

THE 8th March 1930

# LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES

(25th February to 20th March, 1930)


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## SIXTH SESSION

OF THE

## THIRD LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1930

Chamber Fumigated. 18.10.73.....



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1930

# Legislative Assembly.

## *President :*

THE HONOURABLE MR. V. J. PATEL.

## *Deputy President :*

MAULVI MUHAMMAD YAKUB, M.L.A.

## *Panel of Chairmen :*

PANDIT MADAN MOHAN MALAVIYA, M.L.A.

MR. M. A. JINNAH, M.L.A.

SIR DARCY LINDSAY, KT., C.B.E., M.I.A.

SIR ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN, KT., C.S.I., M.L.A.

## *Secretary :*

MR. S. C. GUPTA, BAR.-AT-LAW.

## *Assistant of the Secretary :*

RAI SAHIB D. DUTT.

## *Marshal :*

CAPTAIN SURAJ SINGH BAHADUR, I.O.M.

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# LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

*Saturday, 8th March, 1930.*

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The Assembly met in the Assembly Chamber of the Council House at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. President in the Chair.

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## MEMBER SWORN:

Mr. L. V. Heathcote, M.L.A. (Associated Chambers of Commerce: Nominated Non-Official).

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## SHORT NOTICE QUESTION AND ANSWER.

### IMPRISONMENT OF SARDAR VALLABHBHAI PATEL.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** Will Government be pleased to state under what section or sections Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel has been sentenced?

**The Honourable Sir James Orerar:** I have not yet received any official information on the subject. I have asked the Government of Bombay to report the facts by telegram.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** Will the Honourable Member be pleased to convey the information to me when he has received it? I expect he will receive it by tomorrow.

**The Honourable Sir James Orerar:** I shall be glad to intimate to the Honourable Member when the information which I have asked for has been received.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** Will the Honourable Member try to obtain it by tomorrow morning?

**The Honourable Sir James Orerar:** Sir, a telegram is being despatched immediately. I cannot, of course, guarantee when the reply will be received.

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**Mr. President:** I have received notice of a motion for leave for the adjournment of the House to draw the attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the imprisonment of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel from Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. In view of the answer just given by the Leader of the House, perhaps the Honourable the Pandit would be well advised to wait till he receives the reply from the Government of Bombay.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya** (Allahabad and Jhansi Divisions: Non-Muhammadian Rural): I will, Sir. Thank you.

**Mr. R. K. Shanmukham Chetty** (Salem and Coimbatore *cum* North Arcot: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Will he be in order then?

**Mr. President:** The Chair will be prepared to waive urgency.

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### STATEMENT OF BUSINESS.

**The Honourable Sir James Orerar** (Leader of the House): Sir, I desire, with your permission, to make a statement as to the probable course of business in the week beginning Monday, the 10th March. As Honourable Members are aware, Monday, the 10th, Tuesday, the 11th, and Wednesday, the 12th, have been allotted for the discussion of the Demands for Grants. On Thursday, the 13th, the Government business will include the election of a Member to the Standing Committee for Roads in place of Mr. Ganganand Sinha and the election of Members to the Standing Finance Committee. The Honourable Sir George Rainy will move to take into consideration and, if that motion is accepted, to pass the Bill further to amend the Indian Tariff Act, 1894, and to amend the Indian Tariff (Cotton Yarn Amendment) Act, 1927. Friday, the 14th, and Saturday, the 15th, as Members are aware, are gazetted holidays.

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### THE GENERAL BUDGET—LIST OF DEMANDS—*contd.*

#### DEMAND No. 39—ARMY DEPARTMENT.

**The Honourable Sir George Schuster** (Finance Member): Sir, I beg to move:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 5,47,000 be granted to the Governor General in Council to defray the charges, which will come in course of payment, during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1931, in respect of 'Army Department'."

#### *Military Policy of the Government.*

**Maulvi Abdul Matin Chaudhury** (Assam: Muhammadan): Sir, I move that the Demand under the head "Army Department" be reduced to rupee one.

Sir, I move this motion as a protest against the general military policy of the Government, and in particular the policy of not giving effect to the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee. Though, Sir, there has not been any authoritative official pronouncement to that effect, it is evident that the military policy of the Government is the policy of excluding Indians from the higher ranks of the Army. It is a policy of perpetuating the hegemony of the British officers in the Army. One fact that emerges unmistakeably out of the examination of the military policy of the Government is that the settled policy of the Government is to deny to the Indians the opportunity of higher military training, and make India absolutely dependent upon the British officers, both for internal security and for protection against foreign aggression. We are persuaded to believe that the British officer has undertaken the onerous responsibility, the white man's burden, of guarding the frontiers of India, so that the martial races from the North may not sweep upon the plains of Hindustan, or that the internal peace of the country may not be disturbed by the Mussalmans and the Hindus flying at each others throats. That is what we have been

asked to believe. But the last European war has been responsible for exploding many a myth. It has among other things, exploded the myth of the white man's burden, and it has also exploded the myth of the white man's superiority. It is time that the Government realised that India can no longer be lulled into sleep by these comforting shibboleths. The Indians have been demanding their rights and the opportunity of defending their own country, their own hearths and homes, and wisdom and statesmanship demand that Government should make a ready response to that. But unfortunately there is no sign of any growth of wisdom in the Government. There is no sign of any return to any sane and sound policy. They are moving, Sir, along their traditional lines and this is best illustrated by their attitude with regard to the recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee. In that Committee, distinguished military officers on the one side and eminent Indian politicians on the other came to the unanimous conclusion as to the steps that ought to be taken to Indianise the higher ranks of the Army. The main recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee were the creation of an Indian Sandhurst, forcing the pace of Indianising the Army, so that, by 1952, fifty per cent. of the officers of the Indian Army would be Indianised, and the abandonment of the eight unit scheme. These recommendations, Sir, did not come very much up to the expectation of the country. But they marked a definite advance on the existing position. I am not, Sir, an admirer of this Sandhurst Report. I consider it a halting and cautious compromise, but even that, Sir, the Government is reluctant to accept. Three years ago the Report was published, and there is as yet no indication that the Government accept the policy underlying the Report. The Honourable the Army Secretary told us the other day that a Sandhurst was to be started in 1933 and there was still three years to go.

**Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru** (Agra Division: Non-Muhammadan Rural): He never said anything like that.

**Maulvi Abdul Matin Chaudhury**: He reminded the House that it was to be started in 1933.

**Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru**: He did not say it was going to be started in 1933.

**Maulvi Abdul Matin Chaudhury**: This is what Mr. Young said on the last occasion:

"May I remind the House that an Indian Sandhurst was to be founded in 1933 and there are still three years to go."

That is the sentence used by him.

**Mr. M. B. Jayakar** (Bombay City: Non-Muhammadan Urban): Did not the Commander-in-Chief refer to this matter in the other House?

**Mr. G. M. Young** (Army Secretary): What I did say was, "May I remind the House that it was to be founded in 1933 and that there are still three years to go." I did not say that it was the intention of the Government to found it in 1933.

**Maulvi Abdul Matin Chaudhury**: From this it is evident that the Government say, there are still three years to wait for the Indian Sandhurst to come. So far, in the Budget we find no provision for any preliminary expense for the Indian Sandhurst three years hence. My Honourable friend, Mr. Young, believes in the Bible. According to the Old Testament, when God created the Universe, He said, "Let there be light", and there

[Maulvi Abdul Matin Chaudhury.]

was light, and God said, "it was good". Imitating the Lord Almighty, Mr. Young will say in 1933, "Let there be a Sandhurst" and there will spring up a Sandhurst in the tableland of Dehra Dun and we shall all rejoice and say "It is good". But, Sir, surely Mr. Young does not expect us to be satisfied with this lame assurance of his. The Army Headquarters may congratulate themselves on their effectively shelving the major recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee, but do they realise, Sir, what has been the reaction on the country of this policy of Government? Now-a-days no public meeting is held in any town or village in India but sends up the cry, "Long live Revolution". Do Government realise the significance of this cry? It means that people have lost all faith in the evolutionary process in politics. The conviction is growing upon our countrymen that all the constitutional agitation and all the eloquence of Mr. Jinnah or the sweet reasonableness of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya lead the country nowhere. At least, it has led the country nowhere nearer its goal, so far as the military sphere is concerned. Events in India are moving very fast. They are moving with startling rapidity. Three years ago the Sandhurst Report was welcomed as a definite advance, but today, Sir, many representative Indians will hesitate to put their signatures to a document like that. I can tell you, Sir, that five years hence, you will not find a single patriotic Indian who will be left to do it homage. It will be relegated to limbo of obscurity, as an obsolete and antediluvian document. But at this particular juncture, the attitude of Government towards the Sandhurst Report has got an additional significance. His Excellency the Viceroy has announced that the goal of India is the attainment of Dominion Status. Dominion Status, Sir, postulates a Dominion Army. Mr. Young cannot extemporise a band of trained army officers simultaneously with the grant of Dominion Status, and this attitude of Government and their apathy in this matter has made the Indian public sceptical about the Viceregal pronouncement. The House expects from Mr. Young an authoritative pronouncement as to what is going to be the policy of Government in this matter, whether the Government intend to take immediate steps for the starting of the Indian Sandhurst, what steps do the Government intend to take for forcing the pace of Indianising the Army, and what steps do they intend to take with regard to the abandonment of the eight units' scheme? We want a clear, definite statement on these points. We want to know whether the Government will still continue its policy of keeping India under the heels of an army of occupation, or do they contemplate a departure from that policy. That is what we want to know from Mr. Young. Before I sit down, I want to sound a note of warning to the Government Benches. In this country, there is a vast reservoir of energy, pluck initiative and enterprise among the Indian youth. Unless it is harnessed to the military service of the State, unless this is disciplined and brought under control, there is every danger of its seeking an outlet in other directions. Already, Sir, the Indian youth has become a keen student of Irish revolutionary history and Irish revolutionary methods. De Valera and Michael Collins are the ideals of the Indian youths of today. (Mr. B. Das: "Hear, hear.") They seek their inspiration from the careers of these Irish patriots and their exploits. Now, Sir, if this revolutionary tendency is to be checked, the best course for the Government is to throw open the higher military career to the educated Indian youth. If they give effect to the recommendations of the Sand-

hurst Committee, by 1952 half the cadets of the Indian Army, will be Indians. But if they do not give effect to that, if they ignore the Report of the Sandhurst Committee, if they do not strengthen the hands of those who stand for gradual, constitutional advance, it is quite likely that, in 1952, the flag that the Indian Army officers will salute may not be the Union Jack, but it will be the Tri-colour flag of an Independent India. (Hear, hear and applause.)

**Dr. B. S. Moonje** (Nagpur Division: Non-Muhammadan): Sir, I want to make two or three points on this question. My first point is that the Indian Army is too big for the needs of the situation. It might sound a little bit fantastic for me to say in view of the perpetual threat already magnified beyond bounds, from the North Western Frontier, that the present Indian Army is really too big for the needs of the situation. I might go in for a little critical analysis and calculation so that I might try to impress upon the House that it is really too big for the needs of the Indian situation. The Indian Army at the present moment is composed as follows:

(a) On the one hand:

Britishers holding King's Commission	..	..	7,444
British other ranks	..	..	62,069
			<hr/>
<b>Total Britishers</b>	..	..	<b>69,513</b>

(b) On the other hand:

Indians with Viceroy's Commissions	..	..	4,658
Indian other ranks	..	..	1,51,691
			<hr/>
<b>Total Indians</b>	..	..	<b>1,56,349</b>

Such is the Army, as composed at the present moment. Now, one British soldier, as I have said and proved by calculations in one of my budget speeches in this Assembly costs the State five times more than an Indian soldier. Do I mean thereby that the value of a British soldier as expressed in terms of fighting capacity is five times more than the value of an Indian soldier? I will not express my own opinion in the matter, but that is what the British officers allege. Sir Mortimer Durand, who has been memorialised in what is known as the Durand Line says in his diary:

"I confess I always thought 100 British Soldiers were worth five times the number of Asiatics."

If this value be expressed in terms of numbers of Indian sepoy, then 69,513 Britishers multiplied by 5 means 3,47,565 Indian soldiers. This plus 1,56,349 actual Indian soldiers means 5,03,914 trained Indian soldiers. So the whole Indian Army at the present moment may be said to be composed of 5,03,914 fighting Indians. But let me be not unfair to Sir Mortimer Durand. He further on says:

"Anything more cool and gentlemanly than a Sikh under fire is not to be found; and at all events, with the cavalry branch, Indians are far more practically useful."

Now, what is the military threat to India? There could be no threat from the seaside, because there is the British Navy, and India forms a bright jewel in the Crown of the British Empire. Therefore, there is not much of a threat worth mentioning from the seaside.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford** (Bengal: European): What do you pay for this Navy?

**Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru:** What do the Dominions pay?

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** That is not the point. What we pay for the British Navy is not the question at the present moment. My point is that I want to make out that the present Army is too big for the needs of the present situation in India. The military threat to India therefore is practically nothing from the seaside. Now let us see the land frontier. It is practically nothing from its Eastern frontier. It is practically nothing from its Northern frontier, because there are the invulnerable Himalayas. The only frontier which allows a military threat to India is the North Western frontier from Baluchistan to the Khyber. Now, what are the populations there? My Honourable friend, Mr. Coatman, the Publicity Officer of the Government of India, interrupted me the other day, and I am now quoting from the book which he has presented to Parliament as the Report upon India in the year 1927-28, this being his latest book. About the people inhabiting the hilly country known as the Tribal Territories bordering on our North West Frontier he says:

"They (i.e., these tribes) are believed to number three millions" (i.e., 30 lakhs), "of whom at least half" (15 lakhs) "are males and of the latter, close on three quarters of a million" (about 7 lakhs) "are regarded as adults and fighting men".

Therefore, we have got in all 7 lakhs of men on the North Western frontier who are regarded as a perpetual threat to the British Empire in India. We have therefore to provide against any aggression coming from these 7 lakhs of men only, and these 7 lakhs of men are armed with what weapons? Mr. Coatman says:

"Their armament has vastly increased within the last few years, and as long ago as 1920 there were believed to be not less than 140,000 modern rifles in tribal territory."

Suppose now that their armaments have vastly increased since 1920. In seven years the number of their rifles may have increased by 10, 15 or 20 thousand. That means that, at the most generous calculation, there are now not more than two lakhs of modern rifles there at the present moment. Therefore, the military threat, which is regarded as a perpetual threat to India, and on the excuse of which such a huge military expenditure of 55 crores is justified, is a threat composed of 7 lakhs of fighting men and about 2 lakhs of modern rifles. I hope it is not contended that the people there have got 50 pounders, or 60 pounder guns or field artillery or machine guns or air force. There are no such modern scientific weapons there in the possession of the people of the tribal territory. And supposing if they had, have they the training and the scientific knowledge needed for their use on the battlefield? Therefore on all the most generous considerations, the military threat to India is composed of only 7,00,000 men and about 2 lakhs of modern rifles. Besides are these men trained, drilled and disciplined on modern scientific lines? The Great British General Sir Ian Hamilton says, in his book, "Soul and Body of the Army":

"A thousand men standing up in the open with arms in hand, each anxious to fight himself, but each uncertain of how far his fellows meant to fight, were liable to be scattered like chaff by a mere handful of soldiers hypnotised by habit into responding as one individual to the order of their Sergeant."

Are these tribal people so trained? In order to provide against the possibility of an attack on India by 7 lakhs of men armed with 2 lakhs of rifles, we have provided for an expenditure this year of 54 crores and 20 lakhs of rupees. That is the calculation that I have come to and I am

going to present this calculation to my Honourable friend, Mr. Young, who is the Army Secretary in India. If he thinks that he can present a better case to justify a military expenditure of 54 crores and 20 lakhs, I should invite information. I keep an open mind.

That is one point that I wanted to speak about and therefore my contention is that the present military policy in India is lavishly expensive I therefore believe that, looking to the possibility of any threat of foreign aggression, as it exists at present, there is no need for such a heavy expenditure on the Army in India.

Now, I should like to draw the attention of the House to a little speech, as reported in the Press, made in the Council of State day before yesterday by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The points that he made out in his speech are as follows. First he quotes with approval the fact that whereas all the European countries have seen their way to increase their military expenditure, it is only England that has reduced her military expenditure, thereby perhaps indicating that the military threat to England has become very much less. Have the Germans ceased to entertain any kind of idea of hostility to England? Has France ceased to be so inimical to England as she was about 50 years ago? Is Russia so very friendly to England that England may feel that there is no military threat from that side, and therefore England must reduce her military expenditure? And His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief puts it with great pride and satisfaction that England should teach a lesson to other Nations like America, Germany and France and see its way to reduce its military expenditure from 51 to 40 million pounds, that is, a reduction of 10 million pounds. And India alone in the British Empire, with a military threat of 7 lakhs of fighting men only, is not in a position to be able to reduce its military expenditure by very much more than Rs. 80 lakhs. I said the other day that even this reduction is a make-believe reduction, an eye-wash, a camouflage. I have made calculations and proved that it is not the real reduction that it ought to have been.

The second point of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, which concerns me at present, is this. A question was asked two days ago in the House of Commons by Commander Kenworthy, and Mr. Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for India, said that he was quite prepared to consider the extension of the present scheme of Indianisation of the Indian Army if the Government of India felt justified in recommending it on the basis of the results already achieved. In this connection, His Excellency said in his speech in the Council of State day before yesterday that the recommendations of the Skeen Committee had been given effect to in every respect except in regard to the eight unit scheme and the establishing of the Indian Sandhurst in 1933. He said further that the Government of India did not feel confident that the cadets coming forward for the Indian Sandhurst could be relied upon as being sufficient either in quality or in quantity so as to justify the Government in undertaking the heavy expenditure involved in the immediate creation of an Indian Sandhurst with possibly a very large staff. This means that His Excellency has two objections to the creation of an Indian Sandhurst. The first is that the Indian cadets that have so far come forward have not given entire satisfaction, or at least as much satisfaction as he was led to expect, and therefore, if an Indian Sandhurst were started in India, it would be a costly thing, and it would not be patronised or made full use of by the Indian cadets, that is, what His Excellency means to convey is that it will be creating a supply before

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there is any demand for it, if he were to go in for an Indian Sandhurst. Let us see what are the results achieved so far in regard to the cadets appearing before the Interview and Record Board for selection for admission into the cadet colleges of England. Taking for instance, the last examination, the November examination, out of the two examinations that were held last year, only one examination was held in 1928—taking the last November examination, let us see what the results are. The results were, if I remember aright—I am open to correction with regard to these figures—the results were that 69 students appeared before the Interview Board.

**Mr. G. M. Young:** Fifty-nine, three in England and the rest in India.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** If I remember aright, 69 appeared; I think I am right. But I take your figure as 59, and that is for how many vacancies? Would you supply me those figures?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** There were 10 vacancies at Sandhurst . . .

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** I will tell you if you do not remember. So far as my information goes, there were 10 vacancies for Sandhurst, 4 for Woolwich and 6 for Cranwell. Is it right?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I think yes.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Oh that does not matter. That is, about 20 candidates were to be selected, and 69 candidates, according to my memory and 59 according to the information of my Honourable friend, Mr. Young, the Army Secretary, appeared for the competitive examination. That is a good competition, three or three and a half times as many students appeared for competition as there were vacancies. Who can say that is not a good competition with a better promise for the future? Therefore, even from this point of view, from the point of view of the students taking advantage of the competition, the result is not to be despised, because three times as many students appeared for competing for ten vacancies for Sandhurst, six for Cranwell and four for Woolwich. Besides, the Government, as my Honourable friend, Mr. Kelkar, just reminds me, have not been undertaking, as they ought to, any propaganda work in order to popularise it and bring in a larger number of students for the competition and also has not been creating a larger number of vacancies. The Government may, or rather are, unmindful of their duties in the matter, but it concerns me vitally and I am therefore carrying on the propaganda on my own initiative, but it is not looked upon with favour, I personally know, by the Members of the Bureaucracy. (*An Honourable Member:* "How many passed the test?") I will just come to it. Sixteen boys were declared passed both in the written and oral examination for Sandhurst, but unfortunately only 10 were taken, because there were no vacancies for the other 6, though they satisfactorily passed the examination held by the Interview and Record Board. What damping effect will it have on the young men if only ten vacancies are to be filled up every time out of so many boys competing and passing the examination? Look at the amount of disappointment and discontent that it will give rise to. As regards Cranwell, there are only 6 vacancies; 7 boys were declared passed but only 6 were taken, and one was kept out because there was no vacancy. As for Woolwich, none from India was taken. Now I might cite here an instance which is very instructive. One boy had got 747 marks total for the Woolwich examination. Though

the number of pass marks fixed for Woolwich was 690, he got 747 marks, that is 57 marks more than the total pass marks fixed. This same boy got 656 for Sandhurst, for which the pass marks are 540 that is 116 more than the pass marks fixed. So this boy got very much more than the pass marks both for Sandhurst and Woolwich. But he could not be taken in for Sandhurst because there were no more vacancies than 10 and he could not be taken in for the Woolwich because unfortunately he did not get a sufficient number of marks in one subject, mathematics. Up to two years ago, up to 1928, the marks in mathematics, and chemistry or physics were combined and the pass marks fixed for the combined subjects were 240. A boy was required to pass in two subjects combined either mathematics and chemistry, or mathematics and physics and was required to get 240 pass marks in these combined subjects. If we take that standard, this boy failed only for want of 3 marks because he got only 237 marks in these combined subjects. He got 210 marks in the Interview and Record Board examination though the pass marks fixed are only 140; that is, he got 70 marks more than the pass marks. But, according to rules, he could not be taken, because he did not get a sufficient number of marks in the subject of mathematics, and he failed by 3 marks only in the combined subjects of mathematics and physics. I have referred in my questions, asked some days ago, to what Lord Rawlinson, our late Commander-in-Chief had said in connection with slackness of the test of these competitive examinations for entry into the military colleges of England for British boys. He has said in his diary that for the competitive examinations for Sandhurst and Woolwich about his time, though the standard was the same, as it is now, the standard for testing of British boys was very low; because a sufficient number of cadets were not coming forward to fill the number of vacancies that were offered. Could not a little relaxation be made in the observance of these rigid rules so as to provide for taking at least one or two students for Woolwich like the one of whom I have thought to make mention here? I may make mention here, for what it is worth, about certain misunderstandings or impressions prevailing among the people in respect of selection of Indian boys, particularly for Woolwich and Cranwell, though I do not believe that there could be much truth in them. Anyway, the impression is gaining ground in the country that prejudices are still lingering in the minds of the British officers in two respects. First, that boys generally not belonging to what are called the martial classes, though quite up to the standard of fitness prescribed for selection, are generally turned down; that is one misunderstanding prevailing among the people. The second impression or misunderstanding that is prevailing is that, though they might take some Indian boys for Sandhurst, as far as possible, they turn down boys for Woolwich and Cranwell. I do not think that that kind of misunderstanding is well founded, but at least so far as there is any little ground for such belief among the people.

**An Honourable Member:** What are the conditions under which boys are permitted to appear in the examination?

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** The Honourable Member can get a copy of the rules and regulations and see for himself. There is no time for me to go into that now. The results of the examinations for the last two years give some basis to that belief, to that misunderstanding, to that impression amongst the people. In 1928, so far as my information goes, no student was selected for Cranwell or Woolwich. In 1929, excepting the

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last examination of November, 1929, no students again were selected for Woolwich or Cranwell. In the last examination only one was selected for Woolwich from amongst 60 boys who appeared for the competition in India. It may be that, in the opinion of the Interview Board, none of the boys was fit for Woolwich. It may be, and yet these things give colour to the belief, to the misunderstanding amongst the people, that boys for Woolwich and Cranwell are to be turned down and boys for Sandhurst alone are to be taken. It is this point that I want here to bring to the notice of the Government of India, and I wish they could do something to remove this misunderstanding, this impression, wherever it might exist. Therefore, from what I have said, it has been proved beyond doubt, beyond contradiction, that so far as the results of the Interview and Record Board examination are concerned, boys come in sufficiently large numbers for competition to be selected for the vacancies, however few they may be, at Sandhurst, Woolwich and Cranwell. Therefore, this system of Indianisation of the Army so far has achieved results even to the satisfaction of the British Military officers like those of the Board and I hope these results, when brought to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will be found satisfactory even by him and enable him to revise his opinion in the matter, and recommend and justify his recommendation for further substantial extension of the Scheme.

Now, as regards Indian officers who have been given King's Commissions, there are I think about 115 in number. About them the Skeen Committee themselves say:

"There are a number of young King's Commissioned officers already in the Indian Army who are pronounced by their Commanding officers to be efficient according to the single standard of efficiency which the Army recognises, and many of these have reached their present position in the face of far greater disadvantages and difficulties than a British boy has to overcome." (Page 21.)

Thus they have stood the test of efficiency, the only one standard of efficiency which ought to prevail in the Army. Therefore, either from the point of view of cadets coming up for the competitive examination before the Interview Board, or from the point of view of the efficiency of the Indians who have been given King's Commissions and are working in the Army under British Commanding Officers, it has been proved that the results achieved so far are quite satisfactory and most promising for the future. I am therefore surprised at the statement made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the other House that the Government do not feel confident that the cadets coming forward for the Indian Sandhurst could be relied on as being efficient either in quantity or in quality so as to justify the Government in undertaking the heavy expenditure involved in the immediate creation of an Indian Sandhurst. Until an authoritative case with substantial proofs has been made out from the Government's side, justifying the remarks made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that the Government do not feel satisfied about the results achieved so far we must be pardoned if—we feel we are justified if—we attribute motives to the Government that they really do not look upon the Scheme of Indianisation with any favour. If, as I have said, the results are satisfactory, then there is absolutely no reason why Government should not come forward and allay our doubts, remove the misunderstandings that are in our minds, by making a declaration that, as recommended by the Skeen Committee, an Indian Sandhurst will really be

established in 1933. If they are still suspicious, if they are still doubtful, about the efficiency of the Indian cadets, they have got the Military College at Dehra Dun, they might increase the number of entrants in that College; they might reduce the fees of the College so that a larger and larger number of intelligent boys might find it within their means to join the College; they might train them, and in three years' time a sufficiently large number of cadets trained in their own way, and by their own men in Dehra Dun, would be available for taking their education and training in the Indian Sandhurst. Thus so far I have not been able to find one valid reason amongst those which the Government have advanced so far against an Indian Sandhurst being established in 1933, as recommended by the Skeen Committee. With these points before me, Sir, I cannot but support the cut that has been made by my friend, Mr. Abdul Matin Chaudhury.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum** (North-West Frontier Province: Nominated Non-Official): Sir, I really sympathise with my Honourable friend, Dr. Moonje, in his impatience to see the Indian Army Indianised at the earliest possible date and made less expensive than it has been in the past. There are many others in this House who are of the same opinion and would like to see the Indian Army Indianised to its full extent, as fast as possible, and to cut down the Army expenditure to its minimum, and to this extent, Dr. Moonje has my fullest support. Sir, I hold no brief for my friend, Mr. Young, or for the Government of India, and if I make a few observations on this subject, I hope they will be taken as the spontaneous remarks of a man, who has spent most of his time with the Indian Army in their operations in the various centres of their activities. I feel I also have a little justification for speaking on this subject, because I happened to be a member of the Sandhurst Committee, which has come under discussion. These are the two pleas which I can bring forward for the expression of my views on this subject.

Taking first the general question of the expensiveness of the Army, I know from my personal experience that the Army expenses are more strictly scrutinised in most of the Departments of the Army than the expenses of some of the ordinary Departments of the civil administration. In the ordinary administration, the addition of a lakh here or a lakh there does not count for much. As a matter of fact, for very ordinary reasons posts can be created for people who can make themselves indispensable in some of the Departments, on the plea that their expert opinion must be available and money does not matter very much in the creation of such posts. But in the Army, no new appointments can be created, no additional officers can be appointed in a battalion, neither can a joint Commandant be appointed to command a regiment. But, whether the present strength of the Army is just enough, or whether it can be reduced, is really the point at issue. I think that in spite of all that has fallen from the lips of my friend, Dr. Moonje, the Army is really not too large at its present strength. At present the dangers may be less or more, I cannot say. Dr. Moonje thinks that we are quite safe from the North-East and South-East borders of India; and though I cannot fully agree with him on that point, there may be some justification for it; but as far as the North-West Frontier is concerned, we are certainly not safe from that corner, though here the blame lies with our own people perhaps. But I think it is not the danger from the tribesmen alone for which India

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has to keep up this Army, but it is on account of the possibilities of dangers and invasions from that direction that India must maintain a strong Army. As to the direction of the possible invasions of India, the invading Army need not follow the routes through the Hindu Kush range or the valley of Chitral, or even through the Kabul or Kandahar plateaus. There is a very open space and a fine route for the possible invasion from the North, between the East of Persia and the West of Afghanistan; and it is for that reason that Baluchistan at least should be well defended and well equipped with troops.

Sir, the Army is a thing which cannot be raised or created in a day; it requires a great deal of training and equipment; and if anything extraordinary happens on Indian borders, the same difficulty will arise as had to be faced by the British Government in raising the Kitchener Army. If the war had not been prolonged and given more time for the training of the new troops, perhaps the raw material or half-trained troops that were pushed on to the German frontier, would have failed to achieve the victory. You keep your watchmen for eventualities; whether you see an immediate danger of burglary in your house or not, still you have to keep permanent watchmen at your gate to make sure that your house is not burgled. It is a kind of watch that has to be maintained by keeping a permanent army.

As regards the personnel of the Army, Sir, let us take it for granted that it is a bit large. But with the very indifferent communications and very inferior equipment as compared with the armies of the West, you have to keep a larger number. I believe the expenses go a good deal towards the equipment of the Army and the opening of new communications, and especially the mechanical transport, etc. When these communications are completed, when the equipment is brought up to date, and when you can put in more aeroplanes and strengthen the Air Force, perhaps the number may then be reduced. Sir, my friend laid great stress on the British element in the Army. He thinks that it is very expensive, and that the cost is five times more than the cost of the Indian section. That, I am afraid, is an unavoidable evil. My friend has not touched at all the question of the internal peace of the country. (*Colonel J. D. Crawford*: "Hear, hear.") Perhaps he has intentionally avoided it. He spoke only of the poor North-West Frontier Province and the dangers from that corner. But that is not all. The internal peace of the country almost entirely depends on this British element in the Army. . . .

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** 70,000 Britishers are required for internal security?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Yes, I think so; the country is nearly as big as the whole of Europe. I may give an example. In 1919, when we were unexpectedly attacked at Landi Khana, and wanted some troops, we could not get more than three to four thousand men in the whole country north of Jullundur. Occasions like this do arise every now and then and may arise again. You must not forget the great disgrace that India had to suffer by the temporary fall of Thal though for a few hours only—this was simply due to the fact that we could not spare troops for that corner, although we knew the danger was real in that direction, and troops from the Khyber had to be transported to the Thal side in lorries . . . . .

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** The inner history of that war has yet to be written.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** When it is written, I hope you will be able to change your opinion. If, as I say, communications are opened and transport is improved and the Air Force comes more into operation, naturally the personnel of the Army will be reduced. But what I want to say is this: it is the armament and the equipment part of the Army which absorbs the greater part of the Military Budget. It is the opening of new communications and various other matters of that sort which lead to the expensiveness of the army and it is the standard of life and equipment of the forces, as compared with other European countries, that go to swell the Army Budget. Have you ever compared the rise in the civil expenditure with that in the Army? Every day in this House, Resolutions are put in for the increase of the salaries of the Postal and Telegraph Department employeers, of peons here and of peons there, and so on. If you will compare the figures, you will see that the pay of the Army man is comparatively very low. As regards equipment, of course, that is not the concern of the poor soldier. He is prepared to sacrifice his life for the sake of the Rs. 13 or Rs. 23 that he is getting a month. He does not get even a rupee per day, which is given to an ordinary coolie in many parts of India; nor has he any additional advantages in the military service by way of pensions, etc. Even the higher officers of the Army draw lower pensions than those drawn by officers of their rank in the civil services. Well, Sir, I don't like to go into greater details here, but all that I want to point out is that the greater part of the Army expenditure is incurred on the present-day equipments, and the moment those equipments, etc., are brought to the level of those that exist in other advanced countries, there will then be the possibility of reducing the expenditure, as well as the number of men in the Army.

I will now come to the Sandhurst Committee's Report. There were three points made by the Mover of the Resolution. The first was that there were no signs of the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst in the near future; the second was that the eight units' scheme, which was recommended to be abolished by the Committee, is still in existence; and the third was that a larger number of candidates were not taken at the entrance examination. Sir, I think that the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee were very moderate and modest, and they should have been accepted without much hesitation. There is still a chance for Government to reconsider the matter before it is too late . . . . .

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah** (Bombay: Muhammadan Urban): It does not want to.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Well, Sir, I shall come to the establishment of an Indian Sandhurst later on, but I do not see any justification for Government refusing the recommendation for the abolition of the eight units' scheme. I have never been able to understand the great danger that would follow if Government accepted that recommendation, I have never been able to understand the great delay in the removal, if I may use the words that have often come to my ears, of the untouchability bar put on those eight units. Why should those eight units be segregated from the rest of the Army? Personally, I have not been able to understand the reasons for the policy of Government in that respect.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Because the British did not want to serve under Indian officers.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Well, they have been serving in the civil Departments, and in the Army too there are many units in which Indians are serving in the non-Indianised units along with Britishers. If there are cases where they can live together and work together, why should these eight units be particularised for Indianisation? The Indian officers lose the opportunity of learning a good many things from their British comrades.

Then, Sir, as regards the candidates coming up for the Sandhurst examination, I had the opportunity of sitting on the Interview Board once or twice. To be frank, and I hope my friend Dr. Moonje will not feel injured, if I say that the type of candidates that is coming before the Interview Board, with some exceptions of course, is not the real type of men whom you will care to have for the Army.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Do you contradict the figures that I gave out of the candidates who appeared at the last examination?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** I have already said, with a few exceptions. I do not condemn the whole lot that came up before the Board. I only say that the majority, with of course a few exceptions, is not of the type of people who will do well in the Army . . . . .

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Seven more candidates passed than there were vacancies. You must remember that.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** If you simply want to change the colour from white to black, you are quite justified, but what I am referring to is that the type of man with character, who can command a unit in action, is not forthcoming. I do not know if all that is wanted by my friend is a change of colour and that he will not attach much value or credit to the spirit inside the candidates, but I don't want to enter into a discussion with him on this point.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** That very agency composed of not Indians but British officers, that certifies the character has passed seven students more than there were vacancies.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** When my friend said that there were as many as fifty candidates for as many as twenty posts, and that that was a good competition, I thought in my mind whether 2½ candidates for one post was really good competition. I think that 50 candidates for one post will be a good competition out of 30 crores of people, who want to get themselves trained for the Army. You have not condemned very many. A boy may have passed, and he may not have got a post; but you must see how many failed to get through.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Perhaps, from your point of view, 33 crores should compete for 10 vacancies?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** That is exactly what I am coming to. I want the thirty crores to break up their caste system and that they all should make up their minds to go up for military service . . . . .

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Then we shall not have to discuss the Sandhurst Report at all.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** The Sandhurst Report is really out of date now. When you signed it on the 9th of November some

years ago, the communal trouble was not so bad in the country. But do you now suggest, in the light of what is happening in the country today, that the Army which is maintained for keeping peace and order should be interfered with by a new experiment, especially when your police have been accused of partiality and class prejudices? Do you want to establish a Sandhurst here, when the cadets will be living in an atmosphere surcharged with ideas of independence and cries of "Long Live Revolution" and what not? Well, you must change your mind now and take your Sandhurst either to the South of the Andamans or to Australia and establish it there, so that the cadets may be free from this poisonous atmosphere!

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Does the Honourable Member still require responsible government in the North-West Frontier Province or not?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** I shall not ask for it if others do not want it. I have said, on the floor of this House, more than once that I am not a great believer in these reforms, but as we are part and parcel of India, and we do not consider ourselves a bit less fitted for them than you are, we claim constitutional advance as our birthright. We are second to none in education, and in patriotism. We have been Indians for the past hundred years, so much so that we have sacrificed our mother tongue for the sake of Indian citizenship, by adopting Urdu as our *lingua franca*.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Does the Honourable Member argue that, owing to the communal troubles in India, the Indian Army should be disbanded and the entire Army should be composed of British officers?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** If it were in my power, I should have done that. Nothing short of that. I have said on the floor of this House that there is only one solution of these difficulties and that is that there should be a forced settlement between Hindus and Muslims and that intermarriages between Hindus, Mussalmans and other communities must be contracted by some statute if you want a real unity.

**Sir Hari Singh Gour:** Did you not oppose the Special Marriage Act?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** It was not enough to create the spirit which I should like to see created. If Dr. Gour will see the proceedings, he will see that I said that it was a small measure of advancement in the right direction. I want the Treasury Benches or the non-officials to come up with a strong measure to bring about forced marriages between the various communities and the settlement of their differences by some law. If my friend over there (Dr. Gour) will bring in a Resolution or a Bill according to which everybody in India will be at liberty to do anything in the name of religion or according to the dictates of his conscience under the protection of Government, whether it is the killing of a cow or playing of music before a mosque or an untouchable getting into the most sacred temple or an untouchable marrying a high class woman, then I shall certainly support him. If I am here, I promise him my whole-hearted support.

**Sir Hari Singh Gour:** Why don't you bring in a Bill like that yourself?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Simply because Mr. Acharya and men of that sort will not support me. Social reformers who come to this House, are not justified in bringing such measures before this House unless

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they are prepared to go before the masses and address them at public meetings, and get support from them. My friend, Sir Hari Singh Gour, has no justification for coming to this House and asking us to put our signature to measures of this sort without first going before the public.

Now, Sir, I have taken myself away from the main subject and I am sorry for that. I believe, Sir, that the Sandhurst Committee recommendations are not very many and they could be easily adopted and might be adopted even now without much difficulty, except, of course, with one exception. It is about the place of the location of this Indian Sandhurst. In the present circumstances this Sandhurst should I think be located somewhere in Central Asia across the Pamirs, or somewhere in the South Seas, away from the poisonous atmosphere of this country. Things were really not so bad with respect to communal troubles when we signed the report some years ago. But under the present circumstances I don't believe that even the 18 months' absence of cadets from India at Sandhurst is enough for purifying them from this communal bias. If the cadets could be isolated, I believe, we should get very fine army officers from among our large population, with the spirit that is coming on. I do not mean that spirit is lacking in India. There are people who go on hunger strike, which is harder than a fight. If they can hunger strike, they can easily face the enemy too. On that ground, I think it will be wiser if the more modest recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee are accepted, and some definite policy announced by the Army Department in this direction.

There is one point more and that is about the number of candidates that are coming up before the Examination Board. We know that, with good social position and money resources, and with good education and other influences, a number of candidates do come up every time for this entrance examination, but I have noticed that, in many cases, they belong to classes which are not represented in the rank and file of the Army. I know that there are only special communities which are taken in the rank and file of the Army, but if a candidate is seeking to be an officer in the Army in the higher ranks, commanding men who do not belong to his own class or whose confidence he cannot command, he will be handicapped greatly in the discharge of his duties. Where martial spirit is required, that spirit should be known to the rank and file at least by the traditions of the families to which the candidates belong, to begin with. My own experience tells me that a man who comes from the same class which forms the majority of the rank and file of the regiment, is much more respected as an officer and commands greater confidence of the people under him. I hope that an opportunity will be given to some of these people, who are not taken in the Army, to go into the rank and file and show their worth there, so that they may establish their claim for the officers' class as well. I do not think that there are many in the non-combatant classes who are poor enough to join the rank and file! If, however, these classes do not care to join the rank and file and prefer to do their ordinary trade or business, or find other avocations of life more profitable, then they have no justification in sending up their youths for the higher grades only.

**Mr. H. P. Mody** (Bombay Millowners' Association; Indian Commerce):  
Sir, the question of the military expenditure of the Government of India and of the Indianisation of the Army has been a veritable hardy annual,

but it must be recognised that it lies at the root of most of the evils from which the country is suffering. The maintenance of military expenditure on the present scale is calculated, on the one hand, gravely to hamper our advance towards self-government and to stand in the way of our complete mastery in our own house, and, on the other hand, to draw away immense resources which could be utilised for objects which are vital to the well-being of the people. Now, Sir, the military policy and military expenditure of the Government of India have been sharply criticised and as stoutly defended. I am afraid it is an absolutely unequal fight. On one side, we have the Government Benches, which are in possession of facts and figures, and, on the other, we have non-official Members who, in these highly technical matters, are not by any means as well equipped as my friends on the Treasury Benches. Therefore, I do not propose to be drawn into details. I do not desire to discuss any particular item or to put forward any definite suggestion with regard to making a cut here or doing away with an item there. I regard this as absolutely beside the issue which is now before the House. It is possible that the Government might say, as they have always said, and to which my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum, has just endorsed, that the expenditure on the Army is by no means extravagant, and that the strength of our forces is by no means excessive when you take into account the needs of the country, its vast population and the immense frontiers which have to be guarded. Now, Sir, that may or may not be the case. I am not prepared to argue that point here. But I do know, and it is a fact which neither the Benches on the other side nor its supporters in the country can dispute, that, this country simply cannot afford the expenditure which is now being incurred on the Army.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** You mean expenditure on the administrative side.

**Mr. H. P. Mody:** I will come to that presently. I say that the economic condition of the masses is so unhappy in spite of all the improvements which have taken place in recent years, improvements which we are not prepared to ignore, that it is impossible for us to stand still while the Army expenditure is rising, or, if it is not rising, at any rate, while it is swallowing up a great deal of the resources of the country. The military expenditure is admitted to be 27 per cent. of the resources of the country. Whatever it is, what I am trying to establish is that it is altogether beyond the resources of the country. Now, you might say, that may be so, but the expenditure is necessary. I dispute that proposition. I say that, irrespective of any necessity which you think you might be labouring under of maintaining the Army at a particular strength and spending a particular amount on it, you cannot possibly ignore other aspects of the question. I say that you have to retrench, and if that means the taking of certain risks, you *have* to take those risks. What is happening in other countries? Is my Honourable friend, who represents the Army Department, prepared to say that other countries at the present moment are not taking very considerable risks? What was the position of England immediately prior to the declaration of the Great War? I do not claim to be an expert, but I think I can say with confidence that experts many years before the Great War were of opinion that, if there was a European conflagration, it was impossible for England to stand aside, and in that case the strength that she would have to put

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forward would be very largely in excess of the standing army which England was then maintaining. And yet, Sir, apart from the Territorials, not a single man was added to the regular strength of the Army. If that is not absolutely correct, we might say that very little was added to the regular strength of the Army. England, therefore, went to the war unprepared in a sense, and raised thereafter millions of men to go forward in the various theatres of war throughout the world. The same was the case with France. She was menaced for 50 years by a militant neighbour, whose preparations were known the world over, and yet France was prepared to take certain risks and she took them, and she paid heavy penalties for these risks. In order to guard against possible dangers, you do not starve the country, you do not tax the people out of existence, and that is exactly what is happening in this country at the present moment, I am very sorry to have to state. Government might think they are providing this Army with a view to safeguard our frontiers and to secure internal peace. That may be so. I am not prepared to deny it, because I have not got the expert knowledge of my Honourable friends, Dr. Moonje and Sir Abdul Qaiyum. I am not prepared to state that the strength is not required for the needs of the country. My whole point is that, while you are safeguarding yourself against certain dangers, you are laying yourselves open to far greater dangers, in other directions. And those other dangers are those which the Mover of the proposition has just pointed out. They are largely due to unemployment and to the economic distress that is prevailing throughout the country. Thereby, you are creating an army of incipient rebels. (Interruption by the Revd. J. C. Chatterjee.) I see that my Honourable friend's idea is to provide employment for them by raising the strength of the Army. That is not my idea of improving the economic status of the people. The economic status of the people can only be improved by keeping your expenditure down to the lowest possible minimum, consistently with a reasonable degree of efficiency. It is true that you have a highly civilized government, but the question arises—and it is a point which I might have made on the Budget—whether this country can afford the very best, and whether the time has not come when it should be satisfied with the second best. The whole issue is whether it is possible for us to maintain an expenditure, either on the civil or on the military side, at the figure at which it is being maintained at the moment. I say that, if you do not keep down your taxation to the lowest figure possible, consistently with safety, efficiency and other considerations, and if you do not provide an outlet for trade and industries to expand, then you are creating a very grave situation in the country. That, Sir, is all that I have to say on the first aspect of this question.

Now, Sir, the second point is with regard to the question of the Indianisation of the Army. A great deal has been said about the report of the Sandhurst Committee. The Honourable the Mover stated that the Report was exceedingly modest and that he was not prepared to subscribe to it, but that it was a happy compromise. It has not turned out to be either happy or a compromise, because the Government, for one reason or another, have shown themselves unable to accept the very modest recommendations which that Committee put up. A great deal has been said in recent years, about the difficulties in the way of the acceptance

of this Report. I want to ask my Honourable friends on the other side, in all friendliness, can you be heard at all when you talk about difficulties in this matter? I find, on a casual reference to the Report that, out of a strength of something like 1,600 Captains in the Indian Army in 1925, only seven Indians were found fit to hold the rank of Captain. That was in 1925, more than a hundred years after British rule has been firmly established and consolidated and extended. My Honourable friend, who just preceded me, Sir Abdul Qaiyum, seemed obsessed by the difficulties in the way and said armies could not be created in a day—you require the right spirit, you require character, you require morale which builds up armies and which commands them. Well, I accept all that. But I say to my Honourable friends on the other side, after more than a hundred years, could you not find more than seven people of the required intelligence and character to occupy the posts of Captains? Is that what you say?

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** What can they do, if they are not fit?

**Mr. H. P. Mody:** I am coming to that presently. What I was saying was that if Government could not have more than seven men for holding the rank even of Captains, how can they be heard when they speak of difficulties? If we on this side said nothing, they would go on talking about difficulties for another fifty years, and at the end of it, what would happen? Nothing. They would still be talking of want of character, want of capacity, want of morale, and everything else that can be brought out in arguments of this character. My Honourable friend, Dr. Moonje, wanted to draw me out on the question of fitness. Indians are supposed to be fit for the highest positions under the Crown; they can become Governors of Provinces, Members of Executive Councils; they can become Privy Councillors, and they can be admitted to all the privileged positions in the country. In all these positions, they have shown capacity and character, and have acquitted themselves with credit. But when it is the question of the Army, you require something very different, and you say that Indians do not possess the character, the capacity and the morale sufficient for occupying positions in the Army at the present moment. When is that something to come, and from where? I want to know when the Government are going to make a real solid beginning. When they merely talk about difficulties, it is impossible to regard such arguments with any degree of patience. For these reasons, I feel that this House ought, unequivocally, to express itself on the motion which is before the House. We must convey to Government, in the strongest possible terms, that this country cannot afford the present military expenditure, and that it is grossly dissatisfied with the pace at which Indianisation is proceeding. With these words, I support the motion.

**Mr. M. S. Aney** (Berar Representative): Sir, I have very great pleasure in supporting the motion which my Honourable friend, Maulvi Abdul Matin Chaudhury, has moved. The motion opens up the discussion of all the questions with regard to military policy, and particularly with regard to the attitude of the Government towards the Sandhurst Report. I am not going to discuss, Sir, the question of military expenditure, because you know, Sir, that on the floor of this House, that question has been threshed out very often, so often that it is impossible for any one of us to make any useful and new contribution to the debate on that point. It is an admitted

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fact that the expenditure which the Indian taxpayer has to bear for maintaining this huge corps of the military department is simply grinding and crushing him, and under this weight he finds it very difficult to make any progress whatsoever. All that is an admitted fact, notwithstanding the bold stand which my Honourable friend, Mr. Young, may take in opposition. I, therefore, do not want to go into that question, because I take it to be a self-evident proposition requiring no more demonstration.

Secondly, on the question of the Sandhurst Report also, my Honourable friend Mr. Jinnah has so often discussed that Report threadbare before this House, and brought out the iniquities which the attitude of Government has created in not accepting the main and the most substantial recommendations of that Report, that I do not think I should be able to throw any light on the matter, in taking up that topic and discussing it again. Besides, some of the points had already been touched upon in the debate. And I am perfectly sure that my Honourable friend Mr. Jinnah is bound to take part in this debate at some stage or another, and I think he will be able to throw more light on the question by his authoritative statement. I do not therefore want to anticipate him also. But military policy does not merely consist of military expenditure and the Indianisation of the Army. There are many other aspects of military policy which, in the heat of controversy, and in our zeal to consider these two important questions, generally go unnoticed; and one of these neglected aspects is the question of the entire disarming of this nation. That is also a part of the military policy, in my opinion. The administration of the Arms Act is one of the integral part of the military policy. I maintain that the Government of India are ruling this country not merely by exclusively confining the choice to Britishers in the matter of officering the Indian Army, but by putting heavy and intolerable burdens, and by crushing the people under the perpetual weight of extravagant expenditure which demands a considerable fraction of the revenues of the country and by taking from the citizens all the arms and by submitting them to the inhuman and cruel policy of emasculation by disarming the whole nation. That is another and the most shocking part of the military policy, and a very integral part of it too. I am particularly drawing the attention of this House to this part of the military policy on this occasion for this reason. For one reason or another, we often find our debates on important and essentially national issues very dexterously and deviously diverted into communal channels. One reason, in my opinion, why communal jealousy exists in this country is, that this is a nation which is disarmed. It is a nation in which people do not feel confidence in their own strength. It has become a nation of men who have lost all sense of self-respect and all sense of self-confidence. They feel that they are helpless and that they are entirely dependent for their ordinary protection upon a foreign bureaucracy. It is a common experience that two weak neighbours always and invariably suspect each other. Two strong men feel confidence in and respect each other. If you arm this nation, if my Hindu friends and Muhammadan friends will not remain a disarmed people, as they are today, I am sure that a good many communal troubles that are referred to in the debates on the floor of the House will never occur at all. Both the communities will have greater respect and regard for each other, because they, feeling secure in their own strength, can easily detect and respect the good qualities of each other. Now, suffering from a

sense of weakness they have been reduced to the position of utter helplessness, and been forced to depend entirely, even for their ordinary protection, upon an alien bureaucracy, and obliged to look up to it for help as the guardian of peace and order. The result is that most of them feel that probably his neighbour is trying to harm him by joining hands with the foreign Government. Every one thinks that the other man is in an unholy combination with the foreign bureaucrat, and thus gaining all the advantage over him, and there is an unconscious transformation in his mind persuading him to be hostile to the neighbour and friendly to the foreigner who happens to be the ruler. These mutual jealousies and recriminations are unfortunately the most deplorable outlook of our public life, but they are the inevitable results of the cruel policy of disarming the nation which the Government have been pursuing for the last 75 years; a policy which no civilised nation will ever like to pursue if it cares to rule any people in a civilised manner. I shall give you, Sir, an historic illustration and contrast the present with the past. Are not Honourable Members, at least the Indian Members of this House, aware of this fact, that even when Hindu rulers and Muhammadan rulers were at war in the 17th and 18th centuries, there were loyal Hindu subjects, under Muhammadan rulers, who fought for them, and also there were loyal Muhammadan subjects under Hindu rulers, who fought for them. The subjects and the rulers, though of different religions and beliefs, never suspected each other. Under the Peshawas and the Mahrattas there were Muhammadan Generals who loyally and bravely fought with the Muhammadan armies opposed to them and I say, without hesitation, that they fought with the same loyalty against the Mughal Emperor as any other Mahratta regiment fought at that time. The same is the story as regards Hindu soldiers and officers, who fought under Muhammadan Generals and Muhammadan rulers against the Hindu armies opposed to them. Can it be said that the Hindu or the Moslem of the 18th century was less religious and devout than his great grandson of today? They never suspected that a Muhammadan ruler would do injustice to a Hindu, or that a Hindu ruler would do injustice to a Muhammadan. Both of them felt quite confident of their own strength and were appreciative of the innate good qualities of each other. It is comradeship in arms on the field of battle that really cements unity between the two people or communities. In a state of helotage and abject and demoralising conditions of disarmament and helplessness, no attempt however honest, can ever hope to succeed in bringing about full and sincere and lasting concord and harmony between two great and large communities. It is thus your policy of emasculation which has created this detestable spirit of division between the Hindus and Muhammadans in this country, and one of the main factors by which you have brought about that disunity is keeping both of us in a state of perpetual helplessness, by disarming us and by making us feel every moment of our existence on this earth that we are a helpless miserable lot which can only be protected by you, and which must therefore look up for ordinary succour to you as the guardians of peace and order in this country.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** And also appointments.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** That is true, and I admit the truth of the valuable suggestion which my Honourable friend Mr. Jinnah has made. This is the sort of thing that is being done. So I say that this is the main

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reason why well meaning leaders of public opinion, whose disinterestedness is above question, leaders of the type of Mr. Jinnah on the one side and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya on the other side, and even men of world-wide reputation like Mahatma Gandhi have up to this time failed in bringing about any unity or concord and harmony. Do you mean to say that their efforts were not disinterested? This feeling of mutual jealousy, which is generated on account of a policy like this, cannot be completely eradicated unless there is a radical change in the policy itself; and, therefore, when my friends on this side of the House stand on the floor of the House and ask you to make a radical change in your military policy, I desire to warn the Government of India to take particular note of this fact, and in future whatever you may do about Indianisation and other questions, you must remember that you cannot keep Indians a nation of disarmed people for ever. Relax the rules under the Arms Act, give full facilities to the people to carry arms in the same manner as is done by the people of free and civilised countries, and you will soon find that the well-meaning efforts of our friends will bring about that complete concord and harmony in this country, the absence of which you deplore so much every day.

With your permission, Sir, I want to address a few words direct to the Treasury Benches. The tears, that you shed now and then and the expressions of regret and sorrow that you use at the present tension between the two communities, are considered by us as crocodile tears and insincere professions, so long as you do not make real efforts, which alone can bring about concord and harmony. We feel like that; probably my language is harsh and it may perhaps be unnecessarily strong, but I must tell you frankly how we feel. We maintain that a situation of this nature has been brought about by you, and you are seen perversely persisting in taking advantage of that fact to tell us that we are not fit for self-government. Indianise the Army, arm the people of this country, give them full facilities to grow as men to their full stature, and you will soon find that, not only are we fit for self-government, but, without your assistance, we shall maintain that Government against any foreign aggression whatsoever. For these reasons I strongly support this motion.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar** (Punjab: Nominated Non-Official): Sir, I belong to a class which mostly fills the Indian Army and a class from which recruits for the Army are mostly drawn. So I may not be able to tell you much about high policy, but I may be able to tell you how the Indian Army has been organised since I joined it in 1883. In 1880 the cost of the Army was 20 or 21 crores, and it has gone up now to something like 54 crores. In those days, when I joined the Army, the pay of a sepoy was Rs. 7 per month, *plus* 8 annas for his clothing, *plus* Rs. 2-8-0 as compensation for his food.

**Mr. M. R. Jayakar:** What was the cost of living in those days?

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** The cost of living was something like six or seven rupees per head and Rs. 8-8 the man had to pay himself. The rest was compensated to him by Government, which used to come to something like Rs. 2-8. The total amount which he used to draw was Rs. 10. That was in 1883. In 1899, the pay was raised to Rs. 9, *plus* compensation, and perhaps a rupee more

for his clothing. At that time the expenses were either 20 or 21 crores. In 1911, another Rs. 2 were added and he drew 11 rupees a month, excluding his rations. In 1917, the pay was raised to Rs. 16, *plus* free rations and free clothing. Clothing in my opinion costs him about Rs. 10, per annum. His food costs not less than Rs. 10, which comes to about Rs. 30 per head per month. His pay has therefore gone up during these 47 years to about three times more than what it was in 1888. Of course the cost of a British soldier is much higher than that of an Indian soldier.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Yes, five times as much.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** It may be five times or more. But some Members, probably Dr. Moonje is surprised to see that it is five times more. I think Dr. Moonje knows very well that, when we buy English made goods or articles, naturally we pay more, as they are sold at a higher rate than articles manufactured in other countries. I need not say more on this, but my friends can easily see the difference when one buys a Ford car and my Honourable friends on the opposite Benches buy Rolls-Royces. You can very well judge then why it is five times as much. I think that should satisfy Dr. Moonje.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** Yes, I said that in my speech.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** One thing more. In the general discussion, some Members have stated that they would like to have the British troops reduced. I cannot say very much in this connection. But ever since I joined the Army, wherever we went, we went in mixed brigades. That is, when the armies were mobilised, they were always brigaded mixed. One Punjabi, one Rajput, one Gurkha and one British Regiment. (*An Honourable Member:* "Why mixed?") Why are we mixed here? I can well see that we are well mixed here, and perhaps more mixed. We are sitting in seven divisions in this House. This is the world. I believe every soldier fights well when he finds another present by his side. If the other is more disciplined he says, "I should be still better disciplined". There will be so much competition and so much of learning from each other. Well, Sir, that is one of the advantages. Another one is, as my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum said, to maintain internal peace I will say nothing more in this connection.

**Mr. Abdul Latif Sahib Farookhi** (North Madras: Muhammadan): Mr. Aney has rightly replied to it.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** Yes.

**Mr. Abdul Latif Sahib Farookhi:** What is your answer for that?

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** I do not remember what he said. (Laughter.) Unless it is made clear to me again, I can't say anything in that direction. He travelled so very fast. Well, Sir, I remember one thing more. You know I had the honour of serving on the Indian Sandhurst Committee. I think this question was also considered at that time and the Committee have never made any attempt to forecast the time when it may be possible to dispense with the British element. They say on page 33:

"Again we do not attempt to forecast the time when it may be possible to dispense with the British element in the Indian Army. \* \* \* We also for the present assume generally the employment in India of a quota of British troops."

[Captain Hira Singh, Brar.]

Now, that is all I can say about the British troops in India. About the reduction, I have already told you about the expenditure in 1880, and you know what it is now. As regards the reduction of the Indian Army, any body who has studied the situation of the long frontier line on the North-West and South-West of India should never think of reducing the Indian Army in India. Of course, every one knows that the efficiency of the Army depends on two factors, mechanical and technical. You have to buy the latest mechanical transport, things like aeroplanes, just like the one now flying over us, to carry our messages and letters faster than by any other means. The spirit and morale of the troops depends very largely on the confidence of their leaders and their training, and if they possess inferior weapons to those of their opponents, they are sure to fail. Therefore, our Army must have the best weapons.

The status of the Indian soldier today is a little better than what it was about 100 years ago, and the House is well aware of the part the Indian soldier has played during the Great War. But what have they got after that? Reduction in cost, reduction in units, more reduction, more unemployment and still more reduction, and perhaps still more unemployment. The Indian and other soldiers get just sufficient to live on. Instead of carrying gold or silver in their pockets, they carry lead or fragments of bullets. Now, Sir, in this House, every now and again Resolutions are passed, as my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum has said, to raise the pay of postal employees, or the pay of employees in other Departments, on the plea that labour has increased. But have they ever thought of an increase in the pay of the Indian soldier? The House can do a lot to improve the Indian soldier's position. Unfortunately, the Indian soldier, or any other soldier, is remembered only when a war is on, and as soon as the war is over, he is forgotten. Afterwards everybody thinks of reducing whatever little pay he gets. Now, everybody says, that

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the Army is swallowing the whole of the revenue of India. But when we ask our Commanding Officer for any little concession by way of free passes for our families or children, from a station in the South to our village in the Punjab, we are told that there is no money, and that they cannot help us. Similarly, if we ask for a little more accommodation for our families in the married quarters, we are told there is no provision. But in this House, I find all Honourable Members are thinking that the whole of the revenue of India is eaten by the Army. It reminds me of a story. A man was sentenced to death and he was about to be put on the stake; the sweeper came and said that the man was too thin. The judge replied, "Get hold of a fat man and put him on the stake instead." Now, the Army is fat, so cut the Army Budget, reduce the Army expenditure. Most of the Members here, Sir, some of them at any rate, do not know the face of a soldier, nor the face of the man who has seen service in war. (*Some Honourable Members*: "Here you are, we see you.") Come with me to Jullundur and Rohtak and I will show you their real faces, I will show you the wealth they possess. You will be surprised to find that they are carrying, uncoined metals in their bodies. Some of it is in the shape of a bullet in the body. Others carry silver plates to hold their skulls together; many have silver plated arms, instead of gold and silver in their pockets. I wonder if some of the Honourable Members would like to see these soldiers. The glorious pages which they

have made in Indian history during the great war, are something of which every Indian ought to be proud.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** There are Honourable Members in this House whose relations have died in the world war.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** My own relations, why, my two brothers have died in the Army. One brother is lying in Burma, one brother was killed in Thal near Kuram in 1878 in an Afghanistan campaign, and my father had three wounds in his arm and leg which he received while defending the Residency at Lucknow, for which my father received the Order of Merit.

**Mr. N. C. Kelkar** (Bombay Central Division: Non-Muhammadan Rural): And yet you are only a Captain in your old age?

**An Honourable Member:** Only an Honorary Captain.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** Here I am sorry. Of course, I blame. . . . .

**Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas** (Indian Merchants' Chamber: Indian Commerce): Whom do you blame?

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** That is my lot. I blame myself. I blame my *kismet*. If my father had cared to give me a little more education, I would have been something else; now I am what I am, a soldier, a soldier today, and for the last 47 years. Sir, I do not know why the late Mr. S. R. Das, who was a Member of the Executive Council and who raised Rs. 10 or 20 lakhs, did not ask this House to start a school for the sons of the poor Indian soldiers, who gave their lives in thousands on the battlefields of Palestine, the Dardanelles, France and other places? Sir, has this House established any record of sympathy, since the Great War, for the poor Indian soldier, who has always defended our hearths and homes?

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** Who is paying for the Jullundhur School? Is it not this House?

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** The Government are doing everything, and the Honourable Mr. Jayakar wanted to take away even that. What is that, Sir, after all? Only a primary school for our boys. Give our sons a little more education, so that they may become fit to get King's Commissions.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** But you said just now you don't want that.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** Why not? I have sent my three sons to Sandhurst. One of them failed, but the other two have got commissions. I am for Sandhurst and for nothing else. Sir my class is for the Army. Our occupation is the Army. Somebody asked me the question, how many soldiers died in the last war. I say there is no home, which has not lost one or two of its dear sons or relatives.

**Mr. President:** The Honourable Member must now conclude.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** Very Good, Sir, How are we going to enlist the Indian soldier's sympathy? That is the question. I most respectfully beg this House always to bear in mind to

[Captain Hira Singh Brar.]

do something for him. I do not say that you never do anything for him. I do not know from where we are to get the money to do that, when you think the Army is already getting too much. Surely you don't mean to reduce the soldier's pay. At the same time, I do say, as Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum has said, that the money spent on the Army is so strictly controlled that a pice is not spent more than what is allowed. Sir, I can never forget Sir Prabhshankar's words. He told us that India is a great continent and that it is something like a big cow which stands facing towards the North West Frontier with its sharp horns, and the soldiers are made to catch the horns while the people in the plains milk her and enjoy the butter and cream; and they do it, Sir, without asking whether the man holding the horns is fully paid for his difficult task or for his chances of injury. But we are asked to hold the horns more firmly and at a reduced cost.

Now, Sir, about the selection of the Sandhurst cadets. I think we are doing well, and I think, in time, more boys will come up, and I think the people are realising the necessity of developing the body and the physique of their boys better than before. Perhaps you may like to hear what we did when the Sandhurst Committee went to Aligarh College; we went and reviewed the boys, and General Skeen asked us how many in our opinion were fit for the King's Commission. If I were to say exactly what I told him then, you will get annoyed perhaps. . . . .

**An Honourable Member:** We should like to know.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** I think I shall reserve it; but it was a very poor number; a very miserable number I told him. . . . .

**Maulvi Muhammad Yakub:** Were you fit yourself for the King's Commission?

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** If you can manage to give me one now, I shall feel very happy; I am still feeling strong and I shall still carry on, I tell you honestly.

**Mr. President:** I think the Honourable Member must now conclude.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** There is very little I have to say, Sir. This is my first chance, so, Sir, I beg your pardon. I want to say something about the Sandhurst. Our boys who are going to lead the soldiers ought to be of superior quality to those whom they are to lead. Honourable Members may ask, "How do you think yourself a better man?" Sir, I am not a better man, nor have I got better brains. But body and physique are surely the most important things for a soldier. . . . .

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Not without brains!

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** Quite right, Sir, also brains; when the body is good, the brain is generally good; if the body is weak, the brain suffers a great deal. So, Sir, is my own experience. . . . .

**Mr. President:** Will the Honourable Member now conclude?

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** I tell you my own experience. . . . .

**Mr. President:** Order, order.

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (North Punjab: Muhammadan):** Sir, I want to inform my friend, Captain Hira Singh, who is supposed to be here to defend the interests of the Indian soldiers, that there are Members in this House who not only know the faces of the Indian soldiers, but know their feelings too.

**Sardar Bahadur Honorary Captain Hira Singh, Brar:** I said some Members, Sir.

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** I have the honour to represent a constituency in this House which I can safely call the biggest and the largest military constituency in India. My small constituency contains at least 150,000 soldiers and in certain parts 57 per cent. of the population joined the Army during the great war. I know what their grievances are, and I know what their complaints are. I for one would be very reluctant indeed to say any words about the reduction of the Military Budget, because I know how our speeches in this Assembly are misrepresented, and an active propaganda is carried on against us. For instance, Sir, suppose I make a speech here and say that the Army Budget should be cut down by one or two crores, my intention being that the excessive items, such as the maintenance of the British troops in India should be reduced, what happens actually is that some small sum is cut down, say, in the construction of barracks for Indian commissioned officers, and the accommodation for their family quarters is reduced or, as Captain Hira Singh said, they are denied free tickets for their families, and when they complain about it, the answer given is, "Oh, the Legislative Assembly will not allow us to spend more money". Sir, I want to ask, is there a single Indian Member here who would grudge providing all such facilities to the Indian soldiers and officers?

**Honourable Members:** Certainly not. .

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** There is not a single Member here who would do so; but at the same time we know as the Honourable the Finance Member has told us, that there is a deficit Budget, and to meet that expenditure, we have got to raise more taxation. One of the biggest items in the Budget is the military—about 55 crores—and we cannot help but ask the Government to reduce that figure as far as it lies in their power. We are supported in this opinion by the Inchcape Committee, who thoroughly went into the question. Now, Captain Hira Singh says that the British soldiers are indispensable, and I must confess that I was greatly disappointed to hear similar remarks coming from my most respected friend, Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum. My only consolation is that he made those remarks more in a jocular way than seriously. I cannot believe for a moment that a man like Nawab Sir Abdul Qaiyum will say that, if the military policy at present were in his hands he would demolish and disband all the Indian regiments and have only British troops. . . . .

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Did I say that?

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** My Honourable friend did say that, and I am very glad to see that it was just as I thought—he never meant what he said.

Another point is the communal question. It is very unfortunate that this communal question has loomed so large on the horizon that, whatever discussion may be taking place in this House, this question is dragged in. I can say definitely that it would be extremely unjustifiable on the part of any Member in this House to blame the military or the police for showing even the slightest communal prejudice in the maintenance of law and order. During the last seven or eight years we have not come across a single instance where communal trouble broke out between soldiers of a regiment in a cantonment, or where the police were deputed to discharge their duties of maintenance of law and order and they showed any communal bias.

Therefore, I think, when Nawab Sahib made the remark that the integrity of the police was being criticised it was more by way of joke . . .

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** I feel, Sir, I must make a personal explanation now. In the first place, I really forget the words used by me; that is whether I actually said what is ascribed to me.

**Mr. President:** That is all right.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** The second point which I mentioned was this, that I thought it was only the Army which was so far safe in maintaining peace and order and that the police, wherever it came in contact with riots, were suspected of partiality and did not command the full confidence of the people in communal riots, and that the Army was the only source of safety.

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** I am quite satisfied as long as Nawab Abdul Qaiyum says that it is only on the allegations published in certain irresponsible newspapers or certain conversations he had with some of his friends, that he based his opinion, but I would ask the Government to say whether they have got any suspicion that the police have not shown absolute honesty and fairness in dealing with communal riots . . .

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** But is it not a fact, Sir, that whenever a riot takes place, telegrams reach the headquarters asking that a certain police officer belonging to one community or the other, should be transferred, and in some cases even Magistrates are suspected in such matters?

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** Sir, I would not like to waste my time in answering that argument of my friend. All I can say is this. Even when there is a riot between two parties in a village, one of the parties, who is generally in the wrong, sends telegrams to higher officers just as a safeguard . . .

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** May I recommend to the Honourable Member to read the Central Committee's Report on the subject?

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** Sir, I attach more importance to the Indian Sandhurst Committee's Report than to the Central Committee's Report. I personally do not share the views expressed by Dr. Moonie, as far as the military policy in India is concerned. I think it would be

entirely wrong if the Government of India were to determine their military policy by counting of heads and the number of rifles at seven lakhs and two lakhs on the frontier. Sir, this is a much larger and more important question, and I personally think that the size and number of the Army maintained in India is not at all larger than is required for this country, and therefore I am not one of those who would plead for the reduction of the Army. What I do maintain is that the number of British troops kept in India is far larger than is really required. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the Government of India can absolutely depend upon their Indian soldiers and officers to serve when the opportunity arises with the same amount of efficiency as they can possibly expect from British soldiers. For instance, I may refer to the interview given by Commander Kenworthy the other day, what does he say? He says that his experience of the regiments in the Indian States is that they are as efficient as any army in any country, although they do not possess any British soldiers . . . .

**Sir Hugh Cocke** (Bombay: European): How did he find it out?

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan**: By personal experience. (*An Honourable Member* from the European Group: "Experience of six weeks!")

Then, Sir, turning to the third annual discussion of the Sandhurst Committee's Report, I am a little bit surprised to see that my friend Mr. Matin Chaudhury has used the word "inaction" in relation to the Sandhurst report.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah**: It is a polite way of putting it.

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan**: If by inaction he means that the Government have not been playing about with the Report and sending the files here and there, then he is entirely wrong. If he has got any suspicions on the point, I may be permitted to read only a few lines from the speech which the Army Secretary made in 1928, wherein he says that:

"When the Committee's proposals were received by us, the first thing that happened was they were referred to the principal Staff Officers. Then they submitted their memorandum to the Government of India, who again, in their turn, considered all the proposals most carefully. They eventually forwarded their recommendations to the Secretary of State. Their recommendations, together with the reports of the debates that took place in the House last September, were considered at length by the Secretary of State in Council and were approved. The Secretary of State forwarded them to His Majesty's Government, which were again forwarded to the Cabinet, assisted by the highest military advisers of the Empire. They considered these proposals and submitted their recommendations to the Cabinet. In the end His Majesty's Government sent out to us their concurrence."

So, Sir, after doing all this, you cannot blame the Government for inaction. If by "inaction" he means that the Government have not put into practice any of the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee's Report, well, I think he is again wrong, because they have positively rejected at least 80 per cent. of the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee and therefore you cannot blame them for inaction. (Laughter.)

Sir, if I may be permitted to refer for a moment to the terms of reference of the Sandhurst Committee, the House will observe that they were divided into four classes, (a) by what means it may be possible to

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improve upon the present supply of Indian Cadets, both in regard to numbers and quality, and (b) whether it is desirable and practicable to establish a military college in India to train Indians for the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army, (c) and (d) relate to (b) because they say, "If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, then this should be done and that should be done". So really speaking, the Sandhurst Committee had to deal with only two terms of reference, one was how to get an increased number of candidates for King's Commissions, and secondly the desirability of establishing an Indian Sandhurst. Now, Sir, reading in one of the papers the speech made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the Council of State the other day, I found that His Excellency is reported to have said this, "We are, in the year 1980, and according to the recommendation of the Sandhurst Committee, the Sandhurst College is to be established in 1983". He further adds, "Provided the Sandhurst College is unable to accept the number of Indian candidates we want to send," and so on. In other words, according to His Excellency's speech, really these two distinct terms of reference to the Sandhurst Committee are put together, though really speaking they are absolutely separate. The question of the English Sandhurst being able to accommodate Indian candidates has got nothing to do with the second term of reference to the Committee, but quite independent of that question, the Committee recommends that an Indian Sandhurst should be established in 1983. Now, Sir, it is highly disappointing to find that the Government of India have not even decided to establish an Indian Sandhurst in 1983. Therefore, it is obvious from this that, so far as this term of reference is concerned, the Government of India have absolutely declined to do anything in the matter.

Then we come to the first term of reference, that is the desirability of getting more Indians to come forward to accept the King's Commissions in the Army. Here the recommendations of the Committee can be divided into three parts, No. 1 to take in 20 Indians, and No. 2 to increase their number progressively in such a way that their number should reach 50 per cent. at the end of 25 years, and (3) to adopt such means as would encourage suitable Indian young men to adopt the military career. Now, what have the Government of India done with regard to this? They have accepted the first recommendation; they have agreed to take 20 candidates every year, but then they do not agree to increase the number annually in accordance with the suggestion of the Sandhurst Committee. Secondly, instead of adopting such means as would encourage suitable young men to join the military line, they have, by insisting upon the continuation of the eight unit scheme, positively devised a means which would discourage the proper stuff in India to come forward and take a military career. There is absolutely no justification for this scheme, and I can assure the Government, whatever reasons they may give to the Indian young men who are actually in service, and who belong to the eight unit scheme, they are extremely dissatisfied, and they think it is great racial distinction. Now, it has been said that, while British officers of the civil departments are willing to work under Indian officers, naturally they should have no compunction in serving under Indian officers in the Army. But the fact remains that they do not want to serve under Indian officers. What does it show? There is

very strict discipline in the Army, and the British young men are not prepared to undergo that strict discipline and then serve under Indian officers. In the civil departments, the discipline is not so very stringent, and therefore they can pull on even if the superior officer happens to be an Indian. As regards the appointment of Indian commissioned officers to the King's Commission, I think this is a very important matter, provided the Government would always restrict their choice to the young Indian commissioned officers.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to point out to the Government that a Resolution was passed by the Legislative Assembly on March 28th, 1921, where they recommended that the general rule, in selecting candidates for training in Sandhurst, should be that the large majority of the selections should be from communities which furnish recruits, and as far as possible in proportion to the numbers in which they furnish such recruits. I want the Army Secretary to tell me whether, in making selections, they keep in view this recommendation of the Legislative Assembly or not. If they do not, will he explain why the Army Department do not keep this recommendation in view?

Now, Sir, I come to a comparatively minor point, which does not relate to the Sandhurst Committee Report, but concerns a matter of local importance and interest, about which I have tabled a separate motion. I had better speak on it in connection with this cut. This concerns one of the nation-building branches of the Army Department, that is horse breeding, an activity which is confined at present to three districts in the Punjab. I think the Members in this House would be interested to know that more than a crore of rupees is annually spent on purchase of horses for the country from Australia. About 80 or 85 years back, the military authorities decided to devise means by which they would encourage country-bred horses, so that they might dispense with Australian horses. With this object in view, they devised a scheme. Anybody who would bring to them an approved mare, would be given a certain portion of land. He shall maintain that mare and the Government will have the first right on the sale of the colts. This scheme has been working for the last 85 years satisfactorily, with the result that now, most of the supplies of the Army can be obtained locally, and so the money, which used to go out to a foreign country, now remains in India. For the last four or five years those people have been put to extreme difficulties and very unfair treatment. The most unfortunate thing is that the officers in that Department seem to be non-transferable. I can quote the name of an officer who has remained there for more than 20 years, and in spite of the fact that the people are extremely dissatisfied with his behaviour, the Government have not transferred him.

**An Honourable Member:** Has he misbehaved?

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** I would not hesitate to call it misbehaviour. I can give you an instance. A gazetted officer of another Department was passing along the road and this officer crossed him. This Indian officer did not salute him and he reported to the higher officers immediately that, "This gazetted officer passed me and did not salute me". (*An Honourable Member:* "Shame.") Now, with a man of that type, how can you expect him to be in sympathy with these small petty zamindars, who have sold their own houses and gone out of their native place to settle in this

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new colony? These are very loyal people. I am talking of that part of the country where people think that, even reading a newspaper amounts to defying law and order, and they are so loyal that they would not read a daily paper even.

**An Honourable Member:** Even the *Pioneer*!

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** Even the *Civil and Military Gazette*. During the last year and a half, they have become so impatient that they have started holding meetings, and inviting leaders from outside to help them. If the Government really want to avoid trouble, which I think is bound to come, they had better meet their very modest demands and the Government may not appoint a regular committee, but hold an inquiry into the various allegations which are common. Two years ago I had sent a motion of this nature, and the Army Secretary had assured me that, if I did not move that motion, he would look into this matter.

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I did not say anything of the sort. We did hold an inquiry into the matter, but there was no stipulation on my part about my Honourable friend not moving his motion. There was not the slightest objection to his moving his motion. We held an inquiry two years ago, and I sent to my Honourable friend the full results of that inquiry, in which practically all the allegations which he brought forward were entirely disproved. I have not heard anything since from my Honourable friend from that day to this.

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** Now, Sir, what was that inquiry? How was that inquiry conducted? The Army Secretary and an officer of the Remount Department constituted that Committee. I am not surprised in the least that they reported that all the allegations were baseless. They are the very people whose conduct had to be inquired into and I do not believe all that they say. On the other hand, I can still challenge the Government that, if they appoint an Indian or, I would not insist on an Indian, even if they appoint a European civil officer who is unprejudiced and ask him to inquire into these things, they will be thoroughly convinced that my allegations are perfectly true.

The Assembly then adjourned for Lunch till Ten Minutes to Three of the Clock.

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The Assembly re-assembled after Lunch at Ten Minutes to Three of the Clock, Mr. President in the Chair.

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**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** Sir, the debate can be divided into two phases—one, the question of the retrenchment of military expenditure and the other, the question of an Indian Sandhurst. I propose to take up the question of retrenchment first. The Army, as the House knows, is divided for military purposes into three parts, the field army, the covering troops, and internal security. My friend, Dr. Moonje, gave us what was his opinion of the military situation beyond our frontiers, and pleaded that, at the moment, it was such as to enable us to take some risks towards the reduction of our troops. I do not think that you can run your defence on the

particular situation at any particular moment. I do not think the field army, which we maintain, is actually adequate to do more than repel the first dash of an attack upon India. It would, in the long run, have to be very materially increased to enable us to cope successfully with any attack beyond our borders.

On the question of the covering troops, I think there is something to be said. We have undertaken a policy along our North-West Frontier, amongst our border tribes which has cost the Indian taxpayer no little sum of money. From the reports that reach us, that policy is at last proving successful. We are bringing our border tribes towards peace and to decent methods of living, and I think the taxpayer has a right to ask Government to what extent the pursuance of that policy has enabled them to consider a reduction in covering troops.

On the third question of internal security, there are two points which I would like to emphasise before the House. Dr. Moonje, I know—at least I hope so—is doing a great deal to settle one of those troubles in India which are a factor in the size of the Army that you have to maintain for internal security. I think the heckling on the part of the Opposition of my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum, has proved this, that he was prepared to take you in this debate into actual realities. At times we do not face realities, and that is our difficulty in solving our military problem. Communal trouble is a grave reality, and whilst Mr. Aney may give us some idea as to how he would settle that very difficult problem, I felt that he was rather taking the role of a fretful wife who looks to a husband (the Government of India) and blames him for everything that happens, whether right or wrong. There is a duty for him and for all of us here to remove the beams that are in our own eyes before we try to remove the motes in the Government's eyes. That is our duty all along. That is our great problem, our difficult problem, and one, which, if we can settle it amongst ourselves, is likely to bring Dominion Status many years nearer and reduce military expenditure much quicker than it would otherwise be possible. And that is not the only danger to internal security. We have today those in this country who are definitely set on a revolutionary purpose, and it was a great surprise to me to see that some Members of this House are prepared to back such a movement. I find it difficult to understand how my friend Mr. B. Das finds it compatible with his oath of allegiance to make remarks such as he did this morning.

**Mr. B. Das** (Orissa Division: Non-Muhammadian): I quite stand by them.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** You stand by them and also by your oath of allegiance; your conscience is very wide. Sir, those are the actual facts in the situation, facts which may be very very dangerous to India. Under those circumstances it is undoubtedly difficult for us to press upon Government retrenchment in its internal security measures. I might be inclined to do so, if we could get this House to support the Government in taking measures that would free India from any danger from those directions.

**Diwan Chaman Lall** (West Punjab: Non-Muhammadian): I do not want to interrupt the Honourable Member, but I would like to ask him whether it is his opinion that the size of the Indian Army is dependent upon internal security alone and upon no other factor.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** I have taken the three divisions of army responsibility, field army, covering troops and internal security.  
 3 P.M. I have said that the field army, to my mind, is only adequate at the moment for its purpose, but were a war to come on, the field army would have to be materially increased in order to defend India. As regards the covering troops, I have offered a suggestion to Government that they should let us know how far the policy, the excellent policy they have been pursuing on the North-West Frontier, will enable them to reduce the number of troops that must be maintained under the head, covering troops.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** They will have to incur expenses in some other way.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** As regards the internal security, I say there are two great factors, there are two great difficulties menacing us, one amongst ourselves and one in revolutionaries and men who are not in my mind amenable to any reason. That is the reason why you cannot at the moment reduce your internal security troops. My Honourable friend Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan dwelt on the question of the maintenance of British troops. I have often read in the extremist papers praise for British troops whenever they have been called in in connection with communal riots. They get that praise because the general public know that they are not participants in any of our own disputes and they take confidence accordingly. You cannot replace them until you can find equally neutral men fit to take their position.

My Honourable friend, Captain Hira Singh, made an appeal to the House to remember what the Indian soldier has done for India. Who was it who won first for India the declaration of 1917? Those men who by co-operation, and by giving their lives, won that well deserved recognition for India. (Hear, hear.) There is very little recognition of that fact on the Benches opposite. It gives, to my mind, a lesson well worth remembering that whole-hearted co-operation brings with it, more rapidly than any other means, adequate reward.

While on the question of retrenchment, there is one other question I should like to ask the Government. To what extent has the development of your Royal Air Force and the development of mechanisation led to the possibility of retrenchment in some way or other? It seems to me that the development of these two things might and must, in the future, lead to some reduction in the strength of our Standing Army in so far as numbers are concerned, and yet I wonder if mechanisation is going to lead us to a cheaper Army, or is constant replacement of mechanical equipment going to be as expensive as are the old conditions? When you come to retrenchment, I think we have got to recognise that Government have done a good deal. When the House came to the arrangement that the Army should have a definite figure over a period of years and should make within itself economies to provide itself with equipment, we saved ourselves a good number of crores of rupees on account of replacement of equipment. I think we should acknowledge the work that the Army has done within itself, in being able to make economies that enabled it to carry the burden of properly equipping our men. I do wish the House would remember that. I have been a soldier myself on the frontier in the war, and we have had to go into the war not properly equipped. The Mesopotamian

campaign should have been fresh in the minds of many Honourable Members here, when the Indian Army was sent to the war absolutely inadequately equipped.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** In spite of the many crores that are spent, you went unequipped.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** I do think that Honourable Members opposite should not ask their countrymen to fight without every possible mechanical aid that it is possible to give them.

**Sir Hari Singh Gour** (Central Provinces Hindi Divisions: Non-Muhammadan): Is the Indian Army to be equipped to fight in any part of the world?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** There is one other point I should like to mention at the moment, and that is the statement made by my Honourable friend Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan. The point that I want to make, about his statement, is that we cannot hope to get to the bottom of this problem if we take as facts things that are not facts. Commander Kenworthy, as the Honourable Member reminded us, has issued a statement on the splendid fitness of the Indian State troops. Now, I am not one who is going to deny the wonderful service that Indian States rendered during the war, nor the fineness of the material that forms their troops, but we must remember that, when it actually came to fighting, the lack of education given to their officers and the method of appointing their officers was such as to make those battalions very nearly useless until they had been provided with fully trained officers. That is a fact, and it is no use shutting our eyes to it.

**Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan:** May I remind the Honourable Member, Colonel Crawford, that I did not base my opinion on Commander Kenworthy's interview but on the speeches made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and by His Excellency the Viceroy since the War about the Indian States? (Hear, hear.)

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** I can but tell the House, and I believe that the House want to know, and ought to know, what are the real facts, if you do not know the real facts it is not possible to build correctly.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** You do!

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** I now pass on to the question of the Sken Committee's Report. The House are aware that I was one of those who did not believe in that Report, because that Committee set out to accomplish its task, in what I believe was the wrong way. They set out to Indianise what they called the higher ranks in the Army, and I submit that you cannot have two classes of Indian officers. You will have to start to reorganise on the same basis as the British battalions. All your officers should be put in the same class, and should start life as platoon commanders and rise from that to full command of a battalion. Those are the lines upon which I believe the problem should be tackled. I keep telling the House—they may laugh at me, when I say it—that 18 officers in an Indian battalion today are Indians. They may be uneducated men, they may not know how to read or write. I quite agree that it has been very difficult for them to carry on. They have all been gallant and they serve their particular purpose so long as you have British officers in India. These officers serve

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as go-betweens between the British officers and the rank and file. But lack of education and lack of training do not fit them to fill to the full the duties of an officer. Altogether, apart from politics, the Army today finds that the training of these men is not up to modern requirements. What have they done? The Army have established a school today for the training of those officers, and I believe those are the lines and that is the way in which we should proceed—a military school and a military college for the training of our officers in India.

**Sir Hari Singh Gour:** Are they merely to be go-betweens and not officers?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** I see no reason why these men should be go-betweens any longer when the whole Army is Indianised.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** But when will that be? How long will it take?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** My Honourable friend is aware that it takes an ordinary officer to rise from the position of platoon commander to commanding officer 26 years.

**Diwan Chaman Lall:** How long did it take during the war?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** That is a question which is very often asked. How long did it take during the war? It shows how very little some of the Honourable Members realise what was the position in the war.

**Diwan Chaman Lall:** How long did it take you?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** The war in France was a static war. If you had been there, Mr. Chaman Lall . . . . .

**Mr. President:** Order, order.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** If the Honourable Member had been there, he would have understood that the people commanding were the staff who issued minute orders and minute details in writing as to everything that was to be done from minute to minute, and that a battalion commander, therefore had not the same responsibility even as a platoon commander in open warfare.

**Diwan Chaman Lall:** It was the biggest war.

**Mr. M. S. Aney:** Is the efficiency of a commanding officer tested more during war time or during peace time?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** War time, of course.

**Diwan Chaman Lall:** How long will it take during the war?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** You turn out in that period officers who, because they were so minutely instructed, did the work in an admirable condition.

**Diwan Chaman Lall:** How long?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** But they did not do it to my mind as efficiently as officers who had had longer training.

**Diwan Chaman Lall:** Will it take six months?

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** If you start a civil war, then you will be able to turn out a good Indian army in no time.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** The point is that we must remember that in training your regular Army you cannot adopt the method you are forced to do under war conditions. Now, so far as I understand the position, the Skeen Committee were really given a particular job, that was to advise Government as to how they could secure from India men suitable for Indian military service. My friend Dr. Moonje has done a good deal more to help that than possibly any other Member in this House. He has not ignored the desire to go on at the top, but he has dug in at the bottom. He has forced upon Government measures for the physical training, disciplining and education of our schoolboys that must lead to the building up of a national military spirit; and I regretted, the other day, when he took a further step, that the House considered it so unimportant as not to support him in a review of the work being done in that direction, and as to whether we could or could not make suggestions for improving or speeding it up. That is the type of work that is very valuable. He is today bringing pressure to bear on the Government to increase the Territorial forces set up mainly for that purpose of increasing the military spirit in India. I think Government could tell us whether our existing establishment of 21,000 for the Territorial forces is filled, and whether there is room for expansion—I understand that in many of our schools there are boys today who want to join the Officers' Training Corps, but the strength of these units is limited—room for expansion there, scope for expansion so as to give more lads training of that nature, training which whether it leads to the Army or not is bound to be valuable to them throughout life.

Now, the Skeen Committee did make certain recommendations and the one that appealed to me most was that, unless the public understand that there is a real career being opened to men in the Army, you will not get the same or adequate numbers of recruits coming forward. That is a very reasonable argument, but I think, from what we know of what Government have done—the Honourable the Mover suggested that Government have done nothing—we can say that they have done something, and that we are today, judging from the figures my friend Dr. Moonje gave, getting to that position in which the supply of candidates exceeds the vacancies at our disposal. The more the supply of candidates increases, the greater the opportunity for setting up a military college in India. I have very real sympathy over that question. I cannot believe that you can make any real start in this subject if you have to send your men for training six thousand miles away. That is really a great obstacle. What I visualise is a training school from which we shall not only recruit from civil sources, but we shall recruit men from our rank and file, from Dehra Dun and from our King George's Schools and schools of that nature who would, and should, take up Dominion Commissions. I think this King's Commission, which Government have given, is definitely retarding our process of building up a Dominion Army. No other Dominion has the King's Commission. They have their own commissions, and that is what we should have here as a real basis and a sound foundation for the Dominion Army. By all means let your candidates, if they like—as they do in other Dominions—go in certain numbers to Sandhurst for service in the Imperial Army. I have no objection to their being placed on the same footing as the other Dominions.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** After self-government, it will be an Indian commission and not British.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** These are the lines upon which we should build and the commissions we issue should be Dominion Commissions.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** What will that be?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** My Honourable friend Mr. Jinnah knows perfectly well what a Dominion Commission is.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** No, I don't. What will be the position of an officer to whom you will give a Dominion Commission?

**Sir Hari Singh Gour:** What will be his position *vis-a-vis* an officer holding the King's Commission?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** His position will be that of a full officer in the Indian or Dominion Army.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** What does that mean?

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** It gives him authority to command troops in India.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** I will ask my Honourable friend to consult legal advisers about it before he expresses an opinion.

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** My Honourable friend is of course a legal authority himself. My purpose is perfectly plain. If you have your Dominion Army here, you will have your own officers with your own commissions with authority to command that Army. That is, I believe, the correct method, and I hold that the grant of King's Commissions to all our men is definitely retarding the rate at which we can build up any Dominion Army.

I should like to make some suggestions here to Government. We who are laymen or outside the confidence of the military authorities, do not know what is the final goal to which you are moving, as regards defence. It seems to me that you cannot build your foundations until you have some idea as to what your final goal is. No architect builds his house until he has drawn it fully, and I believe that we are slipping along, building up here and there, without any real idea as to where we will go. One thing that is obvious to me is that you are intending to build up a Dominion Army. You started with eight units, and very shortly no doubt you will be expanding that number of units. What is going to be the final strength of the Indian Army and what are going to be its particular responsibilities? It seems to me that the time has nearly come when technical men, soldiers themselves, should face that problem and should give us some indication of what are the lines upon which you are building. I can perfectly well understand and sympathise with the desire of the House to get on with the job. I only have a technical disagreement with my friends on the Skeen Committee, because I believe that the basis upon which they were working was fundamentally wrong. It is becoming, as I said, necessary today that we should think of the large number of officers who are already in our Indian regiments and whose equipment is not suitable to fit them to modern requirements.

I think there is little more to be said, but I do plead with the House that they should recognise that something is being done and materially

done, that we have made considerable advance along the lines upon which we are going; and I would ask them also, in discussing this problem, to remember the realities. Elected Members opposite have said that Indians have risen to very high positions under the Crown. All credit to them for having done so, but whilst you may make experiments and take some risks in all ordinary administrative spheres, when it comes to war, you cannot take risks which you cannot correct. You can correct a mistake in administration; you cannot correct it in battle; and unless we maintain in India an army capable of keeping off external aggression we shall never rise to a free India.

**Mr. G. M. Young:** Sir, this debate has fallen, as my Honourable friend, Colonel Crawford, has said, into two parts. That part of it which deals with general military policy has been restricted almost entirely to a discussion of military expenditure. The other part is the part, which came first in the motion, on the action, or, as the Honourable the Mover preferred to put it, inaction, of the Government of India on the Indian Sandhurst Committee's Report. I will take that part of it first. Not only the Honourable the Mover, but several Honourable Members, not only on this occasion but on previous occasions, have maintained that the Government have taken no action beyond entering into certain correspondence on the recommendations of that Committee. Now, as long as Honourable Members maintain that attitude in defiance of the facts, how can we reach any reasonable solution of the difficulty? How can we decide what is the next stage, when Honourable Members opposite do not admit the first step which has already been taken?

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** What is that?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I will tell the Honourable Member. I believe he knows it already.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** I would like to hear it today.

**Mr. G. M. Young:** The first step was to increase the number of vacancies at Sandhurst to 20 a year, and to open Woolwich and Cranwell to Indian cadets, with a view to their becoming King's Commissioned officers in the Engineers, Artillery and Air Force. I am perfectly aware that the Government of India knew, before they made that recommendation, that those 20 vacancies were the maximum which the Army Council were at that moment prepared to accept as a start. The Indian Sandhurst Committee were also aware of that fact, and that is no doubt why they fixed 20 as the figure to be taken at the beginning. Honourable Members may call that nothing. But an average of 20 cadets a year is sufficient to keep going an establishment of 500 officers. Honourable Members may say that that is not enough. But it is a start, there is no doubt; an establishment of 500 Indian King's Commissioned officers, whereas 12, or 15 years ago there was not one. Honourable Members then go on to say—at least I remember my Honourable friend, Mr. Jinnah, saying—that there are so many vacancies offered, and it will be a very distant date before they are increased. I rather fancy the date he named was Doomsday. As a matter of fact, we made it perfectly clear that this original expansion is only as a start. The Indian Sandhurst Committee then added what they called a suggested scheme for expansion as an appendix to their Report. There they laid down, in advance, the amount of expansion year by year. The

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Government of India said, "No, we cannot accept this time-table in advance; we must proceed upon established results". Now, Sir, what have the results been? My Honourable friend, Dr. Moonje, has called attention to the results of the last examination. Those results, I may say at once, are very promising. Until that examination, we had not had real competition; that is to say, no Indian candidate had ever qualified, and then failed to get a place because there were not enough vacancies. In the examination of last November, there were 69 candidates. My Honourable friend, Dr. Moonje, was perfectly right. There were 69 candidates who appeared for the examination. There were 59 who completed it. The other ten were examined by the Interview Board, and were told that they had not passed. In view of that fact, they did not complete the written examination. There is one other small figure of my Honourable friend's which requires correction. He said that there were four vacancies at Woolwich. As a matter of fact, there were six. Otherwise the figures are correct. Therefore, there were 69 candidates, of whom 20 have obtained vacancies in the cadet colleges. That is, as I said, the first time that there was competition. Speaking the other day, my Honourable friend, Mr. Jinnah, enlarged upon the desirability of getting good competition. He said, "If you have 500 candidates for 20 or 30 vacancies, that is good. If you have 1,500 candidates for 20 or 30 vacancies, that is better still; that will be getting good competition." We have not got as far as that, but we are on our way.

**Dr. B. S. Moonje:** I think it is 18 vacancies that were available, and not 20.

**Mr. G. M. Young:** My Honourable friend is right again. I included in my figures two vacancies for the Royal Indian Marine, which were filled. Before leaving the question of the expansion of the vacancies, I should like to mention, that, not only is it the declared policy of the Government of India to expand those vacancies when the time arises, but that policy was quite recently reaffirmed by the Secretary of State in his answer to the question asked by Lieut. Commander Kenworthy.

I now turn to the question of establishing an Indian military college. There again, in answer to the same question, the Secretary of State said that the question of training Indians in India for the King's Commission was under his consideration. I have frequently stated in this House that the establishment of an Indian military college will come, when the number and quality of the candidates coming forward justifies it. You cannot start laying down a military college unless there is a certain minimum number of candidates. What that minimum will be, we do not know yet. We are working it out, and we are watching the results of the examination. When you get a steady flow of candidates, sufficient to start a military college, that will be the time to start a college.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya** (Allahabad and Jhansi Divisions: Non-Muhammadan Rural): What is the minimum number, would the Honourable Member tell us?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I think we can lay down the number when the time comes. It is not possible to say at the moment exactly what the minimum will be. But when the time comes, it can be settled. Honourable Members may say that we are not proceeding fast enough. We may not be

proceeding as fast as some Honourable Members would wish. That we accept, but we have our reasons for going slow. But they stultify the discussion when they say that we are doing nothing. My Honourable friend, Mr. Jinnah, drew a humorous picture the other day of myself hurrying with bricks and mortar towards the end of 1932. That seems to me rather an unconvincing argument. It is perfectly true that to build a large military college and equip, it will cost a good deal of money. But there is nothing to prevent one starting with a temporary building or a building which already exists. There is no need to take a decision four or five years in advance and say that then we will have a college. All I wish to maintain is that we have made a start in both these respects and that we are moving, and not stationary.

Now, I come to the one point on which it may fairly be said that the Government of India and His Majesty's Government have turned down the recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee. That is, the so-called eight units system, the principle of Indianising by units instead of Indianising by individual posts within the units. My Honourable friend, the Mover of this motion, argued that Dominion Status involves the creation of a Dominion army, and that that cannot be raised in a moment. I quite agree with him that it cannot be raised in a moment. But it might surprise him to learn that the reason why we adopted the principle of the eight-units' system, instead of the recommendations of the Indian Sandhurst Committee, is that we are aiming at the creation of a Dominion army, which the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee would not have achieved. The whole point of it is that you get Indian officers together in units, and get these units completely officered by Indians. By that means alone will you be able to make the experiment and discover whether it is a success or not. If we had proceeded on the plan recommended by the Indian Sandhurst Committee, and reversed Lord Rawlinson's scheme of the eight units, as I have said before in this House, by 1952 we should not be anywhere nearer knowing whether Indian officers can, unaided and unsupported by British officers, lead Indian troops, than we are today. By that time, you would have, it is true, half the officers of the Indian Army Indians; but they would have been distributed in exact proportion to the British officers throughout every unit in the Army. I do not know whether Honourable Members are aware of any army in the world that is officered on a plan of that kind; I personally have never heard of one. The eight units system was admittedly unpopular at the start. There is no doubt that those Indian officers who are in the Army—and there are still 36 of them in 28 units which are not Indianised units—disliked at the outset the eight units' scheme. That is a matter on which we keep a very close eye and we are satisfied that that prejudice is to some extent lessening, and Indians are beginning to take pride in having their own units, as we foresaw they would. We all knew that the plan would be unpopular at the start; but in our opinion it was necessary, and it is now less unpopular.

It has often been said, Sir, that the sole object of this measure was to prevent a deterioration in British recruitment. I have never denied that British recruitment would suffer if the recommendations of the Skeen Committee had been put into force. That was not the sole object, however, in forming the eight units scheme. Sir, the unpopularity of

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the Indian Army among British recruits, which would have ensued if the Skoen Committee's recommendations had been accepted, has been attributed to racial arrogance, superiority complex, and all that sort of thing. As a matter of fact, Sir, it has nothing, so far as I know, to do with that. It is merely the natural desire of an officer to serve with his own kind. That very natural desire is not confined to British officers of the Indian Army; it exists all over the world. If Honourable Members will only look at realities, if they take up a copy of the Indian Army List today, and look, for instance, at the battalion that is stationed here in Delhi, the Gordon Highlanders, if they look at the officer establishment of the unit, they will find that the names are practically all Scottish. The same tendency is already to be found in our own Indianising units. We have had applications from members of one community or another to go to the unit which already contains the largest number of that community. There is no racial arrogance about it. There is no superiority complex about it. It is merely the natural desire of birds of a feather to flock together. That in itself will be a great help towards the efficiency of these units. The officers will be brother officers in more senses than one.

Sir, I now turn to the other division of this question, the retrenchment of military expenditure. We are almost tired of hearing that we have not given effect to the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee. We did give effect to them immediately, and reductions were effected which took us well below the figure recommended by the Inchcape Committee. It is quite true that a large portion of the reductions below that figure was due to the rise in exchange. We do not deny that, but the fact remains that we carried out the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee, and that our figure now is well below what that Committee recommended. Here again, we are not stationary; we are still moving. It has been suggested that the drop of 80 lakhs in military expenditure this year, in the budget year, is not a true saving. My Honourable friend, Dr. Moonje, produced figures to show that if the ultimate figure falls to Rs. 50 crores, there will be no real saving. But I think he loses count of the fact that, by taking the drop now, and increasing the period of stabilization, we are facilitating a larger drop at the end of it than would otherwise be possible. There was one Honourable Member today who said, that, though military expenditure might not be going up, at any rate it is not falling. He did not, use the formula that was used during the last few years, that military expenditure was going up by leaps and bounds. It is not doing that now, it is actually falling. It is relevant, Sir, to point out what His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief pointed out the other day in another place, about what other nations are doing. I hope I shall not be tiring the patience of the House if I read some of the figures of military expenditure of other nations. In France, including the expenditure on air forces, in 1922-23 it was £39 millions; it has risen steadily until, in 1929, it is £64.6 millions. Germany only began military expenditure again in 1924 with a figure of £22.5 millions, which has now reached approximately £32 millions—an increase of £10 millions. The United States of America,—who are taking a lead with Great Britain in the naval disarmament campaign—their figures are distinctly instructive. Their expenditure in 1923 was £51.7 millions; in 1928 it was £59.3 millions; for 1929-30 the figure is £61.7 millions. That represents army

expenditure only. The air force expenditure in the same period has risen from £2.76 millions to £7.2 millions; naval expenditure from £6.2 millions to £7.5 millions. Italy shows an increase from £18 millions in 1928 to £28.7 millions in 1929, but a decrease from £31.1 millions in 1928. At the same time, in air force expenditure, Italy has risen from £1.9 million to £7.6 millions; and in naval expenditure, from £6.1 millions to £13.3 millions. I come last to Russia. We have no figures for Russia before 1925, but Russian military expenditure in 1925, was £41.7 millions; now it is £84 millions, that is, the estimate for the ensuing year. We have often been told that Russian military expenditure is due to fear of Great Britain. These figures of course make that quite clear. Russia's expenditure has risen from £41.7 millions to £84 millions. Great Britain has reduced her expenditure from £51 millions to £40 millions, and India has reduced hers in the same period from Rs. 65 crores 26 lakhs to Rs. 54 crores and 85 lakhs.

Now, Sir, certain methods of retrenchment have been proposed by my Honourable friend, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, in the general discussion on the Budget. He brought forward two specific proposals. In one he referred to the recommendation of the Inchcape Committee that the strength of Indian battalions should be reduced by, I think, 154 men. There was an immediate reduction of 64 men, and he asked if there had been any further reduction since then. He seemed rather pained at the idea that any further reduction could have been made without informing the House. As a matter of fact, a further reduction has taken place, consequent upon the reorganisation of battalions from a four-company to a three-company basis. I do not think, Sir, that it would be worth while troubling the Honourable Members of this House with these tactical details, but it is a fact that the strength of the Indian infantry battalions has been cut down by another 34 men. It is now 728, whereas it used to be 826 before the Inchcape recommendations. That, Sir, is the furthest limit to which, in the opinion of the military authorities at the present time, it would be wise to reduce a battalion from a tactical point of view.

**Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru:** May I put a question to my Honourable friend? The Inchcape Committee recommended that the war strength of an Indian battalion should be 766; that is, it recommended that the strength should be reduced immediately from 826 to 766; and in addition to this it recommended that, after the formation of a proper infantry reserve, the peace strength should be 20 per cent. below the war strength; am I therefore correct in saying that we have to reduce not 826, but 766 by 20 per cent.?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I have given the House the reductions that have been made in the light of the needs of the reorganisation. These are the reductions that have actually been made. Further reduction, even to the extent of 30 or 40 men, would not result in an economy sufficient to bridge the gap of Rs. 4½ crores, which was under discussion during the general discussion of the Budget. I hesitate to say exactly how much it would come to; but certainly it would not come to more than half a crore at the outside.

Another measure of retrenchment that has been suggested by my friend was the reduction of British troops. Sir, I have been in this House now for some years; and I have heard that suggestion occasionally put

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forward, but it has almost always been by way of interruption. The other day, towards the end of the general discussion on the Budget, my Honourable friend, the Leader of the Opposition, made a speech summarising the discussion, and dwelling at some length upon the necessity of reducing military expenditure. I may not have heard him correctly, but I do not think that he put forward that suggestion in the course of his speech. However, when the Finance Member rose to reply, and himself reached the question of the reduction of military expenditure, my Honourable friend called out from his seat, "Why don't you reduce two or three internal security battalions? I understand there are 28 of them". I have myself been subjected to similar interruptions, but I have never known this House discuss seriously the question of the reduction of British troops. I think that it is a problem of sufficient importance to merit something more than an interruption; and if Honourable Members wished it to be discussed on the floor of this House, surely they have had plenty of opportunities of doing so . . . . .

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** Has not attention been drawn many times to the desirability of reducing the internal security British troops?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** Yes, Sir; but almost always by way of interruption . . . . .

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** Not necessarily; in the course of debate also.

**Mr. G. M. Young:** Sometimes in the course of debate, but repeatedly by interruption; and never has it been discussed on a Resolution on the floor of this House.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** Will my Honourable friend give the reason why Government think that 28 battalions are maintained as internal security British troops and why they cannot be reduced?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I think the answer to my Honourable friend's question was given by my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum, when he made his interruption.

**An Honourable Member:** Oh! On behalf of Government?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** He frankly said, as far as I understood him, that he did not wish a single soldier to be reduced.

**Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:** My Honourable friend complained just now that we did not discuss this matter seriously. Is he serious when he presents to us the remark of Sir Abdul Qaiyum on this point that not a single soldier can be reduced? Is he serious?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** I made no complaint at all. I merely said that the subject was one worthy of something more than an interruption, and I still say so.

My Honourable friend, Colonel Crawford, asked me one or two questions. He asked to what extent we might be able to reduce our covering troops as a result of our policy on the frontier. Of course that is a question that will be borne in mind. We have not come to any conclusion yet. We have only just reoccupied Wana, and I think it is hardly the time for a reduction just now. He also asked me to what extent the

development of our air force, and of mechanisation, has led to retrenchment in other directions. That, again, Sir, is a problem that is constantly kept in mind. But the Royal Air Force is now only at the strength which was originally recommended for it shortly after the war. We have since added two squadrons, which were originally recommended. As for mechanisation, it is by no means as yet complete; but as I say, these problems are constantly in our mind. He also asked us whether mechanisation will not land us in greater recurring charges than animal transport. That is not the opinion of our experts. The opinion of our experts is contained in the memorandum which I laid on the table in September 1928, and is that it will involve some slight reduction in recurring expenditure in peace time, and an enormous reductions in recurring expenditure in war.

I do not think, Sir, I have now anything more to say but this. The motion before the House is not a token cut. It is a motion for the reduction of the Army Department grant to one rupee. There will be two direct effects of this motion, if it is carried. The first is that it will throw out of employment a very large body of Indian Government servants and only a few European Government servants. (*An Honourable Member*: "That is non-votable.") The second effect of this reduction would be to deprive this Honourable House of its only means of criticising and keeping control, such as it is, (*Laughter*), over military expenditure. I do not know if the Honourable Members who vote for this motion will do it with either of those two objects in mind, or if they will be doing it in anticipation of the grant being restored by His Excellency the Governor General.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah**: Sir, I think this House deserves congratulations that we have had at last some statement from the Department which the Honourable Member represents and which takes away something like 54 or 55 crores to keep it up. It is a most extraordinary position in this House, that this is the first opportunity we have of hearing anything about what the Honourable Member has done in the course of the official year and why the expenditure is necessary and so on and so forth. Sir, it was the ordinary practice of this House that the Commander-in-Chief, who is the Member-in-charge of this Department, usually made a statement at least in the course of general discussion on the Budget. The last of such statements was made, I believe, in 1928, and on that occasion his statement was a detailed statement, and further he gave us information as to what the Government were doing, what their policy was, what their programme was, how they were spending money and so on. But, Sir, it happened to be the duty of some of us here ruthlessly to criticise, not the Commander-in-Chief as such, but the Member-in-charge of that Department speaking on behalf of the Government of India, and it seems that, since then, the Member-in-charge of that Department is no more here. That date marks his exit from the floor of this House. Now, Sir, I want to know who is the Member-in-charge? If the Commander-in-Chief thinks that this House is not worthy of him to sit in his uniform as the Field-Marshal, I want to know who is the Member-in-charge on behalf of the Government of India who is accountable to this House, and who can, with some responsibility and with some authority, make any statement with regard to the policy of the Government of India. Nobody. Of course, we have got the Army Secretary here. I have a great personal regard for my friend, Mr. Mackworth Young. But, Sir, I

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hope he will not follow his Chief and leave this House if I criticise him, because I shall certainly miss him, because I think he is the finest Secretary that could be put forward to evade every question, to draw red herrings across our path and mislead this House in every way he can. But what is his position? Where does he stand? What can he speak? You might as well—I say with great respect to him personally—you might as well put there a clerk who will read out whatever he is told to read out to this House to the best of his abilities. Is this the way you are going to treat this House? Because the Commander-in-Chief is not here, we have nobody here on behalf of the Government of India in charge of this Department to meet us on the floor of this House. I pity the poor Secretary, who has only got to carry out the orders and instructions issued to him. Is he responsible for the policy? Can he put forward the policy? No. Well, Sir, I think it has been repeatedly said before, and I do ask the Government of India carefully to consider this extraordinary position. This Army Department, which takes away not only 54 or 55 crores of rupees a year of the total revenue of this country to spend as they like, but which is also responsible for the military policy in this country has no responsible member to represent it in this House? Of course, my friend, Mr. Young, is very clever. When he meets some arguments to reduce the British troops, to make this reduction here or retrenchment there, the answer is: "Oh, well, we cannot endanger the safety and the security of India. This is absolutely necessary," and so on. Now, Sir, that is an expert opinion behind him. I cannot, nor can any Honourable Member who is not acquainted with the technique and the strategic point of view, possibly challenge an opinion from that side that the strength of or the composition of the Army is absolutely essential. But why do you misrepresent the position that we take up? The position that we take up is, not that you should reduce the Army so as to endanger the safety of India with regard to either the internal security or the external aggression, I for one, Sir, standing in this place have never said that you should reduce the Army by a single soldier which will endanger the safety of India. That has never been my point, and I do not think that is the point in the mind of any Honourable Member in impressing upon the Army authorities the necessity of effecting retrenchment or reduction. But says the Secretary: "You ask us to reduce the British troops. Why don't you table a Resolution?" Surely, Mr. Young knows why. What will be the answer of Mr. Young? He will ask, "What will you substitute for it?" Naturally, would you not put that question? And what is the substitute that I can offer? You will then say, "You are on the horns of a dilemma. You wanted to take away the British troops, but what is the substitute you can offer?" I say I cannot offer a substitute,—how can I? That is just, Sir, how Mr. Young can very well ask us, "Why don't you raise the question by way of a Resolution?" Sir, Government understand perfectly well why we don't raise that question. Our point is this, that you will never be able to get rid of this garrison,—the Indian Army, composed both of British troops and Indian troops as it is constituted at present is a garrison,—you will never be able to get rid of this garrison so long as you have not got materials ready to make the Army a national army. Now, that is the policy, and that is the programme which I want the Government of India honestly to follow. Do you wish to nationalise the Indian Army or you do not? Then

you will ask me, "How are we to do it?" Well, if you do not know it, I have repeatedly told you, and I shall repeat it again, that as long as we have not got a sufficient number of Indian officer ranks, it is not possible for us to nationalise the Indian Army, and I think Mr. Young will honestly admit that, if not on the floor of this House, at least in the lobby. How can you nationalise an army? Because Mr. Young knows perfectly well, and I think Colonel Crawford ought to know it,—that it is impossible to nationalise your Army unless you have got your officer ranks. That is exactly the first step, the fundamental step, on which we have concentrated; and not only have we concentrated, but even Lord Rawlinson concentrated on it. Why? Even the Government of India realise it, and they have, by implication, if not expressly, admitted that the first thing to do is to Indianise the officer ranks. Sir, officers, I admit, cannot be made to order. A certain amount of training is necessary; but of course, my friend, Colonel Crawford, went much further. According to his argument and his conclusion, it comes to this, that you can only make officers quickly if there is a civil war or revolution in the country. If he wants to wait for that, he might get it; but don't wait for that . . . .

**Colonel J. D. Crawford:** I should like to point out, Sir, that I said that officers were made during the Great War because they were under much greater control than the regular officers whom you require for the regular Army.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** No, Sir. Your statement was quite correct that officers are made by a revolution, by actual war, whether it is civil or international. It is a perfectly sound proposition, according to Colonel Crawford. But do you want to try that method? Probably, if there had not been a revolution in France, Napoleon would never have been heard of. It was the revolution that made Napoleon, and there are many Napoleons probably in embryo in India, who may come forward and even excel your Commander-in-Chief. Are we going to try that method? We want constitutional evolution. That is why I am standing on the floor of this House. Do you want to follow this policy honestly or do you not? Do you want the officer ranks of the Indian Army to be Indianised, or to you not? That is the whole question, and until you recognise that and nationalise your Army, and get a second line of defence, it is no use my tabling a Resolution and asking you to reduce white troops or black troops.

Now, who is responsible to this House? Who cares for the opinion of this House? Here is a question put in the House of Commons by Commander Kenworthy. He said the matter was causing uneasiness among Britain's best friends in India, and asked for an assurance of sympathetic consideration. Mr. Benn replied that he was ready to consider the extension of the scheme of Indianising the eight units in the Army as soon as the Government of India felt justified in recommending it on the results achieved. Well, have you done that? Why have you not done that? We in India are in this position. There is the Army Secretary; there is the Commander-in-Chief, there is the Governor General in Council, there is the Secretary of State for India, the British Cabinet, the Imperial General Staff and the Imperial Defence Committee, and after all these bodies, who were referred to by my friend, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, had been consulted, before His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief made that so-called "satisfactory" announcement on the 8th March,

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1928, after digesting the Report of Sandhurst Committee for nearly two years. Between these bodies and authorities one does not know where India stands. Naturally Mr. Young feels that he has got this bad and rotten case to defend. He does his best and jogs along as best he can. What does he say about the Sandhurst Committee's Report? He says it is not right to say that we have not accepted any of the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee. Strictly, technically, perhaps he is right, because the recommendation of the Sandhurst Committee was that the number should be doubled in the first year. My friend asks, "Have we not done that?" Well, Sir, I am surprised that a responsible Member, sitting on the Treasury Bench, should talk in this fashion. I ask, is that the recommendation, or the only recommendation, of the Sandhurst Committee? We asked you to give us bread and you are giving us stones. The very foundation of the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee was the establishment of a Sandhurst in India. What other recommendation of the Sandhurst Committee have you carried out? Have you carried out this recommendation to double the number of vacancies up to now? You have not. Why have you not? The Honourable Member says, "Oh, we cannot get suitable candidates". Why not? You say, "They are not forthcoming". When a responsible Member comes here and says that he cannot get 20 or 24 or 27 suitable candidates for Sandhurst, I refuse to believe it. I say there is something rotten in your system. You know that is the testimony of no less an authority than Sir Malcolm Hailey, who is not always favourably inclined towards India. If you have got eyes to see, look at the cricket fields. Why is it that you are not getting these candidates? There are reasons and you are responsible for them. You proceed in this matter in such a way that, instead of encouraging the people to put their heart into it, instead of bucking them up, you start in a manner which throws a damper on them. Take the eight unit system. Every British officer, be it said to his credit, who appeared before the Sandhurst Committee, emphatically condemned the eight unit scheme, and equally and naturally more emphatically every Indian officer who held the King's Commission, who was examined before the Sandhurst Committee, opposed it. The reason is an obvious one. It means this, that under this scheme an Indian would never command a British officer. When you tell this to an Indian boy, it chills him. It does not encourage him. It makes him feel, "What is the good of going into this business?" Mr. Young says, "By Indianising these eight units, you will get an officer who will be in charge of the regiments in 22 or 23 years." Does he suggest that otherwise it will take 100 years?

**Mr. G. M. Young:** Perhaps my Honourable friend will allow me to correct that statement. I did not say that. What I said was that, by this system, you will get a regiment officered entirely by Indians in approximately that time, which you would not get under the Skeen Committee's scheme.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** What is the idea of that? Why don't you have the entire Treasury Bench composed of Indians or a portion of it by means of an eight unit scheme of segregation? What is the use of putting forward these arguments? Why don't you confess it? Why don't you honestly say that you do not want an Indian officer to command over a British officer? I assure you it will be much better for you to say that.

Do not try to mislead us, because it will not serve any good purpose at all. Now, it was a very important recommendation that the eight unit scheme should be given up. Has that been accepted by the Government? No, it has not been accepted. Even today what do we hear? In this connection I would like to quote from the speech of the Commander-in-Chief. Of late, he has taken to making statements in another place, and this is what he said there, while referring to the Establishment of a Sandhurst and the abolition of the eight unit scheme :

"The former was recommended to be established only in 1933. Government did not feel confident that the cadets coming forward for an Indian Sandhurst could be relied upon for being sufficient either in quality or in quantity to justify Government undertaking the heavy expenditure involved in the immediate creation of a Sandhurst in India."

Now, Sir, who says that we want a Sandhurst to be established immediately? It is quite clear and it is understood that the Sandhurst is to be established in 1933. It is also quite clear and understood that the number is to be increased gradually, and if you follow the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee, which I have always described as interdependent or interwoven, you will find that they are intended, to a very great extent, to spur on the recruitment and to encourage it. If you take it as a whole and whole-heartedly support it, and not talk too much of the time-table, referred to in the Sandhurst Report—as if the Government of India were the only authority in whom the entire wisdom was centred—the difficulty will soon be solved. We are told over and over again that it is difficult to follow the time-table. If you cannot accomplish it, no crime will be committed. But why don't you accept it? Say that we do accept the time-table, and we will do our best to accomplish it. Supposing you do not succeed in it, what will happen? Will the heavens fall? Why are you then quibbling? Why don't you frankly say that we do accept this and we will do our best and carry out this programme as it is recommended by the Sandhurst Committee. We will go on increasing the number. Of course, if you do not get the candidates, it is no fault of yours. Then you should explain to us why you cannot get them. But why don't you endorse it? Why do you hesitate? That is what I cannot understand. That shows that you do not want to encourage the recruitment, and that your continuation of the eight unit scheme is a damper and is certainly against the entire sentiment of the Indian youth. You do not even admit that you will go on with the increase of the number according to the time-table. I will quote to the House what the Honourable Mr. Mackworth Young said on the last occasion. But today he says that he is glad that the result of the last examination was more favourable. Why do you want it to be forced step by step, and why do you want to be humiliated in this fashion? You know it perfectly well, that you can easily get 27 boys if you want to. This is what he said on the last occasion :

"What we cannot do is to prophesy that that event will take place in 1933." (*That is, the Sandhurst.*) "I have never been able to understand what Honourable Members want, nor how have we turned down, as they say, the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee in this respect. We have started this year exactly the number of vacancies for Sandhurst which the Committee recommended. We have never up to this moment succeeded in obtaining the full number of candidates for the vacancies at Sandhurst. All we say is that we are not going to raise the number of our 20 above the initial recommendation of the Indian Sandhurst Committee until we get something like 20 candidates. The Committee, on the other hand, postulate 20 this year, 24 the next year, 27 the next year, and so on subject, of course, to suitable candidates being forthcoming."

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Why don't you accept it? Am I not justified in saying that the three main fundamental recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee are not accepted by the Government of India?

Now, let us take the subsidiary recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee. Have they been accepted? Have you done anything with regard to the physical training and drill? This House had to pass a Resolution, and I believe my friend Dr. Moonje brought in that Resolution. Until he brought in that Resolution, and that was in 1928, what did the Government do? Did they do anything? No. And what about the Resolution which we passed the other day here, namely, the co-ordination of other educational institutions, which should give training to the boys, which would help them if they ever chose to take up a military career for themselves? My friend here, the Honourable the Secretary of the Education Department, told us many rosy things, but did he tell us what lead they did give, as recommended by the Committee since 1926? What about that? Nothing was said about it until that Resolution was brought up here. Then the Government, like a drowning man who catches at a straw, were willing to accept the amended Resolution of Colonel Crawford. What I say is this. There was no need for any Resolution. Government ought to have carried this out. If they told us that, in consequence of these recommendations, we have taken the following steps, and have achieved these results, then I would have thought that there was somebody there responsible to this House in charge of the Army Department. But you have not done that either.

May I ask frankly and honestly, which other important recommendation of the Sandhurst Committee you have endorsed? And yet, Sir, I am astonished. To my amazement I find that a man in the position of the Commander-in-Chief makes a statement in the other place, and says that we have given effect to every recommendation of the Sandhurst Committee, except the establishment of a Sandhurst and the scheme of eight units. Sir, if it had not been the Commander-in-Chief, if anybody else had made that statement, I would certainly have characterised it as a tissue of lies.

Sir, you are trifling with this question. What is the position? We started the inauguration of this policy in 1918, when for the first time in the history of India, you admitted the sons of the soil as eligible for the King's Commission. That was how many years ago? Twelve years ago. And what is the total number of Indian Commissioned officers today? It will be 107 in April this year. One-hundred and seven, out of how many? As many as 3,200 of officers' rank and yet, Sir, the Army Secretary stands here and says to me, "You may accuse me that we are not going fast." I say, you are proceeding in a most disgraceful manner, unworthy of any Government who honestly believe in their own declaration that you want to Indianise the officers' rank in India. Sir, on this subject, it is difficult to speak with restraint because of misrepresentations and misleading arguments that are advanced. And what are we told in this House, Sir? Is there a man—I venture to say, there is no man—who is not the well-wisher of the poor Indian soldiers? Has there ever been uttered a single word in this House against the poor Indian soldier, the sepoy who started his life on Rs. 7 a month in 1858, as the gallant Captain Hira Singh pointed out to us? Have we ever grudged them, have we ever grudged you, Captain

Hira Singh, a fair treatment? What is the position of the poor Indian soldier in the Army? Yes, you are loyal, you give up your life for the salt that you eat, for the master that you serve. Whoever grudges you anything, so far as these Benches are concerned? And yet I know it is a wicked thing to do. I know it is represented that, whenever this House wants to cut down military expenditure, it is said that these representatives of yours in the Legislature are responsible for all the troubles of the Indian soldiers. We had heard my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum. I listened to his speech with great attention. His heart, Sir, is with us (Hear, hear), but his head is there (pointing to the Government Benches). (Laughter.) He consciously or otherwise reflected, as a mirror, the views and sentiments and feelings of the Treasury Benches which, after he had finished, rewarded him and gave a great deal of applause. There happens to be a common chord running between my Honourable friends on the Treasury Benches and my Honourable friend Sir Abdul Qaiyum.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** I did not notice any applause.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** But I did; because the Honourable Member was excited (Laughter), he did not notice. I am stating facts quite correctly. Although he was in great difficulty, and felt great pains and labour, he ultimately said, you should at least give effect to the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee (Hear, hear and Laughter), because he had signed it. After all, it is his old love, notwithstanding the fact that, since he signed it, he feels that communal tension has grown much, which of course does not entitle him to ask for reforms in the North-West Frontier Province. I hope he will not ask for reforms for his province.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** If Government will take back the reforms from the provinces which are worse than the North-West Frontier Province in many respects, then I shall not ask for them.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** The Honourable Member is asking for them because other provinces ask for them.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Yes, because other people have them.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** As I already said, my Honourable friend's heart is with us. That is enough for me, because he occupies a very difficult position. Well, I hope and trust that, when a division is taken, he will go with me into the lobby.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** What will they do with one rupee? They cannot even disband the Army with it.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** My Honourable friend is now immersed in the thought that, if we cut down this Army grant to only one rupee, as my Honourable friend Mr. Young pointed out, it will be only your countrymen who will suffer, not others. Well, what does it matter? After all, there is His Excellency the Governor General, who has the power to put right a matter, and he will do so. But apart from any frivolities, I do want you to understand that there is a very big constitutional issue involved in this vote. I know some Honourable Members will say, why practically reject the whole grant if you only want to pass a vote of censure on Government? Why don't you give a cut of Rs. 100 or Rs. 200? Well, Sir, a cut of Rs. 100 or Rs. 200 does not compel certification. I say that,

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from a constitutional point, it is the only way in which I can defeat the Government—it may be the fiction of a constitution—it is a fiction. In reality Government are irremovable, the Government are irresponsible, as you heard yesterday, in fact even the Honourable the Home Member admitted that you cannot do anything to them, they are a permanent fixture (Laughter), you can do nothing to them—I say that, in constitutional language, if I compel the Governor General to certify a grant, then in constitutional language, I have unequivocally defeated this Government, and if they have got any self-respect, they ought not to occupy those Benches. But here they will do so all the same. (Laughter.) That really is the position, and therefore I hope that my Honourable friend, Sir Abdul Qaiyum, will not hesitate on that score.

**Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum:** Hope against hope.

**Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Then, I will sit down as hopeless, and I hope there are other countrymen of mine who will walk with me into the lobby and defeat the Government. (Applause.)

(Mr. President having stood up to put the question to the House.)

**Mr. Arthur Moore (Bengal: European):** Sir, I rise to a point of order. Is it in order for an Honourable Member of this House to refer to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's statement in another place and say it is a tissue of lies? The Honourable Member should make some withdrawal.

**Mr. President:** The question is:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced to Rs. 1."

The Assembly divided:

AYES—49.

Abdoola Haroon, Haji.  
Abdul Matin Chaudhury, Maulvi.  
Abdullah Haji Kasim, Khan Bahadur  
Haji.  
Acharya, Mr. M. K.  
Aney, Mr. M. S.  
Ayyangar, Mr. K. V. Rangaswami.  
Bhargava, Pandit Thakur Das.  
Chaman Lall, Diwan.  
Chetty, Mr. R. K. Shanmukham.  
Das, Mr. B.  
Dutt, Mr. Amar Nath.  
Farookhi, Mr. Abdul Latif Saheb.  
Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Raja.  
Gour, Sir Hari Singh.  
Gulab Singh, Sardar.  
Haji, Mr. Sarabhai Nemchand.  
Hyder, Dr. L. K.  
Ismail Khan, Mr. Muhammad.  
Iswar Saran, Munshi.  
Javakar, Mr. M. R.  
Jehangir, Sir Cowasji.  
Jinnah, Mr. M. A.  
Kelkar, Mr. N. C.  
Kunzru, Pandit Hirday Nath.  
Lal, Mr. Hari Prashad.

Leichand Navalrai, Mr.  
Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan.  
Mitra, Mr. S. C.  
Mody, Mr. H. P.  
Moonje, Dr. B. S.  
Mukhtar Singh, Mr.  
Munshi, Mr. Jehangir K.  
Murtuza Saheb Bahadur, Maulvi  
Sayyid.  
Neogy, Mr. K. C.  
Pandya, Mr. Vidya Sagar.  
Patil, Rao Bahadur B. L.  
Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Sir.  
Rahimtulla, Mr. Fazal Ibrahim.  
Rang Behari Lal, Lala.  
Rao, Mr. G. Sarvotham.  
Reddi, Mr. T. N. Ramakrishna.  
Shafee Daoodi, Maulvi Mohammad.  
Shah Nawaz, Mian Mohammad.  
Singh, Kumar Rananjaya.  
Singh, Mr. Gaya Prasad.  
Sitaramaraju, Mr. B.  
Talatuley, Mr. S. D.  
Yakub, Maulvi Muhammad.  
Zulfqar Ali Khan, Sir.

## NOES—44.

Abdul Aziz, Khan Bahadur Mian.  
 Abdul Qaiyum, Nawab Sir Sahibzada.  
 Alexander, Mr. W.  
 Banarji, Mr. Rajnarayan.  
 Baum, Mr. E. F.  
 Chatterjee, The Revd. J. C.  
 Coatman, Mr. J.  
 Cocke, Sir Hugh.  
 Cosgrave, Mr. W. A.  
 Crawford, Colonel J. D.  
 Crerar, The Honourable Sir James.  
 Crosthwaite, Mr. H. S.  
 Dalal, Dr. R. D.  
 Ferrers, Mr. V. M.  
 French, Mr. J. C.  
 Gidney, Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J.  
 Gwynne, Mr. C. W.  
 Hamilton, Mr. K. L. B.  
 Heathcote, Mr. L. V.  
 Hira Singh, Brar, Sardar Bahadur,  
 Honorary Captain.  
 Howell, Mr. E. B.  
 Jawahar Singh, Sardar Bahadur  
 Sardar.

Kikabhai Premchand, Mr.  
 Lindsay, Sir Darcy.  
 Mitra, The Honourable Sir Bhupendra  
 Nath.  
 Mitter, The Honourable Sir Brojendra.  
 Monteath, Mr. J.  
 Moore, Mr. Arthur.  
 Mukherjee, Rai Bahadur S. C.  
 Noyce, Sir Frank.  
 Pai, Mr. A. Upendra.  
 Parsons, Mr. A. A. L.  
 Rainy, The Honourable Sir George.  
 Rajah, Rao Bahadur M. C.  
 Rau, Mr. H. Shankar.  
 Sahi, Mr. Ram Prashad Narayan.  
 Sams, Mr. H. A.  
 Schuster, The Honourable Sir George.  
 Scott, Mr. J. Ramsay.  
 Slater, Mr. S. H.  
 Sykes, Mr. E. F.  
 Tin Tut, Mr.  
 Yamin Khan, Mr. Muhammad.  
 Young, Mr. G. M.

The motion was adopted.

**Mr. President:** The question is:

"That a sum not exceeding Re. 1 be granted to the Governor General in Council to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1931, in respect of 'Army Department'."

(On Mr. President declaring for the "Noes", some Honourable Members on the Opposition Benches maintained that "the Ayes have it".)

**Mr. President:** The Honourable Members should have challenged a division at the proper time. I have already declared the result. The "Noes" have it.

The motion was negatived.

The Assembly then adjourned till Eleven of the Clock on Monday, the 10th March, 1930.