

Tuesday, 10th March, 1931

THE

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES

(Official Report)

Volume II, 1931

(19th February to 11th March, 1931)


FIRST SESSION

OF THE

FOURTH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,

1931

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1931

Legislative Assembly.

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Assistant of the Secretary :

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Committee on Public Petitions :

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RAJA BAHADUR G. KRISHNAMACHARIAR, M.L.A.

MIAN MUHAMMAD SHAH NAWAZ, C.I.E., M.L.A.

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LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

Tuesday, 10th March, 1931.

The Assembly met in the Assembly Chamber of the Council House at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. President in the Chair.

MEMBERS SWORN.

Mr. Jehangir Kaikhoshru Munshi, M.L.A. (Burma: Non-European):
and

U. Kyaw Myint, M.L.A. (Burma: Non-European).

THE GENERAL BUDGET—LIST OF DEMANDS—*contd.*

DEMAND No. 39—ARMY DEPARTMENT.

The Honourable Sir George Schuster (Finance Member): Sir, I beg to move:

“That a sum not exceeding Rs. 5,39,000 be granted to the Governor General in Council to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1932, in respect of the ‘Army Department.’”

Military Expenditure.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz (West Central Punjab: Muhammadan): Sir, I beg your permission and that of the House to permit me to move my cuts Nos. 224* and 225† together regarding the military expenditure.

Mr. President: I explained to the Honourable Member that motion No. 225 deals with military expenditure, and therefore Indianisation and all aspects of military expenditure are included in that cut. The debate on the motion will be open in regard to every item which affects military expenditure, and it is not necessary to mix up two cuts in one motion. Honourable Members are aware of the procedure we adopted yesterday, and I should like to ask whether it is their pleasure that the same procedure should be followed today in allowing Mr. Shah Nawaz to move out of its turn motion No. 225. (*Several Honourable Members:* “Yes, yes.”) Very well, Mr. Shah Nawaz is allowed to move his cut No. 225.

*“That the Demand under the head ‘Army Department’ be reduced by Rs. 100. (Indianisation of the ‘Army.’)”

†“That the Demand under the head ‘Army Department’ be reduced by Rs. 100. (Military Expenditure.)”

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: Sir, I beg leave to move that the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100, the subject-matter of my cut being the military expenditure. Mr. President, now that an era of co-operation and goodwill has dawned, now that the hearts of India and Great Britain are beating together, now that we earnestly desire and hope to create an everlasting union of friendship and comradeship, between Great Britain and India, we the Indians on this side of the House appeal to our British friends on the other side of the House to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation of the Army, and thereby cut down the expenditure to its lowest figure. Sir, ever since the advent of the constitutional reforms in India, this House had again and again urged upon the Government the necessity of Indianising the Army and reducing the military expenditure, but I regret to say that all our efforts so far had little effect. In the first place, I want to make it quite clear that I do not in any way minimise the important decisions arrived at by Sub-Committee No. VII (Defence) of the Round Table Conference regarding the Indianisation of the Army. His Majesty's Government have now accepted the principle that the defence of India must be the concern of the Indian people themselves, and not of the British people alone. His Majesty's Government have also accepted the general principle of the rapid Indianisation of the Army, and in order to give effect to it, a training college is to be established in India for the training of Indian boys to secure King's Commissions. I am glad that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief only the other day, in the Council of State, gave an assurance that he intends to implement the decision of the Round Table Conference at the earliest possible opportunity, and that he is about to set up an expert Committee to go afresh into the question of rapid Indianisation of the Army and to establish an Indian Sandhurst at some suitable place in India. But, Sir, that does not mean that all is well with the Army Department of the Government of India. This House has not much faith in the Army Department. In 1918 the Indians were granted King's Commissions, and up till now there are only 131 officers in the higher ranks of the Army. Now, Sir, in 1921 a Committee was appointed by the then Commander-in-Chief of India to prepare a detailed scheme for the Indianisation of the Indian Army, and the Committee reported on the 11th January 1922. That Committee recommended that the complete Indianisation of all arms and services (excluding Gurkhas for whom special arrangements will be necessary) of the Indian Army should be carried out in three definite stages, each of 14 years, commencing from 1925: first period, 1st to 14th year; second period, 15th to 23rd year; and third period, 24th to 30th year; *i.e.*, a total of 30 years. That Committee recommended that the entire Indian Army was to be Indianised within a period of 30 years. The Committee recommended:

"In this way, after twelve years, all British officers in 7 cavalry regiments, 20 Infantry battalions, 3 Pioneer battalions, 6 Pack batteries, 1 Headquarters Company, Engineers, 6 Field Companies, Engineers, 2 Field Troops, Engineers, 1 Railway Company, and 1 Army Troops Company undergoing Indianisation would have disappeared and such units would be completely officered by Indians."

The Committee further recommended:

"That, with a view to ensuring the necessary supply of military qualified officers for the Quartermaster-General's and Educational Services, a number of—approximately 16—Indian officers should be appointed annually and posted as supernumeraries one to each of certain selected units undergoing Indianisation."

The Committee further recommended :

“That during the second period the numbers of commissions to be given annually should be increased to approximately 182, and this should provide for the Indianisation of the following units :

Cavalry regiments	7
Infantry battalions	40
Pioneer battalions	3
Pack batteries	6
Engineer units—	
(i) Headquarter companies	2
(ii) Field Companies	6
(iii) Field troops	1
(iv) Army troops companies	2

Together with a proportion for the Quartermaster-General's and Educational Services, and an allowance for wastage among first period officers.

The remaining units of the Indian Army would be Indianised during the third period—which, if justified by experience, might be shortened.

The Committee recommend that all ancillary services be Indianised on the same lines as the fighting troops.”

Briefly put in a tabular form, their recommendation came to this :

“(i) Number of King's Commissions granted, during each period :

	Officers,
(a) First period :	
(i) Fighting troops	937
(ii) Q. M. G. Services	148
(iii) I. A. Educational Corps	54
Total	1,139
Average annually	81.4

(Please remember this number, 81 officers annually, for the first period.)

(b) Second period :	
(i) Fighting troops	1,966
(ii) Q. M. G. Services	444
(iii) I. A. Educational Corps	137
Total	2,547
Average annually	182

(Please remember that figure of 182 officers per year for the second period.)

(c) Third period :	
(i) Fighting troops	2,561
(ii) Q. M. G. Services	481
(iii) I. A. Educational Corps	136
Total	3,178
Average annually	227

(Kindly remember the figure of 227 officers annually.)

[Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz.]

(ii) Grand Total : King's Commissions :

(a) First Period	1,139
(b) Second Period	2,547
(c) Third Period	3,178
Grand Total	<u>6,864</u>

Therefore, the Committee recommended that, within a period of 30 years, there should be complete Indianisation of the Army. That is a very clear-cut scheme. I do not know why the Government have not carried into effect that scheme. I want to ask the Honourable Mr. Young why that scheme was not discussed in the First Assembly. Is this the way in which the Army Department is going to deal with us? I ask my Honourable friend, Mr. Young, why the Report of that Committee was not placed before the Skeen Committee, so that they might have looked into it and acted on it if they thought fit. I want a clear answer to these questions. In my opinion the scheme of Indianization of the Army prepared by Lord Rawlinson's Committee of 1921 was a first class scheme. It was a far better scheme than the Skeen Committee's scheme. Under it the Army was to be Indianised within a period of 30 years. If the recommendations of that Committee had been given effect to, from the year 1925 to 1931 we should have had nearly 500 Indian officers in the Army. What is the position now? We have got only 131 officers. Then, Sir, another committee, called "The Sandhurst Committee" was appointed to go into the question of Indianization of the Army. It was presided over by Sir Andrew Skeen. It is very strange that the recommendations of the Committee of 1921, which had reported on 11th January, 1922, were not placed before the subsequent Sandhurst Committee. Again, the Indian Sandhurst Committee recommended that half of the Army was to be Indianised within a period of 26 years; that is to say, by the year 1952. It recommended that the eight units scheme should be abandoned; also that an Indian Sandhurst should be established at some suitable place in the year 1933. What has been done so far? We see that the Government had been selecting only 20 candidates a year in the officer ranks of the Army. Last year they selected 24, and this year they may be selecting 27. The eight units' scheme is not to be abandoned. I ask, if there is a change of heart—undoubtedly there is a change of heart—why that should not be manifested in this direction. If Indians are prepared to serve under British officers, there is no reason why the British soldier should not be prepared to serve under Indian officers. If we are going to be comrades, if we are going to be friends, if there is to be a complete understanding and goodwill between Great Britain and India, there is no reason why the Indian officers should not have British soldiers under their command. The racial and colour prejudices must now disappear. The eight units' scheme must be abandoned. And although His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has now very kindly told us that he is going to establish an Indian Sandhurst in 1932 or 1933, I ask my Honourable friend Mr. Young, or I would have asked His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief if he had been in this House today, whether the Army Department have asked for any funds from the Honourable the Finance Member to meet

the preliminary expenditure in regard to the establishment of this college. I know that they have done nothing of the kind. I do not know what they are going to do. This House has a lurking suspicion in mind that the Army Department has always been playing the game of delaying tactics, but we earnestly hope that they will at least this time look into the matter very seriously and give up their old ways of sin.

Now, Sir, I ask three distinct questions from my Honourable friend, Mr. Young. Is the Army Department going to give effect to the recommendations of the Military Requirements Committee of 1921, and the Shea Committee of 1924, and select 81 Indian officers this year and the year after? That is a simple question and I want a simple answer. I ask the head of the Army Department whether they are going to give us 16 Indian officers in the Indian Army Educational Corps this year and the next year? That is a very simple question and I want a straight answer. (*An Honourable Member*: "From whom?") From the Honourable Mr. Young. (*An Honourable Member*: "You are an optimist.") I do not know if in this era of goodwill and co-operation Mr. Young will not be kind enough to reply to these questions. The civil disobedience movement is gone. We have got to restore peace and contentment in the country, and I do hope that Mr. Young will be very glad to see that the children of the soil are made to defend their own motherland. I make it quite clear that if there is any attack from the North on India, my country, every Indian is and will be in honour bound to defend his own motherland. Let there be no misgivings about it. On my part I shall be dying with my British comrades on the frontier. Sir, the policy of mistrust must now disappear. Well, Sir, that policy of mistrust must vanish for ever if we are going to be friends and if we desire to effect an alliance between Great Britain and India—an alliance that would strike the greatest blow to racial prejudices since the time of Christ and bring about peace and happiness in the world.

Then, Sir, I ask my Honourable friend Mr. Young as to what he has done for the development and training of the Volunteer Corps, the University Training Corps and the Territorial Force to evolve a system of elementary military training so as to provide a steady flow of well trained young men for the Indian Sandhurst. So far as I know, the Army Department has not done much. It is high time that they proposed a scheme to give military drill, etc., to our boys in the schools and colleges.

Sir, I now come to the question of immediate retrenchment in expenditure of the Army Department. India is a poor country. The Army expenditure comes to nearly 54·20 crores. It is true that in the estimates of the coming year it has been cut down by 1·70 crores, partly due to the fall in prices and partly to the fact that the re-equipment programme is to be spread over two additional years. Still we say that we have not got the capacity to pay such an enormous expenditure. Is Mr. Young or the Army Department going to help us? It is impossible for a poor country like India to bear such a heavy military expenditure. Now, Sir, the Inchcape Committee recommended that military expenditure should be reduced to 50 crores. Have the Government done that? The Army Department may be sick of hearing this again and again, but we are also sick of getting no reasonable reply from them. Again, Sir, the Inchcape Committee recommended that the strength of the Indian battalions was to be reduced

[Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz.]

by 154. The strength of the Indian battalions, before the Inchcape Committee sat, was 826, and if this reduction were made, it would come down to 672. What have the Government done? They have reduced the strength of the Indian battalions to 728 and not to 672. I have calculated the details of the expenditure, and if the Indian battalions were to be reduced to 672, as recommended by the Inchcape Committee, there would be a saving of nearly a crore of rupees. Can the Honourable Mr. Young deny that? Will Government rise to the occasion and reduce the strength of Indian battalions to 672 and thereby reduce the expenditure? Then there is another way of reducing the expenditure. We can reduce the number of British troops. There is now peace on the frontier and there is now peace in the world. Afghanistan has been paralysed by civil war. Russia is far away. There is no reason why the number of British troops should not be cut down to its lowest figure. The number of British soldiers in India is nearly 69 lakhs 300 and that of the Indians

Mr. G. M. Young (Army Secretary): May I interrupt the Honourable Member? Did he say that the number of British troops is 69 lakhs?

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: It is 69 thousand, and that of the Indians is 1,56,349. We know that the cost of the British soldier is five times that of the Indian soldier. Here I beg leave to invite your attention to the finding of the Sub-Committee No. VII (Defence) of the Round Table Conference, page 62, where it is said:

“The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation.”

Are the Government prepared to reduce the number of British troops? If the number of British soldiers is reduced say, by 5,000, it will make an enormous difference in expenditure. Sir, I do hope that the Army Department will look into the matter and reduce the number of British soldiers as far as possible. Then I ask the Honourable the Army Secretary, to what extent the development of our Air Force and mechanism have produced retrenchment in expenditure and in other directions. Has Mr. Young looked into the matter carefully? Can he give us the figures to which the military expenditure can be cut down due to the presence and development of our Air Force? Then there is our frontier policy. I have been to the trans-border districts. I know those districts very well. We have opened schools there, we have developed roads. I ask the Honourable Mr. Young to what extent the covering troops can be reduced as a result of our policy on the frontier. If there is peace now, and peace there is, there must be reduction, as any military officer must know, in the number of covering troops. Have the Government done that? Nothing of the kind. Sir, the Honourable the Finance Member has proposed a Retrenchment Committee in respect of the expenditure of the Civil Departments. Am I to understand that he also proposes that the proposed Committee should go into the military expenditure as well? If that is the case, then this House may accept the Retrenchment Committee. Will Government accept my suggestion? Sir, we are firmly convinced that there is a lot of room for reduction in the military expenditure. Then I claim, that the military expenditure of India is far greater than the military expenditure of any other country in the world. Can the Honourable Mr. Young deny that

fact? The military expenditure of this country is 54 crores 20 lakhs, that is to say, 27 per cent. of the total income of India including the provinces and one-half of the total income of the Government of India. Can Mr. Young point out to me any country in the world where the military expenditure is so high as compared with the income? I am sure he cannot find any such country. Is this the way you are going on in this poor country? Is this the way you are treating the Indians—Indians who have not the capacity to pay, Indians who are crushed by the enormous amount of this military expenditure?

Then, Sir, there is room for reduction in the internal security troops. Sir, I believe calm is going to be restored in this troubled land, and we feel no longer distracted and perplexed. Cannot our police do the work of the internal security troops? Cannot we reduce the number of these troops? I believe, Sir, that there can be reduction in that direction also, and I ask the Honourable Mr. Young whether he is prepared to do it. Lastly, there is the question of readjustment of military expenditure between England and India. We all know that we want troops in this country for two purposes—troops that are wanted for the defence of India and those that are wanted for Imperial defence. Is it not right, I ask, that England should share the military expenditure with us? Sir, if the Government of India were only to urge their view-point before the British Government in England, I am sure there could be a reduction in expenditure to the extent of Rs. 10 crores or 12 crores. (*Mr. S. C. Mitra*: "Hear, hear). Sir, I do not wish to inflict a long speech on this House. But Indians are quite clear in their minds that hitherto they have not been treated fairly and squarely. India, Sir, has produced many Generals in the past; India has produced many Commanders in the past, and there is no reason why they should not be able to lead their own soldiers on the battlefield. In Europe and other parts of the world they have done well. That cannot be denied. There are martial races in India; there are young men who are ever ready to seek employment in the Army. Will the Government of India help us before the new constitution comes into force by increasing substantially the rate of Indianisation in accordance with the recommendations of Lord Rawlinson's and General Shea's Committees of 1921 and 1924? Are they going to do that? Sir, I submit that the Government of India should reduce the military expenditure which is absolutely crushing us. Will the Government do it? Statesmanship and wisdom can give only one answer to that question. Sir, I move my cut. (Applause.)

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar (Madras City: Non-Muhammadan Urban): Mr. President, although I am aware that according to constitutional precedents and usage, the Honourable the Finance Member moves that the House should grant each Demand; I still think it is an irony of fate that the military Demand in particular should have been so moved by him. I say so, Sir, because I feel that the Finance Member is in just as helpless a position with reference to this particular Demand as we on this side of the House are, I propose to deal first with the retrenchment that has been made in the military budget this year, and secondly with the larger question of Indianization which occupied the attention of the Round Table Conference in London and is going to be taken up in this country. Sir, I find that in a note that is contained in the Military Budget it is stated:

"All military expenditure is controlled by the Government of India in the Army, Marine and Finance Departments."

[Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar.]

Sir, I contest that position. Military expenditure is controlled by the Army Department; quite right. It is controlled by the Marine Department; quite right. But I do contest the position that the Finance Department controls this military expenditure. In theory, according to the constitution, the Finance Member is the ultimate controller, no doubt, but in practice I venture to state on the floor of this House that the Finance Member has been practically compelled to abdicate his position. Sir, let me take up at once the question of military expenditure and make some reference to the retrenchment that the Honourable the Finance Member told us has been made with reference to the Military Department. He has told us that 1 crore 75 lakhs have been saved by the Military Department, and he has asked us to infer that this saving has been made because the military authorities are anxious to come to the help of the civil authorities in times of grave crisis such as the present. Let us consider the expenditure that has been cut down and the details of which are given in the Budget that has been presented to us. I would request Honourable Members to turn to page 23 of the Military Budget, and they will find explanations given as regards the several reductions that have been made. "The Budget for 1931-32", says the note, "is less than the Budget for 1930-31 by 1 crore 38 lakhs", and the details are given. The decrease in the purchase and manufacture of stores due chiefly to the fall in prices and to less demands is put down at 66·84 lakhs. Under Non-effective charges, due chiefly to arrear credits as a result of the readjustment of the pensions of officers, etc., between His Majesty's Government and the Indian Government the decrease is put at 34 lakhs. This being a credit which has gone to the Military Department, we may ignore it as not being part of the retrenchment that the military authorities have made. I come now to the two substantial amounts—66 lakhs, being a reduction in the purchase and manufacture of stores, and 16 lakhs being a reduction in the rates of kit and clothing allowances. It may at first sight appear to the Members of this House that this is a very great service which the Military Department has done to us. But I should like to draw the attention of the Honourable Members at once to page 247 of this very Budget, where unfortunately explanations are given which belie the expectations and the inferences that Honourable Members may draw from this cut. At page 247 it is stated under "Purchase and Sale of Stores, Equipment and Animals":

"The gross annual expenditure on the purchase of ordnance stores in a normal year is estimated at Rs. 354 lakhs as against only Rs. 189·25 lakhs required during the year 1931-32. The difference of Rs. 64·77 lakhs represents the extent to which in 1931-32 the Army will still be living on stocks surplus to requirements, etc."

Now, Sir, that is the retrenchment that the Honourable the Finance Member wants us to thank the military authorities for. They have not made a retrenchment; they are going to live on stock surplus to the extent of 64 lakhs. Does the Honourable the Finance Member think that that is a retrenchment? Sir, according to household economy, it means nothing of the kind, and yet he wants us to think that the military economy means something very different from household economy. Take again, this question of kits. The explanation runs as follows:

"The gross annual expenditure on provision of clothing in a normal year is estimated at Rs. 106 lakhs as against only Rs. 76·80 lakhs required during the year 1931-32. The difference of Rs. 29·20 lakhs represents the extent to which in 1931-32 the Army will still be living on stock."

You draw from your stock surplus and you get these amounts during this year, and you ask the House seriously to believe that you have in these times of crisis made a very big retrenchment and thus have rendered help to the civil authorities. Surely, if the Honourable the Finance Member wants us to sing the praises of the Military Department for the retrenchment they have effected, the least he should have done was to see that these explanations were omitted from the Budget that he has presented on behalf of the Army.

Take, again, Sir, the Military Engineering Services, where there is the biggest cut of 34 or 35 lakhs, and for which the Honourable the Finance Member wanted us in particular to be very grateful to the military authorities. Now, what is the position with reference to the Military Engineering Services? According to the accounts of 1929-30, the sum required was 4,12 lakhs; according to the revised estimates of 1930-31 the sum required was 4,43 lakhs. Now, the Military Department has been so considerate because of the extremely delicate position in which my friend the Honourable the Finance Member found himself during the current year, that in the revised estimates the net expenditure is not 4,43 lakhs but 4,50 lakhs! This increase of 7 lakhs has been effected as a matter of special consideration for the feelings of the Honourable the Finance Member, who is subjected to the slings and arrows of outrageous criticism on this side of the House! Now, Sir, in the next year, the demand is 4,09 lakhs as against 4,12 lakhs in the year 1929-30. The saving is merely due to a few barracks not being built. I may explain to the House that this saving means really that the question of giving certain amenities in some cantonments by way of pure water supply and so on is delayed. Sir, this saving means therefore that in some of the cantonments some of the barracks get water just as the hundreds of millions of people do get it all over the country. They get unfiltered and impure water just as so many people get from the ordinary wells. That is the sort of retrenchment that has been suggested. I am unable to understand, dealing with this particular Military Engineering Service, why this demand is to be met in a different way from other similar demands in the Civil Budget. I see here a very illuminating note that this service bears to the Army Department what the head "Civil Works" bears to other civil heads of expenditure on the civil side. If I understand that analogy aright, the expenditure in the Civil Works Budget mainly comes from capital from loans. Now, the whole Military Budget is met from revenues. No portion of it comes from capital; no portion of it comes from loans; but it is only in the Military Engineering Service that, though the Public Works of the Military Department is analogous to the Public Works of the Civil Department, the whole amount has to be met from current revenues, and no portion of it is met from loans. At least that is how I understand the working of the Department. I do not know why this should be so.

The Honourable Sir George Schuster: I think my Honourable friend is perhaps not quite correct about that. The practice of the Government of India in the past has been to meet all expenditure, even of a non-recurring nature, from revenue, unless it was a productive expenditure. Practically the only exception to that has been the construction of New Delhi. Taking the thing on a broad scale, that is the correct statement. The practice of the Government has been, and it will continue to be, to pay for all the works, even though they are not non-recurring works, out of revenue, unless they are part of definite productive undertaking like the Railways.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: I am very glad to hear that, but still I must confess I am not satisfied, because I have an impression that the whole of the Army Budget is really debited to the revenue accounts. If that is so, I do not see where the practice comes in. The Military Engineering Service of the Military Works Department is part of the Army Budget and the whole of the Army Budget Demand is debited to the current revenues, and all works therefore that are carried out by the Military Department are therefore met from the current revenues. Therefore the analogy of the Civil Works of the Public Works Department does not hold good with reference to the Military Works Department. That is my position.

Sir, these are the retrenchments for which my Honourable friend the Finance Member wants us to be especially grateful. He says that he has saved 66 lakhs because the military are living on surplus, 16 lakhs cut in another item for the same reason and 34 lakhs he has saved in Civil Works, because a few of these things, which cannot be done now, have been put off to the following year. I should like to read to the Honourable House a paragraph of the Honourable the Finance Member relating to this part of the Budget, so that they may be able to better appreciate the part that the Military Department has played and be genuinely thankful to the Military Department for what they have been able to do! In paragraph 30 the Honourable the Finance Member says:

“On top of this, by taking advantage of reduced costs of various articles and savings effected by the military authorities by their economy campaign, and also by postponing part of the ordinary military engineering services, further cuts of no less than 1,13 lakhs have been made. I wish, however, to make it clear that the possibility of this economy depends (and here comes the cautious administrator because he does not want us to believe that next year this could be done) partly on special savings and partly on the continuance of low prices for grain and other stores so that it may not be possible to repeat it.”

I should like the House to note particularly all the superlatives that the Honourable the Finance Member has managed to put into one single sentence:

“This is an *exceptional* cut made in *exceptional* circumstances to meet the present *emergency*, and it means a retardation in the programme of re-equipment which the military authorities could not, acting purely on military considerations, have recommended.”

What has the question of military re-equipment to do with these cuts? I venture to contest the accuracy of this particular sentence of the Honourable the Finance Member, but let me proceed

The Honourable Sir George Schuster: As my Honourable friend has questioned the accuracy of my statement, let me make a statement on that particular point. The point is this that according to the stabilised Budget arrangement, the military authorities were entitled to expect that the benefit of any savings which they were able to achieve in that way would go towards the completion of the re-equipment programme. They have, in fact, made these savings. I quite agree with my Honourable friend's statement. In fact that was the point that I tried to make clear when I said that we might be able to repay it. I quite agree with my Honourable friend's statement that some of these savings are not really retrenchments in current expenditure at all, but they are savings in the Budget of this year, and whereas

they might have expected as a counterbalancing advantage of reducing some of their ordinary stocks to be able to get on with the re-equipment programme, they have in fact surrendered the savings. That really is the point. They are taking risks about the plans for completing their re-equipment programme.

Mr. B. V. Jadhav (Bombay Central Division: Non-Muhammadan Rural): May I ask whether when the Army contract was made . . .

Mr. President: The Honourable Member will have his turn.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: Sir, though I am perfectly willing to give way to the Honourable the Finance Member if he wants to make a correction in any of my statements, I cannot allow the debate to be taken out of hands.

Mr. President: That is why I called that Honourable Member to order.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: Thank you, Sir. I shall next refer to the stabilised Budget. My Honourable friend need not be under any apprehension that I am leaving that out of account altogether. Let me proceed with the statement of the Honourable Member:

"But they have proposed this special cut in order to help out the general situation, and I wish to take this occasion to express my *appreciation* of the way in which they have helped to reduce expenditure this year. I am afraid that many desirable projects for improving barracks and providing other amenities for the troops have had to be postponed, and in many cases officers who, according to the stabilised budget arrangement, had been led to expect that savings would be available for such projects have had to be disappointed."

Sir, that disappointment this House will keenly share. I am perfectly certain that nobody wants that valuable and useful expenditure should be curtailed, but if it is sought to be made out that we are so hard-hearted as not to be willing to give certain amenities to our own Indian troops and that we want to make retrenchment, I may at once say that there is no justification whatever for that accusation. Let me come to the stabilised Budget and examine for a moment what this stabilised Budget means. The whole trouble has been that this stabilised Budget has meant with the military authorities that they can do whatever they like of their own free will, and as I said just now, I think the Honourable the Finance Member is to be commiserated rather than congratulated on the part that he has played with reference to this Military Budget.

Now, Sir, it is not my criticism that I should like to offer but the criticism of the Military Accounts Committee with reference to this stabilised Budget. Here, let me explain that even with reference to the checking of accounts, the Military Budget stands in a peculiar position. Its accounts are checked by the Military Accounts Committee, an Accounts Committee, where, I believe, the Finance Secretary sits with one or two departmental heads, and the non-official side has nothing to do with it at all; and when later on the accounts relating to the Military Department come before the Public Accounts Committee of this House, my Honourable friend Mr. S. C. Mitra has only to go by the Report which the Military Accounts Committee has placed before them, and nothing else is available for them to really deal effectively with this military expenditure. I do not know whether the

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military accounts men are helped by officials on the civil side, but let me take the House through some of the criticisms that they have passed with reference to this military expenditure. They are not very happy, Sir, over this question of a stabilised Budget and they are anxious to see that the exact significance of this Budget is better understood. At page 163 of the Public Accounts Committee's Report on the Accounts of 1928-29, Volume I, the Military Accounts Committee says:

"The Committee agreed with the Auditor General that the variations from the estimates were not large, *relatively* to the amount of the total Military grant, and that their significance was further reduced by reason of the temporary stabilisation of the Budget and the latitude definitely provided under that arrangement."

It is exactly that latitude that I complain about. The military authorities had latitude because we allowed them to utilise for one purpose or another, during the course of a fixed number of years, the amounts allotted under the military head. I do not know whether the House was a party to it or not; I was not a Member of the House, but even granting for a moment that the House was a party to the scheme of stabilisation, it merely meant that the utmost economy should be observed by the military authorities and that the amount which was not used in the year of the Budget might be carried forward for use in the next year. That is how I understand the scheme of stabilisation. But what this latitude has meant is that there had been a lack of control altogether, lack of economy and lack of supervision altogether, and I say deliberately that in several ways, the military authorities, because they had a stabilised Budget, did not care to scrutinise the accounts as carefully as they would otherwise have done, if they had been responsible for every pie and if they had to make their demands year after year.

Now, Sir, let me for a moment deal with this question of surplus. I was telling the House that this large amount of 66 lakhs and odd was really due to the fact that surplus stores were being utilised. Now, Sir, what is the explanation? It is said, "The difference of Rs. 64.77 lakhs represents the extent to which in 1931-32 the Army will still be living on stocks surplus to requirements, etc., owing to surpluses accrued in former years *due to over provision on account of lack of accurate statistics*". That is the history of the Military Department and that is the accuracy with which the Accountant General of the Military Department supervises the way in which the estimates are made. Lakhs and tens of lakhs amounting to crores of rupees, perhaps, of over-estimates occur, and then, from time to time, when any emergency comes, when the House says that you cannot give more than that, the military authorities come forward and say, "We are willing to retrench, because there are surpluses on which we can live very comfortably". Is that the sort of retrenchment that the Honourable the Finance Member wants us to congratulate the Military Department upon? Surely the Honourable the Finance Member is doing an injustice to his own canons of financial propriety, if he expects the House to endorse the panegyrics that he has sung to the Military Department. There are certain economies however which the Military Department are only too anxious to make. Let me at this stage refer to one of these economies. The Territorial Force is the *Cinderella* of the Military Department. They do not like it. I venture to state from my place on the floor

of the House to the highest military authority in this country that the Territorial Force department has been given the most step-motherly treatment. Take your Public Accounts Committee's Report and you find that, in the year 1928-29, before ever any question of retrenchment came in, when you had your stabilised Budget, when you received the full amount that you asked for from this House, you saved from the Territorial Force. What business had you to do that? Why did you save from the Territorial Force? The latitude that the military authorities want for themselves is to kill any particular department which they do not favour and to spend money on any other department which they like. At page 166 of the Public Accounts Committee's Report, we find:

"The Financial Adviser explained that, as a matter of fact, the provision for the expansion of the Territorial Forces had not been diverted to other purposes,"

We are very thankful indeed that it has not been diverted; but look at what follows:

"but that the apparent discrepancy was due to the difficulty of compiling separately the expenditure relating to such expansion. He stated that 7½ lakhs had actually been spent on the scheme and the balance of 2½ lakhs carried to the Military Reserve Fund."

Sir, it does not matter whether you use it for other purposes or not. That is not the issue. You had to spend 10 lakhs on the Territorial Forces, but you have not spent it; on the other hand you have carried a portion forward to the Military Reserve Fund.

Take again, the next year, that is 1930-31. If Honourable Members will turn to page 24, they will find a decrease in expenditure for the current year 1930-31:

"Auxiliary and Territorial Forces due chiefly to saving in the grant for expansion of Territorial Forces, Five lakhs."

Now, Sir, I ask, is that justified? Is that the sort of saving, is that the sort of retrenchment for which we can sing halleluiahs to the Military Department? Is that what this House required? Did this House require the Territorial Forces grant to be cut down again and again? Now, I come to the last year, the new year, the Budget year. There again, there is retrenchment in the Territorial Forces, for which the Honourable the Finance Member wants us to sing the praises of the Military Department. The decrease for the year 1931-32, "under Auxiliary and Territorial Forces is due chiefly to the reduction of Rs. 5 lakhs in the grant for expansion of Territorial Force". Therefore in 1928-29, you saved 2½ lakhs. For 1929-30 I have not got the figures, but I venture to risk the speculation that the Military Department has taken a similar course. Now, in 1930-31, you saved Rs. 5 lakhs and in 1931-32, you unblushingly come forward with this retrenchment of five lakhs of rupees again over the Territorial Forces, which is the Cinderella of your services. I understand that the rifles to be supplied for the University Corps have been cut off already and you still want national army to be developed. You turn round and say, "Indians are not fit, Indians in many parts of the country are not fit to be enlisted in the fighting forces". You indulge in all sorts of criticism about the military character of the various classes of people, a story to which I shall refer presently, and this is the treatment which the Army

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Department has given to one important section, namely, the Indian Territorial Force, on whose development public opinion has been unanimous in this country. Now, Sir, in passing I should only like to refer to one other matter with reference to the Territorial Forces. I have here before me the Regulations of the Army in India Reserve of Officers. I may explain that the rules provide that the officers serving in the various forces, when they come over to the Reserve of Officers, have their services taken into consideration and the period of their service thereafter is counted as a continuation of their past service. The rule with reference to this is this:

“Other previous King’s Commissioned service in any branch of His Majesty’s Naval, Military, Marine or Air Forces (including the Auxiliary Force, India), and Commissioned service in the forces of a Dominion, Crown Colony, or other British Possession, whether regular or otherwise, will count in full.”

Mark the words “including Auxiliary Forces”. You want to make a distinction between the Auxiliary Forces and the Territorial Forces. I am credibly informed that, in a previous set of rules published somewhere in 1926, the phrase “Territorial Forces” was also included. But now you adopt a policy, a deliberate continuous policy of emasculating the Territorial Force altogether, driving it out of existence and making it impossible for decent man to enter that force. You therefore have dropped out the words “Territorial Force” and have put in “Auxiliary Forces” where there are no Indians as such—they have only a few Anglo-Indians and Europeans there I believe. Service in the Auxiliary forces is treated as service continued in the new force, but service in the Territorial Force is excluded—step-motherly treatment for which I do not know who in this House will reply, whether it will be the Finance Member or the Army Secretary, who I understand is a civilian.

Now, Sir, let me go to another aspect of this question. Not merely has military expenditure not been curtailed, but there have been grave irregularities in the whole policy of military expenditure. I need not go into the details which were pointed out by the Public Accounts Committee, but we have been saying over and over again that the Military Budget is a bloated Budget. I want to tell the Finance Member at the very outset that in criticising the military expenditure I am not going to refer to any constitutional questions of any kind. I am aware that it can bear treatment elsewhere and in a different manner, and we have got our rights and privileges secured there; and I know that this Government are not in a position to answer, with reference to these large questions of policy, any questions that I might put at the present time. Therefore I am willing to confine myself to actual retrenchment, apart from questions of policy, apart from questions of reduction of personnel or even of Indianisation. I shall deal with retrenchment that you can now carry out, and in the first place I should like to ask the Finance Member what he has done with reference to the various outstanding disputes between the Government of Great Britain and the Government of this country. Last year, in answer to a question, the Honourable the Finance Member stated that he was vigorously pursuing the various questions outstanding between these two Governments for a settlement of financial accounts. The question of capitation charges is one of those questions which it would be a disgrace for any Government to keep unsolved for nearly 15 or 20, or how many

years I do not know. I find from the Report—I do not wish to waste the time of the House by referring to accurate details—but in this Report the capitation charges are given, the amount is not stated. The only explanation that is given is that, before the war, the rate was £11/8, and after the war, the budgeted figure is a crore and odd. Why has not the Finance Member told us what exactly is the capitation charge today? And the capitation charge, the note says, is still to be settled between the two Governments. When are you going to settle it? Before the war it was £11/8, and at the present moment you have been forced to budget according to a particular rate which you dare not give even in your explanations, and the outstanding question has not yet been settled between this Government and the Government of Great Britain. A number of other questions are similarly outstanding. And while we are in this House talking today of this capitation charge, I can remember my esteemed leader, Sir Dinshaw Wacha, who is now a Member of another House, raising this question, when I was in my teens, this question of capitation charge. And in the Congress, year after year, leaders bewailed the fact that this is a most iniquitous charge, and I am sure if I were to rummage those old speeches, I could come across at least one speech of yours, Sir, where you have said that the capitation charge should not be a charge upon this Government. Yet this question remains unsettled even to this day; and not only that, but an increase has been made on the rate of these capitation charges.

Let me turn to another capitation charge which has slyly crept into this Budget. Take the Air Force. You have a capitation charge with reference to the Air Force. The Air Force came into existence only the other day; it was introduced just five or six years ago, and no capitation charge should have been allowed to be levied at all. What is this Government doing? I know this is an agency Government: I know it has not got plenary powers in many respects, I am also aware that the Finance Member can turn round and say, "Look at the extremely forcible and extremely spicy language in which we have addressed the Government of Great Britain with reference to this capitation charge". I am not going to be satisfied with spicy language, even if it be the language of a despatch of this Government to the Home Government. I want results. I want the Finance Member to take courage in his hands and tell them that, notwithstanding their domineering dictation, he is not prepared, as trustee of the Indian finances, to allow this charge to be put on his Budget, and that he would take the consequences. If the Finance Member were prepared to say that, we on this side, even if he were to stand alone on the burning deck, would come forward and throw, though in a different spirit to what we have done on many occasions to the proposals of the Treasury Benches, enough of cold water to put out the fire. Now, Sir, the Honourable the Finance Member is not prepared to do any such thing. There are again several other questions which are pending adjustment between the Home Government and this Government, the question of the Southern Persian Rifles, the question of various adjustments with reference to Aden and the question of other adjustments with reference to wars that have been raised. I am not raising the question of repudiation of loans. That has been very much misunderstood in this country and nobody in this House desires to raise that. But we say that, with reference to questions which you as the Government of India have raised

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already and which have been pending solution for decades with the British Government, you have not got the courage to say here and now that you must get these questions solved. Sir, the Honourable the Finance Member wants to be armed. Yesterday he made an appeal—an appeal which finds ready response so far as I am concerned—that we on this side of the House, the non-official Members, should arm him so that he might carry on the fight with whosoever might be concerned in this country or outside. I am willing to come under his regimentation; I am willing to accept him as my leader if he will carry on the fight in the matter in which all fights ought to be carried on, carry it to a finish, so that success may be ours. And I want to put forward one suggestion to him. Last year the Imperial Conference met in London, and among the Resolutions that the Imperial Conference passed, was a very significant Resolution, to which I should like the Finance Member's attention to be drawn. It said that, when there was a dispute between a Dominion and the Home Government on any question of a justiciable nature, a special tribunal should be constituted, a tribunal in which the Government of the Dominion will have a certain representation and the Home Government will have a certain representation, an equal representation, and that these members should elect a Chairman who will decide this question. I ask the Finance Member if he is prepared to take that suggestion, and if he is prepared to press that view before the Home Government. I am aware that, according to the terms of the Resolution, the Home Government should be equally a consenting party to the proposal if this tribunal is to be constituted at all. I am not going into constitutional questions at all, but these are questions which at least in this year, when we are met with such high deficits, the Finance Member should have taken up. A whole year has passed since the Finance Member replied to these particular questions in March, 1930, and I should like him to tell us what steps he has taken. I am not here prepared to make merely destructive criticism; I am prepared to help the Finance Member and make him my leader. And I put forward this suggestion to him, so that he may take time now at least and try to see whether, with the Labour Government in power—a Government which appears to us to be not altogether unsympathetic to India's interests and irresponsible to the demands that are made from this side of the House—he is prepared to go forward and have these outstanding questions settled. And if he wants that settlement to be agreeable to this House and agreeable to public opinion, let me at the same time warn him that, unless he takes some non-officials into his confidence in carrying on the fight and in constituting the committee I have suggested, he will not have the support of the public with him in any settlement that may be arrived at thereafter.

Now, Sir, let me come to the Retrenchment Committee, regarding which my Honourable friend the Finance Member again and again—if I may use language which ought not to be considered disrespectful—threw out feelers. Sir, we on this side of the House are not prepared, if I know anything about the intentions of Honourable Members, to consider the question of a retrenchment committee which sits merely to examine the Civil Budget. We do not think this is the time for such a retrenchment committee, and we do not think that any useful purpose will be done by a retrenchment committee of that nature being appointed

at the present time; not that we believe retrenchment cannot be undertaken and that cuts cannot be made; let the Finance Member be under no misapprehension on that score and let him not turn round tomorrow and say "I made this offer of a retrenchment committee, but you turned it down and thereby admitted the fact that retrenchment was not possible". Our reason is merely this; the Retrenchment Committee will take months to go through the whole of the Civil Budget and then they will send their recommendations to the Departments and the Departments will sit on them and when they come back to you you will sit on them, and the result will be that you will be able to produce something by the time when you will be out of office. I do not want the labours of the Retrenchment Committee to await the new Government; they will have to take care of it themselves. In your time, you are not going to give effect to their recommendations, and therefore I say there is no use of that Committee.

I come to the question of military expenditure. I have shown you how overstocking of surplus material is the normal way in which you are carrying on your responsibility. Let me here again quote a few observations from the Military Accounts Committee, your own official committee: (Page 164):

"The Financial Adviser reported that the amounts realised on account of the disposal of surplus and obsolete stores in recent years were as follows." (*Mark the words "realised in recent years."*):

	Rs.
1926-27	1,93,000
1927-28	36,72,000
1928-29	42,44,000
1929-30	29,39,000"

As a result of the sale of surplus and obsolete stores! Any business man knows what is the meaning of "sale of surplus stores". The sale of surplus stores means that the military authorities buy a thing for Rs. 100 and sell it for 10 or 15 rupees. The sale of obsolete stores means something very much worse; it means that a thing worth Rs. 100 is sold for 5 or 10 rupees. And the military authorities have sold these surplus and obsolete stores for Rs. 36 lakhs, 42 lakhs and 29 lakhs during the past three years! And mark this, Sir. This is the most curious part of it all. Mark the observations of this Committee presided over by the Finance Secretary and attended by the military authorities—very big names holding very big offices, mere mention of which must create a great impression among the non-official Members of the House. The Honourable Sir Arthur MacWatters is the Chairman of the Committee; Mr. Kaula is a member, and I see that the Army Secretary was a witness. After this statement, the Committee says:

"The Committee thought that it would be *interesting* to have similar figures every year."

Interesting, Mr. President? heart-burning would have been a more proper word for it; interesting to whom? Interesting to the military authorities? Interesting to those who have bought the surplus and unsuitable stores? Probably to them. But interesting was the last word that I should have expected with reference to this thing, which shows colossal mismanagement in the Military Department. ("Hear, hear" from the Opposition Benches.)

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Now, let me read another paragraph showing how the Army Department is managing these things. Contracts are given out and we all know the principles on which public contracts ought to be given out. You have to call for tenders; and you have to accept the lowest tender unless you are in a position to say that that tender is not the proper tender and that there is something behind it which makes it unacceptable; and you have to see that when contracts are entered into, they are kept on both sides. But in the Army Department all this is different; as in so many other things so also with these contracts; and I should like this House to know the comments, not of an irresponsible public agitator like myself but of a responsible body of Government servants who constitute the Military Accounts Committee:

"The Committee next discussed the position in regard to contracts with Colonel Gaskell who assured them that the principles laid down were being adopted generally."

There comes the word "generally". What is it they do in specific cases? They evade it or break it. The following paragraphs show how they manage contracts:

"The increase, in the year under discussion, in the number of contracts given without tenders being called for, was explained by the fact that, where extensions of works were decided upon, such extensions were entrusted in a number of cases to contractors who were carrying out the original works. Instructions had since been issued with a view to preventing a recurrence of such cases."

Next year's Public Accounts Committee will show how these instructions have been carried out.

"As regards alterations in the terms of contracts once concluded, Colonel Gaskell informed the Committee that they were being allowed only in exceptional cases and with the sanction of the proper authority."

Alterations in every case, mark you, in favour of the other party and not in favour of the Government: I challenge the Finance Member to show me a single instance of alteration in a contract which has been beneficial to the Government. We know how these alterations in the terms of a contract once concluded are made. I hope it is not the general policy of the **military authorities that alterations should be allowed as a matter of course in every case.** But even in exceptional cases, what does it come to? **Why should there be these variations? Why these novations and always to the benefit of the third party as against the public and as against the Military Department itself?** We are after all not living in hide-bound water-tight compartments; we are living in the midst of our people; we also have something to do with contractors; and if we were to inveigh against the Military Department, possibly some others are benefiting by these lax rules of the Military Department. We know that a "big salam" to the Colonel Sahib means a good alteration in the contract.

Maulvi Muhammad Yakub: (Rohilkund and Kumaon Divisions: Muhammadan Rural): What do you mean by big?

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: Now, at the end of it all comes the paragraph of the Military Accounts Committee:

"In conclusion, the Committee were gratified—"

gratified after all this, Mr. President? Because contracts were not made on proper tenders, gratified because contracts were being readjusted to suit the third party, gratified because surplus and obsolete stores are being sold to the extent of lakhs of rupees at the cost of the public tax-payer? But anyhow gratified according to Sir Arthur MacWatters:

"In conclusion the Committee were gratified to note the opinion recorded by the Auditor General that during the year under review, the percentage of financial irregularity, detected by audit and requiring special mention was on the whole satisfactorily small and that there had been some improvement in the standard of financial discipline applied to cases of financial irregularity, etc., in which it was found possible to bring individuals to book."

But even the Military Accounts Committee cannot altogether exonerate the Military Department and they conclude:

"They considered, however, that there was room for improvement in the direction of closer and more correct estimating in the light of the instances cited in paragraph 7 and especially in paragraph 8 of the Auditor General's letter."

Now, that is the record of the Military Department. I charge them with being extravagant. I charge them with being unbusiness-like. I charge them with not paying that consideration to the money which has unfortunately been entrusted to them, which they ought to do. I am not speaking on the question of the personnel. It should not be thought that I am oblivious to the necessities of the military units, or that I am oblivious to the demands of the defence of this country. But I say purely on technical grounds, if I were the Auditor General of the Military Department, I would charge them with a great many laxities with reference to this Budget and with reference to their expenditure.

I make an offer to the Finance Member; are you prepared to appoint a retrenchment committee which will go into the whole of this military expenditure without for a moment recommending that a single unit, British or Indian, should be disbanded or taken away, without in any way questioning the military policy of the Government, but purely to go into these colossal things which have amazed this House and which certainly do not reflect the highest credit on the Military Department? Are you prepared to appoint such a retrenchment committee, to which the fullest assistance will be given by the military authorities, in going through all these things? I ask the Finance Member whether there is such a thing as a store record kept at all in these military offices. Do they know exactly the nature of the stores today in all their arsenals and in the other places where they store these things? I remember to have read somewhere in this bulky volume, or perhaps in the second volume which contains a lot of evidence, that in some places at least that is lacking.

Now, Sir, if the Honourable the Finance Member is prepared to say that there is a possibility of the appointment of some retrenchment committee—I do not commit myself to a retrenchment committee of this House alone—but if he agrees to the appointment of some retrenchment committee which would be acceptable to this House, a suggestion which my Honourable friend the Leader of the Nationalist Party made yesterday, and which other Honourable Members have made on other occasions, we shall be to a certain extent satisfied.

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Now, Sir, there is of course the usual phenomenon that what occurs in the Civil Department occurs in the Military Department also, namely, a rush of expenditure in the last month of the budgeted year. March 1 and everybody is set marching to see that the expenditure is somehow or other completed,—and if in the Civil Department it can be completed, what does it mean for the Military Department to complete the expenditure before the end of March? It opens a wide vista of speculation which I do not like to more specifically mention in this House.

Sir, I should like to make a personal appeal to the Honourable the Finance Member. Let him not understand for a moment that we do not realise his position. He is the last of the Trojans. There is not going to be another Finance Member of his kind in this country. He came with high hopes. When he came some time back with high hopes, we all welcomed him with high hopes, and after nearly three years of his stewardship, I think the Finance Member today is the saddest man on the Government Benches. Sir, I have witnessed Khedda operations where wild elephants are put between two tame elephants, and in the course of a few minutes or a few hours, all wildness is gone out of those wild elephants, and though to the Honourable the Finance Member cannot be attributed either wildness or elephantine qualities, I venture to think that the high hopes with which he came, the record which he wanted to establish in this country as Finance Member, all that has been made impossible, because sitting in juxtaposition there the Finance Member has been absorbed into the service of this country. We get new Members so that they may have an orientation of new policy, so that they may sit tight on all the Departments and be not absorbed by the Departments. I do not say anything unkind of the Honourable the Finance Member. Let there be no misunderstanding on that score. I appreciate his position. I appreciate his difficulties, but all I can say is that Finance Members perhaps should be much more fierce-looking if they want in any way to check the Honourable Members who are sitting by their side. Now, Sir, what is it that has resulted now? After three years of stewardship, and this is almost the last year of my Honourable friend's régime of office. I make a special appeal to him to leave behind him some foot-prints that we may remember hereafter as the footprints of a Finance Member who had done much for this country and who had tried to do in his own humble way some service for the finances of this country. The Finance Member, when he lays down the charge of his high and exalted office, should have the consolation that he has attempted some task, that he has tried to put the finances of this country on a better foundation, that he has been able to assert, as the financial controller, his impress on the whole policy of the Government, that he has controlled the Departments, and that he has made up his mind to give up many of those unnecessary expenditures which they are now incurring. The sands of his official life are fast flowing, and I venture to think that even at this stage it is not too late for the Honourable the Finance Member to get courage, to get what little courage we on this side can give him to fight his battles with the Departments, and particularly with the Military Department, so that when he lays down his office, it might not be said that he has just left one more task undone, that he has frustrated one more hope during his year of office.

Sir, that is the position with reference to the expenditure side of the military administration. If the House is not too tired of what I have been saying and desires me to proceed, I should like to say a few more words. (*Several Honourable Members*: "Please go on, go on.")

I should like now to refer to the question of policy. I have made it perfectly clear that my criticism as regards the military expenditure has nothing to do with policy whatsoever so far; I want definitely to tell the Honourable the Finance Member that we are satisfied that there can be a great deal more of saving in military expenditure, and that, although we feel that we cannot cut down anything except a trivial amount of 5 lakhs which he has put down before the House, which is not worth cutting down, I want to assure him that, when he comes again with the Finance Bill, he will find it very difficult indeed to get us to accept it; I want to give him a warning now. Let me not be misunderstood, because we are not prepared to make a 5 per cent. cut or a 10 per cent. cut. Let not the Finance Member turn round and say that he will place us in a dilemma by telling us that we have voted for the expenditure and so we must find the money. Our position is merely this. We do not want to cut down expenditure indiscriminately, but we are assured that you can make a saving, and particularly in the military administration, by at least a crore or a crore and a half, and we shall take good care to see that, when the Finance Member comes before us with his Bill again, to the extent we are able to do, we shall not give him all the amount he desires, but we shall suitably cut it down, and with that knowledge the Finance Member should come forward and try to balance his Budget. Let him not afterwards, when the Finance Bill comes up, tell us that, having voted for expenditure, we are morally bound to support him in his demands for revenue. The position is nothing of the kind. The Honourable the Finance Member has to look to the question of military expenditure, and he should find from that mainly his resources for balancing the Budget this year.

Now, Sir, I should like very briefly to refer to the larger question of policy with reference to the future Indianisation of the forces of the Indian Army. In the first place, the question divides itself into two parts; there is the Indian Army proper, with the Indian sepoy officers by Europeans, and there is the British Army officered by British officers. These two questions have to be considered separately, and both these questions have been considered by the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference. Let me not be misunderstood by any Honourable Member of this House as trying to dwell again on the work that has been done by the Round Table Conference. I only want to explain on the floor of this House what has been done there, so that Honourable Members may be thoroughly aware, better aware than by a bare perusal of the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee, of the reasoning which underlay their recommendations and the nature of the recommendations themselves. Now, Sir, there has been some question with reference to these two questions as to whom the Committee should be composed of. They have been called "experts" and I understand in another place, until a reply came from Great Britain, there was a good deal of uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase "experts" and that "experts" merely meant military experts. I should like to point out in the first place that the word "military" does not find a place in that Report, but that the Report merely says that a committee of experts will be constituted to consider the question of establishment of a Sandhurst college in India, and also to consider the

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question of future Indianisation. Now, according to us who were on that Committee, it was distinctly understood that experts did not mean military experts, and if only a little more thought had been bestowed on the language of that recommendation, my friend Mr. Young being a civilian, would certainly have understood what this phrase "committee of experts" meant. It was stated that a committee of experts should be appointed consisting of Indians and Englishmen. Now, if you take it that Indians ought to be there—and you know that there are no Indians who are military experts—it obviously follows that the word "experts" does not mean military experts but those who by their special knowledge and special study of these questions can contribute to the discussion and elucidation of the problems which will come before the committee when it is constituted. Why the whole of the Army Headquarters should have been upset and unable to understand for weeks, in spite of the assistance of the latest dictionaries on the subject, the meaning of the word "experts" passes my comprehension altogether, and why a cable should have been sent from India to England and back from England to India on this very simple question, is one of those Eleusinian mysteries which I shall not attempt to solve. What the Defence Sub-Committee decided was merely this, that immediately a Sandhurst Committee should be appointed. It was really not a decision of the Defence Sub-Committee, but the announcement was made at the very start of the proceedings by Mr. Thomas, on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, who presided over the Defence Sub-Committee, that a Sandhurst College should be immediately established in India. Then we went to the question of Indianisation, and here there were two views which were given expression to. One view was that in the light of the various Reports that had already been passed, it should be made clear that Indianisation would proceed at a certain specific pace, and that the Committee should, there and then, decide what that pace should be. The other members of the Committee felt that with the limited time at their disposal—and you may remember that the Defence Sub-Committee was constituted some time about the second week of January, and we had to finish our work by the 19th or 20th—with the limited time before them and with the large number of confidential questions that might arise in relation to the subject, it was not possible or desirable that the pace should be exactly set out by that Committee, and therefore it was decided that another committee should be immediately constituted composed of Indians and Europeans, experts no doubt, experts in that matter, having special knowledge, to decide this question of the pace of Indianisation. Reference has been made to one confidential document which was unearthed at that Committee, and I should like to explain exactly what that confidential document was, particularly because in another place the head of the Army has said that all those committees' Reports will be "washed out". I do not know exactly what the military interpretation of the phrase "washed out" is, but if it means that they have got to be ignored, that they will be of no weight, that other military experts of to-day can give opinions which go directly against the opinions that have been already expressed, that whereas the Rawlinson's committee said that within a period of 30 years complete Indianisation might take place, the present military experts might turn round and say, not within a period of 30 years but within a period of 300 years it might

take place then I venture to submit that the phrase "washed out" has a different meaning to us from what it has to the military experts. They are not going to be washed out, they are going to be taken into consideration, and one recommendation of the Defence Sub-Committee is that they will be taken into consideration.

Let me explain in particular what that Report is. A committee was constituted in the year 1921 when the agitation for Indianisation of the Army was much less severe than what it is today. A committee was constituted, and Lord Rawlinson, the then Commander-in-Chief, asked his military experts to draw up a scheme. That scheme came up before the Executive Council of the Government of India at the time. It was further revised, and the last recommendation of the Government of India, the unanimous recommendation of the Government—the despatch I understand was signed by the Marquess of Reading, the then Viceroy, by Lord Rawlinson, the then Commander-in-Chief, by Sir William Vincent, by Sir Malcolm Hailey, by Sir Charles Innes, by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir B. N. Sarma—that went up to the Secretary of State and suggested that, within a period of 28 or 30 years, the whole scheme of Indianisation of the Indian Army should and could take place.

Mr. T. N. Ramakrishna Reddi (Madras ceded Districts and Chittoor: Non-Muhammudan Rural): The existence of that Report was denied.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: It is a despatch of the Government of India. It was mentioned in the Defence Committee and was not contradicted. It was mentioned with such appropriate previous authority as was necessary for disclosing confidential communications, by two gentlemen who were previously Members of the Executive Council, namely, Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. If they have disclosed any confidential communications, the Official Secrets Act may be mobilised against them, but I am not responsible, and I am simply taking the facts as they have been given out by them.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: But it has been placed on the table of this House.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: Yes, it has been placed on the table of the House. Lord Rawlinson, one of the highest military experts, the Marquess of Reading, who till the other day was not considered as very keen and sympathetic towards Indian aspirations, Sir Malcolm Hailey and Sir Charles Innes, two of them, whom His Majesty the King Emperor has said are his faithful and trusted servants in the order which He issued when appointing them as Governors of various provinces—these are the gentlemen under whose signature this document has gone out. And if that is to be washed out, I hope His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will remember what ought to take its place. It is perfectly true that when they made this recommendation, they fixed this period of 28 years or 30 years at a time when there was no question of self-government or Dominion Status for this country, at a time when the present scheme had not yet been evolved. I do not want to argue on the principle of rule of three, but it is apparent that if in 1921 when there was not this strong agitation, when the Government of the day had not decided on what it ought to do, and when, as a matter of fact, the Government of India Act had just been passed and the idea of responsible Government in the

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centre was far, far away from the minds of practical British statesmen, this was the scheme that was prepared under the unanimous signature of these gentlemen, these experts I venture to call them—I certainly think that the document which will now take its place must have a proper relation to the present day facts.

Now, Sir, that is with reference to the Indianisation of the Army. I do not want to go into the bitter history of the last few years and the attempts that have been made to throw overboard that Report. When the Skeen Committee was appointed, that Committee was not furnished with this singularly useful document, and an attempt was made to see that officers, Indians, were so posted to the different units that no British officer would, in any time, or at any period, be in a position of serving under any Indian officer—the eight units being nothing more than a racially discriminatory piece of administrative injustice. I do not want to go into that history, because we are living in better times and are having new hopes before us. Here, let me say that the Simon Commission's scheme of a Dominion army and an Imperial army was thrown overboard in the first five minutes when the Defence Sub-Committee began to consider this question. (Cheers.) There can be no question of reviving such an idea altogether.

The Sub-Committee's recommendation says:

"That immediate steps be taken to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army to make it commensurate with the main object in view."

These are the two phrases that have to be considered. In the first place, the increase should be substantial, and in the second place, that it should be commensurate with the main object in view, the main object being, that "The defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people" and in view of the new constitution which is developing. They continue to say, regard must be had to all relevant considerations, such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency, etc. Now, Sir, I should like to refer to another portion of this Committee's Report, to which attention was not adverted in the speech of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in another place—a recommendation which is just as important and which will be examined by a committee. The Report says:

"That in order to avoid delay the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian, to work out the details of the establishment of such a college (a training college).

The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation."

That is a point to which my Honourable friend Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz referred this morning. So that the substitution of purely British troops, as far as possible, by Indian troops was also a part of that committee's recommendations. In conclusion, this Report, to which all the Conservative delegates, all the Liberal delegates and all the representatives of His Majesty's Government were parties, because it is a unanimous Report—this Report says:

"In agreeing to the foregoing recommendations, the Committee were unanimous in their view that the declaration must not be taken as a mere pious expression of opinion, but that immediately the Conference was concluded, steps should be taken to deal effectively with the recommendations made."

These are the provisions with reference to the Indianisation of the Army. Now, Sir, I wish to advert to one other remark that was made in another place by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Very often it is suggested that this question of Indianisation will be taken up and that we must always remember that the military is not like the civil Departments, **that you are dealing there not with files and red tape, but that you are dealing with human agency, and that you have to be very, very careful with reference to these matters.** To quote the language of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief:

“They will have to recommend how we shall be able to produce a body of young men capable of training the Army in peace and of leading it in war, men whom the magnificent soldiers of the Indian Army will be content to follow when their lives are at stake.”

Sir, I venture to raise my humble voice of protest against a statement of that kind. You are doing injustice to yourself. You are not doing justice to the Indian soldiers when you suggest the possibility of their being discontented with the future recruited Indian officers of the Army. Suppose I were to turn round—I know outside this House I would come under various penal clauses—and speak of the European recruited officers as not being qualified either morally or physically to lead the splendid battalions of Indian troops that are now under their control. Would that be fair? By all means fix your rate of Indianisation. By all means reject in your selection committees those who, you think, are not qualified, but a general statement like that—that Indian soldiers may not be content to follow those who may be put above them—and practically carrying on an agitation among the Indian soldiers inviting them to enter a caveat against the future process of Indianisation, is likely to do great harm in the future. I do not want to construe either the words or the intentions of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. These words have been uttered so often before by others. I have not got any particular complaint against His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. But these words have been so repeatedly uttered; and it has been so often suggested that Indian soldiers may not be content to follow their leaders, who may be the future officers of the Army, that I say that this is not a fair thing to do. Have as rigorous a test as possible. Exclude the men who you think will not make able officers, but to prejudge the whole issue and more than that, to sow discord among Indian troops and to carry on an agitation among the ranks of the Indian troops and to suggest that they may not be content to follow the lead of the officers who may be put over them, is a thing that ought not to be allowed. It is not fair to the scheme of Indianisation. It is not fair to the Indian people. Reprisals are so easy that I do not venture to dwell on those reprisals.

I am very thankful to you for the great indulgence that you have shown me in the course of this debate. I only want to say this—that the Finance Member must be able to assert himself in these matters, and find his money mainly from the Military Budget. There is no use of his turning round and saying that he is powerless in the matter. Exceptional crises require exceptional remedies, and even the Military, the great Department which is untouchable, even that Military Department must come into some correlation with existing facts. Even they must realise that while Rome is burning, the military cannot go on having surpluses and purchasing unsaleable stores. They must realise that at this time of crisis, they should come to the real help of the civil

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Department and they should cut down expenditure wherever they can possibly do so. I venture to state that, unless this is done, there is no hope of balancing your Budget. Sir, I thank you.

Mr. Jagan Nath Aggarwal (Jullundur Division: Non-Muhammadan): Sir, after the very learned and able criticism of the Military Budget by my friend, Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar, I do not think much has been left for me to say. I feel however in duty bound to draw the attention of the House to a few subjects underlying this question of military expenditure. We have seen how the military expenditure stands at the extraordinary figure of 55 crores, and the Finance Member has said, as a great measure of retrenchment, that he has been able to bring it down to 52½ crores. Now, looking at these figures, one may not have an idea of the immensity of the amount that we are spending on these military services. We must look at it from another point of view and find out what relation it bears to our total revenue. With regard to this, you will be pleased to remember that I had occasion to point out in another connection that this expenditure of the Military Department amounts to no less than 62½ per cent. of the current expenditure of the Central Government. This enormous figure of 62½ per cent. is one that is worth looking into. The Government of India as at present constituted are in no sense a Government constituted solely for the purpose of defence. They are in some respects a paternal government, in some respects a highly socialistic government. They carry on all the ordinary activities of a modern government. They own vast domains of forests, railways, canals and so on. For a Government like this, 62½ per cent. of the expenditure for the Army alone is an extravagant provision. Now, let us look a little more closely into it. We find that this expenditure has not been going on at this scale from very old times. Since 1913, India has suffered this expenditure to go up by not less than 100 per cent. I will just quote a few figures from the Simon Commission's Report, Vol. II, page 217. Great Britain has increased this expenditure from 1913 by 48 per cent. It was 77·2 million pounds in 1913. It is 115 in 1928, an increase of 48·9 per cent. Sir, you will remember that Great Britain is the very centre of the Empire, having to face European combinations and having a far flung empire. The Dominions of Great Britain have increased this expenditure from 9 millions to 12 millions, an increase of 33 per cent. What do we find in the case of India? It is only a part of the Empire, having no extra obligations beyond her own frontier. We have had an increase from 22 million pounds to 44 millions, an increase of 100 per cent. That is one aspect of the case. One would think that India was engaged in a terrible war inside and outside. The position is that even eight years after the Great War, India had obtained no relief, and this is quite against the practice of all other countries in the world. We have not got any relief from the greater sense of world security which has obtained since the War. This is the problem which faces us. We have increased our expenditure by 100 per cent. Are we such a military nation? Are we out to encroach on the territory of our neighbours? Nothing of the kind. Coming to the figures, I would put the subject in another way. The position is that the whole of the Customs revenue, practically amounting to over 55 crores, which my Honourable friend, the Finance Member, is taking such great care to nurse and to increase by various devices such

as surcharges, 10 per cent. increase, Imperial preference, tariffs and so on, is swallowed up by this Military Department. That is the alarming problem we have to face. With regard to retrenchment, and the great waste now going on in the Military Department, that subject has been dealt with at great length by my Honourable friend, Mr. Mudaliar, who has preceded me, and I do not wish to weary the House with the details. I shall however place the matter before you from another point of view. Speaking in another place, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief made a statement implementing the declaration of the Round Table Conference, to which I shall come presently, in a spirit which I entirely appreciate. He said: "I would like to draw the attention of this Honourable House to the vast difference in the atmosphere in which this Committee will sit and the atmosphere in which the previous committee sat". This committee was a committee appointed to recommend the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst. His Excellency announced a committee to be immediately constituted to carry out the declaration of the Prime Minister, and I am sorry the Army Member has not made any declaration in this House. There have been three previous committees, a fact which was not previously admitted in this House. There was the Military Requirements Committee of Lord Rawlinson, the Shea Committee and the Sken Committee. His Excellency said that all these committees sat in an atmosphere of unreality. Now, Sir, these are important words—an atmosphere of unreality. I will just explain what the atmosphere of unreality means. When we talked of the experts of these committees, we were told that there were no such committees or in official parlance they had no knowledge of it. Now, Sir, if the Army Member had no knowledge of it, certainly we, poor non-official mortals, could have no knowledge of it. But it so happened that the representative of the Committee of Imperial Defence before the Round Table Conference had a better show to make; or some Army member, having got hold of the document and being more faithful to the interests both of India and of England, gave away the show, and that document must have come as a surprise to my Honourable friends opposite that the existence of these two committees and the very alarming Reports which these committees presented could no longer be kept a secret. Now the element of unreality then consisted first in ignoring the existence of these Reports. Then comes another element of unreality. The Sken Committee presented its Report, recommending the early establishment of a military college. Well, a military college had to be established; Resolution after Resolution of this House demanded of the Army Member that this college should be established in 1933. Well, he had said so in some form or other that this college was to be established. Why then did he not ask for the money to establish it? The reply was, "Yes, but 1933 was three years ahead". Then came the inconvenient truth that they could only hope to establish this college when there was a convenient flow of recruits to man the college. "We cannot have a college without students", but you cannot, Sir, have a supply before there is a demand? So there was that element of unreality. The Committee had recommended the establishment of a college; the military people did not want it; the Indian people wanted it, and therefore it was a game between these people, the military and the Indian people both saving, with different motives in their mind, that the college should be there, or should not be there. That was the atmosphere of unreality. Now let us hope that any pronouncement that the Army Secretary makes today will be in that air of reality and not of unreality.

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as in the past. Now we find His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief said in another place:

“To my mind they all sat in an atmosphere of unreality. The principle of Indianisation was only very partially accepted.”

Thus, all the Resolutions on the subject which had been moved from this side of the House had been only very partially accepted, and, “The principle of the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst was constantly turned down”. The reason why it was turned down we do not know, but it was constantly turned down. It is said that the situation now is profoundly altered, and I am very glad to hear it. Let us hope it will be altered in this House too:

“The young plant of Indianisation has now had seven years' growth, and if it is still delicate and its constitution is not yet wholly satisfactory, it”—this plant of seven years' growth—“has now the declared support of both Governments, the Government at home and here, while an Indian Sandhurst has been actually approved by both Governments and will be an accomplished fact before very long.”

The new committee will therefore deliberate not in an atmosphere of unreality, but as practical men endeavouring to submit practical proposals on a declared policy. Now, Sir, that is the situation in which we find ourselves, that according to the declaration of His Excellency, this Indian Sandhurst is coming. Sir, let us hope it is coming in this altered atmosphere, and that it has a much more real object than it had hitherto had. I take His Excellency's words to be absolutely true in spirit, and I entirely appreciate them, but I hope the Army Secretary will be able to improve upon that and will not try to take away one word from this declaration which His Excellency made in another place. This declaration, we take it, has the high authority of His Majesty's Government in England, but we were much amused to find that the meaning attached to the word “expert”, was a matter of reference to the Government in England. It was with reference to the declaration in this sentence of the recommendation at page 62 in the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference:

“That in order to avoid delay, the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian (including the representatives of Indian States).”

Now that could not possibly include officials; it was bound to include non-officials; and on that point—you may also bear with me for a minute—the word “expert” was defined by His Majesty's Government thus:

“The term ‘expert’ would include a person, whether official or otherwise, who is qualified by special knowledge or experience to contribute to the solution of these particular problems, those particular problems being to work out the details of the establishment of a college in India to train candidates for commissions in all arms of the Indian Defence services.”

This definition, then, of the word “expert” comes in very handy now,—“Persons who can establish by their expert knowledge or otherwise their claim to contribute to the successful inauguration of the military college”. In this connection, Sir, I have two observations to make. First and foremost, we have the settled principle, which has been accepted, that there must be one standard for the admission of Indians as of anybody else.

There ought not to be various standards for various classes or communities, but there should be one standard of efficiency. Put it as high as you can, as high as you like, for instance, that your brain must be of a certain quality, that your knowledge in arithmetic, algebra or geometry must be of such and such a standard, that your biceps must be developed so far, that your chest must have so much development, that you must know gymnastics, swimming, rowing; put up any standard of efficiency you like. Now in this connection I may be permitted to mention that the co-operation of the educational authorities will be a very valuable asset. It is desirable to enlist all the talent in the country, as far as we can, and therefore, Sir, I would suggest that, when this committee of experts is set up, the educational authorities and the university authorities would by their knowledge of the actual conditions, be able to show how far the educated youth of this country would be able to join these colleges, and their co-operation would be of immense value. Therefore I commend that suggestion to the Army authorities for what it is worth—that in constituting this committee, they should look ahead, look about and enlist the help and co-operation of the educational and university centres. Secondly—and this is a far more important question—I hope the admission to these colleges will not be on any such restricted basis that such and such classes and castes alone would be admitted. Hitherto, we have to say with great regret, the policy of the Government has been to restrict admission to the Army to certain classes, and thus a very inconvenient and inequitable formula was adopted which might have stood the test of time during the last seventy years, but is too rigid for these times. Sir, the universal demand now is for a truly national army composed of all classes of citizens, all of whom shall have to bear the burden of defence. Provided they come up to the standard fixed, you must be prepared to admit all classes. You must give up the petty-fogging attempt to introduce a class here and a class there; you must give up taking men only according to the formula, "This man is the son of one belonging to the agricultural class", "That man belongs to the martial class", and so on; you must open the portals of your college to all; you must take the best material in the country from whatever place it may hail and train it. Your military recruitment policy must be democratic.

Sir, I hope the encouraging words of His Excellency in another place which I have read out will be very faithfully carried out. Now with regard to one or two other matters, I may just claim your attention for a while. In this connection one may just notice this salient fact, that the Army in India is very expensive from two points of view. The first is that this is an Army which is kept in India for the purpose not only of India but, as has been pointed out before, it performs a triple service. It is kept for the purpose of preventing internal commotion, secondly, for the purpose of frontier defence, and thirdly, what is more important, for the purpose of discharging Imperial obligations. Now, Sir, it is this part of the case that I submit should be examined rather more carefully. In this connection I wish to draw the attention of the House to a very weighty pronouncement by no less a person than Lord Curzon who in the introduction to his book on the British Corps in France wrote:

"The Indian Army in fact has always possessed and has been proud of possessing a triple function—the preservation of internal peace in India itself, the defence of the Indian frontiers, and preparedness to embark at a moment's notice for Imperial service in all parts of the globe."

[Mr. Jagan Nath Aggarwal.]

Now, Sir, if this is a matter of credit—and we are very proud of it—
 1 P.M. that the Indian Army has acquitted itself so well in these various theatres of war, not only during the Great War, but before and since, and if it is prepared to embark at a moment's notice for Imperial services in other parts of the globe, then I respectfully submit that it ought to be a necessary consequence that that Imperial body, which is responsible for sending these troops or keeping them, should bear their expense. It has been pointed out that the moment these Indian troops embark on some other theatre of war, the British Government have got to pay for them. That is precisely so. But the whole question is that you may keep them for 20 years and may use them in war only for 20 months. So you pay really only for 20 months, but what about the 20 years? Sir, this 100 per cent. increase in the Army is due to this important fact, namely, that the Indian Army here is kept in order to be ready at a moment's notice to discharge Imperial obligations abroad. In this connection, I give a quotation again from Lord Curzon:

"In this third aspect, India has for long been one of the most important units in the scheme of British Imperial defence, providing the British Government with a striking force always ready, of admirable efficiency and assured valour."

I am thankful to Lord Curzon for all these superlatives which, I submit, the Indian Army well deserves, but I submit that somebody else must now pay the piper. We have paid it too long and too foolishly. This is a matter to which this House should direct its attention, because in all self-governing countries we have seen that the military burden is borne by those countries themselves. Sir, the military expenditure of this country is simply terrible, and we have, during the last year and this, as has been shown so clearly, levied 20 crores of extra taxation, and I do not know whether my friend, the Honourable the Finance Member, will be able to justify it. Sir, we are passing through critical times, and conditions are not temporary. Therefore these 20 crores of rupees, which my friend hopes to get by additional taxation, will not bridge over the gulf.

The second aspect of the case must also be considered that it is possible to replace British troops by Indian troops. That aspect of the question has also got to be looked at. It has been pointed out over and over again—and I do not wish to weary the House by repeating it—that the cost of a British soldier is five times the cost of an Indian soldier. Now, Sir, that would mean that if one unit of the British Army were sent back, we would be able to get five units of the Indian Army in its place. In the present circumstances and with the present personnel and management and efficiency and all the rest of it, we could very well manage to raise in place of five units of the Army say 2½ units. Economy is possible in a much greater degree in that way. I have just invited the attention of the House to this question because I find that the atmosphere has changed, and we are not living in an atmosphere of unreality. Therefore, I wish to make a present of this quotation from a very high source which the Army Secretary might like to take note of. This House will remember that a committee was appointed known as the Esher Committee, which recommended that the Army in India was regarded as a part of the Imperial defence forces, on which the Assembly appointed a committee which made certain recommendations. As a result of that, the Governor General in Council proposed a reduction. How it was

dealt with by the Army Department at home is a matter to which I may be permitted to draw the attention of the House. I am quoting from a book of Sir Sivaswami Aiyar called "Indian Constitutional Problems". Of course, the quotation which I am concerned with is given from another source, which I will indicate :

"A very interesting light is thrown upon the real attitude of the military authorities in India by the correspondence between Lord Rawlinson, the then Commander-in-Chief of India, and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the United Kingdom. The following passage shows that in spite of a decision arrived at by the Governor General in Council to reduce the British troops by four battalions and two cavalry regiments, Lord Rawlinson thought it fit to appeal direct to the Chief of the General Staff against the decision. This is what Sir Henry Wilson entered in his diary.

'At five o'clock, I got a S. O. S. from Philip Chetwode, who reported a wire just received to me from Rawly, which said that, in spite of his most strenuous opposition, the Viceroy in Council had ordered a reduction of British troops by four battalions and two cavalry regiments. Rawly says this is 'madness' and asks for my help. I have wired to Philip to go to Montagu and to find out whether I am or am not his military adviser; and I told Philip not to be put off by being told that this was a matter of internal economy to be decided by the Viceroy in Council, because the internal security in India, the protection of her frontiers, the power to send troops to countries outside her frontiers such as Mesopotamia, Burma, Singapore and Hongkong, and finally the obligation on Home Government to reinforce India in case of necessity, were all matters interwoven with Imperial strategy and therefore come under me.

I wonder what Philip will get as an answer. As I said a week ago when writing to Rawly, Montagu and Chelmsford have set up a council with a lot of natives on it and have lost control, and now they dare not impose the extra taxation necessary!'

I pause here for a minute because this was written seven or eight years back. The atmosphere is changed, things have changed and I take it that the angle of vision from which the Army Secretary will look at it is also changed. To continue the quotation :

"This same council will before long refuse to allow Indian native troops to serve outside of India!"

What followed my learned friend will be able to indicate to us. This is one part of the subject.

Then, Sir, a good many other matters would call for notice, but I pause to consider only one subject of much humbler dimensions than the other important matters which come within the administration of the Army Department. There is one subject to which attention need be drawn and that is the administration of the cantonments. Now, Sir, these cantonments have grown up not as a matter of accident, but as a matter of design. At a time when these cantonments were established, the authorities wanted the people to come over and live in them just as you want people to come over and live in New Delhi, by coaxing, cajoling, granting pieces of land and various other devices. By these means a certain amount of civil population was brought there. Of course, those were the times when the Military Department was more profuse in its promises and in grants than in threats. That population has grown up and we all know that these cantonments are no longer mere annexes of the Military forces. They are big civil stations, with trade, commerce and industry, such as, at Ambala, Sialkot, Ferozepore and Jullundur. I am talking of the Punjab only. There are the various cantonments, the administration of which was carried on at any rate up to 1924, and I am sorry to say is carried on in spirit though not in letter at the present time, in more

[Mr. Jagan Nath Aggarwal.]

or less inelastic manner. After a good deal of agitation in 1924, instead of a small Cantonment Act followed by Regulations or Rules which were called the Cantonment Code, we have now a comprehensive measure called the Indian Cantonment Act. Now, Sir, one of the things which has been troubling the cantonment people, and to which I wish to draw the attention of the Army Secretary, is that there was a section in the old Cantonment Code, and there is a section in the present Act, which permits the Officer Commanding to order the expulsion of any person from the cantonment whom he considers of an undesirable character. If this section had not been used in the way that it has been used of late, I would not have raised any objection to it. Nobody on this side of the House would for a moment suggest that persons who are guilty of seducing persons from their loyalty or of otherwise tampering with the military forces or the air forces, or persons who are otherwise engaged in such designs should be allowed to live in cantonments. We do not want that. But the question is that in the civil population there are persons who may become unacceptable to the military authorities, just as a good many people outside do become unacceptable to the civil population in the country as a result of the repercussions of movements in the country. There are various methods of punishing these people under the ordinary law, but the military people have a simpler way of dealing with them, *viz.*, by expelling these people from these cantonments. Now, what has happened is that under the Code of 1910 a good many people are at present serving the sentences of expulsion. I put it to the Army Member whether he has ever looked into the cases of these people and the particular hardships that are involved therein. A person is there in his place whose activities are not acceptable to the Army Department, and he is ordered to quit the cantonment, leave his property, leave his relations and also leave his means of livelihood. Persons like that have been there and under the Cantonments Act of 1912, they have not been permitted up till now to return to their homes. Has anybody looked into those cases? Similarly under the present Cantonments Act, a number of persons has suffered expulsion, and I put it to you, Sir, we are living at a time when the rule of law is supposed to be law for all men, when the same law is supposed to prevail not only in civil areas but also in these military areas. But in practice there is nothing of the kind. For these civil populations, where is the rule of law which permits expulsion of this kind for a person without any trial, without giving the man an opportunity of explaining his position, though there are certain provisions that a man will be called upon and so on and so forth. But, I say, Sir, you do not place a man on trial before a court of law. You have only the summary power of turning him out from his place where he may have been living for several years. These are the hard cases to which I wish to draw the attention of the House. If you want a clearer and cooler and calmer atmosphere, then you ought to change your angle of vision, you ought to look into the cases of these people and permit those people—unless they have been guilty of seducing the Army or tampering with their loyalty—wholesale to return to their homes, if you want quiet and peace to prevail. People outside, on the civil side, have had their amnesty owing to the peace agreement just now concluded, and I submit those who live in the military areas should also have their amnesty. During the last six years hundreds of persons have been turned out of their homes in the cantonment areas, and they

should all be permitted to return to their homes. This is the last subject, Sir, to which I would invite the attention of the Honourable Member.

The Assembly then adjourned for Lunch till a Quarter Past Two of the Clock.

The Assembly re-assembled after Lunch at a Quarter Past two of the Clock, Mr. President in the Chair.

Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad (United Provinces Southern Divisions: Muhammadan Rural): Sir, just one year and two days ago, this party moved a similar cut and it was carried by 49 votes against 44. A year has passed away and we are today just in the same position as we were in 1930. The speeches that were delivered last year drew the attention of the Army Secretary to the recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee. No action has been taken during this interval. The Leader of the Independent Party, Mr. Jinnah, complimented the Army Secretary as an expert in giving evasive replies, but I hope he will not give evasive replies this year too but that he will give direct replies to the questions that are raised from this side of the House.

Sir, coming first to the recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee, it was pointed out that no action has yet been taken about the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst. I do not believe that it can be established by an Aladin's lamp. There are so many important things to be discussed, the location of the site and the building, the syllabus and the courses of study, rules and regulations, etc., all these matters should be settled before the College is in working order. So unless the work is taken up in right earnest and immediately, it will be impossible to establish the Indian Sandhurst in 1933. The second thing to which attention has been repeatedly drawn,—it was pointed out today and also recommended by the Indian Sandhurst Committee—is the abolition of the 8 unit scheme. In this connection nothing has been done, and we would like to have a definite reply from the Army Secretary and not the evasive reply that he has been accustomed to give. The third important suggestion of the Indian Sandhurst Committee was that suitable Indian students from British Universities should be granted direct commissions in the Army. I should like to know how many Indians have been selected during the last four years from the British Universities. The fourth recommendation, which was really also an important recommendation, was that Indians should be made eligible to be employed as King's Commissioned officers in the Artillery, Engineer, Signal, Tank and Air arms of the Army in India; and in this connection I should like to have some figures as to how many Indians have been selected for these technical grades. The fifth recommendation was that Indian cadets who qualify at Woolwich, and later, those who qualify in India by the course corresponding to that of Woolwich, should complete their initial training in exactly the same way as the British cadet does at present, i.e., by attending courses at Chatham and Cambridge in the case of Engineer officers and at Larkhill in the case of Artillery officers. Here also I should like to know from the Army Secretary what has been done about this recommendation.

[Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad.]

These were the main recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee, and now we come to the subsidiary recommendations, and I should like to know what has been done in that connection.

One of the very important suggestions that was made was that the Government of India should impress upon the educational authorities the paramount importance of reforming the system of education in India with a view to developing in the pupils of the ordinary schools and colleges those characteristics so essential in an army officer, to which little or no attention is at present paid by them, and should appeal to them to re-organise the institutions under their control to this end. Here I should like to know what action has been taken either by the Army or by the Education Department to reform the educational system. Have they ever appointed a committee to consider these questions? Have they issued any circular to the Principals of Colleges or the Registrars of the Universities drawing their attention to the need for reforming the educational system? This is a reform which is badly needed. But, I am not going to dilate upon it today. I simply say all this, in order to find out what action, if any, Government have taken to give effect to these very important recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee. Sir, this year I expect a better reply from the Treasury Benches, and I hope that they will be able to tell us what they have done during the last 12 months.

Sir, the second point that I should like to take up, which was raised by the Honourable the Mover of this motion, but on which I will just give some more details, is the question of the reduction of the number of men in an infantry battalion. In the old days we had 866 men in a battalion, and it was pointed out by the Army Secretary last year that the number had been reduced to 728. Further reduction is also possible according to the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee. The Inchcape Committee suggested that during the war time the number should be 776 and during peace time the number should be further reduced by 20 per cent.; and if we reduce 776 by 20 per cent., a further reduction of 110 for the present number of 728 is possible as was pointed out by the Mover of the motion. I also calculated the figures as to how much reduction we could make if we carry out this important recommendation of the Inchcape Committee. I came to the conclusion that the Finance Member will no longer need fresh taxation on income-tax, because that will be covered by the saving in the Army Budget under this head alone.

Sir, we have at present, as was also pointed out, two lakhs and 26 thousand odd Indian soldiers. Out of this we require some force, I put it approximately at 26 thousand, for internal peace, and the remaining two lakhs are kept in harness to keep peace on the Frontier Province. It was pointed out last year, and I would like to repeat it here again, that the whole population of these borderline tribes for whom we have to maintain such a large Army is only 30 lakhs, and out of this it was calculated that the number of persons who are actually able to fight does not exceed 7 or 8 lakhs. Is it at all desirable that we should maintain such a big Army in order to keep only 7 or 8 lakhs persons in order? We keep them in disorder simply because we keep a large force to keep in order. Such an expenditure to my mind is exceedingly undesirable. Before we determine the exact strength of Army required for defence, it is first necessary to define our frontier policy. We should first like to know—and the

answer to the whole question depends upon this fact—what is the boundary line of India on the North West side? This question was not directly taken up by the Simon Commission; it was omitted also in the Despatch of the Government of India; and in the Report of the Round Table Conference as given to us, the question is not handled directly. It is of the utmost importance that we should know what is the boundary line on the North West side of India and what is our North West Frontier policy. From the First Afghan War the question has been agitating all the political and military authorities as to what should be the boundary line of India. There were the people who advocated a forward policy, and they suggested that the boundary line should be adjacent to Russia, or at least adjacent to Afghanistan. Then there were the advocates of what may be called the backward policy and they said that the boundary line of India should be the River Indus, which is its natural boundary. A great conflict went on for a very long time between the advocates of the forward and the backward policies, till 1893, when the Durand Line was defined and clearly marked. It is an artificial line marked out on the trans-frontier area. This Durand Line is sometimes alleged to be the boundary line of India. This line was defined in 1893, but from the speeches and despatches later on, it looks as if this was never clearly admitted. I shall just read a despatch from Lord George Hamilton in 1901 in which he said that:

“The policy of maintaining a weak buffer state between two strong empires was an experiment made many years ago and it certainly has not proved a success either in Afghanistan or Persia. I look forward to the day when the frontiers of Great Britain and Russia may be coterminous.”

Evidently, this despatch of Lord George Hamilton has not been officially denied: at least I have never seen it anywhere and we have got a suspicion in our minds that it is quite possible that this large Army is maintained not so much for the protection of India, as for contemplated attack in trying to make the boundaries of India coincide with Russia. The Durand Line did not settle the controversy between the two policies. A third policy has been brought into the controversy called a stationary policy. We should first of all clearly define what our border line is, and I think this is a question which should be settled once for all. I from this side of the House advocate very strongly that India's boundary should be definitely defined as the Durand Line and we should give up once for all the backward and forward policies. It is on this policy that we should establish our frontier defence and it is on this policy that we should estimate the Army we require for defence purposes. This is the first point, as I said, which should be settled before we can determine the strength of the Army.

Now, Sir, after defining the boundary line, we should take up next the very important question of how much Army we require for different purposes. We have got three distinct objects. One is the maintenance of internal peace. The second is the defence of our frontier borders, and the third is the foreign attack, outside the border tribes, or what I may call the Imperial Defence. These are the three distinct objects, and before we can undertake any question of Army review or curtailment of expenditure we should have some clear idea before us how much Army we require for each of these three purposes. It should be formed no doubt by military experts, but their opinions and their reports should be open to

[Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad.]

discussion by the Assembly and then we will be in a position to face our Military Budget. I admit, and every one will admit, that the Military Budget at present is a very top-heavy one. It was pointed out today by Mr. Aggarwal that the expenditure on the military is 62 per cent., of the total expenditure of the Central Government and that if we exclude payments on account of interest, which is after all not an administrative expenditure, this military expenditure rises to about 75 per cent. And I think everybody will agree that devoting 75 per cent., of the total expenditure to military purposes in time of peace cannot be justified by any logical argument or by any administrative reasons. After all there is a certain limit beyond which military expenditure ought not to go. There are more important subjects—nation building subjects like education, the development of industries, health and sanitation and medicine which must have a prior claim to military expenditure; and no country in the world can devote three-fourths of its resources for destructive purposes and leave only one-fourth of its resources for constructive work and for administration. In order to avoid this state of affairs, it is desirable, as I have just pointed out, that military experts should determine the strength of the Army necessary for each of these three purposes; and after determining the strength of the Army for each of these three purposes, we will be able to determine the expenditure for the Army.

Reference has already been made today to the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces. I was a member of the Territorial Force Committee, but on account of my departure to England, I had to resign and I was convinced at that time, and I am convinced today, that the present artificial division between the Territorial Force and the Auxiliary Force is nothing but a racial division. All Europeans and Anglo-Indians go to the Auxiliary Force and all the Indians go to the Territorial Force; and as the Honourable gentlemen from Madras pointed out this Territorial Force is really a step-child. We want a very drastic change, and really speaking this Auxiliary Force might be re-organised as a second line of defence; the Territorial Force may be taken to be a third line of defence, and they may be called out in time of necessity. We should fix the strength of the regular Army we require for peace time; and in order to meet emergencies and special occasions, we should determine the strength of Auxiliary and Territorial Forces. In this connection I may also mention by the way that invidious distinction will disappear if the Auxiliary Force is taken to be a second line of defence and the Territorial Forces as the third line of defence, and no person should be admitted to the Auxiliary Forces unless he has served for a certain number of years in the Territorial Force, so that the approach to the Auxiliary Force may be through the Territorial Force and then this racial distinction, of which we complain today, will disappear.

So much about the maintenance of peace and order in the country. Then we come to our frontier defence. This also is a matter which will require very careful consideration: and if we stick to the Durand Line and treat our settled districts like the other provinces and the unsettled tracts, as pointed out in the Simon Report, as a kind of Indian States with separate agencies attached to the Frontier Province, then most of the difficulties will be minimised and we will not be required to maintain a large Army

Taking this as the fundamental principle, the military authorities ought to calculate the exact strength of the forces necessary for the defence of the five settled districts and for maintaining peace in the trans-frontier area. After calculating the strength of the force for these two purposes, I have no hesitation in saying that India ought to contribute also for Imperial defence. The amount of money which we ought to spend, and the strength of the forces which we ought to maintain for Imperial defence may be settled in consultation with the War Council or the Imperial Defence Council, and India will contribute her quota for this Imperial defence. The Army should not be out of proportion to the resources of this country.

Sir, there has been a good deal of discussion as regards capitulation adjustments between India and England. In this connection I should like to draw the attention of the House to one point. It was discussed in the Indian Sandhurst Committee, though definite recommendations were not recorded, and it is this, that whenever any British Army or British officers are deputed to the Indian Army, they should be given an Indian Commission in the same manner as Dominion Commissions are given to English Army officers deputed to Canada or other Dominions. Therefore, any British Army officers who may be stationed in India may be definitely included in the Indian Army, and they may be included in the quota which India is required to maintain for Imperial defence. If this arrangement is followed, all these troubles about the adjustments will disappear. I do not believe that we should pay a lump sum of money to Britain for the maintenance of the Navy or Air Force. We should maintain our own quota of Navy; we should maintain our own quota of Army and our own quota of the Air Force, all these forces should remain in India and definitely under the Indian Government.

Sir, as regards the expenditure, there is one thing more which I should like to find out, and perhaps the Honourable the Finance Member may be able to explain that. In the Railway Budget supplied to us at page 8, it was definitely pointed out that the contribution from the Railways to the general fund was 7 crores 45 lakhs, out of which they deducted the expenditure due to strategic lines, i.e., 1 crore 72 lakhs, and they only gave 5 crores 73 lakhs, while in the Memorandum supplied to us by the Financial Secretary, I find that on the Receipts side only 5 crores 73 lakhs are mentioned, and there is no mention whatever of the receipt of 1 crore 73 lakhs which the Railway Board spent for military lines. Now, I wonder under what account I should put these 173 lakhs. Should I add this amount to the 52 crores that has been put down for 1931-32 or should I add it to the discredit, shall I say, of the Railway Board? Of course, it is no credit to the Railway Board at all, because the contribution of 1 crore 73 lakhs which they made to the military authorities ought to have been placed to the credit of the Railway Board. As I said last time, the Railway Board is like an old horse whose yield is inversely proportional to the capital and it should not be made to look older by artificially reducing its contribution and general revenue.

Sir, before I sit down, I should like to make an appeal to the Army Secretary and to the Honourable the Finance Member, that they ought to release us from the heavy military expenditure. We entirely share with

[Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad.]

them the view that India should be defended. We entirely agree that we should maintain a very efficient Army. At the same time they should sympathise with us that no country in the world can afford to pay 75 per cent. of her resources to the military expenditure, especially in times of peace. Maintain minimum Army necessary for defence in times of peace, have your Auxiliary and Territorial Forces ready to come to action in time of necessity, and by adopting this principle it will be quite possible to substantially reduce our military expenditure.

Mr. Arthur Moore (Bengal: European): Sir, two years ago I pleaded in this House for a radical redistribution of military expenditure and for a complete reconstruction of the relations between the Army and the air arm with a view to securing greater efficiency at less cost. My friend, Mr. Mackworth Young, was unable to give me any assurance that anything on those lines would be done in the following year, but he did say that when the re-equipment of the Air Force with higher powered machines and with a higher ceiling had taken place, and after the experimental introduction of some troop carriers, it was possible that the whole question of the adjustment of balance between the Army and the Air Forces would have to be considered by the experts. Well, I have no doubt that I shall be told today that at the present time there is a very important Committee of experts under Mr. Howell considering this very question. I welcome the appointment of that Committee, and I trust that it will lead to very important results, and it is for that reason and because that Committee is sitting that I cannot support my friend, Mr. Shah Nawaz, in his motion for a cut in military expenditure. I should like to support the Government, but in giving my vote I wish to make it clear that I consider the situation serious. Sir, it is the military expenditure that is breaking our backs, and I am not convinced that we are getting value for money. ("Hear, hear", from the Nationalist Benches.) The position is unsafe, and I believe that it could be made safe at less cost. Substantially it remains where it was two years ago. On the Army we are spending over 50 crores, which is more than what Great Britain is spending. On the Air Force we are spending a shade over 2 crores. Great Britain is spending on her Air Force alone,—apart from what she spends on her Naval Forces—over £18,000,000, in fact 23 crores. That is to say, in Great Britain they spend half as much on the Air Force as on the Army, and in India we spend approximately 1/25th. And, Sir, we maintain that extraordinary ratio, although we here in India are confronted by an Air Power which has a greater air arm than Great Britain. We have heard a good deal, and very justly so, of the remarkable performance in the evacuation of Kabul. But we do not hear so much of the salient military lesson of that evacuation, which was that in a time of peace India was unable to undertake that entirely peaceful operation, and that it had to be done for her by Iraq. I feel that we are too parochial in India. We think too much in terms of tribal war and too little in terms of modern war. We go on making the assumption that, if India became involved on her Northern frontiers with a great Power in a modern large scale war, there would elapse a considerable interval, while both sides were pushing forward their railways, before we should come to grips. But are we right in considering it in those terms? Is it not much more probable, is it not even certain

that the Power with an overwhelming air strength would wait for no such interval, but would, as rapidly as possible, establish a forward line of aerodromes and proceed with an air offensive against this country? We with our few squadrons would be entirely unable to imitate that example. They would be wanted for protective purposes; they would be completely useless for offensive purposes. And I would ask my Honourable friend, Mr. Mackworth Young, how in the existing situation he would propose to give this House any guarantee that, within a short period after the outbreak of war, Karachi and Lahore might not be bombed from the air? I do not myself know what a mere 80 aeroplanes could do against a possible 600 or 700.

Well, Sir, turning from that to the question of tribal war, I saw it stated last Summer that the Air Force had failed in regard to the tribes. I think that the more the facts of what really happened last Summer become known, the more clearly it emerges that the real failure is the failure to use the air arm as it should be used. In the case of the first raid upon Peshawar, the Air Force was not allowed to attack the assembled lashkar in tribal territory. The lashkar was unmolested till it had crossed over into British territory and was in the cultivated lands close to Peshawar where, as we know, the tribesmen were absolutely undistinguishable from the local inhabitants and could be dealt with successfully neither by aeroplanes nor by ground troops. The second raid was, I believe, due to the fact, again, that the Air Force was not allowed to carry out the policy of blockading villages from the air, which they have so successfully used in other parts of the world. It is possible for the Air Force to make a village beyond the Frontier, any particular village, uninhabitable and to make the villagers give security for good behaviour in order to be allowed to return to the village with security. Personally I feel quite convinced that, but for the Air Force, there might have been, instead of a merely local trouble, a real war along the whole length of the Frontier last Summer and I am also quite convinced that the reason why that local trouble died away was because the tribesmen at Jammid were made to understand that in future, if they did not give this undertaking for good behaviour, they would be so treated.

Two years ago I took up the point of troop-carriers. All that we have got today is two or three machines, but if we had, say, even four squadrons of troop-carrying bombers, with a proper provision of landing grounds, it would be possible, within a radius of 500 miles in any direction, to move a whole battalion in four hours. Over shorter distances it would be possible to move two battalions in one day. Think what that means in terms of mobility. And alternatively, those troop carriers can carry bombs, they can transport ammunition, they can transport guns, and they can transport supplies. A single squadron could move a company, or it could transport 250 policemen. Aeroplanes cannot and ought not to be used offensively themselves for internal security purposes; but they can be used as a means of transport, and they can be used to diminish the number of ground troops that it is necessary to maintain. (Hear, hear.) Well, Sir, I feel that what has been done in Iraq, where the air arm is in command, and in Palestine, and Trans-Jordan and Aden, will finally have to be attempted here, if for no other reason, because of the increasing financial *impasse*.

[Mr. Arthur Moore.]

And what is the reason which makes it so difficult to get any advance here? Why is it that in these two years we seem to have made absolutely no alteration in the balance of expenditure? The truth must be that inevitably the Army becomes a vested interest, which quite instinctively and naturally seeks to protect itself. I have a great deal of sympathy with that, and I do feel that the disappearance of a famous regiment, or of any historic unit is a very real tragedy. But the public interest has got to come first, (Hear, hear), and I am not convinced that in every case it does. (Hear, hear.) In this country we ought to be in a better position than at Home, because we are fortunate here in having what I think they ought to have at Home, an embryo Ministry of Defence for the co-relation of the whole problem. The Commander-in-Chief here, the Military Member, is responsible not merely for the Army. He is responsible for the Navy and he is responsible for the Air Force. He ought to be in a position to balance the claims of all three. But the Commander-in-Chief is appointed by the Secretary of State for War solely on the advice of the Army. So long as that system continues, he will always be a soldier. He is naturally a very distinguished soldier, but every soldier inevitably is bound to become the champion of his own service, and I do feel that the Commander-in-Chief ought to be appointed by the Prime Minister in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which considers the whole problem in relation to the three arms, and not by his political subordinate in the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for War. If that were done, in time the Air Force would be given a turn; and then we should get some proper adjustment. I am very far from suggesting that the Air Force should in any way dominate the Army, or that in a measurable period of time it should monopolise the greater part of the estimate, but I do firmly believe that it would be possible, within a reasonable period of years, with far greater efficiency to get down to a peace figure in the neighbourhood of 40 crores. I think it would certainly be possible gradually to save a division and also a number of the battalions now strung out along the Frontier between Baluchistan and Chitral. The opportunity of the Air Force only came in Iraq because of the accident that, for a short time, Mr. Churchill held the portfolios of War as well as of the Air, simultaneously. It was at that time that he had the opportunity of studying the whole question, and it was he who put through the air command in Iraq. The saving was colossal, so colossal that in Trans-Jordan, Palestine and Aden the example has been followed. I am not suggesting that India can ever be garrisoned and protected in precisely the same way, but there is a great deal to be done, and the subject has hitherto not been treated whole-heartedly. I look forward hopefully to the labours of the Committee now sitting.

Mr. G. M. Young: I propose, Sir, to deal in my speech, firstly with
 3 P. M. the question of expenditure, secondly, with that of Indianisation
 and the kindred questions arising out of it, and lastly, with a few
 miscellaneous questions which have arisen in the course of this debate.
 My Honourable friend, the Mover of this Resolution, based his attack upon
 military expenditure upon the recommendations of the Indian Retrenchment
 Committee, and he repeated the old, old misstatement, if I may so call

it, that that Committee made an unqualified recommendation for the reduction of military expenditure to a figure of 50 crores. He seemed to assume also that there had been no reduction in military expenditure in the last few years. Now, Sir, the front page of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Financial Adviser, which has been issued to all Honourable Members, gives a true picture of the position. I do not think that any one who reads the statistics on that page and the explanatory paragraph following it, can consider himself justified in talking as if there had been no such thing as a reduction in military expenditure. It is quite true that we have had the advantage of the exchange. At the time that the Inchcape Committee made its recommendations, the rupee stood at 16*d.* and the effect of the stabilisation of the rupee ratio at 18*d.* has been beneficial to us in our sterling charges. Our sterling charges may be taken roughly at about £9½ million a year. In 1930-31, they were £9,401,000. If we had had to pay those charges at the rate at which the rupee stood in 1923-24, the year in which effect began to be given to the Inchcape Committee's recommendations we should have had to spend 13.70 or 71 crores. As it is, if you take the ratio which prevailed in 1931, the figure is 12.69 crores, so that roughly we have a saving of a crore a year on exchange on our present rate of sterling charges. The Inchcape figure should therefore be taken at 56 rather than 57 crores. One has only to look at this Memorandum to realise how far below 56 crores we have already got. The Inchcape Committee, it is true, made a further recommendation—that, should there be a further fall in prices, they considered that the Government of India should not rest content with the budget of 57 crores, but should be able gradually to reduce it to 50 crores. Last year we had the fall in prices to which the Inchcape Committee looked forward: and, as far as we can estimate, it gave us a benefit to the extent of 64 or 65 lakhs only. Even if we allowed for this benefit, it would not bring the Inchcape figure down to our actual expenditure which is far below 55.35 crores. My Honourable friend challenged me to produce an instance of any other country which spends so much on its military estimates as this country.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: As compared with income. Please remember that.

Mr. G. M. Young: I did not hear my Honourable friend saying that. He simply challenged me to quote the instance of any country which spends as much as India on its military estimates. I did give figures last year of other countries, which showed that most of the great powers had immensely increased their military expenditure in the last few years, while the military expenditure of India had steadily declined during the same period. For instance, in France, the military expenditure in 1922-23 was £39 millions, and in 1929 it was £64.6 millions. In the United States the figure of army expenditure rose from £51.7 millions in 1923 to £61.7 millions in 1929-30.

Diwan Bahadur T. Rangachariar: May I know what is the income per head of population of the United States?

Mr. G. M. Young: I am merely pointing out that the expenditure has risen so much.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: Did exchange have any effect?

Mr. G. M. Young: Then in Russia—and this is perhaps the most instructive of all—the military expenditure in 1925 was £41.7 millions, and is now £84 millions. Now, Sir, we have reduced our military expenditure this year by a sum of 1 crore 70 lakhs. That saving is made up in this way. 57 lakhs represents the reduction of the stabilised Budget figure to 58.63 crores, in return for which the contract—as one may call it—has been extended by a further year. We estimate a saving owing to the fall in prices of another 63 lakhs. Then we have, by economies and curtailment of the re-equipment programme to some extent, realized another 50 lakhs; and the remaining 10 lakhs is represented by a curtailment of our barrack-building programme.

An Honourable Member: Does all this mean any real retrenchment?

Mr. G. M. Young: This figure of 1 crore 70 lakhs would have been still higher but for one other circumstance. During the past year the expenditure from military estimates in connection with the civil disobedience movement, and disturbances on the Frontier closely related to that movement, amounted to no less than Rs. 71.5 lakhs. If we had not had to incur that expenditure, we should either have been able to reduce the level of our military expenditure this year, by that amount, to well below Rs. 52 crores; or—what would probably have been more economical—we should have been able to devote that sum to pressing on with the completion of the re-equipment programme, and thereby would have saved the necessity of extending the present period of a stabilised Budget by another year.

I now turn to some of the individual criticisms made on military expenditure. My Honourable friend, the Mover, asked me why we did not reduce our battalions by 154 men, as had been recommended by the Inchcape Committee. My Honourable friend, Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad, referred to what I said about that last year. I will not weary the House by repeating that in full now. I said that there had been an immediate reduction of 64 men, and that subsequently there had been a further reduction, and that the total reduction had come to 98 men. I added that that was the farthest limit to which, in the opinion of the military authorities at the present time, it would be wise to reduce the battalion from a tactical point of view. The major reduction advocated by the Inchcape Committee was very carefully considered, and, as a result, the Government eventually decided, on the advice of its military advisers, that the reduction to 98 men was all that it was possible or wise to make.

Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad: You did not then agree with the recommendation of the Inchcape Committee?

Mr. President: Order, order. Mr. Young.

Mr. G. M. Young: To that extent, Sir, we did not agree with the recommendation of the Inchcape Committee. My Honourable friend then mentioned the subject of the reduction of the number of British troops. That subject is one which has been raised, as Honourable Members are aware, in connection with the Round Table Conference, and of course will be considered in that connection by His Majesty's Government. My Honourable friend also inquired to what extent the covering troops could be reduced as a result of the pacification of the frontier; and my Honourable friend, Mr. Arthur Moore, who spoke last, also referred to this subject in connection with the use of the air arm on the Frontier. It is of course impossible for me to follow my Honourable friend, Mr. Arthur Moore, into all those

strategical questions which he raised about the use of the air arm in the defence of the Frontier and also in war. But I must remind the House that the Committee, to which my Honourable friend referred, is still sitting, and that it is considering the whole question of the control and the disposition of forces on the Frontier. The question of the extent to which the air arm can be substituted for the military arm is one which requires very high expert knowledge and very careful consideration. It is also one which is never lost sight of. But it is not one which I think can very profitably be debated in an Assembly such as this. My Honourable friend, Mr. Mudaliar, made several very trenchant criticisms on items which appeared to be claimed by us as items of retrenchment, but which is thought really involved no retrenchment or economy at all. He devoted some time to the question of surplus stocks. Now surplus stocks are of two kinds. There are surpluses which become apparent on stock-taking in arsenals and which are due to a change of pattern of equipment, or which from some other cause have become obsolete. The second kind of surpluses are those which are created by an economy in the use of stores. Now, Sir, I admit that many of the surpluses of the former character, which have become available, were due to faulty provision in the past, especially in the years immediately succeeding the war but I would not admit that they were all due to that cause. It stands to reason that if you are prepared to go to war, you must maintain a large number of lethal and other stores which, if there is no war, become obsolete and which have to be replaced without having been used. The comparison which my Honourable friend makes with business firms in this respect is not altogether accurate or applicable. The second kind of surpluses which are created by an economy in the use of stores is one for which the Army has every right, I think, to take credit. It simply means a very careful, a stringently careful, management of their stores. My Honourable friend also complained that the stabilized budget gives the military authorities an absolutely free hand and that there is no control by the Finance Department. Well, Sir, that betrays, if I may say so, a misconception of this arrangement of a stabilized Budget. The Army have no more free hand in that sense than they had before; but in order to carry out a certain re-equipment programme, they are permitted to retain their savings and to carry them over from the year in which they accrue, towards the completion of the programme in subsequent years. The programme itself has been scrutinised and approved by the Finance Department: every item in it has been so approved. What happens in respect of our savings is that we are allowed, without further question, to apply them to approved items in the programme. But every item involving expenditure or a change of policy or any other feature which would require financial approval, has to get that financial approval just the same as if there had been no stabilised budget at all. The scrutiny applied to military expenditure under this system is considerably closer than was applied before the system came into force, because it is not only applied by the Finance Department, but is applied by the higher military authorities themselves.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: My point about the stabilised Budget was not that I suggested that money could be expended in any way they pleased but that over-estimates were the order of the day in the Military Department. Will the Honourable the Army Secretary explain how, if the scrutiny is so much closer, in several pages of the Budget it is admitted that over-estimates have been made.

Mr. G. M. Young: I was talking of scrutiny of actual expenditure—of the nature of things on which expenditure is sanctioned. That is to say, the military authorities have not a free hand to spend money as they like. They have not got the power to choose, uncontrolled, on what they are going to spend their money. Every item on which they spend their money, is an item that is settled in the approved programme, or if it is not, it is one for which they have to get the sanction in the ordinary way. My Honourable friend also said that there was the usual rush of expenditure in March. I do not know if he raised the criticism on anything that he has observed in the military estimates.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: My criticism is based on what I have seen in the Public Accounts Committee's Report and in the Military Accounts Committee's Report.

Mr. G. M. Young: I can only say that, although there is undoubtedly a natural tendency to spend more money in the latter half of the year, it stands to reason that, with the stabilised budget system, in which you can carry your own savings over from one year to another, there is, at any rate, no temptation to spend money in March.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: I would refer my friend to paragraph 56 of the Military Accounts Committee's Report where it is said:

"As regards the rush of expenditure in March, Colonel Gaskell explained to the Committee that steps had been taken to secure an earlier intimation of allotments for new works to the officers concerned and earlier preparation of estimates, so that expenditure would be spread more evenly over the different months of the year."

Mr. G. M. Young: I cannot deny, then, that there was a rush of expenditure in March but I do repeat that there is no temptation, which the stabilised budget, to rush through expenditure in March, for the simple reason that military authorities are at liberty to spend it if they so wish in April or May.

An Honourable Member: So, without any temptation, the expenditure has been incurred.

Mr. G. M. Young: My Honourable friend had a good deal to say about the Territorial Force. He drew attention to the Territorial Force as an item on which the military authorities were not anxious to spend money and on which they were only too ready to retrench. It is true, Sir, that a grant of 5 lakhs to the Territorial Force was not spent, and was carried over to the military reserve. But it was carried over, I can assure my Honourable friends, to the military reserve earmarked for expenditure on Territorial Forces expansion. That is to say, it did not go into the general military coffers. It is still earmarked for the expansion of the Territorial Forces. Another point is that this amount was taken from the extra grant. It belongs to the extra grant, and not to the normal grant for the Territorial Forces. So there was no question of actually reducing the expenditure on the Territorial Forces.

My Honourable friend then quoted as an instance that he had heard that all the rifles have been taken away from the University Training Corps. That is a very interesting question. About three years ago my

Honourable friend, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, who, I am sorry to say, is no longer with us, drew attention to the fact that the University Training Corps in the United Provinces were supplied with drill purposes rifles instead of service rifles. It was perfectly true that the battalion in the United Provinces, as also a detachment at Lyallpur in the Punjab and a detachment at Patna, had these drill purposes rifles instead of service rifles. The Honourable Member, who drew attention to this, suggested that it was very unfortunate that these students were not trusted with service rifles. I gave an undertaking that I would see what could be done about it. I said that I thought it was due almost entirely to the difficulties of custody, and that if the University authorities could make proper arrangements for their custody and so on, we should be only too glad to give them service rifles. It took a long time to make the proper arrangements for the custody of these rifles. It was about two years ago that we were able to supply these detachments of the various Universities of the United Provinces with service rifles. Almost as soon as we had done this, they asked to get back their drill purposes rifles. They found that the care of the service rifles, and the responsibility attached to it, together with the trouble and inconvenience of having these special custody arrangements, were really not worth while. Some of them had to keep their rifles stored a long way off in the nearest military armoury; others had to build armouries for themselves, because there was no military armoury in which they could be kept. So the University authorities applied to us to have these drill purposes rifles restored: and on that we consulted the Local Governments and the various University Training Corps on the question whether they would also prefer to have these drill purposes rifles. They all did. Every battalion is now to have a sufficiency of service rifles to enable it to do its musketry courses, and for the rest they will have drill purposes rifles. That is the history of the equipment of the University Training Corps with drill purposes rifles. When my Honourable friend quotes that as an incident of economy, I am afraid he is under exactly the wrong impression, because it will cost us a certain amount—not very much—to convert a number of service rifles into drill purposes rifles, in order to issue them to the University Training Corps.

My Honourable friend also complained that previous service in the Territorial Force does not count for eligibility for a Commission in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers. That question is at this moment under consideration. It is perfectly true that it does not count at present.

I will now turn to the general question of Indianisation. I think, having regard to the recommendations of the Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference, and the fact that these recommendations have been immediately accepted both by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, and that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in a recent speech, indicated that we were losing no time whatever in giving effect to their recommendations, my Honourable friend the Mover of this Resolution should not have thought it necessary to go back so far into the past as he has done.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: I was not going into the past; I am talking of the present. What are you going to do before the new constitution is set up?

Mr. G. M. Young: My Honourable friend referred to it. I do not propose to follow my Honourable friend into the various recommendations of the Shea Committee and the Indian Military Requirements Committee. But I think it is due to the House that I should give them some short account of the circumstances in which these Committees were convened; because there is still a great deal of misapprehension about that; the misapprehension arising from the natural fact that one of those Reports is still a secret document. In 1921, in the first Legislative Assembly, the Government of India accepted a Resolution that 25 per cent. of the vacancies, I mean officers' vacancies, in the Indian Army should be thrown open to Indians. That recommendation was not accepted by His Majesty's Government. Later on in the year, the Indian Military Requirements Committee was convened. The function of that Committee was not Indianisation at all. It was a Committee that was called together to offer advice and make recommendations on the strength and the cost of the Army, and in fact, as its name implied, it was a Committee to advise the Government of India what were its military requirements. Now, Indianisation was no part of the terms of reference of that Committee: and the Committee recognised that fact. But the matter, they said, was so important that they did make certain recommendations about Indianisation. But they prepared no detailed scheme at all. A detailed scheme was prepared by the Committee of Military Advisers under the presidency of General Sir John Shea, which was convened immediately after the Military Requirements Committee, and was set up by Lord Rawlinson in order to prepare a detailed scheme. That is the scheme that has been laid upon the table of the House. The Military Requirements Committee, the majority of whom were Indians, made a very strong and unanimous recommendation that in no circumstances whatever should, either the Report, or the evidence of the witnesses that came before them, ever be made public. That is why the Government have never published the recommendations of the Indian Military Requirements Committee.

Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar: May I ask the Army Secretary whether that recommendation referred to the portion relating to Indianisation or whether it only related to that portion which dealt with the military requirements, where questions referring to military matters had naturally to be considered confidential?

Mr. G. M. Young: The recommendation referred to the whole Report, without any qualification whatever. They said that in no circumstances whatever should either the Report or the evidence tendered before them, be published.

Sir Cowasji Jehangir: Will the Honourable Member tell the House . . .

Mr. President: Order, order.

Sir Cowasji Jehangir: Did the Government of India accept those recommendations?

Mr. President: Order, order. The Honourable Member must be allowed to proceed.

Mr. G. M. Young: Every one knows the recommendations of the Shea Committee. That was the one Committee appointed to prepare detailed schemes for Indianisation. They were not accepted; they were rejected as I have said already in answer to a question the other day, by His Majesty's Government: and that is the reason why they were not published at that time.

But, Sir, the history of Indianisation really dates from the decisions of Government on the Report of the Indian Sandhurst Committee. Those decisions were taken in 1928. They involved the acceptance of the initial increase of vacancies to be thrown open to Indians recommended by the Committee. The number of vacancies was increased from 10 to 20, to which the Government of India also added five vacancies to be given to Viceroy's Commissioned Officers. That decision caused discontent at the time, because the Government of India did not accept the further recommendation of the Skeen Committee for an automatic increase of vacancies for a number of years right up to 1952. What the Government of India said at the time was, that they would make this initial increase, and then they would wait and see whether more candidates were forthcoming of the requisite standard, before they considered a further move. The first examination, after this new system came into force, was in the Autumn of 1928. The vacancies on that occasion were not all filled, nor were they all filled at the subsequent examination in the Summer of 1929. In the Autumn of 1929, all the ten vacancies were filled and for the first time there were candidates who qualified and did not actually get in; in fact there was competition among qualified persons, for the first time, for entry into the Indian Army. That, obviously, was an event of some importance. It showed that we were now beginning to get something like competition for entry into the Indian Army; and it is upon that that the Government of India at once began to consider what their next step should be. In the following Summer, we had ten vacancies filled again, but there were no persons who qualified, but did not pass: and in the last examination, the results of which came out at the end of January, the same thing happened, that is, ten got in, so that now, we have had for 18 months all the vacancies that we offered to Sandhurst filled by Indian candidates.

Mr. B. V. Jadhav: What about the remaining five from the rank of the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers?

Mr. G. M. Young: There are at this moment two Viceroy's Commissioned Officers at Sandhurst. A Viceroy's Commissioned Officer has the difficulty of age. At present we have very few Viceroy's Commissioned Officers who are of the requisite standard of education and age. At present we can only get them from 27 to 29 years of age. As I said just now, during the last 18 months, we have had three examinations in which we obtained the full number of candidates; and we may say, now at any rate, that we have symptoms of a steady flow, not an overwhelming, but a steady flow of Indian candidates for the King's Commission. After those three examinations, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India accepted the principle of an immediate and substantial increase in Indianisation. I do not think that it can be said that we have unduly delayed matters, or that we have proceeded really substantially slower than what has been recommended by the Indian Sandhurst Committee. The

[Mr. G. M. Young.]

same thing applies to the establishment of the Indian Military College. Speaking in this House on the 10th March, 1928, immediately after the decisions on the Indian Sandhurst Committee's Report were announced, I said:

"The Committee laid down 1933 as the year for the inauguration of the Indian Sandhurst, because, according to their time table, by that time you would get, and be assured of, a steady flow of Indian candidates of suitable quality who would be, on the one hand, more than Sandhurst could accommodate, and on the other hand, sufficient to establish an Indian Military College, all this being of course subject, as they have said themselves several times over, to efficiency at every stage. Sir, we absolutely agree with them. All we say is that we do not know that that is going to happen in 1933. But, Sir, whenever it does happen this Report which Honourable Members insist on saying that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India have turned down, will be then, as now, the basis of our own immediate and constructive proposals."

Well, Sir, we are now in 1931, and the Indian Military College, if it is not an established fact in 1933, will be an established fact in 1932. When I was speaking on this subject last year, I said that Honourable Members could hardly accuse us of not having carried out these recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee until 1933; and I was then told that it would be quite impossible to build such a college in the time that was left. The same criticism has been made in the course of the debate today. It was also made in another place the other day. The difficulty of building was said to be insuperable. Now there is no particular difficulty about building. We have always contemplated the possibility that we might have to take a decision to establish an Indian Military College, before we had full time to lay out the new buildings required. It is quite easy to find a temporary home for the Indian Military College while buildings are being erected. That is exactly what happened in the case of the Staff College at Quetta. When it was first inaugurated, that College was begun before the buildings were ready. The students and staff were accommodated temporarily in buildings at Deolali. There is no practical difficulty arising out of that.

My Honourable friend, Mr. Mudaliar, made several inquiries about this Committee, and drew a picture of Army Headquarters being thrown into a great state of confusion by the fact that it was called an expert committee. We knew that the intention was that this committee should include non-officials, but the word expert, generally means a professional expert—not necessarily a military expert. We assumed that this committee would contain, besides military experts, a financial expert and educational experts, not necessarily in Government service, but professional experts. We never supposed for one moment that it was the intention that the whole of the committee should consist of military experts: and that is not the intention of His Majesty's Government either. But we did want to make sure what was meant: and so we telegraphed Home and got from the Secretary of State a definition of what he meant by an expert.

There is only one other point to which I wish to allude and that was raised by my Honourable friend, Mr. Jagan Nath Aggarwal, on the subject of cantonments. He spoke of the section under which Commanding Officers are enabled, at their own discretion, to expel from cantonments any persons whose presence in cantonments they think for one reason or another is undesirable. He referred to an old section of the Cantonment Code which is no longer operative; but there is a corresponding section

in the present Cantonments Act, section 239, under which a number of persons have recently been expelled from cantonments. He asked me whether we were prepared to inquire into these cases. We have called for all the cases that are at present outstanding. As to those before 1930, I think I am right in saying that we have seen them all. Of those who have been expelled from cantonments in connection with the civil disobedience movement, we have not got all the figures, but we know of those who were expelled from the Ambala, Poona and Kirkee cantonments. I believe that there is not a very large number of these persons altogether. In any case, as an immediate consequence of the settlement which was reached last week, we telegraphed to the military authorities, and repeated the telegrams to Local Governments, saying that all persons against whom such orders had been passed in connection with the civil disobedience movement were to be allowed unconditionally to return to cantonments. So that matter is already over.

I do not think, Sir, that I have anything more to say.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: Sir, in 1923 I moved a Resolution to this effect:

"This Assembly recommends to His Excellency the Governor General in Council to be pleased to get the King's Commission for Indians by direct recruitment and by promotion from the ranks of the Viceroy's Commissioned officers in such number that all vacancies in the Indian regiments be in future filled by such Indian officers only till all Indian regiments are wholly Indianised."

This Resolution was moved on the 24th January and on that day, in the afternoon, the late Lord Rawlinson, the then Commander-in-Chief, came out and made a speech, a few paragraphs of which I will read to this House. He said:

"The circumstances have so far not made it possible to make a definite announcement with regard to the matter or to state the measures that are in contemplation in order to secure the object which the Honourable Mover has in view. It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to make an announcement at no very distant date when the correspondence which is still proceeding between the Government of India and the Secretary of State has been concluded. In these circumstances it will be clear that it would not be open to Government to accept the Resolution as it stands, since they cannot prejudice the matter which is still under discussion. On the other hand the Resolution is not unwelcome since it gives me an opportunity of placing before the House some at any rate of the principles on which a decision must ultimately depend, and also of stating in their proper relation the measures which the Government have already undertaken to grant His Majesty's commission to Indians."

He further on said:

"I should not be doing justice to any one, least of all to the representatives of the people of India, if I did not at the very least pay this tribute to the order which the Resolution of my Honourable friend apparently seeks to change. Now, it would be idle to ignore on the other hand the desire for change that comes very naturally with changing times, and I can readily understand that as the people of India claim increasing independence they should also claim increasing opportunities to fit themselves for self-defence. A desire that the Indian Army should be Indianised follows as a natural consequence and Government, as I have already said, have for a considerable time recognised that a demand of this kind is inevitable, and they have spent much time and pains in investigating the best means of assisting the people of India to realise their ambition without at the same time sacrificing even for a time the traditional efficiency of the Indian Army."

Now, Sir, he went on to pay a tribute to the Indian Army at great length and he supported me on that point. I want to know what has been done since then. Then, Sir, after the 24th January, this debate

[Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan.]

was adjourned till the 17th February, and on the 17th February His Excellency comes and announces the eight-unit scheme. He was the first speaker on the Resolution on the next day and he announced this. This took the House by surprise and quite naturally people, who had not properly thought over this matter and what this eight-unit scheme would be, were lured into the trap, and the result was the unfortunate one that, whereas in the morning I had about 60 or 70 Members on my side who were going to vote with me, in the afternoon after this announcement, I got, as I find from the division list, only 22 Members voting with me and 42 on the other side, the rest remaining neutral. I was asked to withdraw my Resolution, but I did not withdraw it and I pressed it to a division. I wanted to justify it at some future day and I stand today justified in asking for a division on my Resolution at that time. I have found that these eight units are treated like the depressed classes. If you go and ask the officers of these regiments, they will tell you tales about the treatment which they are receiving in their Department. It was never my intention that there should be a class created who would be treated later on as untouchables and as something different from other units. My scheme at that time, which Lord Rawlinson supported, was that with the change of times there must necessarily come these demands from Indians that they should have an increasing share and proportion in the Army. I ask, during these eight years has that number increased to any considerable extent? I put this question to the Treasury Benches. What more changes have taken place? You say you have Indianised eight units. Out of how many? When Lord Rawlinson finished his speech on that occasion, I asked him, "Out of how many units are these eight units going to be Indianised"? He said there were altogether 120 infantry and pioneers and 21 cavalry Indian regiments: and out of these eight units were to be picked out—and all of them infantry with a little proportion for the cavalry as he said at the time. This means that out of 141 units 8 units were selected, where they were going to put these Indian officers who were picked out from all the units together. This was not the object—that the officers should be picked out from all the different units and posted to these eight units, the object was that the officers for these eight units should be created among the eight units themselves. This has caused a good deal of grievance in the military classes; and if the Military Department cares to know their feeling they will be very well advised to know what kind of feeling is prevailing now in the Army. It is very easy to say here that people will not like those officers whom they cannot trust and who cannot lead them when it is a question of life and death. But do you ask if your military officers and your Army are well satisfied or are not satisfied with you? The days of the East India Company are gone and you must change now. This Army was created by the East India Company, and you are still pursuing the same policy today which was pursued before 1857. The Indian Viceroy's Commissioned Officer wants to know what are the prospects before him. In the civil side you have got prospects for everybody. An Indian can become a Governor, even though it may be of Bihar and Orissa. (Laughter.)

Mr. Gaya Prasad Singh: What about Bihar and Orissa?

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: But in the military, a man can never rise beyond a Lieutenant-Colonel. How many have you got as Colonels

in these eight units today? Is there any full Colonel? Have you got any General after these sixty years' administration? Have there never existed in India Generals and Colonels who have led armies in the whole of India? The Mahrattas had them and the Sikhs had them.

An Honourable Member: Also the Rajputs.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: Yes, and the Rajputs from whom my Honourable friend and another Honourable friend come and of which community they are the flowers here. (Laughter.) Do they not want a career open to them where they can shine just as their forefathers shone in the past? They have had a glorious past and they want to tread in their footsteps today and you are shutting them out for ever. You say "No," you cannot rise beyond a Risaldar-Major; and if you come up we will make you an Honorary Captain when you are on the verge of retirement." You keep this as a title with you and you give it as a great honour although it will bring no fruits whatsoever. (Laughter.) This is what you tell your Army today, the Army which has fought for you, which has stood by you in your worst times, which has guarded your frontiers for you, which has guarded your business for you and guarded your lives. What are you doing for them? Is it not an open secret that the Indian regiments went to Flanders, Mesopotamia and various other places during the war where they shone? There have been Indian officers who have led even the British Army in France, and we have got one of those examples even in our Indian Legislature. Everybody knows Nawab Sir Muhammad Akbar Khan, who led the British troops in France when there was no other officer of higher rank. (Opposition Cheers.) Was it not the Hyderabad contingent which went to Egypt and Palestine and Flanders? Did not the Indians go to Mesopotamia, and have they not shown how well they could acquit themselves? And now you refuse the very same people, the people who could produce such fine soldiers. Can they not produce equally good officers? If they can produce very good Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, what is the reason for saying that they cannot produce equally good King's Commissioned Officers? Is there any reasoning in it? You simply say they are not properly educated. Whose fault is it? If you have got good Viceroy's Commissioned Officers in those regiments, certainly the same people can become very good and very efficient King's Commissioned Officers if you properly train them and if you give them an opportunity to train themselves. How much money have you spent on their children? A poor officer who gets about Rs. 200 a month cannot put his child in Dehra Dun, where the expenditure comes to more than Rs. 100 a month; and you blame this officer that he does not send his son or sons. If he has got two sons, then his whole income is gone. A Jemadar gets little, but a Risaldar gets about Rs. 200 a month only on which he has to live and keep his family going and he wants to send his son or sons to be trained there and follow the profession of his forefathers; but you make it hard for him because the expenditure in Dehra Dun will not be less than Rs. 100. This man can never think of sending two sons to Dehra Dun to take up his own profession. You shut them out in every possible way.

It is preposterous to suggest that Indians are not fit today to take up their proper share in the Army as officers. I would point out, Sir, that to suggest that the people who fought the deadliest battles and whose horses trampled every inch of the soil of India are not fit to become soldiers or officers in the Army is to cast a slur on the military classes in

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India. These people resent that suggestion. When you have created large openings for the merchant classes, for lawyers, for civilians and for everybody else, you have still closed the doors for the martial classes in the Army. You do not allow Indians to take a legitimate share in the Army, although they have defended and still defend the borders of India as well as the Indian shores. You might have followed this unjust policy hitherto, but today, Sir, with the new policy which you are introducing, if you do not change your old policy of shutting Indians from getting their right and legitimate share on the posts in the Army, the result will be that every British officer in the Indian regiments will be hated by his own people; he will never be tolerated after some time. It is high time that you make a proper beginning. In those days there were many things in your gift; in the good old days a British officer in the Army could keep control over his regiments not on account of his personality, but on account of many things which he had behind him. He could then offer many temptations over which he had command, but these things are passing out of your hands. You will not have any squares of land to give to the soldiers. You will not have many things in your hands. Even a letter which was supposed to be a good recommendation from a military officer to civilian officers to provide a job for an Indian soldier's son with a sub-Registrar's job or any other post like that, will not be valued in future. All such patronage and power will get out of your hands, and when the British officers fail to satisfy the soldiers under them on these things, the result will be quite different. The soldiers will not care for their officers. They will say, "Look here Sahib, times were when we used to fight for you, but since you cannot help us, you cannot expect us to help you". Remember, Sir, that power is fast getting out of the British hands, and the power which united the soldiers and their officers will no longer exist, and an Indian soldier will soon find that he is a poor soldier who is neither helped by the British officer nor by the Indian Ministry which will be sitting over there. He will never receive the same consideration at the hands of the Indian Ministry which will come into being (*An Honourable Member*: "Why not?") because he is not chosen by them. He will be a man belonging to a different body which might be working from 8,000 miles away, and the criticism which will be directed against the Indian soldier will make him think twice before he will be loyal to you. So that, as I said, the time has come when you must change your ideas and opinions about the capacity of Indians; you must also change your policy, and the sooner it is done the better. I know that Government sometimes do things when the most favourable moment has passed away. They do not do the right thing at the right moment. They wait for agitations and more agitation, and then they yield, but they yield much larger then and with no grace. If you change your present policy, if you want to keep up the loyalty of your soldiers and your Army, if you want them to remain loyal to you as they have been for such a long time, you must give them proper encouragement. you must throw open all the higher posts in the Army from which they are now debarred, because once our Army begins to get dissatisfied, there is great danger. Do not let the past history vanish: do not let the soldiers think that you have no regard for them, but make them feel that their interests are as dear to your hearts as the interests of the civilians, that while you improve the civil administration in India you are also ready and willing to give the Indian soldiers their proper

share in the military administration. Sir, it is high time that you changed your policy. I suggest that you should give all the vacancies in the Indian regiments in future to Indian boys only. I don't say that you must create Generals or Captains at once, but you can certainly make them Second Lieutenants. If there are 141 regiments, is it right to say that this country with a total population of 37 crores could not produce 141 Indian boys every year to take up the post of Second Lieutenant in each regiment? Can the Government convince us on that point? If you can, and if this House is convinced about it, then all I can say is that this House is not worthy of being represented at the Round Table Conference. You do not deserve to be in the Indian Legislature, because a people which cannot produce 141 Indian boys for the officer ranks of the army out of a total population of 37 crores does not deserve any form of representative institutions

Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum (Nominated: Non-official): Do you mean officers should be recruited from the soldier classes or
4 P.M. from any other class?

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: From the soldier classes, because people from these classes came in large numbers during the war as recruits ready to die for the sake of the country, for the sake of the King, without even ever having seen the King or without ever having known what benefits he would bring to the country on account of risking their lives, and when you shut out these boys from their just and legitimate aspirations in the Army, will they not have enough grievances against you?

Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum: I think the selection should be confined to the martial classes.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: I know it is difficult for any class to claim only the officers rank in the Army which does not supply soldiers. The class which can never supply a soldier, can never hope to supply officers. I would welcome every class in the Army. Even the Bengalis supplied a large number of recruits in the last war, and I would certainly have them first as soldiers. (*An Honourable Member from Bengal: "Bengal will answer."*)

Mr. President: Let the Honourable Member proceed. Time is getting on.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: It may be said, Sir, in some quarters that at present we do not want the Baboo class. Let there be no Baboo class, but there is a martial class

Kumar Gupteshwar Prasad Singh (*Gaya cum Monghyr: Non-Muhammadan*): May I know whom does the Honourable Member refer to by the "Baboo class"?

An Honourable Member: He means the educated classes.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: Sir, it is the martial classes today who are supplying recruits in large numbers, and they deserve to be taken up in the Army. My friend over there wants to know whom I meant by the term "Baboo class". I may tell him that it is not I who use that term, but the military authorities themselves use that term.

An Honourable Member: They use the term for every Member of the House.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: Now, Sir, as I said, the present policy which you are pursuing must be changed. This question affects us in two ways. You are keeping the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and also you are giving the King's Commissions. This is a novel thing which is not known anywhere else. In all other countries you have got only one class of commissioned officers, whereas you have got two classes of commissioned officers. What do these poor Viceroy's Commissioned Officers do? They merely help the King's Commissioned Officers. Another anomaly which exists is this. If there is a King's Commissioned Officer with only two years' service, he is made to take command in preference to a Risaldar-Major, who might have been in the Army for about 30 years, and who knows each and everything about his Army; but unfortunately this young boy, who has had the good fortune to get a King's Commission, and who had only about two years' service, is made to take command of the regiment over the head of this experienced officer. Now, Sir, this is the way in which you are treating your Army and your officers in the Army. Don't you know that they feel it today

Mr. President: The Honourable Member should address the Chair.

Mr. Muhammad Yamin Khan: Those grievances have to be removed very soon and it is on account of that that I am supporting this motion.

Mr. B. V. Jadhav (Bombay Central Division: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Sir, the previous speakers have traversed much of the ground covering the motion moved by my Honourable friend, Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz, and I need not take up the time of the House in going over the same matter again. We also have had the advantage of listening to the defence of the Army by the Honourable the Army Secretary, and we have seen what sort of a defence it was. We all appreciate the strength, the discipline and the prowess of our Army and we are all proud of it, and I do not think that the Army needed any defence from the Honourable the Army Secretary—at all events, it did not want such a defence.

As for retrenchment, I shall refer to only one point. Rs. 2 crores and odd were paid for Block No. 8 near Colaba in the town of Bombay. I do not know whether any supplementary grant was asked from this House, or whether that amount was paid out of the contract grant for the Army. If a supplementary grant was asked for, that amount of Rs. 2 crores and odd is over and above the contract grant of Rs. 54 crores and odd. In that case I submit the Army Department should repay that amount to the general revenues, and they cannot take any credit for the retrenchment of Rs. one crore and seventy lakhs and ask for their pound of flesh by insisting upon the extension of the contract period by one year. To say that the contract period is to be extended by one year more for the sake of this retrenchment, means that the Army is insistent upon exacting its pound of flesh and will not allow the general revenues to benefit from any economies that might be effected under the retrenchment scheme of Lord Inchcape. I may also say that the total expenditure on the Army is not the amount of Rs. 54 crores and odd. The construction of the strategic railways and the losses incurred on their working ought to be added to the total expenditure on the Army. If that is taken into account, I think the whole cost may amount to considerably over Rs. 57 or 58 crores.

The Honourable the Army Secretary has assured this House that the military college will be opened in 1932 instead of in 1933 as recommended by the Skeen Committee

Mr. G. M. Young: On a point of explanation, Sir, I said, if it was not in 1933, it would be in 1932.

Mr. B. V. Jadhav: In what year was it to be opened according to the recommendation of the Skeen Committee? (*An Honourable Member:* "1933.") That is what I am going to say, that the Indian Sandhurst College would be opened in 1932 instead of in 1933 as recommended by the Skeen Committee. The Honourable Member well knows that, had the Government of India accepted that recommendation, then nobody would have insisted that it should be opened earlier than 1933. But England is always noted for doing things late, and sometimes she has to pay a very heavy price. The Government in Britain and Mr. Thomas, the Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee, plainly saw that the members of the Round Table Conference were in no mood to hear anything about the late opening of the military college, and the Ministry had to come to a very quick decision and promised an early opening of the military college.

Much has been said about the persons who should be admitted to this military college, and a claim has been made by some Members of this House on this occasion and on previous occasions, that the youths of the so-called martial classes only should be allowed to this college. Fortunately, I belong to one of those communities which are classified as martial communities, and I stand to gain and my community stands to gain if the claim that has been made here is accepted by the Government. But, in the interests of India, as a whole, I do not want to be very selfish. I maintain that the college should be open to all the eligible youths of India, irrespective of race, or creed, or colour. (Cheers.) What is a martial class? From old history I notice that the most despised class called the Adi Dravidas in Madras and the Mahars in Maharashtra were recruited as sepoy by the John Company, and they fought all the battles of that Company and conquered this Indian Empire for England. But the sons of these very people have been declared to be non-martial; they are not recruited into the Army, and much less will they be admitted into this military college. When I was at school in a small taluka town, I used to see hundreds of military pensioners belonging to the despised depressed classes coming up and receiving their pensions. They were about a hundred or two hundred in number and went once a month to the cutcherry and received their pensions. But the army reorganisation scheme came into operation and the Committee said that these were not martial classes, and that they should not be recruited in future. So, those poor fellows were left out of the Army, and the condition of the community has worsened very much. On the Victory Column at Koregaon about sixteen miles East of Poona are recorded the names of those Mahars who fell in the battle at that place defending the cause of Britain. That column bears a lasting testimony to the martial qualities of those people. In the late war, when recruits were wanted, two Mahar regiments were recruited in the Bombay Presidency, and at that time, perhaps, the military authorities, all of a sudden, remembered that the Mahars had martial qualities but as soon as the war was over those regiments were disbanded and the poor Mahar is not now taken in any regiment.

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As far as martial qualities are concerned, I may point out that every race in India, every people in India, at one time or another in history has distinguished itself by providing both military leaders and fighting men, and if opportunities are offered, I do not think that any race, any caste, or any creed will be found wanting in martial qualities. (Hear, hear.) Opportunity must be given.

Some say that the people have lost their martial qualities on account of the Arms Act; that as they are not allowed to wield arms they have lost their martial qualities. I do not subscribe to that view, because I know that even in England the majority of the people do not handle arms and I have seen some people in India who, although they have got arms licences, are not martial at all. So I do not think the possession of arms or the permission to carry arms will endow martial qualities to any person. If military training is given, the influence of the environment is such that it will create martial spirit in any people. We have seen that the cooks, *dhobis* and barbers in the Army, although they do not belong to the acknowledged martial communities, have distinguished themselves in war. They do not run away; because the environment makes them bold and creates the martial spirit in them. What I maintain is that, in selecting candidates for the military college, there is no need to declare that the youths of particular communities only will be eligible. Let that college be open to all the communities and those who are eligible by education, by qualities of leadership and other things requisite for a military career should be admitted into it.

I want to draw the attention of the House to an item of military policy. Many of the Presidencies are far away from the seat of danger, namely, the North West Frontier Province; and they have been rather unfairly treated. Recruitment is generally made in the Punjab, the United Provinces and the North West Frontier Province. Other provinces are neglected, and the military qualities of the people are being lost. In the despatch of the Madras Government on the Simon Report, a complaint has been made which I should like to bring to the notice of the House. It is this:

"There is one other matter connected with the army upon which the Madras Government wish to lay stress, namely, the need for the revival of the old Madras regiments."

In Volume I, paragraph 116 of the Report of the Simon Commission, the Commission notices the remarkable variations in the contributions which the provinces make to the Indian Army. They say:

"The Government of Madras would remind the Government of India that the pre-eminence of the Punjab and the United Provinces as recruiting grounds for the Army is comparatively recent and has been a natural consequence of the gradual reduction of the old Madras army till there are now three Madras regiments left. The Madras army has a fine record of gallant and loyal service and military traditions are still strong in many parts of the Madras Presidency. If the Northern India recruit is superior in physique, the Madrasi claims superiority in intelligence which is likely to count far more in the future than it has done in the past."

This has been the cry not only of the Madras Government, but of other Governments also, and therefore the military policy of the Government of India should be revised, empowering recruitment from all parts of India, and in this way giving all people an opportunity of serving their country in the Army.

Now, Sir, in this matter of the Sandhurst College, I may point out that the education given in England is very costly. The English army system is so very costly that a Lieutenant or a Captain finds it very difficult to make both ends meet with the high salary they are paid. Such a costly system will not do for India. India is a poor country. The expenses at the military college and of those who join the service should be commensurate with the financial position of the Indian people in general. Therefore those who will be on the expert committee will have to bear this in mind and adopt the system of Japan or some other country where the military training system is not so costly. I submit that there is race discrimination also in the Army; but I shall not take up the time of the House by dilating on that point. I may point out that in the Tank Corps and the Air Force, Indians are kept out. I hope that in future these services will also be thrown open to young Indians. I shall not take up more time and I shall sum up by saying that we on this side of the House and the country in general expect more stringent economy and heavier savings in the Military Department. We also expect that Indianisation in the Army should proceed as rapidly as possible and that a cheaper system of military training be adopted and the life in the military services should be simplified so as to correspond with the means of the people and not be very expensive. Indian methods and Indian traditions should also be imported into the Army and the policy of favouring a few classes should be given up and the Army should be thrown open to all castes, creeds and communities.

Mr. B. R. Puri (West Punjab: Non-Muhammadian): Sir, we have discussed this question threadbare, and so far as the economic situation of the country goes, we have got to concentrate our attention solely to the Army expenses, and the biggest item in that question of Army expense would be Indianisation. We are interested in this subject in two ways. Firstly, if we have to enjoy the status of a self-governing country, then it is absolutely essential that we must be a self-supporting country, that is we should be in a position to defend ourselves without having to look to any extraneous help. Secondly, the subject of Indianisation interests us from another very important point of view, that is because it is far more economical and since from time immemorial, fortunes and fortunes have been sunk in the Military Department, I think it is time that we revised the past history and started a new leaf. So far, Sir, the policy of the Government has been, to put artificial obstacles in the way of the achievement of the desire of the people to secure Indianisation of the Army. At one time the formula was that proper material was not available—proper material in the sense of material of martial character. According to the Government formula, the privilege and title of being martial was enjoyed by only a very few limited sections of the people. As has been clearly pointed out, Sir, by previous speakers, to be martial is not the monopoly of any particular class or creed. It is not a sort of thing which could be made the subject of a statutory provision. It is the result and outcome of training. Any person is entitled to be admitted to any military institution, provided he fulfils the physical qualifications for it. So far as the officer class is concerned, it was put forward as a plea by those who were opposed to Indianisation that educated people who were at the same time possessed of martial instincts were not available. The whole thing came to this, that if an educated person came forward in order to enlist in the Army for the officer rank, the objection was

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"You no doubt fulfil the qualification of being an educated person, but you do not belong to the martial race". If a person belonging to the martial race came forward, the objection raised against him was that "You do not possess the necessary educational qualifications". How then, I ask, is Indianisation to come about? Some who are educated are not martial, while others who are martial are not educated. According to this formula, the country can be prevented from ever achieving the Indianisation of the Army. So far as the rank and file of the Army is concerned, I do not think any valid plea could possibly be put forward.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: Nobody is putting forward any such plea.

Mr. B. R. Puri: My Honourable and learned friend says that nobody is taking up that position now. He is quite right. This was however the position that hitherto had been taken, I say there is no valid reason against Indianisation, and I ask why a start is not being made to Indianise at a rapid pace. Sir, I do not see any Indianisation in the near future if my reading is correct. Recently a question was put in the Council of State and the answer was vouchsafed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I am now reading from the proceedings of the Council of State dated the 24th February. The question that was put was what was the number of Indian and European officers appointed annually to the Indian Army, what was the proportion of Indian officers to European officers in each year, and whether at the present rate of Indianisation of the officers' cadre, that cadre would ever become totally Indianised. The answers of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief were:

"The figures for actual appointments vary from year to year, and are not readily available: but it will perhaps meet the object of the Honourable Member's inquiry if I give the figures for vacancies. At the present time a maximum of 82 vacancies a year is offered to Europeans. Of these, 70 are obtainable through Sandhurst, and 12 through universities. The maximum offered to Indians was 10 a year, until 1928, when the number was increased to 25, of which 20 are by direct entry into Sandhurst, and 5 by nomination of Viceroy's Commissioned officers, who proceed to Sandhurst after being nominated."

Then there is a significant sentence:

"There has been no year in which all the vacancies, European and Indian, were filled. The deficit has been partially met by transfers from the British Service. The approximate total numbers of Indian and European officers admitted to the Indian Army during the years 1925 to 1930 were:

Indians	57
Europeans	491

which gives a proportion of a little more than one Indian to 9 Europeans.

The foregoing figures are exclusive of the vacancies recently opened to Indians at Woolwich and Cranwell. Four Indians have passed into Woolwich and six are now under training at Cranwell."

Then I particularly invite the attention of the House, Sir, to part (d) of the question:

"whether, at the present rate of Indianisation of the officers' cadre, that cadre will ever become totally Indianized?"

The answer of His Excellency was, "No"—but it should have been "never". I will quote his answer:

"(d) No, Sir, as I have explained, the present maximum rates of entry are 82 Europeans and 25 Indians, annually."

Now could we reasonably hope and expect at this rate ever to attain the Indianisation of the Army? This would, if I may be permitted to say so, achieve the opposite result, that is the Europeanisation of the Army, rather than Indianisation, because, considering the disparity between the two proportions, and considering further that the rate of mortality amongst Indians is greater than among Europeans, I think this class, *i.e.*, Indians should in the long run be eliminated. What we need is that there should be a graduated scale. Let us begin say with 25 or 30 per cent. Indians, each year the number should go up say by 10 per cent. and the corresponding number of Europeans should decrease. If we proceed on those lines, then we can hope in the course of a few years to eliminate the outside element and to see the Indianisation of the Army accomplished. Unless we do that, it is impossible to achieve that object.

Sir, I am bound to say that the subject was not approached in that spirit even at the Round Table Conference. If we look at page 16 of the Sub-Committee's Report (No. VII Defence), we find that at the very outset a peculiar atmosphere was created, when Indianisation was about to be discussed, the position created being something like this, that now that they were about to touch a very weak point, Indianisation being the source and element of weakness, every member was made to realize that they were about to tread upon very delicate ground, and that the less they said the better it was, lest this would get to certain quarters and thereby the safety of this country be imperilled. Sir, is it such a dreadful subject as that? I invite your attention to sentences which occur on page 61:

"The discussion in the sub-Committee centred mainly round the question of Indianisation, and every aspect of this question received thorough attention. It was unanimously agreed that in a matter of such importance as Defence, the utmost care was necessary in expressing opinions, and the sub-Committee as a whole was very anxious not to create the impression that anyone in any way or to any degree wanted to say anything that could even remotely tend to imperil the safety of the country, or to weaken the strength of the Army."

Is there not, Sir, a veiled suggestion, a sort of innuendo, that if you desire to discuss the Indianisation and propose a substitute for the European element, you would be introducing a subject that is fraught with very great dangers, and that the less you say, the better? Is this the spirit in which the subject should have been approached? Then, again, when you consider the proceedings further, you will find that the policy of delay and drift was pursued, and the sub-Committee never came to any definite conclusion. It never even indirectly gave any encouragement to this question. On the other hand, reading between the lines, one is constrained to come to the conclusion that the subject was not very popular and it was not quite to the liking of those who were in authority. You will be pleased to see the next sentence which speaks for itself. It runs thus:

"The majority of the sub-Committee considered it impossible for practical reasons to lay down any definite rate of Indianisation or anything of a precise character that might in any way embarrass those responsible for defence and fetter the judgment or the discretion of the military authorities. Those that held this view felt that the

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principle of the Indianisation of officers of the Indian Army could not be looked upon as merely a question regarding the efficiency of a single officer or group of officers, or even of a single unit or group of units. It was a principle that to the majority appeared to affect the Army as a whole. It was in consequence the view of this large section of the sub-Committee that a highly technical question was involved on which the sub-Committee was not qualified to express an opinion."

Then, Sir, it was brought out that the matter was to be referred to a Committee which was to be hereafter appointed and which would go into the whole question.

And this brings me to another matter—the Report says:

"The sub-Committee also recognised that in dealing with the question of Defence it was not possible to overlook that a factor that must govern all considerations of the subject was the responsibility of the Crown through the Committee of Imperial Defence, which body was ultimately responsible for examining all these problems."

Now, Sir, it is this Committee of Imperial Defence, of which we have been the victims during all this period. We are afraid of this Committee of Imperial Defence because it is through this Committee that we have had, during the last 50 years or so, to entertain the surplus Army of Great Britain, to house them, to feed them, to keep them well equipped for any emergency and for every occasion whenever their services were required abroad. Sir, this, I submit, is an act of great injustice upon the people of this country, whose resources are really very poor. This question has been discussed, but the one aspect that I would like to put before the House in that connection is that it is time that the British Government realised that they have not been dealing with us fairly. This is what they say in the Report of the Round Table Conference:

"The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure, and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation."

Sir, does it require any expert investigation? I submit, Sir, that it is an immoral act to inflict and force upon us this task. We are poor in comparison with the resources enjoyed by Great Britain and we should not be made to play the part of a wet nurse. We are not responsible for these people. They create children and they dump them on us. We have got to feed them. Is that a fair treatment? Now that we have discovered it, it is time that it was stopped. It puts me, Sir, in mind of a man who walked up to a shop of a fishmonger and on the sly picked up a fish and shoved it into his pocket but the tail was sticking out. The fishmonger happened to detect it and just as the man was about to depart with the fish, the fishmonger said: "Look here, young man, take my tip, next time you steal a fish, select a smaller one or have a bigger pocket". Now, that we have discovered the trick it does not require any expert investigation to decide whether you should stop it or not. The answer of that young man was very significant. He said: "All right, Mr. Fishmonger, I am very sorry; but now that I have been found out, I will not repeat it any longer". Therefore, my submission is that it is time that these gentlemen, who are responsible for inflicting upon us such a heavy burden, stopped this practice.

There is one other item to which I particularly wish to draw the attention of the House. I find that, so far as the medical machinery of the Army is concerned, it is a most wasteful one. It is most extravagant,

and too elaborate a machinery and is not really required for the needs of the Army. Now, on this point, if the House will bear with me just for two or three minutes, I would like to place one or two preliminary facts before them, so that they might be able to appreciate what I wish to say. You will be pleased to note that for 65,000 British troops there are at the present moment very nearly 320 R.A.M.C. officers. Apart from that, there are 739 I.M.D. officers, out of which 346 are retained in the Army and rest are transferred to the civil Departments. Then there are 143 nurses, etc. This is so far as the British Army is concerned. For the Indian soldiers there are 748 I.M.S. officers, out of which 449 are retained for the military duties. Apart from those, there are about 700 subordinate medical officers. Now, having regard to this number, you will find that there are several station hospitals that are run for the needs of the Army and for the British troops in this country, whose number may be roughly taken to be 60,000—there are 8,000 beds provided in the station hospitals. It really comes to this, that for every 100 British soldiers there is in the hospital always a permanent arrangement of 13·3 beds. In the Indian hospital you will find that for 2,50,000 Indian troops, 12,000 beds are provided. This gives a ratio of 5 per cent. Now on the average you will find that half the beds in the British hospital and three-fourths of the beds in the Indian hospitals always remain empty. You will find that consequently all the provision that you have made on that scale goes absolutely waste. It is never utilised. This elaborate provision that you have made is not really needed. Now, just compare it with the case of a town like Amritsar. I take Amritsar for this reason that its population is 2,50,000 corresponding to the exact number of the Indian Army in this country. Now, you will find that there are only 500 beds that are provided in the Amritsar hospital. This is how the civil side is treated. Compared with that, for an army of 2,50,000 or nearly three lakhs army in this country, there are 20,000 beds provided, and I will just give you, Sir, the number of medical men that the civil Medical Department employs. One Civil Surgeon, one Health Officer, and a few Assistants who are in charge of the health, sanitation and medical relief of not only the town of Amritsar but of a large area in the district containing many dispensaries. Against this the Army Department employs 769 medical officers and over 1,200 Assistants. This huge disparity between two administrations in the same country and dealing with the same class of people cannot be explained.

Now, apart from that, you will find that if you visit an ordinary station hospital, you will find about 10 to 12 I.M.S. Officers who are practically doing nothing. One is an eye specialist, the other is a surgical specialist, a third is an ear specialist. They keep on drinking their whisky and soda without having anything else to do and the class of patients that they usually get is often a soldier with a minor injury received in a football or a hockey match. That is the sort of diseases that they are called upon to treat. Is it not sheer waste? I submit, Sir, it is time that the military authorities paid a little attention in this direction.

The other suggestion which I should like to offer is that vast amounts, vast fortunes are being made in the Military Department. There is a considerable amount of leakage that is going on from day to day, and the reason for that is, I make bold to assert, that unfortunately corruption in that Department is so great that, in most cases, it is not confined to the lower strata. Therefore, it is time that the military authorities took some

[Mr. B. R. Puri.]

care and paid a little more attention in that direction. Some very important sensational cases have, from time to time, been started but unfortunately those prosecutions have generally collapsed. The reason is obvious. The reason is that it is not confined to any particular class. We find that from considerably higher ranks down to the lower ranks, the whole thing is really a fabric of corruption and therefore these things do not come to light and the prosecutions generally collapse.

One word more I wish to submit for your consideration and it is this. We have really laboured under a great disadvantage. The financial policy which has hitherto been pursued has made this machine of the Government so expensive that anybody who now takes charge of it will find it extremely difficult to manage. It is like a machine, like a motor car which runs only five miles to a gallon, and one would hesitate to acquire such a machine lest it might prove too expensive for him to run. We will beg of those who have been in charge of it to devise means and to leave a better legacy than they are about to leave. If, Sir, they cannot restore back to us our country where there was peace and plenty, if they cannot give us back milk and honey, at least they ought not to return to us a bankrupt exchequer.

The Honourable Sir George Schuster: Sir, according to the usual procedure in dealing with motions of this kind, it has not been customary for me as the Finance Member, although I move the motion in the first place, to reply at any length, but the course of the discussion today has followed certain lines which make it very important that I should say certain things on subjects which have come before the House. The particular point to which I refer is this, that there has been developed a double line of argument or, perhaps rather, a double line of attack not merely on the policy and expenditure of the Army Department, but on the measure of control over that expenditure exercised by the Finance Department, and it is with that line that I, particularly, wish to deal. But, before I pass to that subject, I cannot leave unnoticed some of the remarks made at the conclusion of his speech by the last speaker. If the Honourable Member wishes to make general charges of corruption against a Government Department, and comes forward to make statements of that kind on the floor of the House, I think, Sir, speaking on behalf of the Government, it is fair for me to say that if he wishes to maintain his position, after having made such charges, it is up to him to substantiate them. (Hear, hear.)

The main speech with which I wish to deal in my remarks will, I think, be generally accepted by this House as the speech with which I ought to deal. I refer to the very full argument developed by my Honourable friend Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar. I find myself in some difficulty in replying to my Honourable friend, because if, on the one hand I defend myself with vigour, I may be accused of not being sufficiently responsive to Honourable Members opposite; on the other hand, if I am responsive I may be accused by my Honourable friend of not showing a proper fighting spirit such as he would like to see in the Finance Member of the Government of India. (Laughter.) I shall try, Sir, to steer across between these two extremes. Perhaps, in the first place, I might select a certain portion of my Honourable friend's remarks for replying in a form different to agreement with what he has said. Sir, my Honourable friend developed his line of attack as a line of attack chiefly against the method of control which is now exercisable under what is generally known as the contract

budget system, and the largest part of his evidence in support of his attack was taken from the latest Report of the Public Accounts Committee. There are one or two things that I would like to point out with reference to that Report. In the first place, the Report deals with the accounts of the year 1928-29. It is a point to which I had to make reference when this House was considering the Report of the Public Accounts Committee a week or two ago. These Reports come before us very much out of date; it is inevitable that they should do so, but it makes their discussion of less value than it might otherwise be. All that my Honourable friend has been able to select for his attack are certain remarks which refer to the account year, 1928-29, the year before I myself took charge of my present office, and actually the first year to which this contract budget system applied, a year which had really passed before the system got into proper working order at all. Therefore, if there was any fault in that year, I do not think it is fair to blame this particular system, and I hope, if my Honourable friend is a Member of this House two years hence and sees before him the Report of the Public Accounts Committee on the accounts for the year 1930-31—and he will have to wait two years to do so—I hope he will then find evidence of very considerable improvement from the state of affairs which prevailed in 1928-29. But there is another thing which I should like to say with reference to this matter, and that is that the Honourable Members of this House must realise that the Public Accounts Committee, as I pointed out the other day, is a Committee which is concerned solely with cases that go wrong. Its whole object is to find out matters for complaint, and the general substance of the Report is an aggregation of cases which call for comment and criticism. It is not the duty of the Public Accounts Committee to call attention to the vast mass of work which is well done. But quite apart from this, I submit that if my Honourable friend had been able to read the whole of this Report of the Military Accounts Committee, he would have presented a very different picture to what he was able to do very cleverly by selecting one or two sentences. My Honourable friend referred particularly to cases of alterations in the terms of contracts which had been concluded, and I have taken pains to ascertain what these cases mainly are. I find they are mainly cases of where a contract for making a particular stretch of road is given and it is necessary to make that stretch a bit longer. Then, as an obvious business course the extra work is given to the same contractor. In such a case, quite naturally, tenders are not called for and possibly the terms of the contract may be altered. I feel confident that if my Honourable friend had time to go into the particular facts referred to here, he would feel constrained to come before the House, I think, and inform them that he had painted a picture which was considerably too black. Sir, the whole of this Report of the Military Accounts Committee was submitted, according to our ordinary procedure, to the Public Accounts Committee whose Report is signed by myself as Chairman, and by Members of this House, Mr. B. Das, Mr. M. C. Rajah, Mr. Abdul Matin Chaudhury, Mr. S. C. Mitra, Maulvi Muhammad Yakub, Mr. Ramsay Scott, and the Auditor General: and they in commenting on the Report of the Military Accounts Committee say:

“We are, like the Military Accounts Committee gratified to note that during the year under review the percentages of financial irregularity detected by audit and requiring special mention was on the whole satisfactorily small and that there has been some improvement in the standard of financial discipline applied to cases of financial irregularity.”

[Sir George Schuster.]

They went on to say that there was still room for improvement—there is always room for improvement—and I hope that my Honourable friend when he sees the Reports for later years, will find that there has been considerable improvement. I therefore would go so far as to say that my Honourable friend has not really substantiated his claim that the system of control is now unsatisfactory. I would go further and give him an expression of my own opinion, which is that from having watched very carefully how this system is working, although I must confess and freely admit that I was completely opposed to it at the outset and thought that it was an entirely wrong principle to which, however, I was bound honourably to give effect, as the arrangement had been completed before I took over my office, although I make that admission, I have been convinced in practice that as a working arrangement there is a very great deal to be said for it; and if it is worked properly and if the Finance Department do their duty and if the principal staff officers exercise their control, which I know for a fact they are now doing, this is really a businesslike arrangement, and I would suggest to this House that they would be unwise to condemn it prematurely. I quite admit that it is an arrangement which wants very careful watching. It is an innovation which does not apply in other countries. But it has certain very great advantages. There is not that incentive which we always find and every Government finds to overspend just at the last moment of the financial year; for however close your control is, any one who has got experience of Government business knows that, when heads of Departments and officers in control of expenditure know that they must spend their grant before the end of the financial year, it is inevitable that, just at the end of the year, there is a tremendous rush to get orders placed and the public interest is damaged thereby. That disadvantage is certainly guarded against by this stabilised budget arrangement, and therefore I feel that it has very considerable advantages and that it should not lightly be condemned. Having said that, I do not wish to dispute my Honourable friend's statement that there may be room for improvement in the business methods of the Army. There is always room for improvement. But I say he would find that comparing the Army now with other armies, it is on the whole managed on very businesslike lines. But I shall return to that subject again.

I want to turn now to a particular subject mentioned, and that is the question of the capitation payments and I want to respond as far
 5 P.M. as I can to what was said on the other side. I feel sure that this House will excuse me if I do not attempt to particularise too closely. I did not know that this subject was going to be raised today, and I have not had time to consult everybody concerned so as to ascertain exactly how far I can make disclosures or not. But I can give a certain general account of the situation. It is a well-known fact that this question of the capitation rates has been a subject in dispute between the War Office and the Government of India for some time. It is not merely a claim by the Government of India to have the capitation payments abolished. But there is quite distinctly a claim on the other side that the rates at present paid do not as a business arrangement recoup the British Government for the expenditure which they are intended to recoup. Therefore we entered upon a consideration of this subject in the first place as people resisting a claim which had been made against us on the other side. The matter was in constant discussion certainly during my first year out here, and we were able to come

to an agreement in principle as to how it ought to be handled; and the method that we agreed about resembled very closely what my Honourable friend referred to when he mentioned a recommendation which had been made at a recent Imperial Conference. I have not been able to check my Honourable friend's reference, but I should be very glad if he would give it to me afterwards. We were and are definitely contemplating a reference of this whole question to an independent tribunal, and His Majesty's Government had agreed that it should be handled in that way. Then we got involved in this constitutional question, and although my Honourable friend says that this could have been handled independently of the constitutional question, I would ask him to accept it for a fact that the delay has been entirely due to the fact that these constitutional points were under discussion; and the reason for it—and I think the Government of India must accept a certain amount of responsibility for it—the reason for it really has been that we on our side felt that the Indian case would have a better chance of consideration after the constitutional issues had been cleared and in the atmosphere which we hoped would be created at these constitutional discussions, than it would be if we dealt with it quite independently. Of course, we may possibly have been wrong about that, but that at any rate was the reason by which we were guided. I think those who were at the Round Table Conference may be inclined to agree that something has been gained by waiting. Apart from that, I think it would in fact have been impossible to detach it from the constitutional issue, because a great many of the arguments on which the Government of India's case was based really did raise constitutional points and they particularly raised the sort of points which have been referred to in the Report of the Statutory Commission; indeed we had throughout felt bound to await the result of that inquiry, because we understood that certain things were going to be said in that Report which would have a distinct bearing on this particular case. I should like to make it clear that we on our side have been careful to see that the Government of India's interests should not be prejudiced by this delay, and in the discussions with His Majesty's Government on the subject it has been agreed that, whatever settlement should be arrived at should be retrospective and should date—I think I am correct but I have not been able to verify it since this debate began—from the 31st March, 1926. So that if we are able to obtain a reduction of the payments, we are not losing by delaying now and we shall be credited with the arrears. I must on the other hand say that His Majesty's Government also reserved the same position, for they think that it may be they and not we who will benefit by securing the introduction of this particular provision for retrospective adjustment. However Honourable Members will I think be satisfied that we are not prejudicing our interests by delay.

Then there was a particular point in reference to the capitation rates which my friend mentioned, and that was that in recent years the actual per-head rate had not been given in any of the Government's statements of account. That is perfectly true and the present payment really represents a lump-sum payment which was arrived at at a sort of provisional compromise payment. It is fixed at a definite sum, £1,400,000, and it does not vary according to the numbers of troops. As a matter of fact the numbers of troops are fairly constant so that there is not very much in that; but having fixed the matter in that way, it ceased to be reckoned on a *per capita* basis and the *per capita* rate is therefore not stated.

[Sir George Schuster.]

Now, before I leave this capitation payment question, I should like to say this. Speaking on behalf of the Government, there is a good deal more to be said about it which I have not been able to say today, and if Honourable Members opposite would desire to discuss it with us confidentially, if leaders of parties or two or three Members to be selected in any other way would wish to discuss it with me, I shall be very pleased to do so, and to go very fully into the whole position with them. In fact I should appreciate the opportunity to do that because we are anxious to get some opportunity of testing public opinion as to the way in which the matter might best be handled in the future from the Indian point of view. Therefore I trust that that offer will satisfy Honourable Members and that they will excuse me from going into any further details on the question.

I now turn to the last point with which I need deal, and that is the test question which my Honourable friend put to me: "If the Government are prepared to allow the Retrenchment Committee to go into the Army expenditure", he said, "then we on this side will accept such a committee and consider it a valuable offer and one in which we shall be glad to participate". Well, Sir, I say without any reservation or hesitation, that the Government are perfectly prepared to do that on the terms on which my Honourable friend made quite clear he was speaking. He said he does not want to suggest that the Committee should go into questions of military policy, but he wants it to investigate the whole of the business side of Army administration: I think I am correct in my interpretation of what he asked for. Sir, on that understanding, as I have said, we welcome the suggestion, and I would like to refer back to what I have said in previous debates, that on this whole question of how best we should set up a retrenchment inquiry—whether it had better be by a number of separate committees, whether it had better be by committees representative of this Assembly or by the Government associated with experts—on all those details I think it would be most advantageous if we could discuss them with representatives of the unofficial parties; and I shall be very glad to arrange for an early meeting for that purpose. We are as anxious as they are to go into this whole question of business efficiency, and I think when we work together and make some advance on these questions, my Honourable friend may withdraw the suggestion that he made that it is our desire or intention to leave most of the dirty work to be done by our successors.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: Mr. President, there is a stile in the way of one who is sitting on a horse; there is a stile in the way of one who is sitting on a fence, and there is a stile in the way of one who is watching to see which side the cat jumps. My esteemed and learned friend, Mr. Arthur Moore, belongs to the last category. He is simply waiting for the results of the expert committee which is sitting to enquire into the development of the Air Force, hoping perhaps thereby a corresponding reduction may be made in the fighting troops. I have no quarrel with him on this account. Indeed I asked a question of my Honourable friend, Mr. Young, as to what extent the development of the Air Force and the mechanization will produce reduction in other directions; but as usual I have received no answer from him. My Honourable friend, Mr. Arthur Moore, admitted that the cost of the Military Department was more than it ought to be and that there is room for retrenchment. On that admission he would go with me into

the lobby to vote against the Government, not to vote with the Government. My cut is that the military expenditure is excessive and Mr. Arthur Moore admits that it is so. He is, therefore, in honour bound to vote with me.

I come now to my Honourable friend, Mr. Young's arguments. He admits that the Inchcape Committee recommended that the military expenditure should be reduced to Rs. 50 crores; but he said that they also recommended that this ought to be done when there is a fall in prices of agricultural products. Does not my learned friend know that there has been a tremendous fall in the prices of agricultural commodities now? Why cannot the Army Department reduce the expenditure to Rs. 50 crores if they want to accept the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee on that score?

My Honourable friend then said, "Well, the military expenditure has risen in some countries". I know that it has risen. I know that in some countries it is ranging from 6 to 10 per cent. of the total income and that in Russia it amounts to 20 per cent. But can he show me any country in the world where it has risen to 27 per cent. of the entire income? He has not replied, as usual to that question.

My learned friend again said, "Oh, the strength of the battalions cannot be reduced; our experts say so and we do not agree with the Inchcape Committee". Then, why did you appoint that Committee? This is just the way that an irresponsible, irremovable government will talk. We are decidedly of opinion that the strength of the Indian battalions can be reduced by 154 men and there is no argument to the contrary, except the interested expert opinion which of course there may be; but as regards the Army, we all know that your experts want to increase the number of troops.

I asked my learned friend to what extent the number of the covering troops would be reduced as a result of our policy on the frontier. My learned friend has given no reply as usual to that question. If the frontier is pacified, as he admits that it is being pacified, there is no reason why the strength of the covering troops should not be reduced and retrenchment in expenditure effected in that way.

Sir, I am very grateful to my Honourable friend, Sir George Schuster, for agreeing to my proposal and that of my learned friend, Mr. Mudaliar, for the appointment of a Retrenchment Committee which would go into the question of military expenditure. We are thankful to him, and I think this House should on this basis accept the proposal of my learned friend for the appointment of a Retrenchment Committee.

There was another question which I asked, but to which I received no reply as usual from Mr. Young. I asked was it not a fact that the Committee of 1922 had recommended that there should be 81 Indian officers per year in the higher ranks of the Army. Are you going to do that this year? My learned friend gave no reply. He simply said that the recommendations were not accepted by His Majesty's Government, forgetting that last year Mr. Wedgwood Benn himself said that if the Government of India were to recommend a rapid Indianisation of the Army, he would accept any recommendation. Are you going to do that? Are you going to recommend it to the Secretary of State? I pause for an answer.

Mr. G. M. Young: I am not quite sure what the recommendation is to which the Honourable Member refers. Recommend to whom? To His Majesty's Government, and if so at what stage?

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: I say that the Committee of 1922, which reported on 11th January 1922—and this Committee was appointed by the late Lord Rawlinson—recommended that there should be an annual increase in the officer ranks to the extent of 81 per year in the first period. That I made quite clear. I said that Mr. Wedgwood Benn last year made it perfectly clear that if the Government of India were to recommend the rapid Indianisation of the Army, they would accept any suggestion in this matter. Are you going to do it now? Are you going to select 81 officers this year and next year before the expert committee makes a Report, before the new constitution comes into force? My question is clear and I want a clear answer, Sir.

Mr. G. M. Young: Sir, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief made it perfectly clear in his recent speech in the Council of State that he was not yet in a position to disclose the extent of his recommendations for Indianisation. That is the position, but those recommendations will of course have to be disclosed by the time the expert committee meets.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: As usual, Sir, the reply is confidential.

Mr. Jehangir K. Munshi (Burma: Non-European): I warned you in the morning that you would get no reply.

Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz: That I know very well.

Then, I asked my learned friend whether he could not reduce in this time of peace, in this time of goodwill and co-operation, the number of the British troops in India. The reply is, "Well, it cannot be said now, because an expert committee will sit and inquire into that question". Can you do it now? Are you prepared to reduce the number of the British troops in any shape or form? As usual, no answer. (Laughter.)

Then, Sir, replying to my esteemed and learned friend, Mr. Mudaliar's arguments, the Army Secretary said that generally the Army estimates were not over-estimated. This is a very laconic and brief answer. My Honourable friend referred to facts and figures, and the reply from the Government side was that it was not correct and that the Army estimates were not generally over-estimated. But figures show that they are over-estimated.

Then, Sir, as regards the constitutional question which was raised by my learned friend Mr. Mudaliar in a very able speech, my Honourable friend Sir George Schuster has given a frank reply, and I will leave the various points raised for consideration by expert investigation. All that I say is this. I have made out an unanswerable case, and I want every elected Member in this House, leaving alone my friend Mr. Arthur Moore, whose speech is somewhat inconsistent, to go with me into the lobby and vote with me. (Loud Applause.)

Mr. President: The question which I have now to put is:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

The Assembly divided :

AYES—66.

Abdoola Haroon, Seth Haji.
 Abdur Rahim, Sir.
 Aggarwal, Mr. Jagan Nath.
 Ahmed, Mr. K.
 Anklesaria, Mr. N. N.
 Anwar-ul-Azim, Mr. Muhammad.
 Azhar Ali, Mr. Muhammad.
 Bagla, Lala Rameshwar Prasad.
 Bhuput Singh, Mr.
 Biswas, Mr. C. C.
 Chetty, Mr. R. K. Shanmukham.
 Dudhoria, Mr. Nabakumar Sing.
 Dutt, Mr. Amar Nath.
 Fazal Haq Piracha Shaikh.
 Gour, Sir Hari Singh.
 Gunjal, Mr. N. R.
 Hari Raj Swarup, Lala.
 Hoon, Mr. A.
 Ibrahim Ali Khan, Lt. Nawab
 Muhammad.
 Ismail Ali Khan, Kunwar Hajee.
 Ismail Khan, Haji Chaudhury
 Muhammad.
 Jadhav, Mr. B. V.
 Jehangir, Sir Cowasji.
 Jha, Pandit Ram Krishna.
 Jog, Mr. S. G.
 Kyaw Myint, U.
 Lahiri Chaudhury, Mr. D. K.
 Maswood Ahmad, Mr. M.
 Misra, Mr. B. N.
 Mitra, Mr. S. C.
 Mody, Mr. H. P.
 Muazzam Sahib Bahadur, Mr.
 Muhammad.

Mudaliar, Diwan Bahadur A.
 Ramaswami.
 Mujumdar, Sardar G. N.
 Munshi, Mr. Jehangir K.
 Neogy, Mr. K. C.
 Pandian, Mr. B. Rajaram.
 Pandit, Rao Bahadur S. B.
 Permanand Devta Sarup, Bhai
 Puri, Mr. B. R.
 Puri, Mr. Goswami M. R.
 Raghbir Singh, Kunwar.
 Rajah, Raja Sir Vasudeva.
 Ranga Iyer, Mr. C. S.
 Rangachariar, Dewan Bahadur T.
 Rao, Mr. M. N.
 Reddi, Mr. T. N. Ramakrishna.
 Roy, Kumar G. R.
 Sadiq Hasan, Shaikh.
 Sant Singh, Sardar.
 Sarda, Rai Sahib Harbilas.
 Sen, Mr. S. C.
 Shah Nawaz, Mian Muhammad.
 Shahani, Mr. S. C.
 Singh, Kumar Gupteshwar Prasad.
 Singh, Mr. Gaya Prasad.
 Sitaramaraju, Mr. B.
 Sohan Singh, Sirdar.
 Sukhraj Rai, Raj Bahadur.
 Thampan, Mr. K. P.
 Tun Aung, U.
 Uppi Saheb Bahadur, Mr.
 Walayatullah, Khan Bahadur H. M.
 Yakub, Maulvi Muhammad.
 Yamin Khan, Mr. Muhammad.
 Ziauddin Ahmad, Dr.

NOES—43.

Abdul Qaiyum, Nawab Sir Sahibzada.
 Acheson, Mr. J. G.
 Alexander, Mr. W.
 Allah Baksh Khan Tiwana, Khan
 Bahadur Malik.
 Ayyangar, Diwan Bahadur V.
 Bhashyam.
 Bajpai, Mr. G. S.
 Banarji, Mr. Rajnarayan.
 Baum, Mr. E. F.
 Boag, Mr. G. T.
 Chatterjee, The Revd. J. C.
 Cocke, Sir Hugh.
 Crerar, The Honourable Sir James.
 Dalal, Dr. R. D.
 Fazl-i-Husain, The Honourable Khan
 Bahadur Mian Sir.
 Fox, Mr. H. B.
 French, Mr. J. C.
 Graham, Sir Lancelot.
 Gwynne, Mr. C. W.
 Hamilton, Mr. K. B. L.
 Heathcote, Mr. L. V.
 Hezlett, Mr. J.

Jawahar Singh, Sardar Bahadur
 Sardar.
 Khurshed Ahmad Khan, Mr.
 Macmillan, Mr. A. M.
 Montgomery, Mr. H.
 Moore, Mr. Arthur.
 Morgan, Mr. G.
 Mukherjee, Raj Bahadur S. C.
 Parsons, Mr. A. A. L.
 Rafiuddin Ahmad, Khan Bahadur
 Maulvi.
 Rainy, The Honourable Sir George.
 Rajah, Rao Bahadur M. C.
 Rau, Mr. H. Shankar.
 Roy, Mr. K. C.
 Sahi, Mr. Ram Prashad Narayan.
 Sams, Mr. H. A.
 Sarma, Mr. R. S.
 Schuster, The Honourable Sir George
 Scott, Mr. J. Ramsay.
 Shillidy, Mr. J. A.
 Studd, Mr. E.
 Tin Tüt, Mr.
 Young, Mr. G. M.

The motion was adopted.

Mr. President: I should like to ask Honourable Members whether they wish to follow the procedure which the House adopted yesterday. If that is so, I will have to put the reduced demand for the Army Department to the vote, in order that the House may be able to take up the Income-tax Demand tomorrow.

Honourable Members: Yes.

Kumar G. B. Roy: May I move my Assam Rifles cut motion*? It will take only five minutes.

Several Honourable Members: No, no.

Mr. President: Honourable Members must realise what I pointed out yesterday, that they have either to accept the procedure adopted then, or to proceed with the cut motions as they appear on the Order Paper. I take it that the House unanimously wishes

Mr. C. S. Ranga Iyer: No, not unanimously.

Mr. President: If the House is not unanimous, then I shall be obliged to adjourn the House now and take up the other cuts under the Army Department tomorrow.

Honourable Members: No, no.

Mr. H. P. Mody: If the majority of the House is in favour of the procedure you have suggested, I think it is up to you to carry out that wish.

Mr. President: It cannot be done. The Rules and Standing Orders lay down a specific procedure, which the House can, I think, vary only unanimously. Yesterday the House was unanimous as no one expressed his dissent. Today some dissent has been expressed, but I hope that the dissenting Members will respect the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the House. My hands would otherwise be tied. It is for Honourable Members to consider whether they will not follow a procedure which enables the House to deal with as many Departments as possible for which Government demand grants. I will ask once more whether the House will agree that I should now put the reduced demand for the Army Department to the vote in order that the path may be cleared for to-morrow's discussion of a new Demand. (*Honourable Members:* "Yes, yes.") I take it that the House is unanimous. The question I have to put is:

"That a reduced sum not exceeding Rs. 5,36,900 be granted to the Governor General in Council to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st March, 1932, in respect of the 'Army Department'."

The motion was adopted.

The Assembly then adjourned till Eleven of the Clock on Wednesday, the 11th March, 1931.

*"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 1. (Assam Rifles.)"

APPENDIX.*

Translation of a speech delivered in Marathi by Mr. N. R. Gunjal, M.L.A., in the Legislative Assembly, on the 6th March, 1931, in connection with the General discussion of the Budget.

Mr. N. R. Gunjal (Bombay Central Division: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Sir, I am indeed thankful to you for giving me an opportunity of offering my remarks on the General Budget. It is with a heavy heart, I find that the Budget for 1931-32 which, Sir George Schuster, the Finance Member, has submitted to this House, is full of odium and widespread dislike. If the history of Indian Budgets from the year 1921-22 onwards, is traced it will be evident that expenditure has been growing heavily, year after year, and that no attention whatsoever has been paid by the representatives of people of India to these excesses and increased expenditures, and also to the crooked policy of extravagance. I wonder, why the representatives of the people of India should not protest against these heavy demands in the Budget? Why should they remain satisfied with simply delivering speeches on only the general aspect of the Budget in this Chamber and by publishing them in newspapers? If carefully surveyed, it will be seen, that the Budgets, as submitted by the Finance Members, from time to time, are passed, without any reduction in the expenditures proposed therein. But, Sir, this is the year,—the year 1931-32—when it should be remembered that this House should denounce this policy, and should reject all proposals and express the inevitable discontent.

In all the Departments in the Centre, Sir, all high-salaried posts are filled up by Europeans. In many places in the Budget, their salaries are shown under the head "non-votable grants". When these high-salaried posts are created in the Departments, these posts, in the beginning for some time, are shown as "votable", but, no sooner the Departments are confirmed or made permanent, the salaries become "non-votable". The result of this is that the Members of the Assembly have no chance of offering their "cuts". In this way, the white elephants of England are freely moving about in the vast grazing ground of India.

Sir, what have Government done for the agricultural classes in India? Are the agriculturists not paying much to the Government? Has the Finance Member announced any measure of relief to, or any constructive scheme of economic uplift for, these dumb millions of the population? Will Government reply to these questions? To my mind, the Budgets presented to this House, year after year, are nothing but bankruptcy Budgets, and this is one of the main causes of all the suffering of our leaders and of the truce declaration by His Excellency the Viceroy and Mahatma Gandhi—the leader of India.

Sir, for about one hundred and fifty years, the British Government have been sucking the blood of our agricultural classes, and have been labouring under a wrong impression that their policy is not understood by the peasants of India. I am here to tell this Assembly and the Treasury Benches that, in the past, India has produced intelligent men—more intelligent men than at the present day—and that, at present, there are men who are also wise and have sufficient knowledge and intelligence.

*Vide page 1587 of these debates.

They know that India is their motherland, the agriculture and the agricultural income are their own, and they desire that they must have a share in the administration of their own country. They think, they must raise their own army, and in order to achieve this, the present day Indian intelligent leaders are at work, and are endeavouring, day and night, to achieve that end.

I am greatly surprised, Sir, to see in this year's Budget a deficit of 13½ crores, and in order to balance this Government's suggestions are that income-tax and super-tax should be increased. This policy of increase of taxation is very harmful to the trading classes of India. The increase in income-tax is one which will hit the middle classes very heavily. Are the Members of the Assembly not aware of this? There are several heads in the Budget, showing expenditures and incomes, but, I find, that the main monopoly there is for white officers. All these difficulties are created in the Budget by the Government and the Budget is showing a horrible deficit, and for that purpose, people are now taxed for no faults of their own. Land settlement is another cause of heavy taxation of the agricultural classes. The present system of land settlement should be abolished, and a new system of permanent settlement should be brought into force, or the revision period should be fixed at 100 years, so that the peasantry can have some relief. Every village should have a free grazing ground according to the number of cattle, and other necessities of agriculturists, such as, wood for agricultural implements, and thorns for fencing etc., should be given free of all charges.

Government should encourage the Ayurvedic medical system and should open a college for the same because foreign medicines are very costly and not suitable to the climate of this country. Sir, I submit that the encouragement of the Ayurvedic system would not only act as a stimulus to the medicines made in this country, but would also improve the health of the people of this country. Similarly, the difficulties and deficiencies in the case of irrigation must also be removed. The assessment charged in cases of irrigated areas should be reduced to Rs. 20 per acre.

Primary and higher education should receive more liberal grants as are given in Western countries. Government should spend more on these items and mere assurances on the part of Government would be of no avail. The expenditure on police and on liquors should be reduced, and political prisoners should be given better food, better treatment and better facilities. Political prisoners should have separate jails and they should be given all the facilities that an ordinary European prisoner receives. The committees, that are appointed, from time to time, to suggest improvements in agriculture, should contain experienced agriculturists, who are aware of their conditions and difficulties, and only then, the condition of the agricultural classes would be improved. In order to carry out the above suggestions, sufficient money is required. All these white elephants (Europeans) which are freely grazing over the rich and fertile land of India will have to be tied up and such grazing should be prohibited. And if this is not done, there will be no other course open to Indians except to turn out these white elephants, their tusks taken out, and their trunks cut off.

The Government of India should remember that India will have to put an end to the autocratic and oppressive policy with which the bureaucracy is carrying out the administration, and if they want to carry out the administration peacefully, they must act in accordance with the opinion of the people.

This Budget, Sir, contains several things which require scathing criticism, but I propose to deal with these at the time of voting on Demands.

Recently, during the last year, the police and the military have committed excesses and *zulums* on ryots. India will never forget the disgraceful and shameless manner in which the police and the military assaulted eminent citizens and ladies of high families. The execution of the Sholapur prisoners and such other black acts of the bureaucracy will never be forgotten. The grants for extra police for places like Sholapur and others are placed before the Assembly and it is the duty of all the wise Members of this Assembly to throw out all these grants.

In conclusion, Sir, I would say that the Budget, which has been submitted to this Assembly, shows clearly not only the financial bankruptcy of the Government of India, but also the bankruptcy of intellect and statesmanship of those who framed the Budget and submitted to this House. This being the general discussion on the Budget, I need not bring to the notice of the Assembly the particular irregularities, and I leave them to other Members of the Assembly to speak on matters relating to figures.