

**GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
SHIPPING
LOK SABHA**

UNSTARRED QUESTION NO:1788

ANSWERED ON:07.03.2011

COLLISION OF SHIPS

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Will the Minister of SHIPPING be pleased to state:

- (a) the details of incidents of collision between ships/vessels in Indian coastal water during the last two years;
- (b) if so, the details of casualties and other losses suffered on this account during the above period;
- (c) whether any enquiry conducted in the matter;
- (d) if so, the details thereof and the action taken thereon;
- (e) whether the Government has evolved some guidelines to prevent such collisions in future; and
- (f) if so, the details thereof alongwith shipping practices being followed by the International Shipping comity for prevention of such collisions?

Answer

MINISTER OF SHIPPING (SHRI G.K. VASAN)

(a) & (b): On the Indian coast, there have been a total of 5 major collisions in the last 2 years. The details are as under:-

Sl.No. Name of Ship Date of Incidents/ Location Remarks

1. M.V. "Global Purity"/ ICG Vivek 23/3/2010 Mumbai Port Collision with ICGS "Vivek" while turning in the basin, resulting in capsizing of ICGS "Vivek".
Flag Panama
2. M.V. "MSC Chitra" 7/8/2010 Mumbai Port Collision with M.V. "Khalijia 3"
Flag Panama
3. M.V. Green Valley & M.V. Tiger Spring 23/11/2010 Hoogly River, Collision while vessels transiting in Kolkata Hoogly river. M.V. Tiger Spring inward & M.V. Green Valley outbound. There was no loss of life, personal injury or Fire.
Flag Bahamas & Gibraltar
4. M.V. YM America Flag 16/12/2010 20.16.0 N Collision with F.V. Odhari Krupa, F/V 071.08.0 E Sunk. Out of 7 crew members 6 crew rescued and 1 crew missing.
Taiwan
5. M.V. Nord lake & INS Vindhyagiri (F 42) 30/1/2011 Mumbai Port Collision in Mumbai Shipping Channel
Cyprus and Indian

(c) & (d): Yes, Madam. The details are annexed.

(e) & (f): Yes, Madam. Ships are manned by duly certified persons in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping (STCW), 1978, as amended and ships are navigated as per International Convention on Collision avoidance Regulation at Sea, (COLREGS) 1972, as amended from time to time. Vessels visiting Indian ports are

mandatorily required to take local pilots for entering/leaving ports. These pilots are trained and certified by the concerned ports.

All concerned are notified through DGS circulars, about the findings of casualty investigation. Corrective actions are taken by concerned stakeholders.

Navigational aids (lights and shades) on Indian coast are displayed in accordance with the requirements of International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). Lights and Signals erected on the Indian coast are maintained by Directorate General of Lighthouses and Lights (DGLL). In the port areas, the port authorities are responsible for such lights. Similarly, navigation charts for the port and Indian coast are published by the National Hydrographic Office.

In ports, the safety of navigation is governed by rules made by ports under the provisions of Indian ports Act. In Non-major ports, safety of navigation is regulated by certificates issued by Navigational Safety in Port Committee (NSPC), a Committee formed through an executive order of Ministry of Shipping. In major ports, the conservator (Board of Trustee) of port regulates safety of navigation. Internationally, apart from strict adherence to International Convention on Collision avoidance, traffic in heavy density areas is regulated by Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)/Vessel Traffic Management Services (VTMS)/Traffic separation Schemes (TSS).

ANNEXURE

I Collision between MV NORD LAKE and INS "VIDHYAGIRI" (F42)

1. At 1600 hrs (IST) on 30th January, 2011, merchant ships (M.V. "Nord Lake" and M.V. "Sea Eagle") were transiting the main navigation channel of Mumbai port. At the same time a naval convoy of about dozen ships were returning back to naval port after an exercise. Naval vessel were transiting the channel and turning in the naval dock yard. There were also the families of naval officers/ratings on these ships.

2. Apparently, it appears that a communication gap/communication misunderstanding between vessels, M.V. "Nord Lake" an outbound vessel from JNPT and M.V. "Sea Eagle" inbound vessel from sea for JNPT. Both the vessels had JNPT pilots on board. As result of communication gap, two merchant ships nearly collided with each other. While averting the collision with inbound ship (M.V. "Sea Eagle"), the out bound vessel (M.V. "Nord Lake") collided with naval vessel INS "VIDHYAGIRI" (F42), which was in the middle of inbound naval convoy. The collision occurred at 1638 hrs near Middles ground in Mumbai Main Navigation Channel. During the accident, visibility was moderate.

3. The Directorate has ordered Preliminary Investigation through Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Department, Mumbai. Also Flag State of M.V. "Nord Lake", Cyprus has been invited as substantially Interested State to participate in the investigation carried out by MMD Mumbai in view of international obligation under IMO Casualty Investigation Code effective since 01st January, 2010

4. Causes:

4.1 Primary cause appears to be lack of communication and navigation protocol between naval ships and merchant ships in MbPT channel. The technology, communication, training, resources, SOP etc have not kept pace with increase in traffic in the MbPT channel. However, final report is awaited.

II. Collision between MV Green Valley and MV Tiger Spring in Hooghly River

1. At 1134 on 23rd Nov-10, the Bahamas registered container vessel M.V. Green Valley collided with the Gibraltar registered container ship M.V. Tiger Spring at Eastern Gut in Hoogly River, while both vessels had Hooghly River Pilots on board.

1.1 The bow of M.V. Green Valley hit the mid-ship section of M.V. Tiger Spring at almost perpendicular direction to her stbd side. M.V. Green Valley sustained damages to her bow i.e. Forepeak tank, bulbous bow and rupture of forward collision bulk head, resulting in flooding of Forepeak tank and bow thruster room.

1.2 M.V. Tiger Spring suffered damages in her No. 2 & 3 holds which were breached. Subsequent to the collision, the Pilot of M.V. Green Valley dropped her stbd anchor and later heaved anchor and shifted her position to safe waters away from M.V. Tiger Spring. Pilot of M.V. Tiger Spring beached the vessel at nearby shoal area, off Hooghly point, to prevent sinking of M.V. Tiger Spring in the navigational channel. There was no Loss of life, personal injury or Fire. Oil sheen was observed soon after collision.

2. The collision was primarily caused due to uncontrolled swinging of M.V. Tiger Spring toward M.V. Green Valley in very close proximity and the presence of both ship at same time in Easter Gut area, which has a very sharp bend where maneuvering the vessels becomes complicated due to effect of changing current direction.

3. Recommendations: a. To ensure effective communications between the Pilot and the bridge team is maintained.

b. To extend coverage of VTS to the entire length of navigable river.

c. Kolkata Port Trust (KoPT) to undertake risk analysis of their operational waters and review their contingency planning of the port for better response.

d. All visiting ships should have local updated navigational charts.

III. Collision between MSC Chitra & Khalijia 3

1.1 On 7th August 2010, M.V.'MSC Chitra' and MV. 'Khalijia 3' collided in the approach channel of Mumbai Port. At the time of the

collision 'MSC Chitra' was outbound from Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) while 'Khalijia 3' was inbound to Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT), from W-I anchorage of Mumbai Harbour. Consequent to the collision, both vessels sustained severe damage. 'MSC Chitra' immediately began taking in water as her hull was breached on the port side. She veered off northwards and finally ran aground just outside the approach channel. M.V. 'Khalijia 3' sustained damages to her forecastle and bulbous bow, but remained stable and eventually berthed alongside at BPX jetty of Mumbai Port. There were no injuries to any persons, neither on the two vessels nor on any other water craft.

1.2 A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Mercantile Marine Department, Mumbai, under the provision of Section 359 of Merchant Shipping Act. A copy of the Preliminary Inquiry report was subsequently forwarded to the Ministry of Shipping on 26th October, 2010

1.3 Ministry of Shipping, vide letter No. SR-13014/13/2010-MG dated 8.12.2010, constituted a committee under the Chairmanship of the Capt. P.V.K. Mohan, Chairman, National Shipping Board to examine the recommendations given in the Preliminary Inquiry report.

2. Recommendations

2.1 Corrective actions to be taken By Directorate General of Shipping, Mumbai. a. Certificate of Competency of both Masters should be suspended, for specified period, to be decided by the Chief Examiner of Master of Maters, as per the provisions of the MS(Cancellation or Suspension of Certificate) Rules, 2003.

b. The Document of Compliance (DOC) issued to technical managers be forthwith suspended/ withdrawn.

c. Flow of information between Ports and the regulatory authority for safety i.e. Directorate General of Shipping should be further streamlined so that cases of unseaworthy ships are well reported to DGS by the ports, whose pilots are the first person who board the incoming vessel into their port.

2.2 Corrective actions to be taken by MbPT and JNPT:

a. The on-going proposal of JNPT and MbPT for widening of pilot boarding area is to be expedited.

b. Additional navigational aids such as Fairway buoy, transit lights, and navigational buoys (with Racons) at every turn of the channel should be installed.

c. Manning, training and qualification of operators and supervisors of VTS should be as per the international norms.

d. Vessel Traffic Service(VTS) equipment should be upgraded to better technology which has features such as 'guard range' etc so that audible and visual alarms could alert the VTS operator for impending collision.

e. A VTS authority under the MbPT should be formed which will provide pilot service for the entire length of approach channel i.e. the MbPT and also the JNPT stretch, to ensure the seamless flow of information under one authority.

2.3 General instructions for all ports:

a. A voluntary review of navigational safety in all ports should be undertaken by the Navigational Safety in Port Committee (NSPC) should be extended to include all major ports, as well, so that navigational safety of both MbPT and JNPT is audited by an external oversight body.

b. Government should identify such person/authority and make appropriate amendments in the legislative instruments. In UK, such authority is vested with 'Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP).

c. There is a need to restructure the decision making hierarchy in the port organizational structure to include a person of seafaring background with domain knowledge of cargo, navigation and safety issues so as to serve as bridge between the traffic depart and the marine department. This could be best achieved by including the said experience/qualifications as desirable qualifications of Dy. Chairman of the Port.

d. An independent casualty investigation agency be formed which should be staffed with 4-6 permanent officers and with provision for co-opting industry experts on job specific requirements. The agency should directly report to Ministry of Shipping. Subsequent to Mangalore air disaster, similar system is being formed by DGCA.

e. Considering that both the vessels were very old (MSC Chitra being 31 years and M.V. Khalijia being 25 years old), it is recommended to ban entry of over 25 years old ships into Indian ports unless such ships are certified under classification societies which are members of IACS.