

17

STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON DEFENCE  
(2012-2013)

FIFTEENTH LOK SABHA

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

*[Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Thirteenth Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) on 'Performance of Coast Guard Organization']*

SEVENTEENTH REPORT



LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT  
NEW DELHI

*February, 2013/Phalguna, 1934 (Saka)*



SEVENTEENTH REPORT  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE  
(2012-2013)

(FIFTEENTH LOK SABHA)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

*[Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations  
contained in the Thirteenth Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) on  
'Performance of Coast Guard Organization']*

*Presented to Lok Sabha on 26.02.2013*

*Laid in Rajya Sabha on 26.02.2013*



LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT  
NEW DELHI

*February, 2013/Phalguna, 1934 (Saka)*

**C.O.D. No. 135**

*Price : Rs. 79.00*

© 2013 BY LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT

Published under Rule 382 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha (Fourteenth Edition) and printed by National Printers, New Delhi-110 028.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE (2012-2013) .....	(iii)
INTRODUCTION .....	(v)
CHAPTER I Report .....	1
CHAPTER II Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by the Government .....	32
CHAPTER III Recommendations/Observations which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of the replies of the Government .....	50
CHAPTER IV Recommendations/Observations in respect of which replies of the Government have not been accepted by the Committee and which require reiteration .....	51
CHAPTER V Recommendations/Observations in respect of which final replies of the Government are still awaited .....	66

### APPENDICES

I. Minutes of the Fourth Sitting of the Standing Committee on Defence held on 18 December, 2012 .....	70
II. Analysis of Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations contained in the Thirteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) .....	72



COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE  
(2012-13)

Shri Raj Babbar — *Chairman*

MEMBERS

*Lok Sabha*

2. Shri Sameer Bhujbal
3. Shri Kamal Kishor 'Commando'
4. Shri R. Dhruvanarayana
5. Shri Varun Gandhi
6. Shri P. Karunakaran
7. Shri Mithilesh Kumar
8. Shri Sidhant Mohapatra
9. Shri Saugata Roy
10. Shri Asaduddin Owaisi
11. Shri A.T. Nana Patil
12. Shri C.R. Patil
13. Smt. M. Vijaya Shanthi
14. Smt. Mala Rajya Laxmi Shah
15. Shri Mahabali Singh
16. Rajkumari Ratna Singh
17. Shri Uday Singh
18. Shri R. Thamaraiselvan
19. Vacant
20. Vacant
21. Vacant

*Rajya Sabha*

22. Shri Pankaj Bora
23. Shri Naresh Gujral
24. Shri Prakash Javadekar
25. Shri Hishey Lachungpa
26. Shri Mukut Mithi
27. Shri Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi
28. Dr. E.M. Sudarsana Natchiappan
29. Shri C.M. Ramesh
30. Shri T.K. Rangarajan
31. Shri Devender Goud T.

SECRETARIAT

1. Dr. R.K. Chadha — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri R.K. Jain — *Joint Secretary*
3. Shri D.S. Malha — *Director*
4. Shri Sanjeev Sharma — *Additional Director*



## INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence (2012-13), having been authorized by the Committee to present the Report on their behalf, present this Seventeenth report on Action Taken by the Government on the observations/recommendations contained in the Thirteenth Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) on 'The Performance of Coast Guard Organisation'.

2. The Thirteenth Report was presented to Lok Sabha and laid on the Table of Rajya Sabha on 8 October, 2011. The Ministry of Defence furnished their Action Taken Notes on the subject on 10 April, 2012.

3. The Report was considered and adopted by the Committee at their sitting held on 18 December, 2012.

4. For facility of reference and convenience, the recommendations/ observations of the Committee have been printed in bold letters in Part-I of the report.

5. An analysis of Action Taken by the Government on the observations/recommendations contained in the Thirteenth Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) of the Committee is given at Annexure II.

NEW DELHI;  
19 December, 2012  

---

28 Agrahayana, 1934 (Saka)

RAJ BABBAR,  
Chairman,  
Standing Committee on Defence.



## CHAPTER I

### REPORT

This Report of the Standing Committee on Defence deals with action taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Thirteenth Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) on 'Performance of Coast Guard Organisation', which was presented to Lok Sabha and laid in Rajya Sabha on 08.12.2011.

2. The Committee's Thirteenth Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) contained 28 recommendations/observations on the following aspects:—

Sl.No.	Recommendation/ Paragraph No.	Subject
1.	01	Setting up of Regional Headquarters (North-East)
2.	02	Adhocism in Long Term Plans
3.	03	Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I and Phase-II
4.	04	Under-Utilisation of outlay During Eleventh Plan
5.	05	Infrastructure
6.	06	Force Level
7.	07	Surface Platforms
8.	08 and 09	Issue of Biometric Identity Cards to Fishermen
9.	10	Registration of Fishing Boats
10.	11	Vessel Traffic Management
11.	12 and 13	Disaster Management
12.	14	Controlling Marine Pollution
13.	15 to 19	Oil Spill
14.	20 to 23	Manpower and Training
15.	24 and 25	Anti Piracy
16.	26	Lead Intelligence Agency
17.	27	Federal Apex Body
18.	28	International Cooperation

3. Action Taken Replies have been received from the Government in respect of all the recommendations/observations contained in the Report. These replies have been examined and the same have been categorized as follows:—

- (i) Recommendations/observations, which have been accepted by the Government (Please *see* Chapter II):—

Para Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28

*(15 Recommendations)*

- (ii) Recommendations/observations, which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of the replies of the Government (Please *see* Chapter III):—

Para Nos. Nil

*(Nil Recommendation)*

- (iii) Recommendations/observations in respect of which replies of the Government have not been accepted by the Committee and which require reiteration (Please *see* Chapter IV):—

Para Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 19, 25

*(09 Recommendations)*

- (iv) Recommendations/observations in respect of which final replies of the Government are still awaited (Please *see* Chapter V):—

Para Nos. 9, 10, 15, 16

*(04 Recommendations)*

**4. The Committee expect that utmost importance would be given to implementation of the recommendations/observations accepted by the Government. In cases, where it is not possible for the Department to implement the recommendations in letter and spirit for any reason, the matter should be reported to the Committee with reasons for non-implementation. The Committee further desire that Action Taken Notes on the recommendations/ observations contained in Chapter-I should be furnished to them at an early date.**

A. SETTING UP OF REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS (NORTH-EAST)

**Recommendation (Para No. 1)**

5. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee observe that as per the existing Organisational Structure, the Coast Guard operates from its headquarters located at New Delhi. The field functions of the Coast Guard are executed by the four Regional Headquarters located at Mumbai, Chennai, Gandhi Nagar and Port Blair alongwith 12 District Headquarters set up under these Regional Headquarters located at the Coastal States of India. The Committee during the course of deliberations have observed that the maritime States of Orissa and West Bengal are located adjacent to Bangladesh and of late there has been a large number of refugee influx and anti-national activities in this area. Not only that the sea area adjoining these two maritime States is rich in marine biotic resources and the Coast of Orissa is known for nesting of endangered species of Olive Ridley Turtle which needs to be protected. To add to the importance of this area the Sand Heads approach in river Hooghly is the gateway to the ports of Kolkata handling large amount of import-export trade. This being the restricted water, there is persistent risk of oil pollution. Besides large exploration activity is being undertaken in sea adjoining West Bengal and Orissa. The Ministry itself has acknowledged that there is inescapable need for establishing Regional Headquarters (North-East). The Committee have further been informed that the case for Regional Headquarters (North-East) along with co-located station at Kolkata is being examined.

While taking note of the strategic and important location of the maritime States of Orissa and West Bengal, the Committee are of the firm view that there is an urgent need to take the immediate action with regard to setting up of Regional Headquarter (North-East) at the proposed site *i.e.* Kolkata so that the environment, sea life and property are protected besides meeting the strategic need of checking the influx of refugees, anti-national activities and poaching. The expeditious decision in this regard should be taken by the Government and the Committee informed accordingly.”

6. The Ministry in its action taken reply has stated as under:—

“Establishment of Regional Headquarters (North-East) alongwith co-located station at Kolkata has been prioritised for establishment. Five acres of land has been acquired in March 12 from the

Government of West Bengal to develop infrastructure for the Headquarters.”

7. The Committee are happy to note that five acres of land has been acquired in March 2012 from the Government of West Bengal to develop infrastructure for the establishment of Regional Headquarters (North-East). They also take note of the fact that land at Kolkata has been prioritised for establishment as recommended by them in their Thirteenth Report. While taking note of this development the Committee feel that the Ministry could have provided details about the project such as its time lines indicating clearly the date of commencement, proposed date of completion, details of cost involved, the detailed project report etc. The Committee as such would like the Ministry to provide detailed information in this regard. Besides the Committee would also like to be apprised of the environmental benefits that are expected with the development of infrastructure with the establishment of Regional Headquarter (North-East). The Committee hope that the setting up of Regional Headquarter (North-East) would help in better surveillance on the Eastern Maritime Borders of the country and result into arresting infiltration through maritime borders.

#### B. COASTAL SECURITY SCHEME PHASE-I AND PHASE-II

##### **Recommendation (Para No. 3)**

8. The Committee had in their Thirteenth Report recommended as under:—

“The Committee observe that a comprehensive and integrated Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) was formulated in consultation with all agencies concerned with the objective of strengthening infrastructure of marine police force for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas, particularly in shallow water areas close to the post. The CSS Phase-I was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in January 2005 and was to be implemented over the five years starting from 2005-06. The Committee further note that the date of completion of CSS Phase-I has now been extended by one year *i.e.* till March 2011. The data furnished by the Ministry with regard to the physical progress of Phase-I further indicates that there are gaps between the sanctioned buildings and the buildings made operational. Such gap is of No. 2 with regard to coastal police stations No. 5 in respect of check posts and out posts and No. 2 with regard to barracks. Besides in a good number of projects

construction has not yet started. With regard to coastal police stations although 71 out of the 73 sanctioned police stations have been made operational, as per the information furnished by the Ministry, the construction in respect of 42 out of 48 buildings has been completed and for 11 buildings the construction is in progress.

In respect of 14 buildings the construction has not yet started. It indicates that Phase-I may require further extensions. Not only that a good number of police stations seems to be working without buildings. With regard to Phase-II even the financial implications have not been yet finalized and the approval of CCS is yet to be obtained.

The Committee observe that post 26/11 scenario, there is an urgent need to increase patrolling and surveillance infrastructure in coastal areas. With the status of infrastructure projects, the details of which have been given above it would take more years to complete the projects targeted under Phase-I and Phase-II. Keeping in view the strategic requirement, the Committee strongly emphasize that the targeted projects under Phase-I should be completed expeditiously. Besides financial allocations for Phase-II should be finalized expeditiously so that Phase-II can start expeditiously.”

9. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

- “1. **Setting up of Coastal Police Stations:** MHA is the nodal agency dealing with the setting up of Coastal Police Stations.
2. **Status of Coastal Security Scheme Phase – II:** The scheme has been approved by the Government and implementation commenced *w.e.f.* 01 April, 2011. The Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-II) aims to carry forward the objectives specified in the Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-I) by way of providing additional infrastructural support to coastal States/UTs for marine patrolling and supplement other coastal security initiatives taken by the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard. The scheme involves setting up of 131 Coastal Police Stations and provisioning of 180 Interceptor Boats, 60 Jetties, 131 four wheelers and 242 Motor Cycles.”

**10. The Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) assumes immense significance especially in view of 26/11 scenario when insurgency took place through the coastal boundaries of India. The Committee had earlier found that Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I depicted several**

gaps. Moreover it ran through an additional period of one year *i.e.* March 2011. Such gaps as distinctly brought out by the Committee were concerning sanctioned buildings and buildings made operational. To quantify, precisely the gaps were about 02 Coastal Police Stations, 05 Check Post/Outpost and 02 Barracks. Eleven buildings were yet to be completed and construction in respect of 14 buildings was still to commence. The Committee had recommended that targeted projects under Phase-I should be completed and financial allocations for Phase-II be finalised expeditiously.

The Committee note that the reply of the Ministry is conspicuously silent on setting up coastal police stations. Instead of taking up the matter urgently with the Ministry of Home Affairs, the nodal agency dealing with setting up of Coastal Police Stations in the light of the concerns expressed by the Committee, the Ministry has chosen to shift the responsibility by simply stating that MHA is the nodal agency in this regard. The Ministry has not even bothered to intimate about the state of implementation of Phase-I, particularly when the extended deadline of Phase-I expired in March, 2011. It goes without saying that national security is an issue which cannot be compromised in any circumstances. The Committee, therefore, recommend that the Ministry of Defence should take up this matter forthwith with MHA for setting up of coastal police stations within the definite time frame and the outcome be intimated to them.

The Committee find from the Action Taken Note that the Coastal Security Phase-II has already been approved by the Government and its implementation commenced from 1st April, 2011. Even when the implementation has already commenced and more than one year has elapsed since then, the Ministry has not bothered to furnish the details about the financial allocations made for Phase-II of the project as desired by the Committee in the earlier recommendation. The Committee as such would like to be apprised of the outlay earmarked along with the financial and physical achievements under Phase-II so far. Besides the Committee would also like to be apprised of the details of OEMs, the mechanism in place for post delivery maintenance and if selection has already been made whether they are comparable with the state-of-the-art technologies being used by most advanced Coast Guard Organisations of the world such as USA, UK, etc. They, accordingly, recommend that all these details be furnished to them expeditiously.



## C. UNDER-UTILISATION OF OUTLAY DURING ELEVENTH PLAN

### **Recommendation (Para No. 4)**

11. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee note from the data furnished by the Ministry that Rs. 20134.901 crore under the capital head for different projects have been earmarked to be spent by the end of the Twelfth Plan. Out of the allocated outlay, Rs. 5293.093 crore would be spent by the end of the Eleventh Plan and Rs. 12855.982 crore would be carried forward to Twelfth Plan. The detailed examination of the data further reveals that likely expenditure for the new schemes is Rs. 2631.270 crore out of Rs. 5293.093 crore for the Eleventh Plan which means that almost 50 per cent of the outlay is earmarked for meeting committed liability, replacement schemes and civil works. The analysis further indicates that there is under utilization of outlay, particularly under the capital schemes during each year of Tenth Plan and Eleventh Plan. During the first three years of Eleventh Plan overall expenditure is 92.81 per cent of the total outlay whereas under the capital head, the expenditure is Rs. 1667.86 crore out of the allocation of Rs. 1916.71 crore *i.e.* 87.01 per cent.

The Committee at one place have been informed by the Ministry that the annual allocations would depend upon resource availability. On the one hand the allocations earmarked are not being fully utilized on the other hand the deadlines for proposed upgradations have been stated to be dependent upon resource availability. The Committee again emphasize that there is an urgent need to ensure that upgradation, modernization of various plans of Coast Guard are completed within the stipulated deadline so as to address the challenges before the Coast Guard Organization. As such all the initiatives should be taken to ensure that the allocations made for the different projects are fully utilized. Besides keeping in view the long-term plans, the adequate outlay for the new schemes, should be made available by the Government. The concerns of the Committee in this regard should be duly communicated to the Ministry of Finance.”

12. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The approved Development Plan caters to proposals for acquisition of new and replacement schemes, infrastructure development, manpower augmentation and upgradation of existing assets. Post approval, these proposals are again required to be processed

individually as per prevalent policies and procedures in force for sanction of the Competent Financial Authority (CFA). As such, this process involves time.

Further, ship-building is a very complex process with a gestation period ranging from 2 to 3 years. Similarly, cases for acquisition manufacture of aircraft involve a gestation period of 3 to 4 years. Even after concluding contracts, the ability to spend money is contingent upon the selected Firms' ability to absorb funds based on the actual physical progress made towards deliveries. Firms, in turn, are highly dependent on issues of corporate governance, availability of labour, material supplies from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), as also, on occasions, on acts of 'Force Majeure'.

Notwithstanding, the overall utilisation of funds during the 11th Plan has been satisfactory. Details of fund utilisation (as on 19 Mar. 2012) is as follows:—

Major Head	Approved in Revised 11th Plan	Expenditure	Shortfall/Excess (Rs. in crore)
Capital	4662	4135 (88.7%)	527 (-11.3%)
Revenue	3268	3174 (97.2%)	94 (-2.8%)
Total	7930	7309 (92.2%)	621 (-7.8%)

**13. A close scrutiny of the reply furnished by the Ministry clearly indicates that the specific recommendation of the Committee has not been adequately dealt with. The budgetary process is very complex and time consuming exercise which involves making an in-depth examination of all the projections any Ministry ought to propose. The Committee had highlighted under utilization of funds and had unambiguously recommended that the allocations made for the different projects be fully utilized. Against this back drop, the Ministry has furnished figures regarding the actual utilization against the approved outlay in revised Eleventh Plan. The under-utilization in both the capital and revenue heads comes to Rs. 621 crore which, in the opinion of the Committee, is quite substantial. The country after 26/11 scenario cannot afford such approach particularly related to coastal security. In the opinion of the Committee this situation is not only appalling but will put a question mark on the necessity and urgency of budgetary demands. While reiterating their earlier recommendation that the allocations should be fully utilised, the Committee want the Ministry to furnish details of underutilisation of Rs. 621 crore both in Capital and Revenue Head.**

The Ministry in its reply has also stated that ship building is a very complex process with a gestation period ranging from 2 to 3 years. The Committee would like to emphasize that the plans for commissioning and decommissioning of ships should be formulated keeping in mind the gestation period and accordingly expenditure should be planned and projected. The budgetary projections/spending are always undertaken keeping in view the time period involved for various activities. The Committee, reiterate their earlier recommendation that all out efforts be made by the Ministry to utilise their budgetary allocations. The steps planned/taken in this regard should also be communicated to them.

#### D. INFRASTRUCTURE

##### **Recommendation (Para No. 5)**

14. The Committee had, in their Thirteenth Report recommended as under:—

“The Committee find that a lot of infrastructure is being upgraded with a view to enhance the coastal surveillance network. At present, there are 27 Coast Guard Stations along the coast line and as per the information furnished by the Ministry, Coast Guard Station generally covers a range of approx. 75 to 120 km. The Ministry itself has acknowledged that the present arrangements are considered inadequate for surveillance keeping in view the long coast line of India and adverse topography. To monitor the coastal boundaries, the Ministry has taken up the case with the Government to enhance the stations from 27 to 41 by 2012. Besides, 204 Coastal Police Stations have also been sanctioned which would be operating in the Hub and Spoke concept with the Coast Guard Stations for filling gap identified after carrying out vulnerability and gap analysis by the State Government/Marine Police of the State along with the Indian Coast Guard. With regard to upgrading Air Stations, Air Enclaves and Squadrons, the Committee have been informed that at present there are two Air Stations, three Air Enclaves and three independent Squadrons operating from strategic locations along the coast line. Additional three Air Stations and four Air Enclaves are being planned to be established by 2012. As such by 2012 the Coast Guard would be having total five Air Stations, seven Air Enclaves and one Helibase and two independent Squadrons which according to the Ministry would meet the effective air surveillance of the entire coast. In addition a total of 46 coastal radar chains are in the process of being started.

The representatives of Coast Guard Organisation during the Study Visit of the Committee to Mumbai, Goa, Bangalore and Vishakhapatnam from 29 June to 04 July, 2011 made certain suggestions to upgrade the infrastructure at each of the existing port and airport. The suggestions made include providing 200 meters of dedicated jetty for unhindered 24x7 CG Operations, 5-10 acres of seafront land adjacent to jetty for creation of logistics, administration and technical support complex to support CG operations and 20-30 acres of land for creation of hoverport within port limits. Suggestion was also made to provide 150-200 acres land for administrative complex for married accommodation and other allied facilities outside port limits. For airports, the representative suggested that 50-100 acres of land for creating dedicated dispersal, hangers and air operation support facilities should be provided. The Committee recommended the Ministry of Defence to consider the suggestions of Coast Guard Organisation.

The Committee during their study tour to Mumbai, Goa, Bangalore and Vishakhapatnam from 29 June to 04 July, 2011 have observed that keeping current security scenario into consideration, Coast Guard force level is being enhanced at a much faster rate. Towards this purpose the Coast Guard requires infrastructural facilities in a larger scale *viz.*, support for berthing place for ship place for hovercraft operations, air operations, maintenance facilities, land for creation of operation and communication centres, Administrative Complexes, Married Accommodation. The present assets with the Coast Guard are negligible and are on temporary arrangements with other organizations at most of the places. Respective State Governments port authorities and airport authorities are being approached to provide such support. The Committee are of the strong view that infrastructure are the backbone for maintaining a strong force level for Coast guard organization to meet the current security scenario. This type of stop-gap arrangement will weaken not only the capacity of CG but also the morale of the Coast Guard Personnel. This matter need to be dealt on war footing stage. The State Governments have to play an important role in setting up the proposed infrastructure primarily on the issue of acquisition of land for various types of infrastructure projects. As such, there is an urgent need to sensitize the State Governments about the urgency of upgradation of coastal network. The issue needs to be taken up at the highest level with the State Governments. The Ministry has to play a proactive role in motivating the various State Governments. Concrete initiatives on the suggested lines should be taken by the Government and the Committee apprised accordingly.”

15. The Ministry, in its Action Taken Reply, has stated as under:—

“The ICG has 22 stations and 08 air units as on 25 November, 2008. Post 26/11, renewed impetus was accorded to addressing vulnerability gaps along the coast, and accordingly 20 additional stations and 07 air units were sanctioned by the Government.

Of the total 42 stations and 15 air units sanctioned till date, 35 stations and 08 air units have already been activated. Of these, 13 stations were activated in just three years time. Stringent timeline are being maintained for setting up of balance stations.

While efforts are in hand to expeditiously activate balance stations/air units, most new stations are functioning from hired buildings leased from other organisations. There is also inadequate land holding and absence of dedicated berthing facilities for ICG Ships/boats, which are essential for operational effectiveness of the force.

State Governments/Port Authorities are being impressed upon to address deficiencies in land, berthing and infrastructure so as to enable effective functioning of CG stations and basing of additional assets in the larger interest of maritime security.”

**16. The Committee in their 13th Report had highlighted the vulnerability of Coast Guard infrastructure and stop gap arrangement with which Coast Guard had to manage with State Governments/other stakeholders. The Ministry in its Action Taken Replies have acknowledged that most new stations are functioning from hired buildings and there is also absence of dedicated berthing facilities for Indian Coast Guard ships/boats, which are essential for operational effectiveness of the Force. However, the Ministry has stated that State Governments/Port Authorities are being impressed upon to address deficiencies in land, berthing and infrastructure to enable effective functioning.**

The Committee would like to be apprised in detail regarding all the measures/initiatives attempted by the Ministry in order to sensitize/motivate all stakeholders/State Governments and at the same time the results achieved thereof. The Committee find that the reply of the Ministry is casual as the specific initiatives taken in order to sensitize Central agencies/State Governments have not been given. The Committee would also like to know the present status and the tangible progress made in regard to Coastal Stations, Air Stations, Air Enclaves, Heli base, Coastal Police Stations and Coastal Radar Chain as against

**the targets to be achieved by 2012 which was 41 Coastal Stations, 5 Air Stations, 7 Air Enclaves, 1 helibase, 2 Independent Squadrons, 204 Coastal Police Stations and 46 Coastal Radar Chain.**

**E. FORCE LEVEL AND SURFACE PLATFORMS**

**Recommendation (Para Nos. 6 and 7)**

17. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee observe that the existing strength of aircraft and other surveillance force level of Indian Coast Guard includes 44 ships, 6 hovercrafts aircrafts, 24 boats, 20 Chetaks and 4 ALH. The Coast Guard during the year 2007-08 had 42 ships, 18 boats and 45 aircrafts as informed to the Committee during the course of examination of Demands for Grants 2007-08. The comparison of the status of surveillance force level of Coast Guard during the year 2007-08 and the strength, at present, indicates that there has been addition of only 2 ships and 6 boats during the past four years. The Committee have been given the impression that a lot of efforts are being made to upgrade the capacity of Coast Guard Post 26/11 Mumbai attack. However, the aforesaid scenario with regard to upgradation of force level indicates that the progress in this regard is slow. Even if the data with regard to the existing force level is compared to the assessed requirement during the year 2007-08 as informed to the Committee during the course of examination of Demands for Grants, the Committee note that there are huge gaps between the required and the existing force level. The assessed requirement of ships at that time was 154 and 93 boats while the Indian Coast Guard at present has only 45 ships and 27 boats.

The Committee further note from the Information furnished by the Ministry that a large number of gadgets/helicopters/aircrafts available with Coast Guard Organisation are lying non-operational for long time and repair/servicing seems to be a very slow process. The Super Rapid Gun Mounting (SRGM) installed onboard ICG ships Samar, Sangram are not working since 2006 and on ICG Sagar since June, 2009. The SRGM onboard ICGS Sarang is partially operational. The Electronically Operated Fire Control System (EOFCS) of all the SRGM had become obsolete and OEM had expressed inability to provide product support. The existing strength Donier and Chetak are 28 and 20 respectively, out of which one-fourth of the fleet is undergoing major servicing/repairs.

The Committee take serious note of the huge gaps between the existing and the required force level as well as the slow progress of acquisition of the force level in Coast Guard. Not only that whatever limited capacity of force level the Coast Guard possesses, is not fully operational as is apparent from the information furnished by the Ministry. The Committee would like to emphasize that with the increasing perceived threat levels from various quarters, the country cannot afford delay and shifting of deadlines in respect of acquisition of various types of force level. As such the Committee strongly recommend that all out efforts should be made to ensure that the inductions are in place within the stipulated time-frame. The requisite allocation should be made available to Coast Guard so as to meet the gaps between the required and existing strength to enable the Coast Guard to meet the emerging security challenges as well to handle the peace time operations particularly during natural calamities. Besides, it should also be ensured that the various systems and the aircraft, equipments, electronic gadgets, etc. which become non-operational due to various reasons are repaired/serviced within the shortest possible time. In this regard, the Defence capacity to repair/service the various equipments, aircraft systems also need to be augmented.

The Committee further express serious concern over almost one-fourth of the total strength of Donier and Chetak undergoing major services/repairs. The Committee would like to be informed whether the Defence has tried to find out the reasons for such a large number of aircraft going non-operational. The detailed reasons in this regard should be furnished to the Committee so as to understand the issue of such a large number of Donier and Chetak going non-operational.

The Committee during the Study Visit to Goa observed that the accommodation provided to the officials of Coast Guard Organisation/Navy was in a dilapidated condition. The Committee note that on the one hand there is shortage of accommodation for the officials of the services, on the other hand, whatever accommodation is provided is not being maintained properly. The Committee take serious view of the poor maintenance of the residential accommodation provided to the officials of Coast Guard and Navy. The Committee strongly recommend the Ministry to look into the matter urgently. Besides the outlay required for proper maintenance of the residential accommodation should be provided."

18. The Committee in regard to recommendation at Sl. No. 7 had recommended as under:—

#### “SURFACE PLATFORMS

The Committee note that the Coast Guard has been performing the delegated charter of duties with a force level of 72 commissioned surveillance platforms out of which, as per the Ministry’s own admission, 50 per cent of the platforms have exceeded their designated life. The Ministry has informed that 131 surveillance platforms are already under construction in Indian Shipyards and another 200 platforms are in the process of being contracted. The aforesaid position indicates that there are huge gaps between the required and the existing strength of surface platforms. What is more disturbing is the fact that whatever limited capacity of platforms Coast Guard has, have already exceeded their life. While expressing serious concern over the existing situation, the Committee strongly recommend that all the initiatives should be taken so that additional platforms are inducted within the stipulated time frame and the out dated platforms are phased out thereby strengthening the force level of Coast Guard.”

19. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

- “1. The ICG had a surface force level of 60 ships/boats (42 ships and 19 boats/hovercrafts) as on 25 November, 2008. Post 26/11, induction of assets and augmentation of force levels received undivided attention. Due to this, contracts for 104 platforms (*i.e.* 36 ships and 68 boats/hovercraft) were concluded by the Service during the period January, 2009 to March, 2011.
2. Currently, acquisition cases for 46 platforms (*i.e.* 26 ships and 20 boats) are being progressed, which are likely to conclude by 2013. This acquisition programme also caters for replacement of again platforms inducted in early eighties by the ICG. By 2018, ICG would have a force level of about 150 ships/boats and 100 aircrafts, which would be adequate for securing the maritime interests of India to a reasonable level. The fully desired force level of 154 ships, 126 boats and 139 aircrafts is likely to be achieved by 2027.
3. The phase lag in ‘acquisition’ and ‘induction’, as brought out in the Report, is unavoidable since ship construction is a highly complex and time intensive process. Shipyards require



a minimum delivery period of 2-3 years from signing of contract to affect the delivery of the first vessel of a class of ships follow-on vessels need an additional 06 to 12 months depending on size/complexity.

4. Operational status of Weapon/sensors. Effective maintenance and optimal utilisation of weapons/sensors is accorded utmost priority by the ICG. The ICG, accordingly, has an elaborate maintenance philosophy for weapons/sensors/equipment fitted on its sea going assets, with a mechanism to test their operational effectiveness periodically.
5. As for the Super Rapid Gun Mound (SRGM), the non-availability of the gun was mainly on account of the defective; Electro Optical Fire Control System (EOFCS). The OEM/PAC firm (M/s BHEL) had expressed inability to provide product support for the EOFCS, in absence of which, operational availability of the gun mount onboard ICG ships Samar and Sangram was adversely affected.
6. Following remedial measures have been instituted for operationalising the SRGM:—
  - (a) Early conclusion of periodic routines on the gun mounts have been accorded high priority. Normal Routines of SRGM on-board ICGS Samar have been completed by M/s BHEL in Sep. 2011. Routines on ICGS Sangram commences in January, 2012 and are likely to be completed by end March, 2012. Routines on ICGS Sagar and Sarang will follow on completion of Sangram.
  - (b) One Target Designator Sight (TDS) for each of the ships fitted with SRGM have been procured from M/s BHEL, Bangalore, and installation is in progress. The TDS will enable manual exploitation of the SRGM upon installation.
  - (c) Development of a new EOFCS for SRGM by M/s BHEL, Bangalore is in progress as replacement for the obsolete EOFCS.
7. Servicing/Repairs of Aviation Assets. The aviation fleet of the ICG includes 28 Dornier aircraft and 24 Helicopters. Presently, 10 Dornier aircraft and 07 Chetak Helicopters are undergoing mandatory servicing on completion of their respective flying

hours/stipulated calendar life inspections. Only two Chetaks, viz. CG 808 and CG 821, are non-operational. Details, as on 08 March, 2012, are as under:—

Aircraft	Total Strength	Allotted to Frontline Units	Undergoing scheduled Servicing by M/s HAL	Non-Operational	Remarks
Dornier	28	18(20)	10(08)	—	—
Chetak	20	11(13)	7(06)	02(01)	CG 808. The aircraft is non-operational since 21 January 2008, post accident at Port Blair. The damage of aircraft was categorized as Cat 'ZZ' i.e. 'Total Loss'. MoD approval for regularisation of the loss is awaited. CG 821. The aircraft is non-operational since 31 August 2011, post accident at Daman. Presently, the aircraft is undergoing repairs as M/s HAL (Barrackpore), under warranty, and the repairs are likely to be completed by April, 2012.

8. Maintenance of Residential Accommodation : Funds for maintenance and project work associated with coast guard residential accommodation is allocated yearly as part of the

Annual Works Programme (AWP). This is a time-tested system that ensures periodical and continuing maintenance of CG infrastructure.

9. As for the Coast Guard residential accommodation at Goa, concerned authorities have been directed to chart out a detailed plan for refurbishment/maintenance of residential accommodation through MES, which is the primary engineer agency for maintenance of buildings and accommodation.”

20. In regard to the deficiencies concerning surface platforms the Ministry replied as under:—

“Post 26/11, added impetus towards augmentation of assets resulted in conclusion of contracts for 104 surface platforms (36 Ships and 68 Boats/Hovercraft) in just a period of two years from 2009 to 2011. Further, ICG is currently progressing acquisition of 46 Ships/Boats (07 Offshore Patrol Vessels, 14 Fast Patrol Vessels, 01 Training Ship, 04 Auxiliary barges and 20 Interceptor Boats). The contract for acquisition of 06 additional Offshore Patrol Vessels on nomination basis to M/s GSL, Goa is also likely to conclude in the near future.

The acquisition programme of surface platforms is being progressed as per a stringent timeline in accordance with the DPP. The acquisition programme initiated by ICG would cater to capability enhancement, as also phasing out of old platforms.

As a result of these acquisition initiatives, the gaps currently being witnessed would be eliminated to a large extent with the induction of 150 surface platforms by 2018. The fully desired level of 154 ships and 126 boats is likely to be achieved by 2027.”

21. While taking note of the appalling situation in regard to the deficient force level the Committee had categorically recommended that the requisite allocation be made available to Coast Guard to enable them to meet the gaps between the required and existing strength so that Coast Guard is well equipped to meet the emerging security challenges and to handle the peace time operations particularly during natural calamities. Such deficiencies were quantified in the Committee’s Report and also the inoperability of the assets such as SRGM, EOFCS and idling of Dornier Aircraft and Chetak Helicopters was deftly brought out in the Report. They also took note of serious deficiencies in regard to the surface platforms where huge gaps existed between the required and the existing strength of surface platforms to be precise,

50% of the platforms exceeded their designated life and as such 131 surveillance platforms were under construction and another 200 in the process of being contracted.

The reply of the Ministry has submitted information on the conclusion of the contracts for 104 platforms during the period January 2009 to March 2011. It also states that the acquisition cases for 46 platforms were being progressed and were likely to conclude by 2013. The Committee note that it is already more than one and a half years since the contract for 104 platforms was entered into but the reply has not thrown any light on the progress made in this regard. Also, they believe that the acquisition for 46 platforms would be completed by 2013 *i.e.* after lapse of exactly two years. In the opinion of the Committee the time for mere finalisation of the contract is too long which amounts to compromising with the national security. Hence, they recommend that the progress with regard to 104 platforms be communicated to them and all out efforts be made to curtail the period for finalizing the contract for acquisition of 46 platforms. They would also like to have the complete details of the road map which would lead to acquisition of 154 ships, 126 boats and 139 aircrafts to be achieved by 2027. While disagreeing with the casual response of the Ministry that the acquisition programme of surface platforms was being progressed as per the stringent time line, the Committee, in unequivocal terms recommend that the contractual obligation for such acquisition be culminated forthwith and strict guidelines for implementation be framed so that induction of 150 surface platforms by 2018 becomes a reality.

Coming to the inoperability of weapon/sensors the Committee foresee a very dismal picture with regard to the efforts made by the Ministry. The reply is again silent on important aspects such as penalty clause being entered into with the OEMs and whether it was ever invoked in this case. The reasons for showing inability in providing product support should have been communicated to the Committee specially highlighting the fact that whether the defective equipment was supplied by the manufacturers. They would also like to be informed about the status of the remedial measures taken for operationalising the Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM). This is more alarming in view of the fact that stringent and tedious acquisition processes are in place and being practised by the Ministry.

The number of aviation assets at the disposal of Coast Guard is very meagre and far from the targeted numbers aimed for achieving

by 2027. Notwithstanding the fact, two assets *i.e.* Chetak has been damaged due to accidents. Out of these one CG 808 has been categorised as a total loss and Ministry's approval for regularising is still awaited. The second, CGA 21, as per the reply of the Ministry was undergoing repairs which were likely to be completed by April 2012. The Committee are surprised to find that Ministry has not intimated them basic facts such as when was the request for regularisation of the loss was communicated to the Ministry and since when it was pending with it. Also the Ministry has not been candid to reveal the status of completion of repair of the second aircraft which was due for 2012. Detailed information on both these points be communicated to the Committee in order to enable them to ascertain the delays which are taking place on both these counts.

The information furnished in respect of the maintenance of residential accommodation at Goa is of routine nature and hides more than it reveals. In this regard the Committee can only recommend that the plan for refurbishment/maintenance be finalised without any further loss of time and the accommodation be finally upgraded to the required liveable conditions.

#### F. VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

##### **Recommendation (Para No. 11)**

22. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee have been informed during the course of examination that the Coast Guard is coordinating with the Director-General Shipping for fitment of vessel, tracking system on board for all fishing vessels in accordance with the decisions taken by the Cabinet Secretary post 26/11. To achieve the task, the Government is examining some of the proposals to regulate the movement of fishing boats in and out of all landing points along the Indian Coast which include the fitment of shipping harbor/landing points with Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID), fitment of satellite based transponder on each fishing boat below 20 mts. in length, fitment of vessel monitoring system (VMS) for deep sea fishing vessel and fitment of AIS(B) for all fishing vessels above 20 mts. in length.

The detailed examination of the subject by the Committee has revealed that some headway has been achieved in respect of fitment

of vessel tracking system in fishing vessels less than 20 mtrs. However, in respect of fitment of transponders for fishing vessels above 20 mtrs. and for deep sea fishing vessels as well as for fitment of RFID tags, the proposals seems to be still at the conceptual stage. The Committee feel that an effective vessel monitoring and tracking system is utmost necessary for monitoring the operation of all types of vessels in the sea. As such there is an urgent need to fast track the process of identification of technologies, trials so that various types of proposed monitoring systems are fitted in all types of vessels. So far as the constraint being felt with regard to the small boats which do not have power supply to provide power to the monitoring equipment is concerned, the Committee feel that the constraint can be addressed by fitting the rechargeable batteries.

The Committee strongly recommend that all the proposed initiatives should be fast tracked so that the monitoring and tracking systems/transponders RFID tags are fitted in all types of vessels expeditiously. The Committee may also like to recommend to take the help of DRDO a premier Defence Research Organisation of the country in identification of various technologies and to address to the constraints being faced in various trials.”

23. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The aspect of fitment of transponders for fishing vessels above 20 mtrs. length is governed by Ministry of Shipping (MoS) Notification of May 2009 that makes fitment of AIS Class ‘A’ mandatory for all fishing vessels above 20 m in length. MoS is the nodal agency for progressing the fitment on such vessels.

All Deep Sea fishing Vessels are fitted with AIS. Voyage clearance is not provided by ICG unless the Deep Sea fishing vessels are fitted with AIS. Coast Guard ships and MRCCs are being equipped with AIS for effective monitoring of these AIS fitted vessels.”

**24. The Committee bearing in mind the security concerns, had recommended that the help of DRDO be taken to address the constraints being observed for fitment of transponders on fishing vessels above 20 meters in length and fitment of RFID Tags on deep sea fishing vessels. In their reply the Ministry had now stated that Ministry of shipping is the nodal agency for progressing the fitment on such vessels. However, they have not categorically informed whether the two equipments mentioned above have actually been installed on the category of vessels recommended by the Committee. The Committee had also recommended to take the help of DRDO a premier Defence**

Research Organisation of the country in identification of various technologies and to address to the constraints being faced in various trials. In the reply of the Ministry there is no mention about considering DRDO service for identifying technologies required for various type of vessel monitoring systems. The reply of the Ministry is also silent on this point and it goes without saying that no initiatives have been commenced by the Ministry even after having been specifically recommended. As such the Committee reiterate their earlier recommendation that all the proposed initiatives should be fast track so that the monitoring and tracking systems/transponders RFID Tags are fitted in all types of vessels expeditiously.

#### G. DISASTER MANAGEMENT

##### **Recommendation (Para No. 12)**

25. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“One of the mandated duties of Coast Guard Organisation is to provide assistance and protection to fishermen at sea while in distress. As informed to the Committee during the course of deliberations, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue and fishermen helping are the daily operations of the Coast Guard. The Committee note that at the time of a natural calamity in the coastal areas, various Ministries/Departments play an important role. There is a National Disaster Management Cell. The Indian Meteorological Department, Lodhi Road, New Delhi is the main Department for weather forecast for Tsunami. Besides, the Government of India has got a Tsunami warning centre. The task of off-shore evacuation has been stated to be the responsibility of the concerned State Governments. The Committee find that a lot of lessons need to be learnt post recent Tsunamis which have played havoc and costed many lives. The most important task during a natural disaster like tsunami is to disseminate the warning of impending disaster and to evacuate the people residing in the area to a safe location so as to avoid the large scale loss of life and destruction in such areas. The Committee observe that during a natural calamity like Tsunami the Coast Guard is the organisation which first comes in direct contact with the coastal areas. As such all the initiatives should be taken to have a full proof coordinating mechanism between the various agencies, Ministries, Departments of Union Government and State Governments. There should be a structured mechanism whereby the Coast Guard Organisation is immediately alerted about the predicted natural disaster. The warning of the natural disaster

should be telecast on real time basis on Radio and Doordarshan. Coast Guard Organisation can also disseminate the warnings through some other mechanisms like public address system, etc. The Committee strongly recommend that the Ministry of Defence, Coast Guard Organization should take up the issue with the concerned Ministries, Departments, State Governments and related organisations and convey the concern of the Committee so that the immediate action is taken up.”

26. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) operated by the ICG coordinates rescue efforts in all Coastal States. Further, each Coastal State has a Maritime Rescue Sub Centre which complements the efforts of the MRCC. ICG maintains constant liaison with the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), Hyderabad, which is the nodal agency with requisite infrastructure for Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre.

Regular mock exercises are conducted by INCOIS to establish communication procedure, accurate flow of information and mobilization of men and assets. The last Indian Ocean wide mock Tsunami drill was conducted by INCOIS in collaboration with the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in October 2011.”

**27. The Committee note that systems are in place for mitigation of disasters in all coastal States to which Indian Coast Guard is also contributing. They also take note that mock Tsunami drill was conducted by INCOIS in October, 2011 in collaboration with the National Disaster Management Authority. While taking note of the support which is in place the Committee are astonished to find that the reply of the Ministry throws no light on the specific recommendation of the Committee. The fresh initiatives proposed/taken such as issuing warning of natural disasters and telecasting them on mass communication system, disseminating such warnings through PA system have not been addressed to by the Ministry *per se*. The Committee, therefore, recommend that their recommendation be followed in letter and spirit.**

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 13)**

28. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee further observe that fool proof telecommunication and internet connectivity is the pre-requisite for a proper



coordination mechanism amongst various Ministries, Departments, State Governments and other authorities responsible for warnings, evacuation and post Tsunami operations. The Coast Guard Organisation can play an effective role in discharging its various activities only when the warnings regarding disasters are instantly communicated. Further, as suggested above, the news about the expected disaster can be broadcast on Radio and Doordarshan on real time basis, only when various technologies, telecom and internet connectivity, power supply remains intact during a critical situation. The Committee may further like to emphasize that the emerging state-of-the-art technologies over the world have actually redefined the emerging threats from the sea. The positioning of latest and the state-of-the-art force levels on our coastal borders to some extent act as a deterrent. However, for proper functioning of all the technological equipments it is utmost necessary that our connectivity which include telecommunication, internet and power connectivity remains intact during the disaster which may be natural disaster or a war like situation. As such there is an urgent need to have layers of alternate telecommunication, internet and power supply networks. The Ministry of Defence, Coast Guard Organisation should take up the issue with the concerned Ministries/Departments so that Coast Guard Organisation remains connected even in worst situation, particularly in the natural disasters.”

29. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“ICG ships and boats are equipped with independent telecommunication equipment and facilities, which are designed to work even when shore based infrastructure is partially affected.”

**30. Consequent to the specific recommendation of the Committee that the Ministry of Defence should take up the issue with the concerned Ministries so that unhindered connectivity is available to the CG in terms of functioning of technological equipment including telecommunications, internet etc. which function on power supply, the Ministry has simply stated that the ICG ships and boats are independently equipped with such facilities and can work even when shore based infrastructure is partially affected. It appears that the import of the recommendation has not fully been comprehended by the Ministry. The recommendation aimed to include both shore and off-shore infrastructure as both are complementary to each other. Partial connectivity on-shore would definitely hamper the rescue operations during disasters and would eclipse the functioning of ICG ships and**

boats. The Committee, therefore, reiterate that all efforts be made to ensure unhindered power supply and alternate layers of communications during natural disasters by taking up the issue with the Ministries/Departments concerned.

#### H. OIL SPILL

##### **Recommendation (Para No. 17)**

31. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee further note that entry of the ships/vessels who have outlived their life is one of the important factor for oil spill in the ocean. When the issue was raised during the course of deliberations, the Committee have been apprised that it is under the administrative domain of the Ministry of shipping. One of the suggestion made by the Coast Guard to prevent operation of sub-standard ships is restriction of entry of vessels more than twenty five years in territorial waters. The Committee find that sea has no boundaries and as such the issue of entry of sub-standard ships in the ocean need to be addressed internationally through various conventions and treaties. The Committee during the course of deliberations have been informed that India is likely to sign the OPRC HNS 2010 Protocol. The Ministry of Defence/Coast Guard should take up the issue with the Ministry of Shipping and the issue of restricting entry of ships/vessels more than 25 years old should be taken up at the international fora/conferences so that some way out can be found to address the matter.”

32. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The ICG has raised the issue of restricting entry of old and unseaworthy ships in Indian waters on previous occasions with the MoS/DG Shipping. This issue was also taken up by the ICG during the meeting of Committee of Secretaries held on 02 December, 2011. MoS has been requested to take suitable action to prevent unseaworthy ships from operating in Indian waters.”

**33. The Committee note that ICG is taking up the issue of restriction of entry of unseaworthy vessels in Indian waters at various platforms as recommended by the Committee in their Report. The Ministry has informed that ICG took up the matter during the meeting of Committee of Secretaries held on 2nd December, 2011. The Committee desire to know the outcome of the meeting.**

**The Committee also emphasize that the issue needs to be vigorously taken up at international fora/conferences so that the same can be dealt holistically.**

**Recommendation (Para No. 18)**

34. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Coast Guard during the course of deliberations have made various other suggestions to address the issue of operation of sub-standard ships in the Indian waters. Such suggestions include increasing the number of ship inspections, targeting the vessels that are operated by flags which has history of violating the standards of shipping vessels, strict checking of loading operations at ports, avoiding loading operations of iron ore during monsoon and establishing Emergency Towing Vessels during monsoon to assist the vessels in emergency. The Committee feel that the aforesaid suggestions merit consideration and need to be pursued with the concerned Ministries/Departments. Besides guidelines need to be prepared with regard to periodic checking, inspections of ships, etc. The concrete initiatives in this regard should be taken and the Committee informed accordingly.”

35. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The matter related to ship inspections etc. are in the purview of DG (Shipping) and Marine Mercantile Department.

DG (Shipping) hired and deployed Emergency Towing Vessel (ETV) on the west coast of India during the monsoon season in 2011. The ICG role is limited to operational deployment of the vessel under the overall coordination by Marine Emergency Response System Committee.

The ETV was successfully utilised during Monsoon in 2011.”

**36. The Committee note that the matter related to ship inspections etc. are in the purview of DG (Shipping) and Marine Mercantile Department. Notwithstanding the fact the Committee once again see that the reply tends to shift responsibility on one ground or the other. The Committee does not acquiesce with the stand taken by the Ministry that the matter related to ship inspections are in purview of DG (Shipping) and Marine Mercantile Department and feel that in the normal course a spirit of camaraderie ought to exist between the concerned Ministries on important issue such as prevention of oil spill.**

Further, they feel that deployment of emergency towing vessel was a stopgap arrangement and not a permanent solution. They, therefore, reiterate their earlier recommendation that guidelines be prepared and implemented effectively with regard to periodic checking, inspections of ships which have history of violating the standards etc. and concrete initiatives taken in this regard be communicated to them.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 19)**

37. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee have been apprised that the Coast Guard has recommended MoS to establish the necessary framework and modalities for implementation of the HNS response system, prior acceding to the OPRC HNS protocol. In this connection, the Committee find that the Coast Guard has certain constraints. The Coast Guard has intimated MoS that the service is not ready at present to shoulder the responsibility of HNS pollution as it requires specialized training, skill, equipment, protective gears, monitoring gadgets, availability of scientific inputs and enormous coordination to undertake any response actions. The Committee may again like to emphasise that the Coast Guard has been designated as the central coordinating agency for combating oil spills in Indian waters. The Coast Guard being not well-equipped to take up the responsibility of HNS pollution is the matter of serious concern. The Committee strongly recommend that capacity building of Coast Guard in this direction should be given utmost importance and the officials should be imparted specialized training, besides creating the desired infrastructure so as to enable it to address for the challenge of HNS pollution.”

38. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The issue of HNS is being administered by MoS through DG Shipping and MMD in accordance with the provision of MS Act, 1958. The OPRC-HNS 2000 protocol is likely to be ratified by India. The Coast Guard has requested the MoS to establish necessary frameworks and modalities for implementation of HNS response system, prior acceding to OPRC-HNS protocol.”

**39. In response to the specific recommendation of the Committee that Coast Guard be given teeth to take up the responsibility of HNS response system the Ministry have simply stated that this issue is being administered by MoS through DG (Shipping) and MMD in accordance with the concerned legislation. It is also learnt that**

Coast Guard has requested MoS to establish necessary frameworks and modalities for implementation of HNS response system, which it seems is contingent to acceding to OPRC-HNS protocol. The Committee, once again reiterate that this issue be followed vigorously and no stone left unturned for putting the required infrastructure in place for augmenting HNS response system and eventually signing of the international protocol in this regard.

## I. ANTI PIRACY

### **Recommendation (Para No. 24)**

40. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee find that the constant piracy/robbery threats by Somalian pirates in the Indian Ocean is an area of concern. The major volume of India’s trade is through sea route. The issue of vulnerability to piracy/robbery need to be addressed on an urgent basis since it affects our strategic maritime interests. As such all the desired initiatives need to be taken to create safe and secure maritime environment. In this context, the Committee in 12th Report on Demands for Grants (2011-12) have recommended the Government to consider setting up of a separate unit to deal with the anti piracy operations. The Committee while reiterating their earlier recommendation would like the Government to consider the aforesaid recommendation on an urgent basis.

The Committee find from the information furnished by the Ministry of Defence that the Ministry of Defence/Coast Guard has not maintained records/statistics for Indians taken hostages by Somalian pirates. However, with regard to Indian crew, the Committee have been informed that a total of 490 Indian crew were taken as hostages by the Somalian pirates in the last three years. So far as the position with regard to crew members still in the custody of the pirates is concerned, the Committee have been informed that 437 crew members have been released and 53 are still in captivity. The Committee are concerned to note the response of the Ministry of Defence that the Coast Guard has no role in negotiation with Somalian pirates for the release of Indian crew. The negotiations are initiated by the concerned shipping company. The Committee observe that the efforts made by the Government for release of the Indians held hostages by the Somalian Pirates are insufficient and even today many of the Indians have been held hostages for considerable period of time. The Committee would like to strongly

recommend to the Ministry to coordinate with the concerned Ministries/agencies so as to ensure that the Indians held hostages are released without any further delay.”

41. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“With regular anti-piracy patrols, the Coast Guard maintains a proactive stance towards preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. With the designation of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) under the Coast Guard as the internationally recognised Piracy Reporting Centres by the IMO, anti-piracy coordination efforts of the ICG have received the requisite fillip. Proactive stance of the ICG and synergised operations with the Indian Navy to counter piracy in the eastern Arabian Sea have, in recent times, resulted in sinking of 3 somalian pirate mother ships, apprehension of one ship and capture of 121 pirates in the Indian EEZ off L&M Islands.

Presently, there is no dedicated legislation in India for prosecution of offences related to piracy at sea. Further, there have been problems related to exercise of jurisdiction by the Indian Courts for offences committed on high seas. Though piracy cases are currently being processed under the provisions of the Admiralty Act and the IPC, handling of such cases has been complicated.

MEA is in the process of framing legislation on piracy. The draft legislation deals with existing lacunae in the prosecution of piracy and provides a framework for addressing offences related to piracy.”

**42. The Committee take note of the fact that regular anti-piracy patrols are being conducted by the Coast Guard hence maintaining a proactive stance towards preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. These synergised operations with the Indian Navy has recently resulted in sinking of 3 Somalian pirate mother ships, apprehension of one ship and capture of 121 pirates in the Indian EEZ off L&M Islands as informed by the Ministry in Action Taken Notes.**

However, the fact, as intimated by the Ministry, that presently there is no dedicated legislation in India for prosecution of offences related to piracy at sea and there have been problems related to exercise of jurisdiction by the Indian Courts for offences committed on high seas are matter of serious concern. It has been further informed that

**Ministry of External Affairs is in the process of framing legislation on piracy. In this context, the Committee opine that Coast Guard should convey detailed ground realities/situations to MEA so that the legislation is able to provide teeth to the authorities dealing with cases of prosecution of offences related to piracy at sea and should also take measures in order to expeditious framing of the legislation.**

**Recommendation (Para No. 25)**

43. The Committee had recommended as under:—

“The Committee may further like to refer to the Group of Ministers Report, 2001 on Reforming the National Security Systems, whereby it has been suggested that the laws and procedures relating to detention and prosecution of poachers and confiscation of boats need to be tightened and the concerned Ministries/Departments of the Government of India should consider setting up the Maritime Courts or alternatively giving powers of prosecution and detention to the Coast Guard and the Marine Police. The Committee while endorsing the views of the Group of Ministers would like the Government to consider the aforesaid suggestion keeping in view the increased threats of piracy and robbery by the poachers/pirates.”

44. The Ministry in its action taken reply, has stated as under:—

“The recommendations/observations of the Committee’s Report stands addressed in the following two Central Government legislations.

The Maritime Zone of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 and the Maritime Zone of India (Regulation of fishing by Foreign Vessels) Rule, 1982, have been enacted by the Ministry of Agriculture. These statutes provide for regulation of fishing by foreign vessels in the Maritime Zones of India. All Coast Guard Officers and Subordinate Officers are authorized under this Act to stop, board and search a foreign vessel. Where such an Officer has reason to believe that the foreign vessel has, or is being used to or is about to be used to commit an offence under this Act, he may with or without warrant, seize and detain such vessel and direct the master to bring the vessel to any of the specified ports notified in the Gazette of India under this Act. The offender is to be tried in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate First Class as notified in the Gazette of India under the Act as the Designated Court. The Government, in a separate Gazette

Notification under this Act, has further delegated these powers to the officers of Indian Navy, as also to Police officers of different ranks belonging to coastal States.

The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on the continental Shelf Act, 2002 has been enacted by the Ministry of Shipping and has come into force *w.e.f.* 01 Feb. 2003. Section 4(1) of this Act provides that the Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette, confer on any Gazetted officer of the Coast Guard or any other Gazetted officer of the Central Government the powers of arrest, investigation and prosecution exercisable by a Police officer under the CrPC. The Central Government, *vide* Notification SO 137(E) dated 22 Jul 2004, has conferred these powers on all Coast Guard Officers borne on board a Coast Guard ship. The offences listed in Section 3 of this Act are as under:—

- (a) Committing an act of violence against a person on board a fixed platform or a ship, which is likely to endanger the safety of the fixed platform or safe navigation of the ship.
- (b) Causing destruction/damage to a fixed platform or a ship or its cargo in such a manner, which endangers the safety of such platform or safe navigation of such ship.
- (c) Seizing or exercising control over a fixed platform or a ship by force or threatening/intimidating in any other form.
- (d) Placing or causing to be placed on a fixed platform or a ship, by any means, a device or substance which is likely to destroy/damage that fixed platform or ship or endangers its cargo or fixed platform or safe navigation of that ship.
- (e) Destroying or damaging maritime navigational facilities or interfering with their operation by an act which is likely to endanger safe navigation of a ship.
- (f) Knowingly communicating false information thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship.
- (g) During course of commission or attempt to commit any of the above offences:—
  - (i) Causing death to any person;
  - (ii) Causing grievous hurt to any person;



- (iii) Causing injury to any person;
- (iv) Seizing or threatening a person;
- (v) Threatening/ endangering a ship or a fixed platform;

In addition, this Section also states that acts of attempting or abetting commission of any of these offences would also be punishable. The act of unlawful or intentional threatening, which compels a person to do or refrain from doing any act or to commit any offence, is also punishable.”

**45. After gleaning through the list of offences enacted *vide* notification SO 137(E) dated 22 July, 2004 as provided by the Ministry, that Coast Guard can deal with, the Committee find that these offences exclusively relate to smooth operations of Coast Guard ships and ignore the suggestion given in the Report which relates to setting up of maritime courts or alternatively giving powers, prosecution and detention of poachers to the Coast Guard and marine police.**

The Committee are perturbed at the dithering approach adopted by the Ministry while replying to the specific suggestion of the Committee and they reiterate their earlier recommendation relating to setting up of maritime courts or giving powers of prosecution and detention to the Coast Guard and marine police so that such cases can be fast tracked and thereby create deterrence for perpetrators of crime such as poachers/confiscators. The outcome may be communicated to the Committee in due course.

## CHAPTER II

### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 1)**

The Committee observe that as per the existing Organisational Structure, the Coast Guard operates from its headquarters located at New Delhi. The field functions of the Coast Guard are executed by the four Regional Headquarters located at Mumbai, Chennai, Gandhi Nagar and Port Blair along with 12 District Headquarters set up under these Regional Headquarters located at the Coastal States of India. The Committee during the course of deliberations have observed that the maritime States of Orissa and West Bengal are located adjacent to Bangladesh and of late there has been a large number of refugee influx and anti-national activities in this area. Not only that the sea area adjoining these two maritime States is rich in marine biotic resources and the Coast of Orissa is known for nesting of endangered species of Olive Ridley Turtle which needs to be protected. To add to the importance of this area the Sand Heads approach in river Hooghly is the gateway to the ports of Kolkata handling large amount of import-export trade. This being the restricted water, there is persistent risk of oil pollution. Besides large exploration activity is being undertaken in sea adjoining West Bengal and Orissa. The Ministry itself has acknowledged that there is inescapable need for establishing Regional Headquarters (North-East). The Committee have further been informed that the case for Regional Headquarters (North-East) along with co-located station at Kolkata is being examined.

2. While taking note of the strategic and important location of the maritime States of Orissa and West Bengal, the Committee are of the firm view that there is an urgent need to take the immediate action with regard to setting up of Regional Headquarter (North-East) at the proposed site *i.e.* Kolkata so that the environment, sea life and property are protected besides meeting the strategic need of checking the influx of refugees, anti-national activities and poaching. The expeditious decision in this regard should be taken by the Government and the Committee informed accordingly.

## **Reply of the Government**

3. "Establishment of Regional Headquarters (North-East) alongwith co-located station at Kolkata has been prioritised for establishment. Five acres of land has been acquired in March 12 from the Government of West Bengal to develop infrastructure for the Headquarters."

(Please *see* Para No. 7 of Chapter-I of the Report)

## **Recommendation (Para No. 2)**

4. The Committee during the course of examination have been informed that the long term planning for the Coast Guard Organisation is being made since inception. The detailed analysis of the information furnished by the Ministry indicates that various long-term plans envisaged by the Coast Guard could not be finalized. The proposed Coast Guard Perspective Plan (2007-22) initially had an outlay of Rs. 49377.33 crore and post 26/11, it was decided to ensure a comprehensive CGPP 2012-27 instead of revising the CGPP 2007-22. As such, as per the Ministry, the envisaged expenditure involved in the upgradation of ICG force level during CGPP 2007-22 shall have no relevance. With regard to Five Year Plans, the Committee on the one hand have been informed that Eleventh Plan was approved by the Ministry of Finance with an outlay of Rs. 7,000 crore which was consequently revised to Rs. 7930.22 crore, on the other hand, the approved figures have been stated to be purely indicative. When the Committee specifically enquired about the deadline for the proposed upgradations post 26/11 scenario, the Committee have been informed that the deadline for upgradation would be made on the approval of CGPP 2012-27. The Committee conclude from the aforesaid scenario that long-term Plans envisaged are not being finalized and the revised plans are taking so much time thereby leading to uncertainty over the annual allocations for the Coast Guard and the whole plans of upgrading the infrastructure and the force level.

5. While expressing serious concern over the ad-hocism in the whole planning process, the Committee strongly recommend that Coast Guard Perspective Plan 2012-27 should be finalised within the stipulated time-frame. Besides the allocations for the Twelfth Plan according to the set targets as per the CGPP 2012-27 should be finalized expeditiously by the Coast Guard Organisation/Ministry of Defence so that the approval of the Ministry of Finance is obtained before the start of the Twelfth Plan. The Committee may again like to emphasize that there is an urgent need to give more attention to the long-term plans so that the proposed

upgradations are made so as to enable Coast Guard Organisation of India to meet the responsibilities bestowed to it owing to change in maritime scenario and increased incidents of terrorism and poaching at sea over the years.

### **Reply of the Government**

6. 1. The Perspective Plan is a broad-based long term plan for 15 years prepared with due consideration to maritime security scenario and the perceived threats. The Perspective Plan comprises of 3 five-year Plans, christened as “Development Plans”. The first five year plan is normally firm and thus called “Definitive Plan”; the second five year plan is an “Indicative Plan”; and the third five year plan is a “Vision Plan”. Thus, the overall projection in a Perspective Plan is always indicative.

2. The Coast Guard Development Plan is formulated with meticulous planning and strategic vision to develop desired capabilities over time. Post preparation of the Plans at the CG Headquarters, these plans are examined by various authorities keeping in view national goals and priorities before the Government. As such, this process takes time due to the scrutiny at various levels prior approval.

3. Nonetheless, various measures are taken to ensure timely approval of plans. The 11th Development Plan (Apr. 2007-Mar. 2012) was approved in Jun. 2007, almost at the beginning of the plan period. The 12th Development Plan (2012-17), carved out of the Perspective Plan (2012-27) was finalised and approved by the Raksha Mantri and submitted to MoF for accord of their approval prior commencement of the Plan Period (*i.e.* Apr. 2012).

### **Recommendation (Para No. 7)**

7. The Committee note that the Coast Guard has been performing the delegated charter of duties with a force level of 72 commissioned surveillance platforms out of which, as per the Ministry’s own admission, 50 per cent of the platforms have exceeded their designated life. The Ministry has informed that 131 surveillance platforms are already under construction in Indian Shipyards and another 200 platforms are in the process of being contracted. The aforesaid position indicates that there are huge gaps between the required and the existing strength of surface platforms. What is more disturbing is the fact that whatever limited capacity of platforms Coast Guard has, have already exceeded their life. While expressing serious concern over the existing situation, the Committee strongly recommend that all the initiatives should be taken

so that additional platforms are inducted within the stipulated time-frame and the out dated platforms are phased out thereby strengthening the force level of Coast Guard.

### **Reply of the Government**

8. "Post 26/11, added impetus towards augmentation of assets resulted in conclusion of contracts for 104 surface platforms (36 Ships and 68 Boats/Hovercraft) in just a period of two years from 2009 to 2011. Further, ICG is currently progressing acquisition of 46 Ships/Boats (07 Offshore Patrol Vessels, 14 Fast Patrol Vessels, 01 Training Ship, 04 Auxiliary barges and 20 Interceptor Boats). The contract for acquisition of 06 additional Offshore Patrol Vessels on nomination basis to M/s GSL, Goa is also likely to conclude in the near future.

The acquisition programme of surface platforms is being progressed as per a stringent timeline in accordance with the DPP. The acquisition programme initiated by ICG would cater to capability enhancement, as also phasing out of old platforms.

As a result of these acquisition initiatives, the gaps currently being witnessed would be eliminated to a large extent with the induction of 150 surface platforms by 2018. The fully desired level of 154 ships and 126 boats is likely to be achieved by 2027".

(Please *see* Para No. 21 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 8)**

9. The Committee note that for centuries people were free to go for fishing without any regulation. Post 26/11 scenario, the move to issue license has started. The Committee appreciate that fishing community is understanding the need to regulate the fishing. One of the initiative being undertaken to regulate the fishing in the country is issue of biometric identity cards to fishermen. So far as the status of the task in this regard is concerned, the Committee find from the information furnished by the Ministry that 16,75,398 coastal fishermen have been identified for issue of biometric identity card. Data in respect of 10,15,001 *i.e.* 64.34% of the fishermen have been collected. So far as the issue of biometric identity cards to the individuals is concerned, the Committee note that the position is not very satisfactory. Only in Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh more than 30% of the identified fishermen have been issued biometric identity card. In six States/UTs the percentage of the task completed has been shown as nil, as per the data furnished by the Ministry. In Karnataka, only 1.7% of the task has been completed.

In Kerala which has large number of fishermen population only 20.9% of the task has been completed. The Committee express serious concern over the tardy progress of the task of issue of biometric identity card to fishermen. The Committee strongly recommend that Coast Guard Organisation should monitor and pursue the State Governments and Ministry of Agriculture so that the biometric identity cards are issued within the stipulated timeframe. The concerns of the Committee in this regard should be duly communicated to the respective Ministries/State Governments.

### **Reply of the Government**

10. The Indian Coast Guard is maintaining constant liaison with the Ministry of Agriculture to monitor the status of implementation of Biometric ID cards for fishermen. Coast Guard Regional Commanders at Gandhinagar/Mumbai/Chennai/Port Blair are regularly taking up the matter with the State Govts. within their Regions, particularly during the periodic meetings on Coastal Security. Regional Commanders have also apprised the State Govts. of the concerns expressed by the Standing Committee.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 12)**

11. One of the mandated duties of Coast Guard Organisation is to provide assistance and protection to fishermen at sea while in distress. As informed to the Committee during the course of deliberations, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue and fishermen helping are the daily operations of the Coast Guard. The Committee note that at the time of a natural calamity in the coastal areas, various Ministries/Departments play an important role. There is a National Disaster Management Cell. The Indian Meteorological Department, Lodhi Road, New Delhi is the main Department for weather forecast for Tsunami. Besides, the Government of India has got a Tsunami warning centre. The task of off-shore evacuation has been stated to be the responsibility of the concerned State Governments. The Committee find that a lot of lessons need to be learnt post recent Tsunamis which have played havoc and costed many lives. The most important task during a natural disaster like tsunami is to disseminate the warning of impending disaster and to evacuate the people residing in the area to a safe location so as to avoid the large scale loss of life and destruction in such areas. The Committee observe that during a natural calamity like Tsunami the Coast Guard is the organisation which first comes in direct contact with the coastal areas. As such all the initiatives should be taken to have a foolproof coordinating mechanism between the various agencies, Ministries, Departments of Union Government and State Governments. There should be a structured

mechanism whereby the Coast Guard Organisation is immediately alerted about the predicted natural disaster. The warning of the natural disaster should be telecast on real time basis on Radio and Doordarshan. Coast Guard Organisation can also disseminate the warnings through some other mechanisms like public address system, etc. The Committee strongly recommend that the Ministry of Defence, Coast Guard Organization should take up the issue with the concerned Ministries, Departments, State Governments and related organisations and convey the concern of the Committee so that the immediate action is taken up.

### **Reply of the Government**

12. "The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) operated by the ICG coordinates rescue efforts in all Coastal States. Further, each Coastal State has a Maritime Rescue Sub Centre which complements the efforts of the MRCC. ICG maintains constant liaison with the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), Hyderabad, which is the nodal agency with requisite infrastructure for Indian Tsunami Early Warning Centre.

Regular mock exercises are conducted by INCOIS to establish communication procedure, accurate flow of information and mobilization of men and assets. The last Indian Ocean wide mock Tsunami drill was conducted by INCOIS in collaboration with the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in October 2011."

(Please see Para No. 27 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 14)**

13. The Coast Guard Act,1978 specifically mentions that one of the roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard Organisation is taking such measures as are necessary to preserve and protect the maritime environment and to prevent and control marine pollution. The Coast Guard besides the charter of duties enumerated in section 14(2) of the Coast Guard Act, has to undertake many other duties. These include Protection of endangered species such as Whale Sharks, Olive Ridley Turtles, etc. and Coordination of international Coastal Clean-up Day in September every year with the inter-governmental organization *viz.* South Asia Cooperative for Environment Protection (SACEP).

The Committee appreciate the effort of the Coast Guard Organisation regarding protection of the endangered species, *viz.* the

Olive Ridley turtles off Orissa coast. Such exclusive efforts may be initiated in connection with protection of mangrove forests, coral reefs and other onshore as well as offshore natural assets.

### **Reply of the Government**

14. 1. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) is the nodal Ministry for appropriate legislation/policies towards protection of coral reefs and mangrove forests. Concerned States/UTs are responsible for implementation of policies promulgated by the Centre. Indian Coast Guard is a member of the National Committee on Mangroves and Coral Reefs and has been actively participating in various meetings on the issue.

2. In addition to the initiatives towards protection of Olive Ridley turtles, the Coast Guard annually mobilises its own personnel, as also local volunteers/college students/NCC cadets, for cleaning drives at various beaches across the country on the occasion of International Coastal Cleanup Day.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 17)**

15. The Committee further note that entry of the ships/vessels who have outlived their life is one of the important factor for oil spill in the ocean. When the issue was raised during the course of deliberations, the Committee have been apprised that it is under the administrative domain of the Ministry of shipping. One of the suggestion made by the Coast Guard to prevent operation of sub-standard ships is restriction of entry of vessels more than twenty five years in territorial waters. The Committee find that sea has no boundaries and as such the issue of entry of sub-standard ships in the ocean need to be addressed internationally through various conventions and treaties. The Committee during the course of deliberations have been informed that India is likely to sign the OPRC HNS 2010 Protocol. The Ministry of Defence/Coast Guard should take up the issue with the Ministry of Shipping and the issue of restricting entry of ships/vessels more than 25 year old should be taken up at the international fora/conferences so that some way out can be found to address the matter.

### **Reply of the Government**

16. The ICG has raised the issue of restricting entry of old and unseaworthy ships in Indian waters on previous occasions with the MoS/DG Shipping. This issue was also taken up by the ICG during the meeting



of Committee of Secretaries held on 02 December, 11. MoS has been requested to take suitable action to prevent unseaworthy ships from operating in Indian waters.

(Please *see* Para No. 33 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 20)**

17. The Committee have been informed that the acceptable teeth to tail ratio maintained by any maritime force is normally 1:2 *i.e.* for every one person at sea two are placed ashore, so that they can replace man at sea at regular intervals. Whereas Indian Navy generally maintains the set 1:2 ratio which is the minimum requirement but in case of Coast Guard the teeth to tail ratio is 2:1 resulting into longer sea time and frequent transfers. What is more disturbing is the fact that there are huge gaps between the sanctioned and the existing strength of personnel at various levels. The Coast Guard has a sanctioned strength for 12446 personnel whereas the borne strength is 8718, the overall shortage being 34.94%. If the shortage category wise is taken into consideration, the said shortage in civilian category is more acute *i.e.* 41.84%. In case of officers the shortage is 36.23% and for enrolled personnel the shortage is 26.77%.

The Committee during the course of deliberations have been informed that the major constraint in bridging the gap between the sanctioned and borne strength is non-availability of a dedicated training academy for the Coast Guard Organisation. As per the existing system the officers and enrolled personnel are sent to naval training establishment for basic and downstream training. The Committee have further been apprised that the setting up of dedicated Coast Guard academy has been envisaged in Coast Guard revised Eleventh Plan and approval in principle has been accorded by the Government on 12th October, 2010. Subsequently, 164 acre land has been acquired at the identified location at Azhikkal, Kerala and even Hon'ble Raksha Mantri has also laid foundation stone for the academy on 28th May, 2011. The Committee strongly recommend that the dedicated Coast Guard Academy should be set up expeditiously which would certainly pace up the induction of Coast Guard personnel at various levels.

### **Reply of the Government**

18. 1. As regards gap between sanctioned and existing strength the ICG has enhanced annual intake of the officers from 60 to 130 per year

and Enrolled Personnel from 400 to 700. This will reduce the gap in coming years.

2. The Indian Coast Guard came into being in 1978 with the enactment of the CG Act in the Parliament. Basic/*ab-initio* training for CG Officers/Enrolled Personnel is being undertaken in Naval training facilities. This provides adequate synergy and it is also not cost effective to have independent basic training schools. However, a need has been felt for developing dedicated training infrastructure in certain niche disciplines which the ICG exclusively deals with.

3. A Coast Guard Academy is planned to be setup. The Kerala Government offered 164 acres land at Azhikkal, Kannur District for setting up the CG Academy.

4. In order to provide structured training and achieve requisite standards in performance of Coast Guard statutory duties, the Academy is envisaged to have six schools as under:—

- (a) Search and Rescue School
- (b) School of Maritime and CG Law
- (c) Marine Environment School
- (d) Boarding Operations School
- (e) Command and Staff School
- (f) Technical and Management School

5. It is envisaged that the ICG Academy will be capable of training a peak load of 650 trainees at any given time.

6. The Coast Guard academy is a significant Project and the ministry is seized of the need for its expeditious execution. Necessary steps are being taken for the establishment of the Academy at an early date.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 21)**

19. The Committee have been apprised that efforts are being made for filling up the post of 649 civilian personnel through SSC/local recruitment which according to the Ministry would take considerable time. The Committee may like to recommend that the vacancies should be properly advertised through press and electronic media. The advertisement may, particularly, be given in the regional newspapers. With regard to the shortage of officers in the Coast Guard, the Committee may like to emphasize for filling the vacancies by recruitment examination and campus placements. The Committee feel that the Ministry/Coast

Guard may consider the persons living in shore areas/coastal villages and river estuary areas for the post of sailors as they are well-versed with water. The Committee strongly recommend that all the suggested measures should be taken so as to fill the gap between the sanctioned and borne strength of the Coast Guard at various levels within the definite time frame.

### **Reply of the Government**

20. 1. Publicity of vacancies for enrolment of Civilian personnel in the ICG is done as per existing DoP&T guidelines on the subject. In order to fully harness modern technology and means of communication, electronic and computer-based media is increasingly employed to support recruitment drives. At the same time, vernacular and local news/print media remains a key element of recruitment efforts.

2. In order to bridge the gap between sanctioned and borne strength, various measures have been instituted. These measures, *inter alia*, include:—

- (a) Conduct of recruitment through 30 recruitment centers optimally spread across the length and breadth of the country.
- (b) Nationwide publicity through print/electronic media to enhance awareness and attract talented youth towards the Coast Guard; special emphasis is laid on remote/coastal areas during such drives.
- (c) Conduct of Special Recruitment Drives (SRDs)/Fast Track Selection/in addition to regular recruitment drives, as also for backlog of SC/ST candidates.
- (d) Introduction of Short Service schemes in Officer cadre for General Duty (Women) and Commercial Pilot License holders as Asst. Comdt. (Pilot).
- (e) Setting of maiden Coast Guard Selection Board (CGSB) at Noida.
- (f) Constant liaison with the Staff Selection Commission for sponsoring candidates.
- (g) Notification of unfilled vacancies in Employment News and local newspapers for filling up through Employment Exchange procedure for direct recruitment.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 22)**

21. The Ministry during the course of deliberations has acknowledged that there is no second alternative for physical patrolling at sea. Not only that the incidents/threats from sea have increased over the years. The challenges for the coast guard have increased manifold post 26/11 scenario. The Committee, therefore strongly recommend that the existing teeth to tail ratio of 2:1 with the Coast Guard should be immediately reviewed to 1:2 *i.e.* at par with Navy and is the acceptable teeth to tail ratio for any Maritime force.

### **Reply of the Government**

The duties and responsibilities of Navy and Coast Guard are different. However, augmentation of manpower at various shore units will be considered to have an effective patrolling by Coast Guard units at sea.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 23)**

22. The Committee find that the Coast Guard Organisation is a multi task agency. Besides, the challenging role of the Coast Guard in war time situation, the mandate of Coast Guard includes multiple peace time operations of various types like preservation and protection of marine environment and anti smuggling operation, protection of fishermen at sea, etc. To handle the multi task it is utmost necessary that Coast Guard personnel are provided the requisite training. The Committee during the course of examination have found that the service is not ready at present to shoulder the responsibility of HNS pollution. As such the Committee strongly recommend that the training curriculum of Coast Guard personnel should be such that it results into capacity building of the personnel to handle the multiple tasks which include certain technical tasks. The Committee may further like to add that besides the proposed inductions of latest state-of-the-art force level, it is utmost necessary that persons behind these machines/equipments are well trained. As such while signing various agreements for acquisitions it should be ensured that the deals contain provisions for training of the Coast Guard personnel in manning/handling and maintenance the latest technology.

### **Reply of the Government**

23. 1. The Coast Guard shares a common training programme with the Navy in order to optimally utilize training resources and achieve

greater on-ground synergy. The Coast Guard also undertakes capacity building exercises through interaction with foreign nations/agencies such as various Coast Guards, IMO and other maritime organizations. Once initial expertise is developed abroad during such interactions, officers 'train the trainee' at the Coast Guard Training Centre (Kochi) on CG roles, thus ensuring retentivity of expertise.

2. India is currently not a signatory to the HNS protocol. Present day Coast Guard officers training programme includes an eleven week package for the CG role which is revised regularly. The Coast Guard would introduce more role specific courses for mid-level officers and Enrolled Personnel at the proposed Coast Guard Academy in the near future.

3. Coast Guard personnel are adequately trained to undertake first line maintenance onboard ships and aircraft. Infrastructure and manpower required for second and third line technical maintenance is, however, not available with the Coast Guard. Nonetheless, incremental in-house expertise is being developed on second line maintenance through interactions with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) as part of acquisition contracts. Efforts are in hand to progressively develop repair and maintenance infrastructure.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 24)**

#### **ANTI PIRACY**

24. The Committee find that the constant piracy/robbery threats by Somalian pirates in the Indian Ocean is an area of concern. The major volume of India's trade is through sea route. The issue of vulnerability to piracy/robbery need to be addressed on an urgent basis since it affects our strategic maritime interests. As such all the desired initiatives need to be taken to create safe and secure maritime environment. In this context, the Committee in 12th Report on Demands for Grants (2011-12) have recommended the Government to consider setting up of a separate unit to deal with the anti piracy operations. The Committee while reiterating their earlier recommendation would like the Government to consider the aforesaid recommendation on an urgent basis.

The Committee find from the information furnished by the Ministry of Defence that the Ministry of Defence/Coast Guard has not maintained record/statistics for Indians taken hostages by Somalian pirates. However,

with regard to Indian crew, the Committee have been informed that a total of 490 Indian crew were taken as hostages by the Somalian pirates in the last three years. So far as the position with regard to crew Members still in the custody of the pirates is concerned, the Committee have been informed that 437 crew members have been released and 53 are still in captivity. The Committee are concerned to note the response of the Ministry of Defence that the Coast Guard has no role in negotiation with Somalian pirates for the release of Indian crew. The negotiations are initiated by the concerned shipping company. The Committee observe that the efforts made by the Government for release of the Indians held hostages by the Somalian Pirates are insufficient and even today many of the Indians have been held hostages for considerable period of time. The Committee would like to strongly recommend to the Ministry to coordinate with the concerned Ministries/agencies so as to ensure that the Indians held hostages are released without any further delay.

### **Reply of the Government**

25. 1. With regular anti-piracy patrols, the Coast Guard maintains a proactive stance towards preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. With the designation of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) under the Coast Guard as the internationally recognised Piracy Reporting Centres by the IMO, antipiracy coordination efforts of the ICG have received the requisite fillip. Proactive stance of the ICG and synergised operations with the Indian Navy to counter piracy in the eastern Arabian Sea have, in recent times, resulted in sinking of 03 Somalian pirate mother ships, apprehension of one ship and capture of 121 pirates in the Indian EEZ off L&M Islands.

2. Presently, there is no dedicated legislation in India for prosecution of offences related to piracy at sea. Further, there have been problems related to exercise of jurisdiction by the Indian Courts for offences committed on high seas. Though piracy cases are currently being processed under the provisions of the Admiralty Act and the IPC, handling of such cases has been complicated.

3. MEA is in the process of framing legislation on piracy. The draft legislation deals with existing lacunae in the prosecution of piracy and provides a framework for addressing offences related to piracy.

(Please *see* para No. 42 of Chapter-I of the Report)

## **Recommendation (Para No. 26)**

### **LEAD INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

26. The Coast Guard Organisation has been additionally designated as the Lead Intelligence Agency for maritime, coastal and sea borders. The representative of the Ministry has informed that the DGICG will be designated as Commander Coastal Command and will be responsible for overall coordination between Central and State agencies in all matters related to Coastal security. Besides the Coastal security, other mandated duties of the Organisation are providing assistance to customs and other authorities in anti-smuggling operations, providing seaward security during the VIP visits to the various metros as requested by various Police Authorities/State Governments, seaward clearance around the area whenever there is a satellite launch or missile is tested (Sriharikota and Chandipur), enforcement of anti-poaching measures, monitoring and surveillance of Deep Sea Fishing etc. All these tasks involve intelligence gathering and quick dissemination of information.

In this connection, the Committee may like to observe that there is an urgent need to have a structured mechanism whereby the information by different intelligence gathering agencies is shared instantly with the Coast Guard Organisation which has been designated as the lead intelligence agency for maritime coastal and sea borders. Intelligence gathering and sharing is a technical task and as such the Coast Guard personnel need to be imparted specialized training to ensure that the Coast Guard perform the task of lead intelligence agency for maritime coastal and sea borders effectively. The Committee may also like to recommend that the fishermen and the coastal communities living in the coastal areas are the first to notice any suspicious activity in area. As such the confidence should be built in them so that they are more involved in intelligence gathering and sharing.

### **Reply of the Government**

#### **Enhancing Mechanism for Sharing of Information**

27. 1. ICG, as Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA), has put in place suitable mechanism for timely sharing of information in its area of responsibility. Every month, LIA meetings are held at ICG Regional/Distt./Stn. Hqrs. involving all stakeholders. In 2011, a total of 177 LIA meetings were conducted. Through these meetings, the ICG has developed an efficient mechanism for sharing actionable information among the various stakeholders in the coastal security arena. The mechanism is validated for its efficacy during periodic Coastal security Exercises and Operations,

and is further fine-tuned based on experience and lessons learnt. The proposed secure connectivity of Multi Agency Centre (MAC)/IB with its member agencies and SMAC also includes the Coast Guard for further strengthening the information-sharing mechanism.

### **Training Efforts of CGIO**

2. The Government has sanctioned 176 personnel for developing the intelligence cadre in the Coast Guard. Training has been one of the priority areas for CGIO. Even though manpower sanction for CGIO was accorded in 2009, training efforts commenced in earnest in early 2003. Officers and Enrolled Personnel have been trained in various facets of Intelligence Operations including source running, interrogation, and surveillance in general trade craft; and Sat imagery and Synthetic Aperture Radar course in tech Int. Further, cases have also been taken up for Sat Imagery Course with Air Force, Basic Int Course (BIC) for Officers with IB and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) course with NTRO.

### **Interaction with Fishermen**

3. ICG has always regarded fishermen as an invaluable source of information in coastal security operations. Interaction mechanism with the fishermen has been institutionalised through the system of **Community Interactions**, which are being regularly conducting in fishing villages/hamlets across the coastline.

4. During such interaction programmes, fishermen are encouraged to become the 'EYES AND EARS' of law-enforcement agencies at sea on account of their constant and enlarged presence at sea. As fishermen are most likely to notice any irregularity/suspicious activity at sea during its early stages, they are guided about ways in which timely dissemination of such information can help build actionable intelligence. This interaction, over a period of time, has instilled confidence in the fishing community and reinforced their commitment to participate in coastal security efforts. So far, 429 Community Interaction programs have been conducted in 2011.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 27)**

#### **FEDERAL APEX BODY**

28. Coastal Security involves many agencies and proper coordination among those agencies is quintessence for fool proof coastal security. And specially under the present circumstances, no stone may be left unturned to gear up zero tolerance coastal security network. The



Committee comprehend that lack of appropriate coordination and information sharing between the concerned agencies is a relevant problem in strengthening the Coastal security chain. This was previously apprehended in the Group of Ministers Report on Reforming the National Security System in 2001 wherein it was recommended to form a Single window federal apex body. However, no such body has yet been formed.

The Committee find that the recommendation made in the Group of Minister's Report for a single window federal apex body merit consideration and as such the recommendation should be considered positively by the Government.

### **Reply of the Government**

1. The 'National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) against threats from the Sea' was formed in August 2009 with a view to ensure timely implementation of important decisions taken by the Government in respect of maritime and coastal security of the country. The Committee is headed by the Cabinet Secretary as Chairman, and the following as members:—

- (a) Chief of Naval Staff.
- (b) Foreign Secretary.
- (c) Defence Secretary.
- (d) Home Secretary.
- (e) Secretary (Border Management), Ministry of Home Affairs.
- (f) Secretary, Department of Shipping, Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways.
- (g) Secretary, Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture.
- (h) Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.
- (i) Deputy NSA-cum-Secretary, NSCS.
- (j) Secretary (R), Cabinet Secretariat.
- (k) Director, Intelligence Bureau.
- (l) Director General, Indian Coast Guard, Ministry of Defence.

- (m) Chief Secretaries/Administrators of Coastal States and Union Territories.
- (n) Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.
- (o) Chairman, CBEC, Ministry of Finance.

2. The Terms of Reference of the NCSMCS include:—

- (a) To review timely implementation of various proposals as approved by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in its meeting held on 16 February, 2009 and other important matters pertaining to Maritime and Coastal Security.
- (b) To ensure effective coordination among various Central Ministries and Agencies and the Coastal State Government/ Union Territories.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 28)**

#### **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

29. The Committee during the course of examination of the subject have been apprised that Indian Coast Guard has institutionalized joint exercise programme with Japan Coast Guard (JCG), Korea Coast Guard (KCG) and Maldives Coast Guard. The service is also in the process of signing MoU's with Coast Guards of many countries for assisting each other in case of search and rescue, anti-piracy and other trans-national crimes and issues pertaining to oil spill disaster. The Committee again emphasize that sea has no boundaries and as such threat from the sea need to be addressed internationally. While appreciating the aforesaid initiatives being taken by the Indian Coast Guard, the Committee may like the Indian Coast Guard to continue the efforts and joint exercise programmes may be undertaken more regularly and with other countries having coastal areas.

### **Reply of the Government**

30. 1. The Indian Coast Guard is seized of the growing relevance of maritime cooperation in dealing with common maritime challenges. Towards this, the ICG has a comprehensive interaction programme with major Coast Guards across the globe. In addition to the more formalized exercises with few select Coast Guards, informal interactions by way of ship visits and participation in Seminars and training activities is also

pursued to develop closer ties and understanding. Few recent/forthcoming interactions are highlighted for information in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. ICGS Samar with integral helicopter visited Thailand and Indonesia 16–29 Jan. 12 for combined exercises with maritime law enforcement agencies of the two countries as also to develop bilateral and professional linkages.

3. A high level delegation led by Admiral Hisayasu Suzuki, Commandant, Japan Coast Guard (a four-star General), along with seven members, participated in a High Level Meeting between the ICG and the JCG at New Delhi in Jan. 12. This was followed by the XIth Combined Exercise between the two Coast Guards off Chennai during which Japanese Coast Guard Ship SETTSU participated from the Japanese side.

4. 'DOSTI-XI' series joint exercises between the Indian Coast Guard and the Maldivian National Defence Forces (MNDF) Coast Guard are scheduled at Male (Maldives) in Apr. 12. The 5th Indian Coast Guard–Korea Coast Guard combined exercise is planned to be conducted in Aug. 12 in Korea.

5. Such visits enable interaction with Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies of respective States and help ascertain the areas of common concern/interest, as also evolve working and professional relationships in the field of Maritime Search and Rescue, Pollution Response and other duties related to Coast Guard charter.

### **CHAPTER III**

RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS, WHICH THE COMMITTEE  
DO NOT DESIRE TO PURSUE IN VIEW OF THE REPLIES  
OF THE GOVERNMENT

- Nil -

## CHAPTER IV

### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COMMITTEE AND WHICH REQUIRE REITERATION

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 3)**

1. The Committee observe that a comprehensive and integrated Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) was formulated in consultation with all agencies concerned with the objective of strengthening infrastructure of marine police force for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas, particularly in shallow water areas close to the post. The CSS Phase-I was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in January, 2005 and was to be implemented over the five years starting from 2005-06. The Committee further note that the date of completion of CSS Phase-I has now been extended by one year *i.e.* till March, 2011. The data furnished by the Ministry with regard to the physical progress of Phase-I further indicates that there are gaps between the sanctioned buildings and the buildings made operational. Such gap is of No. 2 with regard to coastal police stations No. 5 in respect of check posts and out posts and No. 2 with regard to barracks. Besides in a good number of projects construction has not yet started. With regard to coastal police stations although 71 out of the 73 sanctioned police stations have been made operational, as per the information furnished by the Ministry, the construction in respect of 42 out of 48 buildings has been completed and for 11 buildings the construction is in progress. In respect of 14 buildings the construction has not yet started. It indicates that Phase-I may require further extensions. Not only that a good number of police stations seems to be working without buildings. With regard to Phase-II even the financial implications have not been yet finalized and the approval of CCS is yet to be obtained.

The Committee observe that post 26/11 scenario, there is an urgent need to increase patrolling and surveillance infrastructure in coastal areas. With the status of infrastructure projects, the details of which have been given above it would take more years to complete the projects targeted under Phase-I and Phase-II. Keeping in view the strategic requirement the Committee strongly emphasize that the targeted projects

under Phase-I should be completed expeditiously. Besides financial allocations for Phase-II should be finalized expeditiously so that Phase-II can start expeditiously.

### **Reply of the Government**

2. 1. Setting up of Coastal Police Stations: MHA is the nodal agency dealing with the setting up of Coastal Police Stations.

2. Status of Coastal Security Scheme Phase – II: The scheme has been approved by the Government and implementation commenced *w.e.f.* 01 Apr. 2011. The Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-II) aims to carry forward the objectives specified in the Coastal Security Scheme (Phase-I) by way of providing additional infrastructural support to coastal States/UTs for marine patrolling and supplement other coastal security initiatives taken by the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard. The scheme involves setting up of 131 Coastal Police Stations and provisioning of 180 Interceptor Boats, 60 Jetties, 131 four wheelers and 242 Motor Cycles.

(Please *see* Para No. 10 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 4)**

#### **UNDER UTILISATION OF OUTLAY DURING ELEVENTH PLAN**

3. The Committee note from the data furnished by the Ministry that Rs. 20134.901 crore under the capital head for different projects have been earmarked to be spent by the end of the Twelfth Plan. Out of the allocated outlay, Rs. 5293.093 crore would be spent by the end of the Eleventh Plan and Rs. 12855.982 crore would be carried forward to Twelfth Plan. The detailed examination of the data further reveals that likely expenditure for the new schemes is Rs. 2631.270 crore out of Rs. 5293.093 crore for the Eleventh Plan which means that almost 50 per cent of the outlay is earmarked for meeting committed liability, replacement schemes and civil works. The analysis further indicates that there is under utilisation of outlay, particularly under the capital schemes during each year of Tenth Plan and Eleventh Plan. During the first three years of Eleventh Plan overall expenditure is 92.81 per cent of the total outlay whereas under the capital head, the expenditure is Rs. 1667.86 crore out of the allocation of Rs. 1916.71 crore *i.e.* 87.01 per cent.

The Committee at one place have been informed by the Ministry that the annual allocations would depend upon resource availability. On the one hand the allocations earmarked are not being fully utilized on

the other hand the deadlines for proposed up-gradations have been stated to be dependent upon resource availability. The Committee again emphasize that there is an urgent need to ensure that up-gradation, modernization of various plans of Coast Guard are completed within the stipulated deadline so as to address the challenges before the Coast Guard Organization. As such all the initiatives should be taken to ensure that the allocations made for the different projects are fully utilized. Besides keeping in view the long-term plans, the adequate outlay for the new schemes, should be made available by the Government. The concerns of the Committee in this regard should be duly communicated to the Ministry of Finance.

### **Reply of the Government**

“The approved Development Plan caters to proposals for acquisition of new and replacement schemes, infrastructure development, manpower augmentation and upgradation of existing assets. Post approval, these proposals are again required to be processed individually as per prevalent policies and procedures in force for sanction of the Competent Financial Authority (CFA). As such, this process involves time.

Further, ship-building is a very complex process with a gestation period ranging from 2 to 3 years. Similarly, cases for acquisition/manufacture of aircraft involve a gestation period of 3 to 4 years. Even after concluding contracts, the ability to spend money is contingent upon the selected Firms’ ability to absorb funds based on the actual physical progress made towards deliveries. Firms, in turn, are highly dependent on issues of corporate governance, availability of labour, material supplies from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), as also, on occasions, on acts of ‘Force Majeure’.”

Notwithstanding, the overall utilisation of funds during the 11th Plan has been satisfactory. Details of fund utilisation (as on 19 March, 2012) is as follows:—

Major Head	Approved in Revised 11th Plan	Expenditure	Shortfall/Excess (Rs. in crore)
Capital	4662	4135 (88.7%)	527 (-11.3%)
Revenue	3268	3174 (97.2%)	94 (-2.8%)
Total	7930	7309 (92.2%)	621 (-7.8%)

(Please see Para No. 13 of Chapter-I of the Report)

## Recommendation (Para No. 5)

### INFRASTRUCTURE

4. The Committee find that a lot of infrastructure is being upgraded with a view to enhance the coastal surveillance network. At present, there are 27 Coast Guard Stations along the coast line and as per the information furnished by the Ministry, Coast Guard Station generally covers a range of approx. 75 to 120 km. The Ministry itself has acknowledged that the present arrangements are considered inadequate for surveillance keeping in view the long coast line of India and adverse topography. To monitor the coastal boundaries, the Ministry has taken up the case with the Government to enhance the stations from 27 to 41 by 2012. Besides, 204 Coastal Police Stations have also been sanctioned which would be operating in the Hub and Spoke concept with the Coast Guard Stations for filling gap identified after carrying out vulnerability and gap analysis by the State Government/Marine Police of the State along with the Indian Coast Guard. With regard to upgrading Air Stations, Air Enclaves and Squadrons, the Committee have been informed that at present there are two Air Stations, three Air Enclaves and three independent Squadrons operating from strategic locations along the coast line. Additional three Air Stations and four Air Enclaves are being planned to be established by 2012. As such by 2012 the Coast Guard would be having total five Air Stations, seven Air Enclaves and one Helibase and two independent Squadrons which according to the Ministry would meet the effective air surveillance of the entire coast. In addition a total of 46 coastal radar chains are in the process of being started.

The Committee during their study tour to Mumbai, Goa, Bangalore and Vishakhapatnam from 29 June to 4 July 2011 have observed that keeping current security scenario into consideration, Coast Guard force level is being enhanced at a much faster rate. Towards this purpose the Coast Guard requires infrastructural facilities in a larger scale *viz.*, support for berthing place for ship place for hovercraft operations, air operations maintenance facilities, land for creation of operation and communication centres, Administrative Complexes, Married Accommodation. The present assets with the Coast Guard are negligible and are on temporary arrangements with other organizations at most of the places. Respective State Governments port authorities and airport authorities are being approached to provide such support. The Committee are of the strong view that infrastructure are the backbone for maintaining a strong force level for Coast guard organization to meet the current security scenario.



This type of stop-gap arrangement will weaken not only the capacity of CG but also the morale of the Coast Guard Personnel. This matter need to be dealt on war footing stage. The State Governments have to play an important role in setting up the proposed infrastructure primarily on the issue of acquisition of land for various types of infrastructure projects. As such, there is an urgent need to sensitize the State Governments about the urgency of upgradation of coastal network. The issue needs to be taken up at the highest level with the State Governments. The Ministry has to play a proactive role in motivating the various State Governments. Concrete initiatives on the suggested lines should be taken by the Government and the Committee apprised accordingly.

### **Reply of the Government**

5. "The ICG has 22 stations and 08 air units as on 25 Nov. 2008. Post 26/11, renewed impetus was accorded to addressing vulnerability gaps along the coast, and accordingly 20 additional stations and 07 air units were sanctioned by the Government.

Of the total 42 stations and 15 air units sanctioned till date, 35 stations and 08 air units have already been activated. Of these, 13 stations were activated in just three years time. Stringent timeline are being maintained for setting up of balance stations.

While efforts are in hand to expeditiously activate balance stations/air units, most new stations are functioning from hired buildings leased from other organisations. There is also inadequate land holding and absence of dedicated berthing facilities for ICG Ships/boats, which are essential for operational effectiveness of the force.

State Governments/Port Authorities are being impressed upon to address deficiencies in land, berthing and infrastructure so as to enable effective functioning of CG stations and basing of additional assets in the larger interest of maritime security."

(Please *see* Para No. 16 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 6)**

#### **FORCE LEVEL**

6. The Committee observe that the existing strength of aircraft and other surveillance force level of Indian Coast Guard includes 44 ships,

6 hovercrafts aircraft, 24 boats, 20 Chetaks and 4 ALH. The Coast Guard during the year 2007-08 had 42 ships, 18 boats and 45 aircrafts as informed to the Committee during the course of examination of Demands for Grants 2007-08. The comparison of the status of surveillance force level of Coast Guard during the year 2007-08 and the strength, at present, indicates that there has been addition of only 2 ships and 6 boats during the past four years. The Committee have been given the impression that a lot of efforts are being made to upgrade the capacity of Coast Guard Post 26/11 Mumbai attack. However, the aforesaid scenario with regard to upgradation of force level indicates that the progress in this regard is slow. Even if the data with regard to the existing force level is compared to the assessed requirement during the year 2007-08 as informed to the Committee during the course of examination of Demands for Grants, the Committee note that there are huge gaps between the required and the existing force level. The assessed requirement of ships at that time was 154 and 93 boats while the Indian Coast Guard at present has only 45 ships and 27 boats.

The Committee further note from the Information furnished by the Ministry that a large number of gadgets/helicopters/aircraft available with Coast Guard Organisation are lying non-operational for long time and repair/servicing seems to be a very slow process. The Super Rapid Gun Mounting (SRGM) installed onboard ICG ships Samar, Sangram are not working since 2006 and on ICG Sagar since Jun. 2009. The SRGM onboard ICGS Sarang is partially operational. The Electronically Operated Fire Control System (EOFC) of all the SRGM had become obsolete and OEM had expressed inability to provide product support. The existing strength Donier and Chetak are 28 and 20 respectively, out of which one-fourth of the fleet is undergoing major servicing/repairs.

The Committee take serious note of the huge gaps between the existing and the required force level as well as the slow progress of acquisition of the force level in Coast Guard. Not only that whatever limited capacity of force level the Coast Guard possesses, is not fully operational as is apparent from the information furnished by the Ministry. The Committee would like to emphasize that with the increasing perceived threat levels from various quarters, the country cannot afford delay and shifting of deadlines in respect of acquisition of various types of force level. As such the Committee strongly recommend that all out efforts should be made to ensure that the inductions are in place within the stipulated time frame. The requisite allocation should be made available to Coast Guard so as to meet the gaps between the required and existing strength to enable the Coast Guard to meet the emerging security challenges as well to handle the peace time operations particularly during

natural calamities. Besides, it should also be ensured that the various systems and the aircraft, equipments, electronic gadgets, etc. which become non-operational due to various reasons are repaired/serviced within the shortest possible time. In this regard, the Defence capacity to repair/service the various equipments, aircraft systems also need to be augmented.

The Committee further express serious concern over almost one-fourth of the total strength of Donier and Chetak undergoing major services/repairs. The Committee would like to be informed whether the Defence has tried to find out the reasons for such a large number of aircraft going non-operational. The detailed reasons in this regard should be furnished to the Committee so as to understand the issue of such a large number of Donier and Chetak going non-operational.

The Committee would like to emphasize that with the increasing perceived threat levels from various quarters, the country cannot afford delay and shifting of deadlines in respect of acquisition of various types of force level. As such the Committee strongly recommend that all out efforts should be made to ensure that the inductions are in place within the stipulated time frame. The requisite allocation should be made available to Coast Guard so as to meet the gaps between the required and existing strength to enable the Coast Guard to meet the emerging security challenges as well to handle the peace time operations particularly during natural calamities.

### **Reply of the Government**

7. "1. The ICG had a surface force level of 61 ships/boats (42 ships and 19 Boats/Hovercraft) as on 25 Nov., 2008. Post 26/11, induction of assets and augmentation of force levels received undivided attention. Due to this, contracts for 104 platforms (*i.e.* 36 Ships and 68 boats/hovercraft) were concluded by the Service during the period Jan., 2009 to Mar., 2011.

2. Currently, acquisition cases for 46 platforms (*i.e.* 26 ships and 20 boats) are being progressed, which are likely to conclude by 2013. This acquisition programme also caters for replacement of again platforms inducted in early eighties by the ICG. By 2018, ICG would have a force level of about 150 ships/boats and 100 aircraft, which would be adequate for securing the maritime interests of India to a reasonable level. The fully desired force level of 154 ships, 126 boats and 139 aircraft is likely to be achieved by 2027.

3. The phase lag in 'acquisition' and 'induction', as brought out in the Report, is unavoidable since ship construction is a highly complex and time intensive process. Shipyards require a minimum delivery period of 2-3 years from signing of contract to affect the delivery of the first vessel of a class of ships. Follow-on vessels need an additional 06 to 12 months depending on size/complexity.

4. Operational status of Weapons/sensors. Effective maintenance and optimal utilisation of weapons/sensors is accorded utmost priority by the ICG. The ICG, accordingly, has an elaborate maintenance philosophy for weapons/sensors/equipment fitted on its sea going assets, with a mechanism to test their operational effectiveness periodically.

5. As for the Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM), the non-availability of the gun was mainly on account of the defective; Electro Optical Fire Control System (EOFCS). The OEM/PAC firm (M/s BHEL) had expressed inability to provide product support for the EOFCS, in absence of which, operational availability of the gun mount onboard ICG ships Samar and Sangram was adversely affected.

6. Following remedial measures have been instituted for operationalising the SRGM:—

- (a) Early conclusion of periodic routines on the gun mounts have been accorded high priority. Normal Routines of SRGM onboard ICGS Samar have been completed by M/s BHEL in Sep., 2011. Routines on ICGS Sangram commences in Jan., 2012 and are likely to be completed by end Mar., 2012. Routines on ICGS Sagar and Sarang will follow on completion of Sangram.
- (b) One Target Designator Sight (TDS) for each of the ships fitted with SRGM have been procured from M/s BEL, Bangalore, and installation is in progress. The TDS will enable manual exploitation of the SRGM upon installation.
- (c) Development of a new EOFCS for SRGM by M/s BEL, Bangalore is in progress as replacement for the obsolete EOFCS.

7. Servicing/Repairs of Aviation Assets. The aviation fleet of the ICG includes 28 Dornier aircraft and 24 Helicopters. Presently, 10 Dornier aircraft and 07 Chetak Helicopters are undergoing mandatory servicing on completion of their respective flying hours/stipulated

calendar life inspections. Only two Chetaks, viz. CG 808 and CG 821, are non-operational. Details, as on 08 Mar., 2012, are as under:—

Aircraft	Total Strength	Allotted to Frontline Units	Undergoing scheduled Servicing by M/s HAL	Non-Operational	Remarks
Dornier	28	18(20)	10(08)	—	—
Chetak	20	11(13)	7(06)	02(01)	CG 808. The aircraft is non-operational since 21 Jan., 2008, post accident at Port Blair. The damage of aircraft was categorized as Cat 'ZZ' i.e. 'Total Loss'. MoD approval for regularization of the loss is awaited.  CG 821. The aircraft is non-operational since 31 Aug., 2011, post accident at Daman. Presently, the aircraft is undergoing repairs as M/s HAL (Barrackpore), under warranty, and the repairs are likely to be completed by Apr., 2012.

8. Maintenance of Residential Accommodation: Funds for maintenance and project work associated with Coast Guard residential accommodation is allocated yearly as part of the Annual Works Programme (AWP). This is a time-tested system that ensures periodical and continuing maintenance of CG infrastructure.

9. As for the Coast Guard residential accommodation at Goa, concerned authorities have been directed to chart out a detailed plan for refurbishment/maintenance of residential accommodation through MES, which is the primary Engineer agency for maintenance of buildings and accommodation.”

(Please see Para No. 21 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 11)**

8. The Committee have been informed during the course of examination that the Coast Guard is coordinating with the Director-General, Shipping for fitment of vessel, tracking system on board for all fishing vessels in accordance with the decisions taken by the Cabinet Secretary post 26/11. To achieve the task, the Government is examining some of the proposals to regulate the movement of fishing boats in and out of all landing points along the Indian Coast which include the fitment of shipping harbor/landing points with Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID), fitment of satellite based transponder on each fishing boat below 20 mts in length, fitment of Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) for deep sea fishing vessel and fitment of AIS(B) for all fishing vessels above 20 mtrs. in length.

The detailed examination of the subject by the Committee has revealed that some headway has been achieved in respect of fitment of vessel tracking system in fishing vessels less than 20 mtrs. However, in respect of fitment of transponders for fishing vessels above 20 mtrs. and for deep sea fishing vessels as well as for fitment of RFID tags, the proposals seems to be still at the conceptual stage. The Committee feel that an effective vessel monitoring and tracking system is utmost necessary for monitoring the operation of all types of vessels in the sea. As such there is an urgent need to fast track the process of identification of technologies, trials so that various types of proposed monitoring systems are fitted in all types of vessels. So far as the constraint being felt with regard to the small boats which do not have power supply to provide power to the monitoring equipment is concerned, the Committee feel that the constraint can be addressed by fitting the rechargeable batteries.

The Committee strongly recommend that all the proposed initiatives should be fast tracked so that the monitoring and tracking systems/transponders RFID tags are fitted in all types of vessels expeditiously. The Committee may also like to recommend to take the help of DRDO a premier Defence Research Organisation of the country in identification of various technologies and to address to the constraints being faced in various trials.

### **Reply of the Government**

9. The aspect of fitment of transponders for fishing vessels above 20 mtrs. length is governed by Ministry of Shipping (MoS) Notification of May 2009 that makes fitment of AIS Class 'A' mandatory for all fishing vessels above 20 mtrs. in length. MoS is the nodal agency for progressing the fitment on such vessels.

2. All Deep Sea fishing Vessels are fitted with AIS. Voyage clearance is not provided by ICG unless the Deep Sea fishing vessels are fitted with AIS. Coast Guard ships and MRCCs are being equipped with AIS for effective monitoring of these AIS fitted vessels.

(Please *see* Para No. 24 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 13)**

10. The Committee further observe that fool proof telecommunication and internet connectivity is the pre-requisite for a proper coordination mechanism amongst various Ministries, Departments, State Governments and other authorities responsible for warnings, evacuation and post Tsunami operations. The Coast Guard Organisation can play an effective role in discharging its various activities only when the warnings regarding disasters are instantly communicated. Further, as suggested above, the news about the expected disaster can be broadcast on Radio and Doordarshan on real time basis, only when various technologies, telecom and internet connectivity, power supply remains intact during a critical situation. The Committee may further like to emphasize that the emerging state-of-the-art technologies over the world have actually redefined the emerging threats from the sea. The positioning of latest and the state-of-the-art force levels on our coastal borders to some extent act as a deterrent. However, for proper functioning of all the technological equipments it is utmost necessary that our connectivity which include telecommunication, internet and power connectivity remains intact during the disaster which may be natural disaster or a war like situation. As such there is an urgent need to have layers of alternate telecommunication, internet and power supply networks. The Ministry of Defence, Coast Guard Organisation should take up the issue with the concerned Ministries/Departments so that Coast Guard Organisation remains connected even in worst situation, particularly in the natural disasters.

### **Reply of the Government**

11. ICG ships and boats are equipped with independent telecommunication equipment and facilities, which are designed to work even when shore based infrastructure is partially affected.

(Please *see* Para No. 30 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 18)**

12. The Coast Guard during the course of deliberations have made various other suggestions to address the issue of operation of sub-standard ships in the Indian waters. Such suggestions include increasing the number of ship inspections, targeting the vessels that are operated by flags which has history of violating the standards of shipping vessels, strict checking of loading operations at ports, avoiding loading operations of iron ore during monsoon and establishing Emergency Towing Vessels during monsoon to assist the vessels in emergency. The Committee feel that the aforesaid suggestions merit consideration and need to be pursued with the concerned Ministries/Departments. Besides guidelines need to be prepared with regard to periodic checking, inspections of ships, etc. The concrete initiatives in this regard should be taken and the Committee informed accordingly.

### **Reply of the Government**

13. 1. The matter related to ship inspections etc. are in the perview of DG(Shipping) and Marine Mercantile Department.

2. DG (Shipping) hired and deployed Emergency Towing Vessel (ETV) on the west coast of India during the monsoon season in 2011. The ICG role is limited to operational deployment of the vessel under the overall coordination by Marine Emergency Response System Committee.

3. The ETV was successfully utilised during Monsoon in 2011.

(Please *see* Para No. 30 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 19)**

The Committee had recommended as under:—

14. The Committee have been apprised that the Coast Guard has recommended MoS to establish the necessary framework and modalities for implementation of the HNS response system, prior acceding to the OPRC HNS protocol. In this connection, the Committee find that the Coast Guard has certain constraints. The Coast Guard has intimated MoS that the service is not ready at present to shoulder the responsibility of HNS pollution as it requires specialized training, skill, equipment, protective gears, monitoring gadgets, availability of scientific inputs and



enormous coordination to undertake any response actions. The Committee may again like to emphasise that the Coast Guard has been designated as the central coordinating agency for combating oil spills in Indian waters. The Coast Guard being not well-equipped to take up the responsibility of HNS pollution is the matter of serious concern. The Committee strongly recommend that capacity building of Coast Guard in this direction should be given utmost importance and the officials should be imparted specialized training, besides creating the desired infrastructure so as to enable it to address for the challenge of HNS pollution.

### **Reply of the Government**

15. The issue of HNS is being administered by MoS through DG Shipping and MMD in accordance with the provision of MS Act, 1958. The OPRC-HNS 2000 protocol is likely to be ratified by India. The Coast Guard has requested the MoS to establish necessary frameworks and modalities for implementation of HNS response system, prior acceding to OPRC-HNS protocol.

(Please *see* Para No. 39 of Chapter-I of the Report)

### **Recommendation (Para No. 25)**

16. The Committee may further like to refer to the Group of Ministers Report, 2001 on Reforming the National Security Systems, whereby it has been suggested that the laws and procedures relating to detention and prosecution of poachers and confiscation of boats need to be tightened and the concerned Ministries/Departments of the Government of India should consider setting up the Maritime Courts or alternatively giving powers of prosecution and detention to the Coast Guard and the Marine Police. The Committee while endorsing the views of the Group of Ministers would like the Government to consider the aforesaid suggestion keeping in view the increased threats of piracy and robbery by the poachers/pirates.

### **Reply of the Government**

17. "The recommendations/observations of the Committee's Report stands addressed in the following two Central Government legislations.

The Maritime Zone of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 and the Maritime Zone of India (Regulation of Fishing

by Foreign Vessels) Rule, 1982, have been enacted by the Ministry of Agriculture. These statutes provide for regulation of fishing by foreign vessels in the Maritime Zones of India. All Coast Guard Officers and Subordinate Officers are authorized under this Act to stop, board and search a foreign vessel. Where such an Officer has reason to believe that the foreign vessel has, or is being used to or is about to be used to commit an offence under this Act, he may with or without warrant, seize and detain such vessel and direct the Master to bring the vessel to any of the specified ports notified in the Gazette of India under this Act. The offender is to be tried in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate First Class as notified in the Gazette of India under the Act as the Designated Court. The Government, in a separate Gazette Notification under this Act, has further delegated these powers to the officers of Indian Navy, as also to Police officers of different ranks belonging to coastal States.

The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf Act, 2002 has been enacted by the Ministry of Shipping and has come into force w.e.f. 01 Feb., 2003. Section 4(1) of this Act provides that the Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette, confer on any Gazetted officer of the Coast Guard or any other Gazetted officer of the Central Govt., the powers of arrest, investigation and prosecution exercisable by a Police officer under the CrPC. The Central Government, *vide* Notification SO 137(E) dated 22 July, 2004, has conferred these powers on all Coast Guard Officers borne on board a Coast Guard ship. The offences listed in Section 3 of this Act are as under:—

- (a) Committing an act of violence against a person on board a fixed platform or a ship, which is likely to endanger the safety of the fixed platform or safe navigation of the ship.
- (b) Causing destruction/damage to a fixed platform or a ship or its cargo in such a manner, which endangers the safety of such platform or safe navigation of such ship.
- (c) Seizing or exercising control over a fixed platform or a ship by force or threatening/intimidating in any other form.
- (d) Placing or causing to be placed on a fixed platform or a ship, by any means, a device or substance which is likely to destroy/damage that fixed platform or ship or endangers its cargo or fixed platform or safe navigation of that ship.

- (e) Destroying or damaging maritime navigational facilities or interfering with their operation by an act which is likely to endanger safe navigation of a ship.
- (f) Knowingly communicating false information thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship.
- (g) During course of commission or attempt to commit any of the above offences:—
  - (i) Causing death to any person;
  - (ii) Causing grievous hurt to any person;
  - (iii) Causing injury to any person;
  - (iv) Seizing or threatening a person;
  - (v) Threatening/endangering a ship or a fixed platform;

In addition, this Section also states that acts of attempting or abetting commission of any of these offences would also be punishable. The act of unlawful or intentional threatening, which compels a person to do or refrain from doing any act or to commit any offence, is also punishable.”

(Please *see* Para No. 45 of Chapter-I of the Report)

## CHAPTER V

### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH FINAL REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE STILL AWAITED

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 9)**

The Committee observe that the Ministry of Agriculture has provided Rs. 72 crore to the consortium led by M/s BEL, Bangalore to undertake the data gathering and issue of biometric identity cards to more than four lakh fishermen. From the information furnished by the Ministry, the Committee note that more than 16 lakh of the fishermen have been identified for issue of biometric identity cards. The Committee would like the Ministry to clarify whether the remaining task of issue of biometric identity cards would be undertaken by BEL or some other agency has been identified/proposed to be identified to undertake the remaining task. The Committee would also like that the necessary outlay should be provided to the Ministry of Agriculture so that the task is completed within the stipulated time-frame.

#### **Reply of the Government**

Being the nodal Ministry for the project, Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has been requested to intimate the status of data-gathering and issuance of Biometric Cards for fishermen being progressed by M/s BEL, Bangalore. Further, on the recommendations of the Standing Committee, MoA has been requested to allocate necessary outlay so that the project is completed within the stipulated time 2012.

#### **Recommendation (Para No. 10)**

The Committee find that besides issue of Biometric identity cards the Government is registering fishing boats for effective surveillance in coastal areas. In this direction, the Government has given directives in February, 2009 that all fishing boats should be registered under the provisions of the Merchant Fishing Act, 1958. NIC in cooperation with the State Governments is undertaking the task of registration of boats and the necessary funding assistance has already been provided by the Ministry of Agriculture in this regard. The Committee are concerned to note that the initiative of registration of boats started in February 2009,

and even after passage of more than three years, the Coast Guard which is the nodal organisation is not even aware about the number of fishing vessels and their status of registration. The Committee believe that identification and registration of boats is the first initiative to monitor/track the vessels in the sea. As such it is utmost necessary that the task is completed within the stipulated time frame. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommend that Coast Guard Organisation should coordinate with the respective Ministries/NICs/State Governments and monitor the status of registration of boats in Coastal States. The periodic information about the task being undertaken should be obtained by the Coast Guard and furnished to the Committee. Besides the concerns of the Committee in this regard should be conveyed to the concerned Ministries, State Governments and NIC so that the task is completed within the definite time frame.

### **Reply of the Government**

1. As desired by the Standing Committee, the matter has been taken up with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) for obtaining the status of registration of boats in coastal States.

2. The aspect of registration of fishing boats has been accorded high priority by the ICG during various meetings and interactions with concerned Ministries/State agencies. Necessary instructions have also been issued to CG Regional Commanders at Gandhinagar/Mumbai/Chennai/Port Blair to coordinate with respective State Governments within their Regions and monitor the status of registration of boats. Further, a case has also been taken up with MoA informing them of the concerns of the Standing Committee on the delay in registration of boats and the need for completion of task within pre-defined time frame.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 24)**

The Committee observe that oil spill is one of the major factor for marine pollution. Besides, contaminating the sea water, oil spill causes great environmental hazards and is harmful for flora and fauna in the ocean. The Committee during the course of examination have been given the detailed position of the oil leakage cases reported from 1982 to 15 August, 2010. The analysis of the information reveal that 80 cases of oil spill have occurred in Indian water during the aforesaid period. The Coast Guard coordinated oil spill response in 75 cases of oil spill incidents. Out of these 75 cases in as many as 16 cases, the quantity and type of oil spill could not be assessed. Besides only in 11 cases, the amount of compensation could be received from the polluter. The aforesaid scenario indicates that more needs to be done to strengthen our post oil spill

investigation and adjudication mechanism in case of oil spill. The various laws related to compensation/adjudication need to be examined and reviewed. As such the Coast Guard Organisation should take up the issue strongly with the concerned Ministries, including the Ministry of Shipping.

### **Reply of the Government**

The Coast Guard has been taking up the issue of compensation claims for oil spill response directly with the polluter (*i.e.* ship owners), and in case of no response from the owners, with the DG Shipping. The recommendation of the Standing Committee with regards to the strengthening of the post-oil spill investigation and adjudication mechanism is being addressed with the Ministry of Shipping (MoS)/DG Shipping.

### **Recommendation (Para No. 16)**

The Committee understand that the Coast Guard is the Central Coordinating Agency for combating oil spills in Indian waters in accordance with 'Allocation of Business Rules, 1961'. One of the initiative taken by the Coast Guard is to get established the contingency plan and tier-I (upto 700 tonnes) pollution response facility by relevant ports, oil handling agencies and the State Governments to enable them to take up action systematically in the event of an oil spill. The Committee during the course of deliberations have been informed that most of the ports and oil handling agencies have established the contingency plan and tier-I facility. However, the coastal States have not undertaken the task so far. The Committee while expressing serious concern over the delay in finalizing the contingency plans and establishing pollution response facility by the State Governments would like the Ministry to pursue the matter so that such contingency plan and pollution response facility are established within the definite time period. Besides, the Committee would also like to know the name of the ports and oil handling agencies which have not established the contingency plan and the tier-I oil response facility. The Committee would also like to emphasize that such ports and oil handling agencies should be directed to finalize the contingency plan and pollution response facility without any further delay.

### **Reply of the Government**

On the issue of availability and maintenance of tier-I pollution response facilities by ports, Oil Companies and Coastal States/UTs, Government is considering to constitute an Inter-Ministerial Committee headed by Ministry of Shipping with Ministry of Petroleum and Natural

Gas, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Home Affairs as members, and Indian Coast Guard as the convenor. Representatives of concerned State Governments/UTs are also to be associated with the Inter-Ministerial Committee. Ministry of Shipping and Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas have also been mandated to issue necessary directives to Ports and Oil Companies for preparation of Oil Spill Contingency Plans.

2. The Indian Coast Guard and the Ministry of Shipping will jointly undertake inspection and audit of all major ports and oil companies towards their preparedness for pollution response.

NEW DELHI;  
19 December, 2012  

---

28 Agrahayana, 1934 (Saka)

RAJ BABBAR,  
Chairman,  
Standing Committee on Defence.

## APPENDIX I

### STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

#### MINUTES OF THE FOURTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2012-13)

The Committee sat on Tuesday, the 18th December, 2012 from 1500 hrs. to 1515 hrs. in Committee Room 'E', Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

#### PRESENT

Shri Raj Babbar — *Chairman*

#### MEMBERS

##### *Lok Sabha*

2. Shri Kamal Kishor 'Commando'
3. Shri R. Dhruvanarayana
4. Shri C.R. Patil
5. Shri Uday Singh
6. Shri R. Thamaraiselvan

##### *Rajya Sabha*

7. Shri Pankaj Bora
8. Shri Prakash Javadekar
9. Dr. E.M. Sudarsana Natchiappan
10. Shri C.M. Ramesh
11. Shri T.K. Rangarajan
12. Shri Devender Goud T.



SECRETARIAT

1. Dr. R.K. Chadha — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri R.K. Jain — *Joint Secretary*
3. Shri D.S. Malha — *Director*
4. Shri Sanjeev Sharma — *Additional Director*

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members to the sitting of the Committee. Thereafter, the Committee adopted the draft Report on the Action Taken by the Government on the recommendations/ observations contained in the 13th Report (Fifteenth Lok Sabha) on 'Performance of Coast Guard Organisation' without any modification.

3. \*\*\*                      \*\*\*                      \*\*\*                      \*\*\*                      \*\*\*

*The Committee then adjourned.*

---

\*\*\* Not related with the subject.

## APPENDIX II

### ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE THIRTEENTH REPORT (FIFTEENTH LOK SABHA) ON PERFORMANCE OF COAST GUARD ORGANISATION

1. Total number of recommendations: 28
2. Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by Government:  
Para Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28  
Total : 15  
Percentage : 54
3. Recommendations/Observations which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of Government's replies:  
- Nil -  
Total : Nil  
Percentage : 0%
4. Recommendations/Observations in respect of which replies of Government have not been accepted by the Committee:  
Para Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 19, 25  
Total : 09  
Percentage : 32
5. Recommendations/Observations in respect of which final replies of Government are still awaited:  
Para Nos. 9, 10, 15, 16  
Total : 04  
Percentage : 14



---

---

“All Parliamentary Publications including DRSC Reports are available on sale at the Sales Counter, Reception, Parliament House (Tel. Nos. 23034726, 23034495, 23034496), Agents appointed by Lok Sabha Secretariat and Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi (Tel. Nos. 24367260, 24365610) and their outlets. The said information is available on website ‘[www.parliamentofindia.nic.in](http://www.parliamentofindia.nic.in)’.

The Souvenir Items with logo of Parliament are also available at Sales Counter, Reception, Parliament House, New Delhi. The Souvenir items with Parliament Museum logo are available for sale at Souvenir Shop (Tel. No. 23035323), Parliament Museum, Parliament Library Building, New Delhi. List of these items are available on the website mentioned above.”

---

---