

TENTH REPORT  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE  
(2014-2015)

(SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

*[Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Twenty-second Report (15th Lok Sabha) on Threat Perception and preparedness of the Forces including incursion on borders, coordination mechanism with the Central Armed Police Forces and Border connectivity through Road, Air and Rail]*

*Presented to Lok Sabha on 13.08.2015  
Laid in Rajya Sabha on 13.08.2015*



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COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON DEFENCE (2014-15)

Maj Gen B C Khanduri, AVSM (Retd) – *Chairperson*

MEMBERS

*Lok Sabha*

2. Shri Suresh C. Angadi
3. Shri Shrirang Appa Barne
4. Shri Dharambir
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19. Capt. Amarinder Singh (Retd.)
20. Shri A.P. Jithender Reddy
21. Shri Hemendra Chandra\*
22. Shri Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore\*\*
23. Smt. Pratyusha Rajeshwari Singh<sup>§</sup>

\* Sad Demise on 05.09.2014.

\*\* Ceased to be Member of the Committee on 09.11.2014.

<sup>§</sup> Nominated w.e.f. 22.12.2014.

(iv)

*Rajya Sabha*

24. Shri K.R. Arjunan
25. Shri Anand Sharma<sup>#</sup>
26. Shri Rajeev Chandrasekhar
27. Shri A.U. Singh Deo
28. Shri Harivansh
29. Shri Vinay Katiyar
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31. Shri Madhusudan Mistry
32. Smt. Ambika Soni
33. Shri Tarun Vijay
34. Shri Narendra Budania<sup>@</sup>

SECRETARIAT

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2. Shri D.S. Malha — *Director*
3. Shri A.K. Srivastava — *Additional Director*
4. Shri Rahul Singh — *Under Secretary*
5. Smt. Rekha Sinha — *Executive Assistant*

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<sup>#</sup> Nominated *w.e.f.* 08.10.2014.

<sup>@</sup> Ceased to be Member of the Committee on 08.10.2014.

## INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Defence (2014-15) having been authorized by the Committee to present the Report on their behalf, present this Tenth Report of the Committee on 'Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Twenty-second Report (15th Lok Sabha) on Threat Perception and preparedness of the Forces including incursion on borders, coordination mechanism with the Central Armed Police Forces and Border connectivity through Road, Air and Rail'.

2. The Twenty-second Report was presented to Lok Sabha and laid in Rajya Sabha on 18 February 2014. It contained 41 recommendations/observations. The Ministry of Defence furnished Action Taken Replies on all the recommendations/observations on 15 July 2014.

3. The Draft Action Taken Report was considered and adopted by the Committee at their sitting held on 10 August 2015.

4. An analysis of action taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Twenty-second Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (15th Lok Sabha) is given in Appendix-II.

NEW DELHI;  
10 August, 2015  
19 Shrawana, 1937 (Saka)

MAJ GEN B C KHANDURI, AVSM (RETD),  
Chairperson,  
Standing Committee on Defence.





## CHAPTER I

### REPORT

This Report of the Standing Committee on Defence deals with Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Twenty-second Report (15th Lok Sabha) on 'Threat Perception and preparedness of the Forces including incursion on borders, coordination mechanism with the Central Armed Police Forces and Border connectivity through Road, Air and Rail', which was presented to Lok Sabha and laid in Rajya Sabha on 18.02.2014.

2. The Committee's Twenty-second Report (15th Lok Sabha) contained 41 recommendations/observations on the following aspects:—

Para No./Nos.	Subject
1, 2 & 3	Introductory
4	Truncated Defence Force Strength
5	Strength of Equipments
6	Role of Indian Army
7, 8 & 9	Role of Research Establishment and Other Organisation
10	Role of Indian Air Force
11 & 12	Inordinate delay in induction of Light Combat/Other Aircraft
13	Procurement Procedure
14, 15, 16, 17 & 18	Role of DRDO
19	Insufficient Indigenization in HAL
20	Safety of Indian Water
21 & 22	Effective coordination mechanism
23	Expeditious installation of Radars
24	Safety of Vessels
25	International Cooperation and Goodwill
26, 27 & 28	Coordination Mechanism with Central Armed Police Forces
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 & 41	Border Connectivity

3. Action Taken Replies have been received from the Government in respect of all the recommendations/observations contained in the Report. The replies have been examined and the same have been categorised as follows:—

- (i) (a) Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by the Government (please see Chapter II):

Para Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 41

(23 Recommendations)

- (b) Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by the Government and commented upon (please see Chapter II):

Para No. 4, 6, 13, 15, 17, 20, 23, 40

(8 Recommendations)

- (ii) Recommendations/Observations which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of the replies received from the Government (please see Chapter III):

Para No. 5, 14, 27, 28, 39

(5 Recommendations)

- (iii) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which replies of Government have not been accepted by the Committee which require reiteration and commented upon (please see Chapter IV):

Para Nos. 11, 22, 29, 34, 35

(5 Recommendations)

- (iv) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which Government have furnished interim replies (please see Chapter V):

Para No. Nil

(00 Recommendation)

4. The Committee desire that the Ministry's response to their comments made in Chapter 1 of this Report to be furnished to them at the earliest and in any case not later than six months of the presentation of this Report.

## A. Truncated Defence Force Strength

### Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 4)

5. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee are dismayed to learn that against the satisfactory picture given by the Ministry, the three forces are deficient in its strength of officers. The strength of other ranks, Sailors and Airmen are also short then the authorized strength. Against the sanctioned strength of 52859, the held strength of officers in the Army is 43475. It is apparent that the Army is a truncated force having a recorded shortage of 9384 officers. Similarly, in the other ranks the Army short of 20561 personnel. Likewise, the Navy is short of 1561 officers and 11825 sailors. The position of Air Force is relatively eased, though they also have shortage of 659 officers and 3674 Airmen. In the opinion of the Committee no force can perform effectively unless they have the requisite numbers. India is a fast developing country which does not have dearth of talent. A wide network of Sainik Schools already exists, which is supplemented by Rashtriya Military School and Rashtriya Indian Military College. The Committee fail to understand the existing shortage in spite of numerous entry schemes. They, therefore, recommend that a scientific study be conducted to find out the optimum number of force needed also the methodology, as to how this shortage could be tackled in the minimum prescribed period. On the obverse, increasing the number of officers is very essential specially when China has a sizeable Army of 2.3 million and Pakistan has 0.52 million. Our strength of Army is just 1.2 million which is a discouraging figure given to conventional warfare. The Committee feel and leave it to the discretion of forces whether the system of selection for entry of officers be also reviewed in order to enable them to find the right talent.”

6. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“(I) Government has taken a number of steps to reduce shortage of officers in the Armed forces and to attract youth to join Armed forces. Some of these are as under:

- (a) A Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri Ajay Vikram Singh, the then Special Secretary was constituted to look into various issues *inter-alia* including to make the organization more effective in fulfilling the individual career aspirations of officers. Based on the recommendations of Ajay Vikram Singh

Committee, following major initiatives have already been taken to improve the service conditions in the Officers' cadre in Armed Forces:

- (i) All officers including those in Short Service Commission (SSC) are now eligible to hold substantive rank of Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel after 2, 6 and 13 years of reckonable service respectively.
- (ii) A total number of 750 posts of Lt. Colonel have been upgraded to Colonel towards implementation of A V Singh Committee Report (Phase-I).
- (iii) Further, 1896 additional posts in the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier, Major General and Lieutenant General and their equivalents in the other two Services have been upgraded towards implementation of A V Singh Committee Report (Phase-II).
- (iv) Colonel (Time Scale) rank was introduced for those Lt. Colonel, who cannot make for Colonel (Select Rank), after completion of 26 years.
- (v) The implementation of recommendations of the VI Central Pay Commission with substantial improvement in the pay structure of officers of Armed Forces has made the Services more attractive;
- (vi) The tenure of Short Service Commissioned Officers has been increased from 10 years to 14 years;
- (vii) Setting up of seven new Service Selection Boards (SSBs) [2 for Army, 3 for Navy and 2 for Air Force] have been approved by the Government which will enable expeditious selection of large number of candidates for induction of officers into the Armed Forces and will thus help in reducing shortage of officers;
- (viii) The UPSC is now recommending candidates in higher ratio for one vacancy for interview at Service Selection Boards;
- (ix) A second Officers' Training Academy for induction of SSCOs at Gaya has been set up in respect of Army so as to impart pre-commissioning training for large number of cadets.

## (II) ARMY

- (a) Army is selecting adequate number of candidates every year as per planned intake to make up the deficiency over a period of time. Besides, presently following two studies are

underway to review the intake of officers and the selection process:

- (i) Study by Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad: A Study is being carried out by the Army Headquarters through IIM, Ahmedabad to review the Officers Selection Process.
  - (ii) *De novo* Selection System: A project has been undertaken by Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR) to develop a *De novo* Selection System for the officers of the Armed Forces.
- (b) Recruitment of Other Ranks (ORs) in Army is a continuous and an ongoing process. The present deficiency in ORs is 14659 (1.28%) against which 71644 recruits are under training. As such, there is no problem of shortage in the ORs in Army.

(III) NAVY

- (a) Manpower Planning and Recruitment: Manpower Planning and Recruitment Policies in the Navy have been formulated depending upon operational and administrative requirements of the Service.
- (b) Perspective Planning: Manpower Planning is carried out on the basis of long term reviews at a macro level, covering a period of approximately 15 years, whereas the short-term review looks at a scenario of two to five years. In order to decide the number of personnel to be recruited, the following are taken into account:
  - (i) Current shortages
  - (ii) Number of personnel in the training process
  - (iii) Anticipated growth in the sanctioned strength
  - (iv) Wastages/Outgo
- (c) Calculation of Intake Levels: The current shortages in officers and sailors are 1839 and 12884 respectively. However, around 700 officers and 7500 sailors are undergoing training and will be available for deployment shortly. Till 2011, IN was inducting about 500 officers and 3400 sailors per year based on the available selection infrastructure and training capacity. As per the long term Human Capital Strategy (HCS), 2012-17, the IN is presently inducting 850 officers and 4450 sailors every year. The number of officers inducting is planned to be

increased to 1000 per year from 2016, based upon the planned enhancement in the recruitment and training infrastructure. These measures are expected to reduce shortage of manpower in the IN, subject to other factors such as resource allocation, accord of manpower sanctions and commissioning/de-commissioning of ship/submarines as per schedule.

(IV) AIR FORCE

- (a) Present Establishment and Strength of Officers as on 1 April, 2014 are 12606 and 12071 respectively. The shortfall of 535 officers relates to the existing establishment laid down to meet present requirements. Various measures have been taken to overcome the shortage of officers.
- (b) As regard Airmen, the Establishment and Strength of airmen as on 1 March, 2014 is 134349 and 131181 respectively, leading to deficiency of 3168. As on 1 March, 2014, a total of 5262 trainees are undergoing various phases of training. This caters for the deficiency as well as the discharges during the intervening period till pass out of trainees. Induction is planned regularly catering to the discharges as well as accretion vacancies if any.”

7. Keeping in mind the shortage of manpower in the three Services, the Committee had recommended to conduct a scientific study to find out the optimum number of forces needed and adopt a methodology to fill up the shortage in a minimum prescribed period. The Committee are informed that the Government has taken a number of steps to reduce shortage of officers in the Armed forces and to attract the talented youth to join Armed forces as per the Ajay Vikram Singh Committee Report. The Committee are informed that setting up of seven new Service Selection Boards(SSBs) [2 for Army, 3 for Navy and 2 for Air Force] have been approved by the Government which will enable expeditious selection of large number of candidates for induction of officers into the Armed forces and will reduce the shortage of officers. The Committee would like to be informed about the status of these seven SSBs. The Committee have been given to understand that a study is being carried out by the Army Headquarters through IIM, Ahmedabad in order to review the officers Selection Process. However, the Committee desire that necessary action be taken to expedite the recruitment and training of officers.

**B. Role of Indian Army****Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 6)**

8. The Committee had recommended as under:–

“Another disquieting feature has surfaced during the course of Committee’s examination of the subject. Our defence forces, especially Army has certain extraneous duties to perform, which are not related to its primary responsibilities. Though these duties assume great significance as far as the security of the country is concerned, the Committee have every reason to believe that insurgent activities are a form of proxy war instigated by neighbouring countries against our nation to destabilize peace, tranquillity and growth. It is astonishing to find that as many as 78 insurgent active groups have been earmarked in one State of the North East. Our neighbouring countries are espousing a form of perennial and subtle war in which a substantial amount of operational preparedness is absolutely essential. The factual position on the repeated incursion/infiltrations on the western border are the recent examples where our Army also suffered losses. In the Keran and Samba Sectors, our Army was engaged to dissuade militant groups coming from Pakistan who were successful in the breaking our security cordons. The incidents which happened in the border areas where the terrorists not only inflicted casualties on the Armed Forces but Police Personnel as well. The Committee are not oblivious of the fact that several times not only these infiltrators but also the regular Pakistan Army has blatantly broken the rules of engagement in an inhuman manner. To quote another example of belligerence and unbridled aberration by Pakistan, during the years 2009-13, a total of 214 cases of ceasefire violations were recorded across the Indo-Pak Border.

Weighing all the pros and cons of the insurgent activities taking place on our borders, the Committee recommend that Army should not supplant the responsibility of the Central Armed Police Forces like Border Security force but supplement all that is required. As strong and modern Army is the need of the hour which should have optimum operational and strike capabilities to face any aggression by the enemies. The Committee would like to see our Army having a fine balance of teeth and tail ratio and finest officer/men relationship. All the required help should be extended by the Ministry to the Army in terms of finance and infrastructure so that it becomes a force to reckon with. Checking infiltrations is not the

sole responsibility of the Army but concerted efforts have to be made by the other concerned Ministries like Ministry of Home Affairs. The Committee also recommend that the Military Intelligence Network especially the signal Intelligence should be strengthened and made state-of-the-art to oversee the movements of the insurgent groups before intruding into borders rather than combating them on our soil. The Committee also recommend that gathering intelligence inputs from local population and through modern equipment should be shared by Army and CAPFs so that any kind of movement be monitored and corrective action taken by the responsible agency.”

9. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“Border guarding responsibility during peace time falls in domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is also provided in the International conventions that the guarding of the International Borders should be managed by Specialized Police or Para Military Force and not by the Army.

In accordance with the international convention, the International Borders of India are guarded by the Central Armed Police Forces viz. Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), and the Assam Rifles. Government of India is following “one border one force” principle. Under this policy, the BSF has been deployed on Indo-Pakistan Border and Indo-Bangladesh Border, the SSB has been deployed on Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan Border, the ITBP on Indo-China Border, and the Assam Rifles has been entrusted with the task of guarding Indo-Myanmar Border.

While, Assam Rifles is under the operational control of Army/MoD, the other border guarding forces *i.e.* BSF, ITBP and SSB are under the operational control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Recently, Ministry of Defence has agreed to transfer the border guarding duties of Indo-Myanmar border from Assam Rifles to BSF. A proposal for approval of the Government to this effect is under consideration in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Besides, border guarding duties, BSF, ITBP, SSB and Assam Rifles have also been entrusted with counter insurgency (CI) duties in their area of deployment.

Therefore, except for LOC & LAC where Army is deployed along-with BSF and ITBP respectively and Indo-Myanmar border where



Assam Rifles is deployed under the Operational Control of Army/ MoD, the border guarding and Counter Insurgency (CI) duties is being taken care of by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Army is therefore only supplementing the efforts of CAPFs in border guarding and CI duties and not supplanting the responsibility of border guarding.

All the Border Guarding Forces (BGFs) have been entrusted with the responsibility to protect India's international borders. The responsibility includes prevention of illegal migration, anti-smuggling activities, checking infiltration and collection of intelligence. Accordingly, necessary powers under Cr.PC and Custom Act are available to all the BGFs (powers under the Custom Act are not available to Assam Rifles and SSB at this point). The primary responsibility to check infiltration is on BGFs and the Army share this responsibility with BGFs only on active borders for example, active border of Jammu & Kashmir where the Indian army is guarding the border along with BSF.

There exists an inbuilt mechanism in the role and functions of CAPFs for intelligence sharing and operational coordination with the concerned agencies including Army for better operational achievements in the bordering area. Each of the BGF has been nominated as Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) for the border of its deployment to ensure co-ordination of activities of intelligence agencies operating in the border and to share actionable intelligence with all the agencies concerned including Military intelligence. Since the BGFs have already been gathering inputs from the local population and sharing with army and other agencies concerned, the recommendation of the Committee has already been acted upon. The modernization of the intelligence network of the BGFs through the acquisition of latest surveillance equipment is an ongoing process and being undertaken periodically.

In the context of Signal Intelligence, it is stated that the role of the Signal Intelligence Organisation is to acquire intelligence of strategic and tactical military nature and as such, an evolutionary growth model is the basis for modernisation plans. The 12th Plan of Signal Intelligence Directorate is being implemented to acquire state-of-the-art interception systems to equip field units to gather quality intelligence in CI/CT scenario. Further, mandated external intelligence agencies play an active and dominant role to support the intelligence gathering on the targets before and after their intrusion into India during CI/CT scenario. Hence, closer cooperation

between various intelligence agencies is emphasised regularly. Technological updation of SI Equipment normally takes 4-6 years and therefore efforts to keep pace with the technology through speedy procedures for procurement of niche technologies are of vital importance.”

10. To keep the Army out of certain extraneous duties like to contain insurgent activities taking place on our borders, the Committee had recommended that Army should not supplant the responsibility of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) but supplement if required. The Committee are informed that except for Line of Control (LOC) & Line of Actual Control (LAC), where Army is deployed along with Border Security Force (BSF) & Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) respectively and Indo-Myanmar border where Assam Rifles is deployed under the operational control of Army/Ministry of Defence (MoD), the border guarding and Counter Insurgency (CI) duties are being taken care of by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Committee are further informed that recently Ministry of Defence had agreed to transfer the border guarding duties of Indo-Myanmar border from Assam Rifles to BSF. A proposal for approval of the Government is under consideration in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Committee desire that the Ministry of Defence should pursue the Ministry of Home Affairs to come to a early decision in this regard and Army be absolved of the duties of guarding the border.

With regard to the Committee’s recommendation to strengthen the Military Intelligence Network especially the signal intelligence and to make it state-of-the-art to oversee the movements of the insurgent groups before intruding into borders rather than combating them on our soil, the Ministry reply is silent. The Ministry has stated that the primary responsibility to check infiltration is on Border Guarding Forces (BGFs) and the Army share this responsibility with BGF only on active borders. The Committee, therefore, desire the Ministry to furnish reply in this aspect.

In the Action Taken replies, the Ministry has also informed that in the context of Signal Intelligence (SI) closer cooperation among various intelligence agencies is emphasised regularly. Technological upgradation of SI equipment normally takes 4-6 years and therefore, efforts to keep pace with the technology through speedy procedures for procurement of nice technologies are of vital importance. The Committee desire the Ministry to initiate immediate action in this direction under intimation to them.

### C. Inordinate delay in Induction of Light Combat/other Aircraft

#### Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 11)

11. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“Likewise, the Committee recommend that the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) be inducted in the Forces as per the given dates besides maintaining and the flight operation clearance expeditiously. The Committee also recommend in unequivocal terms that Research and Development activities should be given a fillip by the Defence production side/Defence Research and Development Organisation so that dependence on foreign sources be minimized and complete self-reliance is achieved within a well defined period. If required, more areas be opened to private Vendor base within India as is the case in the leading aircraft manufacturing countries of the world.”

12. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was issued in December, 2013 and M/s. Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL) has commenced the production of aircraft against the first contract. The deliveries of these aircraft are scheduled to commence from 2014-15 and conclude by 2016-17. Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) is the Project Management Agency for the design and development activities. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) is under progress jointly by ADA and HAL. The deliveries against the second contract (FOC standard) is scheduled to commence from 2016-17 and conclude by 2018-19.

HAL has identified Research & Development (R&D) as one of the thrust areas to be focused in order to achieve self reliance. HAL has been encouraging private sectors both in development and manufacturing programs. In case of development programs, private industries have been involved in development of systems, equipment and software modules etc. In addition, the following actions have been initiated in R&D.

- Design and Development activities of Medium Transport Aircraft and Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft have been taken up with international partners.
- Design of a medium thrust class (25 kN) turbofan engine for fixed wing aircraft (trainers, small business jets, etc.) has been taken up. A gas turbine engine of 1200 kW shaft power for helicopters is also under consideration.

- MoUs have been signed with premier institutions/organisation for design and development activities.
- The Board of Directors of HAL has decided to create an R&D corpus and to spend 10% of operational Profit after tax on R&D and development of indigenous vendors.”

13. The Committee find the reply of the Ministry is vague and routine in nature. The Committee had recommended that Research & Development (R&D) activities should be given a fillip by the Defence production side/Defence Research & Development Organisation to minimize the dependence on foreign sources and achieve complete self-reliance within a well defined period. However, in the action taken reply, the Ministry has stated that M/s. Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL) has stated identified R & D as one of the thrust areas to be focussed in order to achieve self-reliance. More areas will also be opened up for private sector for this purpose. However, the Ministry’s reply is not specific to this point and no time frame has been fixed for achieving self-reliance.

With regard to induction of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in the forces, the Committee note that Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) of LCA was issued in December 2013 and HAL has commenced the production of aircraft against the first contract. The deliveries of these aircrafts are scheduled to commence from 2014-15 and conclude by 2016-17. The Committee would like to know the indigenisation percentage of LCA and also a break up of important parts with regard to the content which are imported/produced *via* Transfer of Technology (ToT) and those which are indigenously developed. The Committee would also like to be informed about the role of Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) in the development activities of LCA which is distinct from HAL.

#### D. Procurement Procedure

##### Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 13)

14. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“Although the Ministry has informed the Committee that the procurement procedure adopted by the Indian Air Force is one of the best in the world, the Committee find that considerable delays do take place in procurement and final induction of the machines in the Air force. The Committee desire that red-tapism, if any, avoided and best use of procurement procedures be made. All the

items planned in the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) 2012-2027 should move at the desired pace scrupulously. This would help in countering threat perception and enhancing operational capabilities of the Indian Air Force against its adversaries.”

15. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“All defence capital procurements are conducted in accordance with the Defence Procurement procedures, which conform to the highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability. The Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) 2012-2027 lays down the roadmap for capability-building of the Indian Air Force (IAF) over the next three Plan periods based on our threat perceptions, however, the procurements for capability-building are also linked to the annual budgetary allocations. Shortfall in budgetary support may adversely affect the capability-building process, though available funds are optimally utilised for timely implementation of the projects.”

16. The Committee agree with the views expressed by the Ministry on the adherence of capital procurement procedure and Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP). However, they are constrained to note that shortfall in annual budgetary support adversely affect the capability building process. The Committee strongly desire that the Ministry should take up this issue with the Ministry of Finance for providing adequate allocations for capacity building of armed forces because country’s security at any cost should not be compromised.

#### **E. Role of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)**

##### **Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 15 )**

17. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“One of the most important aspects in which Indian Air Force is found to be lacking is acute shortage of trainer aircraft of all three categories, viz. basic, intermediate and advance. The Committee feel that training of pilots is the vital requirement of any Air Force in the world. Unless we have the requisite number of trained pilots in all flying streams, all the paraphernalia of the Air Force becomes redundant. The Committee call upon the Ministry to take the necessary steps in this regard urgently.”

18. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“*Trainer Aircraft (BTA)*: To meet IAF’s flying training requirements, IAF needs 181 BTA, for which Acceptance of Necessity (AON) was

accorded in December 2009 to procure 75 aircraft from the global market, whereas the remaining 106 aircraft were to be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL). However, this was subject to condition that in case, HAL does not fly its first aircraft by the time the first aircraft of the 75 aircraft arrives, then the option clause would be invoked and numbers to be made by HAL would be reviewed.

2. The 'Buy (Global)' case was progressed and a contract was signed with Pilatus for supply of 75 aircraft. The deliveries of aircraft and equipment have started and delivery of all 75 aircraft would be completed by August, 2015. HAL is going ahead with development of indigenous BTA (HTT40) with its internal resources. In the meanwhile, Indian Air Force has proposed to acquire balance 106 PC-7 MK II BTA in 'Buy and Make (Indian)' category from Pilatus Aircraft Ltd.

3. *Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT)*: The IJT aircraft has been under development since 1999. The Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) date for IJT by HAL was March, 2004 and since then, this date has been revised several times to March, 2007, June, 2011, December, 2012 and December, 2013. As informed by HAL, the expected revised date for IOC for IJT is December, 2014. HAL has signed the contract to supply 85 IJT. The present status of development of IJT by HAL is that all activities required for IOC have been completed except for refinement of 'stall characteristics' and 'spin testing'. HAL is now using consultancy from M/s. BAe Systems, UK for the 'stall and spin characteristics' of the IJT."

19. The Committee are dismayed over the delay in development of Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA) and Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) by HAL. In the action taken reply, the Ministry has stated that HAL is going ahead with development of indigenous BTA (HTT40) with its internal resources. The Ministry has neither indicated the status of development nor given any time-frame for its completion. As a result, Air Force has proposed to acquire the balance 106 BTA in Buy and Make (Indian) category from Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Pertaining to IJT, the Committee are informed that after passing of 15 years ever since the sanction of the project in 1999, HAL has completed the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) for IJT except for refinement of stall characteristics and spin testing. It is now using consultancy from M/s. BAe Systems, United Kingdom in this regard. The Committee are of the view that in the absence of any credible trainer, it would be very difficult for the young trainees to gradually move to advanced learning stage of Advance Jet Trainer (AJT). The Committee desire that development of IJT should be given top priority by HAL and it should overcome its difficulties such as stall & spin characteristics, etc.

**Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 17)**

20. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The committee have been informed by the ministry that sanction to develop Intermediate Jet Trainer was given by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 1999, wherein a lead time of 15 years was given to HAL. However, in 2013, after nine years of first prototype was flown in 2004, HAL sought expertise of BAES after the Steering Committee consisting of members of Ministry of Defence, IAF, certifying agency and HAL has decided in its favour. However, this resulted in exceeding their original timeline by 9 years and exhausting total development period of 23 years, thereby making it very difficult for Indian Air Force to continue second stage training of pilots. The Committee, therefore, recommend that various efforts be made either to procure IJT from foreign sources or HAL may impressed upon to adhere to the timelines given in last extension. The committee are also dismayed over the fact that even after knowing well in advance about the ageing fleet of Kiran aircraft, the ministry has not taken any effective steps to procure IJT, jeopardizing the life of young trainees. The committee find that after this inordinate delay, HAL has now given to understand that efforts are being made for achieving the Final Operational Clearance (FOC) by Dec. 2014 which would eventually lead to production of aircraft. Hence, the committee recommend that without compromising the safety features, all out efforts should be made by all stake holders so that targeted date of December 2014 is met and this project finally sees the light of the day. The Committee would also like to be informed of the timelines also when the production would actually start and induction would take place. The committee would be failing in their duty, if they do not caution the ministry and HAL that in future no delays should take place. It goes without saying that cascading effect of this caution should be applicable on all defence public sector undertakings/ organization including ordnance factory Board as well as the research organizations such as DRDO.”

21. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“The IJT project was sanctioned in 1999 with a lead time of 5 years to operational clearance. This was under the assumption that the aircraft will be using an existing off the shelf engine. Accordingly two prototypes were developed using off-the-shelf LARZAC engine. The first Prototype aircraft flew in March 2003 and the second in March 2004. The LARZAC engines turned out to be under powered to meet the performance requirements and so a higher thrust engine was required to be integrated. Since no suitable engine was available off-the-shelf, an engine of required thrust

needed to be developed. The sanction was revised in 2005 to include the higher thrust engine and advanced avionics. The schedule was then revised to March 2007 for Initial Operational Clearance and March 2008 for Final Operational Clearance.

The delays in IJT project were due to the delay in development of higher thrust engine (AL 55I) & various accidents/incidents during the development Flight testing.

All efforts are being made to ensure Certification of IJT by Dec. 2014 without compromising any safety issues.

Concurrent to D&D phase, setting up of facilities for and manufacturing of 12 LSP aircraft have been initiated by HAL. In addition, IAF has placed an order on HAL for production of 73 Series aircraft. HAL has initiated the production processes for this batch also in order to ensure deliveries to customer without any delay after the certification of IJT.

Among the 12 LSPs, 5 are already flying and remaining will be ready by Dec. 2014. This can be delivered to customer for service use by March 2015 if the Certification is completed in Dec. 2014.

Similarly, the delivery of series production aircraft is likely to commence from 2015-16 onwards.

To mitigate the delay in IJT development, the Life of Kiran aircraft has already been extended by 500 hours, due to which IAF will be able to operate Kiran fleet till 2019.”

**22. The Committee are perturbed to note that even after lapse of 15 years ever since the sanction of the project in 1999, the IJT has not seen the light of the day. The LARZAC engine which was bought off the shelf was not further developed in the action taken replies, the Ministry has stated that concurrent to Design and Development (D&D) phase, setting up of facilities for and manufacturing of 12 Large Scale Planes (LSP) aircraft have been initiated by HAL. Indian Air Force (IAF) has placed an order on HAL for production of T3 series aircraft. HAL has initiated the production processes for this batch in order to ensure deliveries to customer for service use by March, 2015 if the certification is completed by December, 2014.**

However, in the action taken replies to the recommendation No. 15, it has been stated that the present status of development of IJT by HAL is that all activities required for IOC have been



completed except for refinement of stall characteristics & spin testing for which HAL is using consultancy from M/s BAe systems, UK to mitigate the delay in IJT development. The life of Kiran aircraft has already been extended by 500 hours as a result IAF will be able to operate Kiran fleet till 2019.

The Committee disapprove the over-delayed production of IJT and relying upon the extended life of an obsolete Kiran fleet. The Committee, therefore, desire that effective steps should be taken by HAL for production of IJT without any further delay.

#### **F. Safety of Indian Water**

##### **Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 20)**

23. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“Coming to the part of the Navy and the Coast Guard, the Committee is perturbed to note that any foreign ship could enter Indian shores with sophisticated load of arms and ammunitions. The Committee is worried to discover that the amount of floating armouries contained in the ship was approx, 5000 rounds of ammunition & sophisticated weapons where each weapon could fire a distance of 3-4 kilometres. In the opinion of the Committee, such a scenario is appalling especially when the country is fraught with threats and news of bomb blasts are a frequent happening to internal security. As such, the role of Navy and Indian Coast Guard becomes very challenging and loaded with multifarious responsibilities. The Committee concurs in totality that the present system of prior notification needs to be changed expeditiously to Pre Approval Notification System (PANS). Since all these aspects are covered in the Coastal Security Bill which has been drafted by the Navy and is under consideration at the Ministry of Defence, the Committee recommends in unequivocal terms that the Bill should be proceeded with utmost priority since it is concerned with the matter as serious as coastal security *vis-a-vis* threat perception to our motherland and the innocent citizens. It is needless to say that the steps initiated, progress made and finality reached in regard to the Bill be communicated to the Committee. Also, the Committee urges upon the Indian Navy & Coast Guard Organisation, which are responsible for overall maritime security in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone, to take up the matter emphatically with the international community. Since the subject is related to the Ministry of Shipping (MoS), it is pertinent for the Ministry of Defence to

impress upon Ministry of Shipping that mere guidelines are not sufficient. The security companies in the business should be registered with international bodies as the unregulated floating armouries in sea and their access to our coastal regions are a matter of great concern.”

24. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

*“Floating Armouries:* The continued threat of piracy has led to the proliferation of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) and floating armouries in International Waters. Freedom of navigation in high seas, and the lack of international regulatory framework to deal with the floating armouries in our region has led to fear of these being used by terrorist/anti national elements. The issue of floating armouries as well as revision of the piracy highrisk area are being taken up by India in International fora for adoption of a common regulatory framework.

*Coastal Security (CS) Bill:* Naval Headquarters have suggested consideration of Coastal Security Bill for enactment of a law to delineate the responsibilities and duties of various agencies involved in Coastal Security of the country as this will lead to better coordination and provide legal basis for actions of Indian Navy. The issue was considered during a review meeting on Coastal Security taken by Raksha Mantri and it was decided that as per Allocation of Business rules the draft Coastal Security Bill will be coordinated by M/o Home Affairs in consultation with MoD and the Coastal State Government. A paper listing the concerns and need for a Coastal Security Bill prepared by Indian Navy has been forwarded to M/o Home Affairs for further action.

*Pre-Arrival Notification for Security (PANS):* The issue of prior approval in lieu of prior notification by Merchant Vessels carrying armed detachments onboard has been considered. However, very limited rights are available to Coastal States beyond Territorial Waters. This issue is being raised at International fora like IMO, CGPCS for consideration of guidelines.”

25. (A) **Floating Armouries:** The Committee understand that floating armouries, Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASPs) in international waters have become a quintessence due to threats of piracy. The Ministry has submitted that lack of international regulatory framework to deal with the floating armouries in our region has lead to the fear for these being used by terrorists/anti-national elements. The Committee are dismayed to find that even

after facing Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, our forces are struggling at international fora for adoption of a common regulatory framework. National security is paramount and any compromises on this front cannot be even thought of. Therefore, the Committee opine that the Ministry of Defence in coordination with Ministry of External Affairs must work towards achieving tangible results in this regard. Internationally centralised registration of such security agencies and necessary communication between shipping companies and Naval Forces could be considered as some of the suggestions in this area.

(B) Coastal Security: The Committee would like to know the dates when the paper listing the concerns and needs for a Coastal Security Bill prepared by Indian Navy was forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs and how the matter was followed up. The Committee duly acknowledge the need for better coordination and legal basis for action by Indian Navy. While examining the subject, the Committee found that there are certain issues such as piracy, confiscation of smuggled and incorporating punishment to culprits etc. are not well defined under law. The Committee desire that tangible result should be achieved in this respect.

#### G. Effective Coordination Mechanism

##### Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 22)

26. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee are aware of many agencies functioning in coastal and ocean region falling under jurisdiction of the country. These include Indian Navy, Coast Guard Organisation, Ministry of Shipping, Customs Department, Marine Police, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Intelligence Agencies, offshore exploration departments etc. What the Committee would like that co-ordination between all the maritime agencies should be very effective. The Committee, as such, recommends that a Maritime Commission or any other such agency should be established so that the objectives could be met. The role of Intelligence Agencies is of vital importance and hence the Committee desire that intelligence sharing should be strengthened and be made state-of-the-art in terms of infrastructure as well as equipment.”

27. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“The issue of creation of Maritime Security Adviser/Apex Maritime Security Advisory Board (MSAB) was considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security in Feb. 2009 while considering the issue of

coastal security post 26/11 and not found desirable. Presently, the task of coordination/monitoring of Coastal Security (CS) issues is being dealt with by the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary which meets at least twice a year. Issues and aspects related to CS are also reviewed periodically by the Hon'ble Raksha Mantri."

**28. The Committee notice that way back in February 2009, the issue of creation of Maritime Security Adviser/Apex Maritime Security Advisory Board (MSAB) was found undesirable. The Committee are dismayed to note that the Ministry has not informed the reasons behind such undesirability. The Committee further take note that the Ministry has remained silent on the issues of establishing Maritime Commission or any other such agency and also on strengthening of intelligence sharing. The Ministry may inform the same while furnishing the action taken notes.**

#### **H. Expeditious installation of Radars**

##### **Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 23)**

**29. The Committee had recommended as under:—**

“The Committee are perturbed to note that the issue regarding the establishment of radars in the Nicobar Islands has staggered and has not reached finality yet. This issue needs to be addressed earnestly and expeditiously especially when our neighbour China has been undertaking various activities in its areas of interest like South-China Sea and deploying of naval ships in the Gulf of Eden as parts of its anti-piracy operations. During evidence, the Committee desired to know about the present status of installation of radar in Nicobar Islands, which matter had come to their notice during their study visit to Andaman and Nicobar Islands in February 2013. Consistent with admission of naval officials, the Committee comprehend that Narcondum Island is strategically very crucial because it is in the Andaman sea, almost 130-140 miles from our nearest island and about 50-60 miles from other side. The Committee were dismayed to know that the radar project at Narcondum could not get Government approval and Navy was asked to look for an alternate location. Subsequently, the Committee were apprised that Navy has identified an alternate location though not strategically as befitting as the Standalone Island. The Committee sense that Indian Navy is gearing up towards Maritime

Capability Perspective Plan and taking up maritime challenges along with security threats emanating from regional interests and such denials/delays will hamper the country's defence preparedness. Even in their 20th report on examination of demands for grants 2013-14, the Committee had categorically observed that due to such delays many important projects are hindered affecting overall development of surveillance network and operational preparedness of country's defence issues. On this point, the Committee insist that the Government should take initiatives/measures towards strengthening strategic needs of Defence. Consequently, the Government may reconsider the project of installation of naval equipment in Narcondum Island and environmental clearances be aptly undertaken with the intention that strategic defence installations/establishments are not derailed."

30. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

"Construction work at three sites in Andaman and Nicobar Island viz. East Island, Sandy Point and Keating Point for setting up of the Radar Stations is being progressed. Narcondum Island being not available due to environmental concerns, Indian Coast Guard is looking at alternate sites for setting up the Radar Station in A&N Islands."

**31. The Committee take note of the reply of the Ministry of Defence and desire that the identification of alternate sites for setting up Radar station in A&N Islands may be expedited and completed in a time bound manner. The Committee be informed about the development in this regard.**

#### **I. Border Connectivity**

##### **Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 29)**

32. The Committee had recommended as under:—

"It is disquieting for the Committee to note that no direct response has been given by the Ministry in regard to pin-pointed query of the Committee as to what difficulties were faced by India due to poor network of road, rail, airports/helipads. To this specific query, the Ministry has given a rhetorical reply that despite the lack of adequate infrastructure along the Northern borders, the Army has been effective in monitoring Peoples Liberation Army's activities along the Line of Actual control. The Committee do not agree with the contention of the Ministry in this regard and they have every reason to believe that our development in regard to road, rail and airport is slumber and behind schedules in all the respects. The

Committee repudiate the claims of the Ministry that our infrastructure development is being implemented in consonance with our threat perception. The detailed analysis in this regard are contained in the successive paragraphs.”

33. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“This para is only observatory in nature.”

**34. The Committee would like to be informed about the response of various bordering States in forming Empowered Committee. The Committee are concerned to note that even after making pin-point query regarding difficulties faced by the country due to poor network of road, rail, airports/helipads, the Government has given an evasive reply that the comments of the Committee are observatory in nature. The Committee once again reiterate that they may be informed about the specific difficulties being faced as mentioned above and the corrective steps being envisaged to be taken by the Government in this regard.**

**Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 34)**

35. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Indo-Pakistan Border in the opinion of the Committee is also very sensitive. The Committee in this regard would like to recommend that construction of 610 km. in Punjab and 1207.42 km. in Rajasthan of lateral axial road in this border area be given final approval in the shortest possible time which is stated to be pending under consideration of the Ministry. They also recommend that all four road projects viz. Chetak, Sampark, Beacon and Vijayak be completed hundred per cent under intimation to the Committee. Also the composite scheme which is an appreciable scheme comprising of fencing flood lighting, construction of roads, connecting border out posts along Indo-Pak border be completed within a fixed target as its accomplishment has inordinately been delayed in various accounts. The Ministry should pull out a specific proposal on this scheme as it was approved by Cabinet Committee on Security as early as January 2000 with the initially proposed completion in five years. The period of delay of almost nine years is serious delay and Committee would like to know why the cost and time overruns have taken place.”

36. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“1. Construction of 610 Km. road in Punjab and 1207.42 Km. road in Rajasthan pertains to MHA.

2. As regards roads in Project Chetak, Sampark, Beacon and Vijayak are concerned it is stated that a long term roll on works plan for BRO has been drawn up in keeping with the priorities of Army and works are accordingly been planned for expeditious completion.

3. No works for fencing flood lighting is entrusted to BRO.”

37. The Committee note that as regards completion of all four road projects viz. Chetak, Sampark, Beacon and Vijayak, the Ministry has given an evasive reply stating that a long term roll on works plan has been drawn up. The Committee would like to reiterate that a concrete plan with specific targeted dates of completion of all these four road projects may be intimated to the Committee.

**Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 35)**

38. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“In the Indo-Bangladesh Border, out of three phases, the Committee find neither Phase-1 nor Phase-2 could be completed. Since approval of Cabinet Committee on Security for completion of these projects by 31.03.2014 has been accorded, the Committee hope and recommend that these are completed by this new date and any lapse be intimated to the Committee.”

39. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“1. As regards IBB fencing, it is stated that because of huge strategic work load it was decided that BRO would focus on core strategic functions. Accordingly no works in Phase-II were taken up by BRO for MHA.

2. The status of Indo-Bangladesh fencing entrusted to BRO is given as under:—

Item	Total scope (km.)	Completed (km.)	Balance (km.)	Remarks
IBB Fence	104	96	8	Balance not feasible due to alignment close to 150 yards of IB.
IBB Roads	567	498	69	Balance not taken up due to insurgency, and no security cover.

3. Ministry is in constant liaison with MHA for release of funds.”

40. The Committee note that as regards taking up of the Phase-II work in the Indo-Bangladesh Border, the Ministry has cited huge strategic work load as the reason for the delay in taking up of this work. The Committee would like to reiterate that given the strategic importance of the completion of this work, the Ministry may set out specific deadlines for this project under intimation to this Committee.

**Recommendations/Observations of the Committee (Para No. 40)**

41. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee would like the Ministry of Railways to keep itself abreast with the technological development taking place in the field of railways specially regarding the high altitude developments not only in the neighbouring countries like China but throughout the world. Knowledge exchange in this era is no big task. Although it has been stated that Ministry of Railways possesses the required know how for executing these proposed 14 lines yet the Committee recommend that our railways lines in border areas should be the most sophisticated ones so that the forces do not face any difficulty and their accomplishments are not compromised. This recommendation is applicable generally for the purposes of road construction also where project should be undertaken with the best available technology in the world.”

42. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“1. Ministry of Railway has informed that it is keeping abreast with technological development taking place in the field of Railways especially regarding high altitude developments. Indian Railways is already undertaking challenging construction work in Himalayas right from Jammu & Kashmir to North-East and have got sufficient experience in construction in hilly region at high altitude. Moreover, it is also ensuring that its personnel are trained in such construction regularly.

2. Ministry of Railways would like to assure the Committee that the 14 strategic lines once sanctioned and fully funded by Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Finance will be constructed with State of the art technology and will be sophisticated to ensure speedier mobilization of military cargo.

3. As far as road construction in high altitude areas is concerned, a decision has been taken to adopt internationally proven best practices and try new technology, material and equipment. Towards



this, 10% of Border Roads Organization (BRO) funds are being earmarked. Furthermore, a collaborative measure has been initiated to establish a multi-discipline-technical expert group with experts from Ministry of Science and Technology (CRRI, CSIR, GSI etc.) to assist Border Roads Organisation in technical matters.”

**43. Proper flow of funds should be ensured by the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the Ministry of Finance so that the work on strategic lines is not hampered or derailed for want of funds. The Committee appreciate the collaborative measure to establish a multi-discipline technical expert group with experts from the Ministry of Science and Technology and are hopeful of tangible outcome.**

## CHAPTER II

### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 1)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee while taking note of the threats, both conventional and modern, being faced by India from her difficult neighbours in the form of repeated incursions and transgressions coupled with infiltration/insurgencies, selected the subject 'Threat Perception and preparedness of the Forces including incursion on borders, coordination mechanism with the Central Armed Police Forces and Border connectivity through Road, Air and Rail' for examination in order to give comprehensive outlook of the security scenario prevailing in the country. Given the nature of issues coming under the purview of this subject, the Committee have taken a selected view in their inquiry by avoiding the routine issues which have been generally covered in the Reports of the Committee. The findings of the Committee are brought out in the successive paragraphs of this Report.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

This para is only observatory in nature.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 2)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The threats perceived by India are not only due to the reasons stated above, India's slow pace in keeping herself abreast of the technological and infrastructural advancement in comparison to our territorial neighbours, especially China is equally responsible. Be it the issues relating to borders, non-demarcation of Line of Actual Control, limited connectivity through Rail, Road and Air, ambivalent claims in our defence production, inadequate delivery in Research and Development, lack of oversight mechanism on the part of Administrative Departments, etc., require substantial improvement and achieving stipulated targets within a timeframe and avoiding cost escalations.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

This para is only observatory in nature.

**Recommendation (Para No. 3)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee find that keeping in view the evolving security scenario in the South Asian Region; the Ministry is continuously reviewing its Defence strategy and plans. Also, the accretion and modernisation plans are stated to be implemented in consonance with our threat perception. While taking note of the submission made by the Ministry, the Committee feel that this reply is routine in nature and does not reveal in detail the specific steps initiated, progressed and achievements made thereto. The reply that steps are continuously being taken to strengthen and to optimise the force structure and capabilities is quite vague. The Committee, therefore, recommend in no uncertain terms, that detailed defence strategy along with the plans which are being reviewed and comprehensive details which are being reviewed, finality accomplished in any area on all infrastructural developments, etc. as mentioned above be intimated to them at the earliest. The Committee would like to glean through this information and guide a trajectory to be taken so that the threats could be effectively countered. The Committee would like to extend all desired help to the Ministry and complement and supplement its efforts in achieving these common objectives.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

India's defence policy includes defence of our national territory, including island territories, offshore resources and assets, maritime trade routes and airspace and whenever required, securing our internal environment whereby our nation is insured against any threat to its unity, core values and peaceful development. The Defence forces are structured, equipped and trained to carry out the task assigned to them in the defence of our country. Funds commensurate with the requirement as assessed by the Government are provided in the Defence budget.

2. The security scenario, technological environment and threat perceptions are being reviewed from time to time and depending on the changing scenario, the forces are augmented/restructured and modernised on need basis. This is an ongoing process.

3. Government is taking steps to ensure that the capabilities of the Armed Forces are enhanced in a planned and integrated manner. An institutionalised planning process is in place for capability development and modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces. As part of this process, the Armed Forces are implementing a focused plan to build up the capability of the Armed Forces by force accretions and force modernisation. This is based on a Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan covering a period of 15 years (2012-27), five year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP). The planning process is under the overall guidelines of Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). The Armed Forces remain in a state of operational readiness to meet any eventuality through a planned capability building and modernisation. While formulating the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), a holistic view is being taken towards identifying threats/ challenges of the future and the capabilities required to meet the same.

4. Government is focussing on the modernisation of our Defence Forces. Funds have been optimally utilised to equip the Armed Forces with state-of-the-art equipment. The budget estimates (BE), revised estimates (RE) and the actual expenditure on Capital acquisition for modernisation of Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Staff) as also as percentage of total defence expenditure during the years 2007-2008 to 2011-2012 are as below:—

Year	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Budget Estimates (in crores)	32826.80	37482.77	40367.72	43799.21	52998.02
Revised Estimates (in crores)	28110.00	30614.64	35146.88	44440.63	47409.45
Actual Expenditure (in crores)	27903.42	30000.42	38427.00	45686.77	50723.97
Army	7.30%	4.71%	5.75%	4.68%	3.10%
Navy	9.17%	7.73%	8.93%	10.45%	10.47%
Air Force	13.79%	13.71%	12.30%	14.39%	15.89%
Joint Staff	0.17%	0.11%	0.12%	0.12%	0.21%
Total	30.43%	26.26%	27.10%	29.64%	29.67%

5. In addition to the above, to ensure timely operational preparedness of the Armed Forces to meet the threat perceptions, Ordnance Factory Board comprising of 39 Factories and 9 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) Government are being modernised on continuous basis. Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which has more than 50 laboratories, is engaged in design and development of strategic, complex and security sensitive systems for the Armed Forces. The option of importing defence equipment is being resorted to, whenever indigenous capabilities are not available.

6. Some of the noteworthy modernisation schemes underway or planned in the 12th Plan period are as under:—

**Army:**

- (a) Induction of T-90 and MBT Arjun.
- (b) Consolidation and enhancement of fire power through induction of SMERCH, Brahmos and Pinaka rocket systems.
- (c) Improved battlefield transparency by induction of UAVs.
- (d) Augment Air Defence capability with MRSAMs/SRSAMs to meet threat in the Tactical Battle Area.
- (e) Modernisation of Army Aviation with induction of variants of Advanced Light Helicopters.
- (f) Modernisation of Infantry to enhance lethality, night fighting capability, communication and personal protection.
- (g) Modernisation of selected Central Ordnance Depots, establishment of overhaul facility and procurement of critical rolling stock.

**Navy:**

**Ships and Submarines:**

- (a) Aircraft Carrier
- (b) Destroyers
- (c) Frigates
- (d) Submarines
- (e) Mine Counter Measure Vessels
- (f) Shallow Water Anti-submarine Craft
- (g) Fast Attack Crafts
- (h) Survey Ships

**Aviation:**

- (a) P 8I, Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti Submarine Warfare Aircraft
- (b) Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft
- (c) Deck based fighters
- (d) Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)
- (e) Multi-Role Helicopter (MRH)
- (f) Naval Multi-Role Helicopter (NMRH)
- (g) KA 31, Air Early Warning Helicopter
- (h) Naval Utility Helicopter (NUH)
- (i) UAVs (HALE/MALE/VTOL/NR)

**Air Force:**

- (a) Procurement of additional Su-30 MKI, Light Combat Aircraft, Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft, very Heavy Transport aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy lift helicopters, intermediate as well as advanced trainer aircraft.
- (b) The air defence system is also being made robust with the induction of short and medium range surface to air, low level quick reaction missiles and integrating these weapons with modern sensors.

**Border Infrastructure**

7. Government is continuously monitoring the situation along the borders and the activities of neighbouring countries and is fully seized of the security imperatives. The threat perception is reviewed from time to time, including the need for developing requisite infrastructure in the border areas.

8. Necessary steps have been initiated through development of infrastructure as well as operational capabilities of the Armed Forces to secure the desired national security objectives. As part of Capability Development along the Northern borders, accretions having a financial outlay of Rs. 64,678.17 Crores have been approved on 03 Oct., 2013 for execution over a period of 8 years. Concomitantly, the case of infrastructure development for the above accretions is in final stages of approval.

9. Reliable and quality roads are also being laid for ensuring rapid mobilisation and demobilisation of our forces. A large number of roads in Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh and J&K have been constructed by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) for construction and improvement. These measures will go a long way in addressing external security threats in a significant manner.

10. In order to strengthen our borders, apart from manning, physical barriers are raised selectively and this is further accentuated by the electronic sensors as dictated by sensitivity of the stretch. The electronic surveillance is both of the ground based and air/space based varieties. Efforts are underway to network these sensors so as to allow quick synthesis and dissemination of the information.”

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 4)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee are dismayed to learn that against the satisfactory picture given by the Ministry, the three forces are deficient in its strength of officers. The strength of other ranks, Sailors and Airmen are also short then the authorized strength. Against the sanctioned strength of 52859, the held strength of officers in the Army is 43475. It is apparent that the Army is a truncated force having a recorded shortage of 9384 officers. Similarly, in the other ranks the Army short of 20561 personnel. Likewise, the Navy is short of 1561 officers and 11825 sailors. The position of Air Force is relatively eased, though they also have shortage of 659 officers and 3674 Airmen. In the opinion of the Committee no force can perform effectively unless they have the requisite numbers. India is a fast developing country which does not have dearth of talent. A wide network of Sainik Schools already exists, which is supplemented by Rashtriya Military School and Rashtriya Indian Military College. The Committee fail to understand the existing shortage in spite of numerous entry schemes. They, therefore, recommend that a scientific study be conducted to find out the optimum number of force needed also the methodology, as to how this shortage could be tackled in the minimum prescribed period. On the obverse, increasing the number of officers is very essential specially when China has a sizeable Army of 2.3 million and Pakistan has 0.52 million. Our strength of Army is just 1.2 million which is a discouraging figure given to conventional warfare. The Committee feel and leave it to the discretion of forces whether the system of selection for entry of officers be also reviewed in order to enable them to find the right talent.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

(I) Government has taken a number of steps to reduce shortage of officers in the Armed forces and to attract youth to join Armed forces. Some of these are as under:

- (a) A Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri Ajay Vikram Singh, the then Special Secretary was constituted to look into various issues *inter-alia* including to make the organization more effective in fulfilling the individual career aspirations of officers. Based on the recommendations of Ajay Vikram Singh Committee, following major initiatives have already been taken to improve the service conditions in the Officers' cadre in Armed Forces:
  - (i) All officers including those in Short Service Commission (SSC) are now eligible to hold substantive rank of Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel after 2, 6 and 13 years of reckonable service respectively.
  - (ii) A total number of 750 posts of Lt. Colonel have been upgraded to Colonel towards implementation of A V Singh Committee Report (Phase-I).
  - (iii) Further, 1896 additional posts in the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier, Major General and Lieutenant General and their equivalents in the other two Services have been upgraded towards implementation of A V Singh Committee Report (Phase-II).
  - (iv) Colonel (Time Scale) rank was introduced for those Lt. Colonel, who cannot make for Colonel (Select Rank), after completion of 26 years.
  - (v) The implementation of recommendations of the VI Central Pay Commission with substantial improvement in the pay structure of officers of Armed Forces has made the Services more attractive.
  - (vi) The tenure of Short Service Commissioned officers has been increased from 10 years to 14 years.
  - (vii) Setting up of seven new Service Selection Boards (SSBs) [2 for Army, 3 for Navy and 2 for Air Force] have been approved by the Government which will enable expeditious selection of large number of candidates for induction of officers into the Armed Forces and will thus help in reducing shortage of officers.



- (viii) The UPSC is now recommending candidates in higher ratio for one vacancy for interview at Service Selection Boards.
- (ix) A second Officers' Training Academy for induction of SSCOs at Gaya has been set up in respect of Army so as to impart pre-commissioning training for large number of cadets.

## (II) ARMY

- (a) Army is selecting adequate number of candidates every year as per planned intake to make up the deficiency over a period of time. Besides, presently following two studies are underway to review the intake of officers and the selection process:
  - (i) Study by Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad: A Study is being carried out by the Army Headquarters through IIM, Ahmedabad to review the Officers Selection Process.
  - (ii) De novo Selection System: A project has been undertaken by Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR) to develop a De novo Selection System for the officers of the Armed Forces.
- (b) Recruitment of Other Ranks (ORs) in Army is a continuous and an ongoing process. The present deficiency in ORs is 14659 (1.28%) against which 71644 recruits are under training. As such, there is no problem of shortage in the ORs in Army.

## (III) NAVY

- (a) Manpower Planning and Recruitment: Manpower Planning and Recruitment Policies in the Navy have been formulated depending upon operational and administrative requirements of the Service.
- (b) Perspective Planning: Manpower planning is carried out on the basis of long term reviews at a macro level, covering a period of approximately 15 years, whereas the short-term review looks at a scenario of two to five years. In order to decide the number of personnel to be recruited, the following are taken into account:
  - (i) Current shortages.
  - (ii) Number of personnel in the training process.

- (iii) Anticipated growth in the sanctioned strength.
- (iv) Wastages/Outgo.
- (c) Calculation of Intake Levels: The current shortages in officers and sailors are 1839 and 12884 respectively. However, around 700 officers and 7500 sailors are undergoing training and will be available for deployment shortly. Till 2011, IN was inducting about 500 officers and 3400 sailors per year based on the available selection infrastructure and training capacity. As per the long term Human Capital Strategy (HCS), 2012-17, the IN is presently inducting 850 officers and 4450 sailors every year. The number of officers inducting is planned to be increased to 1000 per year from 2016, based upon the planned enhancement in the recruitment and training infrastructure. These measures are expected to reduce shortage of manpower in the IN, subject to other factors such as resource allocation, accord of manpower sanctions and commissioning/de-commissioning of ship/submarines as per schedule.

#### (IV) AIR FORCE

- (a) Present Establishment and Strength of Officers as on April 1, 2014 are 12606 and 12071 respectively. The shortfall of 535 officers relates to the existing establishment laid down to meet present requirements. Various measures have been taken to overcome the shortage of officers.
- (b) As regard Airmen, the Establishment and Strength of airmen as on March 1, 2014 is 134349 and 131181 respectively, leading to deficiency of 3168. As on March 1, 2014, a total of 5262 trainees are undergoing various phases of training. This caters for the deficiency as well as the discharges during the intervening period till pass out of trainees. Induction is planned regularly catering to the discharges as well as accretion vacancies if any.

(Please see Para No. 7 of Chapter-1 of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 6)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Another disquieting feature has surfaced during the course of Committee's examination of the subject. Our defence forces, especially Army has certain extraneous duties to perform, which are not related

to its primary responsibilities. Though these duties assume great significance as far as the security of the country is concerned, the Committee have every reason to believe that insurgent activities are a form of proxy war instigated by neighbouring countries against our nation to destabilize peace, tranquility and growth. It is astonishing to find that as many as 78 insurgent active groups have been earmarked in one State of the North East. Our neighbouring countries are espousing a form of perennial and subtle war in which a substantial amount of operational preparedness is absolutely essential. The factual position on the repeated incursion/infiltrations on the western border are the recent examples where our Army also suffered losses. In the Keran and Samba Sectors, our Army was engaged to dissuade militant groups coming from Pakistan who were successful in the breaking our security cordons. The incidents which happened in the border areas where the terrorists not only inflicted casualties on the Armed Forces but Police Personnel as well. The Committee are not oblivious of the fact that several times not only these infiltrators but also the regular Pakistan Army has blatantly broken the rules of engagement in an inhuman manner. To quote another example of belligerence and unbridled aberration by Pakistan, during the years 2009-2013, a total of 214 cases of ceasefire violations were recorded across the Indo-Pak Border.

Weighing all the pros and cons of the insurgent activities taking place on our borders, the Committee recommend that Army should not supplant the responsibility of the Central Armed Police forces like Border Security force but supplement all that is required. As strong and modern Army is the need of the hour which should have optimum operational and strike capabilities to face any aggression by the enemies. The Committee would like to see our Army having a fine balance of teeth and tail ratio and finest officer/men relationship. All the required help should be extended by the Ministry to the Army in terms of finance and infrastructure so that it becomes a force to reckon with. Checking infiltrations is not the sole responsibility of the Army but concerted efforts have to be made by the other concerned Ministries like Ministry of Home Affairs. The Committee also recommend that the Military Intelligence Network especially the signal Intelligence should be strengthened and made state-of-the-art to oversee the movements of the insurgent groups before intruding into borders rather than combating them on our soil. The Committee also recommend that gathering intelligence inputs from local population and through modern equipment should be shared by Army and CAPFs so that any kind of movement be monitored and corrective action taken by the responsible agency.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Border guarding responsibility during peace time falls in domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is also provided in the International conventions that the guarding of the International Borders should be managed by Specialized Police or Para Military Force and not by the Army.

In accordance with the international convention, the International Borders of India are guarded by the Central Armed Police Forces *viz.* Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), and the Assam Rifles. Government of India is following “one border one force” principle. Under this policy, the BSF has been deployed on Indo-Pakistan Border and Indo-Bangladesh Border, the SSB has been deployed on Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan Border, the ITBP on Indo-China Border, and the Assam Rifles has been entrusted with the task of guarding Indo-Myanmar Border.

While, Assam Rifles is under the operational control of Army/MoD, the other border guarding forces *i.e.* BSF, ITBP and SSB are under the operational control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Recently, Ministry of Defence has agreed to transfer the border guarding duties of Indo-Myanmar border from Assam Rifles to BSF. A proposal for approval of the Government to this effect is under consideration in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Besides, border guarding duties, BSF, ITBP, SSB and Assam Rifles have also been entrusted with Counter Insurgency (CI) duties in their area of deployment.

Therefore, except for LOC & LAC where Army is deployed along-with BSF and ITBP respectively and Indo-Myanmar border where Assam Rifles is deployed under the Operational Control of Army/MoD, the border guarding and Counter Insurgency (CI) duties is being taken care of by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Army is therefore only supplementing the efforts of CAPFs in border guarding and CI duties and not supplanting the responsibility of border guarding.

All the Border Guarding Forces (BGFs) have been entrusted with the responsibility to protect India’s international borders. The responsibility includes prevention of illegal migration, anti-smuggling activities, checking infiltration and collection of intelligence. Accordingly, necessary powers under Cr.PC and Custom Act are available to all the BGFs (powers under the Custom Act are not available to Assam Rifles and SSB at this point). The primary responsibility to check

infiltration is on BGFs and the Army share this responsibility with BGFs only on active borders for example, active border of Jammu & Kashmir where the Indian army is guarding the border along with BSF.

There exists an inbuilt mechanism in the role and functions of CAPFs for intelligence sharing and operational coordination with the concerned agencies including Army for better operational achievements in the bordering area. Each of the BGF has been nominated as Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) for the border of its deployment to ensure co-ordination of activities of intelligence agencies operating in the border and to share actionable intelligence with all the agencies concerned including Military intelligence. Since the BGFs have already been gathering inputs from the local population and sharing with army and other agencies concerned, the recommendation of the Committee has already been acted upon. The modernization of the intelligence network of the BGFs through the acquisition of latest surveillance equipment is an on-going process and being undertaken periodically.

In the context of Signal Intelligence, it is stated that the role of the Signal Intelligence Organisation is to acquire intelligence of strategic and tactical military nature and as such, an evolutionary growth model is the basis for modernisation plans. The 12th Plan of Signal Intelligence Directorate is being implemented to acquire state-of-the-art interception systems to equip field units to gather quality intelligence in CI/CT scenario. Further, mandated external intelligence agencies play an active and dominant role to support the intelligence gathering on the targets before and after their intrusion into India during CI/CT scenario. Hence, closer cooperation between various intelligence agencies is emphasised regularly. Technological updation of SI Equipment normally takes 4-6 years and therefore efforts to keep pace with the technology through speedy procedures for procurement of niche technologies are of vital importance.

(Please see Para No. 10 of Chapter-1 of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 7)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee further recommend that the Research Establishments working for the forces should either develop the most sophisticated projects/products in achieving this objective or by acquiring the technologies from the countries where such projects are in use.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is already engaged in design and development of strategic, complex and security sensitive systems for the Armed Forces. A large number of systems/products/technologies developed by DRDO have been productionised and inducted into Armed Forces and many are in the process of trials/production/induction, which include missiles; multi-barrel rocket launcher; unmanned aerial vehicles; radars; electronic warfare systems; sonars; torpedos; combat vehicles; bridging systems; combat aircraft; sensors; NBC technologies; parachutes; combat free fall system; propellants and explosives; detonators; communication systems; armaments systems; etc. The value of systems/products/technologies developed by DRDO stands at over ₹ 1.60 lakh cr. Some of the major systems which have been developed by DRDO and inducted into Armed Forces are:—

- Prithvi, Surface-to-Surface Missile.
- Dhanush, Naval version of Prithvi Missile.
- Akash Weapon System.
- BrahMos, Supersonic Cruise Missile.
- Pinaka, Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher.
- INSAS Weapons (Rifle & LMG).
- Ammunitions, Explosives and Mines.
- Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL).
- Arjun, Main Battle Tank Mk-I.
- Remotely Operated Vehicle.
- NBC Recce Vehicle.
- Sarvatra, MultispanMobile Bridging System.
- Bridge Layer Tank (BLT) T-72.
- Armoured Ambulance.
- Electronic Warfare Suite for Fighter Aircraft (EWSFA).
- Pilotless Target Aircraft, Lakshya-I.
- Samyukta and Sangraha EW Systems for Army and Navy, respectively.
- Samvahak, Command Information Decision Support System.

- DivyaDrishti, Integrated COMINT System.
- Battle Field Surveillance Radar (BFSR).
- Rohini, Revathi, Rajendra, Bharani, Aslesha, Weapon Locating and Tactical Control Radars.
- NBC Defence Items.
- Combat Free Fall System.
- Integrated Shelter.
- HUMSA, USHUS, HUMVAD and Panchendriya Sonars.
- Torpedoes.

DRDO has speeded up the process of developing sophisticated products in achieving the objective of self-reliance in defence technology or acquiring the technologies from foreign countries where such technologies are in use. DRDO is making efforts in adopting ‘concurrent engineering’ and ‘joint venture’ approach for development and production to avoid any delay. A few collaborative programmes with foreign private companies are also supported by the respective MoDs. Several projects are being done in foreign countries and in India in the collaborative mode. The foreign countries include Israel, Russia, France, Belarus, USA, etc.”

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 8)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The role of Ministry of External Affairs in containing the anti-India sentiments, particularly in our neighbouring countries is also very important. They should present propitious conditions for diplomatic talks at all times and address the issues such as handling of Prisoners of War (PoW) and taking up the issues relating to ceasefire violations at the highest possible level. Such confidence building measures would result in a cordial atmosphere which would definitely reduce the hostile activities like infiltrations. The Committee would desire the Ministry also indulge in serious dialogue with the international community so that pressure could be exerted on the neighbours to dissuade from such nefarious activities. This exercise should not be limited only to our neighbours on the western side but also with our neighbour in the North-East.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

#### **China**

India follows a policy of engagement with China. There are elements of both cooperation and competition with that country. Regular high

level exchanges between the two countries, increased strategic communication and enhanced dialogue mechanisms have ensured a steady improvement in India-China relations. PM visited China in October, 2013 and had good discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement was one of several Agreements signed during the visit. The 17th meeting of the Special Representatives of India and China on the Boundary Question took place at Delhi on February 10-11, 2014. The Government of the two countries have decided to mark 2014 as the Year of India-China Friendly Exchanges.

### **Nepal and Bhutan**

India has excellent cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan in the area of security and has a range of bilateral mechanisms which are held regularly, including on border management, border infrastructure project and bilateral trade, transit and investment.

### **Pakistan**

India has repeatedly emphasised, including at the highest level that Pakistan must abide by its commitment not to allow its territories as well as territories under its control to be used for terrorism against Indian or other anti-India activity. The Government have also repeatedly conveyed that Pakistan's hostile propaganda against India, as well as its sponsorship of cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India is a violation of the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.

India has conveyed the need for Pakistan to uphold the sanctity of the Line of Control and abide by its ceasefire commitment of 2003 along the international border and Line of Control. The Government has also repeatedly taken up with Pakistan the issue of release of 74 Missing Defence Personnel believed to be in Pakistani jails, including 54 Prisoners of War (PoW). However, Pakistan does not acknowledge the presence of any Missing Defence Personnel in its custody.

The Government has highlighted before the international community the facts regarding Pakistan's attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India and working against Indian interests in Afghanistan. The international community recognises the impact this has on the security of our country and the region. India will continue to take all necessary measures to protect the territorial integrity of the nation and ensure the safety and security of all our citizens.



**Bangladesh**

India's links with Bangladesh are civilisational, cultural, social and economical. India follows a policy of constructive engagement with Bangladesh through several institutional mechanisms of regular interaction. India is also a partner in development of Bangladesh with several development projects being executed with the help of Indian aid. In the area of security cooperation, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, an MoU for Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners and an Extradition Treaty with Bangladesh, was signed recently.

**Myanmar**

Myanmar, India's neighbour in the east, shares a land border of over 1600 km. as well as a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal, with India. Security cooperation is an important aspect of India-Myanmar engagement. The need for enhanced cooperation between security forces and border guarding agencies for securing peace, security and stability in the border areas has been underlined at the highest levels by both the countries. During the Prime Minister's State Visit to Myanmar in May, 2012, an MoU on Border Area Development was signed, under which India is financing construction of schools, hospitals and bridges.

Both India and Myanmar have assured that territories of either country would not be allowed to be used for activities inimical to the other, including for training, sanctuary and other operations by terrorist and insurgent organisations and their operatives. Various bilateral institutional mechanisms have been developed for regular interaction in this regard. All the aspects of bilateral relations, including those related to defence and security are discussed between the two sides at Foreign Office Consultations, led by Foreign Secretary.

**Recommendation (Para No. 9)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

It is astonishing that a large number of insurgent groups are active in the North-East States and it only reflects the lack of effective co-ordination between the State, Central Armed Police Force and Military Intelligence. The Committee desire that besides tackling the hostile activities on the borders, CAPFs should be made fully empowered with the latest technology and search powers to deal with the insurgent groups and Army should be gradually devoid of internal security duties. Efforts in this regard should be communicated to the Committee within three months of presentation of this Report.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

As per available information, 78 insurgent groups are operating in the North-East region and out of which 48 insurgent groups are active in Manipur. The insurgent groups are active in North-Eastern States due to various socio-economic problems and not because of lack of coordination between State Police, CAPF and military intelligence.

In North Eastern region, the dynamics of dealing with insurgency is totally different from other parts of the country. A number of terrorist groups in the NE region are in Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement/Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/awaiting talks with Central/State Government. These terrorist groups have Designated Camps where they can stay and keep their weapons. Whenever a terrorist group decides to come for peace talks, some cadres float a new faction/group which has led to creation of numerous minor/major insurgent groups/factions. Analysis of such splinter groups indicates that they lack adequate strength/weapons but tend to fulfil local aspirations of a handful of leaders.

Though there may be a rise in the number of groups, the scale of violence in affected North-Eastern States has considerably reduced. This is solely attributed to effective coordination between various agencies, and security forces and proactive approach of the Government. As regards coordination amongst the CAPFs and Military Intelligence, there has been no problem regarding coordination at the ground level.

The border guarding forces are equipped with the modern equipments and are being further modernized to meet the challenges of the border management and counter insurgency operations. CAPFs have also been delegated powers under various Central Acts viz. Cr.P.C. Act, Customs Act, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in disturbed areas, Passports Act, Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) etc. to deal with the insurgent groups in the bordering States and to check the criminal and other illegal activities along the International Borders of India.

A Unified Command structure already exists in North East to counter the insurgent activities. Besides, Co-ordination Committees at various levels comprising the State Governments and CAPFs have also been set up for better monitoring. The Committees meet on regular basis and supervise the various operations in close coordination with local authorities as well as intelligence agencies from time to time.

The Border Guarding Forces (BGFs) are performing internal security duties along the international border and the Army shares such responsibility only on active borders. The Army has not been entrusted with internal security duty along the border during peace times. Legal framework in the border area to deal with trans-border criminal and anti-national elements by BGFs is already in place and a robust mechanism to share intelligence is in place as discussed above. The Government appreciates suggestions/recommendations of the Committee. In this regard, the recommendation of the Committee that Internal Security responsibility should gradually be assumed by CAPF, is agreed to in principle.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 10)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The role of Indian Air Force in securing our borders through air is equally important. It has numerous challenges to address both during the war as well as peace time, like Counter Air Operations, Counter Surface Force Operations, Air Defence, Maritime Operations, Intelligence/Surveillance/Recce, Strategic Operations, Space Operations, Air Defence, Intelligence/Surveillance/Recce Air Maintenance, High Availability Disaster Recovery (HADR), Training etc. To carry out these roles and responsibilities the first and foremost requirement, in the opinion of the Committee is to achieve the optimum number of squadrons which as authorized strength stands at 42. The Committee are surprised to learn that against this authorized strength, the held strength is only 34 which means that the force is short of eight squadrons. What can be more baffling to the Committee than the fact that Air Force has informed that even after inclusion of 13 Su-MKI squadrons by the end of 12th Defence Five Year Plan, *i.e.* 2012-2017, the number of squadrons would continue to be the same. The reasons for this scenario is stated to be the phasing out of MiG series of aircraft. In the opinion of the Committee, this apparently shows lack of foresight amongst the decision makers. The Committee have every reason to believe that had advance planning being done, resources augmented in a timely fashion and concerted efforts undertaken, the Air Force would have squadron strength of 42 by the end of 2017. The Committee at this stage cannot but recommend that the phasing out programme should be implemented as planned in order to minimize losses to the man and machinery and hasten up the acquisition of new aircraft as planned. In regard to acquisition, the Committee are very particular about the 'Rafale' Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) about which they recommend that negotiations should be completed at the earliest, procurement to be accelerated and every effort be made to avoid any kind of delay.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

All efforts are being put in to enhance the all-round operational capability of the Indian Air Force (IAF). IAF has achieved an increase in heli-lift and air-lift capability with the induction of Mi-17 V-5 helicopters, C-17 and C-130J-30 aircraft in line with Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP). At present, IAF has 34 fighter squadrons against the authorised strength of 42 fighter squadrons. Of these 34 fighter squadrons, 10 are equipped with MiG-21 variants and 4 with MiG-27 variants. These 14 MiG-21 and MiG-27 squadrons will phase out over the next few years.

2. The Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) in respect of the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) procurement case is presently negotiating various aspects of the contract with the L1 vendor M/s Dassault Aviation of France. The 'Maintenance' and 'Offset' sub-Committees of the CNC have completed their task and their reports have been signed. The 'Transfer of Technology' (ToT) sub-Committee is likely to finalise its report shortly. These sub-Committees have referred some issues to the CNC for resolution. The Contract sub-Committee will commence its work on receipt of draft contract and Joint Cooperation Agreement (JCA) from Dassault Aviation and HAL, the Lead Production Agency (LPA) in this procurement case. All efforts are being made to expedite conclusion of the contract negotiations.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 12)**

The Committee had recommended as under:-

The Committee would also like to have complete details in regard to the achievements made so far for the Research and Development phase contract for the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). Such details should pronounce the dates when negotiations started and by when it was likely to be finalized. The Committee are satisfied to learn that a contract for 42 more Su-30 MKI aircraft was signed on 24 December, 2012 and induction of these aircraft were expected to be completed by 2019-20. In this addition to the force, the Committee would like to see a scenario where no time and cost escalations take place and the contract proceeds within the dates specified above. The Committee would also like this be monitored on quarterly basis by an officer of the Ministry not below the rank of Additional Secretary.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

FGFA

The following milestones have been completed in respect of the FGFA project.

- IGA signed – October 2007

- Confidentiality Agreement signed – July 2008
- General Contract signed – December 2008
- IAF Technical Requirements Finalized – August 2009
- Work share finalized – November 2009
- Joint Specification document (TTA) signed – March 2010
- CCS Approval for PD Stage – December 2010
- Preliminary Design (PD) Contract negotiated & signed – 21 December 2010
- T0 for PD Stage – 25 February 2011
- PD Stage completed – 19 June 2013

During the PD stage, the basic technical configuration of the FGFA has been completed jointly by Indian team led by HAL and Sukhoi Design Bureau of Russia. An elaborate set of design documentation has been delivered to HAL in two stages during the PD stage. From the Indian side, in addition to HAL, the following agencies had participated during PD stage:

- DARE, DRDO: Low & High Band Jammers, Dual Colour IR Missile Approach Warning System, Laser Warning Receiver, modules of the Mission Computer
- LRDE, DRDO: Side AESA Arrays, ISAR Algorithm for the main Radar
- ADE, DRDO: Second Flight Control Computer
- BDL: CMDS
- System Control: Weapon Bay Door Control System

Anticipating a long lead time for drawing up and finalization of the R&D Contract, HAL initiated discussions with the Russian side as early as in September 2011. Substantial progress has been achieved in drawing up the R&D Contract as a result of the discussions so far. The progress is summarized as follows:

- Eight rounds (Sep. 2011, Dec. 2011, Mar. 2012, Apr. 2012, July 2012, Apr. 2013, Sep. 2013, Oct. 2013) of technical discussions held between the two sides to define the deliverables and principles of cooperation.
- Contract has been discussed clause by clause towards resolution of issues and to clearly define the terms of agreement. Unresolved issues has been highlighted for taking up in the CNC.

- CNC headed by JS (Aero) was formed by MoD in March 2012.
- CNC set up Expert Group of Cost Analysts in Oct. 2012 to verify the cost details, to collect breakup of costs and to make recommendations.
- Four rounds (Oct. 2012, Nov. 2012, Jan. 2013 and March 2013) of bilateral discussions held between expert group & the Russian side.
- After submission of report by Expert Group, four rounds of bilateral negotiations (July 2013, Oct. 2013, Feb. 2014, March 2014) were held by the CNC. Next bilateral CNC is planned during April 2014.
- Recently, IAF has voiced certain concerns on the technical capabilities and features of the PMF aircraft. These issues have been formally taken up with the Russian side through the CNC. During the recent bilateral CNC meeting in March 2014, 19 clarifications provided by Russian side as against the 27 concerns/points raised by IAF. Balance clarifications are to be provided by Russian side.
- In view of the complexity of the project and the extent of cost negotiations involved, it is estimated that the process of finalization of the R&D Contract will take at least 3-4 months provided the technical issues are resolved to the satisfaction of the Indian Side.
- Subsequently, the approval of CCS will be sought for formal sanction to go ahead with the R&D stage.
- SU-30 MKI  
The observations made by the Committee regarding the SU-30 MKI contract have been noted. As regards, the monitoring on quarterly basis as suggested by the Committee, HAL have been advised to strictly adhere to the timelines stipulated in the contract and send a quarterly report to the Department in the matter.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 13)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Although the Ministry has informed the Committee that the procurement procedure adopted by the Indian Air Force is one of the best in the world, the Committee find that considerable delays do take place in procurement and final induction of the machines in the

Air force. The Committee desire that red-tapism, if any, avoided and best use of procurement procedures be made. All the items planned in the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) 2012–27 should move at the desired pace scrupulously. This would help in countering threat perception and enhancing operational capabilities of the Indian Air Force against its adversaries.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

All defence capital procurements are conducted in accordance with the Defence Procurement procedures, which conform to the highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability. The Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) 2012–27 lays down the roadmap for capability-building of the Indian Air Force (IAF) over the next three Plan periods based on our threat perceptions, however, the procurements for capability-building are also linked to the annual budgetary allocations. Shortfall in budgetary support may adversely affect the capability-building process, though available funds are optimally utilised for timely implementation of the projects.

(Please see Para No. 16 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 15)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

One of the most important aspects in which Indian Air Force is found to be lacking is acute shortage of trainer aircraft of all three categories, viz. basic, intermediate and advance. The Committee feel that training of pilots is the vital requirement of any Air Force in the world. Unless we have the requisite number of trained pilots in all flying streams, all the paraphernalia of the Air Force becomes redundant. The Committee call upon the Ministry to take the necessary steps in this regard urgently.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Trainer Aircraft (BTA): To meet IAF's flying training requirements, IAF needs 181 BTA, for which Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) was accorded in December 2009 to procure 75 aircraft from the global market, whereas the remaining 106 aircraft were to be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL). However, this was subject to condition that in case, HAL does not fly its first aircraft by the time the first aircraft of the 75 aircraft arrives, then the option clause would be invoked and numbers to be made by HAL would be reviewed.

2. The 'Buy (Global)' case was progressed and a contract was signed with Pilatus for supply of 75 aircraft. The deliveries of aircraft and equipment have started and delivery of all 75 aircraft would be completed by August 2015. HAL is going ahead with development of indigenous BTA (HTT40) with its internal resources. In the meanwhile, Indian Air Force has proposed to acquire balance 106 PC-7 MK II BTA in 'Buy and Make (Indian)' category from Pilatus Aircraft Ltd.

3. Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT): The IJT aircraft has been under development since 1999. The Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) date for IJT by HAL was March 2004 and since then, this date has been revised several times to March 2007, June 2011, December 2012 and December 2013. As informed by HAL, the expected revised date for IOC for IJT is December 2014. HAL has signed the contract to supply 85 IJT. The present status of development of IJT by HAL is that all activities required for IOC have been completed except for refinement of 'stall characteristics' and 'spin testing'. HAL is now using consultancy from M/s BAe Systems, UK for the 'stall and spin characteristics' of the IJT.

(Please see Para No. 19 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 16)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee find that for basic training, Indian Air Force has a requirement of 181 basic trainer aircraft to replace HPT-32 aircraft, therefore, Air Force was granted permission to buy Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II trainers outright from the global market and rest of them were to be produced by HAL. Meanwhile, HAL has started process of developing a new basic trainer aircraft termed as HTT-40 thereby forcing the Indian Air Force to have two sets of basic trainer aircraft in near future. The situation becomes more critical when they have to maintain two sets of technical personnel, two sets of simulators and two sets of supply and logistic chain management resulting in non-standardization in training. Therefore, the Committee recommend that the Ministry should help the Indian Air Force to come out of this predicament and decide clearly which Basic Trainer Aircraft to retain after the retirement of current basic trainer.

The Committee also recommend frequent and effective coordination between Indian Air Force and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited should be ensured by way of constitution of a Monitoring Committee so as to enable the user, *i.e.*, Indian Air Force to have a better progress of HAL service delivery and plan its own procurement policy.



The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

In view of the IAF's urgent requirement for Basic Trainer Aircraft (BTA), M/s Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. delivered the first two PC-7 Mk-II aircraft at T 0 + 8 months as against the contracted delivery schedule of T 0 + 15 months. As a result of the early delivery, IAF commenced the first *ab initio* Pilots' course on a BTA, PC-7 Mk-II, in July 2013, which was successfully completed in December 2013. The deliveries of aircraft and equipment have progressed ahead of schedule and as of 28th April 2014, 35 aircraft have arrived. Delivery of all 75 aircraft would be completed by August 2015. The case for manufacture of Basic Trainer Aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has not yet fructified, although HAL is going ahead with development of indigenous BTA HTT-40 with its internal resources. In the meanwhile, Air HQ proposed to acquire balance 106 PC-7 Mk-II Basic Trainer Aircraft 'Buy and Make' from M/s Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. through Transfer of Technology (ToT) to 5 Base Repair Depot of IAF. In its meeting held on 11th March, 2014, the Services Capital Acquisition Categorisation Committee (SCAPCC) has recommended accord of Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for 106 PC-7 Mk-II aircraft with the categorisation of 'Buy and Make (Indian)'. The Committee, *inter alia*, also recommended that the IAF would explore all possibilities including response from Indian private industry. The case is now to be fielded in Services Capital Acquisition Categorisation Higher Committee (SCACHC).

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 17)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee have been informed by the ministry that sanction to develop Intermediate Jet Trainer was given by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 1999, wherein a lead time of 15 years was given to HAL. However, in 2013, after nine years of first prototype was flown in 2004, HAL sought expertise of BAES after the Steering Committee consisting of members of Ministry of Defence, IAF, certifying agency and HAL has decided in its favour. However, this resulted in exceeding their original timeline by 9 years and exhausting total development period of 23 years, thereby making it very difficult for Indian Air Force to continue second stage training of pilots. The Committee, therefore, recommend that various efforts be made either to procure IJT from foreign sources or HAL may impressed upon to adhere to the timelines given in last extension. The Committee are also dismayed over the fact that even after knowing well in advance about the ageing fleet of Kiran aircraft, the ministry has not taken any effective steps to

procure IJT, jeopardizing the life of young trainees. The Committee find that after this inordinate delay, HAL has now given to understand that efforts are being made for achieving the Final Operational Clearance (FOC) by December 2014 which would eventually lead to production of aircraft. Hence, the Committee recommend that without compromising the safety features, all out efforts should be made by all stakeholders so that targeted date of December 2014 is met and this project finally sees the light of the day. The Committee would also like to be informed of the timelines also when the production would actually start and induction would take place. The Committee would be failing in their duty, if they do not caution the ministry and HAL that in future no delays should take place. It goes without saying that cascading effect of this caution should be applicable on all defence public sector undertakings/organization including ordnance factory Board as well as the research organizations such as DRDO.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The IJT project was sanctioned in 1999 with a lead time of 5 years to operational clearance. This was under the assumption that the aircraft will be using an existing off the shelf engine. Accordingly two prototypes were developed using off-the-shelf LARZAC engine. The first Prototype aircraft flew in March 2003 and the second in March 2004. The LARZAC engines turned out to be under powered to meet the performance requirements and so a higher thrust engine was required to be integrated. Since no suitable engine was available off the shelf, an engine of required thrust needed to be developed. The sanction was revised in 2005 to include the higher thrust engine and advanced avionics. The schedule was then revised to March 2007 for Initial Operational Clearance and March 2008 for Final Operational Clearance.

The delays in IJT project were due to the delay in development of higher thrust engine (AL 551) & various accidents/incidents during the development Flight testing.

All efforts are being made to ensure Certification of IJT by December 2014 without compromising any safety issues.

Concurrent to D&D phase, setting up of facilities for and manufacturing of 12 LSP aircraft have been initiated by HAL. In addition, IAF has placed an order on HAL for production of 73 Series aircraft. HAL has initiated the production processes for this batch also in order to ensure deliveries to customer without any delay after the certification of IJT.

Among the 12 LSPs, 5 are already flying and remaining will be ready by December 2014. This can be delivered to customer for service use by March 2015 if the Certification is completed in December 2014.

Similarly, the delivery of series production aircraft is likely to commence from 2015-16 onwards.

To mitigate the delay in IJT development, the Life of Kiran aircraft has already been extended by 500 hours, due to which IAF will be able to operate Kiran fleet till 2019.

(Please see Para No. 22 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 18)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee's enquiry reveals that HAL signed a contract with NPO-Saturn of Russia for the Design and development of AL-55i engine for the IJT with a scope to licence manufacture upto 1000 AL-55i engines at HAL Koraput. In this respect, the Committee want the ministry to ensure that before designing an aircraft, the details of the engine should also be finalized otherwise, the project may have to be remain contented only with the available engine, *i.e.* AL-55i.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

As brought above, the IJT was designed and the prototype aircraft commenced flying with an off-the shelf LARZAC engine. However, the thrust of LARZAC engine was found wanting to meet the performance requirements of the aircraft. Accordingly a higher thrust engine needed to be integrated for meeting the performance requirements of the aircraft. Since no engine of the required thrust rating was readily available in the market, a higher thrust engine was required to be developed. Accordingly the AL-55i engine to be developed by NPO Saturn of Russia was selected after the due commercial procedures pursuant to decision in the Steering Committee and CCS approval.

The Ministry will endeavour to comply with the recommendation taking into account the technical feasibility and time schedule for implementation of the IJT Project.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 19)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee find from the information supplied to them that the ratio of indigenous and imported materials utilized for production

and repair activities in HAL is around 15% and 85% by value respectively, which seems to be very meagre in achieving selfreliance by the premier aircraft manufacturing company. The Committee desire that HAL should look into this aspect also so that dependence on foreign countries can be reduced.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The materials used for production of aircraft can broadly be classified into:

- Raw Materials
- Standard Parts
- Line Replaceable Units (LRUs)

Raw materials: Materials being used in the aircraft industries are Aluminium Alloys, Steel alloys, Titanium & Nickel alloys etc. Indigenisation of raw materials involves substantial financial investments and is also a long drawn process due to certification procedure and low volume requirement.

An initiative has been taken for indigenisation of materials and accordingly a Committee is constituted by MoD with the members from MoD, HAL, Midhani, OFB, DRDO with an aim to study, analyse and recommend ways and means to indigenously develop the advanced materials in the Country. The Committee submitted its report to the Ministry in Feb. 2014. The report of the Committee is being analysed for feasibility of implementation.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 20)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Coming to the part of the Navy and the Coast Guard, the Committee is perturbed to note that any foreign ship could enter Indian shores with sophisticated load of arms and ammunitions. The Committee is worried to discover that the amount of floating armouries contained in the ship was approx., 5000 rounds of ammunition & sophisticated weapons where each weapon could fire a distance of 3-4 kilometres. In the opinion of the Committee, such a scenario is appalling especially when the country is fraught with threats and news of bomb blasts are a frequent happening to internal security. As such, the role of Navy and Indian Coast Guard becomes very challenging and loaded with multifarious responsibilities. The Committee concurs in totality that

the present system of prior notification needs to be changed expeditiously to Pre Approval Notification System (PANS). Since all these aspects are covered in the Coastal Security Bill which has been drafted by the Navy and is under consideration at the Ministry of Defence, the Committee recommends in unequivocal terms that the Bill should be proceeded with utmost priority since it is concerned with the matter as serious as coastal security *vis-a-vis* threat perception to our motherland and the innocent citizens. It is needless to say that the steps initiated, progress made and finality reached in regard to the Bill be communicated to the Committee. Also, the Committee urges upon the Indian Navy & Coast Guard Organisation, which are responsible for overall maritime security in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone, to take up the matter emphatically with the international community. Since the subject is related to the Ministry of Shipping (MoS), it is pertinent for the Ministry of Defence to impress upon Ministry of Shipping that mere guidelines are not sufficient. The security companies in the business should be registered with international bodies as the unregulated floating armouries in sea and their access to our coastal regions are a matter of great concern.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

**Floating Armouries:** The continued threat of piracy has led to the proliferation of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) and floating armouries in International Waters. Freedom of navigation in high seas, and the lack of international regulatory framework to deal with the floating armouries in our region has led to fear of these being used by terrorist/anti-national elements. The issue of floating armouries as well as revision of the piracy high-risk area are being taken up by India in International fora for adoption of a common regulatory framework.

**Coastal Security (CS) Bill:** Naval Headquarters have suggested consideration of Coastal Security Bill for enactment of a law to delineate the responsibilities and duties of various agencies involved in Coastal Security of the country as this will lead to better coordination and provide legal basis for actions of Indian Navy. The issue was considered during a review meeting on Coastal Security taken by Raksha Mantri and it was decided that as per Allocation of Business rules the draft Coastal Security Bill will be coordinated by M/o Home Affairs in consultation with MoD and the Coastal State Government. A paper listing the concerns and need for a Coastal Security Bill prepared by Indian Navy has been forwarded to M/o Home Affairs for further action.

Pre-Arrival Notification for Security (PANS): The issue of prior approval in lieu of prior notification by Merchant Vessels carrying armed detachments onboard has been considered. However, very limited rights are available to Coastal States beyond Territorial Waters. This issue is being raised at International fora like IMO, CGPCS for consideration of guidelines.

(Please see Para No. 25 of Chapter I of the Report)

**Recommendation (Para No. 21)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

In accomplishing the objectives of maritime and coastal security, the Committee also concur with the suggestion of the Ministry that Naval and Coast Guard Officers be delegated with more powers under the Maritime Zones of Indian Act which would enable them to take decisions expeditiously and help in checking the menace of transgression. The responsibilities of other concerned Departments such as Customs, Immigration and Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), in the opinion of the Committee also needs to be redefined. Hence, the Committee emphasize that the Ministry of Defence take a befitting decision while considering the legislation on empowerment of Navy and Coast Guard officials and officers of other organisations/ departments.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Though very limited rights are available to Coastal States beyond Territorial Waters under UNCLOS, the request for empowerment under the Maritime Zones of India Act (MZI) Act, 1976 has been taken up with MEA.

**Recommendation (Para No. 23)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee are perturbed to note that the issue regarding the establishment of radars in the Nicobar Islands has staggered and has not reached finality yet. This issue needs to be addressed earnestly and expeditiously especially when our neighbour China has been undertaking various activities in its areas of interest like South-China Sea and deploying of naval ships in the Gulf of Eden as parts of its anti-piracy operations. During evidence, the Committee desired to know about the present status of installation of radar in Nicobar Islands,

which matter had come to their notice during their study visit to Andaman and Nicobar Islands in February 2013. Consistent with admission of naval officials, the Committee comprehend that Narcondum Island is strategically very crucial because it is in the Andaman sea, almost 130-140 miles from our nearest island and about 50-60 miles from other side. The Committee were dismayed to know that the radar project at Narcondum could not get Government approval and Navy was asked to look for an alternate location. Subsequently, the Committee were apprised that Navy has identified an alternate location though not strategically as befitting as the Standalone Island. The Committee sense that Indian Navy is gearing up towards Maritime Capability Perspective Plan and taking up maritime challenges along with security threats emanating from regional interests and such denials/delays will hamper the country's defence preparedness. Even in their 20th report on examination of demands for grants 2013-14, the Committee had categorically observed that due to such delays many important projects are hindered affecting overall development of surveillance network and operational preparedness of country's defence issues. On this point, the Committee insist that the Government should take initiatives/measures towards strengthening strategic needs of Defence. Consequently, the Government may reconsider the project of installation of naval equipment in Narcondum Island and environmental clearances be aptly undertaken with the intention that strategic defence installations/establishments are not derailed.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Construction work at three sites in Andaman and Nicobar Island viz. East Island, Sandy Point and Keating Point for setting up of the Radar Stations is being progressed. Narcondum Island being not available due to environmental concerns, Indian Coast Guard is looking at alternate sites for setting up the Radar Station in A&N Islands.

(Please see Para No. 31 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 24)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee deeply regrets the sinking of INS Sindhurakshak along with all the men on board in August 2013. In this context, the Committee was anxious and keen to know the causes of disaster. It is baffling for the Committee to find that this vessel had recently returned from Russia after servicing. How a vessel could meet a disaster of this kind almost immediately after its maintenance. The Committee learns

that the cause of accident is under investigation. It is yet to be salvaged and only after the submarine is salvaged, can the actual cause of accident be establishment. The Committee also find that specialised equipments are required for salvaging the submarine and tendering is in process. The whole matter is being dealt with by the Western Naval Command. The Committee observes that it is of utmost importance for the Navy to ascertain the exact cause of accident as such incidents would be catastrophic and adversely affect the morale of naval personnel working on different vessels. The Committee recommends that requisite precautionary measures are put in place to ensure safety of the personnel on board and equipment placed on various submarines at different locations. The Navy should take all necessary steps to obviate accidents in order to safeguard the trained manpower and sophisticated machines.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“After the incidents onboard submarines, extensive checks on weapon related safety systems and audit of Standard Operating Procedures on all operational ship and submarines have been instituted. To ensure that all naval operations are undertaken within a well defined safety operating envelope, Safety Class Authorities (SCAs) experts in their respective fields have been introduced. Subsequently, in February 2014, a comprehensive framework for safety audit of all operational units has also been promulgated to be implemented at Command Headquarters levels.”

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 25)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee is happy to learn that our Navy is engaging itself in exercises with the Navies of friendly countries, which is a right step. Such exercises not only enhance the capabilities of our force but also create an atmosphere of goodwill and friendship. They, therefore, desire that more engagements of this nature be undertaken in future.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Bilateral Naval Exercises with the navies of friendly foreign countries are decided on yearly basis keeping in view all relevant factors.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 26)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee find that there lies a very close interaction between the Army and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs). The Army is



expressly responsible for guarding the borders along the Actual Ground Position Line and Line of Control which gets a backing by the Border Security Force which guards the remaining international boundary. Like-wise, the Army is engaged with Indo-Tibetan Border Police in the border management of India-China border. In the rest of the borders like India-Nepal Sashastra Seema Bal, India-Myanmar Assam Rifles, India-Bhutan Sashastra Seema Bal and India-Bangladesh Border Security Force are engaged. They protect a vast boundary line stretching over thousands of kilometres.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The observations of the Committee has been noted by the Ministry.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 30)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

It is shocking to note that only one road out of 27 ITBP roads is complete and as many as 11 roads are behind schedule and not even the Detailed Project Reports have been finalized. Out of these delayed roads, 2 fall in Himachal Pradesh, 4 in Arunachal Pradesh, 2 in Uttarakhand and 3 roads in Sikkim. For 14 roads, the completion date are not too far and most of them are to be completed by March 2014, October 2014, December 2014, October 2015, March 2016, December 2016, etc. This is a scenario of the roads in progress which pertain to the ITBP. The Committee are very emphatic in their recommendation and desire that at least now after their intervention, the Detailed Project Report be finalized without any further loss of time. They also recommend that the new dates should register very realistic targets in regard to the availability of finance, technology, manpower, etc. The usual handicaps which have been referred in regard to other roads such as lack of environmental clearance, problems in land and acquisitions should be taken care in advance so that further delays do not occur. If need be a high-level task force of the senior most officers of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs and Railways be constituted to execute the land connectivity to the border which should monitor the progress on a monthly basis and report the shortcomings in order to obviate them in a timely manner. Here, the Committee also emphasize that strict compliance should be made in regard to the 14 roads, the completion dates of which is not too far from now. Any delays that would come to the notice of the Committee would be abjured and taken seriously as this issue relate to a matter as high as 'Threat Perception' to the nation.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Out of 27 roads identified for development for ITBP as ICBRs, BRO has been entrusted with the construction of 15 No. of roads with a total length of 397.28 Km. Out of these 15 Nos. roads, the following 02 Nos. roads have already been completed.

- (a) Sugar PtLepcha 7.55 km.
- (b) Chuppan-Shipkila 5.28 km.

2. The overall progress on ITBP roads entrusted to BRO up to March 2014 is as under:

- (a) Formation work of 270.57 Km. (68%)
- (b) Surfacing work of 100.75 Km. (25.3%)

3. The problems being faced in construction of roads in the border region are as under:-

- (a) Lack of stone quarries from State Governments.
- (b) Delay in Forest/wild life cases.
- (c) Land Acquisition.
- (d) High Altitude areas resulting in reduced efficiency.
- (e) Limited working season.
- (f) Paucity of heavy lift Air Effort.
- (g) Shortage of equipment and skilled manpower.

4. The bottlenecks which have affected the progress of works are as follows:

- (i) In Arunachal Pradesh formation works got delayed due to inadequate air effort, labour shortage and difficult terrain.
- (ii) In Uttarakhand, surfacing work has been ceased as quarrying and HMP installation are not allowed in Gangotri National Park.
- (iii) Due to inadequate air effort, formation works of the following roads are delayed in Uttarakhand:
  - (a) Sumna-Rimhim
  - (b) Gunji-Kutti
  - (c) Munsuari-Bugdhiar-Milam.

5. The schedule of completion for the remaining roads is as under:

- (a) 1 road by 2014 (Road Sugar Pt-Pong-Pt 4840).
- (b) 3 roads by 2015 (Road Zimithang-Khinzemane, Road Bona-Gelling and Road Koyul-Photile-Chusumle-Zarasar).
- (c) 3 roads by 2016 (Road Shungatsar-Kharsangla, Road Naga-Jadhang and Road All Weather Road across Marsimikla).
- (d) 1 road by 2017 (Road Yarlung-Lamang).
- (e) 2 road by 2019 (Road Ghastoli-Rattakona and Road Sumna-Rimkhim).
- (f) 1 road by 2020 (Road Mungsiari-Bugdhiar-Milam).
- (g) 1 road by 2022. (Road Gunji-Kuthi-Jolingkong).
- (h) Construction of road Thimbu-Mango-Chuna cannot be commenced as initial 34 Km. is under construction by Arunachal Pradesh PWD and as such no connectivity exists to the start point as of now.

6. The issues affecting progress of works are being addressed by the Ministry by taking up the case with State Government for necessary allotment of quarries and grant of permission for establishing Hot Mix Plants for surfacing works. State Chief Secretaries have been requested to form Empowered Committees under their chairmanship and to hold regular meetings to address bottlenecks that impact progress of BRO works.

7. Besides monitoring of border infrastructure works by the Empowered Committee on Border Infrastructure (ECBI) under the Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary, a special cell called Performance, Coordination and Monitoring Cell (PCMC) has been raised in Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) Secretariat in Ministry to closely monitor the progress of works on important roads and facilitate in resolution of issues affecting progress. The progress on all ICBRs was reviewed by Defence Secretary in March-April 2014. BRO has been asked to try new technologies like modern soil stabilizing materials, use of precast concrete blocks/slabs etc. wherever there is problem in conventional road construction. Special emphasis is also being given to provide air efforts to BRO through an intensive induction Operation by Indian Air Force and efforts are being made to supplement air efforts through outsourcing. Further a Working Group has been constituted under the Chairmanship of Secretary, MoEF with members from MoD, MHA and other stakeholders to periodically review progress of forest/wild-life clearances required for development of border infrastructure projects.

**Recommendation (Para No. 31)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee now take a bird's eye view of other delays of border roads. The Committee find that Ministry of Home Affairs is candid in its admission before the Committee that 'lack of development on our side is in sharp contrast to infrastructure development on the Chinese side'. The Committee have also taken a serious note of the contention of the Ministry that China has over a period of time taken a large scale road construction and developed a network of highways which are also linked to feeder and arterial roads. What can be more appalling for the Committee to learn that many of border passes from China side are now connected by road. The Committee are cautiously optimistic as to what would happen to our nation in case of any eventuality such as war specially when our side has a very dismal network of roads as well as rail connections which could be effective in mobilizing man and machine.

Talking of the BRO projects a sorry figure depicts that out of 8 Border Road Projects such as Himank, Swastik, Shivalik etc. along the Indo-China Border none is hundred per cent complete. The Committee also find that there is a network of agencies planning, executing and monitoring these road projects such as CPWD, National Project Construction Corporation (NPCC), State Public Works Department, Directorate-General (DGMO), concerned Ministries, etc. The Committee wonder how a coordination mechanism is established between all these agencies. Not going into the finer details of each and every *vis-à-vis* projects, the Committee here recommend strongly that all the projects along Indo-China Border should be executed with a new zeal and they be completed as planned. The task force should monitor the progress of all the roads. Also the Committee would like to be informed that the process which has been started for seeking approval for construction of 34 roads in Phase-II and additionally 73 proposed by ITBP should be given approval/endorsement at the minimum possible time under intimation to the Committee so that the ball can be set rolling from the projects of Phase-II.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Due to inherent delays in land acquisition, forest clearance and other terrain related issues like hard rock stretches, limited working period the commencement and progress of works were delayed. Moreover most of these roads in 8 BRO projects were sanctioned from 2006 onward. In fact, 01 of these roads Thimbu-Mango-Chuna under construction by Arunachal Pradesh PWD not yet sanctioned as no connectivity exists to the start point from where BRO is entrusted work. However, work on most of these roads is now well under way.

2. As brought out in the reply to Para 30, it is again stated that the progress of roads is closely monitored by ECBI at the highest level and initiatives have been taken to expedite the completion of these roads.

3. No works under phase-II are entrusted to BRO.

### Recommendation (Para No. 32)

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Gleaning through the replies of the Ministry, the Committee find that the situation of the construction of roads in Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan border is also a bane. On Indo-Nepal Border, the percentage of completion of HIRAK and Swastik is as low as 41 and 45 per cent respectively. What can be more disturbing than the fact out of 6286 border pillars, 1273 are damaged, 1397 missing and only 3616 are in good condition. The Government has, as informed to the Committee, given approval and upgradation of 1377 kms. of roads along this border which fall in three States – Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Uttarakhand. The Committee are perturbed to note that out of 1377 kms., a part approval has been accorded through DPRs. The Committee recommend that final approval be granted before the finalization of Action Taken Note on this Report and also the status of the work initiated be intimated to the Committee.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. In Indo-Nepal border progress of work of BRO project HIRAK is given as under along with reasons for low performance:—

#### Project HIRAK (Indo-Nepal Border)

Sl. No.	Road under ICBR Programme	%age of Physical Progress	Reason for slow progress	Date of Commencement	PDC
1.	Munsiari-Bugdhar—Milam	42%	High altitude, inadequate air effort	2006	2020
2.	Gunji-Kuthi-Jolingkong	40%	HAA, adverse ground conditions	2007	2017
3.	Tawaghat-Ghatibagarh	75%	Adverse ground condition LA/FC problems	2005	2017
4.	Ghatibagarh-Lipulekh	30%	Delay in FC, inadequate Air Effort	2005	2020

2. No works regarding border pillars and roads in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar has been entrusted to BRO.

**Recommendation (Para No. 33)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

On Indo-Bhutan Border, the Committee would like to know first the reason why Swastik Project could be completed only 35 per cent and Dantak only 90 per cent. They would like the dates since when these roads are pending and by when they would be finally completed. Also what the Ministry are doing for 542 missing border pillars and 457 damaged pillars out of a total of 1861 pillars. In the opinion of the Committee, whether these are executed by State Public Works Department or there is a shortage of funds which is proposed to be met by Department of North-Eastern Regions (DONER), the final responsibility lies with the Ministry of Defence as they are the one who have to secure our border against any odd. The Committee are perplexed that the work is held on account of bearing the cost of land and as such recommend that not only now, in future also before according final approval to any project all these issues should be sorted out before hand. They fail to understand that why they have been intimated of one difficulty or the other when the projects have already been approved.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. The progress of Indo-Bhutan border works of project Swastik is given as under along with reason for low performance:

(i) Project Swastik (Indo-Bhutan Border):

Sl. No.	Name of road	% age of Physical Progress	Reason for slow progress	Date of Commencement	PDC
1.	Tr.-Jn.- Bheembase-Dokala	70%	Change in alignment & scope of work, adverse climatic conditions	2005	2018
2.	Flag Hill-Dokala	Nil	NBWL clearance and FC with CEC, SC	2011	2022
3.	Katao-Bump IV	100%	Completed	—	—

(ii) Project Dantak: The roads in project Dantak are progressing as per schedule and are likely to be completed within scheduled completion dates.

2. No works regarding border pillars has been entrusted to BRO.

**Recommendation (Para No. 36)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee learn that on Indo-Myanmar Border there is a comprehensive proposal for creation for border infrastructure which envisages not only construction of new roads upgradation of existing, helipads and helibases in the State of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. Assam Rifles is the Border Guarding Force along the Indo-Myanmar border. Assam Rifles has informed that there are 76 Company Operating Bases (COBs)/Border Out Posts (BOPs) along Indo-Myanmar border of which, 56 have moderate connectivity and the remaining 20 have very poor connectivity. They also find that there is a comprehensive proposal involving construction of 4585 km of roads, 113 helipads and 02 heli bases during the period 2013–25 in two phases. The Committee are perturbed to note that the year 2013 has already elapsed and action is still being taken by the Ministry to commission the prefeasibility study through CPWD. The Committee deprecate the delay in commencement of this study and desire that it be completed soon. They would also like to have a complete picture on how this project along with the cost and time lines in different sectors of this project.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Status of Progress of Indo-Myanmar Border Fencing entrusted to BRO is as under:

(i) Total Sanctioned – 15.73 Km.

(ii) Total Constructed – 4.50 Km.

2. Work delayed due to non-allotment of funds.

**Recommendation (Para No. 37)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Again, for strengthening the connectivity in the sensitive hill areas of North-East, the Committee recommended that planning on the

alternate access route through Bagrakot-AlagarhRhenok-Rorathang-Ranipul be completed within a defined period and the alternate alignment, namely, Balipara-Chardar-Tawang which is under construction be completed soon. Any obstacles being faced be communicated to the Committee so that they can find the right trajectory to be followed by the Ministry.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Alternate access route for Sikkim through Bagrakot-AlagarhRhenok- Rorathang-Ranipul is being planned by MoRT&H and only part of route, from Alagarh to Rishi of length 21.00 km. is entrusted to BRO. The DPR preparation is under progress.

2. Work on Road Balipara-Charduar-Tawang of length 317.28 km. is under progress and the progress as on March 14 is as under:

- (a) Formation - 191.36 km.
- (b) Surfacing - 139.29 km.
- (c) likely to be completed within PDC *i.e.* 2016.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 38)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee do not share the contention of the Ministry that in construction of border roads, the problems such as lack of stone quarries, delay in environmental clearances, land acquisition, shortage of labour are faced. The Committee would like to know that why these were not envisaged initially prior to starting of the work than halting it midway due to such problems. They recommend that these issues may effectively be taken up with the Chief-Secretaries of various States and also with the Ministries of Environment and Forests both at the Centre and States. On the inadequate heavy air lift support by Indian Air Force, the Committee take a serious view. The Committee would like the reasons from the Ministry on the shortfalls on the air lift which affects construction connectivity and also the remedial measures thereof. In this regards, the proposal of BRO for inviting expression of interest from private agencies must be viewed very seriously by the Ministry and full support be given for fructifying this proposal.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Issues related to land acquisition, environmental clearance, lack of quarries etc. are impediments to the smooth progress of work. Chief Secretaries of various State Governments have been requested



to constitute Empowered Committees under their Chairmanship with secretaries of concerned departments as members to resolve issues that affect progress of works by BRO.

2. Various measures have been adopted for quick and time bound disposal of forest clearance cases by MoEF:

- (i) Single window system established at District, State and MoEF levels to fast track processing of forest clearance cases on 28th January 2010.
- (ii) Simplified and unified Proforma adopted for processing both forest and wild life clearance simultaneously.
- (iii) Regular review meeting is being held at Ministry of Defence to review progress of pending cases with representatives of State Government MoEF and BRO.
- (iv) A Working Group has been constituted on 03.06.2013 by Ministry of Environment and Forests under the Chairmanship of Secretary MoEF to review the forest clearance cases.

3. As regards air efforts requirement of BRO is concerned the same is generally met by IAF. But due to capacity constraints of IAF, particularly in heavy lift capacity, it has been decided that BRO would outsource the same. An Empowered Committee under the chairmanship of DG (Air Ops) has been constituted which would carry out the task of outsourcing.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 40)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee would like the Ministry of Railways to keep itself abreast with the technological development taking place in the field of railways specially regarding the high altitude developments not only in the neighbouring countries like China but throughout the world. Knowledge exchange in this era is no big task. Although it has been stated that Ministry of Railways possesses the required know how for executing these proposed 14 lines yet the Committee recommend that our railways lines in border areas should be the most sophisticated ones so that the forces do not face any difficulty and their accomplishments are not compromised. This recommendation is applicable generally for the purposes of road construction also where project should be undertaken with the best available technology in the world.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Ministry of Railways has informed that it is keeping abreast with technological development taking place in the field of Railways especially regarding high altitude developments. Indian Railways is already undertaking challenging construction work in Himalayas right from Jammu & Kashmir to North East and have got sufficient experience in construction in hilly region at high altitude. Moreover, it is also ensuring that its personnel are trained in such construction regularly.

2. Ministry of Railways would like to assure the Committee that the 14 strategic lines once sanctioned and fully funded by Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Finance will be constructed with state-of-the-art technology and will be sophisticated to ensure speedier mobilization of military cargo.

3. As far as road construction in high altitude areas is concerned, a decision has been taken to adopt internationally proven best practices and try new technology, material and equipment. Towards this, 10% of Border Roads Organization (BRO) funds are being earmarked. Furthermore, a collaborative measure has been initiated to establish a multi-discipline-technical expert group with experts from Ministry of Science and Technology (CRRI, CSIR, GSI etc.) to assist Border Roads Organisation in technical matters.

(Please see Para No. 43 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 41)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The importance of air connectivity in the borders cannot be left out even if we have a strong road and rail connectivity in place. It is encouraging to learn that substantial tonnage of material is lifted annually to advance landing grounds in Ladakh. The Committee learnt that feasibility of a new Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) at Padam (South West of Leh) is being examined. The Committee would like to know whether more Advanced Landing Grounds are planned in future. Apart from completing the feasibility study for Padam expeditiously, the Committee recommend that construction of Advanced Landing Grounds be done with pace so that the desired aim of air connectivity to border to transport men and machine may be achieved. Also at Nyoma and eight other airfields construction activity should be started as sanctions have already being given. They would also like to have the details of all Advanced Landing Grounds which require upgradation along with their costs and time schedules.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The proposal for Kargil ALG is being examined in the Ministry in consultation with IAF and Army. Nyoma, in eastern Ladakh, is planned to be developed into a full-fledged airbase. The infrastructure planned includes an extended runway of 11300 ft., hardened aircraft shelters, aprons and all other requirements of an operational base. 'In Principle' approval for development of Nyoma ALG has been accorded by RM. Draft CCS note in this regard has been prepared. Observations of Ministry of Finance on the draft CCS note are being addressed. The semi-prepared ALG at Daulat Beg Oldi is suitable for limited operations by AN-32 and C-130J. Various infrastructure projects at Leh and Thoise are being planned in Annual Major Works Programme (AMWP) 2014-15 and AMWP 2015 -16. Padam had been identified as a probable location for an airbase but was given a lower priority (below Kargil and Nyoma) due to its location which would entail difficulty for wide-bodied aircraft to land.

Brief on Eight ALGs of NE Project. Works Services in respect of seven ALGs viz. Ziro, Passighat, Mechuka, Walong, Along, Tuting and Tawang have been sanctioned. Work at Vijayanagar ALG has been postponed/deferred due to lack of road connectivity to the ALG. Out of the seven ALGs, work Services have commenced at all the ALGs except Tawang. The current status of the eight projects is as follows:—

Name of the Works	Sanctioned cost (Rs. in cr.)	Physical Progress	PDC
Ziro	158.87	25%	03 April 15
Passighat	179.48 <sup>@</sup>	8%	03 April 15
Mechuka	155.22	6%	03 April 15
Walong	82.40	18%	03 April 15
Along	81.95	6%	03 April 15
Tuting	129.64	6%	03 April 15
Tawang	141.46	Works not yet commenced. Administrative Approval/sanction for works services at Tawang was issued on 27.08.2013. However, since the L-1 tender is higher than the sanctioned cost. Revised Administrative Approval at the revised cost of Rs. 141.16 crore is being issued.	130 weeks from date of issue of Revised Admn. Approval.

<sup>@</sup>Construction of security wall at Passighat ALG at a cost of Rs. 9.21 crore was separately sanctioned on 23.12.2010 in view of encroachment problems. Construction of security wall has been completed.

### CHAPTER III

#### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS, WHICH THE COMMITTEE DO NOT DESIRE TO PURSUE IN VIEW OF THE REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

##### Recommendation (Para No. 5)

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee's examination remains inconclusive and no recommendation can be made in regard to the authorized and held strength of equipments including Tanks, Aircraft Carriers etc. The Ministry has simply informed the Committee that induction of these assets in the inventories of the armed forces is an ongoing process and further details regarding holding cannot be divulged in the interest of national security. The Committee do not want to press the Ministry on divulging the exact numbers of these equipments but at least, in the normal course they expected that some kind of trend should be made available to them along with the efforts being made to match the optimum numbers. It goes without saying the role of the Committee and the Ministry are complementary to each other. There is no contradiction of any objective between the two. At this stage, they would like the Ministry of amplify their information on the lines desired above while sending the action taken notes.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

A well-structured process is in place for capability development and modernization of the Armed Forces. As part of this process, the Government is implementing a focused plan to build up the capability of Armed Forces through force accretions and force modernisation. The modernization plan is based on developing force capability in consonance with the National Security requirement with the intent of effectively dealing with the current, as well as emerging threats and challenges.

2. The required force level, armaments and equipments are based on the need for defence preparedness to meet any threats. Indian defence forces are fully equipped to meet all contingencies and are concurrently augmenting themselves by acquiring state-of-the-art weapons and systems. Major acquisitions by three services during recent past are:

Army:

1. T-90 Tanks

2. Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun
3. Radar Systems
4. Missiles etc.

## Navy:

1. Missiles
2. Sonobuoys
3. Torpedoes
4. Surveillance Radar Systems
5. Training Equipment etc.
6. Ships

## Air Force:

1. Aircrafts and associated equipment
2. Helicopters

## Weather Radar System

3. All acquisitions are in line with the planned requirements and projections of the Armed Forces.

4. Budgetary allocations are made based on the requirement projected by Armed Forces and depending on the utilization of funds allocated and progress of various Capital Acquisition Schemes, Additional funds, if required, are made available either with re-adjustments within or additional allocations made at the revised estimate (RE) stage.

5. During the years 2011-12 and 2012-13, the allocated funds have been optimally utilized for capital acquisitions. The budget estimates (BE), revised estimates (RE) and the actual expenditure on Capital acquisition for modernization of Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Staff) was as under:

(Rs. in crore)			
Year	Budget Estimates	Revised Estimates	Actual Expenditure
2011-12	52998.02	47409.45	50723.97
2012-13	66032.24	57599.46	58768.86

6. The Budget allocation for capital acquisition of Armed Forces for the financial year 2013-14 was Rs. 73,444.59 crore.

**Recommendation (Para No. 14)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Also, the Committee recommend that the ballistic missile defence system which is being developed by DRDO should not hang up in bottlenecks and the set deadlines be met. The radar coverage at all levels on a pan India basis be built up within the set time-frame and induction should proceed as planned in the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan. The Committee would in no way appreciate any delays on one ground or the other as had happened in many DRDO product deliveries in the past, to quote one specific instance of Kaveri Engine.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system and the radar coverage at all levels on a pan India basis developed and built up, respectively by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are classified and security sensitive in nature.

(SA to RM will brief the Chairman Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence in person as this project falls under the strategic category.)

**Recommendation (Para No. 27)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee also find that five Central Armed Police Forces viz. CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP and SSB are under administrative as well as operational jurisdiction of Ministry of Home Affairs whereas, Assam Rifles is under the operational jurisdiction of Ministry of Defence. In executing the counter insurgency and counter terrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East a Unified Headquarter mechanism exists in J&K as well as North-East. The operations are presently conducted by Army and also the Headquarter level fortnightly meetings are organised between ITBP and Intelligence Bureau. The Committee feel that such a multiplicity in coordination and planning and that too with several forces is a feature to be relooked into. At the core level Army is playing a very crucial role in guarding the Line of Control in the two difficult borders. The Committee also do not understand why most of these forces are under the administrative and operational

jurisdiction of Ministry of Home Affairs whereas Assam Rifles is operating under Ministry of Defence. Working with so many agencies for the same goal is bound to create confusion. The Committee therefore recommend that one single uniform command be established for effective and easy coordination between Army and all the Central Armed Police Forces. As recommended in the earlier part of this report, the Committee would also like that Army should be absolved of border management responsibilities in a planned manner and the various Central Armed Police Forces should be trained to take over this difficult task.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

As observed by the Committee, in J&K, Army is deployed on LoC (along Indo-Pakistan) for guarding the LoC and also for CI/Ops duties in the State. Similarly, in the North-East, Army is also deployed for CI/Ops duties and guarding the LAC (along Indo-China border in Sikkim & Arunachal Pradesh) along with the CAPFs. Due to multiplicity of forces in J&K and in some parts of the North-East, the unified headquarter mechanism has been established in these areas where forces are deployed in CI (Ops)/IS duties, to take care of the special needs of the area through better coordination among various agencies. However, in other areas of the international border of the country a single CAPF, under 'One Border One Force' Policy, has been deployed for guarding the international border under the administrative and operational control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The existing arrangement is working well and therefore, there does not appear to be any requirement of introduction of uniform command as proposed by the Committee. Further, MHA proposal to transfer the India-Myanmar BG responsibility to BSF has been endorsed by DGMO. Seeing the dynamics and its requirements, BG issues are handled in an objective manner so that security apparatus along LAC functions to its optimum potential.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 28)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee also find that there is very limited interdependency between the Army and the Central Armed Police Forces. Expressly, there is no interdependency for equipment, ammunition, infrastructure etc. and for training as well. Although at the field level, it is stated, that zonal Inspector General of Police and their counterpart of CAPFs have perfect coordination mechanism in place for conducting joint Anti-terrorist operations, the Committee have not been intimated the mechanism in place with the Army. The situation becomes all the more

difficult when the Committee learnt that the State Governments are primarily responsible for countering internal disturbances, terrorists and naxalites activities and as such the CAPFs work in close coordination with the State Governments. Even for the border guarding duties CAPFs have to work in close coordination with local police forces in tackling different illegal activities such as drugs, smuggling etc.

Once again the Committee find that more and more agencies are clubbed in for the same function *i.e.*, guarding the borders taking commands from the State Government officials, their own commandants, other senior officers may become difficult for the forces at the ground level. The Committee strongly reiterate the recommendation that there should be uniformity of command and enhanced interdependency between all the CAPFs. They should be trained on the lines of the Army in order to enable them to enhance their operational capabilities. The Committee would like a detailed note to be sent with Action Taken Notes on the interdependency on real operational front between the Army, CAPFs and State Government officials and then the Committee would like to revisit this issue. Such a note should *inter-alia* contain the targeted and actual numbers of Army *vis-à-vis* CAPFs deployed on the borders, the communication methodology, intelligence set up of each of the Central Armed Police Force and the information sharing between all the agencies.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The observations of the Committee regarding limited interdependency between the Army and the Central Armed Police Forces and also that CAPFs work in close coordination with the State Governments, has been noted. The Army in J&K carries out Counter Terrorist (CT) training for various CAPFs in CT schools as well as in formations.

Border Guarding Forces (BGFs) have been assigned specific border and their responsibility to protect the border in the peace time under the administrative and operational control of MHA is unambiguous and total. However, on active border and during war time, the operational controls of BGFs shift to the Army. Accordingly, chain of command is clearly defined.

The training of BGF is on the line of the Army incorporating all the essential elements of the Army training. The intelligence set up of each of the BGF is well defined.

Each CAPF performs its specific duties as mandated in their Acts which includes internal security and border guarding duties. The BSF, SSB and ITBP have been raised as full-fledged cohesive force with an



inbuilt mechanism to cater to its operational and administrative requirement in terms of equipment, ammunition and infrastructure etc. Their day to day operational and administrative needs are well addressed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore, there is no scope for inter dependency between BSF, SSB, ITBP & Army in terms of equipment, ammunition and infrastructure. However, at ground level there is functional and operational coordination with the concerned agencies including Army and other CAPFs for better operational achievements in the border areas.

Therefore, it is opined that introduction of uniform command will not yield any benefit to the existing command structure, except for adding one more channel of superintendence.

It is also opined that time tested functional coordination arrangement between CAPF and Army may not be disturbed and different forces raised for specific purpose after due consideration should not be allowed to lose their identity and purpose. However, during operations, there is need to ensure compatibility, inter operability and seamless integration to harness the strengths of both Army and CAPFs.

As desired a Note on CAPFs deployed on borders, the communication methodology and Intelligence set up is at Annexure.

Annexure to Para No. 28

Note on CAPFs deployed on borders, the communication methodology and Intelligence set up.

1. BSF

1. Uniformity of Command & enhanced interdependency

1.1.1 As enabled by its mandate BSF has been raised as an independent force to look after the border management issue on its own, under the guidance and direction of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

1.1.2 There is no inter-dependency between BSF and Army in terms of equipment, communication, infrastructure etc. being an independent organization under MHA. All the aspects of its day to day Operational and Administrative needs are well addressed by the Government.

1.1.3 However, at the functional level, BSF battalions deployed on Line of Control and Anti-Infiltration role of J&K are already under operational control of Army.

### 1.2 Training of CAPFs on the line of Army:—

BSF troops and officers are already being imparted training on Army line incorporating all essential elements of Army training required to perform the mandated duty *i.e.* peace time as well as war time role of BSF.

### 1.3 Deployment of BSF on border: BSF is mandated to guard following borders:

#### 1.3.1 Indo-Pak International border:

Total length of IB	—	2300.16 km.
Manned by BSF	—	2289.66 km.
Manned by Army	—	10.5 km.
Total Bns sanctioned	—	71 (01 Bn. temporarily transferred to Indo-BD border)
Total Bn deployed	—	70
On LC	—	14
On IB	—	50
On AI	—	06

#### 1.3.2 Indo-Bangladesh International Border:—

Total length of IB	—	4096.70 km. (The whole IB is manned by BSF)
Total Bns sanctioned	—	82 (05 Bns being raised by the end of FY-2015-16)
Total Bns deployed	—	77

#### 1.3.3 Hot war allocation of BSF Bns under the Army is as under:—

Northern command	—	22 Bns
Western Command	—	20 Bns
South Western Command	—	08 Bns
Southern command	—	19 Bns
Eastern Command	—	69 Bns
Army Hq. Res.	—	10 Bns

1.4 Communication methodology: BSF having STARS V 5/25 Watt Radio sets which are interoperable with Army BSF having VHF/UHF 5/25 watt and HF 15/100 watt radio sets which can be programmed with the frequency of others CAPF for communication.

## **2. ITBP**

2.1 Deployment of ITBP on Border: ITBP along with Army is guarding 3488 Kms. of India-China border from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Jechap La in Arunachal Pradesh by manning Border Out Posts (BOPs) in the State of J&K, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. 28 Bns. have been deployed in these states along the Indo-China border to manage the border.

2.2 Communication Methodology: ITBP is using HF/VHF, POL Net, DSPT sets and Field telephone for communications with Higher HQrs. and other sister organization. Regular meetings on monthly and quarterly basis also in co-located locations of ITBP, Army and other CAPFs for coordination and sharing information with each other.

2.3 Intelligence Set up: Intelligence set up of ITBP has dedicated intelligence persons posted from Force HQ to Coy level. These persons are collecting and sharing intelligence inputs from field at appropriate levels like LIA, SMAC and MAC. Information is also shared with nearby sister organization and LIA meetings are held on regular basis with them. ITBP is Lead Intelligence Agency in Western and Middle Sectors and is part of MAC at Delhi and SMACs in 20 different locations across the country.

## **3. SSB**

3.1 Deployment of SSB on border:—

SSB has been deployed along the 1751 Kms. long Indo-Nepal border in the States of Uttarakhand, UP, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim and 699 Kms. long Indo-Bhutan border in the States of Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. SSB has so far established 616 BOPs (446 on Indo-Nepal border, and 150 on Indo-Bhutan border) for carrying out its mandated border guarding duties. 41 Bns. of SSB have been deployed along Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Nepal border to guard these borders.

3.2 Communication Methodology:—

The interface mechanism between the State Government and SSB is quite organized and well spelt out to the field formations of SSB at

all levels. At the ground level *i.e.* BOP/Coy commanders carry out regular coordination meeting with the local authorities of the State Government like BDOs, SDOs, SHOs and DSPs in their respective Distts. Commandants and DIGs of SSB have regular meeting with the SPs/DMs/ Divisional Commissioners of the State Government This is in addition to the established mechanism/system of regular meetings with State Government Police officials during Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) meetings, Border Districts Co-ordination Committee (BDCC) meetings, monthly coordination meetings etc.

### 3.3 Intelligence Set up:—

(i) The intelligence set up of the Force is being controlled by Ops and Int. Directorate at Force HQ. which is headed by IG (Ops & Int.). There are 25 area offices manned by non-combatised staff of the Force which are solely engaged for intelligence collection work besides Perception Management. The intelligence inputs (both strategic & tactical) forwarded by these field units to FHQ are analyzed and disseminated to the concerned users.

(ii) SSB being Lead Intelligence Agency for Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan border share intelligence with the sister agencies of respective borders as well as the agencies across the border in the following platforms:

- (a) Quarterly Ftr. level LIA meetings.
- (b) Monthly Sector level LIA meetings.
- (c) Monthly Commandant level informal coordination meetings with the Nepali counterparts (on INB).
- (d) District level quarterly meetings with Nepali authorities (CDOs) (on INB).
- (e) Border Districts Co-ordination Meetings (BDCMs) (on IBB).
- (f) Quarterly Commandant level co-ordination and intelligence sharing meetings with Bhutanese counterparts (on IBB).

## 4. Assam Rifles

### 4.1 Deployment of Assam Rifles on border:—

Assam Rifles is mandated to guard the 1631 Km. long Indo-Myanmar Border. Keeping in view the peculiarity of the Border and the Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorism/Internal Security situation in the North-East, all the Assam Rifles units and formations operate under the

operational control of the Army. 15 Battalions of Assam Rifles with 77 Company Operating Bases (COBs) are deployed along the 1631 Km. long Indo-Myanmar Border. Other than the Assam Rifles, no other CAPF/ Army is deployed on this Border. The State-wise deployment of these 15 Border Guarding Battalions is as under:—

- (a) Manipur : 07
- (b) Nagaland : 03
- (c) Arunachal Pradesh : 02
- (d) Mizoram : 03

#### 4.2 Communication Methodology:—

- (a) Since, all the Assam Rifles Formations/Units are under operational control of the Indian Army, the chain of communication is as under:—

Army → Inspector General Headquarters (IG HQ) → Sector HQ (Sect. HQ) → Battalion HQ (Bn. HQ) → COBs/Border Operating Post (BOPs).

- (b) The communication from Army to IG HQ is on a secured Army Net which is being provided and maintained by the Army.
- (c) The communication from IG HQ to Sector HQ and Sector HQ to Bn. HQ is presently on Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) and from Bn. HQ to COBs/BOPs is on High Frequency (HF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) Radio communication. In addition, satellite terminals are deployed at tactically important locations, which presently are 82 in numbers (including 41 Polnet and 41 VSAT terminals).
- (d) Currently, projects to have four layered secured communication down the COB/BOP are in progress, consequent to which the communication will be based on OFC, Broadband, Radio & VSAT terminals right from IG HQ upto COBs/BOPs.

#### 4.3 Intelligence Set up:—

4.3.1 Assam Rifles Field Intelligence Unit (ARFIU) : The ARFIU Unit was raised on 01.03.2010 with the sanction of MHA to provide Intelligence support to Assam Rifles Formations/Units deployed in counter insurgency and Border Guarding (BG) role in their respective areas of responsibility. Accordingly, the ARFIU has been organized in Detachments and teams

which are suitably deployed to establish effective Intelligence grid which is dynamic based on the operation and intelligence reports. The existing State-wise deployment of ARFIU Detachments/Teams along the Indo-Myanmar Border is as under:—

- (i) Manipur : One Detachment and Six Teams.
- (ii) Nagaland : One Detachment and five Teams.
- (iii) Arunachal Pradesh : Three Teams.
- (iv) Mizoram : Two Teams.

4.3.2 In addition each Assam Rifles unit has its own Battalion Intelligence Team which augments the intelligence requirements of the Field units.

4.4 Information Sharing : Inputs at ground level are shared by way of liaison, coordination and periodic meetings amongst the intelligence agencies. These inputs are shared during following meetings:—

- (i) MAC meetings.
- (ii) SMAC meetings.
- (iii) Focus group meetings.
- (iv) LIA meetings.

5. All the communication between the State Government and border guarding forces normally takes place through MHA Government of India, being controlling authority of all CAPFs and the decisions taken upon are communicated to the field office for implementation. However, at times, the local authorities of State Government interact with the Comdt. and field officers to address any immediate/emergent matter. In case of requirement and requisition from the State Government, CAPF coys are being deployed for law and order duty to assist the local Police and their work have been appreciated by the State Governments.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 39)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

What can be more disturbing to the Committee than the fact that our nation is lagging behind in all areas of connectivity whether it be road, rail or air as far as our borders are concerned. The picture of South-Asia is not very conducive for India. In regard to rail connectivity also our success is negligible. Notwithstanding the fact that 14 lines have been earmarked and also prioritized, the actual achievement is nil.

The Ministry of Railways have categorically stated that they would not be able to proceed with these 14 lines unless it is fully funded either by the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Finance. Railways has also stated that these lines are highly unremunerative and they would be incurring operational losses on these lines. The Committee have been given to understand that the issue of provisioning of funds for construction of these Railway lines have been active consideration of the Government and Empowered Committee on Border Infrastructure (ECBI) headed by Cabinet Secretary. They also learnt that a recommendation has been made by the ECBI to hold a separate meeting to resolve the issue of funding between Finance Secretary, Secretary (Planning Commission), Chairman, Railway Board and Deputy National Security Advisor.

The Committee are baffled to learn that an issue so serious as providing border connectivity through rail in the North-East Region and other strategic places is taking rounds on the bureaucratic tables. The Committee in no uncertain words state that Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence and Railway Board have erred in this decision making which is causing delays specially when 14 lines have been earmarked. They are perhaps oblivious of the developments taking place across the borders which is not even a match with India to compare. The Committee emphatically recommend that the issue of funding be resolved forthwith and if needed should be shared by all the three Ministries but it should be materialized. The Committee would not like to be informed of shifting of responsibilities on flimsy grounds as to who shall be spending the money but of the final *via media* that from where the moneys have been finally earmarked. Any delay in this regard would be viewed very seriously by the Committee.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Reply of Para No. 39 has already been sent directly to Standing Committee on Defence by the concerned D(Mov) Wing of Ministry of Defence *vide* their O.M. 7 (3)2014-D(Mov) dated 19.5.2014 because the matter regarding Strategic Railway Lines Project is classified as 'Secret'.

## CHAPTER IV

### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COMMITTEE AND WHICH REQUIRE REITERATION

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 11)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

Like-wise, the Committee recommend that the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) be inducted in the Forces as per the given dates besides maintaining and the flight operation clearance expeditiously. The Committee also recommend in unequivocal terms that Research and Development activities should be given a fillip by the Defence production side/Defence Research and Development Organisation so that dependence on foreign sources be minimized and complete self-reliance is achieved within a well defined period. If required, more areas be opened to private Vendor base within India as is the case in the leading aircraft manufacturing countries of the world.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was issued in December, 2013 and M/s Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL) has commenced the production of aircraft against the first contract. The deliveries of these aircraft are scheduled to commence from 2014-15 and conclude by 2016-17. Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) is the Project Management Agency for the design and development activities. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) is under progress jointly by ADA and HAL. The deliveries against the second contract (FOC standard) is scheduled to commence from 2016-17 and conclude by 2018-19.

2. HAL has identified Research and Development (R&D) as one of the thrust areas to be focused in order to achieve self reliance. HAL has been encouraging private sectors both in development and manufacturing programmes. In case of development programmes, private industries have been involved in development of systems, equipment and software modules etc. In addition, the following actions have been initiated in R&D.

- Design and Development activities of Medium Transport Aircraft and Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft have been taken up with international partners.



- Design of a medium thrust class (25 kN) turbofan engine for fixed wing aircraft (trainers, small business jets, etc.) has been taken up. A gas turbine engine of 1200 kW shaft power for helicopters is also under consideration.
- MoUs have been signed with premier institutions/organisation for design and development activities.
- The Board of Directors of HAL has decided to create an R&D corpus and to spend 10% of operational Profit after tax on R&D and development of indigenous vendors.

(Please see Para No. 13 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 22)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Committee are aware of many agencies functioning in coastal and ocean region falling under jurisdiction of the country. These include Indian Navy, Coast Guard Organisation, Ministry of Shipping, Customs Department, Marine Police, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Intelligence Agencies, offshore exploration departments etc. What the Committee would like that coordination between all the maritime agencies should be very effective. The Committee, as such, recommends that a Maritime Commission or any other such agency should be established so that the objectives could be met. The role of Intelligence Agencies is of vital importance and hence the Committee desire that intelligence sharing should be strengthened and be made state-of-the-art in terms of infrastructure as well as equipment.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

The issue of creation of Maritime Security Adviser/Apex Maritime Security Advisory Board (MSAB) was considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security in Feb., 2009 while considering the issue of coastal security post 26/11 and not found desirable. Presently, the task of coordination/monitoring of Coastal Security (CS) issues is being dealt with by the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary which meets at least twice a year. Issues and aspects related to CS are also reviewed periodically by the Hon'ble Raksha Mantri.

(Please see Para No. 28 of Chapter I of the Report)

**Recommendation (Para No. 29)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

It is disquieting for the Committee to note that no direct response has been given by the Ministry in regard to pin-pointed query of the Committee as to what difficulties were faced by India due to poor network of road, rail, airports/helipads. To this specific query, the Ministry has given a rhetorical reply that despite the lack of adequate infrastructure along the Northern borders, the Army has been effective in monitoring Peoples Liberation Army's activities along the Line of Actual Control. The Committee do not agree with the contention of the Ministry in this regard and they have every reason to believe that our development in regard to road, rail and airport is slumber and behind schedules in all the respects. The Committee repudiate the claims of the Ministry that our infrastructure development is being implemented in consonance with our threat perception. The detailed analysis in this regard are contained in the successive paragraphs.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

This para is only observatory in nature.

(Please see Para No. 34 of Chapter I of the Report)

**Recommendation (Para No. 34)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

The Indo-Pakistan Border in the opinion of the Committee is also very sensitive. The Committee in this regard would like to recommend that construction of 610 kms. in Punjab and 1207.42 kms. in Rajasthan of lateral axial road in this border area be given final approval in the shortest possible time which is stated to be pending under consideration of the Ministry. They also recommend that all four road projects viz. Chetak, Sampark, Beacon and Vijayak be completed hundred per cent under intimation to the Committee. Also the composite scheme which is an appreciable scheme comprising of fencing flood lighting, construction of roads, connecting border out posts along Indo-Pak border be completed within a fixed target as its accomplishment has inordinately been delayed in various accounts. The Ministry should mull out a specific proposal on this scheme as it was approved by Cabinet Committee on Security as early as January 2000 with the initially proposed completion in five years. The period of delay of almost nine years is serious delay and Committee would like to know why the cost and time overruns have taken place.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. Construction of 610 Km. road in Punjab and 1207.42 Km. road in Rajasthan pertains to MHA.
2. As regards roads in Project Chetak, Sampark, Beacon and Vijayak are concerned it is stated that a long term roll on works plan for BRO has been drawn up in keeping with the priorities of Army and works are accordingly been planned for expeditious completion.
3. No works for fencing flood lighting is entrusted to BRO.

(Please see Para No. 37 of Chapter I of the Report)

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 35)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

In the Indo-Bangladesh Border, out of three phases, the Committee find neither Phase-I nor Phase-II could be completed. Since approval of Cabinet Committee on Security for completion of these projects by 31.03.2014 has been accorded, the Committee hope and recommend that these are completed by this new date and any lapse be intimated to the Committee.

The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

1. As regards IBB fencing, it is stated that because of huge strategic work load it was decided that BRO would focus on core strategic functions. Accordingly no works in Phase-II were taken up by BRO for MHA.
2. The status of Indo-Bangladesh fencing entrusted to BRO is given as under:

Item	Total scope (km.)	Completed (km.)	Balance (km.)	Remarks
IBB Fence	104	96	8	Balance not feasible due to alignment close to 150 yards of IB.
IBB Roads	567	498	69	Balance not taken up due to insurgency, and no security cover.

3. Ministry is in constant liaison with MHA for release of funds.

(Please see Para No. 40 of Chapter I of the Report)

**CHAPTER V**

**RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH  
GOVERNMENT HAVE FURNISHED INTERIM REPLIES**

-Nil-

NEW DELHI;  
10 August, 2015  

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19 Shrawana, 1937 (Saka)

MAJ GEN B C KHANDURI, AVSM (RETD),  
Chairperson,  
Standing Committee on Defence.

## APPENDIX I

### MINUTES OF THE NINETEENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2014-15)

The Committee sat on Monday, the 10th August, 2015 from 1000 hrs. to 1045 hrs. in Room No. '62', Parliament House, New Delhi.

#### PRESENT

Maj Gen B C Khanduri AVSM (Retd)–*Chairperson*

#### MEMBERS

##### *Lok Sabha*

2. Shri Suresh C Angadi
3. Shri Dharambir
4. Shri Thupstan Chhewang
5. Col Sonaram Choudhary (Retd)
6. Smt Pratyusha Rajeshwari Singh
7. Shri G Hari
8. Km Shobha Karandlaje
9. Shri Tapas Paul
10. Shri Malla Reddy
11. Smt Mala Rajya Laxmi Shah
12. Shri A P Jithender Reddy

##### *Rajya Sabha*

13. Shri K R Arjunan
14. Shri Rajeev Chandrasekhar

#### SECRETARIAT

1. Smt Kalpana Sharma – *Joint Secretary*
2. Shri D S Malha – *Director*
3. Shri A K Srivastava – *Additional Director*
4. Shri Rahul Singh – *Under Secretary*

2. At the outset, the Chairperson welcomed the members to the sitting of the Committee and briefed about the reports.

3. The Committee then took up for consideration and adoption of the draft Report on 'Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Twenty-second Report (15th Lok Sabha) on Threat Perception and preparedness of the Forces including incursion on borders, coordination mechanism with the Central Armed Police Forces and Border connectivity through Road, Air and Rail'.

4. Thereafter, the Committee took up for consideration and adoption of the draft Report on 'Action taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Third Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (16th Lok Sabha) on Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2014-15 on Army (Demand No. 22)'.

5. The Committee, then, adopted the above Reports and authorized the Chairperson to finalize the Reports in the light of the suggestions received from the Members.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

## APPENDIX II

ANALYSIS OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE TWENTY SECOND REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (15TH LOK SABHA) ON 'THREAT PERCEPTION AND PREPAREDNESS OF THE FORCES INCLUDING INCURSION ON BORDERS, COORDINATION MECHANISM WITH THE CENTRAL ARMED POLICE FORCES AND BORDER CONNECTIVITY THROUGH ROAD, AIR AND RAIL'

- (i) Total number of recommendations: 41
- (ii) Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by the Government (please see Chapter-II):
- Para Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41
- Total : 31  
Percentage : 76%
- (iii) Recommendations/Observations which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of the replies received from the Government (please see Chapter-III):
- Para Nos. 5, 14, 27, 28, 39
- Total : 5  
Percentage : 12%
- (iv) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which replies of Government have not been accepted by the Committee which require reiteration and commented upon (please see Chapter-IV):
- Para Nos. 11, 22, 29, 34, 35
- Total : 5  
Percentage : 12%
- (v) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which Government have furnished interim replies (please see Chapter-V):
- Para No. Nil
- Total : Nil  
Percentage : 0

