

SECOND REPORT

STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE  
(1999-2000)

(THIRTEENTH LOK SABHA)  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

*( Action taken on the Recommendations contained in the 4th Report of the  
Committee (Twelfth Lok Sabha) on the Subject 'Advanced Jet Trainer' (AJT)*

*Presented to Lok Sabha on 19 April, 2000  
Laid in Rajya Sabha on 19 April, 2000*

LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT  
NEW DELHI

March, 2000/Phalguna, 1921 (Saka)

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(Twelfth Lok Sabha)

## COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (1999-2000)

Dr. Laxminarayan Pandey — *Chairman*

### MEMBERS *Lok Sabha*

2. Shri S. Ajaya Kumar
3. Shri Raj Babbar
4. Shri S. Bangarappa
5. Col. (Retd.) Sona Ram Choudhary
6. Smt. Sangeeta Kumari Singh Deo
7. Shri Jarborn Gamlin
8. Shri Indrajit Gupta
9. Shri Raghuvir Singh Kaushal
10. Shri Mansoor Ali Khan
11. Shri Chandrakant Khaire
12. Shri Vinod Khanna
13. Shri K.E. Krishnamurthy
14. Shri A. Krishnaswami
15. Shri Ashok N. Mohol
16. Shri Hannan MoHah
17. Shri Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi
18. Shri Rajesh Pilot
19. Shri Gajendra Singh Rajukhedi
20. Shri Rajenderasinh Rana
21. Prof. Rasa Singh Rawat
22. Shri A.P. Jithender Reddy
23. Shri Madhavrao Scindia
24. Dr. Col. (Retd.) Dhani RamShandil
25. Shri RamJ'iwani Singh
26. Shri C. Sreenivasan
27. Shri Vaiko
28. Dr. Jaswant Singh Yadav
29. Dr. (Smt.) Sudha Yadav

### *Rajya Sabha*

30. Shri V.N. Gadgil
31. Shri Suresh Kalinadi
32. Shri Kapil Sibal
33. Shri Suresh Pachouri
- \*34. Shri K.R. Malkani
35. Shri Nilotpai Basu

36. Shri Adhik Shirodkar
37. Shri Janeshwar Misra
38. Dr. Raja Ramanna
39. Shri S. Peter Alphons
40. Shri Shanker Roy Chowdhury
41. Dr. Y. Lakshmi Prasad
- \*\*42. Sardar Gurcharan Singh Tohra
- \*\*43. Shri T.N. Chaturvedi
- \*\*44. Smt. Ambika Soni

#### SECRETARIAT

1. Dr. A.K. Pandey — *Additional Secretary*
2. Shri P.D.T. Achary — *Joint Secretary*
3. Shri Ram Autar Ram — *Director*
4. Shri K.D. Muley — *Assistant Director*

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\* Ceased to be a Member of the Committee consequent upon his retirement from Rajya Sabha w.e.f. 27.1.2000.

\*\* Nominated w.e.f. 18.2.2000.

## INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman, Standing Committee on Defence (1999--2000) having been authorised by the Committee to submit the Report on their behalf, present this Second Report on Action Taken by Government on the recommendations contained in the Fourth Report of the Committee (Twelfth Lok Sabha) on the subject 'The Advanced Jet Trainer'.

2. The Fourth Report was presented to Lok Sabha/laid on the Table of Rajya Sabha on 25 February, 1999. The Government furnished their replies indicating action taken on the recommendations contained in the Report on 30 November, 1999. The Draft Report was considered and adopted by the Standing Committee of Defence (1999-2000) at their sitting held on 8 March, 2000.

3. An analysis of action taken by Government on recommendations contained in the Fourth Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (Twelfth Lok Sabha) is given in Appendix.

4. For facility of reference and convenience, the observations/ recommendations of the Committee have been printed in thick type in the body of the Report.

NEW DELHI;  
8 March, 2000  
18 Phalgun, 1921 (Saka)

DR. LAXMINARAYAN PANDEY  
*Chairman*  
*Standing Committee on Defence*

## CHAPTER I

### REPORT

This Report of the Standing Committee on Defence deals with the action taken by Government on the recommendations/observations contained in their Fourth Report (Twelfth Lok Sabha) on the Advanced Jet Trainer which was presented to Lok Sabha and laid on the table of Rajya Sabha on 25 February, 1999.

2. Action Taken Notes have been received from the Government in respect of all the 5 recommendations/observations contained in the Report. These have been categorised as follows:—

- (i) Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by Government—  
Sl. Nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5
- (ii) Recommendations/Observations which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of Government's replies:  
Nil
- (iii) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which replies of Government have not been accepted by the Committee:  
Sl. No. 1
- (iv) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which final replies of Government are still awaited:  
Nil

3. The Committee will now deal with the action taken by the Government on some of the recommendations in Chapter-1 of their Report.

#### **Recommendation (Sl. No. I, Para No. 30)**

#### **HAL'S suggestion & Government's inaction**

4. The Committee had pointed out that HAL in 1985 were asked to take on the AJT project. The Chairman, HAL requested the Government to shift the time frame *by* two years or contract the assistance of a proven design house from abroad since the HAL's resources were already committed to the development of LCA & ALH.

5. The Committee felt that the Government had very casually responded to the suggestions of HAL resulting in today's pathetic situation as regards the acquisition of

AJT. The Committee had therefore, recommended that the Government should identify all those who failed (i) to act on the suggestion of the HAL and (ii) to keep the parallel route of indigenous manufacture of AJT also alive at that time.

6. The Ministry, have replied that LCA and ALH projects being highly technically complex required a major portion of design and development resources of HAL to be exclusively earmarked for prolonged durations. The Air Headquarter deliberated at that time and opined that (i) Assignment of design and development of AJT aircraft at HAL, may put additional burden on the resources of HAL and would in turn affect the progress of LCA and ALH projects (ii) given the past performance of HAL, the overruns in the assigned project was likely.

7. The Air Headquarters, therefore, explored the trainer aircraft available in the world market at that time to meet its stage III training requirements. The Ministry have tried to justify their action by stating that LCA and ALH projects have already seen considerable delays and the situation would have been unacceptably stretched out if the AJT was also to be developed.

8. The Ministry have stated that additional projects such as design and development of Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT), a replacement of Kiran stage H trainer, upgradation of MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircraft and license production of SU-30 M.K. aircraft have been given to HAL. The Apex body in 1994 had taken a decision to manufacture one of the shortlisted *aircraft* under licence *at* HAL.

**9. The Committee note that the Air Headquarters had taken a decision to avoid the indigenous design and development route because they thought that the assignment of design and development of AJT aircraft at HAL may put additional burden on the resources of HAL and would in turn affect the progress of LCA and ALH projects and given the past performance of HAL the overruns in the assigned projects was likely. Whether such an assessment made by them was appropriate at that time needs to be examined. However, at a later stage they have been given additional responsibilities of design and development of Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) which is a replacement of Kiran stage II trainer, upgradation of MiG-21 and MiG-27 and licence production of the short listed AJT.**

**10. The Committee again reiterate that the Ministry should take appropriate action against those who did not allow the HAL to keep alive the indigenous design and development route for AJT and contract the assistance of a proven design house for this important job which has resulted in loss of precious lives and aircrafts over a period of 15 years since 1984 when the AST's were formulated.**

**Recommendation (SI. No. 4, Para No. 33)**

## **Frequent re-committal of the proposal to Committees/Technical Groups**

11. *The* Committee had noted that there was frequent recommittal of the proposal to acquire the AJT to various Committees/Technical Groups. The Air Staff Targets were framed in 1984 and as yet no decision on the acquisition of an AJT has been arrived at. The Committee had also felt that because of the indecision of the Government (i) the training of pilots had adversely suffered; (ii) many pilots got killed; and (iii) many aircrafts had been destroyed resulting in loss of crores of rupees in Indian currency and foreign exchange. The Committee had taken a serious view of the existing poor decision making mechanism of the Government for acquiring essential equipment for defence and recommended that Government take urgent measures to streamline the procedures laid down for selection, trial, acquisition and induction of all requisite equipment for defence so that the entire procedure laid down takes a reasonable time.

**12. The Ministry of Defence in their reply have justified the procedure adopted by them for acquisition of the AJT but they have not responded to the suggestion of streamlining the procedure laid down for selection, trial, acquisition and induction of all requisite equipment.**

**13. The Committee while reiterating their suggestions hope that the Ministry should adopt a procedure for acquisition of such equipments which are vital for the survival and competence of the Armed Forces of the country in such a manner that the entire procedure takes a very short period of time to short list a particular item, get it sanctioned by the appropriate authority and make acquisitions.**

### **Recommendation [SI. No. 5, Para No. 34 (a, b & c)]**

#### **Resource Mobilisation**

14. The Committee were critical of the fact that the Government constituted various technical committees and other groups for evaluating the AJT but on no single occasion any effort had been made to specially and exclusively study the feasibility of funding the project.

15. The Committee desired an early decision on the acquisition of the Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) and also strongly recommended licence production of the AJT while keeping alive a parallel route of designing and developing of a futuristic AJT.

16. The Ministry have replied that the annual fund allocations for the project are possible only when the complete details are finalised. Since the commercial negotiations were still in the preliminary stages, the fund allocation had not been done at that stage.

17. The Ministry of Defence have further informed that the Stage-in training of IAF pilots is presently being conducted using MiG-21 trainers and adequate number of MiG-21 trainers had been made available to ensure that training requirements were being met.

**18. The Committee feel that many precious lives and aircrafts have already been lost as a result of the lack of a proper trainer aircraft for Stage-111 training and therefore, acquisition of the best available Advanced Jet Trainer be given top priority and adequate funding should be made for the same. At the same time the Committee reiterate that a parallel route for indigenous design and development of a futuristic AJT be kept alive so that in the next 20 years or so, the IAF is again not left without an adequate trainer.**

## CHAPTER II

### RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT

#### **Recommendation (SI. No. 2, Para No. 31)**

##### **Viability of short-listed options**

The Government have admitted that the Hunters which belonged to the vintage of 1950s have been phased out. They have further admitted that the MiG-21s, which belong to the vintage of 1960s, are in the extended period of operation and their extension of life cannot be further stretched. Of the short-listed options, the Alpha Jet of the French belongs to the vintage of 1960s and the Hawk of the British belongs to the vintage of 1970s. At the time when both short-listed options were first found technically viable in 1986, even if Hawk was to be seriously considered. Hawk had an advantage of only 10 years over the outdated MiGs as well as the Alpha Jet. Alpha Jet whose vintage is as old as MiG-21s, even today appears to be a live option with the Government. 12 years have passed since the Government made out their first affirmation in favour of the short-listed options. The Special Committee on Flight Safety (1982) while spelling out the characteristics of the Advanced Jet Trainer for the IAF and recommending its urgent induction for training purposes opined that the new system could be viable for 20-25 years. This 20-25 years period, if computed from the day the Special Committee gave their report, comes to a close in 2002-2007. The Committee therefore gravely doubt whether the options shortlisted in 1986 of the designs of the vintages of 1960s and 1970s would meet our training requirements upto the first quarter of the millennium ahead especially national resources, in enormous quantities, are to be applied for the acquisition. The Committee is of the opinion that the Government was, from the beginning, concentrating and seriously examining only the Hawk and Alpha Jet options. The Committee is therefore constrained to express their serious displeasure over the failure of the Government, to undertake proper paper and flight evaluations of all other technologically superior options so that the frugal resources of the nation are not, by fault, invested in any weak and unviable option. The Committee thus recommended to the Government to urgently valuate all other options that have come into the market for the purpose of taking a decision in regard to the acquisition/manufacture of the AJT for the IAF.

## **Reply of the Government**

Air HQ had carried out comprehensive evaluation of many of the leading trainer aircraft available in the world market at that time. The aircraft considered for the purpose were SA-IOI CASA Aviojet, Aeromacchi MB-339A, Italian SIA Marchetti S-211, Czech L-39, British Hawk, AlphaJet, Kiran Mark-11, MiG-21/29 derivatives, SU-25, TF-5 and the Ajeet trainer. After evaluating the above-mentioned aircraft against the ASK 3/87, British Hawk and French Alouette were the two aircraft short-listed. A special committee was appointed in July 90 under chairmanship of the then SA to KM and the DCAS, PA (DS), Chairman HAL and JS (Air) were members. The Committee was required to examine the various options for the AJT and recommend the type of trainer to be inducted. After evaluating the available options, the Committee had recommended short-listing of Hawk and Alouette aircraft.

The aircraft listed above other than Hawk and Alouette, had been found unsuitable at the preliminary evaluation itself, because of not meeting some of the essential parameters of ASK such as Max speed, Rate of Climb, Mach No, External load carrying capacity, powered controls, stall behaviour, etc. The trainer aircraft that came into the world market subsequently had improvements in the avionics systems only, and not in terms of the basic flying characteristics stipulated for the stage-III flying training of IAF.

Even after short-listing the Hawk and Alouette and while the procurement processes are in hand, newer options as and when they came up have also been examined by the Air HQ. Aircraft such as MiG-AT, YAK-130, Aeromacchi MB-339 FD from Italy, and L-59 from Czech Republic were evaluated by Air HQ in the last couple of years and found unsuitable as they did not meet certain parameters of ASR.

The Alouette and Hawk aircraft, though originally designed in 60s and 70s respectively, are the only two aircraft, which have met the maximum number of parameters of Air Staff Requirements for the AJT. The aeroengine of the Hawk has been since upgraded by BAe to incorporate the latest advances in the technology. The aeroengine of the Alouette, is current in technology as is evident from the fact that it has been selected to power Russian MiG-AT currently under development. Air HQ has reviewed the avionics configuration of the AJT from time to time so that it would have a large commonality with upgraded MiG versions, SU-30 as well as avionics systems of western origin aircraft like Jaguar and Mirage. Therefore, the short-listed aircraft, which continue to be in operation with several Air Forces of the leading countries in the world, can meet the training requirements of IAF for next 25 years.

[MOD O.M. 1348/US/D (Air) 1/99 dt. 30th Nov. 1999]

### **Recommendation (SI. No. 3, Para No. 32)**

#### **Review of Air Staff Target/Requirements**

The Committee was informed that pursuant to the recommendations of the Special Committee on Flight Safety (1982), Air Staff Targets/Requirements were fixed and notified in 1984. The Air Staff Targets were formulated on the basis of the recommendations made by the Special Committee in regard to pilot training in IAF. The Special Committee in their report (1982) had prescribed an optimised training model for the IAF on the then existing conditions and state-of-the-art the model was considered relevant for 10 years. The Report categorically stated that the model was not to be treated as a binding philosophy for longer periods. Despite these recommendations, the Committee are pained to note that there had not been any purposeful review of the training model after adopting it for 10 years from the angle of suitability of its further continuance after examining all relevant inputs, including the rate of air accidents due to Human Errors (A), the decadal average etc. Since such a review had not been undertaken by the Government, the Air Staff Targets/Requirements formulated in 1984 remained surprisingly static when all other tertiary activities in this direction like considering and keeping on evaluating whatever options that came on the way *vis-a-vis* the already shortlisted options, were at their peak. The Government did not even think that, during the long period when shortlisted options and other options underwent scrutiny and re-scrutiny, it was all the more necessary to review the training model and consequently the review of the Air Staff Target itself, which is the basis on which options should have been evaluated. The training module and the AST remained static much against the recommendations of the Special Committee on Flight Safety despite the fact that the threats from neighbouring Air Force were on the increase. The Committee, therefore, recommended to the Government to seriously and urgently consider the question of reviewing the existing training model of IAF pilots and the Air Staff Target/Requirements for the AJT and also undertake a periodic review of the same thereafter.

#### **Reply of the Government**

Air HQ had undertaken the review of the training model of IAF pilots, based on recommendations of the Special Committee on Flight Safety in late 1980s. The AST-204 was issued in Mar. 1984 and Air Staff Requirements (ASR) 3/87 for AJT were issued in Dec. 1987. The model for flying training has been reviewed periodically at regular intervals for optimum results. Pratap Rao Committee in 1991 and Rathore Committee in 1994 had carried out a comprehensive study. The Rathore Committee recommended rationalisation of the quantum of flying to be carried out in each stage, to remove the element of excessive pace training and emphasised the reintroduction of applied stage with respect to only those trainees selected for the fighter stream. The Rathore Committee recommended continuance of Stage-111 training in the present set up till it becomes feasible to have the complete pilot training scheme under HQ Training Command. The

flying training syllabus was revised in mid 1995 to enhance the effectiveness of Stage-11 training. In another such review of training model in early 1996, a decision was taken to reintroduce the applied stage of training by activating a new base (Bhita), for the conduct of a part of Stage-1 training, thereby generating the additional airspace required for the applied stage training. This change has helped to consolidate the pupils selected for the fighter stream in role oriented exercises before they proceeded for Stage-111 training at MiG Operational Flying Training Unit (MOFTU) at Tezpur. The New Training Pattern has been approved by the MoD till June 2001, subject to review on induction of AJT. All the above mentioned reviews emphasised the need for Stage-111 training.

The first review of ASR was carried out by Air HQ in May 1989 itself and did not suggest any changes. The ASRs for AJT have since been reviewed from time to time and majority of the ASR parameters were found valid and did not warrant changes. During one of such reviews in February 1999, Air HQ has categorised the 'spinnability' criteria of AJT as desirable parameter instead of an essential parameter. It is therefore ascertained that the ASRs for AJT, though formulated in 1987 have since been periodically reviewed and found to be in confirmation with the training philosophy of IAF. From time to time the SOP in terms of avionics has been reviewed to ensure that we have the latest technology and similarity with front line operational aircraft.

[MOD O.M. 1348/US/D (Air) 1/99 dt. 30th Nov. 1999]

### **Recommendation (SI. No. 4, Para No. 33)**

#### **Frequent re-committal of the proposal to Committees/Technical Groups**

The chronology of efforts of the Government towards acquiring the AJT of the specifications laid down in the Air Staff target in 1984, shows that the Government, after issuing the first dispatch of the request for proposal to the two shortlisted vendors (Alpha Jet and Hawk) in April 1986, subjected the proposal to Technical Committee/High Level Expert Committee/Apex groups and other such bodies as frequently as possible to keep the time going up to this hour thereby incurring a time over run of nearly one and half decades. The cost over runs has also consequently got hiked. The Committee feel that the Government had been indulging in this procrastinative technique of committing and re-committing the matter ad nauseum to various Technical Committees and other bodies with a view to wash their hands off the matter albeit for frequent temporary durations. The Committee also feels that this deplorable methodology was being adopted by the Government for inventing alibis for explaining the unpardonable delay in making efforts towards materialisation of the project. This had happened despite the Government's admission that the non-availability of an Advanced Jet Trainer continues to take a heavy toll in terms of training related accidents. The Committee feel that because of the indecision of the Government (i) the training of the pilots had adversely suffered, (ii) many pilots got killed and (iii) many aircraft got destroyed resulting in loss of crores of

rupees in Indian currency and foreign exchange. The Committee take a serious view of the existing poor decision making mechanism of the Government for acquiring essential equipment for defence and recommend that Government take urgent measures to streamline the procedures laid down for selection, trial, acquisition and induction of all requisite equipment for defence so that the entire procedure so laid down takes a very reasonable time.

### **Reply of the Government**

The training philosophy of any Air Force differs from country to country, and similarly the trainer aircraft needed for the purpose. It is in this context a cautious approach was adopted for selection of a suitable aircraft for the IAF against its specifications. The procurement process has further become complicated due to the large number of aircraft required and the budgetary estimates amounting to several thousands of crores. Any procurement of new equipment for services is primarily guided by the operational requirements. While considering the selection of AJT aircraft for IAF, the other important guiding factor had been retention of maximum work content for the HAL.

After HAL had conveyed its inability to indigenously develop AJT, Request for proposals (RFPs) were sent to M/s BAe and M/s DA in October 86. The proposals were received in Dec. 86. After studying the proposals, clarifications were sought from the vendors and consultations were held on technical aspects. The procurement process was interrupted at this stage, due to the American offer of TF-5 aircraft. In view of the additional options on AJT, the issue of short-listing suitable aircraft was referred to a high level committee headed by SA to RM in July 1990. The Committee submitted its report in April 1991 recommending the Hawk and Alphajet as shortlisted aircraft. Prime Minister approved seeking of fresh proposals from the short-listed vendors in Dec. 1991 and fresh RFPs were sent in February 1992. The Cabinet Committee approved procurement of AJT in August 1993 and constituted Apex body for monitoring the procurement of AJT and also the Negotiating Committee. A Technical Working Group (TWG) was formed to finalise the Standard of Preparation (SOP) of the aircraft; the TWG submitted its report in Mar. 1994. Based on the finalised SOP, HAL was asked to prepare a Detailed Project Report and Budgetary estimates for licence production of short-listed aircraft. HAL submitted the Detailed Project Report in July 1985, based on which commercial negotiations were held with M/s BAe and M/s DA in February 1996 and February 1997 respectively. While Bae declined to offer any tangible concessions, M/s DA did not responded to the arguments put forward by us *on* the topics such as Level of Technical Assistance, Integration of Lit Instruments, Costs of Air Prairie, Engine and accessories, and Translation of documents. M/s DA had promised to revert to us in a month's time after they had carried out an examination of our cost evaluation

of various elements, but there was no response from them on this issue. It was also felt that the cost of accessories was marked up considerably by both the vendors on their sub-vendor costs. In order to explore the possibility of undertaking the indigenous/licence production of accessories a joint MOD/HAL preliminary study was undertaken in Mar. 1997. It was opined that consultations with sub vendors were necessary to obtain data on accessories, for further analysis. During the period of 1998-99 several fresh offers though unsolicited were received. These are MiG MAPO's MiG-AT, Aeromacchi MB-339 FD and Czech Republic's L-59 aircraft. Even though the data made available was restrictive in nature, a paper evaluation was carried out by Air HQ and it was found that these aircraft did not meet many of the essential requirements of ASR. Air HQ had carried out a review of Avionics suit of AJT in light of the recent technological advances in the field, and finalised the SOP. Based on the finalised SOP and recommendation of Air HQ, RFP was floated on 20 July 1999 to the two vendors. On 10 September 1999 (Last day for submission of proposal), only British Aerospace submitted their proposal. Before any decision could be taken. Chief of Air Staff wrote for revised RFPs to be issued to both the vendors again to avoid single vendor situation. The issue is under consideration.

[MOD O.M. 1348/US/D Air-1/99 dt. 30th Nov. 1999]

### **Comments of the Committee**

(Please see Para Nos. 12 & 13 of Chapter I of the Report)

### **Recommendations [SI. No. 5 (a), Para No. 34 (a)]**

#### **Resource Mobilisation**

During the 14 years period since the first AST was cast for the AJT, the Government constituted various Technical Committees and other groups for evaluating the options for the AJT before them. On no single occasion, any effort had been made to specially and exclusively study the feasibilities of funding the project. This bears open the lack of honest intentions of the Government in acquiring the AJT for the IAF. Except making projections in the Eighth and Ninth Defence Plans, attention to the area of financing the project in a concentrated manner was not paid by the Government.

## **Reply of the Government**

Operational requirements of the Services are the prime factor for allotment of financial resources by MoD. The capital acquisitions planned for the IAF are undertaken based on the prioritised Modernization Plan drawn by Air HQ. They also indicate the fund allocation requirements for undertaking the schemes listed in the Modernization plan, which in turn again depend on the operational requirements of the IAF. These plans are then examined by the Finance division of the MoD in conjunction with Air HQ which culminates into the finalised projection of the resources required.

The annual fund allocations for the project are possible only when the complete details are finalised. The information such as total project layout, Foreign Exchange element, details of advance payments, Schedule of structured payments and credit terms are available only on completion of commercial negotiations. In the case of project of such magnitude like AJT procurement, which would spread over a period of 6-7 years, all the above issues have to be finalised before firm allocation of funds can be made. Since the commercial negotiations were still in the preliminary stages, the fund allocation was not done at that stage.

[MOD O.M. 1348/US/D (Air) 1/99 dt. 30th Nov. 1999]

## **Comments of the Committee**

(Please see Para No. 18 of Chapter I of the Report)

### **Recommendation [SI. No. 5 (b) & (c), Para No. 35 (b) & (c)]**

(b) On the kind of sacrifice the IAF pilots are called upon to make the Committee were informed that in case of an emergency or something goes wrong with the aircraft, the instructions are that first the pilot should try to control the ac as long as he has got sufficient height and time available, he must, make an attempt to save the ac. Second, he must, during this process, steer the aircraft away from the populated area. Third, he must save himself. In all emergencies, the pilot first endeavours to save the ac, then the people underneath and finally he ejects. One of such emergencies when an IAF pilot puts his life third in order to the national resources invested in the ac and the precious lives of the civil population of the ground who he always defends, is very frequently created for want of an Advanced Jet Trainer for Stage-111 training.

(c) The Government on the other hand appear to be showing no keen interest in the matter. The fact that for more than around one and a half decade that they had not been able to translate the demand of the IAF into reality but were on a spree of scrutinising and re-scrutinising options before them through Committee/Groups speaks volumes for their monumental misdirection of their efforts. The Committee, therefore, recommended that, as the acquisition of the AJT for the IAF brooks no delay, the Government should within the Shortest possible time mobilise the requisite resources clinch one of the options before them, old or fresh, without losing further time. The option chosen should match the parameters laid down in the AST, as quickly reviewed, so that the Trainers inducted for the Stage-111 training in the IAF serve the Force for at least a quarter of a century to come. The Committee also strongly recommends that the Government in addition to urgently acquiring/licence producing the AJT should keep the parallel channel of designing and developing a futuristic AJT for the IAF through the HAL or other indigenous source, alive.

### **Reply of the Government**

The stage-ill training of IAF pilots is presently being conducted using MiG-21 trainers. Adequate number of MiG-21 aircraft have been made available to ensure that the training requirement of the pilots is met. However, MoD is in agreement with the Standing Committee's views on need for early induction of AJT aircraft into IAF. The procurement process is being expedited.

[MOD O.M. 1348/US/D (Air) 1/99 dt. 30th Nov. 1999]

## **CHAPTER III**

**RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS WHICH THE COMMITTEE  
DO NOT DESIRE TO PURSUE IN VIEW OF  
THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLIES**

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH REPLIES OF GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COMMITTEE**

#### **Recommendation (SI. No. I, Para No. 30)**

##### **HAL'S suggestion and Government's inaction**

In September, 1985, when the Government asked the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to undertake the design and development of the AJT, the then Chairman, HAL requested the Government to shift the time frame by two years or to contract the assistance of a proven design house from abroad since the HAL'S resources were already committed to the development of LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) and ALH (Advanced Light Helicopter). The Government knowing fully well the nature of protracted processes involved in various other options before them clearly lacked vision in failing to heed to the advice of the HAL. The Committee feels that the Government had very casually responded to the suggestions of the HAL resulting in today's pathetic situation as regards acquisition of the AJT. The Committee, therefore, recommended that the Government identify those at the decision making level who failed (i) to act on the suggestions of the HAL given to the Government in September, 1985 and (ii) to keep the suggestions alive as a parallel route towards the acquisition of AJT when all other options were actively considered over a period of 13 years that followed for initiating appropriate proceedings against them for dereliction of duty towards the nation.

##### **Reply of the Government**

The indigenous development/production has always been one of the primary considerations while selecting the AJT aircraft. Soon after the Air Staff Targets (AST) were formulated by Air HQ in 1984-85, the AST was initially sent only to HAL and not to any foreign agency. HAL however expressed their inability to take up the project within the stipulated time period, due to their preoccupation with the LCA and ALH projects. LCA and ALH projects being highly technically complex required a major portion of Design and Development resources of HAL to be exclusively earmarked for prolonged duration. Air HQ deliberated at that time and opined that:

- (i) Assignment of Design and Development of AJT aircraft to HAL, may put additional burden on the resources of HAL and could in turn affect the progress of LCA and ALH projects.
- (ii) Given the past performance of HAL, the overruns in the assigned project are likely.

Considering the above facts at that time it was felt that, indigenous design and development would not meet the requirement of IAF. Therefore, Air HQ explored the trainer aircraft available in the world market at that time, to meet its Stage-III training requirements. After a comprehensive evaluation of a variety of trainer aircraft, British Aerospace (BAe) Hawk and Dassault Aviations (DA) Alphajet were short-listed for acquisition. It may be mentioned in this context that, even with full commitment of its resources for the design and development of LCA and ALH by HAL, these two projects have already seen considerable delays. The situation could have been unacceptably stretched out if AJT was also to be developed.

Later, when the pressure on the Design and Development resources of HAL eased up, the Design and Development of Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT), which is a replacement of 'Kiran' Stage-II trainer, has been assigned to HAL. The other projects which are to be undertaken by HAL now are serial upgradation of MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircraft and licence production of SU-30 MK aircraft. The Apex body in 1994 had taken a decision to manufacture one of the short-listed aircraft under licence at HAL. The gestation period for indigenous design and development of an aircraft such as AJT could be nearly a decade and involves large design resources and expenditure. Therefore, having taken an approach of manufacturing one of the short-listed aircraft at HAL, the parallel option of indigenous development was not considered viable by the Government.

It has been the endeavour of the Government to utilise the indigenous production infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, even in the case of AJT project. The Apex body formed to monitor the progress of AJT project had thus decided the mode of procurement of AJT through licence production at HAL by transfer of technology. Therefore, from value addition point of view, HAL'S production facilities would be fully utilised even in the envisaged licenced manufacture approach.

[MOD O.M. 1348/US/D (Air) 1/99 dt. 30th Nov. 1999]

### **Comments of the Committee**

(Please *see* Para Nos. 9 & 10 of Chapter I of the Report)

## CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH  
FINAL REPLIES OF GOVERNMENT STILL AWAITED

NIL

NEW DELHI ;  
March 8, 2000  
Phaguna 18, 1921 (Saka)

DR. LAXMINARAYAN PANDEY  
*Chairman*  
Standing Committee on Defence

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
DEFENCE (1999-2000)

The Committee sat on Wednesday, the 8th March, 2000 from 1500 hrs. to 1545 hrs. to consider and adopt draft reports on (i) Action taken by Government on recommendations contained in Eighth Report of the Committee (12th Lok Sabha) on Demands for Grants (1999-2000) of Ministry of Defence, and (ii) Action taken by Government on recommendations contained in Fourth Report (12th Lok Sabha) on Advanced Jet Trainer.

PRESENT

Dr. Laxminarayan Pandey—*Chairman*

MEMBERS

*Lok Sabha*

2. Shri S. Bangarappa
3. Col. (Retd.) Sona Ram Choudhary
4. Smt. Sangeeta Kumari Singh Deo
5. Shri Jarborn Gamlin
6. Shri Vinod Khanna
7. Shri Hannan Mollah
8. Shri Gajendra Singh Rajukhedi
9. Prof. Rasa Singh Rawat
10. Dr. Col. (Retd.) Dhani Ram Shandil

*Rajya Sabha*

11. Shri Kapil Sibal
12. Shri Adhik Shirodkar
13. Dr. Raja Ramanna
14. Shri Shankar Roy Choudhury
15. Smt. Ambika Soni

SECRETARIAT

- |                       |   |                             |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| 1. Dr. A.K. Pandey    | — | <i>Additional Secretary</i> |
| 2. Shri P.D.T. Achary | — | <i>Joint Secretary</i>      |
| 3. Shri Ram Autar Ram | — | <i>Director</i>             |
| 4. Shri K.D. Muley    | — | <i>Assistant Director</i>   |

2. The Committee took up for consideration the draft report on action taken by Government on recommendations contained in the Eighth report of the Committee (Twelfth Lok Sabha) on Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence for the year 1999-2000 and draft report on action taken by Government on recommendations contained in Fourth Report on Advanced Jet Trainer and deliberated on some of the recommendations made therein.

3. The Committee adopted the Reports.

4. The Committee then authorised the Chairman to finalise both the Reports for presentation to Parliament.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

## APPENDIX

### ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOURTH REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (TWELFTH LOK SABHA) ON THE ADVANCED JET TRAINER

		Percentage of Total
(i) Total number of recommendations	5	
(ii) Recommendations/Observations which have been accepted by Government ( <i>vide</i> recommendations at SI. Nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5)	4	80
(iii) Recommendations/Observations which the Committee do not desire to pursue in view of Government's replies	Nil	
(iv) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which Government's replies have not been accepted by the Committee ( <i>vide</i> recommendations at SI. No. 1)	1	20
(v) Recommendations/Observations in respect of which final replies of Government are still awaited	Nil	