

**HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH
REPORT**

**PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
(1982-83)**

(SEVENTH LOK SABHA)

COACHING SERVICES

MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS

(RAILWAY BOARD)



Presented in Lok Sabha on 29-4-1983

Laid in Rajya Sabha on 29-4-1983

**LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT
NEW DELHI**

April, 1983/Vaisakha, 1905(S)

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CORRIGENDA TO 154th REPORT OF PAC (7TH LOK SABHA)

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(1982-83) held on

30-11-1982 (AN)

1-12-1982 (AN)

26-4-1983 (AN)

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**PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
(1982-83)**

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1. **Shri T.R. Krishnamachari—*Joint Secretary.***
2. **Shri K.C. Rastogi—*Chief Financial Committee Officer.***
3. **Shri Ram Kishore—*Senior Financial Committee Officer.***

INTRODUCTION

1, the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, as authorised by the Committee, do present on their behalf this Hundred Fifty Fourth Report of the Public Accounts Committee (Seventh Lok Sabha) on paragraph 1 of the Advance Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1980-81, Union Government (Railways) regarding Coaching Services.

2. The Advance Report of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India for the year 1980-81, Union Government (Railways) was laid on the Table of the House on 5 April, 1982.

3. The Railways being a public utility cannot abdicate their responsibility in the matter of providing adequate services to the travelling public, the Committee have therefore, desired that Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) make a realistic assessment of the growth of passenger traffic involving, say a lead of 500 kms. and above, with a view to projecting the requirements over the next 5-10 years and planning accordingly. A comprehensive study has also to be carried out immediately with regard to inter-city travel keeping in view the growth centres that are rapidly emerging in the wake of growing industrial/economic activity all over the country so as to help in formulation of Seventh Plan. As regards the current plan, the Committee have stressed the need for stepping up the allocations to the Railways to enable them to execute the necessary schemes for augmenting the no. of coaches, maintenance facilities and terminal and line capacities etc. The Committee have expected the Railways to take necessary measures to contribute to this effort by generating additional resources out of their own revenues by efficient and concentrated utilisation of existing assets both human and material, and by cutting down wasteful expenditure.

4. The Committee have recommended that on-going schemes for augmenting the facilities in existing workshop must be completed expeditiously so as to make up the deficiency to the extent feasible within the shortest possible time. As regards the new schemes, the Committee have desired the priorities to be fixed so that in stead of spreading limited resources too thinly over several projects at the same time the most promising one could be completed expeditiously.

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5. The Committee have also emphasised the need for preparing a perspective Plan covering the period upto 2000 AD for development of the Railway system keeping in view the anticipated growth of traffic, both suburban and non-suburban.

6. The Public Accounts Committee (1982-83) examined paragraph 1 at their sittings held on 29 November, 1982 and 1 December, 1982. The Committee considered and finalised this Report at their sitting held on 26 April, 1983 based on the evidence taken and the written information furnished by the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board). The Minutes of the sittings form Part II* of the Report.

7. A statement containing conclusions and recommendations of the Committee is appended to this Report (Appendix II). For facility of reference these have been printed in thick type in the body of the Report.

8. The Committee would like to express their thanks to the Ministry of Railways (Railways Board) for the cooperation extended by them in giving information to the Committee.

9. The Committee also place on record their appreciation of the assistance rendered to them in the examination of this paragraph by the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

SATISH AGARWAL

Chairman

Public Accounts Committee.

NEW DELHI;

April 28, 1983

Vaisakha 8, 1905 (S)

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REPORT

COACHING SERVICES

1. The Audit Para on coaching services as appearing in the Advance Report (Railways) of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 1980 81 and on which this Report is based, is reproduced as Appendix I to this Report.

2. For the Fifth Plan period 1974-75 to 1978-79 as a whole, the growth rate assumed was around 20 per cent @4 per cent annual growth rate in non-suburban passenger traffic. The annual growth rate in suburban passenger traffic was taken as 5 per cent during 1974-75 to 1978-79 (a total of 25 per cent). However, it is seen from the statements given below that the actual growth of suburban and non-suburban traffic (both in terms of passenger Kms and passenger journeys) was much more than anticipated. The following table illustrates the position as it materialised during the revised Fifth Plan period (1974-75 to 1977-78).

	Suburban Traffic		Non-suburban Traffic		Coaches	
	Passenger Km.	Passenger Journeys	Passenger Km.	Passenger Journeys	EMU —	Conventional
	(in million)		(in million)			
1973-74	28037	1437	107627	1217	1892	26108
1977-78	39433	1928	137201	1576	2321	26647
% increase	40.6	34.2	27.5	29.5	22.7	2.11
% increase (per annum)	10.2	8.6	6.9	7.4	5.2	0.5

3. The Committee desired to know the reasons for rate of growth of non-suburban passenger traffic being assumed at much lower levels during the period 1974-79. In reply, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated :

“The targets for passenger traffic were fixed on the recommendation of the Working Group on Passenger Traffic” specially set up for working out the projections of suburban and non-suburban passenger traffic for the Fifth Plan Period. This working group consisted, amongst others, representatives of Ministry of Ship-

ping and Transport, Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, Indian Airlines and the Planning Commission.

This working group had projected that during the period of the Fifth Plan non-suburban passenger traffic will increase by about 4% per annum and suburban passenger traffic by about 5% per annum in terms of passenger traffic Kms during the Fifth Plan Period (1974-75/1978-79). The projections were based on past trends, growth in population etc.

The actual traffic materialised shows an increase of 7.04% per annum in non-suburban passenger and 10.7% per annum in suburban passenger kilometres. Thus the Projections made by the working group on passenger traffic for the Fifth Plan were exceeded both in the case of suburban as also non-suburban passenger traffic in 1978-79. One reason for the sharp increase in passenger booking, was improvement in discipline all round during 1975/77, as a result of which ticketless travel declined.

It may be pointed out that it is difficult to make accurate projections for passenger traffic as it depends on a variety of factors."

Traffic carried vis-a-vis holdings of coaching stock

4. The details of the suburban and non-suburban traffic carried by Railways during each of the year from 1970-71 to 1981-82 are as under:

Year	No. of Passenger journeys (million)			Passenger Kilometres (million)		
	Suburban	Non-suburban	Total	Suburban	Non suburban	Total
1970-71	1,219 (100)	1,212 (100)	2,431 (100)	22,984 (100)	95,136 (100)	118,120 (100)
1971-72	1,275 (104.6)	1,261 (104.0)	2,536 (104.3)	24,250 (105.5)	101,079 (106.3)	125,329 (106.1)
1972-73	1,385 (113.6)	1,268 (104.6)	2,653 (109.1)	26,596 (115.7)	106,931 (112.4)	133,527 (113.0)
1973-74	1,437 (117.9)	1,217 (100.4)	2,654 (109.2)	28,037 (122.0)	107,627 (113.1)	135,664 (114.9)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1974-75	1,373 (112.6)	1,056 (87.1)	2,429 (99.9)	27,157 (118.2)	99,097 (104.2)	126,254 (106.9)
1975-76	1,639 (134.4)	1,306 (107.8)	2,945 (121.1)	32,862 (143.0)	115,899 (121.9)	148,761 (125.9)
1976-77	1,802 (147.8)	1,498 (123.6)	3,300 (135.7)	37,082 (161.3)	1,26,754 (133.2)	163,836 (138.7)
1977-78	1,928 (158.2)	1,576 (130.0)	3,504 (144.1)	39,433 (171.6)	137,201 (144.2)	176,634 (149.5)
1978-79	2,113 (173.3)	1,606 (132.5)	3,719 (153.0)	43,439 (189.0)	149,506 (157.2)	192,945 (163.4)
1979-80	1,903 (156.1)	1,602 (132.2)	3,505 (144.2)	38,730 (168.5)	159,927 (168.1)	198,657 (168.2)
1980-81	2,000 (164.1)	1,612 (133.0)	3,612 (148.6)	41,086 (178.8)	167,472 (176.0)	208,558 (176.6)
1981-82	2,064 (169.3)	1,640 (135.3)	3,704 (152.4)	43,965 (191.3)	176,822 (185.9)	220,787 (186.9)

(Figures in brackets indicate index numbers with 1970-71 as the base)

5. According to the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board), the holding of passenger coaches and the seating capacity during the year 1970-71 to 1981-82 were as under :

Year	Passenger Coaches		Seating Capacity	
	EMU Coaches	Conventional Coaches	EMU Coaches	Conventional Coaches
1	2	3	4	5
1970-71	1,750 (100)	24,676 (100)	340,541 (100)	1,505,047 (100)
1971-72	1,886 (107.8)	25,087 (101.7)	357,208 (104.9)	1,527,673 (101.5)
1972-73	1,856 (106.1)	25,548 (103.5)	355,083 (104.3)	1,548,425 (102.9)

1	2	3	4	5
1973-74	1,892 (108.1)	26,108 (105.8)	366,998 (107.8)	1,589,461 (105.6)
1974-75	2,041 (116.6)	26,213 (106.2)	382,878 (112.4)	1,602,645 (106.5)
1975-76	2,217 (126.7)	26,309 (106.6)	429,377 (126.1)	1,626,096 (108.0)
1976-77	2,329 (133.1)	26,183 (105.7)	451,935 (132.7)	1,620,262 (107.7)
1977-78	2,321 (132.6)	26,647 (108.0)	450,579 (132.3)	1,649,256 (109.6)
1978-79	2,412 (137.8)	26,902 (109.0)	471,129 (138.3)	1,667,946 (110.8)
1979-80	2,581 (147.5)	27,290 (110.6)	487,337 (143.1)	1,691,069 (112.4)
1980-81	2,625 (150.0)	27,484 (111.4)	500,607 (147.0)	1,695,127 (112.6)
1981-82	2,658 (151.9)	27,257 (110.5)	514,744 (151.1)	1,685,935 (112.0)

(Figures in brackets indicate index numbers with 1970-71 as the base)

6. It is seen from the statements above that the suburban traffic in terms of number of passenger journeys increased by 69.3 per cent from 1,219 million in 1970-71 to 2,064 million in 1981-82 while in terms of passenger kilometers it increased from 22,984 million in 1970-71 to 43,965 million in 1981-82 *i.e.* by 91.3 per cent. Whereas EMU Coaches increased by 51.9 per cent (from 1,750 to 2,658), the seating capacity increased by 51.1 per cent only (from 340,541 to 514,744) during the same period.

7. Similarly, the Non-suburban traffic in terms of number of passenger journeys increased by 35.3 per cent (from 1,212 million in 1970-71 to 1,640 million in 1981-82). In terms of passenger kilometres it increased from 95,136 million in 1970-71 to 1,76,822 million in 1981-82 *i.e.* by 86.9 per cent. The No. of conventional coaches however increased by 10.5 per cent only from 24,676 to 27,257 and the seating capacity increased by 12.0 per cent only (from 1,505,047 to 1,685,935 during the same

period. Asked about the reasons for the inability of the Railways to provide coaching stock commensurate with the increasing traffic requirements, the Chairman, Railway Board, stated in evidence :

“The passenger growth rate or passenger km. growth rate in particular need not necessarily and strictly be related to the number of coaches. For example, if I run a long distance train from here to Trivandrum taking into account the Passenger kilometres what I am going to earn out of that train, or that rake or set of coaches is going to be 10, 20 or 100 times more than that out of the coaches run from Delhi to Palwal. So, the proportion can be entirely different. There need not be any strict comparison of the coaches. As far as coach procurement is concerned, it is not lack of planning nor lack of will on the part of the Railways to procure more coaches. But the basic fact is that we are living with the constraint of paucity of coaches. There are so many overaged coaches running. We defer the periodical overhaul of coaches. Not only that we sometimes even use coaches which are waiting for periodical overhaul after they are given some patchwork repairs. Within the total resources available, we have to live with the constraint of non-availability of coaches. To that extent it is also true that overcrowding in the trains will also exist.”

8. On being asked how the Railways estimated their requirement of coaches if there was no relation between coaches and the passenger kilometres moved, the Chairman, Railway Board, stated:

“A direct relationship cannot be drawn between passenger kilometres and the coaches. A relationship has to be there. But it depends upon how many long distance trains are there and how many short distance trains are there.”

9. In reply to a further question, the witness stated:

“Normally 3 to 5% is the passenger growth rate that we have been anticipating or envisaging every year. But year to year fluctuations are there; in certain years distortions have taken place. But this is the basic minimum requirement for the country. Until we come to a stage of making sufficient coaches and unless we are able to control the forces which generate unnatural traffic, this cannot be helped.”

10. When asked about the growth rate of coaches, *vis-a-vis* the requirements, the witness stated :

“3.5 per cent is the growth rate of coaches on the basis of passengers. We are far far lagging behind already. We had worked out the growth over a period of five years from 1980 to 1985. The minimum requirement of coaches will be 14,000.”

11. As the total installed capacity for production of coaches was 8250 only, the Committee desired to know the basis on which the requirement of 14,000 coaches was projected to the planning commission. The Chairman, Railway Board, replied:

“The projection of requirements has no relation to the capacity available. We can import the coaches, if we have money.”

12. The Committee pointed out that the Railways could produce only 7,340 Coaches during 1974 to 1981 and enquired how the Railway were going to meet the requirement in the Sixth Plan. The representative of Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated:

“So far as availability from the units is concerned, we have every reason to expect that they would work to their installed capacity.”

13. The Chairman, Railway Board, further clarified:

“As far as the figure 14,000 is concerned, it includes replacements. Detailed exercise to get 14,000 and odd coaches can start only after the funds are given. If the constraints are there, than we will have no alternative but to carry on with the overaged coaches; we will not be able to replace all these 7,000 and odd coaches; most of them will not get replaced and we will keep on extending their life and managing with them.”

The witness added:

“We are planning for 14,000 coaches. But we get the funds for only 5,600 coaches. Probably, the money value will further depreciate and ultimately we may be able to manufacture less than 5,000 coaches. So, this recurring gap will be there. Broadly, we have asked the Planning Commission for Rs. 11,000 crores and we got Rs. 5,000 crores for all items including coaches.”

In reply to a further question the witness stated:

The number of coaches due for replacement is 7,800. We have to carry on with them. We will not even cover the total replacement that is required not to talk of adding the coaches."

He added:

"We have asked for money from the planning Commission. But the planning Commission said, there is no money to give; you generate additional resources. So, we will like to generate additional resources."

The witness further stated:

"We have projected to the planning Commission that our requirements were in excess of the installed capacity. We did not ask for import. We want funds to set up a factory for initial manufacture of 400 coaches and subsequently to go up to 500 coaches. The planning Commission has approved this project. But unfortunately they did not allot the funds. We were insisting that if the funds were made available and if the factory started production, there would be some production of the coaches for about three years to start with."

14. In this connection, another representative of the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated:

"Today we are manufacturing 750 coaches per annum from ICF. It was set up 30 years ago. Today, whatever it is producing, is only to replace the stock. Virtually, the factory does not exist. The gap is so large. This is what we are suggesting to the planning Commission."

15. The Committee enquired whether the desirability of manufacturing aluminium coaches had been examined by Railway Board as it might solve some of the problems of seating capacity, e.g. by manufacturing of double decker coaches and even in increasing the capacity for fabrication of coaches. In reply the Chairman, Railway Board stated :

"We have made a very detailed study. Aluminium coach costs two-and-a-half times more than the steel bodied coaches. That means, for every aluminium coach I purchase I will be knocking out two-and-a-half coaches. So, to that extent, carrying

capacity will remain the same. There will be no difference in the carrying capacity except that the body weight will be lighter. But I shudder to think of running aluminium coaches in the country because even now windows are being stolen lock, stock and barrel every day and I do not know how many parts of the aluminium coaches will disappear everyday. We have also found that it is not a world wide practice to run such coaches on long distance routes. These are run for short distance routes for conserving energy. Our need is of long distance trains because in this country the distance are very large. The more affluent countries run stainless steel coaches. We cannot afford that also because they are also two-and-a-half times expensive. Therefore, we are going in for corton steel, which has got more resistance against corrosion, etc."

16. Asked whether the corton steel was to be imported, the witness replied :

"Corton steel will be imported as long as we are importing 'X' quantity of steel. We have tied up our requirement with Rourkela Steel Plant. They have agreed to manufacture that steel for us. After a lot of deliberation and study, a conscious decision has been taken to go in for corton steel coaches."

17. When asked about the salient features of the Report of study team sent abroad to study the latest development in designing and manufacture of passenger coaches, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note :

"The report has been examined by the Railway Board and it has been decided to use low alloy high tensile steel for the coach shells to be manufactured in the proposed new Railway Coach factory. Based on the findings of the Study Team, dialogue has been started with the selected coach builders who can offer a suitable design to the Indian Railways specification. Action is also being taken for preparation of a detailed project Report, estimates, location survey etc. for setting up the proposed new Railway Coach Production Unit."

18. The Committee desired to know the justification for export of coaches to other countries when there was shortage of coaches and the Railways were constantly complaining of lack of resources. In reply the Chairman, Railway Board stated during evidence :

“We are among the ten advanced countries of the world. We have to keep our image, to keep the date with destiny. You cannot break away from it; you cannot say, I will not export at all. Although it is a symbolic sale, it has many advantages. Take Vietnam and Nigeria. We proved that we had the capability of running the whole railway system; for 3 years our management team was working there and rehabilitating their system. Same work was done in Manila, same work is being done in Mozambique. There are certain positive and indirect gains, we got international image. It may not make much of difference if we keep 30 or 40 coaches more; it will not make much of a difference in overcrowding. But in the international world and for our image in export trade, it does make a difference. We want to keep it in such a position that we just remain in the market.”

19. As regards the steps being taken to overcome the shortage of coaches, the representative of Railway Board stated during evidence.

“There are ways of solving this problem of coaches. One is increasing the number of coaches. We are increasing the IInd AC Sleeper coaches which have seating capacity of 46 berths. As against this a first class coach has only 22 or 24 berths. So by replacing first class coach by an AC sleeper we are getting twice the number of passengers. In addition, a second class double decker coach can accommodate 144 as against 72. Therefore, we are increasing the double-decker coaches also. Then there is the question of double heading of trains.”

He added:

“The seating capacity per coach has been increasing. In 1980-81 the total seating capacity in conventional coaches was 1.6 million or 1.695 million to be precise, as against 1.4 million in 1968-69. There is an increase of 17% not in terms of coaches, but in terms of seating capacity because per coach we are having more capacity. We should compare the increase in traffic with the net increase in the seating capacity.”

20. In this connection, the Chairman Railway Board stated :

“One sea change that has taken place in the Railways about the technology, is the traction change, that is the diesel and electric

engines progressively replacing the steam engines which enables us to make much better use of the coaches. We are doing the conversion from Delhi to Bombay which helps basically passengers from Delhi to Bombay by the long distance trains... The more long distance trains we introduce the more passenger kilometres we get in proportion to the passenger traffic."

Factors affecting availability of coaches

(i) Utilisation of coach production capacity :

21. The production of coaches, is planned on the ICF, BEML and Jessop. The workshops of the zonal Railways also produce coaches but these are mainly for departmental purposes, such as crew rest vans, inspection coaches, etc.

22. The yearwise production of coaches by ICF, BEML Jessop and Co. and the export of coaches by ICF, from 1974-75 to 1981-82, were as under :

Year	I.C.F.				Total	BEML		JESSOP	
	BG	MG	EMUs	Export		BG	MG	MG	BG
								EMUs	EMUs
1974-75	411	—	138	21	570	253	138	—	69
1975-76	360	93	55	9	517	220	130	—	48
1976-77	336	193	29	17	575	180	146	—	—
1977-78	404	165	102	—	671	211	—	—	15
1978-79	447	188	67	50	752	223	—	—	—
1979-80	455	102	105	50	712	250	—	—	62
									FW
1980-81	415	176	129	—	720	176	—	—	23
									FW
									3EMU
1981-82	444	141	113	32	730	300	—	12	31
Total	3272	1058	738	179	5247	1813	414	12	251

(ii) I.C.F.

23. The installed capacity per year of the ICF which produces the bulk of the passenger coaches is 750. During the period from 1974-75

to 1977-78 the capacity utilisation was only 77.7 per cent while during 1978-79 to 1981-82 it was 97.1%. The Committee desired to know why production of coaches in the ICF was curtailed to 77.7 per cent of the capacity (average) during 1974-75 to 1977-78. In reply, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated :

“The coach manufacturing activity at ICF during 1974-75 to 1977-78 was kept at a level lower than the installed capacity of 750 coaches per annum, on account of funds constraints, within the limited funds made available by the Planning Commission. Details of Budget provision made and the coaches manufactured, year by year are as under :

Year	Budget provision made (in no. of coaches).			Actual Production.				
	Budget Revised Final			Railways EMU Coaches	Total	Export	Total	
	Estt.	Estt.	Modifin.					
1974-75	588	540	549	138	411	549	21	570
1975-76	477	493	508	55	453	508	9	517
1976-77	470	554	554	29	529	558	17	575
1977-78	643	652	671	102	569	671	Nil.	671

Apart from the funds constraints, in 1974-75, there was also a general strike in May, 1974. Severe power cuts were imposed by Tamilnadu State Electricity Board during 1974-75 and 1976-77 which affected the production operations, both at ICF as well as in the works of suppliers of purchase components to ICF.

The spare capacity on account of less production of coaches for the railways on account of budgetary constraints, was utilised for the following purposes :

- (i) Export of coaches—
 - 21 in 1974-75
 - 9 in 1975-76
 - 17 in 1976-77 (as already shown in the Foregoing table).
- (ii) POH and corrosion repair of coaches—
 - 1975-76—130 coaches were given POH and 140 coaches were given corrosion repair.

1976-77—77 coaches were given POH and 102 were given corrosion repair.

1977-78—12 coaches were given POH.”

24. In reply to a question regarding the financial implications of under utilisation of production capacity in ICF during the four years 1974-78 as estimated on the basis of RSP credit for the installed capacity of 750 coaches (product mix for installed capacity during these four years assumed to be same as for the actual out-turn), the Ministry of Railways have furnished the following information :

Year	OUT-TURN		INSTALLED CAPACITY		UNUTILISED CAPACITY	
	No. of coaches	Value (Rs. in crores)	No. of coaches	Value (Rs. in crores)	No. of coaches	Value (Rs. in crores)
1974-75	570	29.89	750	39.33	180	9.44
1975-76	517	27.88	750	40.44	233	12.56
1976-77	575	30.00	750	39.13	175	9.13
1977-78	671	37.21	750	41.59	79	4.38

25. The main reason for the low capacity utilisation in ICF was stated to be lack of funds allotted for production of coaches. It was, however, seen, in audit that the budget allotment under Rolling Stock (carriages) had been revised downward at the revised estimate stage in 1974-75 and again during 1977-78 to 1979-80, and balance diverted for loco (besides wagon) procurement, the result of which was surplus loco holding and deterioration in their utilisation indices. At the instance of the Committee, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have furnished the following details about the funds allocated to ICF for production of coaches and the funds surrendered, if any, at the end of the year during the period from 1974-75 to 1981-82.

(Rs. in crores)		
Year	Budget estimate for ICF	Amount Surrendered
1974-75	29.33	Nil
1975-76	27.66	Nil
1976-77	29.38	Nil
*1977-78	40.33	3.37
**1978-79	38.50	2.13
1979-80	40.41	Nil
1980-81	41.44	Nil
1981-82	51.00	Nil

* In 1977-78 an amount of Rs. 3.37 crores was surrendered on ICF account while the coach production was revised upwards by 9 Nos. This was due to change in product mix resulting in curtailment of EMUs and upward revision of conventional stock. The cost of EMUs is higher.

** In 1978-79 there was a surrender of Rs. 2.12 crores without any cut in coach production due to accounting adjustment viz. realisation of some debits.

26. According to audit paragraph the actual production of lower and upper class coaches in the ICF during the years 1974 to 1981 was as under :

Year	Number built		Total cost of manufacture	
	Lower class II all type	Upper class AC, Ist, AC II tier etc.	Lower (in crores of Rs.)	Upper
1974-78	1296	589	59.02	34.35
1978-81	1605	133	85.16	18.03
Total	2901	722	144.18	52.38

27. Audit para points out that an analysis of the passenger traffic and earnings therefrom during 1974-81 indicated that 99 per cent of the passengers travelled in the lower class while only one per cent travelled in the upper classes. However, 27 per cent of the amount spent by the ICF in manufacture of passenger coaches was for production of upper

class coaches. When asked about the justification of spending disproportionately high amount on the production of upper class coaches, the representative of Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in evidence :

The needs of the upper class passengers also have to be met. We have to cater to the needs of all sections of society."

28. Explaining the position further, the Chairman Railway Board stated :

"We have been introducing classless trains. A large number of trains introduced in recent years are only with lower class accommodation. Again the figures of 99 and 1 are the figures of numbers and not the earning capacity derived from higher class and lower class. In the earning capacity the ratio is 1 : 9. That means 11% is earned from the upper class passengers."

He added :

"Out of 10 million railway passengers per day, more than 5 million are commuters in the cities of Calcutia, Bombay and Madras. They are mostly travelling in short-distance trains which require a very insignificant proportion of (upper class) coaches as such. Their requirement is only Second Class coaches. They never think of travelling by upper class. Only long-distance passengers think of travelling by upper class. Therefore, upper class coaches will be required on long-distance trains. There can, therefore, be no direct comparison between the number of commuters and coaches of upper class."

29. When asked about the percentage of passengers travelling by the lower class in the long distance trains, the witness stated :

"The percentage reads as under : total suburban, all class, 55.37 percent; non-suburban 44.63 percent. These are 1980-81 figures. Out of the non-suburban of 44.63 per cent, upper class is 0.28 per cent. Second mail/express 7.20 per cent and Second ordinary 37.15 per cent: these make a total of 44.63 per cent."

30 To a query whether it implied that 0.5 per cent long distance non-suburban passengers were carried in upper class and 99.5 per cent passengers travelled in lower class, the witness replied in affirmative.

Further asked as to how the investment of 27 per cent on upper class coaches was justified when only 0.5 per cent passengers travelled in these coaches and they in turn provided only 11 per cent of earnings to the Railways, the representative of the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated :

“With regard to the total seating capacity for the Second class passengers and the transportation of the coaches, line capacity is a constraint. For every second class AC sleeper we are manufacturing, we are able to reduce 2 first class coaches assuming that second class coaches are available. Thus the net result of producing second class AC coaches is that capacity has been increased.”

He added :

“Now with the total line capacity limitation we have, we run trains with double engines; all these things we have done. The only way is to add another second class coach if available. If the funds were not diverted, we would have had more second class coaches but we could not have carried them on the existing trains. Another method of making available more capacity on each train is to add a second class AC coach.”

31. Explaining the position further in this regard, the Chairman (Railway Board) stated :

“With a diesel engine ... or electric engine, I can run a 17 coach train. I cannot put the 18th coach because the engine cannot haul it. Now supposing I run 17 double deckers only, then I multiply 144 × 17. Now, again supposing with 17 second class chair cars only *vis-a-vis* first class, I carry double the number of passengers. The alternative is to run two trains. The moment I run a second train, two freight trains are cut. That means I cannot carry freight on that route. These are all exercises done not in isolation but in a composite manner. That is the line capacity, the route capacity and the engine capacity. All these factors come in.”

32. According to audit paragraph, the ICF produced as many as 49 AC full and 7 AC partial coaches at a cost of Rs. 5.71 crores, upto 1980-81 while 29 AC full coaches were under production (November 1981) (cost Rs. 3.83 crores). This was despite the fact that the occupancy percentage of AC coaches was poor and the earnings well below their repair

and maintenance cost. When asked about the percentage of occupancy of upper class coaches on all Mail and Express trains during the year 1980-81, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note that statistics in respect of class-wise percentage occupation of Mail and Express trains are not maintained.

33. Asked whether in planning the production of AC coaches, the Railway Board had kept in view the needs of the traffic and the recommendation of RCC, 1973 regarding the need for taking into account the requirements of lower class passengers, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated :

“Yes. The production of AC First class coaches has been stopped on additional account since 1977-78. A review of running of 1st AC Services on various trains on Indian Railways is also being done.”

34. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated further in a note :

“The growing requirement of lower class sleeper coaches and the need to relieve overcrowding in lower class has been kept in view while planning for additional coaches. There has been an increase in the seating capacity in lower class BG on the Indian Railways from 7,58,454 in 1969-70 to 9,82,825 in 1981-82 (i.e. 29.58%). The upper class seating capacity was, however, 95122 in 1969-70 which has now decreased to 78580 in 1981-82. The capacity for upper class during 1981-82 was only 7.4% of the total seating capacity.”

35. At the instance of the Committee, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have finished the following statement indicating the losses/profits incurred in running AC coaches on all Railways during 1978-79 and 1979-80:—

(Figures in lakhs of Rs.)							(+) denotes profit
							(-) denotes loss
Rlys.	1978-79			1979-80			
	B.G.	M.G.	Total	B.G.	M.G.	Total	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Eastern	(+) 25	---	(+) 25	(+) 32	---	(+) 32	
Northern	(+) 43	(--)	(+) 40	(+) 46	(-) 8	(+) 38	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
North-Eastern	—	(-) 6	(-) 6		(-) 7	(-) 7
N.E. Frontier	(-) 2	(-) 12	(-) 14	(-) 1	(-) 14	(-) 15
Southern	(-) 12	(+) 2	(-) 10	(-) 11	(+) 5	(-) 6
S. Central	(+) 9	—	(+) 9	(-) 9	—	(-) 9
Western	(+) 46	(-) 11	(+) 35	(+) 45	(-) 6	(+) 39
Central			(-) 76.90			(-) 100.00
S. Eastern			(+) 12.55			(-) 24.00

36. During evidence, the Committee pointed out that the Railways were incurring losses on AC coaches which entered to the rich while they were earning profits on coaches which catered to the poor. To this, the representative of the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) replied:

“As far as profitability is concerned, in the case of I Class air-conditioned we are losing and in the first class and II class air-conditioned and chair car, we are making a profit. In the case of other services on mail and express trains we are making a profit but in second class ordinary services we are losing. That is the overall global feature.”

37. Explaining the position further in this regard, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note:

“The A.C. Chair Car services are self supporting while the A.C.C. services (excluding 2-tier A.C. Sleeper class which is bracketed with I class) as a whole are showing a negative return.

Even in the A.C.C. Services three major Railways (Eastern, Northern & Western) are giving positive returns. Of the remaining, the three predominantly Metre Gauge Railways (North Eastern, Northeast Frontier & South Central) and the Southern Railways have recorded marginal losses, while the losses on South Eastern & Central Railways are particularly high.

The above variations in the profitability of ACC Services on the different Zonal Railways are generally attributable to differences in:—

- (i) The proportion of originating traffic to traffic carried:
- (ii) The degree of occupancy:

- (iii) average lead of travel; and
- (iv) the condition of stock on line, affecting the quantum of expenditure on maintenance.

For instance, the ratio of passengers originating to passengers carried in ACC on Central Railway (42%) is only about half of such ratio on the Northern Railway (87%) and Western Railway 85%. The occupancy per vehicle and the average lead on Central Railway are also much less as compared to Northern Railway or Western Railway. Correspondingly, the earning per vehicle kilometre also is considerably less on Central Railway, as compared to Northern & Western Railways, while the expenses per vehicle kilometre on the Central Railway is about the same as on Northern & Western Railways".

38. In reply to a question whether any costing study had been carried out with regard to the operational cost of 1st class AC coaches, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have explained the position in a note as under:

"Though separate accounts of expenses are not maintained by classes of services, cost studies of classwise passenger services are carried out for each Zonal Railway after the final audited accounts of a financial year become available. On this basis, the cost of working ACC (1st class AC coaches) is also worked out and viewed against the earnings for that class to assess its profitability or otherwise.

2. The position in respect of the last five years, viz. 1975-76 to 1979-80, is furnished below :

Year	B.G.	M.G.	Total	(Figures in crores of Rs.)
1975-76	(+) 0.47	(-) 0.26	(+) 0.21	
1976-77	(+) 0.62	(-) 0.22	(+) 0.40	
1977-78	(+) 0.06	(-) 0.29	(-) 0.23	
1978-79	(+) 0.45	(-) 0.30	(+) 0.15	
1979-80	(-) 0.22	(-) 0.30	(-) 0.52	

It will be seen that while the B.G. services have been generally profitable except in the year 1979-80, the MG services have been consistently showing a negative return.

In the overall, however, the AC I class services were profitable in 2 years upto 1976-77 but started showing a negative return for 1977-78, though there was a marginal recovery in 1978-79 before plummeting to a loss of Rs. 52 lakhs in 1979-80. It is significant that during the period of 1977-78 to 1979-80, no upward adjustment of fare for ACI class had been resorted to inspite of the progressively increasing costs of operation during those years."

39. In reply to a further question regarding the remedial measures taken to reduce the losses/making it viable to running I class AC services to the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated that the following measures have been taken :

- (a) upward adjustments of fares for I Class ACC during the years 1980, 1981 and 1982.
- (b) re-deployment of the existing fleet of I Class AC coaches to the extent possible/necessary to maximise utilisation and increase their earning potential.
- (c) introduction of an air-conditioned coach of a new design with 10 J Class AC berths and 34 AC Chair Car seat in replacement of the exclusive I Class AC coaches with 18 berths, thereby bringing down the capital investment and operating cost per I Class AC berth.
- (d) a number of coaches on the Central Railway are old and therefore the maintenance costs are high. These coaches will be scrapped very soon.

40. During evidence the Chairman, Railway Board explained:

"The real losing proposition is AC first class and a policy decision has been taken not to manufacture any more first class AC coaches. The second AC and First class on Mail and Express trains is a paying proposition whereas the suburban second class is a losing proposition."

He added:

"We make a general review to see where the AC coaching services are not popular or remunerative. Firstly, the manufacture of AC coaches has been stopped. We are using only those we have Secondly, the Delhi- Bombay route on the Central Railway is no longer popular, but the same on Western Railway is. People

have to pay less there. and travel faster. So, after review, the I class AC coaches on the Central Railway have been withdrawn, or reduced in frequency, from certain pairs of trains."

41. When asked about the production programme of coaches, the representative of Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated :

"These are 1982-83 BG figures. Second Class sleeper 185, Second Class ordinary 137 Day coaches plus 228 GSS— 190 SLRS— second class cum luggage van. I would rather give figures for 1981-82 here which I have got—Sleepers—95, second class ordinary—305, second class Chair cars—AC—2 tier—58 and SLRs—176 SNCLR 19, and LR 34."

42. When enquired about the possibility of introducing trains having only one class, the Chairman, Railway Board stated:

"If you run beyond 110 KM, airconditioning becomes a must; dust hazard is there. So it becomes a sort of basic necessity. Japan is running at 210 KM; France is running at 275 KM. It will really be suffocation if you run at 130 KM and don't have airconditioning. There are a number of technological changes which have taken place in this regard."

BEML and JESSOP

43. During the period from 1974-75 to 1977-78 the capacity utilisation in the case of BEML and JESSOP (taking into account their installed capacity as 400 coaches per year for both) was 54 and 34 per cent respectively. Thereafter, while the utilisation in ICF improved to 97.1 per cent during the period from 1978-79 to 1981-82 there was only marginal improvement in the utilisation of capacity in BEML to 59.3 per cent and in case of JESSOP it actually fell to 8.2 per cent during the same period.

44. During evidence the Committee desired to know the reasons for shortfall in production of coaches by BEML and Jessop. To this the representative of Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated:

"The actual capacity of BEML has been assumed at 400 coaches per annum but we are informed that it is 300 coaches per annum. The capacity of Jessop is lower".

45. When enquired why the Railway Board did not inform the Audit or the Committee earlier these figures were not correct, the witness replied :

"I came to know of it only two days ago."

46. If the installed capacity of BEML is assumed as 300 coaches per year the capacity utilisation during the period from 1974-75 to 1977-78 and 1978-79 to 1981-82 comes to 72.0 and 79.1 per cent respectively.

47. According to audit paragraph paucity of funds, as also of wheel sets and other free supply items (supplied by the Railway Board) affected the production of coaches in the BEML (production during 1980-81) being only 176 against 270 coaches programmed while curtailment of funds and delay in finalisation of prices for EMUs retarded their production by Jessop during 1969-73 (the issue was settled only by 1976), later the production was affected by labour trouble etc. for some time and recommended from 1979-80 but the actual production during 1980-81 was only 26 against 118 coaches programmed.

48. The Committee desired to know whether any efforts were being made by Railway Board in consultation with controlling Ministries (Ministry of Defence for BEML and Ministry of Heavy Industry for Jessops) to improve their capacity utilisation for production of more Railway coaches. In a note furnished in this regard, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated:

"Coach production programme for each year is drawn out consistent with funds made available by the Planning Commission. However, BEML slipped up even with reference to these targets and during the period 1974-75 to 1981-82 the funds allocated for acquisition of coaches BEML could be utilised to the extent of about 80 to 90% only (except in 1978-79) as would be seen from the table annexed below. In 1981-82 the target was fully attained.

(In crores of rupees)

Year	Budget Estimate		Funds surrendered	
	BEML	Jessop	BEML	Jessop
1974-75	10.13	4.39	1.71	Nil
1975-76	9.00	6.35	Nil	Nil
1976-77	6.00	8.81	Nil	0.86
1977-78	14.78	1.76	2.51	Nil
1978-79	15.10	1.36	4.07	Nil
1979-80	17.98	13.08	2.03	9.08
1980-81	23.14	13.99	3.70	7.47
1981-82	22.25	17.20	Nil	6.70

In case of Jessops, since they had suspended coach production with effect from 1976-77, and have re-started only in 1979-80 the performance has not been upto the mark and there has been considerable slippage.

The shortfalls are taken up regularly at the highest level viz. that of Chairman and Managing Directors of the plants.

With regard to capacity utilisation, BEML achieved 100% utilisation of their installed capacity of 300 coaches in 1981-82. Jessops are showing signs of improvement."

49. When enquired how and within what period the Railway Board proposed to procure the coaches already on order with BEML and Jessops, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note :

"Outstanding load as on 1.4.1982 on M/s BEML and Jessops is as under :

M/s BEML	---	1240 coaches
M/s Jessops	---	854 coaches (inclusive of EMUs)

As per M/s BEML and Jessops anticipated production at the rate of 325 coaches and 150 coaches (inclusive of EMUs) per year (Based on targets for 1982-83 within the available funds provision) respectively, the above mentioned outstanding load will be completed by 1985-86 and 1988-89 respectively. However, Jessops have a capacity for 250 coaches and they have attained this level in 1972-73. On this basis the load on them would get completed by middle of 1985-86."

Workshops

50. During 1974-75 to 1978-79, the Railway workshops exceeded their installed capacity of 500 coaches by manufacturing 656 coaches mainly for departmental services (e.g. relief vans, stores delivery vans, inspection carriages, crew rest vans etc.). The production of other coaching vehicles, such as SLRs, luggage brake vans, parcel vans etc., required for parcel and luggage traffic, however, accounted for only 20 percent of the capacity.

51. It is seen from audit para that the luggage space provided in the first class coaches was found to be poorly utilised (being unguarded). This space was ordered (August 1972) by the Railway Board to be converted

into two first class berths per coach in Railway workshops. This scheme has, however, made very poor progress, only 16 out of 387 first class (BG) coaches having been converted till December 1981. Similarly, on the MG 324 such type coaches were awaiting conversion by Railway workshops.

52. According to Railway Board, the slow progress in the conversion of these coaches with luggage compartment was due to the inadequate capacity of the Railway workshops to undertake the work alongwith POH work. However, during 1973-74 to 1977-78, against the total monthly POH capacity of 2134 coaches in Railway workshops on the BG, the out-turn ranged from 1563 to 1898. On the MG, against the capacity of 1471 the out-turn ranged from 1252 to 1419. The POH out-turn was thus less than the available capacity in the workshops on the zonal railways from 1973-74.

Extent of ineffectives

53. The assessment of requirement of coaches made by the Railway Board takes into account the usage norms (vehicle km per vehicle day) achieved in recent years. Allowance is also made for ineffectives, to cover coaches under repair, periodical overhaul (POH), detention at destination stations, etc. at 14 per cent of the coaching stock and an additional 12.5 per cent. as spares (for special trains or as standby to coaches in the rakes, etc).

54. When enquired whether the target of 14 percent as ineffectives was not very high, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) explained in a note as under :

“For fixing the target ineffective percentage of coaching stock, a detailed study was carried out by the Efficiency Bureau. Thereafter a Committee was constituted to go into the Efficiency Bureau's study and suggest the targets. The Committee did sample surveys, visited various shops, studied the actual conditions prevailing and took all aspects into account before arriving at any conclusion.

The Committee recommended the following split up of the ineffectives :

- | | |
|---|------|
| 1. (a) In Mechanical Workshops for POH, including trial and post trial repairs. | 6.5% |
| (b) In Mech. Workshops for NPCH repairs. | 1.0% |

2. (a) In sick lines and transportation depots for mechanical repairs including placement time.	2.0%
(b) In sick lines and transportation depots for electrical repairs including placement time.	2.0%
3. Stabled in yards, sick lines and transportation Depots awaiting POH/NPCH repairs in shops, and transit time to shops.	2.5%
	14.0%

The POH period for mail/express coaches is one year and for passenger vehicles on other than mail/express trains 18 months and for other coaching vehicles on other than mail/express trains 24 months. From actual studies, it is however, observed that the average period for the existing "product mix" for each coach to visit shops is in the region of 14 months. Taking about 25 days for POH in shops and thereafter allowing for trial and post-trial repairs, the target of 6.5% is considered reasonable.

For nominated periodical overhaul, viz., special repairs attention to accidented, damaged and vandalised coaches etc., a target of 1% has been fixed based on the sample surveys. The target of 2% for sick line repairs (mechanical) has been laid after a realistic study, taking into account the running repairs required in such lines for attending to various periodical schedules, oiling, repacking, roller bearing examination, greasing, dash pot topping up, flushing of water tanks alarm chain testing etc.

With considerable increase in recent years of electrically equipped coaches as well as increase in electrical amenities, viz., air conditioning etc., a target of 2% to take care of electrical preventive maintenance, is considered justified, specially taking into account the vandalism, pilferages, frequent thefts of electrical fittings etc.

Due to a large number of coaches being overaged (7.14% on BG and 7.66 on MG) and POH capacity being limited, coaches which are dilapidated and run down condition, have to be stabled in yards, sick lines and transportation depots awaiting POH repairs in shops. If to this, transit time of coaches from base shop to the repair shop is taken into account, the effective percentage fixed as 2.5 under this head seems reasonable.

With high speed train operation recently introduced and average earning of kilometres per coach going up (from 274 in 1966-67

to 314 in 1980-81 in the case of BG PCVs), the coaches have to be given intermediate overhaul at half the POH period prescribed. These repairs were not envisaged when the target of 14% was fixed. Considering the above and in view of the fact that this matter has already been studied in great depth earlier, provision of 14% ineffective is not considered high."

55. Out of 14% as ineffective, 20% is for ineffective in sickness and transportation Depots for electrical repairs including placement time. The Committee desired to know the steps being taken to reduce the number of sick coaches under this category. In reply, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note :

- "The Ministry of Railways have laid down an overall target for ineffective coaching stock on Railways at 14 per cent. Out of this percentage, 2% is for ineffectiveness in sickness and transportation Depots for electrical repairs including placement time. The coach ineffective on electrical account is generally within the prescribed norm of 2% on Indian Railways. All efforts are made to keep the lighting and fans in coaches in satisfactory condition. Rigid and thorough checks and maintenance are carried out at terminal stations. The staff carry out maintenance generally on nominated trains basis which ensure better accountability and keep down the number of sick coaches.
- Various steps are taken by the Railways to reduce the number of sick coaches due to electrical causes. Some of the important steps being taken in this regard are :
 - (i) Wherever possible, coaches are repaired in the maintenance yard itself without detaching the coaches from the rakes. Only in the case of major repairs coaches are detached and placed on the sick lines for attention.
 - (ii) Adequate spares are arranged as far as possible at the depots for quick replacement of defective components.
 - (iii) Checking of coaches in important trains especially during rush periods like summer rush etc.
 - (iv) Checks during special drives like Train Lighting Week, Passenger Amenities Week, Cleanliness Drives etc.
 - (v) Electrical staff on duty accompanying trains attend to defects of lights and fans so that passengers are not put to inconvenience.

(vi) Mid-on and end-on generation system of train lighting where a diesel generator is provided in the middle or ends of the train to feed the electric power to all coaches is being progressively introduced on slow passenger and branch line trains. This system will result in improved lights and fans in slow speed passenger trains where self generation is not effective."

56. The Committee desired to know whether the Railway maintain data regarding coaches running with defective lights and fans or rundown batteries and whether any checks were prescribed to be conducted by senior officers of Railways on the functioning of lights, fans and other facilities. Explaining the position in this regard the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have *inter-alia* stated :

"Maintenance schedules exist on Railways which are carried out for ensuring proper upkeep of lights and fans. The condition of train lighting and fans is also periodically inspected by the senior officers at Divisional and Headquarters level on Zonal Railways and by the joint team of officers of Railway Board and Railways. Generally such checks cover various important aspects such as whether the dynamos are generating adequate electricity, whether batteries are fully charged, whether the electric fitting like fans, bulbs, wiring etc. in the coaches are functioning properly, whether there is any pilferage of electric fittings from the coaches etc.

Recently, Services Improvement Group has been formed as directed by the Minister of Railways. This Group includes two electrical officers. These officers have been directed to carry out special inspections at various stations. The observations made by this group are being taken notice by the Railways concerned for necessary remedial action. This is also being followed up by the Railway Board."

57. As against the target norms for ineffectives *viz.* 14 per cent, the actuals according to audit para. (as per statistical records compiled by the Railways) for all passenger coaches (BG) were as under :

Year	POH in workshop	Non-POH repairs in workshop	Sickline etc.	Stabled in yards	Total
1974-75	8.42	2.86	2.97	1.73	15.98
1976-77	7.16	2.45	2.53	0.60	12.74
1979-80	7.41	3.06	2.74	0.69	13.90
1980-81	6.89	2.98	3.64	0.97	14.48

58. It is seen from above that the total ineffectives for all passenger coaches (BG) increased gradually from 1976-77 to 1980-81. When asked whether the Railways had analysed the reasons for deterioration in the availability of passenger coaches and about the remedial measures being taken in this regard, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in a note :

59. A break-up of the total ineffectives of coaches for the 3 years in question is given below :

Years	Total ineffective percentage	In shop	Stabled awaiting shop repairs	In running sheds or sick lines	In transit
1976-77	12.74	7.16	2.53	2.45	0.60
1979-80	13.90	7.41	2.74	3.06	0.69
1980-81	14.46	6.87	3.64	2.98	0.97

60. This shows that while the percentage of coaches under repair in shops has remained virtually constant and, in fact, reduced in 1981-82, the coaches awaiting repairs and under repairs in sick-lines have increased and are primarily responsible for the increase in total percentage. Both the factors have increased due to an acute shortage of workshop capacity. Owing to this shortage, coaches cannot be taken into workshops in time and have to wait for their turn. Also with less workshop capacity, a heavier load falls on the sick lines.

61. Audit para points out that a census taken by the Railway Administrations in March, 1981 (with reference to the position of all passenger coaches including coaches found defective at the departure time of trains) showed that the actual number of passenger coaches under repairs was much higher than that shown above, being between 19.9 and 22.5 per cent. It was particularly heavy in respect of AC (all types 22.8 to 32.6 per cent) First class (23.9 per cent), second class general (20.5%) Second class two tier (22.2 per cent) and SLR coaches (19.5 per cent)*. It was only in the case of Second class three tier coaches that the ineffectives were 13.9 per cent. Thus, the coaches remained idle for longer periods than what was shown in the statistical records and consequently, the percentage of actual ineffectives was much more than the prescribed target norm of 14 per cent.

*A census conducted in March 1975 by the Railway Board had also disclosed similar high percentage of ineffectives viz AC-(36 to 42.6), First class—(26.7), Second class general—(22.5), and SLR —(24.2).

62. The Committee desired to know the reasons for the wide discrepancy in figures of 19.9 to 22.5 per cent of coaches under repairs as revealed by the census taken by the Railway Administration and 14.48 per cent of coaches under repairs as shown in the statistical records. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have explained the position as under :

“As per the Manual of Statistical Instructions, “a coaching vehicle is to be considered as under or awaiting repairs for one day for every 24 hours or portion thereof, after the first 24 hours during which the vehicle is unfit to run.” Therefore, coaches which are ineffective for less than 24 hours are not statistically ineffective. Census, however, enumerates all coaches ineffective at a particular point of time, inclusive of coaches ineffective for under 24 hours. This evidently results in census figures being higher than figures reflected in statistics.

Further, the statistical figure is an average of the daily position for the month/year as a whole, whereas the census figures are as at a particular time of the day on which the census was taken. Coaches marked sick and made fit the same day will also not be reflected in the Statistical compilation, whereas in the census vehicles which are made fit the same day are not excluded once they come in the count at the specified time when census is taken.

The two sets of figures would naturally vary because of these differences in procedures; and it does not automatically follow that there is any basic defect in the methodology for compilation of statistical data.

It may be added that the compilation of statistical data is regularly checked by the statistical inspection teams on the zonal railways and the Railway Board, and any deviation from the prescribed procedure laid down in the Statistical Manual is brought to the notice of the concerned authorities for remedial action.”

63. The Committee desired to know the follow up action taken by the Railway Board after ascertaining the results of the coaching census study. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in reply :

“The census gives us actual position of coaching stock not in use, viz., coaches lying at unimportant places out of use, coaches

lying ineffective etc. Based on the census, in addition to putting into use the coaches which are out of use, extra measures are planned and taken to make fit the ineffective coaches. Further coaches out of use and lying at way-side stations are worked to terminals, to bring the trains to the prescribed load. Based on census results, efforts are made to trace out the unenumerated coaches, locate them and put them to effective use. Keeping in view advantages which accrue by a census, it has now been decided to have a census of coaches not running in the train every month."

64. 2.5 per cent of the stock is the target set for the sick coaches, stabled in yards sick lines, etc. In actual practice, as may be seen from details with Railway-wise break up during 1980-81, the percentage of stock stabled was 4.6 per cent. The Railway-wise position of the percentage of passenger coaches (BG) under POH, repairs non POH repairs, in sicklines, coaches stabled awaiting repairs was as under vis-a-vis the targets fixed (1980-81):

1980-81				
	PHO repairs (Workshops)	Non-PH repairs (sick- lines)	Stabled awaiting repairs including stock in transit	Total
Target (All Railways)	7.5	4.0	2.5	14.00
Actuals (All Railways)	6.89	2.98	4.61	14.48
Railway wise break up is as under:				
Central	7.46	2.60	3.04	13.10
Eastern	7.42	3.12	5.81	16.31
Northern	7.37	1.51	2.87	11.75
Northeast	7.70	5.25	5.00	17.95
Frontier				
Southern	6.74	3.95	3.44	14.13
South Central	4.80	1.86	7.38	14.04
South Eastern	6.81	4.77	9.13	20.70
Western	6.49	2.62	1.55	10.66

Note : A coach which does not remain under repairs for more than 24 hours does not find a place in the number of sick coaches.

65. The Committee desired to know why the percentage of the stock stabled in yards, sicklines etc. was high particularly on Eastern, Northeast, South Central and South-Eastern, Railways, being 5.81, 5.00 7.38 and 9.13 respectively. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have explained the position in a note thus:

“During 1976-77, the total ineffectives were 12.74% of which 3.4% comprised coaches awaiting workshop attention or in transit. Since then there has been a continuous shortage of capacity in the workshops that has increased over the years. New works would not be sanctioned nor sanctioned work progressed at the pace required for want of funds. Owing to shortage of capacity in the workshops, all coaches needing attention could not be taken into the workshops and hence waited for repairs. This lead to an increase in coaches awaiting workshop repairs and in transit and in 1980-81 became 4.61% against a total ineffective of 14.46%.

The Eastern region comprising North Eastern, Northeast Frontier, Eastern and South Eastern Railways have about 35% of the coaches of the Indian Railways. With this large holding, the region has capacity to POH only 675 coaches/month against an arising of about 900 coaches per month. There is thus a shortage of 25% against an all India shortage of less than 20%. Hence, percentage of coaches awaiting repairs on these Railways is higher than the all-India average.

On South Central Railway, only one workshop for giving POH to B.G. coaches exists that has a capacity of 170 units per month. The Railway's requirement is 220. There is thus a shortfall of about 22%. This is more than the overall Indian Railways shortfall of less than 20%. Hence, coaches awaiting repairs are higher on this Railway than other Railways.”

66. In this connection the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have further stated in a note as under:

“by increasing productivity in the existing workshops by a concerted effort by the Railways concerned, the coaches awaiting repairs and in transit as found in the census carried out on 1.11.82 have been brought down as follows :

Eastern Railway		3.73%
South Central	...	2.8%
South Eastern	...	2.7%

The position is expected to become normal once the new workshops under construction become operational.

While all figures in this lot are for BG, figure for ineffective of North Eastern Railway is for MG. This figure has improved from 5.00% in 1980-81 to 2.39% in September, 1982."

67. Audit para points out that a major factor affecting the availability of coaches was the inadequate POH capacity in Railway Workshops, inadequate facilities for routine repairs in sheds and sick lines, for washing of coaches etc. at major terminal stations, etc.

68. Audit para further points out that the break-up of the cycle of 24 hours of the movement of a passenger coach during 1980-81 has revealed that a coach remained for 27 per cent of the time in a day in sick-lines, maintenance sheds and workshops. When asked during evidence whether this percentage was not high, the Chairman, Railway Board replied:

"This 27 per cent is definitely high. We can make up by having greater facilities. But the fact of life is that today our POH capacity is less than what it was with the result that we are mounting up arrears. Again, it is a question of the investment being short and we are to complete these shops at a much faster pace. We give Rs. 2 crores instead of Rs. 20 crores. This 27 per cent from our standard we should be able to improve."

69. In regard to improvement of the working of the workshops and sheds the Minister for Railway *inter alia* stated during the Railway Budget speech as under:

"I have asked both the Chairman and the Member, Mechanical of the Railway Board to visit major workshops with a view to evaluating the repair and maintenance of facilities available and suggesting concrete and practical measures for improving the utilisation of the available capacity. I have also instructed the General Managers to ensure that at least 10 per cent improvement in the capacity utilisation of the workshops and sheds is positively achieved by the end of the current calendar year."

Workshops

70. The overall shortage in the POH capacity was assessed (in 1979) at about 1,500 BG/coaches per year. Major works to augment the repair facilities, including installation of diesel generating sets to make up power

shortage, etc. were being considered and included in the Works programme from 1977-78 but are yet to be completed (1981-82). Meanwhile, the average monthly POH lagged behind the capacity (estimated at 2,104 coaches) resulting in the percentage of coaches overdue for POH increasing from 8.8 in 1973-74 to 16.6 in 1980-81. While the holding of coaches increased net by 10.5 per cent between 1974-75 and 1980-81, the workshop capacity which was assessed at 2104 in 1973-74 remained static during this period: as per the monthly appreciation Report of Railway Board (December 1981) this capacity was reassessed at 2081 coaches only.

71. It is observed that the following factors have effected adversely the out-turn of Railway workshops in recent years:

- (i) Acute shortage of electric power;
- (ii) Inadequate supplies of wheels, tyres and axles;
- (iii) Inadequate supplies of vital materials, fittings;
- (iv) Corrosion repairs.

72. On being enquired about the steps being taken to overcome these difficulties, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note as under:

“During 1979-80 and 1980-81 virtually all railway workshops were adversely affected due to drastic cut in electric power. This not only affected railway workshops directly but traditional suppliers of material also faced this shortage and therefore could not supply material required for maintenance. The position improved by the middle of 1980-81 with better availability of power supply. Out-turn from workshops also improved subsequently as did supply of material. However, to guard against such a situation again the Railways have approved procurement of 28 Diesel Generating Sets of various capacities for its workshop since 79-80 so that stand by power is available in case of failure of power supply. A large number of these sets have already been commissioned.

While procurement from trade has to be depended upon for some items, where possible the Railways are undertaking manufacture of selected vital items themselves. Such items include pins and bushes for brake rigging, springs, etc. Alternative material are also being tried out and used which are more readily available, cheaper and longer lasting.

Alongwith increasing capacity for periodical over of coaches, capacity for doing corrosion repairs has already been increased in the last 2 years. For instance against a total of 2340 BG coaches being given corrosion repairs in 1980-82, 3175 were given corrosion repairs in 1981-82. During 1982-83 it is expected that the out-turn will be 3200. All new workshops being set up have planned for a corresponding corrosion repair section.

Supplies of wheels and axles for coaching stock from Durgapur were poor during 1979-80 and 1980-81. Subsequently the items have been made up from other sources including import.

Another reasons for the low out-turn has been theft and vandalism of coach fittings which results in a heavy need to replace such fittings during repairs and consequent low out-turn."

73. It is seen from the audit paragraph that on the Central Railway, 33 coaches suffered transit detention during 1979 of 10 to 35 days (per coach) between base station and workshop besides waiting period of 55 to 120 days (per coach) in workshop premises before entering POH sheds. On the Western Railway (Parel Mechanical Workshop), the average time taken for POH during 1979-80 was between 21.9 and 22.9 days in respect of passenger and other than passenger vehicles respectively against the target of 18 days. Increase in repair days in recent years especially in 1979-80, was *inter alia*, due to the time required for corrosion repairs in steel bodied coaches, which become acute in 1979-80 on the Central, Western, South Central and Northeast Frontier Railways, mainly owing to (as seen from workshop records) inadequate observance of preventive maintenance instructions/non-completion of corrosion repairs prescribed by the Research, Designs and Standard Organisation (RDSO).

74. It is observed that steel bodied coaches were introduced over 25 years back and over the years, more and more steel bodied coaches are being put on line, these types of coaches are to be given heavy corrosion repairs once in 7 years. With the progressive condemnation of wooden bodied coaches and their replacement with steel bodied coaches, corrosion repairs arising have steadily been increasing from year to year requiring creation of additional repair capacity and drawing up programmes of repair of coaches as per schedule and instructions given by RDSO from 1972. Due to lack of planned efforts in this regard, a sizeable number of coaches (estimated at about 350 to 400) have been queuing up at all time for corrosion repairs.

75. The Committee desired to know the quantum of corrosion repairs on steel bodied coaches (in terms of mandays and amount of repairs cost per coach) and the number of such coaches requiring attention dealt with during 1980-81 and 1981-82. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in a note:

“The average mandays required for corrosion repair of broad gauge steel bodied coach are 500 and a metre gauge coach 410. The corresponding cost of repairs are Rs. 35,000 and Rs. 25,000 respectively. The number of coaches attended to in 1980-81 were 2340 broad gauge and 900 metre gauge. In 1981-82 the coaches given repairs were 3175 BG and 1000 metre gauge.”

76. When asked about the number of such coaches affected by corrosion outstanding as at the end of March, 1981 and March 1982 in the various Railway workshops, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated:

“Figure for coaches awaiting corrosion repair at the end of March 1981 was 386 BG and 58 MG. The corresponding figure in March 1982 was 414 BG and 83 MG.

However, even in the correct figure there is an increase of about 12% in the number of coaches awaiting corrosion repairs. This is inspite of a substantial increase of corrosion repair out-turn in 1981-82 as compared to 1980-81. On the Broad Gauge system out-turn in 1981-82 was 3175 coaches against 2340 in 1980-81. Corresponding figures for metre gauge are 1000 and 900 respectively. There was thus an increase of about 36% on BG and 11% on MG. The increase in coaches awaiting repairs has taken place due to shortage of capacity in the workshops which were hard pressed to meet normal POH out-turn. Steps have already been taken to set up sufficient facilities to meet the arising of both POH and corrosion repair by the end of 6th plan. In fact, corrosion repair out-turn was increased substantially in 1981-82 and 1982-83. As a result of these efforts, coaches awaiting corrosion repair as on 30.11.82 has come down to 393 on BG and 57 on MG.

Increased requirement for corrosion repair is taking place as all new coaches are steel-bodied compared to wooden-bodied coaches that they are replacing. Total coach holding also increasing from year to year.”

77. The Committee desired to know whether the Railway Board have any plan to increase the capacity for POH, repairs etc. in order to make optimum use of the available coaches for passenger services. In reply, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note as under :

“Capacity for POH of broad gauge coaches at the beginning of 1982-83 was 2060 coach units per month. This is short of the monthly arisings by approximately 480 units. The POH capacity for AC coaches also need to be augmented to deal with more units.

2. The Railways are already executing the following works which will not only meet the present shortfall but will also take care of arisings till the middle of the 7th Plan:
 - (i) Expansion of Jagadhari Workshops by 100 units per month.
 - (ii) Expansion of New Bongaigaon Workshop by 100 units per month.
 - (iii) Construction of 3 new Workshops with capacity for 200 units per month each at Mancheswar, Tirupati and Bhopal.
 - (iv) Conversion of MG facilities at Gorakhpur to undertake POH at 100 BG coach units per month.
3. In addition, works at Lileuah Alambagh, Lower Parel, and Perambur have been sanctioned for expanding facilities to handle AC coaches.
4. Progress of all the above works is however seriously affected due to shortage of funds.
5. For open-line repairs, a number of works have already been sanctioned but these too suffer for want of funds. Important among these are works at Bombay, Basin Bridge, Madras, Hyderabad etc.
6. Existing facilities have already been fully utilised. Wherever possible, manpower is being inducted, particularly by transfer from steam sheds that have been closed, to raise out-turn with existing berthing and other facilities. Capacity utilisation for

POH of BG coach workshops was about 95% in 1981-82 and it is expected to be raised to above 100 per cent in 1982-83."

77A. Further in reply to point No. 17 (a) on the Audit para on Utilisation of Locomotives raised by the Committee, the Railway Board stated:

"During 1981-82, 26 steam loco sheds were closed down rendering about 3,600 men surplus, who were given alternative employment. This review was based on the condemnation of 440 steam locos during 1980-81. With condemnation of approximately 900 steam locos, it is expected that about 7,300 men will be rendered surplus. However, the actual figures can only be obtained from the zonal Railways after the close of the financial year. During 1983-84 another 300 locos may have to be condemned and about 2400 men rendered surplus."

78. Explaining the position in this regard, the Chairman, Railway Board stated during evidence:

"We are planning to have a centralised workshop. So far, we are carrying with the old system. Every railway has its own facility to look after its own coaching stock and the shops. Now, we have got to go to a stage where we have to carry heavy traffic. We must have a centralised repair workshop. Basically, four shops in the country in the four sectors should be able to look after the needs as a first step and that will reduce the waiting time. There will be a central repair workshop which will not owe allegiance to any particular railway; although it is situated in the South Eastern railway; it will not necessarily repair the coaches of the South Eastern railway alone. The second shop is at Tirupati. We want to complete it if money is made available. Within 24 months it can be completed. That is not a very technical job. The third shop is in Bhopal and the fourth one is in Jagadari."

79. In reply to a query the witness stated that Rs. 19 crores were needed to complete the work at Tirupati.

When asked why the Railways could not get Rs. 19 crores for completing such a big project, the representative of the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated:

"The total carry forward on maintenance facilities is of the order of Rs. 400 crores. For this workshop Rs. 19 crores may look

a small amount, but the total carry forward has worked out to Rs. 400 crores. We are able to spend only 50 to 60 crores per year."

80 The Chairman, Railway Board added:

".....There were on-going and sanctioned schemes for which quite a bit of money is lying spread all over without giving any return; for new lines another Rs. 800 crores are required. Traffic facilities including gauge conversion require Rs. 1,000 crores which are sanctioned and workshops and sheds require Rs. 450 crores; that means Rs. 2,250 crores are required for on going works. So, you press that balloon on this side it bulges on that side. Rs. 19 crores in isolation does not look big. The total plan allocation is Rs. 5,100 crores. It was at the value of 1980-81 prices and our purchasing power will be much less than the existing purchasing power. This is the size of the problem. We know fully-well that this is an important project."

81. The representative of Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) further stated :

"The allocation for each years Plan expenditure is decided in a joint meeting of the Planning Commission, Finance Ministry and the Railway Ministry. This considers the allocation under the Plan heads, e.g. new lines gauge conversions, traffic facilities, electrification etc. All that is decided. We have no freedom to shift one from the other head. That invites serious criticism."

82. In a subsequent note to the Committee the Ministry of Railways explained :

"The Railway Ministry was aware of the shortage of POH capacity which was building up over the years, but could not plan for increased facilities due to shortage of funds for maintenance facilities. Table below shows that the total allotment of funds since the beginning of planned development for maintenance facilities was only 6 per cent of the allotment for additional rolling stock against an estimated requirement of about 15%.

During the 5th Plan, the gap between capacity and arisings had become too large. Increase in POH arisings took place not only due to increase in the number of coaches but also because of an increased percentage of coaches running on Mail Express trains which require more frequent attention. Against an estimated 35% coaches running on Mail Express trains in 1975-76, the

figure today is about 50% on BG. The Railway Ministry, therefore, sanctioned the following works since 1977-78 which will take care of the shortfall that now exists as well as the increased arisings by the end of the 6th Plan :

S. No.	Year	Work	Capacity increase per month
1.	1977-78	New Workshop at Mancheshwar	200
2.	1978-79	Expansion of New Bongaigaon	100
3.	1979-80	New Workshop at Tirupati	200
4.	1980-81	Expansion of Jagadhari	100
5.	1981-82	New Workshop at Bhopal	200

Progress of these works will depend on provision of funds by the Planning Commission. The works of expansion of Jagadhari and New Bongaigaon are expected to be completed during 1983-84. Mancheshwar is expected to start POH during 1983-84 and reach full capacity in 1984-85. Tirupati and Bhopal are both expected to start giving out-turn during 1984-85.

Five Year Plans	Actual Expenditure		% allocation
	Rolling stock on additional account	W/shops and sheds without Prod. Units	on workshops and sheds to that of Rolling Stock
1	2	3	4
First Plan 1951-52 to (Five Years) 1955-56	85	8.0	9.4
Second Plan 1956-57 to (Five Years) 1960-61	251	16.0	6.3
Third Plan 1961-62 to (Five Years) 1965-66	440	18.0	4.1
Inter Plan period (Three years) 1966-67 to 1968-69	202	11.0	5.0

1	2	3	4
Fourth Plan 1969-70 to (Five years) 1973-74	362	18.0	5.0
Fifth Plan 1974-75 to (Four years) 1977-78	572	34.0	6.4
Two years 1978-79 to truncated 1979-80 (Sixth Plan)	370	30.0	8.0
	2282	135.0	5.9 or say 6%

Repair sheds maintenance depots

83. It is seen from audit para that a test check of the records of 5 maintenance depots on Western Railway showed that the average time taken for maintenance repairs, etc. per coach was between 16 to 29 hours as against the target of 12 hours. The contributory factors for excessive detention were non-availability of wheels, L.B. springs, Axle pulleys, etc. arising out of inadequate planning and coordination between the Stores and the Mechanical Departments of the Railways. Coaches received at the depots on the Central, Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, South Central and South Eastern Railways for primary maintenance during the years 1978-79 to 1980-81 had been found deficient in fittings, especially electrical items, such as bulbs, fans, alternators etc. The loss of fittings from the coaches was Rs. 464.54 lakhs during these years, details of which were as under :

Railway	(Rupees in lakh)		
	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81
Central	0.64	8.51	3.85
Eastern	11.38	17.62	29.98
Northern	37.34	48.90	51.20
Southern	7.65	6.25	6.08
South Central	27.40	23.71	46.05
South Eastern	14.44	13.08	86.51
Western	2.51	8.15	13.29
Total	101.36	126.22	236.96

84. However, often due to heavy deficiencies and non-availability of the required stores in the depots, these coaches had been detained for long periods ranging from 6 hours to 153 hours

85. The details of loss of coach fittings railway-wise, as shown in the statement above, show that the losses sustained by the Eastern, Northern, South Central and South Eastern Railways were very high being 90% of the total loss on this account for 1980-81. The Committee desired to know whether the Railway Board have investigated into the reasons for the heavy losses of coach fittings on these railways. In reply, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated :

“Investigation into the reasons for the heavy losses of coach fittings by the railways concerned have revealed that the POH coaches are contributing the heaviest percentages on this account. The coaches remain lying in the divisions for quite some time before they are sent to the workshop. Quite often they remain stabled at the way side stations due to inadequacy of accommodation inside the workshop. It has been revealed that in the Divisions such coaches are subjected to cannibalisation for utilising these fittings in running coaches due to inadequate supplies of fittings. Lack of staff for providing protection to the coaches is one of the reasons for such losses.

The Railways are seized of the problem and are making efforts to control the theft of railway property and railway fittings from coaches by deploying RPF personnel to guard various yards, godowns, etc. Plain clothed staff of CIB are deployed to collect crime intelligence, conduct raids and apprehend culprits and receivers of stolen railway materials and fittings. As a result of these efforts, stolen railway material and fittings worth Rs. 78,06,911 could be recovered during 1981 with the arrest of 26,578 persons including 1573 railway employees over all Indian Railways.

Efforts are on to improve the position further.”

Repair to EMU coaches

86. The percentage of BMU motor and trailer coaches awaiting repair during 1980-81 was as under :

Year	Central	Eastern	Southern	Wertern	All Railways	Southern
1980-81	BG	BG	BG	BG	BG	BG
Motor Coaches	22.7	22.6	17.2	11.8	18.8	20.5
Trailer Coaches	16.6	21.3	16.9	9.39	16.2	9.92

87. The higher percentage of EMU motor coaches under repair, as compared to the target of 14 per cent, restricted the availability of rakes, since without them, the trailers could not be put to use.

88. The percentage of motor coaches under repair was high particularly in Central and Eastern Railways being 22.7 and 22.6 respectively. When enquired as to what remedial action had been taken/was being taken in 1981-82 and 1982-83 to bring down the repair percentage and improve the availability of motor coaches on the Central and Eastern Railways, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have explained the position in a note thus :

Central Railway. The percentage of motor coaches awaiting repairs during 1981-82 and upto May, 82 in the current year is as under :

1981-82	25.7%
April 1982	21.1%
May 1982	20.8%

The repair percentage has been higher in 1981-82 on account of old stock having exceeded/nearing their codal life of 25 years, part of them having developed serious reverse camber and their repair content having become heavy on account of intensive utilisation corrosion and severe loading conditions. However, there has been an improving trend from April, 1982 as could be seen from the above figures. This has been possible with the replacement of some of the overaged coaches and additional inputs by way of men, material and improved techniques of maintenance. Due priority is being given to despatch of new coaches to Central Railway which will be utilised first to replace the old coaches.

Eastern Railway. The ineffective percentage of motor coaches during 1981-82 has been 21.4%. Efforts are being made to bring it down to 20% during 1982-83.

The higher ineffective percentage has been due to stocks being of multiple type with imported components in some of them and obsolescence of imported components and difficult supply position of indigenous substitutes. However, with persistent efforts in the development of indigenous substitutes, it has been possible gradually to bring down the repair percentage of motor coaches from 27.1% in 1978-79 to 21.4% in 1981-82. As stated above, efforts are continuing to achieve still better and stiff target of 20% during 1982-83.

89. Audit para points out that a large number of EMU motor coaches remained under repair due to inadequate capacity for rewinding

damaged motors, remetalling of bearings of traction motors etc. To meet this situation expansion of car shed at Kurla, setting up of a new car shed at Kalwa, construction of traction motor rewinding factory at Nasik etc. on Central Railway and remodelling-cum-expansion of car shed at Mahalaxmi on Western Railway, were undertaken commencing from 1972-73, but are still to be completed (November 1981).

90. The Committee desired to know when the major works for augmenting the repair capacity of Central, Eastern and Western Railways for EMU motors were expected to be completed and fully commissioned. According to the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) the detailed position as at the end of June 1982 in this regard is as under :

Central Railway

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Expansion of Kurla car-shed | 98% of work has been completed and facilities have been commissioned. |
| 2. Kalwa Car-shed
Phase 1-A
Phase 1-B | 99.5% of work has been completed and facilities have been commissioned. Shed has been operated from January 1981. 93% work has been completed and facilities have been commissioned from January 1981. |
| Phase 1-C | Estimates have to be sanctioned. The work is expected to be completed within 36 months from commencement subject to availability of required funds. |
| 3. Workshop for repair/
rewinding of Traction
Motors/armatures at Nasik. | 98.7% work has been completed and facilities have been commissioned and the workshop has been operated from February 1981. The remaining portion of work is expected to be completed by September, 1982. |

Eastern Railway

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Kanchrapara shop-Rewinding of Traction Machinery. | The work has been completed. The facilities include those for BMU traction motors also. |
| 2. Sonarpur EMU maintenance shed. | The work has been completed. Facilities have been put to use. |

- | | |
|--|--|
| 3. Sonarpur-extension of EMU maintenance shed. | 80% work has been completed. Facilities except Pit Wheel Lathe are likely to be commissioned by the end of 1982. The pit type Wheel Lathe is under procurement by COFMOW, and is likely to be commissioned by the end of 1984. |
| 4. Extension of Howrah EMU car shed. | Work has been completed and facilities have been put to use. |
| 5. Bandel-New EMU Car Shed-Phase I. | Preliminary work on land acquisition is in progress. |

Western Railway

Mahalaxmi Shops overhaul capacity for BMU coaches. Completed.

91. According to Audit para nine coaches EMU trains have been standardised only in the Bombay suburban area, so far (October 1981). In Calcutta and Madras areas, though a policy decision had been taken to implement the scheme in 1974 subject to availability of additional rakes, the EMU trains continue to consist mainly of 8 coaches due to high percentage of motor coaches under repair besides lower rate of materialisation of new EMU coaches on order from ICF/Jessop. So far only 19, nine coach rakes out of a total fleet of 68 rakes have been formed on the Eastern Railway.

92. The Committee desired to know the present progress towards implementation of the scheme of running nine coach EMU rakes on the Eastern and Southern Railways. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note :

“Out of 103 BGAC EMU Rakes on line, Eastern Railway is having 199 coach rakes, 768 coach rakes, 8 push-pull rakes. Against the 1982-83 production, Eastern Railway has been allotted 9 additional motor coaches without the matching trailers for expediting conversion of more 8 coach rakes to 9 coach formation. It is proposed to allot motor coaches only in 1983-84 to Eastern Railway for this purpose. On Southern Railway, there are 218 coach rakes on the broad gauge none of which have been so far converted to 9 coach formation. Provision of one more motor coach to rakes on Southern Railway will be

considered only after requirements of Eastern Railway are met, and the traffic growth necessitates an additional motor coach.

Further conversion of the 8 coach rakes on Eastern Railway will be possible when additional motor coaches become available. In this connection, it may be monitored that production of additional motor coaches itself is subject to, and dependent on, the availability of matching set of electric traction equipments from BHEL and availability of funds."

93. During evidence the Committee enquired why in Calcutta Metropolitan Railway EMU coaches rakes had not been converted from 8 coaches rake to 9 coach rake, despite the existence of line capacity. The representative of Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in reply :—

"Manufacture of EMU motor/coaches has been taken up. What we are doing is instead of 8 coach train we are having a 9 coach train. Seven trains have been completely converted into 9 coach trains. We have got a programme for manufacturing the coaches and next year 24 motor coaches will be manufactured and if we produce like that, we will be able to get over the problem."

94. In this connection the Chairman, Railway Board, stated :

"In Bombay nine are there from the very beginning. That is a different type of traction. It is on the basis of motor coaches, totalling nine. At Calcutta it is on 25,000 volt AC traction. That is a different traction. The system as originally started was with four coaches and one motor-coach, or two motor coaches with eight coaches. But our experience show that to get better service as also to increase the capacity it is better to add a ninth coach to bring it on the Bombay pattern. But the original patterns are basically different due to different traction and different motor coaches."

95. On being pointed out that conversion from 8 to 9 coaches EMU rakes could have been brought about earlier by laying more emphasis on motor coaches as the line capacity was available, the Chairman, Railway Board, stated:

“Again the capacity constraint is the manufacturing capacity of the country, in the motor units and traction motor units. We can manufacture coaches. We are depending on BHEL which is heavily in arrears in supplying the motor components with the result that the coaches which have been manufactured have been lying idle in the workshop because there are no electrical installations for them.”

Excessive Terminal lie over at both ends

96. During 1980-81, the break up of the cycle of 24 hours of the movement of a passenger coach was as under :

	Hours/Minutes	Percentage
1. Run time in train	8—50	37
2. Terminal lie over at both ends	8—40	36
3. POH, sick, idling and spare	6—30	27

97. Thus, a coach remains on the move only for 37 per cent of the time in a day while the ‘terminal lie over’ was 36 per cent and ‘POH’, ‘sick’ and ‘idling’ (in transit to and from workshop or in sick line) 27 per cent.

98. Audit para points out that the terminal lie over (36 per cent or 8.40 hrs.) would have been higher if the lie over period had been reckoned with reference to the scheduled time of running of trains, especially Mail/Express trains which account for 58 per cent of the passenger coaches. The punctuality of Mail/Express trains has deteriorated from 9 per cent in 1976-77 to 65 per cent in 1979-80 and during the years 1980-81 and 1981-82 had been as under :

Year	Mail/Express (Punctuality percentage)	
	BG	MG
1980-81	84.2	85.9
1981-82	85.4	88.3

99. As the utilisation of coaches was only 37 per cent the Committee desired to know during evidence whether any study had been carried out by Ministry of Railways to identify the areas where the coaches were having bigger transit stoppages so as to ensure better utilisation of coaches. To this the Chairman, Railway Board, replied :

“We have carried out such studies. The Efficiency Bureau of the Railway Board have carried out such a study and brought out a study Report. The main problem is the composition of the rakes. If they are dissimilar, naturally it takes more time. If there is standardisation of coaches, then the delay will get reduced. For example, in the case of EMU coaches, when they reach the terminal, within two minutes they come back because there is no time required except for the driver to go out. In some of the branch lines, where we have eliminated the first class, we are trying to get a little better turnover. Now because of the various compositions of the train on the main lines—AC sleeper, AC chair car, first class, postal van, dining cars etc. we cannot make a uniform composition. Such studies are constantly being made.

So far as the actual utilisation is concerned, the figures look very bad when you read them because the total period of time that a coach is actually moving is only 8 hours. But in terms of km the coach earns over a year, it compares favourably with many other countries. Our figures per year is 1.17 lakhs, the corresponding figures for West Germany are 1.13 lakhs, for Italy 1.07 lakhs, USA 1.39 lakhs and Canadian Pacific 22,000. We are the fifth and we are much better than West Germany, Canada and Italy.”

100. The Committee desired to know as to how the Railway Board proposed to reduce the lie over of trains at terminals with a view to improving availability of coaches. The Ministry of Railway (Railway Board) have stated :

“The lie over at terminals can be reduced if the composition of rakes of trains providing a similar type of service are standardised and the rakes are utilised on first in first out basis at terminals after being given due maintenance. In this direction, Ministry of Railways have already issued instructions to standardise the rake composition of Mail/Express trains.

After the standardisation of rakes it would be possible to improve the availability of coaches. Further we have also removed the high speed constraint by reducing the maximum permissible speed of mail Express train to 105 Kmph and less.”

101. According to audit para the Railways had been considering the possibilities of reducing the 'terminal lie over' period of coaches by changing the rake links so as to minimise infructuous detention to rakes at terminals and maximise their availability for train services. No final decision was taken by the Railway Board despite studies by the Board's Operational Research Cell in this regard. When asked about the reasons for delay and the present position in the matter, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in a note :

"Railway Board have been constantly considering the possibility of reducing terminal lie over of rakes and, in this direction several steps have been taken. Rake links of 145/146 Ahmedabad-Madras a weekly train and 181/182 Ahmedabad-New Delhi Sarvodaya Express a biweekly train have been integrated to make 145/146 a bi-weekly train. Similarly, in case of double-headed trains like Kerala and Karnataka Expresses, normally we should have required 4 rakes of run twice a week double-headed train service each to Bangalore and Trivandrum, but with the integration of their rake links, it has been possible to provide biweekly double-headed trains between New Delhi and Trivandrum and New Delhi and Bangalore with three rakes only. Lie-over has also been reduced in case of 173/174 Himagiri Express and its frequency increased from bi-weekly to thrice a week with effect from 1st October 1981. In case of 59/60 Gitanjali Express also the terminal lie over was reduced and frequency increased from 4 times a week to 5 times a week. In case of 143/144 Puri-New Delhi 'Kalinga Express, a weekly train and 77-78 Puri-New Delhi Utkal Express four times a week train, the rakes have been integrated to give a daily service between Puri and New Delhi.

Integration of rake links of GT Express with that of Tamil Nadu with a view to increasing the frequency of Tamil Nadu to 4 times a week, is also under examination. Similarly, integration of rake links of New Delhi-Bombay and New Delhi-Hawrah Rajdhani Expresses are also under examination.

Large scale integration of rake links as suggested by OR Study is not feasible, unless the rake composition of various trains is identical. At present, there are variation in rake composition.

In this direction, Board have already taken a decision to standardise the rake composition for 21 coach and 17 coach trains.

Progressively as and when standardisation of rake composition takes place, it would be possible to integrate more and more rakes and further improve the utilisation of scarce resources.”

102. Audit para has highlighted a few instances of excessive terminal lie over which are as under :

“The Central Railway’s rake links in respect of 5 Dn/6 Up Bombay Ferozpur Mail and 11 Dn/12Up Dadar-Madras Express showed that two rakes (32 coaches) are being kept idle for more than 24 hours at the terminals, Bombay VT and Dadar.

Three super fast trains, 121Dn/122Up Tamil Nadu Express (tri-weekly), 123Dn/124Up Andhra Pradesh Express (bi-weekly) and 125Dn/126Up K.K. Express (bi-weekly), have 5 rakes with availability period of 840 hours per week. However, the run time for the three trains is around 480 hours only. As a result, especially in the case of the Andhra Pradesh and K.K. Express, the rakes remain idle for a period of 32 hours 54 hours and 73 hours at Secunderabad, Trivandrum and Bangalore respectively.”

103. It is seen from audit para that the Railway Board had informed the Railway Convention Committee (RCC) 1973 and 1975 that terminal capacity in Metropolitan Centres would be developed. When asked about the action taken in this direction the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in a note :

“Railway have been making efforts within available resources to develop additional terminal capacity in Metropolitan centres to cater for increase in traffic. In this direction, Dadar on Central Railway has been developed as a third terminal and Nizamuddin has been partially developed in Delhi area.

Works are in progress for development of a suburban terminal in Moore Market area in Madras City to off-load the existing Madras terminal of suburban trains. New Delhi station has been given a second approach to the Railway station and works

are in progress for development of allied facilities. Land acquisition for developing a new terminal at Padampukar in Calcutta has also been taken in hand.

Remodelling of Bombay VT, Bombay Central and Delhi Main stations have also been sanctioned, although the work has not yet been taken in hand for want of resources.

For future needs, surveys are currently in progress for creating 4th passenger terminal in Bombay area and major re-modelling of existing terminal at Howrah.

Most of the work relating to development of passenger terminals is not financially viable and is, therefore, charged to Development Fund accretion to which is generally meagre."

Performance of coaches in terms of vehicle km per day

104. According to audit para the Railway wise position of holding and utilisation of passenger coaches in 1980-81 as compared to that in 1974-75 is as under :

As on	Central	East-ern	North-ern	North-east Frontier	South-ern	South-Central	South-East-ern	Wes-tern	All Rail-ways
Holding of passenger coaches (BG)									
31.3.75	2036	2743	2885	297	1726	1166	1932	1459	14244
31.3.81	2118	2693	3166	467	2093	1353	2156	1700	15848
Passengers carried per train									
31.3.75	612	548	608	162	506	494	377	706	555
31.3.81	814	763	759	138	631	680	493	989	729
Vehicle km per vehicle day									
31.3.75	269	274	213	107	233	230	235	251	243
31.3.81	329	334	256	130	309	332	314	311	314

105. While the vehicle km per vehicle day varied in keeping with the number of passengers carried on Central, Eastern, Northeast Frontier, South Central, South Eastern and Western Railways, the utilisation of passenger coaches in terms of vehicle km per day improved and was above the all India average only on the Central, Eastern, South Central and South Eastern Railways. The performance on other Railways especially Northern, Northeast Frontier and Southern Railways was below the level of the all Railway average (314) in 1980-81, showing relatively poor utilisation of coaches.

106. The Committee desired to know the steps proposed to be taken to improve the performance in terms of vehicle kms per day in these Zonal Railways. In a note furnished in this regard the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated:

“passenger train operation has basically three constraints i.e.

- (i) Passenger trains have to leave at a convenient scheduled time from their originating point and thus turn round of passenger rakes has to be in multiple of 24 hrs. causing excessive lie over.
- (ii) Type of accommodation required for various types of services as inter-city day time, inter-city over night and long distance Mail/Express trains is different and cannot be universalised.
- (iii) There are a large number of slow passenger trains stopping at every station. The Zonal Railways with comparatively large number of passenger trains will have poor utilisation coaches in terms of vehicle kms. per vehicle day.

So far as first and third constraints are concerned, there is hardly anything Indian Railways can do but in regard to the second constraint, Ministry of Railways have already decided to gradually standardise the rake composition of all trains involving night journeys running with 21 coach and 17-coach rakes. Once the rake composition is standardised it would be possible to improve utilisation by integrating the rake links of various trains arriving at terminals. On account of shortage of general Second Class Coaches it has not been possible to standardise the rake composition of other trains at present.

The proportion of passenger trains to Mail/Express trains on Northern, N.F. and Southern Railways, is more when compared with other Zonal Railways, and because of utilisation of a large proportion of coaching stock on slow moving passenger trains leading to poor utilisation. Notwithstanding these in-built constraints coaching stock utilisation of these three zonal Railways have shown improvement in the recent past as will be seen from the data given below:

Railway	Vehicle Km./Vehicle day 31.3.1975	Vehicle Km./Vehicle day 31.3.1981
N-R.	213	256
N.F.	107	130
S.R.	233	309

Passenger reservation arrangements. etc,

107. According to audit para the Railway Board had informed the Railway Convention Committee (RCC) 1971 and 1973 that measures would be taken to make improvements in reservation arrangements. When asked about the action taken in this regard, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated *inter alia* in a note:

“Improvement in reservation arrangements has received continuous attention of the Railways. Some of the measures taken to maximise customer satisfaction in this regard are as under:

A system of RAC (Reservation against cancellation) earmarking sitting accommodation for a specific number of senior most waitlisted passengers who are willing to travel on sitting accommodation so that they can be allotted sleeper berths after the departure of the train against vacancies due to passengers with confirmed reservations not turning up on the train has been introduced recently. This system has also helped eliminate scope for arbitrary allotment of berths by train staff to passengers who hitherto boarded the reserved coaches unauthorisedly on the basis of waiting list.

Apart from the above, sustained attention has been paid to malpractices in the matter of reservations. For this purpose, the following are amongst the important measures taken:

- (i) verification of genuineness of reservations made through a scrutiny of requisition slips tendered by passengers and making door to door checks or sending reply paid letters in cases where the reservations made appear to be in fictitious names,
- (ii) surveillance over reservation/booking offices jointly of commercial/vigilance organisations of the Railways in association with police and CBI to apprehend touts, and
- (iii) enactment of legislation through the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1982, passed in May, 1982, prescribing deterrent punishment for anyone carrying on business in procurement and supply of raitickets/reservations unauthorisedly. The operation of this measure has been stayed by the Supreme Court pending decision on some petitions by unauthorised travel agents challenging its constitutional validity."

108. A part of the accommodation which can be reserved in a train is set aside as quotas for passengers entraining at important enroute stations. Passengers boarding at these stations have to seek reservation against the respective quotas: where these are fully booked and in respect of stations without quotas, the stations are required to send messages for reservation to the starting stations, the latter being required to send a reply message. According to audit para quotas allotted to en-route stations in certain important trains were in many cases found to have been not fully utilised but these (the quotas) had not been reviewed. The unutilised balance of the quotas was left to be allotted on the trains by train officials.

109. The Committee desired to know the remedial measures taken by the Railway Board to reduce or eliminate cases of non-observance of the prescribed procedure and rules in this regard and also enquired whether there was any procedure for systematic review of the utilisation quotas of berths allotted/fixed for wayside stations. In reply, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) stated in a note ;

“In terms of para 622 of the Indian Railways Commercial Manual Vol. I, the various quotas including those at the intermediate stations are required to be reviewed quarterly and this is a continuous process. In making these reviews, accommodation available on the train, demands for reservation at train originating stations as well as important intermediate stations are taken into consideration.

A review of quotas on all India basis by the railways is at present in the process of being made. Suitable adjustments in quotas will be made based on the extent of utilisation and demand. Railways have been asked to pay special attention to the intermediate stations especially where the utilisation is inadequate.”

110. When attention was drawn of the Railway Board to the fact pointed out in audit para that the reply messages were not being sent by major starting stations to requests for reservation at wayside stations with the result that the passengers had to look to the train officials for allotment of berths/seats the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated that the following procedure has been laid down to ensure prompt action on messages for reservations received by train originating stations from intermediate stations including quotas holding stations :

- i) A special register for recording the receipt and disposal time of reservation messages is kept at all train originating stations/ reservation controlling stations.
- ii) Every endeavour is made to ensure that replies to incoming messages are sent as quickly as possible. Wherever it is not possible to dispose off the reservation message within 24 hours, the position has to be put up to the Chief Reservation Supervisor who takes necessary steps to dispose of the message without further delay. If the station seeking reservation does not get a reply within 48 hours, it again repeats the message fully.
- iii) A courier system is in force between certain selected pairs of important stations and the requests for reservation are sent through the train staff who get them confirmed from the concerned stations and bring back the position next day.
- iv) Telex system has also been provided between important reservation offices for conveying reservation messages and obtaining confirmations.”

Over-crowding and ticketless travelling

111. According to audit para inadequate availability of coaches for passenger service due to reasons mentioned earlier coupled with delay in working out and implementing plans to improve the existing level of utilisation, had aggravated over-crowding in second class coaches of trains. The percentage of over-crowding in passenger trains ranged between 100 and 214 in certain cases on Northern, Southern and Western Railways as per the Railway census report of April-May 1980. On the other hand, the occupation of certain trains was poor varying from 1 per cent to 96 per cent of the capacity (October 1980 and May 1981). The Committee desired to know whether a systematic review of the half yearly reports received from the General Managers on the occupation of passenger trains was conducted by the Railway Board and whether on the basis of the results of such study instructions were issued for adjusting the composition of trains to cater to the optimum needs of lower class passengers. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note :

“The half yearly reports on occupation of passenger trains constitute an important reference and guiding material for the purpose of keeping a watch on the trends of demand for accommodation on trains vis-a-vis the trains run and to deal with demands for additional trains/additional coaches etc.

Based on these reports Zonal Railways analyse and take necessary action to increase/decrease the accommodation in various classes by the concerned trains and also run additional trains subject to availability of requisite resources.”

Loss of passenger services and other coaching services

112. According to the Railway Board, the loss on the operation of coaching services was Rs. 227.45 crores in 1980-81. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Railway Convention Committee, 1973 the Railway Board had conducted a profitability study (finalised in September 1980), which revealed, at the level of fares of 1977-78, a loss of Rs. 8.12 crores on AC and first class travel by mail/express trains and profit of Rs. 74.91 crores on second class travel by these trains. Similarly, in respect of ordinary train services it revealed a loss, under both, upper and lower classes of Rs. 106.14 crores and under parcel traffic of Rs. 37.04 crores.

113. It is learnt from Audit that the loss of operation of coaching services for 1981-82 was stated to be Rs. 416.09 crores. The results of the coaching cost study of 1977-78 submitted to the R.C.C. of 1980 still hold good for 1980-81 and for 1981-82 also. The coaching services under lower class mail/express are run at a profit but the A.C. services-ordinary passenger service and luggage and parcel traffic are run at a loss. The following factors were found responsible for the loss in coaching services:

- (i) Underload running due to paucity of coaches. Some of the passenger trains comprise only 5 to 7 bogies with a maximum seating capacity of 300-360 ;
- (ii) Stoppage at each station unlike long distance mail/express train leading to higher operational expenses ;
- (iii) Poor patronage ;
- (iv) Short distance branch line services, etc.

114. The Committee desired to know how the Railway Board proposed to make the services which are at present run below cost, to pay for their cost. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) has stated in a note as under :

“The services which run below cost are the suburban services and short distance passenger services. As far as the suburban services are concerned, the losses are because the season ticket fares are kept very low. The recommendation of RTEC was to raise the season ticket fares in stages so that the earnings on suburban traffic can at best meet the incremental cost of running these services. These fares have been increased to a small extent from 1.4.1981. It is proposed to increase these fares gradually so as to reduce the losses on suburban passenger traffic. Railways also incur some losses on short distance passenger traffic. However, as a public utility concern keeping in view the socio economic environment in the country Railways cannot ignore this traffic and the fares cannot be raised beyond a certain limit, even though, the cost of inputs have been rising steadily.”

115. According to audit para the losing non-suburban short distance (ordinary passenger) traffic had increased by 62.6 per cent during 1974-81. In this connection the National Transport Policy Committee (NTPC)

(May 1980) and Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee (RTEC) (June 1980) had observed that such traffic could generally be carried more economically by road. The RTEC had also recommended that rail and road traffic should be coordinated keeping in view the national economy and the totality of costs between rail and road transport. Notwithstanding the Railways participation in the Capital of the Road Transport Corporation effective action in these directions has yet to be taken.

116. It is observed by audit that the under load uneconomic running of short lead ordinary passenger service is also proved by the fact that the average earning per km realised from ordinary passenger service (lower class) was 2.65 paise against the tariff rate of 4.5 to 5.0 paise (in case of mail/express, the average earning per km was 4.72 paise during 1980-81). In view of the recommendations of NTPC (May 1980) and PTEC (June 1980), an early decision would have to be taken by the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) and the concerned Ministries on their recommendations regarding uneconomic operation of short distance ordinary passenger traffic by the Railway which could be diverted to road transport in the interest of the National economy. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) makes capital contributions to the extent of 50 per cent of the State Government's investment in the road transport organisation of each State and is represented in the Board of Management with the primary object to regulate rail road coordination and to develop rationalised movement of passenger and goods traffic by these two modes, keeping in view their economic leads.

117. The Committee desired to know the present position in regard to implementation of the recommendations of the National Transport Policy Committee and Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee referred to above. The Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have stated in a note as under :

“The National Transport Policy Committee (May 1980) and Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee (April 1980) emphasised the need for carrying non-suburban short-distance passenger traffic by road services, which would generally be more economical. The National Transport Policy Committee observed that the Railways should not expand their services for short-distance passenger traffic except between pairs of points where the density of traffic is very high ; for short distance passenger traffic, the feasibility of introducing more buses in certain states

needs to be explored. Similarly, the Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee observed that short-distance passenger traffic could generally be carried more economically by road except where large numbers have to be transported within limited time.

The recommendations made by the National Transport Policy Committee and the Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee have been accepted and the Railway Administrations have been directed to take up the matter with the State Govts. to suitably strengthen the road services wherever found inadequate or not developed, so that the pressure of short-distance traffic on Railways is reduced substantially. The Railways have also been advised to pursue this matter vigorously through their directors on the Boards of various State Road Transport Corporations."

118. When asked whether the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) had taken any action in coordination with the State Road Transport Organisations to identify their uneconomic short haul sections with a view to closing them down and off-loading the traffic in these sections on the road services, the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) have explained the position in detail as under :

"The working of the uneconomic branch lines has been considered by the Government from time to time and various high powered committees have also recommended steps to improve the working of these lines or their closure.

"The Administrative Reforms Commission has observed that the Railways should be fully indemnified for the losses they incur in running uneconomic branch lines. They had also recommended that the Ministry of Railways should consider the closure of uneconomic branch lines where adequate alternative means of cheaper transport existed and where such closure would not adversely affect public interest, including any important economic activity of the area, such as industrial or mining activity. This view has been endorsed by the Railway Convention Committee (1973). The Convention Committee in their Ninth Report on Social Burdens on Indian Railways have recommended that wherever running of uneconomic lines was continued in public interest, the losses may be made good out of the public revenues, State or Central.

In pursuance of the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission and the Railway Convention Committee referred to above, an examination was undertaken in consultation with the Zonal Railways to identify the uneconomic branch lines which were working on heavy losses and where alternative means of transport existed and could meet the transport needs of the area if the lines were closed. 23 such uneconomic branch lines were identified for closure on the basis of this examination. The details of these 23 lines are given in the Annexure. As recommended by the Railway Convention Committee the State Governments of West Bengal, Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar, Haryana, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat were approached by the Ministry of Railways seeking their consent for the closure of these lines. In case the State Governments did not agree to the closure of such lines, they were requested to agree to reimburse to the Railways the avoidable loss which the Railways were incurring for keeping these lines in operation. Unfortunately, none of the State Governments has agreed to either of the two proposals. In these circumstances, it was not considered necessary to approach the State Road Transport Organisation further in the matter.

Meanwhile, the High Level Committee on Social Burdens on Railways (1979) also recommended that if the State Governments did not agree to the closure of the uneconomic branch lines, the losses incurred on their operation should be fully reimbursed by the Central Government to the Ministry of Railways. This matter was remitted to the Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee (1980) who, after reviewing the pros and cons of the issue, suggested that a detailed examination should be made of each large loss-making branch line by Expert Groups consisting of the representatives from the Railways and the State Governments concerned.

This question was simultaneously examined by the Commission on Public Expenditure in 1980. The Commission recommended that all uneconomic branch lines, where alternative means of transport existed or can be developed, should be closed down.

The National Transport Policy Committee, which subsequently examined the issue, *inter alia*, made the following recommendations :

- No. 9.17. All narrow gauge sections except the Central India narrow gauge system and some narrow gauge hill sections should be closed down. A system approach should be adopted where their conversion to either metre gauge or broad gauge may form part of a net-work and is justified on traffic potential.
- No. 9.18. Formation and other permanent assets of these narrow gauge sections should be banded over free to State Governments. However, before closing, it should be ensured that adequate and efficient road transport is available to serve those areas.

The recommendations made by the National Transport Policy Committee have since been considered and accepted by the Government. Further action for implementing these accepted recommendations in respect of narrow gauge lines and similar other lines on the other gauges, in a phased manner, will now be taken in hand."

119. The Committee observe that in terms of number of passengers the suburban traffic increased from 1219 million in 1970-71 to 2064 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 69.3 per cent while in terms of passenger kilometres it increased from 22984 million in 1970-71 to 43,965 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 91.3 per cent. The number of EMU coaches however increased by 51.9 per cent (from 1780 to 2658) only during this period. The seating capacity in suburban trains increased by 51.1 per cent (from 340541 to 514744) only during the same period. The non-suburban traffic in terms of passengers increased from 1212 million in 1970-71 to 1640 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 35.3 per cent. In terms of passenger kilometres it increased from 95,136 million in 1970-71 to 1,76,822 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 86.9 per cent. However the number of conventional coaches increased only by 10.5 per cent (from 24,676 to 27,257) and the seating capacity increased by 12.0 per cent (from 1505,047 to 1,685,935) during the same period. It is, therefore, evident that the increase in the number of coaches/seating capacity has been lagging far behind the increase in suburban as well as non-suburban traffic over the years thereby accentuating overcrowding in the trains.

120. The targets for passenger traffic for the Fifth Plan period (1974-75 to 1978-79) were fixed on the recommendation of the working Group specifically set up for the purpose. In respect of non-suburban traffic, the

plan envisaged an annual growth rate of 4% (around 20% for the whole period) while for suburban passenger traffic, the annual rate of growth was anticipated to be 5% (around 25% for the whole period). The Committee however observe that the suburban traffic actually increased by 10.2% in terms of passengers kilometres and 8.6% in terms of passengers per annum while the non-suburban traffic increased by 6.9% in terms of passenger kilometres and 7.4% in terms of passengers per annum during the revised Fifth Plan (1974-75 to 1977-78). The Committee are constrained to point out that while the growth in passenger traffic, both suburban and non-suburban, far outstripped the plan projections, the rate of growth of EMU and conventional coaches was 5.2% and 0.5% only per annum during this period.

121. The Committee note with concern that the imbalance in supply and demand is going to be further accentuated during the Sixth Plan period. The Committee understand that the allocation for the Railway's Sixth Plan has been restricted to Rs. 5,100 crores only as against Rs. 11,000 crores asked for. Consequently, with the available funds it will be possible to provide only 5,600 coaches against the minimum requirement of 14,000 coaches (both on replacement & additional accounts) during the Plan period. According to the Ministry of Railways, due to depreciation of money value, not more than 5,000 coaches may be manufactured ultimately. The Committee further observe with deep concern that since the number of coaches due for replacement is around 7,800 much of the over-aged stock will continue to be utilized. This is bound to reflect very adversely on the efficiency of passenger services and safety of passengers.

122. The Committee cannot view this situation with equanimity. Railways being a public utility cannot abdicate their responsibility in the matter of providing adequate services to the travelling public. While it is generally accepted that short distance non-suburban traffic should better be left to road, there is no reason why the Railways should not be able to cater to the requirements of long distance passengers for the vast majority of whom this is the only mode of transport available. Moreover long distance express/superfast trains are a paying proposition. The Committee would therefore urge that a realistic assessment be made of the growth of passenger traffic involving say, a lead of 500 kilometres and above with a view to projecting the requirements over the next 5-10 years and planning accordingly. Likewise, there is need for having a comprehensive study carried out with regard to inter-city travel keeping in view the new

new growth centres that are rapidly emerging in the wake of growing industrial/economic activity all over the country. The Committee would like this exercise to be undertaken immediately so as to help in formulation of the Seventh Plan.

123. So far as the current plan is concerned, the Committee cannot but strongly stress the imperative need for stepping up the allocations to the Railways to enable them to execute the necessary schemes for augmenting the production of coaches, maintenance facilities and terminal and line capacities etc. The Committee would also expect the Railways to take all measures necessary to contribute to this effort by generating additional resources out of their own revenues by efficient and concentrated utilisation of existing assets, both human and material, and by cutting down all wasteful expenditure.

124. So far as suburban traffic is concerned, the Committee find that even while Railways are working to the saturation point in all the metropolitan towns *vis.* Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, people's patience is fast running out and unless immediate steps are taken to alleviate the inhuman conditions in which the commuters have to travel day in and day out, the position is bound to get out of hand very soon. The projections in this regard have proved to be highly under-estimated. The Committee would therefore urge the Ministry of Railways and the Planning Commission to consider the matter in all its ramifications and draw up schemes, both short term and in the long term to prevent resurgence of such a situation. The Committee cannot too strongly stress that additional resources have got to be found for augmenting the suburban services so as to take care of at least the incremental growth which itself needs to be assessed in more realistic terms in the first instance.

125. The production of coaches is planned on the Integral Coach Factory (ICF)—a departmental undertaking of the Railways, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) under Ministry of Defence and M/s. Jessop & Co. under the Ministry of Heavy Industry. The installed capacity of these units is 750, 300 and 400 coaches per annum respectively. In addition, the workshops of the zonal railways also produce coaches (installed capacity—100 coaches) but these are mainly for departmental use. The Audit para has pointed out that during the period 1974-75 to 1980-81 the total production in the three units mentioned above was of the order of 6,487 coaches (including EMUs) as against the possible

production of 10,150 coaches i.e. the capacity utilization was only 64.5% during the 7-year period.

126. The Committee observe that the capacity utilization in the ICF (which produces bulk of the passenger coaches) was only 77.7% up to 1977-78. The Ministry have informed the Committee that during the subsequent years 1978-79 to 1981-82 the production has gone up to 97.1% of the available capacity. In the earlier years, the capacity utilization is stated to have suffered on account of constraints of funds, the general strike in May 1974 and severe power cuts imposed by the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board during 1974-75 and 1976-77. Audit have however pointed out that the Budget allotment under rolling stock (carriages) was revised downwards at the revised estimate stage in 1974-75 and again in 1977-78 to 1979-80 and the balance diverted for loco (besides wagons) procurement. Thus, the plea of lack of funds is not quite convincing. In fact, the Audit report has further pointed out that the Railways have built up surplus loco holdings resulting in deterioration in their utilisation indices. The Committee regret that in the context of acute shortage of coaches, the production capacity in the ICF should have deliberately restricted during 1974-75 to 1977-78 on the Specious plea of constraints of funds. The Committee expect that the Ministry of Railways would ensure adequate allocation of funds to the ICF during the remaining years of the Sixth Plan so that the capacity available in the factory for production of coaches is fully utilized.

127. So far as BEML is concerned, the Committee observe that the production during 1974-75 to 1980-81 averaged 216 coaches per annum against the installed capacity of 300 coaches. During evidence, the representative of the Ministry of Railways informed the Committee that the "the actual capacity of BEML has been assumed (by audit) at 400 coaches per annum but we are informed that it is 300 coaches per annum." Asked why Audit were not informed earlier that these figures were not correct, the witness replied: "I came to know of it only two days ago." The Committee are greatly surprised at the casual manner in which the C & AG's reports are treated by the Minister. The draft Audit paragraph should have been properly verified by the Ministry. The Committee desire that suitable instructions should be issued in this regard for the guidance of all concerned.

128. The Committee find that capacity utilization in the BEML was 72% during 1974-75 to 1977-78 and 79.1% during 1978-79 to 1981-82. Paucity of funds as also of wheel sets and other free-supply items are stated to have affected the production of coaches in BEML. The committee cannot but express their regret over the failure of the Ministry of Railways to provide adequate funds and components needs for coach-building. In the context of acute shortage of coaches, the Committee would urge the Ministry of Railways Defence to look into this matter with a view to removing the constraints in full utilization of the capacity available in BEML.

129. So far as Jessop & Co. are concerned, the Committee find that the average production in the factory was 136 coaches per annum during the years 1974-75 to 1977-78 *vis-a-vis* the installed capacity of 400 coaches. This came down sharply to 29 coaches per annum during the 3-year period 1978-79 to 1980-81 *i.e.* from 34% to 7% in the respective periods. Production in the factory is stated to have been affected by labour troubles. It came down as low as 26 coaches only during 1980-81 as against 118 coaches programmed, in that year. The Committee are greatly concerned at the poor performance of Jessop & Co. The Committee desire that the matter should be taken up by the Ministry of Railways with the Department of Heavy Industry at a high level with a view to improving the capacity utilization in the Company as expeditiously as possible by removing the constraints in production.

130. The Committee find that the outstanding load as on 1-4-1982 was 1,240 coaches on BEML and 854 coaches (inclusive of EMUs) at Jessops. The outstanding orders are expected to be completed by 1985-86 and 1988-89 respectively based on targets and fund allocations during 1982-83. The Ministry have added that if the Jessops are able to sustain the capacity for 250 coaches which they had attained as far back as in 1972-73 they would be able to clear the load by middle of 1985-86. The Committee expect that the Ministry of Railways on their part will ensure that the production schedule does not suffer for want of funds and other facilities.

131. The Committee understand that the Planning Commission have approved a project for setting up a coach factory which would initially manufacture 400 coaches per annum. The production would

ultimately go up to 500 coaches per annum. The question whether it would be feasible to augment the production capacity of the existing units or whether an altogether new unit is necessary, needs careful consideration. The Committee would like to know whether this matter was examined at any stage and if so, with what results. The Committee are of the view that it would be advantageous to expand the existing capacity of the existing coach building factories.

132. The Committee are constrained to note that 20 per cent of the coaches (722 out of 3623) built by ICF during the years 1974 to 1981 were of upper class (AC, 1st, AC II tier etc.) The amount spent by the ICF in manufacture of such coaches was Rs. 52.38 crores out of a total of Rs. 196.56 crores, i.e. 27%. An analysis of the passenger traffic and earnings therefrom during 1974-81 however indicated that 99 per cent of the passengers travelled in the lower class while only one per cent travelled in the upper classes. So far as I Class AC coaches are concerned, the Committee observe that not only the occupancy was poor, these services have been incurring losses on the MG systems of practically all zonal Railways (wherever such system exists). Losses are also being incurred on the BG systems of Central, South Eastern, North East Frontier and Southern Railways and that these were very heavy on the first two of these Railways. The Committee understand that a policy decision has since been taken not to manufacture any more first class AC coaches. The Committee consider that there should be no question of providing AC I Class services on routes where these are incurring losses. Surely, the tax payer should not be asked to subsidize travel by the elite. The Committee therefore recommend that the unremunerative services should be withdrawn forthwith and replaced by II Class Sleeper/ordinary coaches.

133. The Committee further desire that the occupancy ratio of upper class coaches, particularly I Class AC coaches, should be constantly monitored with a view to ensuring that these services not only cover the cost of operation but also leave a margin of profit to the Railways.

134. The Committee note that the luggage space provided in the first class coaches when found to be poorly utilized (being unguarded) was ordered (August 1972), by the Railway Board to be converted into two first class berths per coach in Railway workshops. Audit have

pointed out that this scheme has, however, made very poor progress, only 16 out of 387 first class (BG) coaches having been converted till December 1981. Similarly, on the MG, 324 such type of coaches were awaiting conversion by Railway workshops. According to Railway Board, the slow progress in the conversion of these coaches with luggage compartment was due to the inadequate capacity of the Railway workshops to undertake the work along with POH work. The Committee, however, observe that during 1973-74 to 1977-78, against the total monthly POH capacity of 21 4 BG coaches in Railway workshops, the out-turn ranged from 1563 to 1898. Similarly, against the capacity of 1471 MG coaches the out-turn ranged from 1252 to 1419. The Committee therefore see no reason why it should not have been possible to complete the conversion work, at least for a substantial number of the 771 (387 BG and 324 MG) coaches, if not all, by 1977-78. The Committee would like the Ministry of Railways to complete this work under a time bound programme.

135. Referring to the inadequate augmentation of MU coaches, specially motor coaches, and consequent slow progress in the implementation of the conversion programme of a coach rakes into 9 coach rakes for the suburban services in Eastern region, the Chairman Railway Board explained that this is due to the capacity constraints in this regard in the indigenous manufacturing capacity of traction motor units, etc at the BHEL, which is heavily in arrears in supplying these motor components (motors units, traction motor, etc.) As a result, coaches which have been manufactured have been reported to be lying idle in the workshops.

The Committee would suggest that Railway Board take effective measures in consultation with the controlling Ministry of BHEL—Ministry of Heavy Industry to impress on the public sector unit to clear the heavy backlog in their supply orders and advise the Committee of the results of such measures,

136. The Committee find that inadequate production of passenger coaches was not made up by more effective utilisation of available coaches. The percentage of ineffectives for all passenger coaches (BG) as per statistical records compiled by the Railways, increased from 12.74 during 1976-77 to 31.90 in 1979-80 and still further to 14.46 in 1980-81. A census carried out by the Railway administration in March 1981 (with

reference to the position of all passenger coaches including coaches found defective at the time of departure of trains, showed that the actual extent ineffective was for higher, being between 19.9 per cent and 22.5 per cent. It was particularly heavy in respect of AC (all types 22.8 to 32.6 per cent), First Class (23.9 per cent), Second Class general (20.5 per cent), Second Class two tier (22.2 per cent) and SLR coaches (9.5 per cent). Thus the coaches remained idle for longer periods than what was shown in the statistical records and consequently the percentage of actual ineffective was much more than the prescribed target norm of 14 per cent. Correspondingly, the availability of spare coaches (target norm 12.5 per cent) also got reduced affecting their availability for traffic.

137. The Ministry of Railways have explained that the difference in the two sets of figures is due to the differences in producers in so far as the statistical figure is an average of the daily position for the month/year as a whole whereas the census figures reflect the position at a particular time of the day when the census was taken.

The less repair percentage under the former category was accounted by coaches which were found defective/deficient of fittings and withdrawn from the scheduled trains but rectified within twenty-four hours which do not enter the statistical figures of repair percentage.

The Committee are unhappy to note that such large number of defective coaches as explained by variations in the annual census study were to be detached from the scheduled trains at the last minute causing inconvenience to the passengers as revealed by the census figures of the coaches taken at a particular time of the day. Keeping in view the advantages which accrue by such census, the Committee recommend that measures should be taken to have such census more frequently than at present, *i.e.* fortnightly or monthly, as found practicable, besides, maintaining statistics of such coaches detached from train for effectively monitoring the coaches under repair and not running as per formation of train with a view to reduce running of trains with lesser number of coaches.

138. The data furnished by the Ministry of Railways shows that while the percentage of coaches under repair in shops has remained virtually constant and in fact was somewhat reduced in 1980-81, the

coaches awaiting repairs increased from 2.53% in 1976-77 to 3.64% in 1980-81 while the stock under repairs in running sheds/sick lines increased from 2.45% in 1976-77 to 3.06% in 1979-80 and 2.98% in 1980-81. Acute shortage of workshop capacity is stated to have led to this situation. Owing to this shortage, coaches cannot be taken to workshops in time. Also, with less workshop capacity, a heavier load falls on the sick lines.

139. Another contributing factor was that large number of the coaches were received in sheds/depots on the Central, Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, South Central, and South Eastern Railways with deficient electrical fittings such as bulbs, fans, alternators, etc. As seen from the Audit Para, the loss sustained by the Eastern, Northern, South Central and South Eastern Railways were as much as Rs. 2.14 crores i.e. 90 percent of the total loss on this account for 1980-81. Explaining the reasons for this heavy losses, the Railway Board informed the Committee that the POH coaches are contributed the heaviest percentage as they remain unguarded and lying idle at the wayside stations in the divisions due to inadequacy of accommodation inside the workshops. Further due to inadequate supplies of fittings, these coaches were subjected to cannibalisation for utilising their fittings in running coaches, though no account thereof is available.

The Committee fail to understand why coaches should lie in waiting at wayside stations, as passenger rakes are run from point to point between important stations and are rather unhappy to note the manner in which the POH coaches are being left unguarded resulting in loss of fitting worth Rs. 2.14 crores as reported in the Audit Para for 1980-81. As the inadequacy of workshops to admit their entry in the shops could be monitored well in advance before despatch of coaches from the maintenance depots in the divisions, the Committee are unable to understand why the despatch of coaches due for POH could not be planned in such a way that they were taken out from traffic from the depots only on receipt advice from workshop regarding their entry in the shops. The Committee would, therefore, suggest for immediate steps to enforce a system of necessary coordination between the depots at the divisional headquarters and the assigned workshop so that these coaches are despatched in batches duly locked and guarded by Railway, Security personnel.

In regard to fittings removed from such coaches by cannibalisation, a proper account should be maintained by the depots and the same

should be subjected to inspection by the Railway officials.

The Committee note that as a result of special security efforts taken in 1981, stolen material worth Rs. 78.06 lakhs could be recovered during 1981. The Committee would like the Security measures to be intensified further.

140. The Committee have earlier pointed out that the actual output in Railway workshops has been well below the available capacity. The Committee cannot but infer that the deterioration in the performance of the Railways in this regard is to a large extent due to inefficient functioning of the Railway workshops. The Committee find from the Railway Minister's Budget speech (23 March 1982) that both the Chairman and the Member (Mechanical) of the Railway Board were asked to visit major workshops with a view to evaluating the repair and maintenance facilities available and suggesting concrete and practical measures for improving the utilisation of the available capacity. The General Managers were also instructed to ensure 10 per cent improvement in the capacity utilisation of the workshops and sheds positively by the end of that calendar year viz. by December 1982. The Committee need hardly stress that for improving the operational performance of the Railways, it is of vital importance that the maintenance and repair facilities are kept in top gear. The Committee would, therefore, like to be apprised of the results of evaluation referred to above, the precise steps taken in pursuance thereof and the extent of improvement achieved vis-a-vis the target of 10% improvement in capacity utilisation.

141. The Committee note that 26.5 percent of the coaching stock remains out of traffic use, being under repairs (14 percent) and held as spares (12.5 percent). The Railway Board have accepted this to be capable of improvement. A reduction of 5 percent in the ineffectives would release large number of coaches (1,48 numbers—5 percent of 8,268) and consequently reduce the requirements of additional coaches. As such, the Committee consider that immediate steps are necessary in the interest of overall economy, to plan and provide facilities to achieve such reduction.

The Committee have been informed that due to closure of large number of steam loco sheds due to gradual withdrawal of steam traction, 3,600 artisans have been released as surplus. The Committee, therefore, recommend that urgent steps should be initiated to gainfully utilise the surplus artisans to achieve the aforesaid objective.

142. The Committee are constrained to point out that while the holding of BG coaches increased (net) by 10.5 per cent between 1974-75 and 1980-81, the workshop capacity which was assessed at 2104* in 1973-74 remained static during this period. The Committee have been informed that the increase in POH arisings has taken place not only due to increase in the number of coaches but also because of the increased percentage of coaches running on Mail/Express trains which require more frequent attention. As against an estimated 35 per cent coaches running on Mail/Express trains in 1975-76, the figure today is about 50 per cent on BG. According to the Railway Board, the capacity for POH of Broad Gauge coaches at the beginning of 1982-83 was 2060 coach units per month. This is short of the monthly arisings by approximately 480 units. Thus the over all shortage in POH capacity which was assessed (in 1979) at about 1500 BG coaches per year, has increased to about 5760 BG coaches per year. Accordingly, the percentage of coaches overdue for POH has increased from 8.8 in 1973-74 to 16.6 in 1980-81 and would definitely be much more at present.

143. The Ministry of Railways have informed the Committee that they were aware of the shortage of POH capacity which was building up over the years but could not plan for increased facilities due to shortage of funds for maintenance facilities. The total allotment of funds since the beginning of the planned development for maintenance facilities was only 6 per cent of the allotment for additional rolling stock against an estimated requirement of about 15 per cent. Certain works sanctioned since 1977-78 are under execution. These will take care of the shortfall now existing as well as the increased arisings by the end of the Sixth Plan. These works include new Workshops at Mancheshwar, Tirupati and Bhopal each with a capacity of 200 coaches per month and expansion of existing Workshops at New Bongaigaon and Jagadhari with an increase of 100 coaches per month. The proposed new Workshops at Mancheshwar, Tirupati and Bhopal and the existing one at Jagadhari will serve as centralised repair Workshops catering to the arisings on all Railways in the zone. Expansion of Jagadhari and New Bongaigaon workshops is expected to be completed during 1983-84. Mancheshwar is expected to start POH during 1983-84 and reach full capacity in 1984-85. Tirupati and Bhopal Workshops are both expected to start giving out-turn during 1984-85. The conversion of MG facilities at Gorakhpur to undertake POH of 100 BG coach units per month and work at Liluah, Almbagh, Lower

* As per the monthly (December 1981) appreciation report of the Railway Board this capacity was re-assessed at 2081 coaches only.

Parel and Perambur for expanding facilities to handle AC coaches is also stated to have been sanctioned. However, the progress of these works will, according to the Ministry of Railways, depend on provision of funds by the Planning Commission.

144. The Committee are greatly concerned over the failure of the Railways since the very commencement of planned development in the country to ensure that the repairs and maintenance facilities keep pace with the increase in the number of coaching stock. The Committee find that the gap on the BG system has widened from 1500 coaches per annum in 1979 to 5760 coaches at present. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the workshop capacity which was assessed at 2104 in 1973-74 is stated to have been re-assessed at 2081 in December 1981 and as per the latest re-assessment at the beginning of 1982-83, it is only 2060 coach units per month. This needs to be explained.

145. The Committee recommend that the on-going schemes for augmenting the facilities in existing Workshops must be completed expeditiously so as to make up the deficiency to the extent feasible within the shortest possible time. As for the new schemes, the Committee would like priorities to be fixed so that instead of spreading the limited resources too thinly over several projects at the same time, the most promising ones could be completed expeditiously. The Railways should endeavour to find the necessary finances for the purpose from within their own resources as the provisioning augmentation of such facilities has necessarily to be their own concern. The Committee see no reason why after the steep hike in passenger fares in recent years, the Railways should not be able to make adequate provision for the purpose.

146. The Committee find that one of the principal constraints in fuller utilisation of existing capacity in the Workshops is the inadequate supplies of wheels, tyres and axles. The Committee urge that the Wheel and Axle Plant at Bangalore, should be commissioned expeditiously so as to make up this deficiency. As regards short supply of other essential materials fittings, the Committee would like the Ministry of Railways to take energetic steps for setting up ancillary industries that would be more or less captive to the Railways. This is possible only if such units could be given orders on an assured and sustained basis. The Committee would like to be apprised of the steps taken by the Ministry of Railways in this regard.

147. The Committee find that the capacity in the Railway Workshops has been further restricted on account of the corrosion repairs

required to be undertaken on steel-bodied coaches which were introduced over 25 years back and are to be given heavy corrosion repairs once in 7 years. The arisings have been increasing steadily from year to year on account of progressive addition to stock and condemnation of wooden-bodied coaches and their replacement with steel-bodied coaches. On account of the severely restricted capacity in the Workshops, at least 350 to 400 coaches have been queuing up for corrosion repairs at any given time. During evidence, the Committee were given to understand that the Railways propose to introduce a new type of low alloy high tensile steel coach that would be resistant to corrosion and that this proposal would be given a practical shape when the new coach-building factory is set up. The Committee would like the relative economics of the two types of coaches to be carefully studied before taking a decision in the matter. In the meantime, high priority should be accorded to corrosion repairs on steel-bodied coaches for alleviating overcrowding in the existing trains.

148. The Committee note from the Audit paragraph that utilisation of tourist coaches (405 coaches) ranged from 4 days to 32 days per annum on most of the Railways. This indicates that there is very little demand for tourist coaches from the passengers and as such, there is scant justification to maintain a fleet waiting for use by a few passengers who choose to use them very occasionally. Looking to the paucity of passenger coaches, the Committee recommend conversion of these coaches for effective use as passenger coaches. The progress made in such conversion be reported to the Committee.

149. The Committee regret to observe that as much as 36 per cent of the time of the coaches is spent at terminals as against 37 per cent of its run time in train. Among the contributory causes of the long 'terminal lie over' are inadequate maintenance and washing facilities at terminals and rakes remaining idle for long periods. According to a study conducted by the Efficiency Bureau of the Railway Board, the main reason for excessive 'terminal lie over' of the coaches is the dissimilar composition of the rakes. The lie over at terminals can be reduced if the composition of rakes of trains providing similar types of services is standardized and the rakes are utilised on first in-first-out basis at terminals after being given due maintenance. The Railway Board are stated to have already taken a decision to standardize the rake composition for 21 coach and 17 coach trains and necessary instructions have been

issued. The Committee are of the view that a study of this type was long overdue. It is unfortunate that the Board have realised the need for it so belatedly. The Committee would urge that the question of standardization of rake composition of all mail/express trains should be examined by all Zonal Railways/Railway Board on a priority basis and necessary steps taken to improve the utilization of the available assets. In course of time this exercise can be extended to other passenger trains also. The Committee would like to be apprised of the steps taken in this direction and the results achieved. The Committee further observe that sizeable reduction in the period of lie over would yield more vehicles for passenger utilisation and can reduce the need for addition to a great extent. The Committee would therefore recommend that a review of the washing and maintenance facilities for the coaches at the terminals be undertaken urgently with a view to improve and modernise the same. The steps taken as a result be advised to the Committee.

150 The extant instructions provide for a test check, at least once a month, by officers not below the rank of Senior Scale, of the correct observance of the producers, etc. in regard to the reservation arrangements. Audit have pointed out that there was no evidence on record of such test checks having been carried out. The Committee need hardly point out that this is an area where the travelling public comes into contact with the Railway staff at the cutting edge level. More often than not, the experience of passengers is quite unsavoury. The Committee consider that while there is obviously a need to streamline the procedures and to provide additional reservation counters at stations where traffic is heavy, it is at the same time very necessary that an effective check is exercised by the supervisory officers so as to eliminate corrupt practices which are known to be widely prevalent. It is also necessary to have frequent surprise check of the allotment of berths by train officials specially in lower class during the initial run of important long distance mail/express trains from the starting stations. The Committee would, therefore, like the Ministry of Railways to take tangible steps in this direction in consultation with the Zonal Railway Managers.

The Committee understand that the Indian Railways Amendment Act, 1982 which sought to curb malpractices in the matter of reservations by prescribing deterrent punishment to persons carrying on business in procurement and supply of rail tickets reservations in an unauthorised manner, has been challenged in the Supreme Court and a stay obtained]

The Committee would urge the Ministry of Railways to move the Court to get the stay vacated, if not already done, and to be apprised of the outcome of the case.

151. The Audit paragraph has identified a number of problem areas/bottlenecks in so far as passenger traffic both suburban and non-suburban is concerned. The Committee have dealt with only a few of the numerous important points raised by Audit. The Committee have no doubt that the various other issues highlighted in the Audit Report which the Committee have not touched upon in this Report, shall be gone into with all seriousness and necessary remedial measures taken to improve the services.

CONCLUSION

152. While introducing the Railway Budget for the year 1983-84, the Railway Minister in his speech (24 Feb., 1983) affirmed that "the basic responsibility of the Railways is to provide safe, secure and punctual transit to passengers and freight. In order that a vast undertaking of this dimension continues to play the assigned role, its assets are required to be maintained at the optimum level. Mainly because of funds constraints it is not possible to maintain the assets at a satisfactory level". He further stated that "the problem of overcrowding in trains continues and we have not been able to meet the demands of passengers for accommodation in trains. Shortage of coaches coupled with lack of terminal facilities at important stations has been the main constraint for augmenting passenger services."

153. The Committee consider that while short term measures are obviously necessary to ensure optimum utilisation of the available assets in order to alleviate the problems of the passengers, both suburban and non-suburban, it is equally necessary for the railways to prepare a perspective plan covering the period upto 2000 AD for integrated development of the railway infrastructure in terms of line capacity, terminal capacity, coaching stock, motive power and other ancillary facilities.

154. The Committee desire that realistic projections of traffic growth may be prepared on the basis of past experience and long term plants drawn up for meeting the demand.

155. The Committee expect the Planning Commission to take note of the severe constraint of funds for meeting the developmental needs of the Railways. While the Committee would urge the Railways to raise maximum possible resources out of their own revenues, it would be necessary for the Planning Commission to find additional resources to bridge the gap between the outlays needed and the resources available to the extent possible.

NEW DELHI;

April 28, 1983

Vaisakha 8, 1905 (S)

SATISH AGARWAL

Chairman

Public Accounts Committee

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

(Via Para I)

COACHING SERVICES

Audit Paragraph

I. Introduction

1.1 The Indian Railways earned Rs. 943.18 crores in 1980-81 from passenger (Rs. 827.47 crores) and other coaching (Rs. 115.71 crores) traffic*. 3613 million (2919-BG, 692-MG and 2-NG) passengers were carried during 1980-81, performing 2,08,558 (1,63,881-BG, 42,262-MG** and 1,415-NG**) million passenger kilometres of journeys.

1.2. Details of the passenger traffic carried as also the holding of passenger coaches in some of the years since 1969-70 are given below :

	1969-70	1973-74	1974-75	1978-79	1980-81
1. Passenger km (in millions)					
BG					
Non-suburban	59,876	74,849	69,827	1,08,050	1,24,895
Suburban	21,163	26,684	25,737	41,156	38,896
Total	81,039	1,01,533	95,564	1,49,206	1,63,791
2. Holding of coaches					
BG					
(i) Non.suburban passenger coaches	13,494	15,194	14,862	15,813	16,417
(ii) Electric Multiple Units (EMUs) for suburban services	1,540	1,743	1,856	2,233	2,343
Total	15,034	16,937	16,718	18,046	18,760

*Luggage, parcel and other traffic.

**This review mainly covers the position on BG which carries over 79 percent of the passenger traffic.

II. Position of traffic *vis-a-vis* coaches

1.3 (a) *Upto 1973-74*

(i) During 1969—74, the growth in non-suburban passenger traffic (in terms of passenger kms) was about 25 per cent on BG (5.2 per cent on MG) as against the anticipated increase of 23.06 per cent. On other hand, as against the Fourth Plan provision for increase of 14.1 per cent in the holding of passenger coaches by procurement from the three indigenous coach builders viz. Integral Coach Factory (ICF), Bharat Earth Movers (BEML) and Jessop and Company, the net increase was 12.6 per cent on BG (2.56 per cent on MG), resulting in the passenger traffic outstripping the availability of coaches for catering to it.

(ii) During 1969—74, the increase in suburban passenger traffic was 26 per cent as against the anticipated increase of 25 per cent, while the procurement of EMUs was 489 units (against the Plan provision of 841 units), the net increase being 203 units i.e. 13.2 per cent.

(b) *From 1974-75*

(i) The Ministry of Railway (Railway Board) had assumed an annual growth rate of 4 and 5 per cent in non-suburban and suburban traffic during the Fifth Plan period (1974—79) and provided for procurement of 6,500 coaches and 1,050 EMUs including replacements, the number of overaged coaches and EMUs as on 31-3-1974 being 4,173* and 41 respectively.

(ii) The Railway Board had informed the Railway Convention Committee (RCC) 1971 and 1973 that the following measures would be taken to meet the traffic requirements.

- (1) Capacity in ICF would be fully utilised for production of passenger coaches. Use of saloons and inspection carriages (where not used intensively) for passenger traffic would also be considered.
- (2) The growing requirement of lower class sleeper coaches and the need to relieve overcrowding in lower class would be kept in view while planning for additional coaches.

*As per overaged statements with the Railway Board.

- (3) Coaches with higher capacity such as double decker coaches, chair cars for short distances, AC two tier sleeper coaches with more berths etc. would be produced.
- (4) Wherever the utilisation is not adequate, the existing AC (I class) coaches would be gradually replaced by extra sleeper coaches.
- (5) Nine coach rakes would be provided in a busy suburban sections of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.
- (6) Terminal capacities in the Metropolitan Centres would be developed, trains with diesel and electric traction would be run, etc.
- (7) Other measures like improvement^s in reservation arrangements including provision of more booking windows, installation of self ticket printing machines at busy stations etc. and intensive ticket checking to minimise ticketless travel, would also be taken.

However, the position of coaches *vis-a-vis* the requirements of traffic worsened after 1974-75 as indicated below :

(c) (1) *Passenger traffic.*

Non-suburban

The non-suburban traffic on the BG increased by 78.8 per cent during 1974-75 to 1980-81.* Though 7,340 coaches were procured during this period against the Plan provision of 9,042 coaches, the net addition to the existing holding of coaches was only 10.5 per cent due to more condemnation of overaged stock.

Suburban

The suburban traffic in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras increased by 53.1 per cent during 1974-75 to 1980-81. With the procurement during the period of 802 EMUs only against the Plan provision of 1,388, the net addition to the stock was 26 per cent.

As a result, 2,505 overaged coaches and 99 overaged EMUs were in service as at the end of 1980-81.

*This increase comprises mainly long distance (Mail/Express) traffic 93.9 percent; and short distance ordinary passenger traffic 62.6 percent.

(2) Luggage and parcel traffic

The luggage traffic of the Railways was also affected; due largely to acute shortage of luggage vans (SLR/TLR type coaches, brake vans, etc.) While the number of passenger coaches increased during the period 1974—81 from 14,862 to 16,417 (*i.e.* by 10.5 per cent) and the non-suburban passenger traffic by 78.8 per cent, the holding of luggage-cum-brake vans and other coaching vehicles for similar use increased from 1953 to 1991 only (*i.e.* by 1.9 per cent).

III. Factors affecting availability of coaches

1.4 A review in audit of the factors responsible for the above position revealed the following :

(i) Utilisation of coach production capacity

The production of coaches, as approved by the Railway Board, is planned on the ICF, BEML and Jessop. The workshops of the zonal Railways also produce coaches but these are mainly for departmental purposes, such as crew rest vans, inspection coaches, etc.

7,340 coaches (all types) were produced by all the above units during the seven year period 1974—81 : of these, the number of coaches produced in the first four years (1974 to 1978) and that in the balance period were as under :

Name of unit	Installed capacity per year	Production of coaches		Total Capacity utilisation percentage		
		1974—78 (Average)	1978—81 (Average)	1974—78	1978—81	
ICF	750	2286(572)	2084(695)	4370	76	93
BEML	400	864(216)	649(216)	1513	54	54
Jessop & Co.	400 (including EMUs)	546(136)	88(29)	634	34	7
Railway workshops	100	513(128)	310(103)	823	128	103
Total	1650	4209	3131	7340		

Thus, during the period upto 1977-78 the capacity utilisation was only 76 per cent in the ICF (which produces the bulk of the passenger coaches for traffic) and in the case of BEML and Jessop it was only 54 and 34 per cent respectively. Thereafter, while the utilisation in ICF improved to 93 per cent, there was no improvement in the utilisation of capacity in BEML and in Jessop, it actually fell to 7 per cent.

(ii) *ICF*

(a) The main reason for the low capacity utilisation in ICF was stated to be lack of funds allotted for production of coaches. It was, however, seen that the budget allotment under Rolling Stock (Carriages) had been revised downward at the revised estimate stage in 1974-75 and again in 1977-78 to 1979-80, and the balance diverted for loco (besides wagon) procurement.

(b) The actual production of coaches in the ICF was as under :

Year	Number built		Total cost of manufacture	
	Lower class II all type	Upper class AC, 1st, AC II tier etc.	Lower	Upper
			(In crores of rupees)	
1974—78	1296	589	59.02	34.35
1978—81	1605	133	85.16	18.03
Total	2901	722	144.18	52.38

An analysis of the passenger traffic and earnings therefrom during 1974—81 indicated that 99 per cent of the passengers travelled in the lower class while only one per cent travelled in the upper classes. However, 27 per cent of the amount spent by the ICF in manufacture of passenger coaches was for production of upper class coaches.

(c) The ICF produced as many as 49 AC full and 7 AC partial coaches at a cost of Rs. 5.71 crores upto 1980-81 while 29 AC full coaches were under production (November 1981) (cost : Rs. 3.83 crores). This was despite the fact that the occupancy percentage of AC coaches was poor and the earnings well below their repair and maintenance cost, *vide* details given in Annexure II.

Apparently, in planning the production of AC coaches, the Railway Board had not kept in view the needs of the traffic and the recommendation of the RCC, 1973 regarding the need for taking into account the requirements of lower class accommodation.

(d) During the above period, the capacity in ICF was partly diverted to production of pantry cars (85 produced during 1974—81 and a further 16 under production in 1981-82), besides execution of export orders (147 coaches produced for export during 1974—81 and a further 32 under production in 1981-82). While the existing dining cars were being replaced by new pantry cars since 1974 to make available more accommodation for passengers, there was yet (December 1981) no firm decision to convert the released surplus dining cars into pantry cars or passenger coaches, either in the Railway workshops or in ICF, with the result that as many as 41 dining cars were lying surplus (March 1981) to the requirement with the Railways at a time when passenger coaches were in short supply. This number is likely to go up, as and when the pantry cars under manufacture at ICF are put into service.

(iii) *BEML and Jessop*

Paucity of funds, as also of wheelsets and other free supply items (supplied by the Railway Board) affected the production of coaches in the BEML (production during 1980-81 being only 176 against 270 coaches programmed). While curtailment of funds and delay in finalisation of prices for EMUs retarded their production by Jessop during 1969—73 (the issue was settled only by 1976), later the production was affected by labour trouble etc. for some time and recommenced from 1979-80 but the actual production during 1980-81 was only 26 against 118 coaches programmed. As on 1-4-1981, 848 coaches and 915 EMUs were outstanding from BEML (from May 1977) and Jessop (from May 1978) respectively.

(iv) *Workshops*

During 1974-75 to 1978-79, the Railway workshops exceeded their installed capacity of 500 coaches by manufacturing 656 coaches mainly for departmental services (e.g. relief vans, stores delivery vans, inspection carriages, crew rest vans etc.). The production of other coaching vehicles such as SLRs' luggage brake vans, parcel vans etc., required for parcel

and luggage traffic, however, accounted for only 20 per cent of the capacity.

In February 1973, the Railway Board had instructed the zonal Railways to rehabilitate replaced coaches in Railway workshops and to commission them for movement of perishable traffic. It was observed in test check that while the South Central Railway Administration had identified 60 such coaches as fit for conversion, the actual number converted between September 1973 and September 1975 was only 25 (cost : Rs. 5.50 lakhs). Even of these, 9 were condemned between July 1975 and April 1976, and 15 were either stabled or marked for POH without being used for long periods ; by December 1980 these also had been condemned.

Incidentally, the luggage space provided in the first class coaches was found to be poorly utilised (being unguarded). This space was, therefore, ordered (August 1972) by the Railway Board to be converted into two first class berths per coach in Railway workshops. This scheme has, however, made very poor progress, only 16 out of 387 first class (BG) coaches having been converted so far (November 1981). cf Para 3).

IV. Extent of ineffectives

1.5 The assessment of requirement of coaches made by the Railway Board takes into account the usage norms (vehicle km per vehicle day) achieved in recent years. Allowance is also made for ineffectives, to cover coaches under repair, periodical overhaul (POH), detention at destination stations, etc. at 14 per cent* of the coaching stock and an additional 12.5 per cent as spares (for special trains or as standby to coaches in the rakes, etc.). A review in audit of the position regarding ineffectives showing the following :

*The allowance of 14 per cent for ineffectives comprise :

	per cent
1. time spent in workshop for POH	6.5
2. time spent in workshops for non-POH repairs	1.0
3. time spent in sick lines and depots	
(a) mechanical repairs	2.0
(b) electrical repairs	2.0
4. time spent being stabled in yard, sick lines, etc.	2.5
	—
Total	14.00
	—

As against the target norms for ineffectives viz. 14 per cent, the actuals (as per statistical records compiled by the Railways) for all passenger coaches (BG) were as under :

Year	POH in workshops	Non-POH repairs in workshops	Sickline etc.	Stabled in yards	Total
1974-75	8.42	2.86	2.97	1.73	15.98
1976-77	7.16	2.45	2.53	0.60	12.74
1979-80	7.41	3.06	2.74	0.63	13.90
1980-81	6.89	2.98	3.64	0.97	14.48

It may be seen that the extent of ineffectives has gone up in recent years. Further the above data do not include the coaches remaining under repair for less than 24 hours. A census taken by the Railway Administrations in March 1981 (with reference to the position of all passenger coaches including coaches found defective at the departure time of trains) showed that the actual number of passenger coaches under repairs was much higher than that shown above, being between 19.9 and 22.5 per cent. It was particularly heavy in respect of AC (all types 22.8 to 32.6 per cent), First class (23.9 per cent), Second class general (20.5 per cent), Second class two tier (22.2 per cent) and SLR coaches (19.5 per cent)*. It was only in the case of Second class three tier coaches that the ineffectives were 13.9 per cent. Thus, the coaches remained idle for longer periods than what was shown in the statistical records and consequently, the percentage of actual ineffectives was much more than the prescribed target norm of 14 per cent. Correspondingly, the availability of spare coaches (target norm 12.5 per cent) also got reduced, affecting their availability for traffic.

1.6 A major factor affecting the availability of coaches was the inadequate POH capacity in Railway workshops, inadequate facilities for routine repairs in sheds and sick lines, for washing of coaches etc. at major terminal stations, etc.

*A census conducted in March 1975 by the Railway Board had also disclosed similar high percentage of ineffectives viz.—AC (36 to 42.6), First class—(26.7), Second class general—(22.5) and SLR—(24.2).

(a) Workshops

The overall shortage in the POH capacity was assessed (in 1979) at about 1,500 BG coaches per year. Major works to augment the repair facilities, including installation of diesel generating sets to make up power shortage, etc. were being considered and included in the Works programmes from 1977-78 but are yet to be completed (1981-82). Meanwhile, the average monthly POH lagged behind the capacity (estimated at 2,104 coaches) resulting in the percentage of coaches overdue for POH increasing from 8.8 in 1973-74 to 16.6 in 1980. On an average for all Railways 578 coaches were stabled daily during 1980-81 awaiting workshop repairs, of which as many as 150 were on Eastern Railway and 187 on South Eastern Railway.

Further, on the Central Railway, 33 coaches suffered transit detention during 1979-80 of 10 to 35 days (per coach) between base station and workshop, besides waiting period of 55 to 120 days (per coach) in workshop premises before entering POH sheds. On the Western Railway (Parel Mechanical Workshop), the average time taken for POH during 1979-80 was between 21.9 and 22.9 days in respect of passenger and other than passenger vehicles respectively against the target of 18 days. Increase in repair days in recent years especially in 1979-80, was, *inter alia*, due to the time required for corrosion repairs in steel bodied coaches, which became acute in 1979-80 on the Central, Western, South Central and Northeast Frontier Railways, mainly owing to (as seen from workshop records) inadequate observance of preventive maintenance instructions/noncompletion of corrosion repairs prescribed by the Research, Designs and Standards Organisation (RDSO).

(b) Repair Sheds/maintenance depots

A test check of the records of 5 maintenance depots on Western Railway showed that the average time taken for maintenance, repairs, etc. per coach was between 15 to 29 hours as against the target of 12 hours. The contributory factors for excessive detention were non-availability of wheels, L.B, springs, Axle pulleys, etc. arising out of inadequate planning and coordination between the Stores and the Mechanical Departments of the Railway.

Coaches received at the depots on the Central, Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, South Central and South Eastern Railway for primary maintenance during the years 1978-79 to 1980-81 had been found deficient in fittings, especially electrical items such as bulbs, fans, alternators etc. The loss of fittings from the coaches was Rs. 464.54 lakhs during these years (Details in Annexure III). However, often due to heavy deficiencies and non-availability of the required stores in the depots, these coaches had been detained for long periods ranging from 6 hours to 153 hours*. No data regarding the number of coaches run with deficient fittings were available with the Zonal Railways.

(c) *Repairs to EMU coaches*

The percentage of EMU motor and trailer coaches awaiting repair during 1980-81 was as under :

Year	Central (BG)	Eastern (BG)	South Eastern (BG)	Western (BG)	All Rail- ways (BG)	Southern (MG)
1980-81						
Motor coaches	22.7	22.6	17.2	11.8	18.8	20.5
Trailer coaches	16.6	21.3	16.9	9.39	16.2	9.96

The higher percentage of EMU motor coaches under repair, as compared to the target of 14 per cent, restricted the availability of rakes, since without them, the trailers could not be put to use. While on an average 13 motor coaches on Central Railways and 8 on Eastern Railway were held as spare or stored in good condition in 1979-80, the corresponding number of trailer coaches held as spare etc. was 47 on Central Railway and 30 on Eastern Railway. There was, however, some improvement in 1980-81 in

*Based on a sample study conducted by audit at sick line at Madras Central on Southern Railway.

that the number of motor coaches held as spare etc. was 11 and 4 respectively, while the corresponding number of trailer coaches was 26 and 11 respectively.

A large number of EMU motor coaches remained under repair due to inadequate capacity for rewinding damaged motors, remounting of bearings of traction motors, etc. To meet this situation, expansion of car shed at Kurla, setting up of a new car shed at Kalwa, construction of traction motor rewinding factory at Nasik etc. on Central Railway and remodelling-cum-expansion of car shed at Mahalaxmi on Western Railway, were undertaken commencing from 1972-73, but are still to be completed (November 1981).

Similarly, certain essential works for stabling, repair and maintenance of 9 coaches EMU rakes on the Eastern and Southern Railways are still under execution (1981-82). So far (October 1981), nine coaches EMU trains have been standardised only in the Bombay suburban area. In Calcutta and Madras areas, though a policy decision had been taken to implement the scheme in 1974 subject to availability of additional rakes, the EMU trains continue to consist mainly of 8 coaches due to high percentage of motor coaches under repair besides lower rate of materialisation of new EMU coaches on order from ICF/Jessop. So far only 19 nine coach rakes out of a total fleet of 68 rakes have been formed on the Eastern Railway.

V. Utilisation of passenger coaches

1.7 (i) Between November 1976 and March 1981, the Railways introduced 79 additional Mail/Express trains, besides augmenting the loads of existing services by attachment of extra coaches, etc. As, however, the overall availability of coaches increased only by 9 per cent, this necessitated withdrawal of coaches from the existing passenger trains (and some times even from Mail/Express trains), resulting in these services being run with lesser number of coaches than usual. The overall composition of passenger trains, more particularly those hauled by steam locos, had consequently to be curtailed owing to paucity of coaches. The curtailment was to the extent of 15 per cent in 1980-81 as compared to 1974-75 even though the number of passengers carried on an average had increased during that period from 555 to 729 per train.

(ii) The Railway-wise position of holding and utilisation of passenger coaches in 1980-81 as compared to that in 1974-75 is shown below :

As on	Central	Eastern	Northern	Northeast Frontier	Southern	South Central	South Eastern	Western	All Railways
Holding of passenger coaches (BG)									
31-3-75	2036	2743	2885	297	1726	1166	1932	1459	14244
31-3-81	2118	2693	3166	467	2093	1353	2156	1700	15848
Passengers carried per train									
31-3-75	612	548	608	162	506	494	377	706	555
31-3-81	814	763	759	138	631	680	493	989	729
Vehicle km per vehicle day									
31-3-75	269	274	213	107	233	230	235	251	243
31-3-81	329	334	256	130	309	332	314	311	314

While the vehicle km. per vehicle day varied in keeping with the number of passengers carried on Central, Eastern, Northeast Frontier, South Central, South Eastern and Western Railways, the utilisation of passenger coaches in terms of vehicle km per day improved and was above the all India average only on the Central, Eastern, South Central and South Eastern Railways. The performance on other Railways, especially Northern, Northeast Frontier and Southern Railways was below the level of the all Railway average (314) in 1980-81, showing relatively poor utilisation of coaches. In particular the increase in the holding of passenger coaches was disproportionately more compared to the increase in the number of passengers carried per train on the Northeast Frontier Railway,

(iii) A test check in audit of the rake composition of the train services run on some Railways indicated short running of coaches *vide* instances given below :

On Central Railway, during the months January to May 1981, three express trains* and four passenger** trains were regularly run with lesser number of coaches than the normal composition, resulting in short running of 164 coaches per month on an average.

On the Eastern Railway (May 1981) two important daily express trains (13 Up Upper India Express and 11 Up Delhi Express) were regularly run with lesser number of coaches than the normal composition, *viz.* by 3 and 1 coach per rake respectively.

On the South Central Railway also, 60 passenger trains were run with lesser number of coaches than the normal composition, resulting in short running of 96 coaches per month on an average during November, 1979 and April 1980.

On the other hand, on the same Railway, a review of occupation of 25Dn/26Up Kakatiya Express introduced from 2nd April 1977, conducted by the Railway Administration for November 1979 and April 1980; showed that for the first class coaches the occupancy was about 40 per

*13Dn/14Up Bombay-Madras
Janta Express.

39/Dn/40Up Dadar-Nagpur
Express.

81Dn/82Up Bombay-Trivandrum
Jayanti Janta Express.

**321 Dn/322 Up Bombay-Pune Daund-
Manmad Passenger.

323Dn/324Up Bombay-Sur-Siddeswar
Express.

351Dn/352Up Bombay-Bhusaval
Passenger.

353Dn/354 Up Bombay-Bhusaval
Passenger.

cent between Hyderabad and Kazipet ; further, in the second class, out of the available 530 seats, only 15 seats were found occupied between Kazipet and Warrangal.

Despite limited availability of passenger coaches, their deployment on various Railways, especially on unremunerative services, does not seem to have been reviewed on a regular basis with a view to their optimum utilisation.

(iv) During 1980-81, the break up of the cycle of 24 hours of the movement of a passenger coach was as under :

	Hours/ minutes	Per cent
1. Run time in train	8-50*	37
2. Terminal lie over at both ends	8-40**	36
3. POH, sick, idling and spare	6-30***	27

Thus, a coach remained on the move only for 37 per cent of the time in a day, while the 'terminal lie over' was 36 per cent and 'POH', 'sick' and 'idling' (in transit to and from workshop or in sick line) 27 per cent.

The terminal lie over (36 per cent or 8-40 hours), would have been higher (42 per cent or 10 hours per day) if the lie over period had been reckoned with reference to the scheduled time of running of trains, especially Mail/Express trains which account for 58 per cent of the passenger coaches. The punctuality of Mail/Express trains had deteriorated from 90 per cent in 1976-77 to 65 per cent in 1979-80 consequent on late running of passenger trains, thereby depressing the actual terminal lie over. +

(v) The availability of coaches for train service was affected not only by inadequate utilisation of the production capacity and the extent of

*Computed by dividing vehicle km per day (314 km) by the average speed (35.6 km per hour) of passenger trains all services (1980-81 data).

**A rake generally moves between the terminals without any break-up and undergoes its primary and secondary maintenance at either of the two terminals. The time spent by the rake at the terminals is called 'terminal lie over'.

***Based on repair percentage (14.48) plus authorised spares (12.50); if percentage based on census data of March 1981 is adopted (i.e. 19.11) spare percentage would be correspondingly less than 12.5 (i.e. 7.87).

+ Similar information regarding punctuality of Mail/Express trains for 1980-81 has not been compiled by the Railway Board (December 1981).

actual ineffectives but also by inadequate facilities for POH and repairs extent of lie over at terminals, etc.

Some cases of inadequate facilities in sidings for maintenance noticed in audit are mentioned below :

Due to inadequate siding length at Bombay VT (Central Railway) and want of stabling facilities in the carriage and maintenance depot at Mazagaon (near Bombay VT), sick coaches (in the rakes) could not be attended to in time, resulting in detention to coaches and their non-availability to run trains. During January to May 1981, the outgoing and incoming 5Dn Punjab Mail and 4Dn Howrah Mail were run with lesser number of coaches as compared to the normal composition of these trains, the shortfall ranging from 10 to 31 coaches per month. Similar was the position in the case of the seven trains mentioned in para V(iii) and served by these terminals (Mazagaon and Bombay VT).

On the South Central Railway, all broad gauge passenger trains terminating at Renigunta were extended to Tirupati on it being connected by a broad gauge line with Renigunta in 1968-69. However, rake maintenance facilities were not provided at this terminal till August 1978, with the result that the terminating passenger trains were being hauled empty between Tirupati and Renigunta for maintenance, the average cost of haulage being Rs. 3.64 lakhs per annum besides reducing their availability for traffic.

(vi) Since 1977-78, the Railway Board had been considering the possibilities of reducing the 'terminal lie over' period of coaches by changing the rake links so as to minimise infructuous detention to rakes at terminals and maximise their availability for train service. No final decision has, however, yet been taken by the Railway Board (November 1981) despite studies by the Board's Operational Research Cell in this regard. Meanwhile, idling of passenger coaches on account of high 'terminal lie over' continues. A few instances of excessive terminal lie over are given below :

The Central Railway's rake links in respect of 5Dn/6Up Bombay—Firozpur Mail and 11Dn/12Up Dadar—Madras Express showed that two rakes (32 coaches) are being kept idle for more than 24 hours at the terminals, Bombay VT and Dadar.

Three super fast trains, 121Dn/122UP Tamil Nadu Express (tri-weekly), 123Dn/124Up Andhra Pradesh Express (bi-weekly) and 125Dn/

126Up K.K. Express (bi-weekly), have 5 rakes with availability period of 840 hours per week. However, the run time for the three trains is around 480 hours only. As a result, especially in the case of the Andhra Pradesh and K.K. Expresses, the rakes remain idle for a period of 32 hours, 54 hours and 73 hours at Secunderabad, Trivandrum and Bangalore respectively.

On South Eastern Railway, even an overlapping full rake has been provided and kept as a standby (October 1981) for the Express train between Bokaro Steel City and Madras (introduced in November 1975). As it is, for the rake actually in use in the train more than 28 hours are already available for washing, under gear examination, etc.

Similarly, the three rakes (each comprising 10 coaches) of a daily passenger train (229Up/230Dn) between Waltair and Durg (distance 565 kms) (run time 18 hours 25 minutes) remain stabled for 27 hours 55 minutes each at Waltair.

The tri-weekly express train 183Up/184Dn Ranchi Express (with 13 coaches) introduced with effect from May 1980 between Chandigarh and Ranchi, was being hauled empty to Kalka (distance : 24 km) for primary maintenance (i.e. washing, etc.) for want of such facilities at Chandigarh. Later the empty haulage was regularised by extending the run of the train (without adequate traffic justification) to Kalka with effect from 23/25-5-81. (The train leaves Chandigarh for Kalka at 21.15 hours and Kalka for Chandigarh at 3.40 hours.) Further at Kalka the empty rake is stabled for about 12 hours per round trip. Similarly at Ranchi, the rake is stabled for about 30 hours.

For utilising the rake during the lie over period at Kalka, the Northern Railway Administration had made a proposal (December 1980) that it might be run as a tri-weekly service between Kalka and Hardwar. This, however, is stated to be still (December 1981) under consideration of the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board).

(vii) *Tourist cars, saloons etc.*

As on 1st April 1981, about 405* coaches (294 BG and 111 MG) were being held as tourist cars and saloons but were sparingly used. On the Western Railway, 16 first class and 17 second class tourist cars were

*Includes tourist cars, State saloons and Military cars.

utilised as-tourist cars etc. to the extent of 5 per cent of the number of days available for their use in 1980-81. During the same period these cars were utilised to the extent of 35 per cent by Railway Officers (besides inspection carriages and saloons provided exclusively for them.)

One first class and five second class tourist cars held by Northeast Frontier Railway were used for short trips by private parties for a period of 4 to 20 days only on an average during 1979—81. On the Northern Railway, which holds as many as 32 (27 BG and 5 MG) tourist cars, the average monthly booking during January 1980 to August 1980 was between 0.25 to 7.6 days. The South Central Railway has 7 BG and 6 MG first class and one MG ACC tourist cars but there was practically no demand for them as seen during a test check of 7 tourist cars during January—June 1981, wherein utilisation was found to be 5 per cent by public and 29 per cent by Railway Officers. Similarly, on the Southern Railway, during the two years 1979-80 and 1980-81, its eleven tourist cars were in use for 122—104 days only.

None of these Railway Administrations had (October 1981) considered the possibility of putting these coaches to alternative use in passenger service to relieve shortage of coaches especially for lower class travel.

(viii) *Utilisation of other coaching vehicles*

As already brought out in para (c) (2) under Section II, there was acute shortage of luggage-cum-brake/brake vans (SLRs, LRs). As a result, the capacity for movement of luggage and parcel traffic by regular passenger service got reduced. The Railway Administrations' efforts to despatch such traffic by separate regular parcel service were also affected by inadequate availability of wagons. To meet part of this shortage, other types of coaching vehicles, such as motor vans and four wheeler/eight wheeler wagons had to be used for parcel service.

The holding and utilisation of 'Other coaching vehicles' on the zonal Railways is shown in Annexure IV. It may be seen therefrom that these vehicles on the Central, Northern, Northeast Frontier and South Central Railways were considerably under-utilised in comparison with those on the other Railways, the utilisation (on these Railways) being just 2 to 5 hours in a vehicle day (i.e. 8 to 20 per cent)*.

*Based on speed of passenger/parcel express trains of 26.0/26.7 km. per hour during 1980-81.

A test check of the Central Railway's parcel traffic during the years from 1978-79 showed that owing to acute shortage of parcel vans/wagons made fit for passenger trains, the Railway Administration was not able to clear the parcels offered at road side stations and not transport them either by regular passenger service or by scheduled parcel express trains. Only 8 to 10 parcel vans were available as against 15 to be allotted on an average during the period from April 1979 till June 1981. As a result, the tonnage lifted dropped from 4.35 lakhs in 1978-79 to 4.09 lakhs in 1980-81.

A test check of the utilisation of the Railway service vehicles meant for departmental use (e.g. parcel van, inspection carriages etc.) revealed the following :

On the South Eastern Railway, out of 45 stores delivery vans, 4 had not been used at all. A sample survey of 8 stores delivery vans based at Kharagpur Depot during March to May 1981 showed that against the allotted 122 days for movement of these vans, the actual time taken was 227 days indicating lack of control over their movement by the base depot.

On the Northeast Frontier Railway, 3 parcel vans and 2 delivery vans, sent in October and December 1980 to Lumding and Tinsukia Divisions respectively from New Jalpaiguri for delivery of uniforms etc., had not returned to the base depot till the date of review (31-5-81) even though the programmed journey was for 70 days only.

VI. Passenger reservation arrangements, etc.

1.8 Some aspects of reservation arrangements affecting directly or indirectly, Railway revenues, noticed in audit, are mentioned below :

(i) As per extant instructions, passengers who can not get confirmed reservations are to be waitlisted and allotted reservation according to their priority as and when vacancies occur owing to cancellations, etc. The number of waitlisted passengers who surrendered tickets at the last moment was high as revealed in a test check by Audit (examples given in Annexure V).

(ii) A chart with the names of passengers, both with reserved accommodation and waitlisted, is handed over to the train officials at the

starting station. These officials are required to ascertain the vacant berths/seats due to last minute cancellations, etc., allot these to persons in the waiting list and the remaining to those boarding the train enroute or without reservation. They are then to prepare a revised chart incorporating the names of the passengers who are finally allotted berths/seats and deposit it with their headquarters. There is no procedure at present of checking these charts with reference to the initial reservation charts.

(iii) As per the Commercial Manual, provision of additional coaches to trains should be decided on in advance so that the waitlisted passengers may have adequate notice of the additional accommodation available. However, a test check on Central and Southern Railways showed that decisions to attach extra coaches, had been taken in most of the cases only a day and sometimes even hours before the departure of the train.

(iv) A part of the accommodation which can be reserved in a train is set aside as quotas for passengers entraining at important enroute stations. Passengers boarding at these stations have to seek reservation against the respective quotas ; where these are fully booked and in respect of stations without quotas, the stations are required to send messages for reservation to the starting stations, the latter being required to send a reply message. It was observed, vide instances given in Annexure I, that :

- (a) Quotas allotted to en route stations in certain important trains were in many cases found to have been not fully utilised but these (the quotas) had not been reviewed. The unutilised balance of the quotas was left to be allotted on the trains by train officials.
- (b) Reply messages were not being sent by major starting stations to requests for reservation with the result that the passengers had to look to the train officials for allotment of berths/seats [c.f. sub. paras (b) under Central and South Eastern Railways of Annexure I for details].

(v) Special trains run to clear the rush of passengers during the busy holiday season were often not patronised well, being not run to the notified time schedule and some times even cancelled at short notice :

late running ranged from 4 hours to 17 hours as noticed on South Eastern Railway and nearly 10 hours on Southern Railway.

It would appear that the reservation arrangements, quota allotments, their distribution, etc. had not been reviewed with a view to optimum utilisation of the coaching capacity.

The extant instructions also provide for a test check, at least once a month, by officers not below the rank of Senior Scale, of the correct observance of the procedures, etc. in regard to the reservation arrangements. There was no evidence on record of such test checks having been carried out.

VII. General

1.9 *Tourist Agencies*

Recognised tourist agencies are authorised to issue tickets in accordance with the rules and conditions laid down in the Indian Railway Conference Association Coaching Tariff. There are in all 30 such agencies operating on Indian Railways who have executed agreements with the various Zonal Railways. These agencies, besides competing with the public for reservation in all classes, are entitled to commission on the sale of tickets by them at the rate of 3 to 10 per cent, depending upon the category of tickets sold as per their agreements.

A test check showed that tourist agencies of 7 Railways (*i.e.* all Railways except North Eastern and Northeast Frontier) had brought in business of Rs. 356 lakhs in 1979-80 and Rs. 437 lakhs in 1980-81 (mostly in the upper classes), the commission allowed to them being Rs. 14.9 lakhs in 1979-80 and Rs 17.9 lakhs in 1980-81 (Details in Annexure VI).

The need for these agencies, considering the paucity of accommodation on the trains, at least for passengers other than overseas tourists, does not seem to have been reviewed.

Railway passes—all types

The Railway staff get free travel privilege passes, retirement complementary passes, concessional privilege ticket orders (PTOs) etc. As per the last published statistics (contained in the Indian Railways Annual

Report and Accounts for 1975-76), the value of the passes/PTOs issued in 1975-76* was about Rs. 66.94 crores. According to the Railway Board, the cost of passes/PTOs actually utilised would be much less. Commencing 1976-77, however, the value of passes/PTOs issued is not being given in the Annual Report and Accounts.

VIII. Results of the various inadequacies

1.10 The results of inadequate procurement and utilisation of coaching stock for passenger services are discussed below :

(i) *Over-crowding and ticketless travelling*

Inadequate availability of coaches for passenger service due to reasons mentioned earlier coupled with delay in working out and implementing plans to improve the existing level of utilisation, had aggravated over-crowding in second class coaches of trains. The percentage of over-crowding in passenger trains ranged between 100 and 214 in certain cases on Northern, Southern and Western Railways as per the Railway census report of April-May** 1980. On the other hand, the occupation of certain trains*** was poor varying from 1 per cent to 96 per cent of the capacity. (October 1980 and May 1981).

Despite heavy rush and long queues at the booking windows of the stations in important cities, the Railways had not (according to the Report of the Railway Convention Committee 1977) been able to correspondingly augment facilities for booking of passengers, such as opening of additional booking counters, provision of self ticket printing machines, etc.

Further, with the over-crowding of passenger trains, in suburban as well as non-suburban sections, the scope for ticketless travelling had considerably increased resulting in loss of revenue.

Persons when detected travelling without tickets, are, if unable to pay the excess fares and fines, locked up by Government Railway Police

*The value of passes and PTOs issued to the Railway staff in 1980-81 as estimated in audit, taking into account the increase in staff strength 8 (6.8 per cent) and increase in fares (12.5 per cent) from 1975-76 to 1980-81, is Rs. 80.43 crores.

**Details in Annexure VII (1).

***Details in Annexure VII (2).

(GRP) and prosecuted. It was, however, seen that on the Eastern Railway, during 1978—80, out of 80,876 ticketless passengers apprehended as many as 33,158 passengers were let off without realising excess fares and fines amounting to Rs. 4.24 lakhs and without launching prosecution against them, for want of accommodation in the GRP lock ups.

(ii) *Loss on passenger services and other coaching services*

According to the Railway Board, the loss on the operation of coaching services was Rs. 227.45 crores in 1980-81. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Railway Convention Committee, 1973 the Railway Board had conducted a profitability study (finalised in September 1980), which revealed, at the level of fares of 1977-78, a loss of Rs. 8.12 crores on AC and first class travel by Mail/Express trains, and a profit of Rs. 74.91 crores on second class travel by these trains. Similarly, in respect of ordinary train services, it revealed a loss, under both, upper and lower classes, of Rs. 106.14 crores and under parcel traffic of Rs. 37.04 crores.

The losses in the case of ordinary train services were attributed to underload running of trains due to paucity of coaches, numerous stoppages, short distance branch line services, etc.

The losing non-suburban short distance (ordinary passenger) traffic had increased by 62.6 per cent during 1974—81. In this connection, the National Transport Policy Committee (NTPC) (May 1980) and Rail Tariff Enquiry Committee (RTEC) (June 1980) had observed that such traffic could generally be carried more economically by road. The RTEC had also recommended that rail and road traffic should be coordinated keeping in view the national economy and the totality of costs between rail and road transport. Notwithstanding the Railway's participation in the Capital of the Road Transport Corporation, effective action in these directions has yet to be taken.

IX. Summing up :

- 1.11 (i) While the actual coaching traffic for exceeded the estimated increases the production of coaches was much less than planned, despite availability of capacity. Production was limited to 54 per cent of installed capacity in BEML and 76/93 per cent of capacity in ICF upto/after 1977--78.

- (ii) The recommendations of the Railway Convention Committee 1973 regarding the need for taking into account the requirements of lower class accommodation and elimination of overcrowding therein had not apparently been kept in view in planning the production of 722 upper class coaches accounting for 27 per cent of the funds released during 1974—81.
- (iii) The scope for utilising the Railway service vehicles (inspection carriages, saloons etc.) and tourist cars for passenger service had not been fully explored.
- (iv) Less than planned addition to EMU stock, higher ineffective percentage in EMU motor coaches and lack of adequate repair facilities had led to inadequate augmentation of EMU services which could not keep pace with the fast increasing suburban passenger traffic.
- (v) The capacity of the Railway workshops was utilised to the extent of 20 per cent only for production of SLRs/luggage brake vans/parcel vans despite persistent shortage of such vehicles; conversion of replaced stick in to such vehicles had also not been implemented as envisaged.
- (vi) Inadequate production of passenger coaches was not made up by more effective utilisation of available coaches. On the other hand, the extent of ineffectives, even as per the statistical records of the Railways had gone up and exceeded in 1980-81, the liberal norm of 14 per cent. Further, the actual extent of ineffectives, taking into account coaches under repair for less than 24 hours, was for higher, being between 19.9 per cent and 22.5 per cent, as per the census carried out by the Railways in March, 1981.
- (vi) In a cycle of 24 hours a coach was on the move in passenger trains for 8.50 hours (37 per cent) only. The rest of the period was spent in 'terminal lie over' after running on trains (36 per cent) and in sicklines, maintenance sheds and workshops (27 per cent).
- (.iii) Among the contributory causes of the long 'terminal lie over' and the time taken in sick lines, sheds, idling etc, were inadequate maintenance and washing facilities at terminals, rakes

remaining idle for long periods due to the rake link arrangements which had not been reviewed), inadequate capacity of workshops and maintenance depots resulting in excessive waiting time, time taken for repairs etc. POH was overdue in respect of 16.6 per cent of the coaches in 1980-81 as against 8.8 per cent in 1974-75.

- (ix) The prescribed rules and procedures in the matter of reservation at terminal stations were not being observed fully. The quotas for reserved berths/seats at en route stations, which were found in many cases to have been not utilised fully, had not been reviewed.
- (x) The arrangements for sale of tickets through tourist agencies on commission basis had not been reviewed. The recommendations of the RCC for improved booking facilities, especially at important terminals, had also not been fully implemented.

According to the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) (January 1982) :

- (i) The Railways have not been able to meet the total demand of coaching traffic because of lack of funds and the increased passenger traffic is being carried within the available resources.
- (ii) Whenever any cut has to be made it falls invariably on items like maintenance facilities. As a result, the Railways has not been able to develop requisite maintenance facilities, resulting in the number of ineffectives being rather high.

However, as already mentioned in para III (ii) above, the Budget allotments under 'carriages' were reduced during 1974—80 to release more funds for Diesel and Electric Loco production the result of which was surplus loco holding and deterioration in their utilisation indices (cf. para 4 of the Report on "Utilisation of Locomotives").

[Para I of the Advance Report of C & AG of India for the year 1980-81, Union Govt. (Railways)].

ANNEXURE 1

[cf. Para 1.9 (iv)]

Some specific cases of non observance of the prescribed procedures for passenger reservation noticed by Audit in a test check are detailed below :

Central Railway

(a) At Bombay VT station, the reservations of seats/berths originally made for certain parties were transferred (April/May 1981) in favour of other parties who had not even been waitlisted, on the authority of CRI/ACO.

(b) A proper record of the messages received from out-stations seeking reservations in the trains originating from Bombay VT station had not been maintained (April 1981 to June 1981) at the station.

(c) A return journey quota of 10 berths has been allocated for passengers travelling to Howrah in train No. 59Dn Gitanjali Express starting from Bombay VT. On a number of occasions (March/June 1981), through reply messages from Howrah regarding reservation against the return journey quota had not been received, the reservations had not been given to wait listed passengers; instead the berths were left vacant in reservation charts to be allotted by the conductors to passengers, whether waitlisted or not, waiting on platform or travelling in the train.

Northeast Frontier Railway

(a) No quota in first class at Silchar has been provided in 4Dn (Assam Mail) and 158Dn (Tinsukia Mail) trains even though there was

a long waiting list of 1st class passengers for travelling by these trains, viz. 50 and 40 respectively in March 1981.

(b) At Aizol agency, the quota allotted in train No. 12Dn (Barak-valley) was utilised only to the extent of 25—39 per cent in 1st class (March/June 1981); similarly the quota of 9 berths in II class three tier in train No. 202Dn (biweekly express) was utilised to the extent of 32 to 55 per cent only during the same period; the quota set aside in AC two tier in train No. 158Dn Tinsukia Mail was utilised to the extent of 20-22 per cent only (January and April 1981).

Southern Railway

(a) The outstation quotas for train No. 131Up Mangalore-Nizamuddin Jayanti Janata Express were not being utilised fully (March 1981 to June 1981) vide details below :

Mangalore Station

A quota of 12 seats allotted for Jhansi was utilised fully on two days in March, four days in April, five days in May and fourteen days in June 1981 and on the remaining days, it was only partially utilised.

Quota of 2 berths allotted to Defence was not utilised by Defence personnel during March 1981 to June 1981.

Cochin Harbour Terminus

A quota of 3 berths for Vijayawada was fully utilised only on 5, 10, 12 and 19 days in March, April, May and June 1981 : on the remaining days the quota was only partially utilised.

Ernakulum Jn. and Alwaye station

Quotas of 32 and 6 berths from Ernakulum and Alwaye stations for Renigunta station were not fully utilised on any occasion during March to June 1981.

Palghat Jn.

The quotas of 11 and 7 berths for Nagpur and Vijayawada were utilised fully for a maximum of 19 and 21 days only in any month during March to June 1981.

(b) In April and May 1981, 29 special trains were run between Madras Central/Egmore and Trivandrum (11 trains), Bombay (6 trains), Bangalore City (6 trains), Mangalore (1 train) and Tirunelveli (5 trains). Nine of these 29 trains were run with less than 50 per cent occupancy. In one special train from Mangalore, occupancy was only 10 per cent in first class and 14 per cent in second class. Such trains also generally ran to irregular timings (upto 9 hours 50 minutes for New Delhi-Madras special trains reaching Madras on 19 June 1981).

(c) The prescribed procedure in regard to attachment of extra coaches was not followed at the three major reservation centres, viz. Madras Central, Madras Egmore and Bangalore City. In the months of December 1980, January 1981, May 1981 and June 1981 (middle of June 1981) the number of passengers in the waiting list justified the attachment of additional coaches but no additional coach was attached.

South Eastern Railway

(a) The outstation quotas of berths/seats in second class for 19Up/20Dn Konark Express during March to June 1981 were not fully utilised as mentioned below :

Cuttack

Quotas of 17, 66, 20 and 10 berths for Bombay VT. Secunderabad, Vijayawada and Rajahmundry respectively were utilised to the extent of 20 to 37 per cent only.

Bhubaneswar

Quotas of 17, 102, 10 and 40 berths for Bombay VT, Secunderabad, Rajahmundry and Waltair respectively were utilised to the extent of 36.32 to 53.06 percent only.

(b) Of the messages despatched by Esplanade Mansion reservation office, Calcutta to outstations for confirmation of return journey reservations during March 1981 to June 1981, replies/confirmations were received to the extent of 48 to 57 percent only. Similarly, this reservation office had not sent replies to 73 to 77 percent of the messages received from outstations for confirmation of the reservation during the same period.

(c) 14 summer special trains were run during May 1978, these ran late ranging from 4 to 14-40 hours. 6 summer special trains were run during May and June 1979, these ran late ranging from 5 hours to 17 hours.

Western Railway

A quota of 2 berths in second class AC 2 tier, provided in 181Dn, Sarvodaya Express at Ujjain Station, was not being utilised fully as seen from test review of two months March and June 1981. Similar was the position of the utilisation of the quota of 4 berths provided in 182Up Sarvodaya Express at Mathura Jn.

ANNEXURE II

[cf. Para 1.4 (ii) (c)]

Details of allotment and working of AC coaches on some of the Zonal Railways noticed by Audit.

Central Railway

A loss of Rs. 76.90 lakhs was sustained in 1978-79 in running of AC Coaches on five pairs of mail and express trains.

South Eastern Railway

Losses of Rs. 41 and 56 lakhs were worked out in the running of AC Coaches during 1978-79 and 1979-80 respectively; further, against the requirement of 20 AC Coaches as assessed by the Railway Administration as on 1st November 1980, the actual stock was 25.

Western Railway

Against the requirement of 12 AC coaches for running the services, the actual holding was 29; of this, ten had been allotted from out of ICF built coaches after 1974.

ANNEXURE III

[cf. Para 1.66 (b)]

Statement showing loss of Electrical and Mechanical fittings of coaches

(Rupees in lakh)

Railway	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81
Central	0.64	8.51	3.85
Eastern	11.38	17.62	29.98
Northern	37.34	48.90	51.20
Southern	7.65	6.25	6.08
South Central	27.40	23.71	46.05
South Eastern	14.44	13.08	86.51
Western	2.51	8.15	13.29
Total	101.36	126.22	236.96

ANNEXURE IV

[cf Para 1.7 (viii)]

Statement showing holding and utilisation of Other Coaching Vehicles on Indian Railways

Year	Central	Eastern	Northern	Northeast Frontier	Southern	South Central	South Eastern	Western	All Railways*
1980-81 Holding (in units)	338	396	438	67	348	186	356	366	2496*
Vehicle Km per vehi- cle day	110	169	68	51	238	125	216	321	148
1974-75 Holding (in units)	357	301	420	52	269	158	385	392	2334
Vehicle Km per vehi- cle day	76	262	69	12	239	200	152	302	146

*Excludes the position of North Eastern Railway which held only one vehicle in 1980-81.

ANNEXURE V

[cf. para 1.8 (i)]

Name of the Railway	Date/month checked	Train No.	Class	No. of passengers wait listed per day	No. of persons surrendering tickets per day
South Central	January 1981	54 Madras Express	1st	71	30
	January 1981	32 Bombay Express	1st	30	9
	January 1981	21 Dakshin Express	1st	49	23
Western	June 1981	181 Sarvo-daya Express	IInd	283	112

ANNEXURE VI

(cf para 1.9)

Details of number of tourist agencies, value of tickets/coupons sold by them and the amount of commission paid to them on Indian Railways

(In lakhs of rupees)

Sl. No.	Railway	No. of tourist agencies	Value of tickets/ coupons sold by them		Commission paid to them	
			1979-80	1980-81	1979-80	1980-81
1.	Central	14	60.01	77.20	1.71	2.27
2.	Eastern	5	6.75	7.38	0.25	0.28
3.	Northern	17	59.93	83.00	2.57	3.68
4.	Southern	9	54.28	73.84	2.32	3.07
5.	South Central	1	12.91	13.33	0.31	0.32
6.	South Eastern	5	8.95	9.57	0.29	0.31
7.	Western	13	153.64	172.45	7.47	8.00
	Total		356.47	436.77	14.92	17.93

ANNEXURE VII (i)

Particulars of Mail Express trains whose percentage of occupation is 100 per cent and above.

Section	Train No.	Station where census taken	Percentage of occupation				II ordinary	
			AC	Ist	IIAC	II	Reserved	Unreserved
Main line			Northern Railway—April 1980					
Ludhiana-Ambala Cantt.	172Dn	Ambala Cantt	100	100	100	100		
Tundla Jn.—Kanpur	104Dn	Tundla Jn.	100	100	100	105		
Mughalsarai-Lucknow via Faizabad	135Up	Faizabad	...	115	...	198		
Allahabad-Rai Bareli	357Up	Partargarh	...	100	...	158		
			Western Railway—October 1980					
Dahod-Ratlam	25Dn	Ratlam	100	100	100	127		
Ratlam-Dahod	26Up	Ratlam	100	100	100	111		
Surat-Vadodara	29Dn	Surat	...	100	...	103		
		Bharuch	103		
			Southern Railway—May 1980					
Madras Central-Mangalore	1Dn	Madras Central	...	68	...	100	100	131
Bangalore-Jolarpettai	313Dn	Jolarpettai	...	40	...	100	100	63
		Bangalore City	...	53	100	148
Tiruchirapalli-Erode	31Dn	Erode	...	66	100	140
		Karur	...	66	100	214
		Trichy	...	100	...	91	100	165

ANNEXURE VII(2)

[cf. para 1.10(i)]

Statement showing particulars of Mail/Express/Passenger trains whose percentage occupation is less than 100 per cent

Sl. No.	Section	Train No.	Station where census taken	Percentage occupation	
				1st	Second
1	2	3	4	5	6
NORTHERN RAILWAY MAY 81 CENSUS					
(a) Main line					
1.	Ludhiana-Amritsar	377Up	Ludhiana	34	20
			Jullunder	7	39
			Amritsar	4	18
2.	Kalka-Ambala	2UK	Kalka	—	26
			Ambala	—	—
(b) Branch line					
3.	Amritsar-Atari	5AA	Amritsar	—	21
			Atari	—	21
4.	Khemkaran-Amritsar	9AK	Khemkaran	—	6
			Tarantaran	—	13
			Amritsar	—	18
NORTHEAST FRONTIER RAILWAY MAY 81 CENSUS					
(a) Main Line					
5.	New Bongaigaon-Malda Town	166Dn	New Bongaigaon	—	71.36
			New Cooch Behar	—	86.92
6.	New Jalpaiguri-New Bongaigaon	51Up	New Cooch Behar	6.67	59.79
			New Bongaigaon	33.33	65.42
(b) Branch line					
7.	Haldibari-New Jalpaiguri	96Dn	Haldibari	—	47
			Jalpaiguri	13.33	48.75
8.	Singhabad-Malda Town	73Up	Singhabad	—	9
			Bulbul Chandi	—	11
			Malda Court	—	3
			Old Malda	—	1
			Malda Town	—	1

1	2	3	4	5	6
NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY MAY 1981—CENSUS					
(a) Main Line					
9. Samastipur-Muzaffarpur	22Dn	Muzaffarpur	—	73	
(BG)	20Dn	Muzaffarpur	42	85	
	513Up	Samastipur	—	10	
	514Dn	Muzaffarpur	—	32	
	153Dn	Muzaffarpur	—	57	
WESTERN RAILWAY OCTOBER 1980—CENSUS					
(a) Main Line					
10. Valsad-Bombay Central	26Up	Valsad	56	42	
	(Pashchim)				
	28Up	Bombay Central	23	34	
	172Up	Bombay Central	42	73	
11. Surat-Vadodara	131Dn	Surat	33	96	
		Vadodara	20	44	
(b) Branch Line					
12. Bombay Central-Valsad	39Dn	Bombay Central	14	36	
	41Dn	Bombay Central	54	68	
	45Dn	Bombay Central	8	36	
13. Surat-Vadodara	49Dn	Surat	87	—	
		Bharuch	22	72	
14. Khargoda-Viramgam	72Up	Viramgam	20	60	
		Khargoda	—	14	

ANNEXURE VIII

(cf para 2.III)

Details of BG and MG sections on Indian Railways where diesel rail cars were in operation.

Railway	No. of cars (authorised stock whether in operation; if not, since when)	Section in which deployed	Length of section (Kms)	Remarks (Details whether alternative passenger service available either by rail or by bus)
1	2	3	4	5
BG				
Central	2 (Discontinued in 1974-75)	—		Not in use
Northern	11 (1977-78)	Jullundur City-Nawashahar Doaba	58	1. Alternative passenger service by rail as well as by State Road Transport Corporation available. 2. 11 cars were transferred to South Central Railway for use during 1978-79.
		Jullundur City-Lobian Khas	52	
		Jullundur City-Tandaaurmar	42	
		Jullundur City-Amritsar	79	
		Amritsar-Ludhiana	136	
		Ludhiana-Jullundur City	57	
South Central	27	Kakinada-Samalkot	16	1. Alternative passenger service by rail as well as by bus by State Road Transport Corporation available.
		Gudivada-Machilipatnam	36	
		Rajahmundry-Nidadavolu	22	

APPENDIX II

Statement of Conclusions and Recommendations

Sl. No.	Para No. of Report	Ministry/ Deptt. Concerned	Conclusion and Recommendations
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1.	119	Railways	<p>The Committee observe that in terms of number of passengers the suburban traffic increased from 1219 million in 1970-71 to 2064 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 69.3 per cent while in terms of passenger kilometres it increased from 22984 million in 1970-71 to 43,965 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 91.3 per cent. The number of EMU coaches however increased by 51.9 per cent (from 1780 to 2658) only during this period. The seating capacity in suburban trains increased by 51.1 per cent (from 340541 to 514744) only during the same period. The non-suburban traffic in terms of passengers increased from 1212 million in 1970-71 to 1640 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 35.3 per cent. In terms of passenger kilometres it increased from 95,136 million in 1970-71 to 1,76,822 million in 1981-82 i.e. by 86.9 per cent. However the number of conventional coaches increased only by 10.5 per cent (from 24,676 to 27,257) and the seating capa-</p>

city increased by 12.0 per cent (from 1505,047 to 1,685,935) during the same period. It is, therefore, evident that the increase in the number of coaches/seating capacity has been lagging far behind the increase in suburban as well as non-suburban traffic over the years thereby accentuating overcrowding in the trains.

2.

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Railways

The targets for passenger traffic for the Fifth Plan period (1974-75 to 1978-79) were fixed on the recommendation of the Working Group specifically set up for the purpose. In respect of non-suburban traffic, the plan envisaged an annual growth rate of 4% (around 20% for the whole period) while for suburban passenger traffic, the annual rate of growth was anticipated to be 5% (around 25% for the whole period). The Committee however observe that the suburban traffic actually increased by 10.2% in terms of passenger kilometres and 8.6% in terms of passengers per annum while the non-suburban traffic increased by 6.9% in terms of passenger kilometres and 7.4% in terms of passengers per annum during the revised Fifth Plan (1974-75 to 1977-78). The Committee are constrained to point out that while the growth in passenger traffic, both suburban and non-suburban, far outstripped the plan projections, the rate of growth of

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			EMU and conventional coaches was 5.2% and 0.5% only per annum during this period.
3,	121	Railways/ Planning Commission	<p>The Committee note with concern that the imbalance in supply and demand is going to be further accentuated during the Sixth Plan period. The Committee understand that the allocation for the Railway's Sixth Plan has been restricted to Rs. 5,100 crores only as against Rs. 11,000 crores asked for. Consequently, with the available funds it will be possible to provide only 5,600 coaches against the minimum requirement of 14,000 coaches (both on replacement & additional accounts) during the Plan period. According to the Ministry of Railways, due to depreciation of money value, not more than 5,000 coaches may be manufactured ultimately. The Committee further observe with deep concern that since the number of coaches due for replacement is around 7,800 much of the overaged stock will continue to be utilized. This is bound to reflect very adversely on the efficiency of passenger services and safety of passengers.</p>
4	122	Railways	<p>The Committee cannot view this situation with equanimity. Railways being a public utility cannot abdicate their responsibility in the matter of providing adequate</p>

services to the travelling public. While it is generally accepted that short distance non-suburban traffic should better be left to road, there is no reason why the Railways should not be able to cater to the requirements of long distance passengers for the vast majority of whom this is the only mode of transport available. Moreover long distance express/superfast trains are a paying proposition. The Committee would therefore urge that a realistic assessment be made of the growth of passenger traffic involving say, a lead of 500 kilometres and above with a view to projecting the requirements over the next 5-10 years and planning accordingly. Likewise, there is need for having a comprehensive study carried out with regard to inter-city travel keeping in view the new growth centres that are rapidly emerging in the wake of growing industrial/economic activity all over the country. The Committee would like this exercise to be undertaken immediately so as to help in formulation of the Seventh Plan.

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5.

123

—Do—

So far as the current plan is concerned, the Committee cannot but strongly stress the imperative need for stepping up the allocations to the Railways to enable them to execute the necessary schemes for augmenting the production of

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
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coaches, maintenance facilities and terminal and line capacities etc. The Committee would also expect the Railways to take all measures necessary to contribute to this effort by generating additional resources out of their own revenues by efficient and concentrated utilisation of existing assets, both human and material, and by cutting down all wasteful expenditure.

6.

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**Railways/
Planning
Commission**

So far as suburban traffic is concerned, the Committee find that even while Railways are working to the saturation point in all the metropolitan towns viz. Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, people's patience is fast running out and unless immediate steps are taken to alleviate the inhuman conditions in which the commuters have to travel day in and day out, the position is bound to get out of hand very soon. The projections in this regard have proved to be highly underestimated. The Committee would therefore urge the Ministry of Railways and the Planning Commission to consider the matter in all its ramifications and draw up schemes, both short term and in the long term to prevent resurgence of such a situation. The Committee cannot too strongly stress that additional resources have got to be found for augmenting the suburban services so as to take care of at least the incre-

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mental growth which itself needs to be assessed in more realistic terms in the first instance.

7. 125 Railways

The production of coaches is planned on the Integral Coach Factory (ICF)—a departmental undertaking of the Railways, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) under Ministry of Defence and M s. Jessop & Co. under the Ministry of Heavy Industry. The installed capacity of these units is 750, 300 and 400 coaches per annum respectively. In addition, the workshops of the zonal railways also produce coaches (installed capacity—100 coaches) but these are mainly for departmental use. The Audit para has pointed out that during the period 1974-75 to 1980 81 the total production in the three units mentioned above was of the order of 6,487 coaches (including EMUs) as against the possible production of 10,150 coaches *i.e.* the capacity utilization was only 64.5% during the 7-year period.

8. 126 —Do—

The Committee observe that the capacity utilization in the ICF (which produces bulk of the passenger coaches) was only 77.7% upto 1977-78. The Ministry have informed the Committee that during the subsequent years 1978-79 to 1981-82 the production has gone up to 97.1% of the avail-

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

able capacity. In the earlier years, the capacity utilization is stated to have suffered on account of constraints of funds, the general strike in May 1974 and severe power cuts imposed by the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board during 1974-75 and 1976-77. Audit have however pointed out that the Budget allotment under rolling stock (carriages) was revised downwards at the revised estimate stage in 1974-75 and again in 1977-78 to 1979-80 and the balance diverted for loco (besides wagons) procurement. Thus, the plea of lack of funds is not quite convincing. In fact, the Audit report has further pointed out that the Railways have built up surplus loco holdings resulting in deterioration in their utilisation indices. The Committee regret that in the context of acute shortage of coaches, the production capacity in the ICF should have been deliberately restricted during 1974-75 to 1977-78 on the specious plea of constraints of funds. The Committee expect that the Ministry of Railways would ensure adequate allocation of funds to the ICF during the remaining years of the Sixth Plan so that the capacity available in the factory for production of coaches is fully utilized.

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Railways

So far as BEML is concerned, the Committee observe that the production during 1974-75 to 1980-81 averaged 216 coaches per annum against the installed capacity of 300 coaches. During evidence, the representative of the Ministry of Railways informed the Committee that the "the actual capacity of BEML has been assumed (by audit) at 400 coaches per annum but we are informed that it is 300 coaches per annum." Asked why Audit were not informed earlier that these figures were not correct, the witness replied: "I came to know of it only two days ago." The Committee are greatly surprised at the casual manner in which the C&AG's reports are treated by the Ministry. The draft Audit paragraph should have been properly verified by the Ministry. The Committee desire that suitable instructions should be issued in this regard for the guidance of all concerned.

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Railways
Defence

The Committee find that capacity utilization in the BEML was 72% during 1974-75 to 1977-78 and 79.1% during 1978-79 to 1981-82. Paucity of funds as also of wheel sets and other free-supply items are stated to have affected the production of coaches in BEML. The Committee cannot but express their regret over the failure of the Ministry of Railways to provide adequate funds and compo-

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
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nents needed for coach-building. In the context of acute shortage of coaches, the Committee would urge the Ministry of Railways/Defence to look into this matter with a view to removing the constraints in full utilization of the capacity available in BEML.

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Railways
Heavy
Industry

So far as Jessop & Co. are concerned, the Committee find that the average production in the factory was 136 coaches per annum during the years 1974-75 to 1977-78 *vis-a-vis* the installed capacity of 400 coaches. This came down sharply to 29 coaches per annum during the 3-year period 1978-79 to 1980-81 i.e. from 34% to 7% in the respective periods. Production in the factory is stated to have been affected by labour troubles. It came down as low as 26 coaches only during 1980-81 as against 118 coaches programmed, in that year. The Committee are greatly concerned at the poor performance of Jessop & Co. The Committee desire that the matter should be taken up by the Ministry of Railways with the Department of Heavy Industry at a high level with a view to improving the capacity utilization in the Company as expeditiously as possible by removing the constraints in production.

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Railways
Defence
Heavy
Industry

The Committee find that the outstanding load as on 1.4.1982 was 1,240 coaches on BEML and 854 coaches (inclusive of EMUs) at Jessops. The outstanding orders are expected to be completed by 1985-86 and 1988-89 respectively based on targets and fund allocations during 1982-83. The Ministry have added that if the Jessops are able to sustain the capacity for 250 coaches which they had attained as far back as in 1972-73 they would be able to clear the load by middle of 1985-86. The Committee expect that the Ministry of Railways on their part will ensure that the production schedule does not suffer for want of funds and other facilities.

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Railways

The Committee understand that the Planning Commission have approved a project for setting up a coach factory which would initially manufacture 400 coaches per annum. The production would ultimately go up to 500 coaches per annum. The question whether it would be feasible to augment the production capacity of the existing units or whether an altogether new unit is necessary, needs careful consideration. The Committee would like to know whether this matter was examined at any stage and if so, with what results. The Committee are of the view that it would

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			<p>advantageous to expand the existing capacity of the existing coaching building factories.</p>
14	132	Railways	<p>The Committee are constrained to note that 20 per cent of the coaches (722 out of 3623) built by ICF during the years 1974 to 1981 were of upper class (AC, 1st, AC II tier etc.). The amount spent by the ICF in manufacture of such coaches was Rs. 52.38 crores out of a total of Rs. 196.56 crores, i.e. 27%. An analysis of the passenger traffic and earnings therefrom during 1974-81 however indicated that 99 per cent of the passengers travelled in the lower class while only one per cent travelled in the upper classes. So far as I Class AC coaches are concerned, the Committee observe that not only the occupancy was poor, these services have been incurring losses on the Mg systems of practically all zonal Railways (wherever such system exists). Losses are also being incurred on the BG systems of Central, South, Eastern, North East Frontier and Southern Railways and that these were very heavy on the first two of these Railways. The Committee understand that a policy decision has since been taken not to manufacture any more first class AC coaches. The Committee consider that there should be no question of providing AC I Class services on routes where these are incurring</p>

losses. Surely, the tax payer should not be asked to subsidize travel by the elite. The Committee therefore recommend that the unremunerative services should be withdrawn forthwith and replaced by II Class Sleeper/ordinary coaches.

15. 133 —Do—

The Committee further desire that the occupancy ratio of upper class coaches, particularly I Class AC coaches, should be constantly monitored with a view to ensuring that these services not only cover the cost of operation but also leave a margin of profit to the Railways.

16. 134 —Do—

The Committee note that the luggage space provided in the first class coaches when found to be poorly utilized (being unguarded) was ordered (August 1972), by the Railway Board to be converted into two first class berths per coach in Railway workshops. Audit have pointed out that this scheme has, however, made very poor progress, only 16 out of 387 first class (BG) coaches having been converted till December 1981. Similarly, on the MG, 324 such type of coaches were awaiting conversion by Railway workshops. According to Railway Board, the slow progress in the conversion of these coaches with luggage compartment was due

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17.	135	Railways	<p>to the inadequate capacity of the Railway workshops to undertake the work along with POH work. The Committee, however, observe that during 1973-74 to 1977-78, against the total monthly POH capacity of 2134 BG coaches in Railway workshops, the out-turn ranged from 1563 to 1898. Similarly, against the capacity of 1471 MG coaches the out-turn ranged from 1252 to 1419. The Committee therefore see no reason why it should not have been possible to complete the conversion work, at least for a substantial number of the 771(387 BG and 324 MG) coaches, if not all, by 1977-78. The Committee would like the Ministry of Railways to complete this work under a time bound programme.</p> <p>Referring to the inadequate augmentation of EMU coaches, specially motor coaches, and consequent slow progress in the implementation of the conversion programme of a coach rakes into 9 coach rakes for the suburban services in Eastern region, the Chairman Railway Board explained that this is due to the capacity constraints in this regard in the indigenous manufacturing capacity of traction motor units, etc. at the BHEL, which is heavily in arrears in supplying these motor componenets (motor units, traction motor, etc.). As a result, coaches which have been manufactured have been reported to be lying idle in the workshops.</p>

The Committee would suggest that Railway Board take effective measures in consultation with the controlling Ministry of BHEL—Ministry of Heavy Industry to impress on the public sector unit to clear the heavy backlog in their supply orders and advise the Committee of the results of such measures.

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The Committee find that inadequate production of passenger coaches was not made up by more effective utilisation of available coaches. The percentage of ineffectives for all passenger coaches (BG) as per statistical records compiled by the Railways, increased from 12.74 during 1976-77 to 13.90 in 1979-80 and still further to 14.46 in 1980-81. A census carried out by the Railway administration in March 1981 (with reference to the position of all passenger coaches including coaches found defective at the time of departure of trains), showed that the actual extent of ineffectives was far higher, being between 19.9 per cent and 22.5 per cent. It was particularly heavy in respect of AC (all types 22.8 to 32.6 per cent), First Class (23.9 per cent), Second Class general (20.5 per cent), Second Class two tier (22.2 per cent) and SLR coaches (9.5 per cent). Thus the coaches remained idle for longer periods than what was shown in the statistical

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records and consequently the percentage of actual ineffective was much more than the prescribed target norm of 14 per cent. Correspondingly, the availability of spare coaches (target norm 12.5 per cent) also got reduced affecting their availability for traffic.

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Railways

The Ministry of Railways have explained that the difference in the two sets of figures is due to the differences in procedures in so far as the statistical figure is an average of the daily position for the month/year as a whole whereas the census figures reflect the position at a particular time of the day when the census was taken.

The less repair percentage under the former category was accounted by coaches which were found defective/deficient of fittings and withdrawn from the scheduled trains but rectified within twenty-four hours which do not enter the statistical figures of repair percentage.

The Committee are unhappy to note that such large number of defective coaches as explained by variations in the annual census study were to be detached from the scheduled trains at the last minute causing inconvenience to the passengers as revealed by the census figures of the coaches

taken at a particular time of the day. Keeping in view the advantages which accrue by such census, the Committee recommend that measures should be taken to have such census more frequently than at present, i.e. fortnightly or monthly, as found practicable, besides maintaining statistics of such coaches detached from train for effectively monitoring the coaches under repair and not running as per formation of train with a view to reduce running of trains with lesser number of coaches.

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The data furnished by the Ministry of Railways shown that while the percentage of coaches under repair in shops has remained virtually constant and in fact was somewhat reduced in 1980-81, the coaches awaiting repairs increased from 2.53% in 1976-77 to 3.64% in 1980-81 while the stock under repairs in running sheds/sick lines increased from 2.45% in 1976-77 to 3.06% in 1979-80 and 2.98% in 1980-81. Acute shortage of workshop capacity is stated to have led to this situation. Owing to this shortage, coaches cannot be taken to workshops in time. Also, with less workshop capacity, a heavier load falls on the sick lines.

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Another contributing factor was that large number of the coaches were received in sheds/depots on the Central,

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Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, South Central and South Eastern Railways with deficient electrical fittings such as bulbs, fans, alternators, etc. As seen from the Audit Para, the loss sustained by the Eastern, Northern, South Central and South Eastern Railways were as much as Rs. 2.14 crores i.e. 90 percent of the total loss on this account for 1980-81. Explaining the reasons for this heavy losses, the Railway Board informed the Committee that the POH coaches are contributed the heaviest percentage as they remain unguarded and lying idle at the wayside stations in the divisions due to inadequacy of accommodation inside the workshops. Further due to inadequate supplies of fittings, these coaches were subjected to cannibalisation for utilising their fittings in running coaches, though no account thereof is available.

The Committee fail to understand why coaches should lie in waiting at wayside stations, as passenger rakes are run from point to point between important stations and are rather unhappy to note the manner in which the POH coaches are being left unguarded resulting in loss of fittings worth Rs. 2.14 crores as reported in the Audit Para for 1980-81. As the inadequacy of workshops to admit their

entry in the shops could be monitored well in advance before despatch of coaches from the maintenance depots in the divisions, the Committee are unable to understand why the despatch of coaches due for POH could not be planned in such a way that they were taken out from traffic from the depots only on receipt of advice from workshop regarding their entry in the shops. The Committee would, therefore, suggest for immediate steps to enforce a system of necessary coordination between the depots at the divisional headquarters and the assigned workshop so that these coaches are despatched in batches duly locked and guarded by Railway, Security personnel.

In regard to fittings removed from such coaches by cannibalisation, a proper account should be maintained by the depots and the same should be subjected to inspection by the Railway officials.

The Committee note that as a result of special security efforts taken in 1981, stolen material worth Rs. 78.06 lakhs could be recovered during 1981. The Committee would like the Security measures to be intensified further.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
22.	140	Railways	<p>The Committee have earlier pointed out that the actual out-turn in Railway workshops has been well below the available capacity. The Committee cannot but infer that the deterioration in the performance of the Railways in this regard is to a large extent due to inefficient functioning of the Railway workshops. The Committee find from the Railway Minister's Budget speech (23 March 1982) that both the Chairman and the Member (Mechanical) of the Railway Board were asked to visit major workshops with a view to evaluating the repair and maintenance facilities available and suggesting concrete and practical measures for improving the utilisation of the available capacity. The General Managers were also instructed to ensure 10 per cent improvement in the capacity utilisation of the workshops and sheds positively by the end of that calendar year viz., by December 1982. The Committee need hardly stress that for improving the operational performance of the Railways, it is of vital importance that the maintenance and repair facilities are kept in top gear. The Committee would, therefore, like to be apprised of the results of evaluation referred to above, the precise steps taken in pursuance thereof and the extent of improvement achieved vis-a-vis the target of 10% improvement in capacity utilisation.</p>

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Railways

The Committee note that 26.5 per cent of the coaching stock remains out of traffic use, being under repairs (14 per cent) and held as spares (12.5 per cent). The Railway Board have accepted this to be capable of improvement. A reduction of 5 per cent in the ineffectives would release large number of coaches (1,448 numbers—5 per cent of 28,968) and consequently reduce the requirements of additional coaches. As such, the Committee consider that immediate steps are necessary in the interest of overall economy, to plan and provide facilities to achieve such reduction.

The Committee have been informed that due to closure of large number of steam loco sheds, due to gradual withdrawal of steam traction 3,600 artisans have been released as surplus. The Committee, therefore, recommend that urgent steps should be initiated to gainfully utilise the surplus artisans to achieve the aforesaid objective.

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The Committee are constrained to point out that while the holding of BG coaches increased (net) by 10.5 per cent between 1974-75 and 1980-81, the workshop capacity which was assessed at 2104* in 1973-74 remained static during this

*As per the monthly (December 1981) appreciation report of the Railway Board, this capacity was re-assessed at 2081 coaches only.

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period. The Committee have been informed that the increase in POH arisings has taken place not only due to increase in the number of coaches but also because of the increased percentage of coaches running on Mail/Express trains which require more frequent attention. As against an estimated 35 per cent coaches running on Mail/Express trains in 1975-76, the figure today is about 50 per cent on BG. According to the Railway Board, the capacity for POH of Broad Gauge coaches at the beginning of 1982-83 was 2060 coach units per month. This is short of the monthly arisings by approximately 480 units. Thus the overall shortage in POH capacity which was assessed (in 1979) at about 1500 BG coaches per year, has increased to about 5760 BG coaches per year. Accordingly, the percentage of coaches overdue for POH has increased from 8.8 in 1973-74 to 16.6 in 1980-81 and would definitely be much more at present.

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25.

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The Ministry of Railways have informed the Committee that they were aware of the shortage of POH capacity which was building up over the years but could not plan for increased facilities due to shortage of funds for maintenance facilities. The total allotment of funds since the beginning of the planned development for maintenance facilities was

only 6 per cent of the allotment for additional rolling stock against an estimated requirement of about 15 per cent. Certain works sanctioned since 1977-78 are under execution. These will take care of the shortfall now existing as well as the increased arisings by the end of the Sixth Plan. These works include new Workshops at Mancheshwar, Tirupati and Bhopal each with a capacity of 200 coaches per month and expansion of existing Workshops at New Bongaigaon and Jagadhari with an increase of 100 coaches per month. The proposed new Workshops at Mancheshwar, Tirupati and Bhopal and the existing one at Jagadhari will serve as centralised repair workshops catering to the arisings on all Railways in the zone. Expansion of Jagadhari and New Bongaigaon Workshops is expected to be completed during 1983-84. Moncheshwar is expected to start POH during 1983-84 and reach full capacity in 1984-85. Tirupati and Bhopal Workshops are both expected to start giving out-turn during 1984-85. The conversion of MG facilities at Gorakhpur to undertake POH of 100 BG coach units per month and works at Liluah, Alambagh, Lower Parel and Perambur for expanding facilities to handle AC coaches is also stated to have been sanctioned. However, the progress of these

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			works will, according to the Ministry of Railways, depend on provision of funds by the Planning Commission.
26.	144	Railways	<p>The Committee are greatly concerned over the failure of the Railways since the very commencement of planned development in the country to ensure that the repairs and maintenance facilities keep pace with the increase in the number of coaching stock. The Committee find that the gap on the BG system has widened from 1500 coaches per annum in 1979 to 5760 coaches at present. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the workshop capacity which was assessed at 2104 in 1973-74 is stated to have been re-assessed at 2081 in December 1981 and as per the latest re-assessment at the beginning of 1982-83, it is only 2060 coaches units per month. This needs to be explained.</p>
27.	145	—Do—	<p>The Committee recommend that the on-going schemes for augmenting the facilities in existing Workshops must be completed expeditiously so as to make up the deficiency to the extent feasible within the shortest possible time. As for the new schemes, the Committee would like priorities to be fixed so that instead of spreading the limited resources too thinly over several projects at the same time, the most</p>

promising ones could be completed expeditiously. The Railways should endeavour to find the necessary finances for the purpose from within their own resources as the provisioning augmentation of such facilities has necessarily to be their own concern. The Committee see no reason why after the steep hike in passenger fares in recent years, the Railways should not be able to make adequate provision for the purpose.

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The Committee find that one of the principal constraints in fuller utilisation of existing capacity in the Workshops is the inadequate supplies of wheels, tyres and axles. The Committee urge that the Wheel and Axle Plant at Bangalore, should be commissioned expeditiously so as to make up this deficiency. As regards short supply of other essential materials/fittings, the Committee would like the Ministry of Railways to take energetic steps for setting up ancillary industries that would be more or less captive to the Railways. This is possible only if such units could be given orders on an assured and sustained basis. The Committee would like to be apprised of the steps taken by the Ministry of Railways in this regard.

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
29.	147	Railways	<p>The Committee find that the capacity in the Railway Workshops has been further restricted on account of the corrosion repairs required to be undertaken on steel-bodied coaches which were introduced over 25 years back and are to be given heavy corrosion repairs once in 7 years. The arisings have been increasing steadily from year to year on account of progressive addition to stock and condemnation of wooden-bodied coaches and their replacement with steel-bodied coaches. On account of the severely restricted capacity in the Workshops, at least 350 to 400 coaches have been queuing up for corrosion repairs at any given time. During evidence, the Committee were given to understand that the Railways propose to introduce a new type of low alloy high tensile steel coach that would be resistant to corrosion and that this proposal would be given a practical shape when the new coach-building factory is set up. The Committee would like the relative economics of the two types of coaches to be carefully studied before taking a decision in the matter. In the meantime, high priority should be accorded to corrosion repairs on steel-bodied coaches for alleviating overcrowding in the existing trains.</p>

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The Committee note from the Audit paragraph that utilisation of tourist coaches (405 coaches) ranged from 4 days to 32 days per annum on most of the Railways. This indicates that there is very little demand for tourist coaches from the passengers and as such, there is scant justification to maintain a fleet waiting for use by a few passengers who choose to use them very occasionally. Looking to the paucity of passenger coaches, the Committee recommend conversion of these coaches for effective use as passenger coaches. The progress made in such conversion be reported to the Committee.

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. The Committee regret to observe that as much as 36 per cent of the time of the coaches is spent at terminals as against 37 percent of its run time in train. Among the contributory causes of the long 'terminal lie over' are inadequate maintenance and washing facilities at terminals and rakes remaining idle for long periods. According to a study conducted by the Efficiency Bureau of the Railway Board, the main reason for excessive 'terminal lie over' of the coaches is the dissimilar composition of the rakes. The lie over at terminals can be

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reduced if the composition of rakes of trains providing similar types of services is standardized and the rakes are utilised on first-in-first-basis at terminals after being given due maintenance. The Railway Board are stated to have already taken a decision to standardize the rake composition for 21 coach and 17 coach trains and necessary instructions have been issued. The Committee are of the view that a study of this type was long overdue. It is unfortunate that the Board have realised the need for it so belatedly. The Committee would urge that the question of standardization of rake composition of all mail/Express trains should be examined by all Zonal Railways/Railway Board on a priority basis and necessary steps taken to improve the utilization of the available assets. In course of time this exercise can be extended to other passenger trains also. The Committee would like to be apprised of the steps taken in this direction and the results achieved. The Committee further observe that sizeable reduction in the period of

lie over would yield more vehicles for passenger utilisation and can reduce the need for addition to a great extent. The Committee would therefore recommend that a review of the washing and maintenance facilities for the coaches at the terminals be undertaken urgently with a view to improve and modernise the same. The steps taken as a result be advised to the Committee.

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Railways

The extant instructions provide for a testcheck, at least once a month, by officers not below the rank of Senior Scale, of the correct observance of the procedures, etc. in regard to the reservation arrangements. Audit have pointed out that there was no evidence on record of such test checks having been carried out. The Committee need hardly point out that this is an area where the travelling public comes into contact with the Railway staff at the cutting edge level. More often than not, the experience of passengers is quite unsavoury. The Committee consider that while there is obviously a need to streamline the procedures and to provide additional reservation counter at stations where traffic is heavy, it is at the same time very necessary that an

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effective check is exercised by the supervisory officers so as to eliminate corrupt practices which are known to be widely prevalent. It is also necessary to have frequent surprise check of the allotment of berths by train officials specially in lower class during the initial run of important long distance mail/express trains from the starting stations. The Committee would, therefore, like the Ministry of Railways to take tangible steps in this direction in consultation with the Zonal Railway Managers.

The Committee understand that the Indian Railways Amendment Act, 1982 which sought to curb malpractices in the matter of reservations by prescribing deterrent punishment to persons carrying on business in procurement and supply of rail tickets/reservations in an unauthorised manner, has been challenged in the Supreme Court and a stay obtained. The Committee would urge the Ministry of Railways to move the Court to get the stay vacated, if not already done, and to be apprised of the outcome of the case.

33. 151 —Do—

The Audit paragraph has identified a number of problem areas/bottlenecks in so far as passenger traffic both suburban and non-suburban is concerned. The Committee have dealt with only a few of the numerous important points raised by Audit. The Committee have no doubt that the various other issues highlighted in the Audit Report which the Committee have not touched upon in this Report, shall be gone into with all seriousness and necessary remedial measures taken to improve the services.

CONCLUSION

34. 152 —Do—

While introducing the Railway Budget for the year 1983-84, the Railway Minister in his speech (24 Feb., 1983) affirmed that that "the basic responsibility of the Railways is to provide safe, secure and punctual transit to passengers and freight. In order that a vast undertaking of this dimension continues to play the assigned role, its assets are required to be maintained at the optimum level. Mainly because of funds constraints it is not possible to maintain the assets at a satisfactory level". He further stated that "the problem of overcrowding in trains continues and we have not been able to meet the demands of passengers for accommodation in trains. Shortage of coaches coupled with lack of terminal facilities at important stations has been the main constraint for augmenting passenger services."

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35.	153	—Do—	<p>The Committee consider that while short term measures are obviously necessary to ensure optimum utilisation of the available assets in order to alleviate the problems of the passengers, both suburban and non-suburban, it is equally necessary for the railways to prepare a perspective plan covering the period upto 2000 AD for integrated development of the railway infrastructure in terms of line capacity, terminal capacity, coaching stock, motive power and other ancillary facilities.</p>
36.	154	—Do—	<p>The Committee desire that realistic projections of traffic growth may be prepared on the basis of past experience and long term plans drawn up for meeting the demand.</p>
37.	155	<p><u>Railway</u> <u>Planning</u> <u>Commission</u></p>	<p>The Committee expect that Planning Commission to take note of the severe constraint of funds for meeting the developmental needs of the Railways. While the Committee would urge the Railways to raise maximum possible resources out of their own revenues, it would be necessary for the Planning Commission to find additional resources to bridge the gap between the outlays needed and the resources available to the extent possible.</p>

