. You will realise that. But we do not want to do it even now. The future—we will leave the future. Therefore, so far as the Government is concerned, that is the position of the Muslim League.

I have only got to say a few more words with regard to my Congress friends; and I think I must at least tell them, whether they agree with me or whether they do not, but as Mr. Desai said it very rightly, we must face facts. What is the position? I will narrate it very briefly. Mr. Desai read out a statement of the Working Committee which he said was of the 10th September: I only interrupted him, because, in my record, it was the 14th September: I wished to get the correct date. Mr. Desai says, the 10th,—and I accept that. After that statement of the Working Committee of the 10th September, that Resolution or statement was placed before the All-India Congress Committee, and that Committee passed the Resolution on the 10th October of last year. That Resolution laid down a declaration of India's independence and freedom, the right to frame their own constitution by a Constituent Assembly to be elected by way of adult franchise, and special franchise for the minorities and safeguards for the minorities to the satisfaction of the minorities. And although I am pressed for time, I think I must tell the House the correct position, and I tell you and my Congress friends that they have still, at the back of their head, the idea that the Congress and Congress alone represents the country, the people of India, the Indian nation, and so on, that they alone are the spokesmen, and that the Muslims and others are minorities. I say this on the floor of this House that the reason why there has not been a settlement between the Hindus and Mussalmans is that—the Congress leaders will pardon me for saying this,—the Congress is a Hindu organization, whatever they may say,—the Hindu leaders and

Congress leaders have had always at the back of their head, the basis that the Mussalmans have to come within the ken of the Congress and the Hindu Raj, that they are a minority, and all that they can justly press for is merely safeguards as a minority, whereas let me tell gentlemen of the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party members that the Mussalmans always had at their back the basis,—and it has never been different during the last 25 years,—that they are a separate entity . . . . .

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** At least that was not the view of Mr. Jinnah before 1920.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Since 1916, since the Lucknow Pact was passed on the fundamental principle of two separate entities . . . . .

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** I was there.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** My friend may have been there, but he was not even heard of at that time. That has been at the back of the Mussalman mind, and the other idea has been at the back of the Hindu leaders' mind. The bases are different, and I will give my friends one more proof because I was interrupted. Why is it,—do you know it or do you not,—why is it that the Mussalmans insisted upon the separation of Sind? You know it. Do you know that the man, who was at that time devoted to the Congress, Maulana Mohammed Ali, said:

"We want a corridor from Karachi to Calcutta"

Do you remember that? Why is it that some of you so vehemently opposed the separation of Sind? No doubt, outward grounds are different, but the real grounds we know. Outwardly, it is financial ground, this, that and the other. You said it will be better off if Sind is with Bombay, it is not in the interest of Sind to be separated, and so on . . . . .

**Mr. Lalchand Navalrai** (Sind: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Is it not unfortunate now for Sind?

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** My dear friend, it is a misfortune to all of us now, Nobody is in fortune just now. I am only giving you indications to prove my point that that has been at the back of Muslim India and the Hindu India, and the basis has been different, and that is why we have failed to come to a settlement. That is continued up to the present moment. I will quote from my friend, the Deputy Leader, Mr. Satyamurti, and what did he say only as late as May last after Mr. Amery had made his statement? This is what Mr. Satyamurti said. What was his acid test? The acid test of Mr. Amery's ability and earnestness will be his saying to the Muslim League,—Muslim Leaguers, no Pakistan, no coalition, no coalition ministries, no impossible safeguards, you must settle with the majority; once he says that, the rest will be easy . . . . .

**Honourable Member:** Who says that?

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Mr. Satyamurti: He says, no coalition, no impossible safeguards, settle with the majority. My friend asks—hand over the Muslims to our tender mercies . . . . .

**Mr. S. Satyamurti** (Madras City: Non-Muhammadian Rural): No, no I did not say that.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** My friend's acid test is nothing but that.

**Mr. S. Satyamurti:** I did not say that.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** I say, Sir, that is the mentality at the back of Congress leaders.

**Mr. S. Satyamurti:** Not at all.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** And I tell my friends that they are making the greatest mistake that they ever made in their life. Mr. Satyamurti says to Mr. Amery: "Tell them to settle with the majority". Well, I daresay I get frightened of Mr. Amery also, because these people are sharpening the knife, non-co-operating and preparing for civil disobedience and launching it. This Government and the British Government, if I may say so, is unnerved, and I get frightened, and they think that, in spite of your tenacity, you may be forced into it; but then comes the statement of 8th August and Mr. Amery's speech. That is now the crux. I don't say that the British Government could have done anything else. If they had done anything else, if they had been a party to coerce the Muslims, if they had been a party to throw the Muslims and other minorities at the mercy of the Congress, they would have left a dishonourable record in the history of this country. If they had done that, what would it have come to. That is really where I am fundamentally at variance with the Congress. They do not want the independent of India. I will read what Mr. Gandhi said. What they want is, under the overlordship of Britain, power and patronage to dominate the Muslims and rest of the minorities. This is what Mr. Gandhi himself says, and it is a thing to which I cannot subscribe. This is what Mr. Gandhi said: "It is my conviction, and I am satisfied"—this is an article he wrote on the 29th October. Of course, Mr. Gandhi's articles and speeches are such that you can derive support for any proposition; he is like the oracle of Delphi,—but in order to understand Mr. Gandhi, you have to study and go deep into the thing. This is what Mr. Gandhi said on the 29th October last year after he had rejected the offer of the Viceroy:

"If today the British leave India, the Punjabees from the Punjab"—

—he might have honestly said Muslims,—

"and Gurkhas from the East will destroy the country. If therefore there could be any one desirous of maintaining the supremacy of the British in India,"—

—mark the words—

"if, therefore, there could be any one desirous of maintaining the supremacy of the British in India, it can only be the Congress."

**Some Honourable Members:** Read on please.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** I am reading on. I have studied it much more than you have done.

Now comes the other operative part:

"It is the only authoritative and representative body of Indian people and of those Hindus who are, in spite of their majority, weak."



I ask this House, I ask any intelligent man, what does this mean? 29th October last year, after the Resolution of the All-India Congress Committee of the 10th October, within less than 20 days, Mr. Gandhi writes this thing. That Resolution, if you honestly believe in it, asks for complete independence, the right of the people of India to freedom, chosen by a Constituent Assembly to be elected by adult franchise. But here what does this mean? He was telling the British Government, you settle with me, I am more desirous to maintain your supremacy here than the Punjabis and the Gurkhas. Mr. Gandhi became a convert, a complete convert to this artistic Resolution of the 10th October when he found that this was not going to do. He realised. Then he became a convert, and he found that it was a panacea for every kind of ills the people of India are suffering from. What was the panacea? The Constituent Assembly. This went on. When this Constituent Assembly was beaten and dead, we come to what the Leader of the Opposition emphasised,—I believe the Delhi Resolution. What is it? He only mentioned a part of it. He did not emphasise the first part of it. The first part of it—correct me if I am wrong—declared complete independence of India and freedom with a right to frame its own constitution by a Constituent Assembly, etc., etc., and mind you, it is joint—and not or, provisional National Government at the Centre responsible to the elected Members of this House. Beautiful. I assure you it appeals to me more than it appeals to you, and I dreamt of it when I was a boy of 21. It appeals to me very much, but the situation has changed in this House. A National Government—the Leader of the Opposition said—does not mean democratic majority Government. I quite understand. It was explained, although the word “national” is misleading. However, we won’t argue about that. We always find Congress Resolutions are passed, then commentators like Mayukha and Mitakshara, and so forth, then the commentators go on commenting, and you have forgotten the original text of it. No doubt, we have high authorities as commentators. They said, by a National Government they mean a composite Government. Am I correct?

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai:** Yes.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Coalition if you like, it means the Cabinet will be from all Parties.

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai:** What Mr. Amery said, the Government in England,—at least that was his comparison.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Mr. Amery has also said, you cannot have a Government like they have in England, in the same speech. Mr. Amery has said this also:

“India cannot be unitary in the sense that we are in this island, but she can still be unitary. India’s future house of freedom has room for many mansions.”

Mr. Amery has said that also. Is the first part of the Resolution gone then? You do not want a declaration, immediately a declaration for complete independence and freedom with a right to the people of India to freedom, a Constitution by a Constituent Assembly. Is that gone, or does it remain?

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** One comment said, it was the right to a declaration . . . . .

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** You are asking the British Government to make a declaration here and now.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** I am giving the commentary of Mr. Rajagopalachariar on that.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** That is just the trouble. (Interruption.) Another commentary. But I say, Sir, if the Congress have got a definite practical proposal to make, not the one that they have made, because we have repeatedly said, I have said it, the League said so in the Resolutions. In the first instance, I do not believe for a single moment that any power can declare any other country or a nation independent, by a mere declaration. And, I say, no power can continue the subjugation of people of another country if the people of that other country are fit to throw off the yoke. It is not a matter of declaration. If you believe in complete independence. I would honour you, stick to your guns, then there is nothing to negotiate with the British Government, nothing to negotiate. What is the use of asking them, let me first have a Constituent Assembly and that Constituent Assembly will frame the Constitution? What have they got to do with this Constitution? Are they to have the honour and privilege of putting this Constitution which will be framed by your Constituent Assembly on the Statute-book of Britain? What for? They have nothing to do here. Say so. Let us appeal to the country if you like, let us take the verdict of the country. But if you mean, as I do, the transfer of substantial power immediately, and for that purpose it is the British Government and the British Parliament that can, by enacting a Statute on their Statute-book, transfer that power and vest that power in the representatives of the people of this country, then I can understand. Where is the basis for negotiation? If you drop your first part and if you mean a composite Government, responsible to the elected Members of this Legislature, provisionally, let us not lose our sense of proportion. I say to the Honourable gentlemen of the Congress Party, we are in danger, say what you like. We cannot be indifferent now. If you really have a practical proposal which can be accepted by all reasonable parties, why don't you adopt the correct channel, the proper procedure, the proper method. What is the use of addressing them? What is the use of despatching it to the *Daily Herald*. Well, they cannot make up their mind. Mr. Rajagopalachariar has made a supporting offer. Now, we have been told day in and day out even by the able and competent gentlemen of the Press here, the army of them that I see: what is this? Rajagopalachariar's sporting offer is also not considered! But where is the offer? What does Mr. Rajagopalachariar say? May I read the few lines in which he has compressed this offer? He says:

"In answer to Mr. Amery's difficulty as to the minorities, I may make a sporting offer that, if His Majesty's Government agree to a provisional National Government being formed at once, I shall undertake to persuade my colleagues in the Congress to agree to the Muslim League being invited to nominating the Prime Minister and to let him form a National Government as he would consider best . . ."

Now, Sir, why does he not invite me, the prospective Prime Minister, to have a talk with him; instead of firing it off to the *Daily Herald* and saying: "I will persuade my colleagues of the Working Committee to do

this, that, and the other." I do ask my Honourable friends, is this business, and today Mr. Rajagopalachariar justifies why he did not make that offer to the Muslim League.

I tell you, I cannot restrain my utter astonishment and amazement as to how that mind works. It is impossible to understand it. This is what he says today. I shall only refer to that portion which relates to this subject. The other parts have nothing to do with it. Of course, he has paid us a compliment that the Muslims were more ardent for independence than others. I am very glad.

**Sir Syed Raza Ali** (Cities of the United Provinces: Muhammadan Urban): When did you discover that?

**Mr. S. Satyamurti**: Before you did!

[At this stage, Mr. President (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim) resumed the Chair.]

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah**: The point is this. They say that the British Government did not take any notice of the sporting offer, and some critics suggested that it should have been made to Mr. Jinnah, and not to the British Government. But the offer was not made to the British Government even, though I admit that the British Government have taken note of it. It would, in his opinion, have been improper to make it to Mr. Jinnah in the first instance, as Mr. Jinnah would then have had legitimate ground for considering it an insult and retorting that he was not after jobs. I ask, if Mr. Amery had accepted this offer, and, then, if that offer had been made to me, would it not have been open to the same retort, because it is the same offer and the terms are the same. I would have said: "Both Mr. Amery and Mr. Rajagopalachariar are insulting me, and that I am not here for jobs". Do give some credit to other people at least for commonsense. Is this really the explanation?

**An Honourable Member**: Read the later portion also.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah**: I am quite willing to read the other part. He says:

"Assuming that Mr. Jinnah accepted the offer, it would not be in the speaker's power to implement it unless there was the prior commitment by the British Government to part with power."

His argument is, if I had accepted it, it was not in his power to implement it. It may not be in his power to implement, nor is it in my power to implement, but the latest and authoritative pronouncement of the British Government is this: If you can put your heads together and bring some agreement, we are willing to consider it. Then, what is the use of making this offer to Mr. Amery over the head of the Muslim League.

**An Honourable Member**: We can agree, provided they are willing to part with power.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah**: I do not think they have ever gone the length that you want to go, but they have said this: we are willing immediately to associate the representatives of the political parties and to give them an effective and important share in the Government of India by the proposal of the expanded Executive Council. Surely that is not the last word. In fact, the last word is never spoken in politics. Now, if you really

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think they must give you beforehand the blank cheque that Mr. Gandhi has been giving me for the last 25 years, it is useless. Why not you and I meet and put our heads together? If you make a practical proposition, we present a common united demand to Mr. Amery, or, for the matter of that, to the British Parliament or the British nation if you like.

**An Honourable Member:** No response from the Congress Party.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** The Constituent Assembly is a panacea for all the ills of India. Complete Independence. My complaint is—then you stick to that, and Godspeed; stick to it, honestly; I may agree with you, or I may not agree with you, but you will command my admiration and respect; stick to it; and if you do not want to stick to it, then come down on earth and let us deal, as practical men, and face the realities, as Mr. Bhulabhai Desai says, and do not allow others to take advantage,—as the *Manchester Guardian* says—a British journal—“frankly, our power and position in India is due to the mistake of the others, and it will continue if you go on making this mistake”. The position is this. I am only dealing with the present; I am not dealing with the future.

There is one last sentence, and I will finish. When we talk of this little innocent baby which is put forward, *vis.*, the demand for a National Government responsible to the elected Members of this Legislature, there are far-reaching implications when you examine it in detail—far-reaching implications. It will mean fundamental alterations and changes in the Constitution in order to constitute that Cabinet; and when that Cabinet is constituted, it will be responsible to the elected Members of the Legislature. Mr. Bhulabhai Desai throughout his speech only emphasized two things: “democracy, democracy, democracy, and a National Government.” What is the use? Whatever that Cabinet may be will be responsible to this Legislature,—in which Mr. Bhulabhai Desai can command two-thirds of the elected Members. I will pity the man who happens to be in that Cabinet who does not obey the Congress command and the Congress mandate!

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman** (Finance Member): Sir, it will surely be recorded as one of the most notable phenomena even of these extraordinary times that, at a juncture when the fate of civilization seems to be hanging in the balance, when nations are being swallowed up in a few weeks or days, and under a constitution which is said to be a mere simulacrum of democracy, and in which the right of free speech is entirely gagged and silenced, this Assembly has sat for, I believe, six days to discuss a Supplementary Finance Bill designed to raise six crores of rupees for the financing of the defence of the country. The debate has ranged over a very wide field,—metaphysical, ethical, political but hardly ever financial. In fact I must confess that I rise with an apologetic feeling to discuss it on the level of finance and to attempt to bring the atmosphere or the tone back to so crude and materialistic a level. My Honourable friend, the Leader of the Opposition, said this morning that this was not really, in essence, a Finance Bill. He said that the Government of India had very unwisely chosen this moment to attempt to put before the world some sign of India's willing participation in the war. He said that there were only two crores of rupees involved in this

measure, which we could easily do without or get some other way, and that he did not believe, in fact that it was any financial consideration which had prompted the promotion of this measure but a desire on the part of the Government of India to make some kind of gesture or demonstration before the outside world. Sir, this, if I may say so, I found to be a most extraordinary argument. The war has now been in progress for some fourteen months. On the very first occasion on which it was possible for me to take steps to raise special finance for the purpose of this war, I placed before this House an important measure—the Excess Profits Tax Bill. I was criticized in fact for being premature. I was told that there was no financial need for this and that I ought to have waited a little longer . . . . (Interruptions.)

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Order, order. There is too much noise in the House.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** . . . . until the war was more advanced. However, Sir, that Bill was fully debated in this House. The issues of the war and of the raising of expenditure for the war, of imposing financial sacrifices on the people of this country and on the trade and industry of this country were discussed for a very long time in this House at that stage. My Honourable friend did not appear, neither did the Members of his Party; they did not think it necessary; they did not think that at that moment the Government of India were taking any steps to associate the people of India with this war. A very short time afterwards, in fact within a few days, I placed a Budget before this House. That Budget contained over eight crores of additional defence expenditure. I stated in the course of my Budget speech that I did not expect that expenditure to be the entire cost of the defence measures that would be taken during the year. I stated clearly that it was the estimated cost of the commitments which we had already undertaken. In addition to the Excess Profits Tax I included in that Budget other taxes specifically for the purpose of meeting the extra cost of the war in which we were engaged. Now, Sir, it seems to me an extraordinary thing that my Honourable friend should now come forward and find in this supplementary Finance Bill some curious, hidden, ulterior motive other than the motive of raising finance for the purpose of the war and that he should think that the Government of India's Budget was merely to make a demonstration. Surely, the position is that my Honourable friends opposite have come here not for the purpose of debating the Finance Bill but in order to make a gesture and a demonstration.

Now, Sir, my Honourable friend, Mr. Satyamurti, referred to me as a very prosaic gentleman. The duties of a Finance Member are of a prosaic character.

**Mr. S. Satyamurti:** Ask Sir James Grigg: he was very poetic?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** It is to translate policies into figures, into rupees, annas and pies. His humble task is to attempt to raise the revenues necessary to meet the expenditure which is being incurred. But if the Honourable Member implies that I, any less than he, am unconscious of the great moral issues that lie behind these facts and figures, then I assure him he is entirely mistaken. I am no orator

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as Mr. Satyamurti is. I have often admired the rapid and tempestuous flow with which he is able to express or conceal his thoughts. I have spent my life in the humble tasks of administration, in dealing with files, in dictating notes. I am unaccustomed to addressing a large forum; I am unable to command the mastery of words which he possesses. My Honourable friend in an excess of humility spoke at one stage of his faltering accents and weak logic. In spite of the weakness of his logic, I can assure him that his accents never falter. He called me, Sir, a prosaic gentleman. I deny that, if it means what the Honourable Member suggested. I am one of many thousands in this country who at this moment are very unlikely to be unaware of the issues that are at stake. When we read the news every day, we wonder whether we may not receive a direct personal message that a father or a mother, a son or a daughter, a sister or a brother, has been killed or mutilated by the enemy's bombs. In these circumstances, Sir, we are unlikely to forget the issues that are at stake and the sacrifices that humanity and our kinsmen are being called upon to bear. In these circumstances, Sir, it has been no light ordeal to listen to some of the speeches that have been delivered in this House. I am grateful to my Honourable friend, Mr. Sri Prakasa, for generously including the people of England in his all-embracing sympathy along with the people of Germany. It was a kindly thought. But, Sir, if I did not bring these aspects of the matter into the speech which I made, either on the first occasion before this House or when I moved for the consideration of this Bill, it was because I felt that I was entitled to take something for granted. The Honourable Member opposite has asked me what I meant by civilization and by the forces which threatened to engulf it. Sir, I entertain no doubts on this subject any more than did the Honourable Member and his friends but a few months ago. It is they who have been cast into a welter of discord, doubt and defeatism and have become unable to see the beacon light of truth. I could not help feeling that there was a good deal in their speeches which the enemies of India as well as of Britain would have rejoiced to hear, passages, I felt, of which the speakers would at no very distant date themselves be ashamed. If there is one lesson more than another that this war has taught us, it is that the enemy proceeds by sapping the morals of the populations of those countries which he proposes to subjugate, and if Honourable Members opposite meant everything they said, I should feel that it was a very sinister omen for the future of India. But I do not believe that is the case. I believe that they have come here to make a gesture and a demonstration and that we must not weigh too precisely all the words which they have uttered. Mr. Satyamurti told me that I made a tame speech. I can only say that he and his friends have redressed the balance by making a number of wild ones.

I return, Sir, as I must, to the realities of the present situation.

Honourable Members opposite may adopt an anti-war attitude.  
 5 P.M. They may refuse to think or speak about the war. If that stopped the war, there might be something to be said for it. But, unfortunately, for them and, unfortunately, for us the flames of war continue and they spread ever nearer to India. My duty is to deal with the situation as I find it, and in that situation it seems to me inevitable that India must take ever more active steps for her own defence. We have been told over and over again by Honourable Members opposite

that the Government of India have taken no adequate steps for the defence of India. This charge comes curiously from the lips of those who year in, year out have objected to any expenditure on defence and who have come here now to refuse to vote the finance necessary for immediate defence measures. I am prepared to admit that here as elsewhere in the world adequate measures were not taken to meet the menace which obviously threatened from the self-confessed apostles of aggression and force. But now, when we realise the danger that is upon us, surely we should take every step that is possible to make up for the errors of the past. It is no easy task, it will not be possible in a few days or weeks to rectify the damage done by years of unpreparedness, but we can at least address ourselves to the task now. It has been said by several Honourable Members that to draw attention to the imminent dangers which every man whose eyes are open could see is terrorising, fear-mongering. It is terrorising to point to these facts which are clear from the news that comes to us every day. I say on the other hand, that it is escapism, it is self-delusion to ignore them. It is yielding to what President Roosevelt aptly called the false lullaby of appeasement. I admitted that in India as elsewhere inadequate steps had been taken for defence. But I said just now that surely this was the moment to attempt as best as we can to make up for those deficiencies. It is not an easy task with Great Britain in the front line of battle, with America herself making feverish attempts at preparations for rearmament, it is not too easy to obtain the wherewithal to produce the equipment which is necessary for modern warfare. Nevertheless, we have made and we are making every possible effort in this direction. It was because I realised that this House was entitled to know where we stood and what we were doing that I went into so much detail at the time when I made the financial statement.

It has been argued that factories for production of munitions and aeroplanes should have been transferred wholesale from their very exposed positions in Great Britain to India. There is a very great deal of force in that argument. But the critics must remember that there would inevitably have been a lag of not a month, or two months, not even of six months, but anything up to 18 months or two years before the installation could have been in production in India. Now, at a time when the production of every unit was vital for the outcome of the day's battle in Britain, surely it was not unnatural that the British Government should not have welcomed the proposal. It is not necessary to attribute to them very sinister motives. After all, there would have been the difficulties of obtaining shipping space, the difficulties of providing skilled personnel, until the necessary craftsmen could be trained up in India. Finally, there is the difficulty that hardly any unit of productions is completely self-contained. These units depend upon the environment of ancillary and subordinate industrial production for their continuance and that is one of the difficulties which has to be taken into account. In these circumstances, Sir, I say that it is not necessary to attribute any sinister motives to the British Government if this type of step has not been taken. Besides many of those who criticise the failure to take such action are quite frankly interested in such proposals purely from commercial and economic motives. It is surely a little odd to suggest that there is something ignoble in the attitude of the British Government, if your own attitude is determined so largely by purely mercenary considerations.

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I now come to the points more directly and more closely concerned with the Finance Bill. It has been said that it was unnecessary to bring in supplementary financial proposals at this stage, that we could well have waited a few months longer, and what did it matter if there was a deficit at the end of the year. Sir, I pointed out in my initial statement on this subject that the point at issue was not merely the question of deficit of this year but that here we were already embarking on a scale of expenditure which was far beyond our present revenues and which could not grow less as far as we could see. Was it not, therefore, reasonable that we should take the very first opportunity when this House met to put before it the proposals for raising some taxation towards the additional expenditure which had already become inevitable?

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): The Chair takes it for granted that the House wishes to finish consideration of this Bill today.

**Some Honourable Members:** Yes, yes.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): The Chair did not suggest that. The Chair simply wanted to ascertain if it was justified in sitting here today beyond five o'clock.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** It has been argued that additional taxation would have been unnecessary if we had adopted an economy drive and cut down extravagance in the administration. I must remind the House of the financial history of the last two or three years. In the year 1938-39 it became obvious in the course of the year that there would be a short-fall of revenue and an economy drive was undertaken. The Public Accounts Committee which sat in the course of this last summer to review the accounts of that year have taken note of the fact that 120 lakhs of savings were secured by that economy drive. There was indeed some criticism of the extent to which retrenchment had been pushed in the course of that year. In the following year, as was made clear in the budget speech of my predecessor, a greater part of those same economy measures was continued and extended throughout the year. And in the budget for 1940-41 I pointed out that many of those measures were now having effects which made it impossible to continue with them; that, for instance, in the sphere of civil works valuable Government property was falling into a state of disrepair and it was essential to provide again for their maintenance. That was the state of the budget when the war broke out. We were still under the influence of the economy drive which had been started in 1939-40 and many of the measures of which had been continued. In this situation, Sir, could it be expected that with the preoccupations of war upon us and all the additional activities and burdens which war had thrown upon the Departments of the Government of India, we should have embarked upon a retrenchment drive? Nevertheless, as I have pointed out, we have accepted no expenditure which was not inevitable in the situation, and even expenditure which has been classified as civil has



with the exception of one or two matters which I have specifically mentioned to this House been expenditure directly or indirectly connected with the prosecution of the war.

Now, Sir, it is impossible for any Government to carry out activities which are twice or thrice the volume of its normal activities with exactly the same machinery as it possessed in normal times of peace. Honourable Members have alluded to an additional post here and an additional post there. I can assure this House that the creation of additional posts has been the result of conditions in the Departments which absolutely necessitated further assistance if the functions of those Departments were to be carried out at all. The Departments had gone to the verge almost or breakdown before they had been able to secure additional personnel which was necessary. It is easy to talk of Colonels who on return from Lunch meet themselves going out to tea. I seem to have heard that story some 26 years ago.

**Mr. S. Satyamurti:** And still it goes on in India.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** These stories are the inevitable outcrop of the situation when Government are compelled to employ additional personnel, and the same thing applies to all those dark allusions and mysterious allegations about the Supply Department. It has now become unnecessary to complete the sentence when you say, "the Supply Department"; you merely raise your eyebrows and with a wave of the hand you refer to the Supply Department or you put your fingers to your nose as the *Hindustan Times* cartoonist puts it. This is a sort of thing which grows by what it feeds on. I explained in this House the other day in connection with a Resolution regarding economy in war expenditure and the association of a committee of this House with that object that I was prepared to place the whole of the establishment of the Supply Department before the committee. But I feel that, in view of the repeated statements which are made I ought to mention a few facts before the House now. An Honourable Member suggested that he could only think of one name in the whole of the Supply Department of an officer who was getting no more than what he got before, and I heard a little argument go on because a Member sitting next to him suggested that he knew one other name. Sir, the position is that of 101 officers employed in this Department 60 are not getting a single pie more than they were getting in their normal posts; and, of the remainder, a large number are merely drawing the routine standard scales which attach to posts of that status. Honourable Members will understand that just as if you raise additional regiments there must be more Colonels and that war brings opportunities to younger men who are fit for heavier responsibilities, so even in civil departments you cannot create a complete new department of clerks or even entirely of Under-Secretaries. As my Honourable friend, the Leader of the Opposition, said, there must be an organisation, there must be something approaching a hierarchy.

**Mr. Bhulabhai J. Dessai:** Is pay the essence of a Colonelship?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** No, it is not the essence. At the same time I suggest to my Honourable friend that gradations in status

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and in organisation do tend to express themselves in some differentiation in pay, and that in the case in question the departure that was made was that an officer who was appointed to be a full Secretary to the Government of India and to a somewhat arduous Secretaryship was given the pay of a Joint Secretary. The other day when an Honourable Member referred to this I jumped up in my seat but I was unable to mention the actual figures. He created an impression of tremendous scandal by saying that an officer had been promoted from Rs. 1,700 to Rs. 4,000. I could not remember the figures but I said that the case was misrepresented. The case was that an officer who was a Colonel in a regiment, who was drawing more than Rs. 2,000 as Colonel . . . .

**An Honourable Member:** What is the exact sum?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** It was about Rs. 2,078, over Rs. 2,000. He was appointed Secretary to the Government of India and was given the pay of a Joint Secretary.

**Mr. T. S. Avinashilingam Chettiar** (Salem and Coimbatore *cum* North Arcot: Non-Muhammadan Rural): What is it?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Rs. 3,000.

The same officer when previously employed in the Secretariat had drawn more than the pay of a Lieutenant-Colonel. I am not prepared to say that there may not be two views about some of the appointments that have been made and that there may not be two views about the principles on which the pay of individuals should be fixed; but I entirely deny that there is anything like a hotbed of scandal connected with the pay and the appointments in the Supply Department which is suggested on all hands; not that I am in charge of that Department, but that I am in charge of the Department which has to see to it that scandals of that kind do not occur.

It has been suggested that additional taxation would be unnecessary if we resorted to a cut in pay. I am free to admit to my Honourable friend, Mr. Sri Prakasa, that that is a thought that has crossed my mind more than once in the course of the last few months; but let us look at the proposition. The salary of the employees of Government is in the shape of what I may call a pyramid: it is very broad at the base and narrow at the top. If you wish to get a good slice out of it, you have to cut down very deep. The position at this moment is that there are large numbers of employees of Government in all Departments on low rates of pay, some of them as my Honourable friend, Mr. Joshi, will not forget, are agitating. . .

**Mr. N. M. Joshi** (Nominated Non-Official): I have not suggested any cut in pay.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** . . . . and Mr. Joshi reminds me that he has not suggested any cut in pay. But as he did not explain the

reasons why he has not suggested it, I feel that I must do so. Many of these are agitating for increases in pay and dearness allowances and so on; and the Governments, both Central and Provincial, have been forced to indicate the lines on which they are prepared to deal with increases in the cost of living. This mostly relates to individuals on fairly low rates of pay, although my friend, Mr. Joshi, would not agree that it should. But Government's attention is mostly concentrated on people on rates of 40 or 30 rupees a month or even less; Mr. Joshi would no doubt say that that consideration should at least extend to officials on less than 100 rupees a month. . . .

**Mr. N. M. Joshi:** Yes, I would.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** But whether I agree with him or not, I must agree with him that above the class of low paid government employees for whom some actual increases of pay may be necessary, there is a further layer in regard to whom the question of a cut in pay can certainly not arise. That brings us up to say the level of those who pay income-tax, which is roughly about 170 rupees a month. From those upwards it is possible to think of a cut in pay; but now, why should you reduce the income of these individuals because they happen to be Government servants and not take any sacrifice from people of exactly the same means who happen not to be in Government service? Mr. Sri Prakasa told me. . . .

**Mr. Sri Prakasa** (Allahabad and Jhansi Divisions: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Yes, because the Government servants stand most to gain by the continuance of the Government, and, therefore, their sacrifice should be more.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** That is an argument which I simply fail to understand: my intelligence is too limited to comprehend that argument.

**Mr. Sri Prakasa:** I too am equally dense.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** If you are going to operate on those incomes above the taxable minimum, then I claim that an income-tax surcharge, and, particularly, one superposed on the slab system of taxation, is an ideally equitable method of raising the money you need. If you express your cut in pay as any kind of percentage, you could not possibly achieve the steepening in sacrifice which a surcharge superposed on a slab system of taxation involves. . . .

**Mr. Sri Prakasa:** On a point of personal explanation, I never suggested any cut in pay: what I said was that they should make a voluntary sacrifice of half their income.

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I am coming to that. The question of voluntary sacrifice is one which has been in the minds of many government servants in the last few months. Whole services have taken

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combined action on a voluntary basis—I am not dealing with that. Those voluntary sacrifices will go on, I believe, whatever compulsory sacrifices are imposed by taxation. My Honourable friend, Mr. Satyamurti, said in one of his sweeping gestures: “The Finance Member taxes everybody except himself.” I know that he did not mean it literally, because it is so obviously untrue. But he did imply, I think—and I give him credit for implying that my idea of taxation was to let off those of my class or status. It may interest Mr. Satyamurti to know that the effect of this Bill on the occupants of the Treasury Benches is to increase their tax from 24 per cent. to 30 per cent. of their salary. I do not say that that is a monumental sacrifice; I have not pretended that this is a comprehensive scheme of taxation, nor have I promised that this is the last taxation measure which will have to be brought before this House. But I do suggest that it removes the sting from any remarks that I or my colleagues are not prepared to tax ourselves. Now, I come to a point, an interesting point, which was raised by my friend, Mr. James. He only touched upon it, but he seemed to ask me rather directly,—he seemed to invite my views on it and it was the question of whether not merely public expenditure but private expenditure should not be restricted in this emergency. I think that was Mr. James’ query. The position in India is different in that respect from what it is in the United Kingdom. It is true that there are certain types of commodities which it is just as important to economise in India as it is in Great Britain: in fact in relation to some, it is even more important. We have our difficulties about imports and in particular we obviously must endeavour to economise in any imports which involve the expenditure of dollar exchange, that is, imports from outside the sterling area; but in relation to commodities which India produces, and, particularly, in relation to those of which she has a surplus, there is no special virtue in reducing consumption, and on the contrary it may even be damaging to the economy of the country. Take the case of coffee. It is no advantage for a man to say—I have cut down my budget by Rs. 5 a month; I have stopped coffee drinking, because the slack which he has taken up unfortunately is passed on somewhere else in the economy of India, and though he may be able to subscribe Rs. 5 towards the Defence Loan, that is not necessarily a net advantage.

Sir, there were very few financial points raised in the course of this debate, and although I hungrily tried to pick them up, I have found it exceedingly difficult to collect them. But my friend, Mr. Santhanam did raise a point. He referred to the sterling assets in the Issue Branch of the Reserve Bank of India, and he talked about our maintaining India’s bondage to sterling. I would like first of all to draw his attention to the fact that the increase in those sterling assets is some measure of the advantage which India has so far drawn from the war, that it is because of the increase in India’s favourable balance of trade, and particularly with the Empire, those sterling assets have increased so largely from the figure at which they stood. . . .

**Mr. K. Santhanam** (Tanjore *cum* Trichinopoly: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Is it not a fact that they only represent the cost or the value of the commodities exported?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Yes, Sir, it is, but since to be able to sell your goods abroad is an economic advantage, the foreign exchange

which you acquire is a measure of that type of economic advantage. I do not put it higher than that. India has given goods for that, but she has been paid for it.

Now, my friend alluded to the danger that after the war sterling might depreciate, and, therefore, he implied that these assets should be held in some other form. Well, Sir, nobody in this world is in a position to say what will be the position either of sterling or of gold after this war. My friend may have seen, he may have heard some echoes of the debate which has been going on in America about what will happen to their gold after the war, what will happen to them when all the gold in the world has been securely lodged in the United States and possibly nobody else in the world has any use for it. These are questions which admit of very speculative examination, but the concrete point for India is this. We are a debtor in sterling. Our sterling liabilities are greater than the sterling assets which we possess, and so long as that is the case, we cannot lose on the depreciation of sterling, so long as our sterling assets do not exceed our sterling liabilities. That, Sir, is the technical position which justifies the maintenance of sterling assets, but I do not disguise from the Honourable Member that even if that were not the case, it would be a matter of no small difficulty for India to embark at this time on the acquisition of further gold reserves, for the simple reason that, as everybody knows, gold is the medium in which America accepts payment, and India, like the rest of the Empire, is dependent on America's assistance for the munitions of war . . .

**Mr. K. Santhanam:** May I ask one question? Cannot America be induced to accept some of the sterling securities?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** I have tried to deal with his point at some length, and I trust that he will allow me to go on now.

My friend, Mr. Asaf Ali, referred to the heavy indebtedness of India. That, Sir, is a common theme. I entirely disagree with that view. I realise that India is a poor country. Nevertheless, in relation even to her poverty, the burden of India's non-productive debt is extraordinarily small, and I claim that, whatever my friends opposite will have against me and my predecessors in the years to come, they will not be able to say that India's finances in this respect were not husbanded with orthodox strictness. Now, Sir, that is one reason why at this moment I am bringing a Finance Bill before this House, because I do not think it is a light matter to allow the whole of the deficit of the year merely to pass on to the indebtedness of India. Nevertheless, my friend, Mr. Asaf Ali, referred to this indebtedness, and in the course of his remarks he made a statement which was inaccurate and which, therefore, I cannot let pass. He referred to the repudiation or reduction of debt which followed the post-war settlement, and he said that India with her burden of debt got no relief. I do not know if my friend based that on any information, but I can tell him that the facts are that India did get a considerable measure of relief, to the extent approximately of sixteen million pounds sterling.

[Sir Jeremy Raisman.]

Now, Sir, there is one other financial point which, I think, I ought to bring before the House,—I shall only be a few minutes now,—and that is in relation to India's war effort. Whatever may be alleged about war funds, that is to say, gifts to war funds, I think Honourable Members opposite will admit that no pressure other than the appeal of advertisements has been brought to bear in relation to defence loans and defence investments. The position in relation to them is this. The figures up to November 9th show that this country has raised approximately Rs. 32 crores of defence loans of various kinds; no less than 218 lakhs are interest free, and of that on which interest is paid, the rate of interest is only slightly over three per cent. I suggest that as a financial criterion of India's attitude to the war, the ability to raise sums of that kind at that rate of interest does not seem to indicate a country which is being dragooned . . . .

**Mr. Mohan Lal Saksena** (Lucknow Division: Non-Muhammadian Rural): May I know how much of this is converted loan?

**The Honourable Sir Jeremy Raisman:** Well, Sir, that is all I have to say on the financial points which have surreptitiously and almost apologetically crept into this debate. It is useless to attempt to ignore the fact that the issue before the House is not a financial, but a moral and a political one. It is the question whether India should support the war effort by taking active steps for her own defence, or whether she should pursue the sterile course of non-co-operation to her own peril and that of the civilised world. My Honourable Colleague, the Leader of the House, in a speech of brilliant and lucid eloquence, has given the reply of a profoundly thinking and patriotic Indian. No words of mine could add to the cogent persuasion of his argument. It is only left for me to remind the House that the enemies of freedom and of civilisation, those who would extinguish the torch of progress and plunge us back into barbarism are watching. Every vote for this Bill is a vote against Hitlerism, against Fascism and against the most savage despotism that has ever crushed the soul of man. Mr. Winston Churchill, with his vivid imagery, has spoken of the dark valley through which we are toiling to the sunlit uplands beyond. Already the sunlight is breaking through and rekindling in our hearts the flame of unquenchable faith in victory. In that victory is the sole hope of India and of the world.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): There is an amendment in the name of Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi, that the Bill be circulated for the purpose of eliciting opinion thereon by the 15th of December, 1940.

**Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi** (Meerut Division: Muhammadian Rural): I submit, Sir, that I was personally opposed to the Bill, but I have tabled this amendment, because . . . .

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Does the Honourable Member wish to withdraw the amendment?

**Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi:** Yes, I want to withdraw, but. . . .

- **Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): Does the Honourable Member have the leave of the House to withdraw his amendment?

The amendment was, by leave of the Assembly, withdrawn.

**Mr. President** (The Honourable Sir Abdur Rahim): The question is:

“That the Bill to alter the maximum rates of postage under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, to increase the rates of the taxes on income imposed by the Indian Finance Act, 1940, by a surcharge for the purposes of the Central Government, and to increase the rate of super-tax payable by companies, be taken into consideration.”

The Assembly divided :

AYES—53

Abdul Hamid, Khan Bahadur Sir.  
Ahmad Nawaz Khan, Major Nawab Sir.

Ayers, Mr. C. W.

Bewoor, Sir Gurunath.

Bhagchand Soni, Rai Bahadur Seth.

Boyle, Mr. J. D.

Bunyad Hussain, Khan Bahadur Sayad.

Buss, Mr. L. C.

Caroe, Mr. O. K.

Chaudhury, Maulvi Abdul Halim.

Chettiar, Dr. Rajah Sir S. R. M.  
Annamalai.

Clow, The Honourable Sir Andrew.

Daga, Seth Sunderlal.

Dalal, Dr. R. D.

Dalpat Singh, Sardar Bahadur Captain.

DeSouza, Dr. F. X.

Dumasia, Mr. N. M.

Frampton, Mr. H. J.

Ghuznavi, Sir Abdul Halim.

Gidney, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry.

Griffiths, Mr. P. J.

Gwilt, Mr. E. L. C.

Ikramullah, Mr. Muhammad.

Imam, Mr. Saiyid Haider.

Ismaiel Ali Khan, Kunwar Hajee.

James, Mr. F. E.

Jawahar Singh, Sardar Bahadur Sardar Sir.

Jehangir, Sir Cowasji.

Kamaluddin Ahmed, Shams-ul-Ulema.

Kushalpal Singh, Raja Bahadur.

Laljee, Mr. Husenbhai Abdullabhai.

Lawson, Mr. C. P.

Maxwell, The Honourable Sir Reginald.

Miller, Mr. C. C.

Mody, Sir H. P.

Muazzam Sahib Bahadur, Mr. Muhammad.

Mudaliar, The Honourable Diwan Bahadur Sir A. Ramaswami.

Mukbarji, Mr. Basanta Kumar.

Ogilvie, Mr. C. M. G.

Ormiston, Mr. J. F.

Pillay, Mr. T. S. S.

Rahman, Lieut.-Col. M. A.

Raisman, The Honourable Sir Jeremy.

Scott, Mr. J. Ramsay.

Shahban, Khan Bahadur Mian Gulam Kadir Muhammad.

Sheehy, Mr. J. F.

Sivarsaj, Rao Sahib N.

Spence, Sir George.

Staig, Mr. B. M.

Thakur Singh, Captain.

Tyson, Mr. J. D.

Zafrullah Khan, The Honourable Sir Muhammad.

Zaheer, Mr. Saiyid Hasan.

## NOES—55.

Abdul Qaiyum, Mr.  
 Abdul Wajid, Maulvi.  
 Abdur Rasheed Chaudhury, Maulvi.  
 Aney, Mr. M. S.  
 Asaf Ali, Mr. M.  
 Ayyangar, Mr. M. Ananthasayanam.  
 Banerjee, Dr. P. N.  
 Chaliha, Mr. Kuladhar.  
 Chattopadhyaya, Mr. Amarendra Nath.  
 Chaudhury, Mr. Brojendra Narayan.  
 Chettiar, Mr. T. S. Avinashilingam.  
 Chetty, Mr. Sami Vencatachelam.  
 Chunder, Mr. N. C.  
 Daga, Seth Sheodass.  
 Das, Mr. B.  
 Das, Pandit Nilakantha.  
 Datta, Mr. Akhil Chandra.  
 Desai, Mr. Bhulabhai J.  
 Deshmukh, Dr. G. V.  
 Deshmukh, Mr. Govind V.  
 Gadgil, Mr. N. V.  
 Govind Das, Seth.  
 Gupta, Mr. K. S.  
 Hans Raj, Raizada.  
 Hegde, Sri K. B. Jinaraja.  
 Hosmani, Mr. S. K.  
 Jedhe, Mr. K. M.

Jogendra Singh, Sirdar.  
 Joshi, Mr. N. M.  
 Kailash Behari Lal, Babu.  
 Lahiri Chaudhury, Mr. D. K.  
 Lalchand Navalrai, Mr.  
 Maitra, Pandit Lakshmi Kanta.  
 Manavedan, Raja T.  
 Mangal Singh, Sardar.  
 Manu Subedar, Mr.  
 Misra, Pandit Shambhu Dayal.  
 Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi, Qazi.  
 Pande, Mr. Badri Dutt.  
 Raghubir Narayan Singh, Choudhri  
 Ramayan Prasad, Mr.  
 Rao, Mr. M. Thirumala.  
 Reddiar, Mr. K. Sitarama.  
 Saksena, Mr. Mohan Lal.  
 Sant Singh, Sardar.  
 Santhanam, Mr. K.  
 Satyamurti, Mr. S.  
 Sham Lal, Lala.  
 Sharma, Pandit Pyare Lal.  
 Shrivastava, Babu Hari Saran Prasad.  
 Singh, Mr. Gauri Shankar.  
 Singh, Mr. Ram Narayan.  
 Sinha, Mr. Satya Narayan.  
 Sri Prakasa, Mr.  
 Subbarayan, Shrimati K. Radha Bai.

The motion was negatived.

The Assembly then adjourned till Half Past Two of the Clock on Wednesday, the 20th November, 1940.