

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DEBATES

THURSDAY, 14th MARCH, 1929.

Vol. I—No. 28

OFFICIAL REPORT



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LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

Thursday, 14th March, 1929.

The Assembly met in the Assembly Chamber of the Council House at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. President in the Chair.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

REPORT OF THE FLETCHER COMMITTEE ON THE SCHEME FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE AT DEHRA DUN.

1054. ***Mr. M. S. Aney:** (a) Will Government be pleased to state what action they propose to take on the Report of the Fletcher Committee?

(b) Will Government be pleased to state whether they invited any professional or academic opinion on the recommendations of the Fletcher Committee before they placed the scheme for the establishment of a Central Medical Research Institute at Dehra Dun before the Standing Finance Committee, at its meeting held on 29th August, 1928?

Mr. G. S. Bajpai: (a) The Government of India have approved in principle the recommendation for the establishment of a Central Medical Research Institute at Dehra Dun, but the details are still under consideration.

(b) The Fletcher Committee framed their recommendations after visiting most of the important centres of medical education and research in India, where they discussed the questions referred to them with those competent to express an opinion. The Government of India, on receipt of the Report, further consulted their technical advisers before formulating the proposals. It was not considered necessary to circulate the Report for eliciting further professional or academic opinion.

Mr. B. Das: Will the Honourable Member tell me why they have particularly selected a town in the United Provinces to have a Central Medical Research Institute, and how is it that every institute of the Central Government is located at Dehra Dun and why not any other town of any other province?

Mr. G. S. Bajpai: Because of the superiority of the United Provinces over every other province in India, not excluding Bihar and Orissa.

Mr. B. Das: Is it because the Honourable Member happens to have come from the United Provinces himself?

Mr. President: Order, order. Mr. Aney.

COST OF INSTITUTION BUILDING AND RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS FOR THE MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE AT DEHRA DUN.

1055. ***Mr. M. S. Aney**: Will the Government be pleased to state:

(a) the total amount it will have to spend for making the structural alterations to the buildings at Chandbagh to accommodate the new institution and the construction of residential quarters for the staff?

(b) the amount spent on the above items during the year 1928-29?

Mr. G. S. Bajpai: (a) Government will not have to spend anything on making structural alterations at Chandbagh. This expenditure will fall on the Indian Research Fund Association.

(b) Nil.

PROTESTS AGAINST THE TRANSFER TO THE NEW CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OF A PORTION OF THE ANNUAL GRANT MADE TO THE INDIAN RESEARCH FUND ASSOCIATION.

1056. ***Mr. M. S. Aney**: (a) Is it a fact that the Government propose to reduce the annual grant of Rs. 7,50,000 from the Central revenues to the Indian Research Fund Association to Rs. 1,86,000 and utilise the amount thus saved for the upkeep and maintenance of the Central Medical Research Institute as soon as that Institute will begin to function?

(b) Has the attention of Government been drawn to the observations made by Lieut.-Col. Acton, the Director of the Calcutta School of Tropical Medicine and Institute of Hygiene in his report for 1928 against the proposals of the Government to reduce the annual grant to the Indian Research Fund Association in the interests of the Central Medical Research Institute, and the adverse effects it is likely to have on the research work carried on in the provinces?

(c) Is it a fact that the Bombay Medical Union has submitted a representation with a copy of seven resolutions expressing its opinion on the scheme placed by the Government before the meeting of the Standing Finance Committee on 29th August, 1928?

(d) Will Government be pleased to state what action they have already taken or propose to take in the matter?

Mr. G. S. Bajpai: (a) Yes, but this arrangement merely involves a change of venue and control in respect of certain inquiries, which are now carried on by the Indian Research Fund Association, and not a cessation of those activities. The Association, together with their income from interest on investments, will still have a sum of Rs. 3'63 lakhs per annum for aiding research by other agencies, or for conducting research themselves. I would add that even the change of control will involve little more than the co-ordination of the inquiries in question by one director; the Indian Research Fund Association will continue to be the principal guiding authority for research.

(b) Yes, but Lieutenant-Colonel Acton's remarks are answered by the reply just given by me to part (a) of the question.

(c) Yes.

(d) The representation of the Bombay Medical Union, referred to by the Honourable Member, is under consideration.

RECRUITMENT OF STAFF FOR THE CENTRAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

1057. ***Mr. M. S. Aney:** (a) Are Government aware that there is a strong feeling in the Indian medical profession against the recommendation of the Fletcher Committee to reserve a very large proportion on the cadre of appointments in the Central Medical Research Institute for members of the Indian Medical Service?

(b) Will Government be pleased to state whether they propose to reconsider their proposal to appoint Assistant Professors on the extremely low salary of Rs. 400 p. m., as against the salary of Rs. 2,500 to the Professors, in order to secure competent and qualified Indians to take up the research work as Assistant Professors and to replace the foreign professional staff at an early date?

Mr. G. S. Bajpai: (a) The point has been raised in the representation received from the Bombay Medical Union. The Fletcher Committee did not recommend reservation for the Indian Medical Service of any new posts that may be added to the cadre of the Medical Research Department. Their remark merely referred to the number of appointments in the Department which are already reserved for members of that Service. It is not proposed to reserve any new posts, that may be created in pursuance of the recommendations of that Committee, for members of the Indian Medical Service.

(b) The Honourable Member is presumably referring to the proposed Public Health Institute, Calcutta. The matter is already under consideration.

AMOUNTS OF SILVER COINS WITHDRAWN FROM CIRCULATION AT CALCUTTA AND BOMBAY IN CERTAIN PERIODS.

1058. ***Mr. M. S. Aney:** Will the Government be pleased to state how much silver coin was withdrawn from circulation during the year 1928-29, giving their figures for the mints at Calcutta and Bombay separately for each month of the financial year with the reasons for the same?

The Honourable Sir George Schuster: In statements which I have made on other occasions in this Assembly, I have explained that the public interest does not permit me to give any information which could serve to disclose the amount of silver sold by the Government. I am, for this reason, not at liberty to give the Honourable Member the figures for which he asks. But I may explain that the receipts of uncurrent coin at the Mints have increased considerably since the 1st July, 1928, as from that date silver rupees minted in or before 1876 are being withdrawn from circulation, when received at treasuries and currency offices, and treated as uncurrent coin, the object being to obtain a supply of silver for the refinery in Bombay, and at the same time to improve the quality of the coinage in circulation.

RESTORATION TO THE BUDDHISTS OF INDIA, BURMA AND CEYLON OF THE BUDDHA GAYA TEMPLE.

1059. ***U. Tok Kyi:** (a) Is it a fact that H. E. the Governor General, on his recent visit to Burma, gave a promise to the deputation of the Shwedagon Pagoda Trustees that he would look into the question of the Buddha Gaya Temple?

(b) If so, will Government be pleased to state what they propose to do with a view to its restoration to the Buddhists of India, Burma and Ceylon?

The Honourable Mr. J. Orerar: (a) I have no information to this effect.

(b) Consequently does not arise.

REFUSAL OF PERMISSION TO THE DAUGHTER OF EX-KING THEEBAW OF BURMA TO VISIT MANDALAY.

1060. *U. Tok Kyi: (a) Is it a fact that Government have refused permission to the fourth Princess, daughter of the late Ex-King Theebaw, to visit Mandalay? If so, will Government be pleased to give the reason why?

(b) Are Government aware that Mr. J. N. Manook, Officer in charge of the Burmese Royal Family, is not on good terms with the Princesses? Do Government propose to appoint another man in his place?

(c) What is his pay and out of which funds is it drawn?

Sir Denys Bray: I am inquiring from the Local Government and will let the Honourable Member know the result.

STATEMENT OF BUSINESS.

The Honourable Mr. J. Orerar (Leader of the House): Sir, I desire, with your permission, to make a statement as to the probable course of business during the week beginning on Monday, the 18th March.

Monday the 18th, Tuesday the 19th, Wednesday the 20th, Thursday the 21st and Friday the 22nd are all days allotted for Government business, and it is expected that all this time will be occupied by the Finance Bill and the Public Safety Bill. The House will begin with the consideration of the Finance Bill on Monday, and, on the conclusion of the Finance Bill, will proceed to the consideration of the Public Safety Bill.

THE GENERAL BUDGET—LIST OF DEMANDS—*contd.*

SECOND STAGE—*contd.*

Expenditure charged to Revenue—contd.

DEMAND No. 38—ARMY DEPARTMENT.

The Honourable Sir George Schuster (Finance Member): Sir, I beg to move:

"That a sum not exceeding Rs. 5,36,000 be granted to the Governor General in Council to defray the charges, which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1930, in respect of 'Army Department'."

Entire Army Policy and the Establishment of Military Colleges in India.

Mr. C. S. Ranga Iyer (Rohilkund and Kumaon Division: Non-Muhamadan Rural): Sir, I beg to move the motion which stands against my name:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 5,35,000."

Against this cut I have put in brackets "For the consideration of the entire Army policy and the establishment of Military Colleges in India".

Sir, this House passed a Resolution long ago that a military college should be established in India. Two or three years after, the then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, who had accepted the Resolution at the time, came and explained that, at the time when he accepted the Resolution for the establishment of a military college in this country, he was not aware of the tactics or ways of this House. He said he was caught napping, and added that he proposed to proceed in future rather warily, and he further stated that he was of opinion that the practicability of establishing a military college in this country would have to be considered.

Sir, that was a little going back on the original position which the Assembly had adopted. The Assembly was willing to go back by way of a compromise just to accommodate His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. After that, Sir, came the appointment of what is known as the Skeen Committee, presided over by that distinguished soldier, whom last year Mr. Jinnah truly described as a very conscientious soldier—no more conscientious soldier lived in the British Empire. He, as the President of the Committee named after him, recommended, along with the other members unanimously, the establishment of a military college in this country. He did not want the immediate establishment of a military college; all that the Skeen Committee wanted was the establishment of a military college in the year 1933. In the meantime they wanted the taking of necessary steps towards the establishment of a military college. Last year, however, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief informed this House that they had rejected the recommendation, so far as the establishment of a military college was concerned. The Army Secretary, in his speech, gave reasons that, if the members of the Skeen Committee were unanimous in regard to the establishment of a military college, on the side of the Government also there had been a certain amount of unanimity in regard to the non-establishment of a military college. He quoted the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the War Office, the soldiers and the staff and so on and so forth. The military world was unanimous according to him in regard to the non-establishment of a military college. Therefore it is a question according to him of unanimity *versus* unanimity. But I think the unanimity of the members of the Sandhurst Committee was arrived at after inquiry into certain conditions which they were face to face with and which they investigated, after a study of the working of the military colleges and things in other countries and in other parts of the world. After that investigation, the Committee, produced a document, and that document was turned down by military experts, because it did not suit them. I shall not immediately go into the reasons for turning down the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee, but I shall say that the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee, so far as I am concerned, did not suit them. I also know that the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee as far as the Indian public were concerned, did not satisfy them. The position of the Indian public has always been what you, Sir, took up when you were on the Opposition Front Benches. I have not got your speech before me, but I remember you said, in one of your speeches, what India wanted was, not one military college, but several military colleges,—in fact each Province must have a military college. I know that this might be considered an extreme view by the Treasury Benches, but I consider that it is not an extreme view at all, if

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they understand the spirit of the Montagu announcement, which the other day the Honourable the Home Member stated to us that the Government were going to interpret most correctly.

That announcement of Mr. Montagu applied not only to the Central Government but also to the Provinces. That announcement, Sir, applied not only to political affairs but also to the military affairs. That announcement, Sir, concerned itself with the matter of self-government, and can there be self-government, or progressive realisation of responsible government, without a progressive realisation of responsibility also in the matter of self-defence? This is a point which has been conceded by every competent thinker and writer, every competent authority on the side of the Government themselves. This is a position which was accepted by Lord Rawlinson himself. In one of his notes which are recorded in a recent book, quotations from which appeared very widely in the Press, Lord Rawlinson said:

"The trouble is that the solution of the political problem, in so far as self-government is concerned, is and must always be, directly dependent upon the military problem, that is to say, it is impossible to envisage a self-governing India without an Indianised Army. The process of the Indianisation of the Army must proceed extremely slowly if it is not to prove a complete failure."

Before discussing this aspect of the process, proceeding extremely slowly lest it should prove a failure. I want to put it to the House, I want to put it to the Treasury Benches, and through them to the Government of India and Whitehall, I want to put it to them, whether they mean to promote the progressive realisation of responsible government in India. If they mean it, as the Honourable the Home Member told us he meant it, if they are sincere, as the Honourable the Home Member told us they were sincere, this is the time for them to prove their sincerity, and the only way in which that sincerity could be proved is to accept the very moderate and the very modest recommendations of the Skeen Committee. In regard to the establishment of a military college in India, the House knows the recommendations of the Skeen Committee in this essential respect. I would refer first to the so-called military college in Dehra Dun, which, as we are all aware, is not a military college except in name. It is only a preparatory public school. The Dehra Dun school is a very good institution; I had an opportunity, like other Honourable Members of this House, to visit that institution. But, I say, Sir, that the Government should here and now promise to this House that similar preparatory public schools, preparatory military schools, whatever you call them, should be established in every province in India. Each province must have a school like the Dehra Dun public school. That is absolutely essential if the Montagu announcement is to be interpreted in the spirit in which it was made. I am today interpreting that announcement as the Government would like to interpret it, namely, according to the letter and spirit. I know there is a section of opinion in this country which does not accept the Montagu announcement, but let us all accept, for the time being, the Montagu announcement, and accepting that announcement, I say, that the Government have not, so far as the fundamental question before this House is concerned, interpreted it in the proper light. The Skeen Committee interpreted it by recommending gradual Indianisation, progressive Indianisation. For what are their recommendations relating

to Indianisation? It should go at such a slow, such a uniform and at such a progressive rate that, by the year 1952, there would be in the Indian Army half and half of Indian and European officers. That was what the Skeen Committee recommended. When they recommended it, they had in view the Montagu announcement, and similarly they did not want the immediate establishment of a military college. They wanted the establishment of a military college in 1933.

I say, Sir, that the Government have not fulfilled the Montagu announcement in regard to this matter. I expect the Government should change their attitude in this respect. The policy that has actuated the Government, the policy that has animated Whitehall, that has animated the War Office, which is really, so far as military matters are concerned the chief authority, the policy of the Government of India, is contained in the observations of the Esher Committee, which are quite familiar to the House. They, Sir, have not accepted the spirit of the Montagu announcement in regard to the progressive Indianisation of the military service and the Army and also in regard to the establishment of a military college in India, which means as I said, the simultaneous establishment of preparatory military public schools in every province in India. The spirit in which the Montagu announcement is interpreted will be familiar to this House as evidenced by a letter which was written in connection with certain propositions of Lord Rawlinson. This is what Sir Henry Wilson entered in his diary:

"At five o'clock, I got an S. O. S. from Philip Chetwode, who reported a wire just received to me from Rawly, which said that, in spite of his most strenuous opposition, the Viceroy in Council had ordered a reduction of British troops by four battalions and two cavalry regiments. Rawly says this is 'madness' and asks for my help. I have wired to Philip to go to Montagu and to find out whether I am, or am not, his military adviser; and I told Philip not to be put off by being told that this was a matter of internal economy, to be decided by the Viceroy in Council, because the internal security in India, the protection of her frontiers, the power to send troops to countries outside her frontiers such as Mesopotamia, Burma, Singapore and Hongkong, and finally the obligation on Home Government to reinforce India in case of necessity were all matters interwoven in Imperial strategy and therefore under me.

I wonder what Philip will get as an answer. As I said a week ago, when writing to Rawly, Montagu and Chelmsford have set up a Council with a lot of natives on it and have lost control, and now they dare not impose the extra taxation necessary. This same Council will, before long, refuse to allow Indian native troops to serve outside of India!"

Then follows a mark of exclamation. Sir, that is the spirit in which the Montagu announcement has been interpreted.

When they refer to the other aspect, the aspect of Indianisation, what do the Sandhurst Committee recommend in regard to it? In the first place, they wanted to abolish racial discrimination in the Army, and that racial discrimination, Sir, was represented as nothing more and nothing less than Indianisation by units. They wanted to abandon the eight unit scheme, and they have given their reasons for the same; the House also has given its reason, and the Government also have given their reasons. Sir, this is not the practice in brown colonies of other white Empires. England is not the only country which has got brown colonies. Lord Rawlinson says that you will find quite a different policy in Morocco. The policy there is quite a different one from that adopted by the British Government, a policy which should be attractive to the British recruits in

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England, but will not be attractive to the Indian students in India aspiring for a military career. For, Sir, who will care, under the circumstances, for any one of these units? As a matter of fact, these Indianised units in the Army are known as pariah units. They are most unpopular with the students in India and with the Indian sepoys. When they join units, the soldiers or Indian sepoys have an idea that one day they will rise to the position of a Subedar or a Subedar-Major. This privilege is excluded from the Indian units, for the very simple reason that their place is taken by the Commissioned officers. Not only have these units no attraction for them but the Indian officers are being looked upon as usurpers of their place. So far as the British officers are concerned, why should they be segregated from the Indian officers or *vice versa*?

Sir, we were told definitely by the Army Secretary last year that the English students, who are aspiring for an army career, will not care for an Indian Army if they are to serve under Indian officers. That is the crux of the question. If the Government change or alter the present position, then there will not be any recruits or officers from England for the Indian Army. That is the position which the Army Secretary placed before this House. Sir, I do not think it can be true. At any rate, that is not my reading of the British students in England. I do not think they are animated by racial bias or racial prejudice. I refuse to take that interpretation from the Army Secretary. I say, Sir, that the modern English students in England are not actuated by these petty considerations. I think they believe in their country's mission and I also think that there is no dearth of English students in England, who would like to come to India to fulfil a mission. At any rate, that used to be the case when some of the great writers on India proudly said that Britain had a mission in India; and if what the Army Secretary says is true, then I can only say that that mission has been abandoned. I can only say then that the claims that have often been made that England has a mission are not correct. I refuse to accept that. I do not think English students take such a narrow or petty view. On the other hand, I think it is the view of the Military Department, from the War Office downwards to the Military Department in India. That is not the view, Sir, of the British students in England. At any rate, the Indian view has not been tried; you first try it. See if the English students are not offering themselves for a career in India, and if they are not, then you can say that the English students are not forthcoming and therefore you abandon your policy. But what is the use of libelling these English students as being so full of racial bias?

Sir, one word more, and I have done, and that is in regard to the Imperial aspect of the Indian Army. In Canada, in Australia and in other Colonies, it was customary for Great Britain to bear the burden of the Army. Those were days when the Colonies were not free, just as the present position is in India. I say, even in those days, Great Britain used to bear the burden of the Army. And when the Colonies were liberated, they were asked to bear the burden themselves. A Resolution was passed in the House of Commons in 1862 that Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibilities; and they did undertake the main responsibilities. The position in India, however, is that the Imperial Government does not pay a farthing for the cost of the Indian Army, and yet it is not an Indian but an Imperial force.

Sir, I need not burden my speech with quotations from some of the prominent British statesmen in the last century and in this, who have objected to India being burdened with a part of the British forces in India just for Imperial purposes. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the late Lord Randolph Churchill, to mention only two great men of England belonging to opposite schools, have held identical views on this matter. India certainly does not ask the British to clear out, bag and baggage, but India does ask that Indians should be trained, should be given an opportunity for training, so that, if not by midnight of the 31st of December, 1929, at least at some distant date, say 1953, according to the Skeen Committee, Indians will be able to boss at least one half of the Army and India will be able to say that they have got their own officers, who are competent to look after the question of the self-defence. There can be no responsible self-government without self-defence, and there can be no Home Rule without home-defence. What India wants is that Indians should be trained in the art of self-defence; and, Sir, this opportunity has not been granted in a generous spirit. If the present method of Government were to continue, it would take several years before India could be in a position to defend herself. Sir, I do not want the British Government in India to adopt the same policy as their own rulers once adopted in a far-off century, into which perhaps the lights of history hesitate to penetrate. I refer, Sir, to the period when Great Britain was under Roman rule, when Roman imperialism was doing good to Great Britain. In those days the same policy that is adopted here now was adopted then by them. In those days the Britons were not trained and they could not defend themselves; and when the Roman Empire was splintered and doomed and when the Roman legions were withdrawn, the ancient Britons—every student of history knows—appealed to their Roman masters not to go away, because the "devil" was pushing them into the "deep sea." That is what they said. I do not think it is the mission of British Rule in India that, to use Lord Birkenhead's phrase, when England's Empire is "splintered in doom", India should be in the position in which the Romans left the Britons. Therefore, Sir, I want them to abandon the policy of distrust. It is purely a policy of distrust, this refusal to the Indian people, in peace-time, of opportunities which the Government were willing to grant in war-time. Who does not know of the Indore College? Who does not know how many young men were trained as officers, trained to take their place on the battlefields of Flanders and elsewhere? If they could do that in war-time why should their policy change in peace time? If an emergency college, set up during war-time could train them to take their place in the battlefields of Europe, why should not the people have the same opportunity for taking their proper place today? Why should not there be a steady preparation of India for her place in the Empire? It has been said—His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief last year said something to that effect—that Indians make very good soldiers, but not good commanders. He gave his own reasons for thinking so. I will not go into those reasons. I, Sir, would speak from facts. He spoke perhaps from experience, but I speak from facts, the experience of people who have recorded what happened during the War. In his introduction to "The Indian Corps in France" Lord Curzon observed:

"The Indian Army in fact has always possessed, and has been proud of possessing, a triple function;"

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and one of these was that,

"India has for long been one of the most important units in the scheme of British Imperial defence, providing the British Government with a striking force always ready, of admirable efficiency and assured valour."

That fact, Sir, was proved in war-time; and Lord Birkenhead speaks, in one of his writings, of the "monotonous heroism" of the Indian soldier. He says that:

"The story of the Indian soldier's deeds in Flanders was one of almost monotonous heroism. How the Indian soldier or non-commissioned officer took the place of the British officers who had fallen and how he led the Indian soldiers has been told in various contemporary accounts of the battles in which the Indian troops were engaged."

The answer to the charge of incapacity of the Indian for military leadership is that the charge is not well founded and that, if there is any truth in the accusation, it is due to the manner in which it has been sedulously fostered by the system of training to which the sepoy has been subjected. Military leadership is as much the result of training, opportunity and education as of natural aptitude.

And, Sir, on the question of natural aptitude, I would draw the attention of the Treasury Benches to the condition in which India was before the advent of British rule from the military point of view. What was her condition? British historians speak of India's conquest by Great Britain. Sir, another historian says India was conquered by India's sword; but I am prepared to accept the original proposition of British historians, who say that India was conquered by Great Britain. They would not have had to fight their battles if there were no soldiers in India. They won the battles. But where are our soldiers to-day? Why should you ask the Government to confine their recruitment only to selected areas and selected classes? There were soldiers of old in the Madras Presidency, there were soldiers in the Nizam's Dominions, there were soldiers everywhere, including Bengal. What has happened to these soldiers? Sir, the policy of the Government has been a policy of not giving opportunities to the middle classes on the ground that they are not efficient, but of restricting these opportunities to certain selected classes and areas. This policy must be abandoned. India must have her opportunity. If the Montagu announcement is going to be interpreted by the Government in the spirit in which it was conceived, India must certainly have her chance of creating an Army of her own. Mistrust, on the part of Government, I admit is inevitable, because it is a foreign Government, alien in creed, in language, in customs; but the Montagu announcement clearly proved that it no longer considered India as alien but as belonging to the British Empire. Therefore a policy based on distrust, this ancient policy of which you have such abundant proofs in the Report of the Peel Commission and in other documents must go. That policy of distrust existed before the great Indian Mutiny (which my Honourable friend Diwan Chaman Lal would no doubt describe as "the Indian War of Independence"); that policy continued during 1857 and after the Mutiny. But now that the Government have opened a new era, and the proof of it is that we are present in this House to carry out a new policy, what I ask is how long are the Government going to deal with us as we were dealt with in the days of the Peel Commission of 1858-59 or the Eden Commission of 1870, when the sole consideration was to prevent a recurrence

of rebellion and to overawe the armies of the Feudatory States. Now the Government have proof that, so far as Indians are concerned, they do not desire that England's calamity should be India's opportunity. The Government have proof of what Indians did during the War, and is it not proper, in these circumstances, Sir, that the Government should rise equal to the occasion? I say that the Government have not risen equal to the occasion. A united, a unanimous, Report was produced by a Committee in which their own men were present, and in the selection of whose members Indians in this House had no voice. That report was turned down and still the ancient policy of wholesale disarmament of the civil population, the ancient policy of demartializing the people, and the principle of confining military training to certain areas and classes, still continues. Sir, this exclusion of the middle classes and other classes from the legitimate aspiration of an Army career should cease. I need not refer here to the policy of the Government which is responsible for turning the swords of the soldiers of Indian States into plough-shares. Sufficient unto the day are the troubles of British India.

Sir, I must here mention one of the chief criticisms made on the South African War. President Lowell says:

"One of the chief criticisms related to the lack of initiative and of capacity to assume responsibility on the part of officers both in the War Office and in the field."

That is what President Lowell says, and that is also the charge that is levelled against the bulk of Indians to justify their exclusion from an Army career. Of course the Army Member—this House has not one at present; I hope it will have at one time or another, sooner or later—I mean the Army Secretary may not like that expression. He will not say it is exclusion, he will say "cautious progress"; but, Sir, it is tantamount to the exclusion of the middle classes. Sir, I hope that the Honourable Members on the Treasury Benches or the Army Secretary will tell this House how they propose to revise their policy. Lord Rawlinson stated in 1921 that, as soon as funds become available, steps will be taken to establish in India a Military College such as Sandhurst. I am sure if the Honourable the Finance Member were to come to this House and ask for money for the establishment of a military college in India, every section of this House would generously support him and grant double the amount of money he wanted. Therefore he need not, so far as the question of funds is concerned, hesitate. With these few words, Sir, I bring my observations to a close.

Mr. President: I suppose Members probably desire that the Army Secretary should, at this stage, make a statement. Is that the reason why no Member rises to speak?

(The Army Secretary then rose in his seat.)

Mr. G. M. Young (Army Secretary): Sir, I find myself in a somewhat novel position to-day. On the two previous occasions on which I had the honour of addressing this House in regard to military policy on the occasion of the Army Department grant, it was my task to rise at the end of a long debate, and answer various questions which were put to me by Honourable Members who had spoken, presumably with the object of

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eliciting information. I do not know if I may now assume that Honourable Members require no further information about the policy of Government in relation to the Army and Army expenditure. I must therefore, make my speech more or less as a matter of guess work, answering the questions which I think Honourable Members would have been likely to put, if they had got up to speak.

The first point that I should like to touch on is a new feature in the military budget this year. As Honourable Members are aware, the level of military expenditure has been provisionally fixed, for a total period of four years, of which three remain, at 55 crores and 10 lakhs. Some Honourable Members, in speaking in the general discussion on the budget, seemed to regard this as a fixation of the level of military expenditure for all time, although the arrangement was quite clearly explained by the Honourable the Finance Member. It is, Sir, by no means so. On the contrary, it is a direct and a very practical step towards the further progressive reduction of military expenditure. As Honourable Members will remember, some time ago, the Commander-in-Chief and the late Finance Member informed the House on more than one occasion that there was no prospect of military expenditure being reduced in the near future, but that there was a prospect of its being increased. That second prospect, Sir, no longer threatens us. The reason is that we have now entered upon this arrangement of a fixed budget, within which the military authorities themselves will finance the urgent expenditure which is needed for re-equipping the Army. At the end of that period, three years from now there is, as the Honourable the Finance Member has said, a definite prospect of a substantial reduction in expenditure. What is happening now is that, besides the control of the Finance Department over military expenditure, the military authorities themselves are exercising a further control. I should hesitate to say which is the more rigorous of the two. All I know is that high military officials at Army Headquarters frequently tell me now-a-days that they have the utmost difficulty in getting the consent of their brother officers to certain items of expenditure which they wish to incur. Their difficulty is, I think, almost equal to the difficulty which I experience, once a year, in inducing Honourable Members of this House to let me have some money for the Army Department. The Honourable the Finance Member has acknowledged gratefully the manner in which the Army authorities are co-operating with the Finance Department in economising and preventing waste. My friend, Col. Crawford, made a very interesting suggestion the other day, that some lectures might be given to staff officers, or at the Staff College, about the financial position of the country, so that the Army might take a closer interest in the finances of the country, and the relation of military expenditure to them. Well, Sir, he will probably be interested to learn that it was very much in that way that the economy campaign was started. Lectures were given, which did endeavour to interest military officers in that very matter. The result of the campaign is that, whereas two years ago the then Finance Member and the Commander-in-Chief could only inform the House that there was no prospect of a decrease in military expenditure, and that, on the other hand, there was a prospect of increase, the present Finance Member has been able to tell the House that there will be, after another three years, the probability of a substantial reduction in military expenditure. That

change of position is due to the new arrangement which has been introduced, and to the co-operation of the military authorities. My Honourable friend, Mr. Birla, found nothing to commend in this. He said, in effect:

“If the Army authorities can now find something like two crores of rupees out of their ordinary allotment to finance the re-equipment of the Army, it only shows that there must have been a most appalling waste up till now.”

Well, Sir, there is a degree of truth in that way of putting it. But I should like the House to know that the finding of this amount of money has not been an easy matter. It has been a matter of much consideration and very hard work. I would also like to suggest that, if every attempt at economy and every substantial reduction of expenditure is to be greeted by a criticism of that kind, it is not very encouraging to further efforts. The Army do deserve, I think, credit for having made these economies possible.

Now, Sir, I turn to a subject which I am sure Honourable Members would have spoken on at length if they had spoken before me, and that is the Indian Sandhurst Committee's Report. I have always found it difficult to understand why those critics of Government, who were prepared to accept the Report of the Indian Sandhurst Committee, find that the proposals of Government on that Report are wholly unacceptable and inadequate. In the summer of 1927, while the Government of India and their military experts were engaged upon the consideration of the Report, the word went forth that Government had entirely rejected the proposals of the Skeen Committee. On what authority that word went forth, or with what knowledge, I cannot guess, except that it could not have been from anybody who was privy to the counsels of the Government of India at that time. But that preconception, and misconception also, was established, and has prevailed ever since, even after the publication of the Government of India's proposals. Last year we had only a hurried debate, on a motion for adjournment, during which there was little time for me to give a full description of what the Government were doing, and little time also for the critics of Government to develop their arguments against what the Government were doing, or to explain fully in what respect they found the Government of India's proposals unsatisfactory. Since then not very much more has emerged; but there are two points on which more or less definite dissatisfaction has been expressed. The first is in regard to the perpetuation of the Eight Units Scheme. It is maintained by the critics of Government that that system is a form of invidious segregation, and that Indians do not care to serve in these units. My experience, such as it is, is that, when these units were started, there was a tendency to look down on them, as there always is a tendency to look down on something new. But that tendency is rapidly disappearing, if it has not already disappeared. Apart from that, as a practical measure, Indianisation by units is far more efficacious, and far more rapid, than Indianisation by individuals could ever be. As I think I told the House last year, the units that are being Indianised will be fully Indianised within 22 or 28 years from the time that they were set apart for Indianisation. Under the Skeen Committee's proposals, if the necessary candidates were forthcoming, you would have the whole of the Indian Army officered, half by Indians and half by Englishmen, by 1952. But no single regiment would

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be officered entirely by Indians by that time or for many years after that date. Therefore, Sir, it seems to me that, in the principle of the Eight Units system, you have a more rapid and efficacious method of Indianisation than you would have under the proposals of the Indian Sandhurst Committee. The other direct criticism of the Government of India's decision on the Skeen Committee's Report is in regard to the establishment of an Indian military college. Those who complain against Government forget that the Committee recommended the establishment of this college in 1933; by which time, they said, the number of candidates coming forward and qualifying would be more than Sandhurst in England could accommodate, and at the same time sufficient to justify the creation of a military college in India. As I said last year, the Government of India accept the principle of this proposal. When the time does come, and there are more qualified candidates available in India than can be accommodated in Sandhurst, and when there are enough qualified candidates in India to justify the establishment of such a college, that college will undoubtedly be established. The Skeen Committee, as we know, laid down a time-table for Indianisation by a progressive increase in number of the vacancies to be offered to Indians, subject, of course, to candidates passing in those numbers. It is no use offering 40 vacancies in one year if you get only, say, 17 candidates. The Government of India, in accepting the initial recommendations of the Committee for doubling the existing number of vacancies at Sandhurst, had in mind the argument of the Committee that this should be the first step towards attracting a larger number of qualified candidates. If it does attract a larger number—if we get in one year, I won't say 20, but nearly 20 qualified candidates—the question of a further increase in the number of vacancies is bound to arise. It is not a question of Government making a promise. The pressure of public opinion will be irresistible as soon as we get the requisite numbers of qualified candidates. At present, although we are allowed to carry over from year to year the vacancies which have been unfilled the year before, even so we do not get the whole number. There has never been a single year up to now in which ten candidates have passed into Sandhurst, and ten out again. Well, Sir, as I have said, when we get to the stage, mentioned by the Committee, although we do not prophesy that that is going to happen in 1933,—the question of establishing an Indian military college will arise.

My friend, Mr. Ranga Iyer, said that the Skeen Committee also recommended that we should take steps now towards getting this college ready in time for 1933. Well, Sir, as I shall show later, we are doing this. Before I get to that point, I should like to say something now about Viceroy's commissioned officers and soldiers of the Indian Army. Speaking the other day in the general discussion on the Budget, my friend Mr. Shah Nawaz, said, if I recollect aright, that the Kitchener College in Jullundhur was not nearly enough. I suppose he was referring to the King George's Royal Indian Military School at Jullundhur. If he was, I entirely agree with him that it is not nearly enough, and that is one of the reasons why we have a larger school of the same kind at Jhelum, and are proposing to establish yet another school of the same kind at Agra. They are not of course colleges, but schools for the education of the sons of Indian officers and men. They fulfil a very urgent need, and it is to them that we look for a

higher standard of education and efficiency in the non-commissioned officers and men of the Indian Army of the future. But besides that, we have another step in contemplation which Honourable Members may have noticed in the budget estimates. Next July there will be established a Military Training College at Nowgong. That College is going to hold about 150 students, taken from among the younger Indian officers, non-commissioned officers and men. The object is to train them up to the standard required of a platoon leader. We hope that the younger and more promising ones will proceed from there to Sandhurst, as what are called Y cadets. As Honourable Members are aware, we have a reserve for Indian officers of five cadetships a year, extensible up to ten, if there is a corresponding deficiency in the number of qualified candidates for direct commissions. I anticipate that, along this particular line, we shall get even greater expansion, and that, in time, a large number of men will obtain commissions in this way; that is to say, they will go first into the ranks as Indian officers, then they will go to this Kitchener College, which we are establishing at Nowgong, and later, they will go to Sandhurst. The College, as I have said, Sir, will be founded in July of this year. There will be three terms, each of 50 to 55 students. When the time comes to form an Indian Military College on the lines of Sandhurst, we shall have had for some years in existence an Indian Military College training young men up to the standard of platoon commander. It seems to me, Sir, with all deference to Honourable Members, that that is a better way of laying the foundations of an Indian Military College on the lines of Sandhurst than anything that has been suggested as yet.

12 NOON.

Now, Sir, I come to another burning question on which we have heard several criticisms during the general discussion of the Budget, and that is the Territorial Force. We are constantly being told that the Indian Territorial Force is of entirely insufficient strength, and we are asked, "What are 20,000 men in a country of the size of India?" Well, Sir, the force is small, but it is not yet full. We have not even got the 20,000 men; we cannot get them. We are 1,600 short in the provincial battalions. The only battalions that are full are some battalions in the North of India, where we get more or less the same class of recruit as we take for the regular Army. Now, the whole object of the Indian Territorial Force is the foundation of a national army, and the recruitment of those who belong to what are sometimes inaptly called the non-martial classes. That is the reason for the existence of the Territorial Force. Of course, while the movement is still in its infancy, it is likely that progress among those classes will be slow. That is why, as I have said, it is only those battalions which are recruited more or less from the same sources as the regular Army that are at present up to strength. But I do wish sometimes that those of our critics in this House who are leaders of public opinion, instead of merely criticising our administration of the Territorial Force and telling us that it is not nearly large enough, would do something themselves to fill up the battalions that are not yet up to strength. We cannot do more than make them available, provide the staff, and provide the money. We have done all that, and we have not yet got sufficient men. It is only by the development of the Territorial Force that we can ever reach a national army. My Honourable friend Munshi Iswar Saran the other day talked about martial and non-martial classes. He admitted that we have no distinction between them in the officer ranks of the Army. We have also no distinction in the Territorial Force, except that the Territorial Force is primarily for the non-martial classes. In the Regular Army we must still maintain the distinction

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and go on recruiting from the classes from which we have always recruited, not even from all of them, but only from the best. It is a small Army and it is absolutely essential that it should contain nothing but the best material. But I think some Honourable Members must be under a misapprehension when they talk about these non-martial and martial classes. For instance, my Honourable friend Mr. Ranga Iyer just now said, "Where are the Madras soldiers?" I do not know whether he has heard of the 1st King George's Own Madras Sappers and Miners, which is one of the finest regiments in the Army. I was told the other day that at Razmak in Waziristan the annual tug of war is regularly won by a unit of the Madras Sappers and Miners. This is a unit which, my Honourable friend would say, consists of non-martial classes. They are there, serving up at Razmak in the Frontier Army, and, as I say, regularly winning the tug of war. (Cheers.)

My Honourable friend Colonel Gidney made some criticisms in his speech during the general discussion of the Budget, and some suggestions for economy. One thing he said was that the administration of the Army Headquarters was top-heavy and that we spent too much on overhead charges. He compared us unfavourably with commercial firms, forgetting, I venture to say, that commercial firms exist for carrying on business in peace time, and that the Army exists for meeting the emergency of war. It is obvious that we must have a larger administrative establishment than a commercial firm has. All the same, we have done a good deal to reduce, and economise in, the administrative branches of the Army. At Army Headquarters we have had, as Honourable Members know, two Committees, presided over by Sir Charles Innes, which overhauled and made reductions in the officer establishment. Last year we took advantage of the presence of Mr. Heseltine in India, to get him to report on the possibility of reductions in the ministerial establishment. Mr. Heseltine was only able to investigate a small portion of the offices; but he gave us a report which contained very valuable suggestions. These suggestions have been followed up, and there is now a prospect of economies of something between two to three lakhs of rupees a year in Army Headquarters; not as much as ten per cent., I am afraid, as my Honourable friend suggested. But still it is a very considerable economy.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney (Nominated: Anglo-Indians): The personnel is increasing.

Mr. G. M. Young: My Honourable friend also made another suggestion, that we should reduce the number of Royal Army Medical Corps officers serving in India, and substitute members of the Indian Medical Department. He said that the R. A. M. C. personnel seemed to consist entirely of majors; that captains and lieutenants are kept at home and only majors are sent out here, and that we have to pay for the majors while they pay for the captains and lieutenants. As a matter of fact, if my Honourable friend looks at the British Army List, he will find that the proportion of majors to captains and lieutenants is higher in the service as a whole than it is in the Indian establishment. I admit that the proportion of majors, even in India, is high: but that is due to abnormal conditions immediately after the War. It is just the same in the officer ranks of the Indian Army, as stated by my Honourable friend, Colonel Crawford the other day. We have to face a prospect later on of an enormous number of majors, simply because officers

were recruited in very large numbers during the War and recruitment fell off, as Honourable Members know, very greatly immediately after the War. We are taking steps to meet this situation when it arises, and we have already addressed the India Office about it. The difficulty is not actually upon us at the moment, but it is one which we shall have to face later on . . .

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: For these abnormal conditions you must take abnormal measures to remedy the position.

Mr. G. M. Young: That is what we are doing. At this moment we are engaged in devising measures which will be utilized when the time comes.

My Honourable friend Colonel Crawford also referred to the Air Force, and advocated an extended use of the air arm for internal security. As I explained in answer to a question, we are getting two large troop-carrying machines for experimental purposes, and if we find that we can use such machines with greater economy and efficiency than other methods of transport, we shall certainly do something in that direction. I think that is all I have to say at present, Sir. I have endeavoured to anticipate the sort of criticisms that might be made; and if my speech has been in any way inadequate, I hope Honourable Members will forgive me, for the reason that they have as yet given me nothing to bite on.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 5,35,999."

The motion was negatived.

Indian Medical Department.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: Sir, the motion that stands in my name is:

"That the demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100,"

and the subject I wish to bring forward relates to the proposed new rates of pay to be given to the Indian Medical Department.

The Honourable the Army Secretary will, I think, bear me out when I state that, after considerable agitation, a committee was appointed to examine this matter, and the deliberations of that Committee resulted in the issuing of a circular which I believe is now before the various Provincial Governments for their opinion. I also believe, I speak subject to correction, that the revised pay to this Department has been practically agreed upon by the committee that sat on the subject. Sir, on behalf of the Indian Medical Department, I desire, on the floor of this House, to express my gratitude and to thank the Army Secretary and the Committee that went into this matter for their generosity in recommending this increased pay, but, in thanking them, I feel it my duty to bring to their notice certain very serious flaws and disadvantages embodied in this new scale. The salary recommended is Rs. 200, rising to a thousand. The maximum is only obtained by senior majors after four years' service in that rank. Now, Sir, I wonder if the Army Secretary and the Committee that inquired into this matter ever realised that, when they recommended this increase—this maximum of Rs. 1,000—it had only a paper value and that very few, if any, of the present members and new entrants would ever enjoy it. Let me explain my position. A student enters the medical college at an average age of 19 as ascertained by the average age of the last 25 4th Class M. A. Surgeons in the army list. He has to undergo a five years' training, which

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brings him to the age of 24 when he enters the Indian Medical Department. He has to perform on an average, 23 years' service before he is made a Lieutenant, which brings him to the age of 47. This can be corroborated by a reference to the army list. He has to put in on an average, $7\frac{1}{2}$ years of commissioned service before he obtains the rank of Major, which brings him to $54\frac{1}{2}$ years. This also can be corroborated by a reference to the army list. As a Major he has to put in 4 years before he can get this new maximum pay of Rs. 1,000, per month. I ask the Army Secretary how is it humanly possible for a man of $54\frac{1}{2}$ years of age to serve another four years in order to earn this maximum. He is superannuated at 55, i.e., six months after obtaining his Majority. That is the most serious drawback of these new grades of pay. I go further. Besides this impossibility of new entrants ever having enough service to their credit to secure the maximum rates of pay, I shall now show how these new rates will effect the present incumbents in the Department. Now as per army list, 1928, there are today 188 first class Assistant Surgeons, of whom 102 are in military, the balance are in civil employment. The average age of these Assistant Surgeons is about 48. A man has to serve on an average for 23 years before he is made a Lieutenant. The average age of a Lieutenant is 50. He has to put in 7-63 years of commissioned service before he becomes a Major. The average age of a Captain is $52\frac{1}{2}$. He has to put in 3-28 years of service before he attains the rank of Major. The average age of Majors is 58 and he has to serve as such for 4 years before he qualifies for Rs. 1,000 per month. Now, Sir, I ask the Army Secretary, how is it possible for any of these men to receive the benefit of the maximum pay? It seems to me physically impossible. The result is that, of the present cadre, with the average promotion to commissioned ranks of about 4, per annum, scarcely any of them will receive the benefits of the higher pay for most of them will be superannuated by then and therefore this bait of Rs. 1,000 is practically a myth. With all respect to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the Honourable Member and the Committee and with my sincere gratitude for what they have done, I say these new rates of pay are of no benefit to the senior men. It is only holding out a bait for men to remain in the Service and the practical result is one of *status quo ante* for most of the men will retire on superannuation on their present rate of pay, namely Rs. 700 a month and some on Rs. 800. Now, Sir, the new rates are offered only to those members of the Indian Medical Department in military employment, for you are suggesting the exclusion of those members who are employed in civil appointments. I hope you are not excluding those employed on Railways who only receive an extra allowance of Rs. 50—75 per month. I hope the Honourable Member realises that almost half of the cadre of the Indian Medical Department is today employed in civil and other miscellaneous appointments. Though I quite agree that a man who is employed in a civil appointment, and who is in receipt of a higher pay should not receive any additional advantage, I hope the Honourable Member does not include those who are employed in other Miscellaneous Departments, who do not receive such advantages. I should also like to know why an efficiency bar is demanded for 4th, 3rd and 2nd class M. A. Surgeons before receiving their increments. Will this apply to those in civil employment?

I do not know whether these new rates of pay have been sent to the Secretary of State for sanction, but I do urge on the Army Secretary to

realise that it is neither fair nor generous to offer a rate of pay to men when very few of them will be able to realise any benefit. I would suggest to the Army Secretary as alternatives to a time-scale promotion the following for his serious consideration—(1) The seconding of the senior men; (2) the institution of unemployed lists, the same as in the senior ranks of the Army; (3) the seconding of all men holding miscellaneous appointments; (4) temporarily increasing the commissioned ranks; (5) First Class Assistant Surgeons of 32 years' service and over to be granted a pension of a Captain. If these are not acceptable to the Army Secretary I would suggest what I have so often done, the introduction of a time-scale promotion to commissioned ranks as the only solution of a very vexed problem and grievance. You have granted this relief to the India Unattached List and the India Miscellaneous List, and in doing so you added to the military expenditure of this country a sum of over 20 lakhs and why do you deny similar relief to an equally important ancillary branch of the Army—the Indian Medical Department? You cannot compare men of the India Unattached List with the Indian Medical Department. One is comparatively less educated. The other is a fully qualified professional man. In addition you give the India Unattached List man a pay which is higher than what is given to a man in the superior railway services. Why! A Corporal in the India Unattached List with allowances gets more than a 4th Class M. A. Surgeon and even an officer in the railway superior services recruited in India. A Sergeant gets much more, whereas a Quarter Master Staff Sergeant gets something like 450 including allowances. You have done this without hesitation in the case of the India Unattached List, non-commissioned officers and departmental officers, and here you have in the Indian Medical Department Service of professional men from whom you demand a higher standard of living, a higher standard of knowledge and a higher sense of responsibility, and yet you refuse to give them not only equal treatment, but a salary which is little more than half of what the promoted soldiers from the ranks of the British Army gets in the India Unattached List. You have, moreover, given the India Unattached List a higher rate of pension, and now you recently submitted to the Secretary of State recommending a new rate of increased furlough pay for the India Unattached List.

Sir, this is the generous way in which the Army Department is treating the India Unattached List, which is an ancillary branch of the Army, the same as is the Indian Medical Service. Moreover the Indian Medical Department is attested in the same way as any British soldier and is therefore his equal as a British Officer but because it is recruited from this country the men are treated as inferiors as belonging to a lower class, and yet these very men of the Indian Medical Department are made use of as medical officers when occasions arise in the British Army in India.

Sir, I have given this matter prolonged and careful consideration and I believe the only way of getting over this very difficult question—a question which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Secretary realise has been agitating the entire Department—is to introduce a time-scale of promotion in the commissioned ranks. This is the only way by which new entrants will be able to enjoy the new rates of pay now under consideration. Might I, for his information, suggest what I would consider to be a reasonable remedy for this absolute impasse created by the present system? I would suggest for the consideration of the Army Secretary the following time-scale promotion:—(1) A First Class Assistant Surgeon, after 20 years' service, to receive Rs. 500 per month as suggested in

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the new rates. (2) A First Class Assistant-Surgeon, on completion of 22 years of service, to be made a Lieutenant on Rs. 650. (3) On completion of 25 years service, i.e., 3 years' service as Lieutenant he should be made Captain on Rs. 750. (4) After 2 years' service as a Captain, he should be made a Major on Rs. 850. (5) Major after one year's service Rs. 900. (6) Major after 2 years' service Rs. 950. (7) Major after three years' service Rs. 1,000. If you apply this time-scale to the average age at which a student enters college and the Department, you will find that he has just time enough to put in 4 years as a Major in order to receive the maximum pay of Rs. 1,000, that is to say, before he is 55 years of age for he will thereby have a chance of serving 4 years as a Major and obtaining the benefit of the new rates, otherwise it is absolutely impossible for him to benefit by the proposed new rates. I know that some of the present Majors will enjoy these benefits, but you must remember that these men entered the service at a much younger age than today with the demand of a Senior Cambridge qualification. The new rates of pay are generous to the 4th, 3rd and 2nd class Assistant Surgeons, but are distinctly un-generous to the senior men, and it is the senior men you want to retain in your Department.

I hope the Army Secretary will give this matter his early and personal consideration, and so remedy what I consider to be a serious, though unintentional, error or miscalculation on the part of the Committee that sat on this matter.

Mr. G. M. Young: Sir, I can promise my Honourable friend that all he has said today on this subject will receive the attention of Government before they make a final recommendation to the Secretary of State. I have not been able, of course, to check at this moment what he said about the inadequacy of the rates, or whether they are such that officers have no chance of drawing the highest salary in the scale for an appreciable period. That was certainly not the intention of the revision. In revising the scale of pay, we expected that, in each grade, officers would enjoy the higher rates for exactly the same periods as they enjoy the present rates of pay in those grades. If there is a flaw in the scheme, which has the effect suggested by the Honourable Member, I can only say that I am most grateful to him for his criticisms, and will certainly take steps to inquire into the matter.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: In view of the remarks that have fallen from the Army Secretary, I desire, Sir, to withdraw my amendment.

The motion was, by leave of the Assembly, withdrawn.

Pensions of I. M. D., I. M. L. and I. U. L. Officers who retired between 1919 and 1927.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: Sir, my next motion refers to the pensions of Indian Medical Department, Indian Miscellaneous List and India Unattached List Officers who retired between 1919 and 1927, and reads:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Sir, I would draw the attention of the House to the conditions that prevail not only in regard to members of the I. M. D., who retired between

1919 and 1927, but with regard to members of the I. U. L. and I. M. L., who retired between 1919 and 1925, both in India and in England, in the matter of pensions. There is on record a lengthy correspondence on this matter between the India Unattached List Departmental Association and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as also with the Secretary of State and other well known authorities.

I wish to draw the Army Secretary's attention to the difference between the pensions of the India Unattached List and the I. M. D. I do not wish to repeat my speech of last year showing the similarity of service between them or make invidious comparisons between their qualifications. Comparisons are always odious but when they are informative and instructive they are at times necessary, so I shall confine myself to my demand and trust my remarks will bring home to the Honourable Member in Charge of the Department the necessity for doing something to equalise the conditions. Before and in 1919 various representations were made for increased pensions and in 1921 a new rate of pension was sanctioned. This new rate of pension to the I. M. D., and I. U. L., was an improvement on their former rates and had retrospective effect from 1919. These new rates of pension were given provisional to subsequent periodic revisions depending entirely on the rise and fall of the cost of living. In 1924 the Government of India received a letter from the Secretary of State for India informing them that the pensions of Departmental Officers on the Home establishment had been increased from 1919, from £200 to £450, and asking the Government of India what steps they intended taking in regard to corresponding Indian Departments including the I. M. D., The Secretary of State, I understand, suggested that the I. M. D. should be included in this consideration. I asked the Army Secretary a question on this very subject and he stated that no such communication was received from the Secretary of State regarding the I. M. D. I accept the Honourable Member's denial, but I think I am right in saying that the Secretary of State did write to the Government of India and pointedly brought to its notice the difference in the treatment of these officers with regard to the advanced rates of pension. As a result the Government of India drew up a new scale of pension for the I. U. L., but from which the I. M. D. was absolutely excluded. From the 1st October 1925 these new rates of pension were sanctioned for the I. U. L., and I. M. L., from which the I. M. D. were excluded. From 1925 onwards I repeatedly brought this matter to the notice of the Government of India, who at last awoke to the necessity of equalising the position of these two ancillary branches of the Army, and the I. M. D. were granted a somewhat lower rate of pension, from 1927, that is two years after the I. M. L. This is the present position. The Army Department refuses to give these new rates to the I. M. D. from 1927 as was given to the I. U. L. The Army Department refuses to give to those I. U. L. pensioners who retired between 1919 and 1925 the same rates of pension that were given to the department in 1925, though it was they who by agitating succeeded in obtaining this benefit. The result is that we today have three sets of pensions for the I. M. D. and I. U. L. Those men of the I. U. L., who retired before 1919 after giving of their best, those who retired between 1919 and 1925 and those who retired after 1925. The same applies to the I. M. D. except that the last increase in pensions was given from 1927 and not 1925. The Army Secretary may say that the giving of retrospective effect beyond the beginning of the current financial

[Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney.]

year is against the policy of the Government. This is not correct and I quote from the Lee Commission recommendations which gave advancements of pay and pension with retrospective effect to various services; the Opium Department for instance which had ceased to recruit for years.

And yet the Government of India denied to accord the same concessions to these men of the I. U. L. and I. M. D., who rendered yeomen service to them during the War. That was in 1919. In 1925 new rates of pension were given to the I. U. L. In 1927 another rate of pension was given to the I. M. D., one of the ancillary services of the Army. Thus three rates of pension were in vogue. Now, Sir, I think the Government of India has a duty to perform. Here are these men who have rendered as I have said years of excellent service to the Army and are deprived of the new rates of pensions, though by the promise of a revision an assurance was implied and though it was due to their efforts that the enhanced rates were sanctioned.

(At this stage Mr. President vacated the Chair which was taken by Mr. Deputy President.)

They are thereby deprived of the amenities of life which those who followed them are today enjoying. In view of the promises made at the time, these pensions were sanctioned, I submit the Government of India should not shut their eyes to a sacred duty, should not bury their misdeeds and try to live down a wrong policy in the hope that death or time will hide it. For after all my demand concerns about 200 men only. After all these 200 men are old, death takes its yearly toll, they are incapable of agitating, they are incapable of putting pressure on the Army Department except by constitutional measures. They have failed in all these measures. A statement was made in the columns of the *Statesman* regarding the claims of these men, and in commenting on it the Editor, while sympathising with their lot, advised that the grievance should be ventilated, not in England and the War Office but on the floor of the Assembly. It is for that reason I have moved this motion on the floor of this Assembly to place before the Government an absolutely sacred duty which should be performed by the Army Secretary. I consider this a sacred and solemn duty for the Government to again very carefully consider the needs and claims of a body of retired men, about 200 in number in the I. M. L. and about a similar number in the I. M. D., and to give to those who retired between the years 1919 and 1927, the same rates of pension that are being given to the pensioners today. Of course, I am sure the Army Secretary does not want to add to the military budget. Does he? I am sure he wishes to retrench wherever he can. The Army Department has started an economy campaign, cannot this economy campaign effect further reductions in the Army Estimates and so supply the small sum needed for my demand for this would help to give comfort, ease and relief to a body of men who served their country and Army truly and well? To deny these old and faithful servants the barest justice is in my opinion a discredit to the Army Department under whose care they still remain. I appeal to the Army Secretary to reconsider this matter, not to think entirely of his present servants in the I. U. L. and I. M. D., but to think of those who helped to build up the Army to its present position. The Government should first attend to their needs, moreover as I said it

concerns only a very few people. Give to them what you have given to others. Why give more to those who are already in receipt of much and deny a little help to those, who for no fault of their own, have been penalised and are thereby denied the ordinary amenities and comforts of life?

My proposal is this. I ask the Army Secretary to give to all the pensioners, all the I. U. L. and I. M. D. men who retired between the years 1919 and 1927 the same rates of pension that have been given to the I. U. L. in 1925 and I. M. D. in 1927. I further submit that it is not just to refuse to give the same retrospective date to the I. M. D., and to have sanctioned it two years after you gave it to I. M. L. I therefore suggest to the Army Secretary to reconsider this matter and do justice to these worthy men.

Mr. G. M. Young: Sir, as my Honourable friend knows, we have discussed this question many times, and he has made many representations either to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief or to myself on the subject. I sympathise very much with what he said. It was hard on the Indian Medical Department that they should get their improved rates of pensions two years later than the retired officers of the India Unattached List, with whom they have always had a traditional connection. But that does not mean that the Indian Medical Department was exactly on the same terms in all matters of salary and pension as the India Unattached List. It is true that the Government of India themselves have held that any change in the conditions of service or of pension in the Indian Unattached List necessarily raises the question of doing something similar for the officers of the Indian Medical Department. That position was first taken up, I think, by the Government of India, before the Secretary of State did so. That is my impression, but I have not got the papers before me. This does not, however, confer upon the Indian Medical Department the right to demand exactly the same concessions or improvements as may be granted to the India Unattached List.

As regards the general question of giving retrospective effect, I can only say that one cannot do this. One cannot improve pensions, except for future entrants. It has been done, as far as I know, in none of the public services. As my Honourable friend is aware, pensions in the Indian Army were improved to a considerable extent some time ago. But that did not mean that every living retired Army officer got an increased pension.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: Is that the principle you adopt? Then I must agitate, agitate, agitate, till it is changed.

Mr. G. M. Young: That has been the principle. As I have already said, I very much sympathise with the Honourable Member. I am very sorry I cannot accede to his request. The matter has been fully considered by the Government of India, and my Honourable friend's own representations received the utmost and careful consideration. I wish I could meet his wishes, but I regret that I cannot.

Mr. Deputy President: Does the Honourable Member withdraw his motion?

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: No, Sir.

Mr. Deputy President: The question is :

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

The motion was negatived.

Temporary I. M. S. Officers.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: Sir I beg to move :

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Sir, this motion is one of considerable importance to the country. It refers to the difference in treatment meted out between the permanent including gratuity term and the temporary members of the Indian Medical Service. I believe, Sir, the present total cadre of the temporary members of the I. M. S.—*vide* Army List of 1929—I speak subject to correction,—is 127, and that they are almost entirely Indians. I am here therefore speaking on behalf of these Indian members of the Service. Sir, I wish to bring to the notice of this House the very ungenerous treatment accorded today to these officers. In doing so, I find it necessary to divide the Indian Medical Service into two wings, the permanent wing, in which I include those officers who were employed in the I. M. S. on gratuity-terms, and the temporary wing, *i.e.*, temporary I. M. S. Officers. The permanent wing has a cadre of 620 and the temporary cadre's strength is 127. Out of 620 permanent members of the I. M. S., about 300 are employed in civil duties, which leaves a residue of 300 doing military duties in the Army. If you take into consideration 25 per cent. as absent on leave and furlough you will observe that the medical needs of the Indian Army are today performed in the ratio of two Europeans to one Indian or in other words, one-third of the medical needs of the Indian Army are performed by temporary I. M. S. officers. This shows you the important work performed by these officers.

Sir, the genesis of the temporary I. M. S. Department is rather interesting. It was in 1914, at the outbreak of war, when more medical officers were required for the Army that the Army Department issued a circular calling for recruits in India. There was a liberal response from Indians and other communities, but at the termination of war in 1920 the services of most of these officers were dispensed with. They could not be entirely dispensed with because of the increasing dearth of candidates in the permanent wing of the I. M. S. and the result was that a large number of these temporary I. M. S. officers were retained until such time as recruits were obtained from England, but this has not materialised up to date and so the temporary I. M. S. officer continues to be recruited, to equalise this deficiency. I want the House to take careful note of this fact. As time went on, the Army Department found it increasingly difficult to secure the services of the I. M. S., from England, and so they offered various temptations to encourage candidates to come to India, and in this way induced certain gratuity-term officers to come out to India. The gratuity-term officer enters the I. M. S. for a service of six or twelve years as he pleases. If at the end of six years, he desires to leave, he can do so with a gratuity of £1,000, if he chooses to go after twelve years, he can do so with a gratuity of £2,500. But

still there is a great dearth of candidates and today the I. M. S. is much under strength. Various officers including the Director-General of the Indian Medical Service, when on furlough in England have made it their duty to bring before the medical schools of England the desirability of entering the Indian Medical Service; but all their efforts seem to have failed. Today, taking the gratuity, passage money, pay, etc., given to these gratuity-term officers of the Indian Medical Service the cost per officer comes up to nearly Rs. 1,000 a month. Now, Sir, the temporary Indian Medical Service has been in existence for about 15 years and I submit he can have earned a claim for retention as a permanent branch of the Indian Medical Service. Evidently, the Government thinks otherwise and although the temporary branch of the Indian Medical Service has more or less, become a permanent branch of the Service, the Government have not shown their appreciation of this service by attempting to improve their lot. On the contrary, they are perpetuating a difference between them and those recruited in England. Now, let me refer to a few of the differences in the treatment between these two sets of officers. First, as regards conditions and period of engagement as given in A. I. (India) 284 of 1922 amended up to date. General service in India or abroad for one year or such less period as the services of the officers are required. The contract is renewable every year, but these renewals of temporary engagement will not be permitted after completion of nine years' total service, in the case of officers in service on 28th October 1927, or five years' total service in case of those who have entered or may enter service after that date, unless the officer has been, in the meanwhile, selected for a permanent commission in the Indian Medical Service. Interpreted literally, this means that the services of a temporary Indian Medical Service officer can be disposed of any time by the Government whenever it likes or whenever the Government can secure a few more recruits from Europe or India for the permanent cadre.

In 1923, or so the Government offered commissions to Europeans to join the Indian Medical Service on certain gratuity terms to which I have already referred. That was done with a view to attract more recruits. Last year, some questions were raised in the Assembly on this subject, and I believe in response to that, Government included these gratuity terms in the Memorandum regarding appointment to and conditions of service in His Majesty's Indian Medical Service published on 25th August 1928, and these gratuity terms were as follows, *vide* para. 45 :

"An officer is entitled to retire on gratuity at any time after the completion of six years' service from the date of permanent appointment to the Indian Medical Service, provided he has given notice of his intention to do so twelve months in advance. The amount of gratuity will be as given above, £1,000 after six years and £2,500 at the end of 12 years."

Here, Sir, I would like to bring to your notice that temporary officers are made to retire at the end of nine years without any gratuity or bonus or any attempt at the establishment of a provident fund. That is one very glaring difference between these sets of officers who do the same work. Indeed these temporary I. M. S. officers do one-third of the total medical work in the Indian army. I ask why should there be this disparity between the Indian and the European when both of them do the same kind of work. I ask the Members of this House to support me, should there be a vote taken on this matter.

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I shall now draw attention to another differentiation—Rank. Rank per rank, the permanent officer or officer on gratuity terms, is senior to a temporary officer. For example a Lieutenant with a day's service in a hospital is senior to a temporary lieutenant with two years' service and more and a Captain with even one day's service as such is senior to a temporary I. M. S. officer with 6 years' service. Why should this be so? Why should there be this disparity, I ask? Is it because the one is an Indian and the other an European? That is not all, Sir. This disparity in rank not only affects the temporary officer from the seniority point of view, but also from the financial point of view, because whenever any extra allowance is available, it goes naturally to the permanent officer even if he be junior. For instance, a gratuity-term Indian Medical Service officer recruited from England, who, when all is said and done, is really a temporary officer also gets a command or a 2nd in command allowance ranging from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 a month in preference to the temporary Indian medical officer, though the latter might be a senior officer in years' of service. I ask why? This surely is not fair and does not obtain in any other branch of the Army. There is the same disparity in regard to pay also. For the first six years, the basic pay for the temporary Indian Medical Service officer is the same as for permanent officers, but in the seventh year, the permanent Captain or the gratuity-term Captain who has consented to serve on for twelve years, gets Rs. 750 per mensem, while the temporary Indian Medical Officer, although he serves for nine years, cannot rise above Rs. 650. In the tenth year of service the permanent officer from England which includes the permanent Indian I. M. S. officer also, his pay is increased to Rs. 850, while the temporary officer, even if he is selected for permanent appointment to the cadre, cannot rise above Rs. 650. I ask, Sir, why this discrepancy? They both do the same duty. It cannot bear examination, and I am surprised that this has been tolerated for so long. Why is the temporary officer not allowed the same pay? Again I ask, is clothing cheaper in India than in England? Otherwise, why should a lower outfit allowance be given to the temporary Indian Medical Officer as compared with the British recruit—a difference of about £100?

Now let us take the question of leave. The temporary Indian Medical Service officer receives very limited privilege leave. He can take privilege leave for two months for every year or three months at the end of 33 months' service, if it is continuous. He is denied any furlough. He is allowed no study leave and has therefore no opportunity to improve his professional knowledge. It is not so in the case of the gratuity-term officers, whom I feel I can call the temporary British officers. They can go on leave or furlough though that does not count towards their gratuity. The rules state:—"Privilege leave will be allowed to count towards service for gratuity, but not ordinary furlough or sick leave." While, in the case of the temporary Indian officer, he is debarred from going on such furlough. What does this mean? An Indian temporary medical officer may desire to improve his knowledge and prospects. If he wants to go to England, even after he has given 5 years' service, you deny him the right of going on furlough, a right you deny to no other arm of the Service, either Indian or British. You deny him the opportunity to improve himself so that he may come back and enter the permanent cadre,

and as a rule you deny him selection into the permanent cadre because he has an Indian degree. In other words you say to him, "I will make use of you for 9 years and after that you must go." Sir, is the perquisite of professional knowledge and experience confined to the England recruited doctor? Surely no one in this House will deny that India can produce and has produced as fine surgeons, as fine physicians, as any other part of the world. Why then deny these young men who wish to go to England to improve themselves the opportunity? Why tell them, "You can stop 5 or 9 years and then out you go!" Is that generous? Is that fair? If you say, "But I give them a good pay", ask in reply "Don't you get your return by the labour and service they give you?" If you didn't, you wouldn't give him that pay or keep him for so many years. You have kept this Department going for 15 years! Surely it is time you made it permanent or abolished it and threw the I.M.S. open to a competitive examination as of old instead of nominating your officers as you are doing today. You cannot go on making a convenience of these young men in India and then throw them overboard. It is not fair to them. In fact I consider it is wholly unfair.

As I said just now, no gratuity whatever is allowed to a temporary I.M.S. officer, either at the termination of 5, or 9 years. Why send him away after 9 years, just when he is on the eve of getting his Majority? You say we will keep you so long and no longer; we will not appoint you with a few exceptions to the permanent service. Is that right? And yet the men you get from England, after 6 years, can retire on a gratuity of £1,000 or after 12 years on a gratuity of £2,500. He retires on that to England, purchases a practice and is settled for life. Whereas with the temporary I. M. S. Officer, you give him his bare pay from Rs. 500 to Rs. 650, a rise of Rs. 150 in 9 years of service. I challenge any comparison of this state of affairs and this treatment in any other branch of the British Army.

Another very serious matter is the transfer to the Reserve of temporary officers of the I. M. S. who are required to join the Reserve, provided their service is satisfactory, and they are not over age after a period of less than 5 years. You say to the temporary man, "9 years you will serve me, and at the end of it I demand from you service in the Reserve of another 5 years." Compare this with the treatment accorded to the gratuity-term officers recruited from England. He may be a better man, he may be better qualified and he may not be, but he is allowed to serve his 6 years and go to England with a gratuity and no demand is made for him to serve on the Reserve. It is only the officer who elects to serve 12 years on whom a demand is made for service in the Reserve. Sir, this is not fair. Let me take the other point, selection to permanent commissions in the Indian Medical Service. The temporary I.M.S. man takes a degree in India but his chances of being selected to the permanent I. M. S. is very remote unless he has a British qualification. In my opinion the degree does not make the man, the man makes the degree. But why are you so ungenerous in the recognition of 9 years service given you by these men by refusing to appoint them with few exceptions to the permanent service? Remember, Sir, annual confidential reports are submitted on these officers by their Commanding Officers through the usual channel to the D. G., I. M. S. In these reports it is stated whether they are fit or not for retention. Yet you deny these men the benefit of the service they

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have done and only demand the face value of an English degree. That is hardly the way to recognise the service of your men. The confidential reports may just as well be thrown into the waste paper-basket, for all the good they do. He may be a splendid fellow, but because he has not a British qualification, he is not considered fit. Take any other British service—the R. A. M. C., the Air Force, the Naval Medical Service, in which officers are granted short service commissions for from 3 to 12 years. The officers of these services get gratuities and, as I said, they can start in private practice.

Well, Sir, I have outlined these various differences to bring home to the Honourable the Army Secretary, in as forcible, as truthful a manner as I can, the glaring differences that exist between two sets of officers. I ask him on behalf of a loyal body of men—on behalf of 125 men of the temporary I. M. S.—to consider their grievances to grant them if not equal at least better treatment than they are receiving today. With these remarks, Sir, I ask members on the opposite Benches and every European and Indian in this House to vote in favour of my cut, should the Army Secretary's reply be unfavourable and I am pressed to ask for a division.

Mr. G. M. Young: Sir, I could wish that my Honourable friend (Colonel Gidney) had consulted me before he brought this motion, because his whole speech is based on a series of misconceptions, which I might have been able to remove. I may add they were removed from the minds of other Honourable Members of this House in September 1927 in the Simla Session, when, in answer to a long series of questions by Diwan Chaman Lal, I made the position as between these two sets of men perfectly clear.

It is not a question of two sets of temporary officers: still less is it in any way a racial question. I deplore the action of my Honourable friend, in trying to make a racial question of it. There is nothing racial in it from beginning to end. The facts are these. We have a number of temporary officers in the Indian Medical Service. They were first recruited during the War. Recruitment now goes on only in proportion as officers come to the end of their temporary service and retire. That is to say, we are not increasing the number. The number formerly was higher than it is. It is now about 180. These men come in on a temporary basis. They know it is on a temporary basis. They sign every year an agreement in which they acknowledge that their services may be dispensed with at the end of the year. New comers also now sign an agreement stating that they acknowledge that their service will not, in any case, be extended beyond 5 years altogether. Those of them who were in the service before 1926 sign a similar acknowledgment, at each year's extension, to the effect that their service will not be extended beyond nine years altogether. These men had a grievance, because there was no such clause originally in their agreements, and those of them who had served nine and even, I think, ten years—some of them had a just grievance when their services were suddenly dispensed with. As I explained in detail to the House, orders were issued under a misconception. As a matter of fact I was not then Army Secretary, nor were the orders brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief. We did what we could to redress the hardship that had been inflicted. The hardship did undoubtedly exist. These men had gone on renewing their contracts year after year:

It is perfectly true that, at each renewal they had to acknowledge that they had no right to have their services renewed for more than one year more, but they had been lulled into a feeling of security, and may have thought they were going on for ever. That is why we have inserted in the renewal form of their contracts, this stipulation and acknowledgment that their service will not, in any case, extend beyond nine or five years, as the case may be. Those are the temporary commissioned officers. Of course, if they are selected for the permanent service, their services are extended, and that fact is also recorded on their renewal form in some such words as these:

"I understand that unless I am selected for permanent appointment to the Medical Service, my contract will not, in any case, be renewed beyond such and such a period."

Then my Honourable friend said that, unless these officers possess British qualifications, they have no chance whatever of being selected for permanent commissions. That is not the case. I do not remember the exact figures, but I think that something not very far short of 1 P.M. half the officers selected for permanent commissions from among the temporary commissioned officers had only Indian qualifications. It is quite true that at the last meeting of the Selection Board no officer with only Indian qualifications was selected; but a good proportion of the officers, selected from the time that this system of appointment by selection began, have been officers with Indian qualifications only.

Then, Sir, there is no comparison between these temporary service men, and permanent officers of the Indian Medical Service, who have the option of retiring after six or twelve years with gratuity. These are not temporary officers or gratuity officers, as my Honourable friend incorrectly calls them. They are permanent officers of the Indian Medical Service. Every officer who is now recruited to the permanent medical service has the option of retiring after six or twelve years with a gratuity. Such of the temporary officers as are selected for permanent commissions become entitled to the gratuity in the same way, if they choose to exercise the option of retiring at the end of the period. Moreover these gratuities are granted to Indians, equally with British Officers; there is no racial distinction whatever. All officers who are serving on these terms, that is to say, members of the permanent Indian Medical Service, have the option of retiring on gratuities after six or twelve years, whether they are British or Indian. I explained that very fully 18 months ago; and that is why I wish my Honourable friend had consulted me, because I could have removed the misconceptions on which he based his speech.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: Is not the strength of the temporary Indian Medical Service cadre dependent on the number of vacancies in the permanent Indian Medical Service, and is not the Indian Medical Service cadre today already short by 100 men?

Mr. G. M. Young: It is perfectly true that there is a shortage in the Indian Medical Service cadre and that shortage is at present supplied by the temporary officers. I do not see what that has got to do with this point.

Mr. Deputy President: The question is:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

The Assembly divided:

AYES—62.

Abdullah Haji Kasim, Khan Bahadur
Haji.
Acharya, Mr. M. K.
Aiyangar, Mr. C. Duraiswamy.
Alexander, Mr. William.
Aney, Mr. M. S.
Anwar-ul-Azim, Mr.
Ayyangar, Mr. M. S. Seeha.
Belvi, Mr. D. V.
Bhargava, Pandit Thakur Das.
Chaman Lall, Diwan.
Chatterjee, the Revd. J. C.
Chetty, Mr. R. K. Shanmukham.
Cocke, Sir Hugh.
Crawford, Colonel J. D.
Dalal, Sardar Sir Bomanji.
Das, Mr. B.
Das, Pandit Nilakantha.
Farookhi, Mr. Abdul Latif Saheb.
Gavin-Jones, Mr. T.
Ghuznavi, Mr. A. H.
Gidney, Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J.
Goswami, Mr. T. C.
Gulab Singh Sardar.
Haji, Mr. Sarabhai Nemchand.
Hans Raj, Lala.
Iwar Saran, Munshi.
Iyengar, Mr. A. Rangaswami.
Jayakar, Mr. M. R.
Jogiah, Mr. V. V.
Kartar Singh, Sardar.
Kidwai, Mr. Rafi Ahmad.
Lahiri Chaudhury, Mr. D. K.

Lalchand Navalrai, Mr.
Lindsay, Sir Darcy.
Mehta, Mr. Jamnadas M.
Mitra, Mr. S. O.
Moonje, Dr. B. S.
Moore, Mr. Arthur.
Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Sardar.
Mukhtar Singh, Mr.
Munshi, Mr. Jehangir K.
Murtuza Saheb Bahadur, Maulvi
Sayyid.
Naidu, Mr. B. P.
Nehru, Pandit Motilal.
Neogy, Mr. K. C.
Phookun, Srijut T. R.
Rang Behari Lal, Lala.
Ranga Iyer, Mr. C. S.
Rao, Mr. G. Sarvotham.
Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, Khan
Bahadur.
Sassoon, Sir Victor.
Shah Nawaz, Mian Mohammad.
Singh, Kumar Ranajaya.
Singh, Mr. Gaya Prasad.
Singh, Mr. Narayan Prasad.
Singh, Mr. Ram Narayan.
Singh, Raja Raghunandan Prasad.
Sinha, Kumar Gangasand.
Sinha, Mr. Rajjvaranjan Prasad.
Sinha, Mr. Siddheswar Prasad.
Sykes, Mr. E. F.
Tok Kyi, U.

NOES—31.

Abdul Aziz, Khan Bahadur Mian.
Allison, Mr. F. W.
Ashrafuddin Ahmed, Khan Bahadur
Nawabzada Sayid.
Bajpai, Mr. G. S.
Bower, Mr. E. H. M.
Bray, Sir Denys.
Coatman, Mr. J.
Cosgrave, Mr. W. A.
Crerar, The Honourable Mr. J.
French, Mr. J. C.
Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mr.
Hira Singh, Brar, Sardar Bahadur,
Honorary Captain.
Jowahir Singh, Sardar Bahadur Sardar.
Keane, Mr. M.
Lall, Mr. S.

Mitra, The Honourable Sir Bhupendra
Nath.
Mitter, The Honourable Sir Brojendra.
Mukharji, Rai Bahadur A. K.
Mukherjee, Mr. S. O.
Rainy, The Honourable Sir George.
Rao, Mr. V. Panduranga.
Rau, Mr. H. Shankar.
Rau, Mr. P. R.
Sams, Mr. H. A.
Schuster, The Honourable Sir George.
Shillidy, Mr. J. A.
Singh, Rai Bahadur S. N.
Stevenson, Mr. H. L.
Webb, Mr. M.
Yamin Khan, Mr. Muhammad.
Young, Mr. G. M.

The motion was adopted.

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: Sir, the next item I wish to move is a very small one, and I move:

"That the Demand under the 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100 (Pay and technical allowance to Foremen and Assistant Foremen of Asiatic domicile in the Ordnance Department)."

Several Honourable Members: Withdraw, withdraw.

(The Honourable Member then sat down)

Mr. Deputy President: Is the Honourable Member not going to move it?

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: No, Sir.

Mr. Deputy President: Mr. Moore; Mr. Neogy; Dr. Moonje.

Mr. Arthur Moore (Bengal: European): Sir, I want to speak . . .

Mr. Deputy President: The Honourable Member never got up when I called out his name. Therefore the Honourable Member has lost his chance.

Mr. Arthur Moore: I did get up

Mr. Deputy President: I did not see the Honourable Member getting up, and so I called out Dr. Moonje's and Mr. Neogy's names. I am sorry, what can I do?

(The amendment in the names of Mr. Moore, Mr. Neogy, Dr. Moonje and several others were not moved.)

Mr. Deputy President: Mr. Munshi.

Several Honourable Members: Withdraw, withdraw.

(At this stage Mr. President resumed the Chair.)

Mr. President: Order, order.

Exclusion of Burmans from the Army.

Mr. Jehangir K. Munshi (Burma: Non-European): Sir I move:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

Sir, realising the situation created in the House at the present moment, I had decided not to proceed with this motion, but it seems to me, Sir, as an exception has been made in the case of Colonel Gidney's motion, I hope the House will extend to me a similar indulgence, as the case of Burma requires special and sympathetic treatment.

I do not propose to detain the House with a long speech on this subject. The issue is a short and simple one. The fight in India has been for years to Indianise the officer ranks of the Indian Army, but in the case of Burma the situation is far more miserable. Perhaps this House will be surprised to hear that there is not, at the present moment, a single Burman regiment, there is not one Burman soldier even in the lower ranks of the Army in Burma. There are a couple of battalions, consisting of hill tribes, known as the Chins and Kachins; but they are not regarded as Burmans proper. I understand some time back there was a Burmese

[Mr. Jehangir K. Munshi.]

regiment, but it was disbanded. I understand, Sir, that the Army Headquarters have assigned two reasons for denying Burmans the most elementary right of serving in their own Army. The two reasons advanced are, firstly, that it is difficult to secure a Burman soldier of the right type on the pay and prospects on which the Indian Sepoy is willing to serve. I do not admit that there is any substance in this allegation, but even if there was any force in this allegation, it is purely a matter of a little financial adjustment to suit the requirements of the Burman soldier; and I am sure this House will not stand in the way of Burma having a garrison of its own and a Burman army of its own, even if it costs a little more. Moreover, in a vital matter like this, if the Local Government were approached, they could, with the consent of the Local Legislature, provide ways and means to promote this most essential object.

The second reason, which I understand the Army Headquarters have advanced, and which they regard as a more serious reason, is that the Burman does not like the life of a soldier and that he is not amenable to discipline. Sir, this reason appears to me to be more feeble than the first contention. We have heard a great deal about the qualities of the British Officer, which enable him to train and lead Asiatic soldiers. I wonder how these powers possessed by the British Officer, about which we have heard so much in this House and outside it, have completely failed him when it comes to train and discipline Burmans (Laughter and Cheers). For Burmans are not lacking in courage; they are not lacking in manly qualities; their physique is in no way inferior to the ordinary Indian physique, and compared to the physique of certain Indian races, it is even superior.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya: Hear, hear.

Mr. Jehangir K. Munshi: Why is it then that the Army Headquarters have failed all these years to give an opportunity to Burmans to join the Army and help in defending their own homes? I tried several times to bring up this matter before the Burma Legislative Council, when I was a Member of that House, but His Excellency the Governor of Burma ruled me out and referred me to this House. Now that I do happen to be here as a Member of this House, I consider it my duty and indeed it is a pleasure to me, to advance this particular cause of Burma before this House.

Mr. President: Very inopportune time.

An Honourable Member: After separation you can.

Mr. Jehangir K. Munshi: I do think it is inopportune, it is very late.

Sir, I do not know if there are any other reasons which actuate the Army Headquarters in shutting out Burmans from the Army. If there are, I hope my Honourable friend Mr. Mackworth Young will state them clearly now. As I have said, I do not admit that the two objections which have been advanced by the Army Headquarters are insuperable; and the feeling in Burma over this question is very acute, and it is natural that it

should be acute. Imagine a race, a province without a single soldier of its own! This is a situation which calls for immediate remedy.

Sir, I do not wish to branch off into irrelevant topics, but we find that, at the present moment, the Government of Burma, for reasons of their own which are not difficult to understand, are busy instigating Burmans to ask for separation. After separation what army is Burma going to have? The British garrison and the Indian garrison? At the present moment there is nothing wrong or improper in Burma being garrisoned partly by Indian Units, just as there is nothing improper in the Mahrattas being posted to Bengal or the Sikhs being posted to Bombay. But if the Government of Burma succeeds in its present propaganda and if Burma is separated, what army is Burma going to have? Are the authorities going to convert Burma into a second Hongkong, and have an Indian garrison in a separated Burmese Brown Colony? Therefore, Sir, with apologies to the House for moving this motion under today's unfortunate circumstances I commend it to its support; and I trust that this House will help the Burmans in their legitimate demand for a national Burman Army (Applause.)

Mr. G. M. Young: When I was speaking, Sir, a little time ago, on the first motion moved today, I discussed the question of races, which some people like to talk of as martial and non-martial, and I explained that the Territorial Force is the field in which we expect the military development of races that suffer from being called non-martial. Now, Sir, we have a Territorial Force in Burma for which Burmans are eligible, and if the event to which my Honourable friend has referred comes off later on, and Burma becomes a separate province, he will find the germ of a national Burman army in the Territorial Force which is there. My Honourable friend made a grievance of the fact that the race and the province were without a regiment of their own. He must be aware, however, of a regiment called the 20th Burma Rifles, which is recruited entirely within the Province of Burma. It is true that Burmans proper do not serve in it; the regiment is recruited from races which belong to the Province of Burma, but are not Burmans in the narrowest sense. Burmans used to serve in the regiment, but Army Headquarters decided, with great reluctance, ultimately to eliminate them. The reasons were that these men did not make such good soldiers as the other races in the same province, that they served with reluctance and that they were not as amenable to discipline as soldiers should be. I may say that, when mustering out concessions, as we call them, we offered to these men, they accepted them with alacrity, and gave no evidence of any desire to go on serving in the regiment. It is always difficult to exclude any race in India from the Army, especially if that race shows a real, and genuine desire for military service. But as I have often explained to the House, our Army is a small one and we must choose from the very best. There are many races in India who will make good soldiers, but who do not find a place in the Army, because there are others who are still better. As long as we retain class composition in the ranks of the Indian Army we can only take the very best, and must leave others out.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That the Demand under the head 'Army Department' be reduced by Rs. 100."

The Assembly divided :

AYES—50.

Acharya, Mr. M. K.
 Aiyangar, Mr. C. Duraiswamy.
 Aney, Mr. M. S.
 Ayyangar, Mr. M. S. Sesha.
 Belvi, Mr. D. V.
 Bhargava, Pandit Thakur Das.
 Chaman Lall, Diwan.
 Chetty, Mr. R. K. Shanmukham.
 Das, Mr. B.
 Das, Pandit Nilakantha.
 Gidney, Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J.
 Goswami, Mr. T. C.
 Gulab Singh, Sardar.
 Haji, Mr. Sarabhai Nemchand.
 Hans Raj, Lala.
 Iswar Saran, Munshi.
 Iyengar, Mr. A. Rangaswami.
 Iyengar, Mr. S. Srinivasa.
 Jayakar, Mr. M. R.
 Jogiah, Mr. V. V.
 Kartar Singh, Sardar.
 Kidwai, Mr. Rafi Ahmad.
 Lahiri Chaudhury, Mr. D. K.
 Lalchand Navalrai, Mr.
 Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan.
 Mehta, Mr. Jamnadas M.

Mitra, Mr. S. C.
 Moonje, Dr. B. S.
 Mukhtar Singh, Mr.
 Munshi, Mr. Jehangir K.
 Murtuza Saheb Bahadur, Maulvi
 Sayyid.
 Naidu, Mr. B. P.
 Nehru, Pandit Motilal.
 Neogy, Mr. K. C.
 Phookun, Srijut T. R.
 Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Sir.
 Rang Behari Lal, Lala.
 Ranga Iyer, Mr. C. S.
 Rao, Mr. G. Sarvotham.
 Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, Khan
 Bahadur.
 Singh, Kumar Rananjaya.
 Singh, Mr. Gaya Prasad.
 Singh, Mr. Narayan Prasad.
 Singh, Mr. Ram Narayan.
 Singh, Raja Raghunandan Prasad.
 Sinha, Kumar Ganganand.
 Sinha, Mr. Rajivaranjan Prasad.
 Sinha, Mr. Siddheswar Prasad.
 Tok Kyi, U.
 Yakub, Maulvi Muhammad.

NOES—46.

Abdul Aziz, Khan Bahadur Mian.
 Ahmed, Mr. K.
 Alexander, Mr. William.
 Allison, Mr. F. W.
 Anwar-ul-Azim, Mr.
 Ashrafuddin Ahmed, Khan Bahadur
 Nawabzada Sayid.
 Bajpai, Mr. G. S.
 Bower, Mr. E. H. M.
 Bray, Sir Denys.
 Chatterjee, the Revd. J. C.
 Coatman, Mr. J.
 Cocke, Sir Hugh.
 Cosgrave, Mr. W. A.
 Crawford, Colonel J. D.
 Crerar, The Honourable Mr. J.
 Dalal, Sardar Sir Bomanji.
 French, Mr. J. C.
 Gavin-Jones, Mr. T.
 Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mr.
 Ghuznavi, Mr. A. H.
 Hira Singh, Brar, Sardar Bahadur,
 Honorary Captain.
 Jowahir Singh, Sardar Bahadur
 Sardar.

Keane, Mr. M.
 Lall, Mr. S.
 Lindsay, Sir Darcy.
 Mitra, The Honourable Sir Bhupendra
 Nath.
 Mitter, The Honourable Sir Brojendra.
 Moore, Mr. Arthur.
 Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Sardar.
 Mukharji, Rai Bahadur A. K.
 Mukherjee, Mr. S. C.
 Rainy, The Honourable Sir George.
 Rao, Mr. V. Panduranga.
 Rau, Mr. H. Shankar.
 Rau, Mr. P. R.
 Sams, Mr. H. A.
 Sassoon, Sir Victor.
 Schuster, The Honourable Sir George.
 Shillidy, Mr. J. A.
 Simpson, Sir James.
 Singh, Rai Bahadur S. N.
 Stevenson, Mr. H. L.
 Sykes, Mr. E. F.
 Webb, Mr. M.
 Yamin Khan, Mr. Muhammad.
 Young, Mr. G. M.

The motion was adopted.

Mr. President: I take it that no Honourable Member wishes to move any further cut on this Demand.

Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas (Indian Merchants' Chamber: Indian Commerce): There is only one now left.

Mr. President: There are three or four in the supplementary lists. I take it that no Honourable Member wants to move any of these cuts.

Mr. President: The question is:

"That a reduced sum not exceeding Rs. 5,35,800 be granted to the Governor General in Council to defray the charges which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1930, in respect of Army Department."

***Mr. M. A. Jinnah** (Bombay City: Muhammadan Urban): Owing to certain circumstances and the way in which the various cuts were taken up, we, Sir, were not able to press our cut which stands in the name of a member of my Party. That cut was the reduction of the grant to one rupee on the ground of Indianisation and the Sandhurst Committee Report. We follow the procedure of reducing the grant to one rupee—which means the virtual rejection of the whole grant. Now, that the grant is before the House, I wish to make it clear that I am opposed to this motion, namely, that this sum be allowed.

Mr. C. S. Ranga Iyer: On a point of order, Sir. A similar motion was before this House when I moved my cut and a discussion took place on that motion. Therefore I should like to know whether a repetition of a discussion on a more or less identical motion is in order.

Mr. President: Will the Honourable Member quote the Standing Order on which he relies?

Mr. C. S. Ranga Iyer: I want to know, Sir, whether a repetition of similar arguments on an identical motion is in order.

Mr. President: I wish the Honourable Member had helped the Chair by quoting authority.

Mr. C. S. Ranga Iyer: I have no authority by my side, but I want the ruling of the Chair.

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: I am opposing the motion, that is, that the grant should not be allowed and I want to state my reasons why I am opposed to it.

Mr. President: It is a matter of regret that the Honourable Member who objected does not cite his authority.

Mr. M. Keane (United Provinces: Nominated Official): The authority may be based on the general Standing Order that a question that has been substantially in issue cannot be raised again.

Mr. President: Which is that order?

Mr. M. Keane: That is the general procedure on motions.

Mr. President: The Honourable Member refers to Standing Order 31, which says:

"A motion must not raise a question substantially identical with one on which the Assembly has given a decision in the same session."

That means that this motion which is now put from the Chair cannot be put at all. Is that the contention of the Honourable Member?

*Speech not corrected by the Honourable Member.

Mr. M. Keane: The question stands, I think, this way. It is in perfect order for a debate to arise on the general motion which Mr. President has proposed from the Chair. It appears to me, however, and May's Parliamentary Practice bears this out, that when a particular item has been discussed during the course of debate on motions for reduction, the Chair should not permit the same discussion to be revived, though the motion is not the same but a different motion. What Mr. Ranga Iyer moved was that the grant should be reduced by Rs. 5,35,999. Various Members of the House were probably not satisfied with that procedure. Mr. Ranga Iyer however did propose that the grant should be so reduced on the ground of dissatisfaction with the entire Army policy, and particularly the establishment of military colleges in India. That was discussed fully. I say "fully", because it ought to have been discussed fully, even if it was not. At any rate it was put before the House to be discussed but the House did not deign to discuss it further. They wanted no further discussion and the motion was put and was rejected by the House. Therefore I should—with due deference to the Chair—be inclined to consider that discussion on that particular point of Army policy, namely, the establishment of military colleges is now closed. But that, of course, is a matter entirely for the Chair to decide. (Loud Applause from the Official Benches.)

Mr. M. S. Aney (Berar Representative): I only want to have one point explained very clearly

Mr. President: I should like to know from the Honourable Member if on the occasion of the general discussion of the Budget, a question of policy is discussed, is it not open to any Honourable Member to give a cut on Demand for Grant and discuss the same question again?

Mr. M. Keane: In the general discussion no question can be put to the House. Every question before the House has to be decided by the House by "Yes" or "No". In the general discussion of the Budget no decision can be taken. In all these cases of Demands for Grants the decision of the House is taken and the decision of the House has already been taken this morning on the cut in connection with Army policy and the establishment of military colleges. Those questions, therefore, are outside the scope of further discussion because the House has already decided. In the case of the general budget discussion the House cannot decide, consequently the two do not stand on the same level. (Applause from the Official Benches.)

Mr. President: If the Honourable Member from Bombay has a right to oppose the main motion, I suppose he is entitled to advance his arguments in support of his attitude?

Mr. M. Keane: Provided that the House has not given a decision on the point he wishes to raise. What the Member from Bombay is going to say I don't know. He can of course raise other points; he has a quiver full of arguments; but on any point on which the House has already given a decision, the Chair should not, I think, allow that position to be again traversed in detail.

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: May I point out that the House has not given a decision with regard to the subject matter of the amendment which stands in the name of a Member of my Party. The House has given a decision on Mr. Ranga Iyer's motion for a cut on the ground of the entire Army

policy and the establishment of military colleges in India. It may be that the House did not desire to censure the Government on the entire policy and it may also be that the House did not desire to censure the Government on the question of the establishment of military colleges, because the establishment of military colleges is recommended by the Sandhurst Committee to take place in 1933.

Mr. C. S. Ranga Iyer: Will you refer to my speech?

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: I am not talking about your speech, but am referring to the point of order.

The motion given by a Member of my Party is confined to a different subject matter, a specific matter, which is lesser than the other one, lesser in this way that the House may not condemn the entire military policy, the House may not condemn Government for not having established military colleges in India, but the House may condemn Government on the ground that they are not proceeding in a manner which is satisfactory to Indianise, as well as to carry out the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee, over and above the proposal for the establishment of military colleges not having been given effect to.

Mr. President: Does that mean that the Honourable Member challenges the ruling of the Chair, disallowing the motion which the Member of his Party wanted to move?

Mr. M. A. Jinnah: I most respectfully say that that ruling was not right.

Mr. President: The Honourable Member is entirely wrong. The Chair is not concerned with what the Government is asked to do. The Chair is concerned with putting the interpretation of Standing Order 31 which provides that the same question can not be put twice in the same session. The questions raised by the two motions being the same (*Mr. M. A. Jinnah*: "on a different ground") the Chair disallowed the motion standing in the name of Nawab Ismail Khan.

Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar (Madras City: Non-Muhammadan Urban): Sir, Rule 81 says:

"A motion must not raise a question substantially identical with one on which the Assembly has given a decision in the same session."

It does not say the Opposition must not raise the question.

I beg to submit that my Honourable friend, Mr. Keane is not right on relying on Rule 81 in opposition to Mr. Jinnah's opposition to this Grant. I submit the analogy of the third reading is a right analogy. A Bill may be introduced, and you may amend the Bill or the Bill may not be amended. The amendment may be carried or lost, nevertheless at the third reading the Bill can be opposed.

I take it that these cuts, which are proposed with reference to the grants, are merely amendments. They are merely so many amendments, which are said to be made for the purpose of reducing the total amount of the grant which is contained in the motion proposed by the Honourable the Finance Member. Therefore, when it comes to the last stage of putting this motion, as amended or not amended, as the case may be, as a result of the previous votes taken upon the various cuts, I submit that it is quite in order to oppose the whole grant, because the statute provides that

[Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar.]

you can either make a motion for the purpose of reduction, or you can oppose the whole grant. Therefore every Honourable Member has got a right, in this House, to oppose the grant. If he has got a right to oppose the grant, surely he has got a right to express his views in support of his proposition as to why he votes against the grant. It may be, Sir, that the views which he is going to express may be views which have already been covered, either in whole or in part, or may be views covered in a speech in connection with another cut which may have been either lost or carried. I submit, therefore, that the real analogy is there. I think it is both in accord with principle and common sense. I submit that rule 81, upon which reliance is placed—after all there must be a rule to disallow the opposition of my Honourable friend Mr. Jinnah to this motion and his reasons therefor,—with due deference, I submit that that rule 81 is not applicable.

The Honourable Mr. J. Crerar (Home Member): I venture to suggest that the analogy put forward by my Honourable and learned friend is not really in point. The case of the question put at a later stage of the Bill is of a totally different character; that is to say, the question that a Bill be now passed is a totally different question from the preceding questions to which the Honourable Member referred. In the present case the question to be put is either the same or almost identically the same. The analogy therefore does not hold good.

***Sir Victor Sassoon** (Bombay Millowners' Association: Indian Commerce): I hope that, in giving your ruling on the question whether it is or it is not a fact that Mr. Jinnah had or had not an opportunity of discussing the point with reference to the Sandhurst Committee on Mr. Ranga Iyer's cut, you will make it clear to humble Members like myself whether, in a motion of this sort, we would be in order if we are to traverse the arguments or points that have been dealt with on individual cuts, and whether we would be in order in referring to subjects that had been passed over in cuts that had not been moved. The point is, one does not want to be out of order if we are going to be allowed to raise arguments raised before in the main cut. This may make the discussion rather longer, but we should know what our rights are exactly on the subject, also it would be of interest to know whether we could raise the question of inadequate air establishment, which my Honourable friend Mr. Arthur Moore was not able to move in this apparently general discussion. I hope you will make clear in your ruling as to what our position will be in these matters.

Mr. A. Rangaswami Iyengar (Tanjore *cum* Trichinopoly: Non-Muhamadan Rural): I really think, Sir, that, without any attempt to discuss what shall be said in a speech or what shall not be said in a speech in respect of the motion before the House, the Honourable Mr. Keane had confined himself to the actual substance of the motion that is before the House. The original motion which the Chair put to the House was that a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs and odd shall be granted to the Army Department Secretariat. Now, Sir, the motion that the Chair has now put before the House that that amount be reduced by Rs. 200 shall be the motion before the House. On that motion, the House is called upon to give a decision. Before the House gives its decision, it has a right to discuss it. And

* Speech not corrected by the Honourable Member.

when discussing that motion, every Member has got the right to advance his own argument. Whether those arguments have been anticipated or made by others with greater or less force, he has still got a right, in his own behalf, as a Member, to advance every argument that has been previously advanced or hereafter may be advanced in support of his proposition. Therefore I do not see how, on any occasion on which a discussion arises, a thing which has already been discussed should not again be referred to by a Member in his speech. As a matter of fact, you Sir, put the question as to whether a matter which had been raised in general discussion could be blocked in respect of a discussion on a grant. I go further and say that, even in the case of a Finance Bill, suppose there are amendments on grants, suppose there is a general discussion, and then there is the second reading of the Finance Bill, I say, even in that case, these very points which are now discussed, could be raised again and discussed on motions which may be raised on the Finance Bill, so that the mere fact that a matter has been discussed, or some decision has been given in respect of a motion, which is not substantially the same, will not prevent us from raising a discussion when the whole question is before the House. No rule of an anticipation or no rule of repetition applies and in this case my Honourable friend Mr. Jinnah is perfectly entitled to raise every one of the questions which have been discussed, in the course of a speech on this motion.

Sir Victor Sassoon: Sir, I want to say a few words

Mr. President: The Honourable Member has already spoken.

Sir Victor Sassoon: On some new points.

Mr. President: The House stands adjourned till Three of the Clock.

The Assembly then adjourned for Lunch till Three of the Clock.

The Assembly re-assembled after Lunch at Three of the Clock, Mr. President in the Chair.

Mr. President: The rule against repetition is contained in Standing Order 81 of the Manual of Business and Procedure. It says:

"A motion must not raise a question substantially identical with one on which the Assembly has given a decision in the same session."

If the Honourable Member from Bombay had sought to move any motion raising a question substantially identical with one on which a decision had already been given by this House in this session, he would be entirely out of order and it was on that ground that I had disallowed Nawab Ismail Khan's motion; because, in my opinion, it was a motion raising substantially the question on which the Assembly had given its decision on the motion of Mr. Ranga Iyer.

What the Honourable Member from Bombay proposes to do is to oppose the main motion. I think it is admitted on all hands that the Honourable Member is entitled to oppose the main motion; and if he is entitled to oppose the main motion, he is entitled surely to give arguments and state his grounds for opposing the whole grant. He does not wish to

[Mr. President.]

make any motion, and I do not see how I can prevent him from stating his grounds in favour of the course which he has chosen to adopt. (Applause.) It is no doubt true that the arguments which he now proposes to advance, at any rate some of them, could have been advanced by him on the motion of Mr. Ranga Iyer. But that does not deprive him from taking advantage of another opportunity of stating the same arguments in opposing this motion.

My predecessor in 1921 gave a somewhat similar ruling. Mr. Iswar Saran, who was then a Member of that Assembly, and who is, I am happy to say, a Member of this Assembly also, had raised a question of policy in connection with the Demand for Grant for the North West Frontier Province by means of a cut. The question was fully discussed in the House on that cut. After the cut was disposed of, the Honourable the President, my predecessor, put the main question to vote; and Mr. Iswar Saran naturally did not know whether he would be in order in speaking again on the subject-matter of his cut which had already been discussed and disposed of. And, therefore, he rose to a point of order. He asked:

"Shall I be in order if I reply to the observations that were made by the Honourable the Law Member?"

that is, observations that were made in connection with the motion which Mr. Iswar Saran had moved—

"If I shall be in order, I shall speak; If I shall not be in order, I shall not speak."

My predecessor said:

"The Honourable Member must know quite well that the whole debate is open on the main question."

(Hear, hear.) That being the position, the Honourable Member from Bombay is perfectly entitled to state his grounds for opposing the main question.

The Honourable Mr. J. Orerar: May I take it, Sir, that as consequential on that ruling, the Army Secretary, who has spoken on a motion for reduction, will be able, if he so desires, to speak on the main motion?

Mr. President: The Army Secretary will be in order.

The Honourable Mr. J. Orerar: I wanted to make that point clear, Sir.

***Mr. M. A. Jinnah:** Sir, in view of the ruling that you have given, the position with which I am confronted is this, that the general discussion may take place and the main question is open, namely, whether the Army grant shall be voted or not generally. But, Sir, the object that I had at heart was that I wanted this House to pass a vote of censure on the Government on a specific, definite, matter of grievance which, according to me, is the question of Indianisation and not giving effect to the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee. That question, I am afraid, according to your ruling, I cannot get the House to decide now. That being so, my object cannot be fulfilled, and my purpose cannot be served. Therefore,

*Speech not corrected by the Honourable Member.

it is no use my talking generally on various topics which may be of some interest to this House or may not. I would therefore merely rest content with saying that my vote against this motion that this grant be made, will be recorded against it on the ground that, in my opinion, the Government deserve the severest censure of this House on the policy of Indianisation and for not giving effect to the recommendations of the Sandhurst Committee. This is all that I have to say, Sir.

Mr. Arthur Moore (Bengal: European): Sir, speaking on the main question, I should like to take up a strong position on the fence, and from there rake both sides of the House. I will be entirely guided, as regards my vote, by the reply that I get from the Government Benches. For, in reference to the point raised by Mr. Jinnah, I have a feeling of difference with both sides of the House, both with the critics of the Skeen Committee and with its defenders,—one of whom is naturally the Honourable Member who has just sat down, who was one of the distinguished members of that Committee. It seems to me that both the critics of the Report and the defenders of the Report have their minds running in the same groove. They both assume that it is only a question of more Indianisation or less Indianisation. They both seem to make the basic assumption that the Indian Army is going to continue very largely as it is. The critics of the Report think that everything will be all right, provided you keep the Army as it is now and that in that case the supply of British officers will not fail, and you will always get as many as you want. The defenders of the Report seem to me to think that everything will be all right if, in the existing regiments, you substitute for British officers Indian officers. And in private there is a chorus of battalion commanders justly proud of their very famous regiments who feel that these regiments must remain as they are and things must never change.

Now, Sir, I suggest that things will have to change. I am going to be sufficiently daring to indulge in what Lord Balfour once called the most gratuitous form of error, I am going to venture to prophesy. But I should not dare to prophesy out of my own humble opinion, and I wish to say that I am relying entirely on very high authority. I am relying upon the strongly expressed opinion of one on whose staff I had the honour of serving during the War, one who is no visionary, but on the contrary an extremely cautious Scotch gunner. He is now the Head of the British Army, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It is on Sir George Milne's opinion and not on my own that I base myself. He has made no secret of the fact that the Army—and he includes in that the Army in India—has got to change entirely. With your permission, Sir, I will read one or two of his words:

“A complete change of outlook is essential.”

Then he goes on to speak of attack and mobility and he says:

“This implies an entirely new conception of speed of movement and radius of action, with comparative invulnerability from the effect of weather and topography.”

He goes on:

“A higher mental standard of man will be required and in him in turn a new type of discipline, less rigid, should be instilled—akin to the ideas of Sir John Moore—and correspondingly developed. The technical experts customarily referred to by the term of “bloke” will be as vital and as important as commanders and a new attitude towards them must grow up.”

[Mr. Arthur Moore.]

Well, Sir, he says a great deal more which I might read, but I would now like to put before the House a few round figures. I will knock off the odd pounds and rupees :

Army Estimates in England 40 million.

Air Estimates in England 16 million.

- Proportion of Air to Army 2/5ths.

And in addition to that, you have a separately financed Air Fleet which has a budget of its own of some millions more and in this year to be increased by two additional flights.

In India :

(Purely) Army Estimates 52 crores.

Air Estimates 2 crores.

Proportion of Air to Army 1/26th.

You have a striking force at home of 4 Divisions which has 52 striking Air Squadrons, in addition to the Army Co-operation Squadrons. In this country you have a striking force of 4 Divisions and only 4 Air Squadrons, in addition to 4 Army Co-operation Squadrons. Go to Iraq and you find the Air has supreme command. Go to Palestine and you find the Air is in supreme command. The Air is in command at Aden. Yet here the proportion of Air to Army is 1 to 26!

Now, Sir, I shall be told by my Honourable friend, Mr. Mackworth Young, that while the Air is very important, it is on land that every campaign ends. That is perfectly true. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy can finish a campaign. You must have your ground troops to enter the enemy's stronghold. But, is that a reason for multiplying ground troops without regard to multiplying the facilities for moving your ground troops? Is it not far better to make use of the new possibilities of mobility? Ground troops can be very greatly reduced in numbers if they can be moved about quickly from place to place; and to quote my authority again—the present Chief of the Imperial General Staff—the aeroplane will be used and must be used—quite apart from actual combative work—for transporting troops, for supplying troops, and for removing casualties. In this country we have got to come to that. I had the great pleasure the other day, Sir, of listening to the speech of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in another place, reciting the wonderful story of what the Air Force has done in connection with the evacuations from Afghanistan. It was indeed a wonderful story, and His Excellency gave full credit to the Air Force; but in that speech he drew attention, quite correctly, to the fact that this was essentially a humanitarian operation of peace and not a military operation of war. Well, Sir, I have very high hopes of the part that aeroplanes can play in peace time, and would call your attention to the fact that in the Greek Testament the words which we translate as the Kingdom of Heaven literally mean the Kingdom of the Air. My own private and personal opinion of the way that the millenium will be brought about is that, if ever the lion and the lamb lie down together, they will both be lying on their backs looking up at the aeroplanes and be too busily occupied to have time to think either of eating or being eaten. But I feel, Sir, that the air is the arm of the future, and that its main contribution to producing world peace will be that

it will make war impossible. The prime necessity of the day is to develop the air arm, and with it all new mobile means of ground warfare, especially the tank. But, Sir, we are going to spend only two crores. And are we up to date? Sir Samuel Hoare made a speech the other day, and he said he was going to increase the total number of aeroplane squadrons to over 80. India has 8! He said that the whole force would be re-equipped at once, except India! India is not to be ready till next year. I believe that some time in 1980 the Air Force of this country is to get air-cooled engines and new all-metal machines. Well, Sir, 11 or 12 years ago in Egypt we were all told and we all came to the conclusion that the air-cooled engine was a necessity, and was above all, the thing for a hot country. We have not got them yet; they are on the way. It is the same with the all-metal plane. I was concerned, Sir, in taking over enemy machines at the end of the war and they were all-metal machines. The enemy had come to the conclusion that metal was superior in every way; and yet we, in a monsoon country where the importance of all-metal machines is surely greater than anywhere else, have been carrying on with our three-ply-wood and fabric machines, and we are only now getting down to all-metal machines.

Then, Sir, I come to the question of large machines. There has been a good deal of praise for *Victorias* and *Hinaidis*. Are these the large machines we are to get? They have only two engines, and they have no reserve of power. They have to go all out, and if one engine fails, they have to come down. There was the case the other day of a large machine, of which the engine failed in Afghanistan, and it had to come down. As good luck would have it, it was able to come down at a place where, although the machine became a "write-off", the pilot and flying officer were not hurt. That accident might equally well have happened on the return journey when the aeroplane was full of people being evacuated, and it might equally well have been forced to descend somewhere in the mountains where all the lives on board would have been lost in a crash. Sir, in civil flying we have got to the three-engine machine, with a reserve of power. It surely is necessary therefore that we should have some of these large machines in the Air Force, with a reserve of power so that they can continue to fly even if one engine has in fact failed.

Sir Victor Sassoon: Not with frozen carburettors.

Mr. Arthur Moore: Why should you have frozen carburettors?

Sir Victor Sassoon: That is what brought the machine down.

Mr. Arthur Moore: You mean that both the carburettors were frozen? That could be avoided. I am aware that there has been some difficulty as regards three-engined machines for military purposes. The position of the third engine might limit the field of fire; but this is not an insuperable difficulty. The main point is that, in this country, we have a frontier force facing very high mountains where there are always possibilities of a war. Therefore you need machines with a high ceiling and with a very great reserve of power. Sir, we are told that it is an important matter to promote air-mindedness amongst the civil population. I would like to see a little more real air-mindedness in military circles. I feel that, in this country, we have got into a definite conservative rut, out of which we have got to jerk ourselves, and to get that completely new angle of vision, of which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff spoke. I have the very greatest admiration and respect for His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and

[Mr. Arthur Moore.]

I think India is fortunate to have such a soldier; but I would like to make a suggestion to him to do something for his greater fame. I would like him, when his time for retirement ultimately comes, to put forward a suggestion that he himself should be the last purely military Commander-in-Chief, and thus add greater lustre to his already great laurels. What I particularly ask of the Army Secretary today is some assurance that, between this year and next year, there will be a reconsideration of the whole problem from a new angle of expenditure,—that is to say, consideration whether it is not possible, by taking as a starting point a radical alteration of proportions between your air arm and the Army, to effect such further reductions in ground troops that, with increased efficiency through the development of your air arm, you will have a very much more modern and powerful striking force. And it is in the light of that you will be able to reconsider the whole of the problem of defence in this country. I know that, already, there is in process of formation, an Indian Air Squadron. That starts with a distinct advantage, as compared with a regiment; that is to say, it starts *de novo*, and is not involved in all this terrible controversy surrounding the question of Indianisation. But if we get away from this, and the question is merely one more or less of Indianisation of existing organizations, we shall find that we shall all come together much more rapidly in finding an agreed solution for our very great problem of defence in this country.

Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (Agra Division: Non-Muhammadan Rural): Sir, I should like to state, very briefly, the reasons which induce me to vote against the motion before the House. It is a great pity that the attention of the House cannot be focussed on a specific issue, that the debate cannot be concentrated on the one question of supreme importance to the country at this stage, namely, the Indianisation of the Army in all its grades, higher and lower.

Pandit Motilal Nehru (Cities of the United Provinces: Non-Muhammadan Urban): Why not?

Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru: The voting cannot be concentrated on that point, because, as Mr. President has decided, it is open to everybody to refer to such matters as he likes on the motion before us. This being the state of things, Sir, I consider it unnecessary to place my point of view at length before the House. If India is to enjoy responsible self-Government, it is necessary that she should be able to rely solely on herself for her own defence. This involves that her Army should consist entirely of Indian officers and Indian soldiers. Now, so far as the policy of replacing British by Indian soldiers is concerned, Government have not shown the least inclination to take a single step in this direction. As regards the policy of Indianising the commissioned ranks, Government claim that they have given effect, in part, to the recommendations of the Skeen Committee. It is true, Sir, that the number of commissioned posts which Indians can occupy annually has been increased in consequence of the report of the Sandhurst Committee, but the speech which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief made last year shows exactly what the effect of the new policy is to be. His Excellency stated that, when Government found that they had available:

“Young officers who have passed out of Sandhurst in larger numbers than can be placed on the cadre of squadrons and company officers in these 8 units (that is the

8 Indianised units), we shall be in a position to commence forming one, or possibly more homogeneous units as far as the officer cadre is concerned, i.e., King's commissioned officers replacing Viceroy's commissioned officers and so forming a unit on the same organisation as obtains in all British units."

This shows, Sir, that the policy is not that of Indianising the Army or of replacing British by Indian officers. Government say to us, in effect, "We do not agree with you that there should be a larger number of Indian officers in the Army, but if you insist on it, compete amongst yourselves. Let one Indian replace another. There are Indians already serving as platoon officers; they are holding Viceroy's commissions; if you are not content with that, have other Indians with King's commissions in their place, but you cannot be allowed, as far as is humanly possible, to occupy positions which are now occupied by British officers." In view of this, Sir, it would be throwing dust into our eyes to say that any step has really been taken in pursuance of the recommendations of the Skeen Committee to Indianise the higher ranks of the Army. The failure of Government to give us an Indianised Army is complete and deliberate. Indeed, they have laid themselves open to the charge that, in accordance with their own declaration, they have done nothing to enable India to enjoy responsible self-government, but, on the other hand, have done all that lies in their power to prevent the solution of the most important question connected with the achievement of self-government. For this reason, Sir, they deserve the severest condemnation of this House.

Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar: Mr. President, I have one additional reason for objecting to the motion that was made by the Honourable the Finance Member. In the Simla session of the Assembly in 1927, I think, the Assembly passed, by an overwhelming majority, an amended Resolution, at my instance, which materially improved upon the recommendations of the Skeen Committee. Nevertheless this Government has flouted that considered decision of the Assembly. Technically, Sir, a Resolution passed by the Assembly is a recommendation, but the convention should be that a recommendation, if it relates to any important matter of policy or principle of national importance is an obligatory Resolution. I really cannot understand what the apparatus of Parliamentary institutions means unless that is agreed to. Therefore, Sir, I submit the clear denial of justice to the Indian people and the refusal to meet the demand made by this House on behalf of the Indian people after the Sandhurst Committee's recommendations, and after an investigation into the whole question, and after the Assembly had repeated its deliberate opinion on many occasions on all these matters,—I say that the decision of the Government to give the go-by to it,—merits only one reply from the Assembly at this moment, and that reply is as severe a censure as possible, and that can only be effected by withholding, *in toto*, the grant which is asked for. I submit, Sir, the military policy, as my friend Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru has just stated, is not only a very unjust policy, but it appears to me that it is clearly calculated really to retard or nullify self-Government in this country.

When, thanks to Sir Denys Bray's kind invitation, some of the Members of this House, including myself, had the privilege of visiting the North West Frontier Province last year, I could see there, how a population which is allowed to be armed, and which goes about as free men, is altogether different from the kind of people that we see here. I have therefore become more than ever convinced that the deliberate policy of the Government in withholding the nationalisation of the Army—I do not like this

[Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar.]

absurd word "Indianisation",—is due to reasons which are quite obvious when a foreign army and a population like the Indian population are in question.

It has sometimes been supposed, it has sometimes been said here, that, except for a few tribes, the Indian people are not fit for military training and military leadership, that there is not sufficient tradition, that they will not be able to do this thing and that thing. All that is, of course, untrue. But I consider that the withholding is due to the fear that, if we were allowed to do it, we would surpass our present masters. Let there be no doubt about it all. Even an old man like myself, who is fifty years old—I feel quite confident that I shall be able, if only I am given the privilege of this Indianisation,—I feel that I shall be quite competent to measure my leadership with my friends on the opposite side. (*Cries of "Hear, hear" from the Congress Party Benches.*) Even at this age I am quite prepared to do that. The Government policy is entirely due to the fact that they know perfectly well that, if India gets her national army, there is an end of foreign domination. That was brought home to me and to my colleagues in the most convincing fashion during our extended tour in the North West Frontier Province. What we saw there was really a revelation to me of what Indians are capable of and how Hindu-Muslim unity can be forged. And it can be forged easily on the anvil of a national army and not as easily upon a secular basis. If there is any financial difficulty, if they have got any doubts as to the experiment of Indianisation,—I do not see why Government, in the Army Department, do not agree to license some of us to run private military colleges. We are quite willing to do so; we are willing to bear the expense and the burden of it; and if we could be licensed by the Government to do it, we should undertake that experiment, and the failure would not be laid to the charge of the very wise and very expert Government who are responsible for the destinies, at the present moment, of India.

We all know that Great Britain was not prepared for war when she began and carried on the war against Germany. We know perfectly well that hundreds of thousands of Englishmen, who had not had any training whatever, simply jumped into it and joined the Army. They fought beautifully and they did wonders. Why should it be assumed that Indians could not be trained in that easy and simple fashion? And what is the training that we want, and what are the wonderful armies that we have got to meet in Asia on this side and on that side? Of course, I could understand the level of efficiency in England, as against French and German armies which may be of a different standard, but in Asiatic conditions, the level of efficiency is purely Asiatic, assuming it to be different, and I think we could train ourselves very well. I see why it is in other Departments of the Government, namely, the civil, the revenue, or the judiciary, things are slowly thrown open to Indians, but somehow there is claimed to be a racial inefficiency on the side of the military. It can only be due to the fact that, if the key positions are surrendered to Indians there is an end to this Government and Swaraj is automatically gained. That can be the only reason. I have the greatest pleasure, therefore, in associating myself with the opposition led by Mr. Jinnah, and opposing, whole-heartedly, this Demand which has been made by the Finance Member.

I only want to say one word more, and that is on the financial side. I think it was altogether unintentional, but I am afraid Sir George Schuster, the new Finance Member, in his very clear financial statement, for which, along with other Members, I am indebted to him—has made it clear to us that, for some years, Rs. 1½ crores or something like that, was altogether unnecessary, and was hidden in the military section of the Budget, because that sum of money is going to be impounded for the purpose of the new equipment expenditure of Rs. 10 crores. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the expenditure under the military head has been certainly more at least by a crore or a crore and a half for as many years as possible in the past. This was most objectionable. I think that, unless there is Indianisation, the burden on the taxpayer will not be decreased. We want a less expensive Army. We do not want a costly Army and Indianisation is necessary on that score. Indianisation is necessary on the head of national security. Indianisation is necessary because the Army, after all, is only a method of preserving the peace, and if you want peace, you must have a national army and not a foreign army. It is a tragedy that Indian sepoy should be officered by foreign people. That is a kind of thing which I was not, when I was a young student, able to feel the tragedy of. But fortunately, in the spacious days of the Swaraj fight, we have been able to feel what an unspeakable humiliation, what a deep disgrace it is. Therefore, no true Indian, whatever his other views, can help coming to the conclusion that the military policy of the Government, of all policies of the Government, is the most indefensible and unjust, and notwithstanding the speech of my Honourable friend Mr. Moore, I must say that I cannot congratulate the Army Department and the Government on their policy and I cordially vote against this grant which has been proposed by the Honourable the Finance Member. (Applause.)

Diwan Chaman Lall (West Punjab: Non-Muhammadan): I think it is but just and proper that all the speeches (*Honourable Members*: "Louder please") should be brief, for this, if for no other reason, that the tale, the woeful tale, of military exploitation of this country is a long one. I look upon the Army Budget which has been presented by the Honourable Mr. Young (*Honourable Members*: "Louder please") as a painful attempt to produce the dead rabbit of retrenchment out of an empty hat. (Laughter.) The Honourable Mr. Young has a very picturesque personality and it is almost unkind to say a word against him because of his meek, mild, Gandhian manner. (Laughter.) But he is not so innocuous in the matter of his Department.

Mr. K. Ahmed (Rajshahi Division: Muhammadan Rural): Personal attack is not allowed.

Diwan Chaman Lall: When he was speaking this morning, I was reminded of the far away days of my youth when I was a young man. (Laughter.) There used to be a song:

"Where, Oh! Where, is my little dog gone?
Where, Oh! Where is he?"

and I surveyed the House, this morning, and I surveyed the House, this afternoon, and I asked, where is the Commander-in-Chief? What has happened to the Commander-in-Chief? Why is he not here to face this House over the Department of which he is the head? I regret very much

[Diwan Chaman Lall.]

that he is not here, as it was his custom in the olden days to come and face the music on the floor of this House, and he has left the poor, simple soldier man, Mr. Young, to the tender mercies of the Opposition. (Laughter.)

Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney: He is not a soldier man.

Diwan Chaman Lall: After the private and confidential conversation which Mr. Moore had with Colonel Gidney—his speech amounted to no more—I feel that there was a great deal which was said by him that sent the Honourable Mr. Crerar into a fervent attitude of prayer, but which sent most of us into despair. Mr. Moore's criticism, however, was a detail and I feel that the subject matter of this debate must be prominently brought home to the Opposition Benches. The subject matter of the debate consists of three points. The first is the question of the political policy involved in the military budget. The second is the racial hatred shown in the military budget; and the third is the question of the financial lunacy displayed by the Department concerned. Now, let me take the first point. As regards the question of political policy, let me remind the House of what the Commander-in-Chief said, I think it was last year, on the Skeen Committee's recommendations which had been whittled down by the Government. These are the words used by the Commander-in-Chief:

"For the future the rate of further advance depended upon the Indians themselves."

That is the first statement he makes. Then he goes on to say:

"The question of increase would necessarily arise when the number of qualified candidates forthcoming was greater than the vacancies."

Now, the first postulate that he lays down is that the question of Indianisation depended upon the Indians and the second is that the rate of increase depended upon the number of candidates that were forthcoming in order to fill the vacancies. What do the Government of India do in order to provide the necessary qualifications for the candidates who are forthcoming and who are wanting to come forward. Now, the Skeen Committee suggested the setting up of military colleges in India in order that the young men who are desirous of going into the Army should be given the necessary facilities for qualifying themselves. That recommendation is turned down and yet the Commander-in-Chief comes and says that the question of increase depends only upon the number of candidates who come forward. How can these candidates come forward unless you provide the necessary amount of educational facilities for their training. When we ask you to set up a military college and press for Indianisation—nationalisation as Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar said, your reply is that there are not a sufficient number of candidates. We say—set up your college and we will guarantee the men. The Honourable Mr. Jinnah, when he spoke on this motion, undertook to guarantee the right type of men coming forward to take up the officering of the Indian Army, provided you give the facilities for their training. You turn that proposition down, and yet, illogically enough, you say that the increase will depend upon the number of candidates who are forthcoming and that this depends upon the Indians themselves. How are you helping? How have you helped in the past the Indians who have trained themselves for the army? I submit, Sir, it is not now a question

of the Indianisation of the Army. It is a question of the Europeanisation of the Army. Honourable Members when they examine the military budget will discover that, far from there being an increase of Indian officers, there has been an increase of 43 European officers in the Army. I do not know who prepared this budget, whether Mr. Young had a hand in the preparation of it. If Honourable Members will turn to page 13, they will discover it stated that there has been an increase of 33 under Officers with King's Commission and 206 under British other ranks. That statement, I submit, is wrong. The Army is run on such inefficient basis that they cannot even total up their own figures. It is not an increase of 33. It is an increase of 43, according to the figures that you have supplied to us. Has there been an increase in regard to the Indians? I want to put that question to the Honourable Member over there. The answer can only be this—that there has not been a similar increase in the number of Indians officering the Indian army. We ask for Indianisation. What do we get? We get 43 Europeans added on to the cadre. Look at the expenditure side. When I said it was financial lunacy, I was not very far wrong, for if you examine the question carefully, you will find that there are items put down in the budget under the heading Miscellaneous and incidental expenditure. Nobody knows what this miscellaneous and incidental expenditure is. It goes up to a total of nearly 80 lakhs. Who has the spending of this miscellaneous and incidental expenditure? I want to ask the Honourable the Finance Member whether he, when he comes to examine the Budget, would be a party in the interests of the country and in the interests of honest and decent finance, to a budget of this kind being presented to this House. These are not the only items. As Honourable Members would discover, there are other items. One was discovered by Colonel Gidney. Other items are hidden away in this fashion and no details are given as to what they mean or what they relate to, except a very general indication. Is there any business concern which spends 55·10 crores and, spends nearly two crores for lower Army commands, and spends one crore for the headquarters commands at Delhi and Simla, 3 crores out of this 55·10 crores spent on providing red tapes for gentlemen sitting over there, for keeping them in the cool atmosphere of Simla? Is it not financial lunacy that this should be allowed?

Mr. K. Ahmed: Why do Hindus and Muhammadans fight?

Diwan Ohaman Lal: Look again at the racial hatred found in this budget. Let us take the question of expenditure on the British troops. You have 60,000 British troops. You have nearly 7,000 officers with the King's Commission, out of which there are 88 Indian officers—only 88 out of 7,000. This is the extent of Indianisation and you have considerably over 200,000 Indians including the followers. What you allow for the European part of it is a small matter of 10½ crores for kit and allowances and pay, and what you allow for over 200,000 Indians is a matter of nearly 5 crores, and out of that 10½ crores, 4 crores is spent on officers with the King's Commission. Is it or is it not top heavy expenditure? How much of it could we not save if these delightful gentlemen, who come here for a five years' holiday, were to be sent back? As I said, Mr. Maeworth Young is very meek and mild here. In dealing with this subject he is not so. He follows the principle of the gentleman who invented a Heaven full of *Houris* and said: "Well, you should be as good as you can in this world, because you can be as bad as you like in

[Diwan Chaman Lall.]

the next world". (Laughter.) Good as he chooses to be on the floor of this House but, in the actual administration of this Department there is no word of condemnation strong enough that I can use for him—not personally but in his professional capacity. It has been suggested that we are bringing the Budget within reasonable proportions. Are we doing that? The proposition is that, for the next few years, the Army Budget is to be confined to 55·10 crores. The Inchcape Committee reported that, within a series of years, you must bring down your expenditure to within 50 crores. That is not taken advantage of. Actually 3·34 crores are saved because of new schemes and new organisation, but is that a saving? No. They save it with one hand and spend it with the other. On the other hand you have 55·10 crores budgeted for. But is it not a fact that the expenditure in England to-day amounts to 13½ crores and has increased from 9 odd crores, and is it not a fact that you would, working on that basis, with the ratio as it is, be saving a crore and a half? Why do you not allow for that crore and a half? In reality, under normal conditions, the figure should be not 55·10 but 57. Is that saving? Is that retrenchment? It is nothing of the kind. On the other hand, under the guise of a new name, the expenditure is kept up. Our grouse is that the Army expenditure is extravagant. Crores of rupees, taken from the poor peasant of this country, are used for keeping a British Army of occupation here, for which we have no use. But it is of very great use for Imperial purposes. That charge has been made, and I want the Honourable Member over there to deny that charge, if he can. Is the Army in India purely for defensive Indian purposes or is it for British Imperial purposes? I hope I shall hear a word from him.

4 P.M.

Not only have I made that charge, but it is substantiated by what the Secretary of State has himself said on one occasion, that it is correct that the Indian Army is not being used purely for defensive purposes, but mainly for serving the ends of British Imperialism. Why should India, if that is the position, be called upon to pay for the upkeep of this Army? I wish to draw the attention of the Honourable Member over there—meek and mild as he appears—I almost compared him with Mahatma Gandhi in that respect—to where the money comes from. I wish to touch his heart. This is not merely a question of polemics or forensic ability. It is a question of the life and prosperity and the happiness of the poorest people in this country. Does he know where the money comes from? Let me tell him where the money comes from. He merely signs the cheques or initials the figures for the Budget. This is evidence given by a gentleman before the Agricultural Commission:

"In the course of my co-operative work in villages I studied the economic condition of cultivators in a few typical villages of the Ranchi district: my inquiry revealed that the condition of the rural population of that district is most deplorable; for about six months in a year the people live on half rations; they even have to live on leaves of trees. Their cattle also starve from March to July where there are no forest lands."

This money is taken from people who have to bear this tremendous incidence of taxation, in order to keep a British Army of Occupation in this country. It is taken from people who have to live for a part of the year, according to the evidence tendered, on the leaves of trees. If no other reason will appeal to the Honourable Members opposite, will the argument of humanity appeal to them? Will those gentlemen realise

that, in order to provide little red tabs for themselves, there are people in this country who have got to go without food? Let me remind him again of one other incident. It is said by the Committee itself :

“To a very great extent, the cultivator in India labours not for profit nor for a net return, but for subsistence.”

And it is these people, Sir, who are providing the 55·10 crores to keep the Honourable Members in safety in this country. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar is perfectly correct when he says that there can be no Swaraj in this country unless there is first and foremost a military Swaraj, unless we make up our minds to force the hands of Government to hand over to us the Army of defence. They know perfectly well that they have no intention of handing over to us this Army of defence, because it is not a question which is purely Indian. So far as they are concerned, it is a question of high military Imperial policy. When my friend over there (pointing to Mr. Arthur Moore) in his confidential conversations with Colonel Gidney (*Lieut.-Colonel H. A. J. Gidney*: “I had no conversations!”) with regard to the Air Force, raised questions of detail, I thought that these were matters that did not concern us. What concerns us is that you should place the Budget at the disposal of this Assembly and take a vote upon it as a final vote. To-day every anna of this vote, barring the item that is now put before us, is non-votable by this House. If you are so sure of the justice of your position, so certain about the righteousness of your position, why do you not allow this Budget to be voted upon on the floor of this House and take the opinion of men who are really the representatives of the people as to what they really feel about this matter? I submit that, when Honourable Members talk over there about Bolshevism and Communism and the confiscation of property, will they reply to me when I ask them, what else is it but confiscation of property when you tax the people and do not allow them a voice in this matter? What else is it but pure, unadulterated confiscation of property practised by Honourable Members opposite, who are ready enough to throw a stone at the same practice prevailing in other countries?

I submit, Sir, that no non-official who has the interests of this country at heart, who has the interests of those people who are starving, who have to live on the leaves of trees for a part of the year, according to that official report, I submit that no man who believes that his country must be first and foremost, and that his own people must be the dictators of the destiny of this country, has any right to do anything else but reject the vote that has been asked for. (Applause.)

Dr. B. S. Moonje (Nagpur Division: Non-Muhammadan): Honourable Sir, (Laughter), I rise to oppose this demand and I shall record my vote against it.

Mr President: It is not yet time! (Laughter.)

Dr. B. S. Moonje: It is an important subject; it is a vital subject that concerns our very existence as a nation, and I do not think I should give a silent vote.

I join my friend, Mr. Jinnah, in all the censure that he has inflicted upon the Government as regards their halting policy about Indianisation and the establishment of a military college in India. I would not therefore like to say any more on the subject, but I have noted one remark of

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my Honourable friend Mr. Young in that connection and that remark is that the military colleges cannot be established, because there is no regular flow of competent Indian boys to compete for entrance examination to Sandhurst. In one breath he says that there is no regular flow of competent Indians, and in the next breath they have ignored entirely the recommendations in this respect of the two Committees over which we have spent a lot of money. It is those two Committees, the Shea Committee and the Skeen Committee, that have shown us the way as to how we can get a regular flow of competent Indians, and it is exactly that very point which has been ignored, and it is for this reason that I join in the censure upon the Government, because the Government have not yet given up their policy of callous indifference towards the question of promotion of military education of Indian boys. What did the Shea Committee recommend? What did the Committee suggest?

The Committee suggested that:

"The education for the purpose of spreading military training and the inspiration of military service among the manhood of India should commence in schools."

Has anything been done in furtherance of the same? In further elucidation of the point this is what the Committee says later on:

"In order to achieve the greatest measure of success in this form of national education, it is essential that it should commence at as early an age as is possible, when the mind is most receptive. When a man is full grown, it is no easy matter to alter his outlook, and to graft new ideals upon those he has already set up for himself. The seed must be sown before his mind is formed, and for this reason it appears to us that the schools, colleges and universities offer the most suitable medium through which the first phase of this education can be carried out."

Has anything been done to give effect to this proposal in this country? But what is being done in England in this respect? I have been studying, about the public schools in England. I have been hearing much about the character-forming training that is said to be given in them. I was wondering what it is that is regarded as a speciality of public schools, and what it is that is lacking in our schools in India wherein does the distinguishing difference lie, and what it is that we cannot reproduce in our Indian schools? I find that the only speciality, the only tangible speciality which characterises the public schools in England and which does not exist in our Indian schools is something like this. Take, for instance, the Harrow school as a sample of the public schools of England. Along with book education, which is practically like what we receive in our schools here, very special attention is paid to the teaching of musketry and swimming. "All boys have to qualify in every term in musketry on the miniature range and all have to pass in swimming, unless exempted by medical certificate." I am quoting here from the Year Book of the Public Schools of England. That is one of the specialities of these Public Schools. But why should they particularly care for teaching musketry? They have got to keep in view the need of having to supply a regular flow of competent British boys for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. They have to prepare boys for the Army in these schools and therefore:

"There is a special system of preparation for boys who are intending to compete for the Army and Navy examinations. It consists of special Woolwich and Sandhurst classes, in which boys devote themselves exclusively to the subjects of these examinations. Lectures are given weekly in musketry."

These are what are called Army classes,

Is there any such thing instituted in India so that there may spring up a regular flow of competent Indian boys for Woolwich and Sandhurst. "Every boy in the lowest forms of the school"—such preparations are made from the lowest forms—"every boy in the lowest forms of the school goes through a course of gymnasium, attending at least thrice a week without a charge." Besides that they have started what is called a system of Officers' Training Corps:

"All boys above the fourth form, who have attained the age of 15 and are of the requisite physique, are required to join the corps unless specially exempted by the head master. Attendance in camp is compulsory for all cadets of, or nearing, 16 unless exempted. There are two weekly corps parades and as a rule two field days in each term."

Shooting is a subject on which much emphasis is laid in the public schools. "On miniature ranges and for proficients on open ranges. All boys are expected to pass in shooting each term. Swimming and musketry are taught gratuitously and are compulsory." This is the tangible speciality of these public schools of England about which we have heard so much and which is entirely wanting in India. This is the distinguishing difference between the educational system of England and that of India.

Colonel J. D. Crawford (Bengal: European): Why don't you spend your private money for these things?

Dr. B. S. Moonje: Does the Honourable Member think that if the Government were to come out with a scheme and start such public schools, there will not be sufficient response from the monied classes of India? But what is then the Government for and for what purpose does it take revenue from us?

Colonel J. D. Crawford: Why don't you do it yourself?

Diwan Chaman Lall: What is the Government here for?

Dr. B. S. Moonje: I have put a test case to the Government in which the Government is going to be fully tested. I have put forward a scheme, and I am going to test the sincerity of the Government in the near future. I will see whether the Government is going to encourage us or repress us.

Mr. K. Ahmed: What is the use of learning shooting alone?

Dr. B. S. Moonje: I will not tell in my own words why shooting is so very essential. I will presently tell in the words of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Birdwood, why shooting is insisted upon. Thus the general features of the curriculum of education in these public schools in England are boarding or hostel system where boys between 12 and 16 are admitted and stay together. Most of the responsibility for maintaining discipline and keeping up the organisation in proper form is thrown on the students themselves. That is one of the specialities. Along with the book education, particular attention is paid to the physical training of boys and to their taking part in school games such as footballs, cricket, rowing, etc. Boys seem to be required to learn swimming with particular care. The reason why they are bent on making swimming one of the most important items in their curriculum of education to be attended to with particular care is that England being a small island, surrounded

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on all sides by the sea, boys are required to be sailors for the defence of their island home from foreign aggression and so swimming must be taught to British boys. (Laughter.) Shooting on miniature and long ranges, and drill are also taught with particular care. In schools like Harrow and Eton there are classes known as Army classes, where boys are specially trained to compete for examination for Sandhurst, Woolwich, Cranwell and other military colleges for King's commissions. In some schools musketry and swimming is practically compulsory. If there is a regular flow of competent boys in England, it is the result of proper provision having been made as regards their preliminary training, etc. Is there any such preparatory provision made in India? My Honourable friend, Mr. K. Ahmed, asked me why I am insisting upon teaching shooting as a necessary qualification of the education of boys. I am going to reply to him in the words of our present Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. K. Ahmed: You want to train Hindu boys.

Dr. B. S. Moonje: I do not make any distinction between Hindu boys and Mussalman boys. All are Indians in the public administration of the country. I do not make any distinction, in spite of what you might say. Teaching of shooting is to be common to all, Hindus, Christians, Muhammadans, Parsis, in fact to all who regard India as their motherland.

Mr. K. Ahmed: Then, they will shoot one another.

Dr. B. S. Moonje: Here is what the Commander-in-Chief says with regard to shooting. He says:

"Remember."

(I hope my Honourable friend Mr. K. Ahmed will remember this):

"That the rifle still means everything to the soldier and that good marksmanship will still result in winning battles, while failure to shoot straight may easily result in losing them."

Therefore, if you want to undertake the responsibility of the defence of the country, you must be prepared to win battles. Accuracy in rifle shooting is one of the qualifications that makes a soldier win battles. The Commander-in-Chief says that the rifle still means everything to the soldier and that good marksmanship will result still in winning battles and that failure to shoot straight may result in your losing battles. The clear inference is that you cannot undertake the responsibility of defending the country, until you have acquired proficiency in rifle shooting. The Commander-in-Chief says further:

"Never let any one persuade you that the rifle is of less importance than formerly. It is still the individual arm of the cavalry and infantry soldier and is likely always to be so.

Remember too that to be efficient with his weapons the soldier must be physically fit, for the brain will not be alert unless the body is active."

Another great soldier, General Sir Ian Hamilton, from his own personal experience, says:

"All my own bias is in favour of training. The best energies of my life have been devoted to fire tactics and the cult of marksmanship."

This is the cult I want to see introduced in India among the boys. This is the cult on which the national system of education, national military system of education should be based in India. He says further:

"The significance of our own lives is strangely hidden away from us. Since the battle of Majuba Hill when the British lost two-thirds of their force and the Boers only lost one man; when I myself was crippled for life as a penalty for being a bit slow in taking aim; ever since those days I have preached and fought and begged and prayed for musketry."

I for my part have preached and fought and I am again going to preach, I am going to beg and I am going to pray for introducing among our boys this cult of rifle shooting so that there must be a regular flow of competent Indian boys coming out from our schools to receive the requisite military training in Sandhurst and Woolwich. Is it a new thing that I am telling this House? It may be a new thing in India in these days, but it is quite a common thing in England and therefore it is that there is a regular flow of competent boys in England for the Army. I will give you another instance in the matter, the instance of Japan. Japan is a country which had got a close analogy to India in regard to its sociology. Japan is a country where there was a caste system on practically the same lines as in India. In Japan, hardly 50 years ago, as in India, there was only one caste called Samurai, which alone had the privilege of wielding arms. Other castes were debarred from bearing arms. There were thus the military classes and the non-military classes, that is the martial classes and the non-martial classes as you are distinguishing at present in India. I am not going to quote here the evidence of a Hindu, because it will be considered partial. I am going to give the opinion of an Englishman. Robert P. Porter, in his book on "Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power", 1918, page 315, says:

"But in the field the latter (Samurai) showed no superiority to the conscripts and experience in fact proved that efficiency as a soldier depended entirely in adequate military training and not on any martial spirit or instinct supposed to be inherited by the Samurai and not by the Heimin (the common folk or the civilians who had not the right to bear arms)."

The Heimins were like us regarded as belonging to the non-martial classes. I am not supposed to belong to the martial class though I am a Mahratta Brahmin who, as a caste, along with other Mahratta castes, had distinguished itself as capable of producing leaders of men on battle-fields, not very long ago. I do not know what respect other people have for the so-called non-martial classes to which I am proud to belong. So far, however, as Japan was concerned, she was not indifferent to—she was not so hopeless about the so-called—non-martial classes as our Government is at the present day towards us. What did Japan do to inculcate militarism in her nationals, including what were supposed to be non-martial classes also. What did Japan do to prepare her nationals for self-defence against the onslaughts of the western nations? "The inculcation of militarism" in the schools is being brought about in Japan in a most scientific way. Though European games like tennis and football are becoming popular, "yet the national pastimes continue to be *keudo* or fencing and '*judo*' or *jiu-jitsu*, or wrestling, as it is called, and both in addition to the physical development are supposed to tend to keep alive the old Samurai spirit. Incidentally, a boy is compelled to take up the one or the other in all of the schools, save primary institutions where less

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strenuous exercises are given. Often the fact that the students of all the schools wear uniform tends to increase the group spirit along military lines." Is the Government here spending a single pie over subjects like these in India? Japan, a small country, with less revenue, is spending all this money on inculcating militarism in her boys so that they, like the boys of the western nations, may be fully trained and equipped for entering the Army. And here in India we are simply mourning and crying from day to day that there is no regular flow of competent Indian boys to enter the Army. It seems to be nobody's business here to create that flow. Further, Sir, we find deficiency here of military officers for giving us training; but in Japan, "military instruction at the hands of a regular Army officer attached specially to each school plays an important part in the curriculum. At least once a week each boy receives a thorough drilling in military tactics." Is there a single military officer here attached to any school, so that the boys may be trained to supply a continuous flow of competent officers for the Army? Is there one military officer here attached to any school for inculcating this kind of militarism in our boys, belonging to non-martial classes as they are supposed to be? In Japan, again:

"Besides the Compulsory Military Drill and exercise all middle school boys have to practise either fencing or *judo*. The fencing is done with bamboos in the style of the two handed Japanese sword. So that it consists chiefly of heavy slashing, the head and body being protected."

I am quoting here from the Educational system of Japan by W. H. Start, M.A., Bombay official publication, page 137:

"In the secondary and higher schools, rifle practice is also taught. Military Drill was imposed in 1886 and has been cheerfully taken up by boys of all ages. The older boys are supplied with full sized rifles, knapsacks and other military equipments. So that the average middle school boy would make without further training a most excellent soldier."

Sir Victor Sassoon: Have they got conscription in Japan?

Dr. B. S. Moonje: Yes. All boys are required to undergo military training, of some kind or the other.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya: They flow in voluntarily.

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"Manly courage, virility, endurance, willingness and even eagerness to lay down one's life for the sake of the Empire, all these are excellent things, and if this training has made them chauvinistic, it has at least made them public-spirited, thinking of duties as well as rights." Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power, by Robert P. Porter, 1918, pages 315, 138 and 139.

This is what other people have been doing in their own countries in order to prepare their country for self-defence. But, here, we are all satisfied with appointing Committees, spending money over them like water, talking on their reports and recommendations, and then saying that those recommendations give no enlightened and practical lead at all. Everything is gone, everything has melted away, and nothing tangible is left for us. Is there anything left for us in a tangible form? I ask my friend the Army Secretary. The Skeen Committee Report says:

"It must be recognised that the system of education in India differs so widely from that in England that Indian boys are at a real disadvantage in complying with a test, such as is required for entrance into Sandhurst."

If that is so, what has been done, so that the Indian boy may not be at a disadvantage in complying with the test as compared with the English boy? The Report further states :

"The ordinary schools and colleges of India do not provide these special advantages (physical training and a measure of military training) nor does the ordinary curriculum in these institutions cover the subjects of the Army entrance examination."

Therefore, the Committee reports :

"It follows that material reforms will be required in the matter of educational organization and methods before Indian schools and colleges can hope to produce a regular flow of Indian boys fitted in every way to hold the King's Commission."

One of the recommendations, therefore, of the Skeen Committee is to the following effect :

"The Government of India should impress upon educational authorities the paramount national importance of reforming the system of education in India with a view to developing in the pupils of the ordinary schools and colleges those characteristics so essential in an Army officer, to which little or no attention is at present paid by them and should appeal to them to reorganise the institutions under their control to this end."

And, therefore, they have laid a charge upon the Government of India. They say :

"The main responsibility must rest upon the educational authorities and experts to whom, however, it is imperative that Government should give a clear lead in emphasising the paramount national importance of reforming the educational system of India in the directions we have indicated."

I ask, Sir, a particular, specific question now. What lead has the Government of India given for the reformation of the educational system, as recommended by the Skeen Committee? It is the Government of India that appointed the Commission, and it is that Committee which has reported. It is that Committee which has laid a charge upon the Government of India—and no unreasonable or unpractical charge too—and how has that responsibility been discharged by the Government of India? Have they formulated any comprehensive scheme, have they formulated any broad policy of national military education in India? So far as my information goes, nothing of the kind has been done. Only, my Honourable friend, the Secretary for Education, says that he is prepared to condescend to do us the favour of doing the post office work of forwarding the reports of these debates to the authorities concerned. We are not going to be satisfied with that post office work. There is a separate officer in charge of the post office, and he will do the post office work for us, and we look not to the Secretary in the Education Department and not to the Army Secretary to do that work, and they cannot ask us to be satisfied with mere post office work.

I may also say, when I am charging the Government with indifference, that I am not oblivious of the difficulties that stand in the way. As a practical man of the world, one has to take the difficulties into consideration and also the means that lie at our disposal. The Committee say :

"We recognise that at the present time there may be serious difficulties in the way of establishing Cadet Corps in all schools in India, but a beginning can be made even in schools with the teaching of elementary principles of civic duty and with physical training and elementary military drill."

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For instance, if I were to say, to start with, that a cadet corps should be established in every school and college throughout the length and breadth of India; then I can quite understand if you say that it will be an unpractical proposition. I can understand that. But I feel confident that, if I were in your place, if I had got the power that you wield and the purse that you command, in ten years' time—I am sure in ten years' time—a *bania* boy would be turned into as good a soldier as a British *bania* boy or a London shop-keeper has proved to be in the wild hilly country of the ferocious Pathans. Mr. Birla is sitting here now, and I have seen the little experiment which he has made in Calcutta, and I testify from my personal experience to the experiment that he has done. Let anybody go and see his boys in the gymnasium class and then say if he can recognise the *bania* boy in them. We do recognise those difficulties of the Government at the same time. But I do not like to exaggerate those difficulties, because exaggeration of those difficulties in a way adds almost an insult to the injury already given. And unfortunately, such an exaggeration I find in the diaries of the late Commander-in-Chief of India, the late Lord Rawlinson. In the book on the life of Lord Rawlinson in which his Diary has been generously quoted, he says:

"If the Indian Army is to be completely Indianised, we want over two thousand officers, and it is more than doubtful whether a sufficient number of the right type of Indian will ever come forward to supply the military requirements of the Army."

In a country of thirty crores! In a country of 80 crores he cannot find three thousand fit men.

"... for the Indian of the officer class, except a few of the better class people of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, dislikes discipline and hard physical work and is not imbued with any keenness for a military career. The love of leadership and soldiering is one of the foremost characteristics of the British public school boy of the present day"

I am going to show you presently from a British source how the British boy was in days gone by when he was in a similar position to which we are reduced today in India.

"... The love of leadership and soldiering is one of the foremost characteristics of the British public school boy of the present day, a form of ambition which is quite absent in the average Indian boy"

—as it was absent, I would add, in the British boy of olden times—

"Even if we succeeded in obtaining the required number of young Indians to come forward, educated them at Dehra Dun, passed them through Sandhurst and eventually appointed them to regiments, it is practically certain that after 4, 5 or 6 years' service in the Army, they would become tired of the discipline and the discomforts and would send in their papers and return to their houses."

This, Sir, has been written of Indians knowing, as the writer should have known, that there is, in India, a community called the Mahrattas. What that community was hardly 75 or 100 years ago, I am going to show you presently from a British witness. Here Lord Rawlinson further says in the same strain of pessimism:

"The young British gentleman enters the British Army for the love of leading the men of his unit. The Indian boy, certainly at present enters the Army firstly to serve alongside British officers whom he respects; and secondly, for the *Izzat* and the privileged position which a King's commission gives him amongst his fellow-Indians."

That position of *Issat* is quite novel, quite new to us as if it was not known to us when we were the commanders of our own Armies!

He says further:

"I think this will be true in the future too. He does not now, and I am afraid never will, enter the Army for the love of the profession of arms,"

—I am going to tell you something about that presently—

"prepared to lay down his life for the sake of the land of his birth. In the absence of a definitely Indian patriotism, an efficient and completely Indianised Army becomes unthinkable."

Mr. President: Perhaps the Honourable Member might like to continue tomorrow?

Dr. B. S. Moonje: I should like to, Sir, because I have much more to say.

The Assembly then adjourned till Eleven of the Clock on Friday, the 15th March, 1929,