

# COMMITTEE OF PRIVILEGES

## FOURTH REPORT

(THIRD LOK SABHA)

(Presented on the 30th March, 1966)



LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT  
NEW DELHI

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# PERSONNEL OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVILEGES

## CHAIRMAN

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

## MEMBERS

2. Shri N. C. Chatterjee
3. Shri P. K. Ghosh
4. Sardar Kapur Singh
5. Shri Nihar Ranjan Laskar
6. Shri H. N. Mukerjee
7. Shri V. C. Parashar
8. Shri Purushottamdas R. Patel
- \*9. Shri C. R. Pattabhi Raman
- \*\*10. Shri Jaganath Rao
11. Shrimati Yashoda Reddy
12. Shri Asoke K. Sen
13. Shri Satya Narayan Sinha
14. Shri Sumat Prasad
15. Shri Indulal Kanaiyalal Yajnik

## SECRETARIAT

Shri M. C. Chawla—*Deputy Secretary.*

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\*Nominated on the 22nd February, 1966, vice Shri Sachindra Chaudhuri resigned.

\*\*Nominated on the 22nd February, 1966, vice Shri Shivram Rango Rane resigned.

## FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVILEGES

(Third Lok Sabha)

### I—INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURE

1. The Chairman of the Committee of Privileges, having been authorised to submit the report on their behalf, present this report to the House on the question of privilege raised<sup>1</sup> by Shri V. C. Shukla, M.P., and referred<sup>2</sup> to the Committee by the House, on the 29th November, 1965, against Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., for having alleged *mala fides* against the Speaker, Lok Sabha, in a Writ Petition filed by him before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court, New Delhi.

2. The Committee held six sittings.

3. At the first sitting held on the 9th December, 1965, the Committee decided that Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., might be allowed time to submit his written statement to the Committee by the 10th February, 1966, and also to appear before the Committee personally to explain the position, as requested by him.

4. At the second sitting held on the 19th February, 1966, the Committee considered the written statement submitted by Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P. and decided to call him to appear before the Committee at their next sitting.

5. At the third and fourth sittings held on the 4th and 18th March, 1966, Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., was examined by the Committee.

6. At the fifth sitting held on the 21st March, 1966, the Committee deliberated on the matter and came to their conclusions.

7. At the sixth sitting held on the 24th March, 1966, the Committee considered their draft report and adopted it.

### II—FACTS OF THE CASE

8. Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., in para 10 of a Civil Writ Petition<sup>3</sup> filed before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at New Delhi, against the Union of India, the Speaker of Lok Sabha and others, had *inter alia* stated:

“That the day the petitioner received the above reply, there was an uproarious scene in the Lok Sabha and the petitioner was suspended from the service of Lok Sabha for two weeks on the Motion moved by the Minister for

1. L. S. Deb. dt. 11-5-1965, cc. 14303-304; *ibid.* dt. 18-8-1965, cc. 693-98; *ibid.* dt. 29-11-1965, cc. 4399-4427.

2. L. S. Deb. dt. 29-11-1965, cc. 4399-4427.

3. Civil Writ Petition No. 231-D/65, dt. 30-4-65. In his Writ Petition, Shri Madhu Limaye had challenged the decision of the Speaker, Lok Sabha, disallowing certain Cut Motions.

Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Satya Narain Sinha, supported by the Leader of the House, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. The action of the Speaker in naming the petitioner and of Mr. Satya Narain Sinha in moving the aforesaid motion for his suspension was not only against the Rules but *mala fide*, as he was punished for raising the question of discussing the Secretariat Demands and for his having moved Cut Motions in that connection."

9. On the 11th May, 1965, the Speaker informed<sup>1</sup> the House that he had received notices of a question of privilege from Shri V. C. Shukla, Sardar Amar Singh Saigal and others in respect of the allegations made by Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., against the Speaker, Lok Sabha, in the Writ Petition filed by him before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at New Delhi. The Speaker, however, observed that he would keep the matter pending till the High Court's order on Shri Madhu Limaye's Writ Petition.

On the 18th August, 1965 (the Punjab High Court had dismissed Shri Madhu Limaye's Writ Petition by an order dated the 14th May, 1965), when Shri V. C. Shukla sought to raise<sup>2</sup> the matter again, Shri Madhu Limaye stated that he intended to file an application for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court against the order of the Punjab High Court. He added that the matter might be kept pending till the final disposal of his proposed application by the Supreme Court. The Speaker agreed and kept the matter pending.

The Supreme Court having dismissed on the 25th November, 1965, Shri Madhu Limaye's application for special leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab High Court, Shri V. C. Shukla raised the question of privilege against Shri Madhu Limaye in the House on the 29th November, 1965. While raising the question of privilege, Shri V. C. Shukla stated *inter alia*:—

"...In the Writ Petition filed by the hon. Member he affirmed by a court affidavit on oath of personal knowledge that the disciplinary action taken against him by the Speaker was really out of malice and, therefore, *mala fide*, and he was actually punished for raising this question of discussion of the Lok Sabha Secretariat Demands and for having moved Cut Motions in that connection."

After some discussion, the House referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges.

### III—FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

10. Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., in his written statement submitted to the Committee had contended that there was no precedent in the House of Commons where "a statement or an affidavit made in the course of a proper legal proceeding before a Court of Law"

1. L. S. Deb. dt. 11-5-1965, cc. 14303-304.

2. L.S. Deb. dt. 18-8-1965, cc. 693-98.

had been considered a contempt of the House. He had, therefore, stated that the statement made by him in the writ petition did not constitute a contempt of the House.

11. The gravamen of the charge against Shri Madhu Limaye is that he "committed a contempt of the House or a breach of privilege by alleging *mala fides* against the Speaker of the Lok Sabha."

12. "Reflections on the character of the Speaker and accusations of partiality in the discharge of his duty" is clearly a breach of privilege, or contempt of the House. As stated by *May*:—

"As examples of speeches and writings which have been held to constitute breaches of privilege or contempts may be mentioned:

Reflections on the character of the Speaker and accusations of partiality in the discharge of his duty...."

[*May*, 17th Ed., pp. 124-25]

13. Although, no case is available in the Lok Sabha or the House of Commons, U.K., where action for contempt of the House was taken for a statement or an affidavit filed in a court of law, there are many cases in which persons have been punished for contempt of Court on account of allegations made by them against Judges or Magistrates in their applications or affidavits filed before Courts of Law. Two such examples are given below:

(i) A person in his appeal against the decision of an Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (deemed to be court for certain purposes) objected to the order of the Assistant Registrar as *mala fide*. The Patna High Court convicted him for contempt of Court and observed *inter alia*:—

"...I have already held that the opposite party committed contempt of Court by attributing *mala fides* to the Assistant Registrar in his memorandum of appeal so much so that the Assistant Registrar was made a respondent in the appeal and cost was sought to be recovered personally against him. In this court, he claimed to justify and insisted on justifying his use of *mala fide* against the Assistant Registrar in his memorandum of appeal. Thus the contempt is a calculated one and serious notice must be taken of such a calculated contempt..."

[A.I.R. 1965 Patna 227 at page 238]

(ii) A person in his application under section 528 Cr. P.C., for transfer of a case from one court to another, made allegations against the Magistrate that he had joined in a conspiracy to implicate the accused in a false case of theft and that the Magistrate had taken a bribe of Rs. 500/-. When the matter came up before the Supreme Court, it observed *inter alia*:—

"...We must make it clear here that at this stage we are expressing no opinion on merits, nor on the correctness or otherwise of the aspersions made. All that

we are saying is that the aspersions taken at their face value amounted to what is called scandalising the court itself, manifesting itself in such an attack on the Magistrate as tended to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the courts. We are aware that confidence in courts cannot be created by stifling criticism, but there are criticisms and criticisms.

'The path of criticism', said Lord Atkin in *Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago*, 1936 AC 322, at p. 335: (A.I.R. 1936 PC 141 at pp. 145-146), 'is a public way: The wrong-headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.'

If, therefore, the respondent had merely criticised the Magistrate, no notice need have been taken of such criticism as contempt of court whatever action it might have been open to the Magistrate to take as an aggrieved individual; but if the respondent acted in malice and attempted to impair the administration of justice, the offence committed would be something more than an offence under S. 228, Indian Penal Code."

[A.I.R. 1959, S.C. 102, at page 106]

14. The offence of contempt of the House is analogous to the offence of contempt of Court.

15. It may also be mentioned that statements made in Courts are not immune from action for defamation by the persons affected as will be seen from the following observations of the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court in the cases of *Gir Raj vs. Sulla and another* and *Basir-ul-Haq and others vs. The State of West Bengal* respectively:

- (i) "In this case *Gir Raj* was examined as a witness and he made certain statements which are the subject matter of a complaint against him filed by the opposite party under S. 500, I.P.C. (Defamation).

Learned counsel for the applicant.....has argued that as the impugned statement was made by the applicant before a Court of law, the only offence which can be charged against him on its basis, if at all, was covered by S. 193 or 195 of the Indian Penal Code, cognizance of which was barred under S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of a private complaint. The second point raised by the learned counsel is that the applicant was protected under the proviso to S. 132 of the Evidence Act for having made that statement in Court. I do not find, however, any substance in these arguments.....

Even if the statement made by the applicant before the Court of the Sessions Judge comes under the purview of S. 193 or 195, I.P.C. but if it also discloses an offence under S. 500 I.P.C., there is no legal bar for the aggrieved person to seek his remedy in a Court of law against the applicant."

(A.I.R. 1965 Allahabad, 597)

- (ii) "...The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not *per se* bar the cognizance by the magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made...."

As regards the charge under S. 500, Penal Code, it seems fairly clear both on principle and authority that where the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against the public servant and the other against a private individual, that other is not debarred by the provisions of S. 195 from seeking redress for the offence committed against him...."

(A.I.R. 1953 Supreme Court, 293)

16. Thus, when statements made in Courts or in writ petitions or affidavits filed in Courts are not immune from action for contempt of Court or even for defamation by private persons, there appears no reason why such statements should be immune from action for breach of privilege or contempt of the House.

17. It may be stated that the power possessed by the House to punish for contempt or breach of privilege is in its nature discretionary. Absence of precedent will not prevent an act from being treated as a breach of privilege or contempt of the House (*Parliamentary Dictionary* by L. A. Abraham, page 40). As stated by *May* :

"It may be stated generally that any act or omission which obstructs or impedes either House of Parliament in the performance of its functions, or which obstructs or impedes any member or officer of such House in the discharge of his duty, or which has a tendency, directly or indirectly, to produce such results may be treated as a contempt even though there is no precedent of the offence."

(*May*, 17th Ed., p. 109)

18. The Committee are of the opinion that Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., has committed a breach of privilege and contempt of the House by attributing *mala fides* to the Speaker, Lok Sabha, in the discharge of his duty in the House, in the Writ Petition filed by him before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at New Delhi.



19. Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P.; however, made the following statement before the Committee expressing regrets for the impugned statements made by him in his Writ Petition filed before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court:

"I have explained at great length that my object in moving the Punjab High Court was to seek its authoritative interpretation of the Constitutional position embodied in Article 113 of the Constitution, read with Rules 208-11 of the Lok Sabha Procedure, and not to commit contempt of the House or the Speaker. But since my statements in the Court have caused pain to the Speaker and my other colleagues in the House, I hereby express regrets as an index of my honourable intentions in the matter."

#### IV—RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE

20. The Committee recommend that in view of the regret expressed by Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., in his statement before the Committee, no further action be taken by the House in the matter.

S. V. KRISHNAMOORTHY RAO,  
*Chairman, ' Committee of Privileges.*

NEW DELHI;  
*The 24th March, 1966.*

## NOTE BY SARDAR KAPUR SINGH

I do not agree with the opinion incorporated in the Report, that "Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P. has committed a breach of privilege and contempt of the House", by stating in an affidavit in a court of law, that "the action of the Speaker in naming the petitioner and of Mr. Satyanarain Sinha in moving...for his suspension was not only against the Rules, but *mala fide*".

2. I am persuaded to dissent for two reasons: (a) No case is available in the Lok Sabha or the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, which latter is the prototypal source and authority for our privileges as contemplated in Article 105(3) of the Constitution Act, where action for contempt of the House was taken for a statement or an affidavit filed in a court of law and on intrinsic merits and extrinsic considerations no case is made out for the opinion given, and (b) although our privileges are "those of the House of Commons", they are not literally identical with those of the House of Commons for the simple reason that there exist substantial and significant differences between the climate, the temper, the Speaker, and the procedural milieu of the two Houses, such as make it imperative to interpret established privileges and precedents of the House of Commons in relation to cases pertaining to the Lok Sabha, concretely and not with mechanical literality.

3. I will now try to explain myself.

4. The majority Report argues that although (a) there is no precedent for our action for contempt in case of a statement or affidavit made in a Court of law, (b) the contempt of the House is analogous to that of the Court. It may be so, but from these two propositions it does not logically follow that, (c) the House may, *therefore*, take action in respect of things said or done in a Court, just as a Court may proceed to do so. Students of logic would call it the *fallacy of Accident* which applies a general rule to a particular case whose accidental circumstances render the rule inapplicable, for, what is true generally may not be true universally and without qualification. It is true that a Court can take action itself for its or a subordinate Court's contempt. It is also true that what constitutes a Court's contempt would also constitute a contempt of the Lok Sabha. But it does not logically follow that since a Court can take action in respect of its contempts, the Lok Sabha can take

action in respect of things said or done in a Court, even though *qua* the Courts such things when said or done attract or have attracted no penalties. /I say, that, it was permissible for Hon'ble Shri Madhu Limaye to make the affidavit in the Court that he did, and if the affidavit was false or otherwise reprehensible, action lay in the Court where he made it and it does not lie in the House, even though such a statement made inside the House, or otherwise made publicly, might entitle the House to take action for contempt. /Looked at differently, the essence of the question is *not* as to whether the impugned affidavit, in the words of *May's Parliamentary Practice* (17th Edition, page 109), "has a tendency, directly or indirectly", to "impede or obstruct" the House, or "any member or officer" of the House, but the essence is as to whether the House may take action in respect of things said or done, permissibly, in a court of law, as constituting its own contempt. To the first question, my answer might be in the affirmative, namely, that *prima facie* to attribute *mala fides* to the Speaker, does constitute a contempt of the House, but the second question, namely, as to whether in respect of things said or done permissibly in a Court, the House may take action of its own contempt, an affirmative answer is, by no means, obvious. The dispute on the point involved between the Courts and the Legislative Houses is of a long standing, and is not settled yet, as is demonstrated in the recent case of Keshav Singh and the Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha. By accepting and adopting the majority Report, from which I dissent, we might be accused of settling and finalising this matter unilaterally and by a kind of storm-action and this delicate matter is not susceptible to such a settlement, by convicting Shri Madhu Limaye thus, we will be raising more problems than we solve. The dualism inherent in the long standing controversy between the Courts asserting that their decisions are binding on the legislative Houses in matters of privilege and contempt, and the denial by the latter of such a claim by the Courts, cannot be finally resolved by convicting Shri Madhu Limaye, in this case. And it is prudent and proper that we do not presume and proceed to do so. Let it be understood that between the Courts and the Legislative Houses, there is agreement on certain issues. (1) It is accepted that supremacy of Parliament over the law-Courts is only a legislative supremacy, which does not confer any exclusive jurisdiction on matter of privilege of contempt. (2) Judges are bound to take judicial notice of parliamentary privilege, which like any other law is the law of the land. (3) Courts have conceded that the House has an absolute control over its internal proceedings. But in case of the areas of conflict the House has a remedy only by having recourse to legislation (*May's Parliamentary Practice*, 14th Edition,

9th Chapter). It cannot presume to control, influence or interfere with proceedings in a Court of law, through action in respect of unprecedented, undeclared and non-established, privileges.

*The House cannot, by its own declaration, create a new privilege.*

5. I will now exegetise my second reason of dissent. The Constitutional authority of our privileges is contained in the Article 105 (3) which says that, "the powers, privileges and immunities" of our House, and of "the members and the committees", shall be "those of the House of Commons", and of "its members and Committees at the commencement of this Constitution". It will be seen that the guarantee is in respect of (a) powers, and (b) privileges of (1) the House, (2) the members, and (3) the Committees and the powers and privileges of, and relating to, the Speaker are of a derivative character, which is not to say that they are less important. The Speaker, indisputably is the pivot of the House and the fulcrum of its proceedings. He, (1) presides over the deliberations of the House, (2) maintains order in its debates, (3) decides doubtful points of order, and (4) puts questions for the decision of the House and declares the decisions. The Rules of Procedure of the House are designed to enable the Speaker to achieve these ends, and their essential functions are (1) to maintain decorum, (2) ascertain the will of the majority, (3) preserve the rights of the minority, and (4) facilitate orderly and harmonious transaction of business of the House. These are the traditionally accepted powers, privileges and functions of the Speaker, in the context of which the case-precedents of the Speaker of the House of Commons have evolved and established. The House of Commons, by a custom, dating from the 6th Henry VIII, lay claim to these rights and privileges, at the commencement of every Parliament, through a humble petition to the Crown by referring to them as "their ancient and undoubted privileges," which aim at maintaining the authority, independence and dignity of the House. One of the greatest authorities on the British Constitution, Sir Ivor Jennings, said about the Speakership: "The qualities required of a Speaker are not really very high, and so great is the prestige of the office, and so careful are all parties to maintain his independence and authority, that any reasonable man can make success of the office." Dr. Horace King, M.P., present Speaker of the House of Commons, while speaking at a grammar school dinner, recently, (*The Listener*, London, January 6, 1966, page 6) observed that, "If you are of modest ability don't worry; you may not become Prime Minister, or Leader of the Opposition, but you have the chance to become a Speaker."

6. This image of the Speaker is not an exact replica of the typical Speaker of the Lok Sabha, with the result that the House of Com-

mons' precedents relating to breach of privilege and contempts arising out of things said or done in respect of the Indian Speaker, become somewhat inapplicable where a mechanical literality is insisted upon. The typical Indian/differs from the House of Commons Speaker, in two essential respects: (1) His much wider authority, and (2) his formal allegiance and active association with the ruling party in and outside the House. Added to these two, is a third factor, arising out of these two, (3) a progressive widening of his own discretionary powers through exercise of absolute and subjective discretion. Philips Laundby in his recent book, *The Office of Speaker*, at page 418, says about the first aforementioned point:

"The authority of the Indian Speaker is thus wider than that of any other Speaker in the Commonwealth. Most assemblies insist on maintaining a wide measure of control over their procedure and practice, but in India, the House of the People has been content to entrust the shaping of its rules to its presiding Officer."

At page 415, he explains that, "The standing orders (that is, the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business) of the House of the People confer wide discretionary powers on the Speaker".

To explain the second point, I quote from the presidential speech of our Union Minister of Parliamentary Affairs delivered at the Fifth All India Whips Conference held at Bangalore on the 4th January, 1966. He said:

".....some of the functions and powers which the Indian Speaker has come to enjoy and exercise by convention and practice are strictly outside the sphere of the Constitution and have been given to him by executive dispensation, because he belongs to the majority party and does not sever connections with it even after occupying his high office. Furthermore, if he is inclined to exercise more powers, outside the Chamber, he has to look to the Government to get them..... (these facts) give rise to suspicion of subtle influences being reflected in his rulings...."

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8. The Office of the Indian Speaker, in theory and practice, both, is in many respects, meaningfully different from that of the Speaker of the House of Commons, and any mechanical application, therefore, of House of Commons precedents is bound to be self-defeating in purpose. The purpose, I repeat, is no other than preservation and

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\*Omitted by the Chairman.

maintenance of rights, privileges and dignity of the House, its members and its Committees, and nothing less and nothing more. To treat and deem the Speaker as excessively, sacrosanct, even at the cost of, the basic postulates of a democratic parliamentary system and an erosion into the well recognised rights and privileges of the members of Parliament, particularly those of the Opposition groups, and those who are heretic and dissident, would be tantamount to reduce the whole question of privileges into a sabotagous mockery. All true judgements must take into account circumstances of the context and contingencies of the case. All attribution of *mala fides* cannot *ipso facto* be deemed as contempt and breach of privilege here, even if, such is the case there in the United Kingdom.

\* \* \* \*

10./I conclude that,

(1) It is not permissible for this House to take action in matter of things done and said, permissibly, in Courts,

(2) Precedents and cases arising out of House of Commons' practices may not be mechanically and literally applied to our own cases, without due modifications, and, therefore,

(3) I acquit Shri Madhu Limaye of the accusation of having committed a contempt of the House or breach of privileges, on the basis of facts before us./

NEW DELHI;

The 28th March, 1966./

## **MINUTES**

### **I**

#### **First Sitting**

*New Delhi, Thursday, the 9th December, 1965.*

The Committee met from 16.00 to 16.20 hours.

#### **PRESENT**

##### **CHAIRMAN**

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

##### **MEMBERS**

2. Shri N. C. Chatterjee
3. Sardar Kapur Singh
4. Shri Nihar Ranjan Laskar
5. Shri H. N. Mukerjee
6. Shri Purushottamdas R. Patel
7. Shri Shivram Rango Rane
8. Shri Asoke K. Sen
9. Shri Sumat Prasad.

#### **SECRETARIAT**

Shri M. C. Chawla—*Deputy Secretary.*

2. The Chairman read out a letter dated the 7th December, 1965, received from Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., requesting that he might be allowed time to submit his written statement to the Committee by the 10th February, 1966, and also to appear before the Committee personally to explain the position.

3. The Committee agreed to accede to his request.

4. The Committee decided to meet again on Saturday, the 19th February, 1966, to consider the matter further.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

II

**Second Sitting**

*New Delhi, Saturday, the 19th February, 1966.*

The Committee met from 15.20 to 15.30 hours.

**PRESENT**

**CHAIRMAN**

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

**MEMBERS**

2. Shri H. N. Mukerjee.
3. Shri Purushottamdas R. Patel.
4. Shri Shivram Rango Rane.
5. Shri Sumat Prasad.

Shri C. R. Pattabhiraman, Minister of State in the Ministry of Law, was also present.

**SECRETARIAT**

Shri M. C. Chawla—*Deputy Secretary.*

2. The Committee decided to call Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., to appear before the Committee at their next sitting to be held at 15.30 hours on Monday, the 28th February, 1966, as requested by him.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

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III

**Third Sitting**

*New Delhi, Friday, the 4th March, 1966.*

The Committee met from 14.30 to 15.00 hours.

**PRESENT**

**CHAIRMAN**

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

**MEMBERS**

- 2 Shri N. C. Chatterjee
3. Sardar Kapur Singh
4. Shri H. N. Mukerjee
5. Shri Jaganath Rao
- 6 Shri Sumat Prasad



**SECRETARIAT**

Shri M. C. Chawla—*Deputy Secretary.*

**WITNESS**

Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P.

2. Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., was examined by the Committee. His evidence was not concluded.

3. The Committee decided to meet again on Friday, the 18th March, 1966, at 16.00 hours.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

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**IV**

**Fourth Sitting**

*New Delhi, Friday, the 18th March, 1966.*

The Committee met from 16.00 to 16.25 hours.

**PRESENT**

**CHAIRMAN**

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

**MEMBERS**

2. Shri N. C. Chatterjee
3. Shri H. N. Mukerjee
4. Shri V. C. Parashar
5. Shri Jaganath Rao
6. Shri Sumat Prasad

**SECRETARIAT**

Shri M. C. Chawla—*Deputy Secretary.*

**WITNESS**

Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P.

2. Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., made a statement before the Committee expressing regrets for the impugned statements made by him in his petition filed in the Punjab High Court.

3. The Committee decided to meet again on Monday, the 21st March, 1966 at 15.00 hours, to consider the matter.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

**Fifth Sitting**

*New Delhi, Monday, the 21st March, 1966.*

The Committee met from 15.00 to 15.25 hours.

**PRESENT****CHAIRMAN**

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

**MEMBERS**

2. Sardar Kapur Singh
3. Shri H. N. Mukerjee
4. Shri V. C. Parashar
5. Shri C. R. Pattabhi Raman
6. Shri Jaganath Rao
7. Shrimati Yashoda Reddy
8. Shri Sumat Prasad.

**SECRETARIAT**

Shri J. R. Kapur—*Section Officer.*

2. The Committee decided that the allegation of *mala fides* made by Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., against the Speaker, Lok Sabha, in his Writ Petition filed before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court, constituted a breach of privilege and contempt of the House. The Committee, however, decided to recommend that in view of the regret expressed by Shri Madhu Limaye in his statement before the Committee, no further action be taken by the House in the matter.

3. The Committee decided that the written statement submitted by Shri Madhu Limaye, M.P., and the oral evidence given by him before the Committee earlier need not be appended to the report of the Committee.

4. The Committee decided to meet again on Thursday, the 24th March, 1966 at 15.00 hours, to consider their draft report.

*The Committee then adjourned.*

**Sixth Sitting**

*New Delhi, Thursday, the 24th March, 1966.*

The Committee met from 15.00 to 15.25 hours.

**PRESENT****CHAIRMAN**

Shri S. V. Krishnamoorthy Rao

**MEMBERS**

2. Sardar Kapur Singh.
3. Shri Nihar Ranjan Laskar.
4. Shri H. N. Mukerjee.
5. Shri V. C. Parashar.
6. Shri C. R. Pattabhi Raman.
7. Shri Jaganath Rao.
8. Shri Sumat Prasad.

**SECRETARIAT**

Shri M. C. Chawla—*Deputy Secretary.*

2. The Committee considered their draft report and adopted it.

3. Sardar Kapur Singh expressed his dissent from the findings of the Committee and said that he desired to give a note containing his views for being appended to the Report of the Committee, by Monday, the 28th March, 1966.

4. The Committee authorised the Chairman and, in his absence, Shri Jaganath Rao, to present their report to the House on the 30th March, 1966.

*The Committee then adjourned sine die.*

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