

SPEECHES BY
PRIME MINISTER
JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU
IN PARLIAMENT
(1952–1957)

VOLUME I

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REPLY ON MOTION OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

22 May 1952

With your permission, Sir, I would like Members not to address each other in this way. I think it is most objectionable.

I have listened with care and I hope, earnestness to this debate which has lasted nearly four days, sometimes with a measure of astonishment also at the things that have been said. I am perhaps at a certain disadvantage compared to hon. Members on the other side of the House, and more specially those on the opposing benches, because I have to try, at any rate, to speak with a certain restraint, because I cannot refer to great countries or small casually, either condemning them or praising them up to the skies. It may be that I do not agree with what another country says or does, but hon. Members will appreciate that the foreign policy of Governments is not carried on in the same way as public meetings are carried on, that the phraseology which may come very easily to some hon. Members on the other side of the House is not used when responsible people speak about other countries.

First of all, I should like to point out, as has been pointed out in fact before, the strange misconception about the President's address. Hon. Members have given notice of hundreds of amendments and in their speeches have pointed out how many things are not included in the address. Now, the address is not meant to be a catalogue of all the things that have to be done. It is a brief, a concise statement, with some reference to foreign policy, of what the next session of Parliament is likely to do. That is all. This particular session specially is a budget session and, as is pointed out in the President's address, not much legislation can be undertaken. In any event it is, I think, not possible or desirable for the President's address to contain these long lists of all that we wish to do. Therefore, for us to be told that it does not contain references to so many subjects shows a certain misapprehension of the situation.

There are many things. For instance an hon. Member from Manipur, I think, talked about the tribal people, about the Nagas in particular. Well, so far as I am concerned I attach the very greatest importance to the tribal people of India, and I hope that this House also will consider this matter at the proper time more fully, not only because there are a large number of tribal folk in the country but because they occupy a very special position and have a very special culture which, I think, should be protected and helped to advance on the lines of its own genius. I do not want the tribal culture to be overwhelmed or exploited by others among our people, because they happen to be simple folk.

So in this way there are many other matters. Reference was made to the refugees, that nothing is said about them. On a previous occasion there were full particulars given in the President's address of the rehabilitation of refugees. Now, I do not see

the point of repeated reference unless you merely wish the President to go on saying that we wish well by them and we would like this to be done.

So I should like the House now and, I hope, in the future to deal with the President's address in a concise way. I do not wish to limit the freedom of the House to discuss any matter. But the result is that somehow we get lost in a maze of detail and the main points that should come out in such a debate are somewhat hidden from view. No doubt we have had a fairly long debate and many points have arisen, and I shall in the course of what I say refer to some of the minor matters if I have time and to some of the major matters.

First of all, I should like to say a few words about something that fell from Dr. Mookerjee and perhaps one or two other Members opposite. They asked for some measure of cooperation from Government with the opposition, in regard to various policies that we adopt or are likely to pursue. I want to say that so far as we on the Government side are concerned, we would welcome every kind of cooperation from every Member of this House, whether he sits on this side of the House or the other. It may be that in certain vital matters, there may be differences of opinion, basic differences, but I feel quite sure that there is a large field over which there can be cooperation, and even in matters where there might be difference of opinion, it is always a good thing to see and hear the other opinion and then form your own. Naturally the Government cannot give up its responsibility for coming to its own decisions, but in doing so, it certainly wishes to consult and to have the views of other Members of the House, whoever they might be.

Having said that, I would like to point out that it is not a particularly easy matter to pursue that course always. Stress has been laid by some hon. Members on the fact that the majority party in this House according to some arithmetical and mathematical calculation represents 47 decimal something percentage of the electorate. I take that figure to be correct. I have no personal means of judging it, but then, of course the Question arises as to what mathematical percentage hon. Members on the other side represent (Hear, hear). It will interest the House to know that the Members of the Communist Party plus the Peoples Democratic Front of Hyderabad etc. represent 4.45 per cent. The Socialist Party represents the most and from this Point of view, it represents 10.5 per cent. The K.M.P. Party represents 5.8 per cent., the Jan Sangh 2.3 per cent. The Scheduled Castes Federation .3 per cent., the Independents 15 per cent, and so on till we get into infinitesimal fractions. Now we have in these Members who sit in the opposition every variety of opinion—I say so with all respect and if it is represented in colours from scarlet, various hues of red, pink and yellow to deep blue. If you represented in the normal language of the West, you have every variety in the Opposition from the extreme left to the extreme right. They hold together. I suppose because of the stress of circumstances and sometimes there are marriages of convenience, sometimes followed by rapid divorces, and on the whole we find these strange bedfellows consorting together because of a certain spirit of opposition to the majority group. I do not criticise that. I am merely pointing out the fact that

where you have this motley array, it is not exceedingly easy to deal with it in the matter of consultation, etc. But I do wish to make it clear that we are desirous of having that consultation and cooperation wherever it is possible.

We welcome the coming to this House of the Members of the Opposition. Whoever they may be, and however much we might differ from them in many matters, we welcome them, because, undoubtedly, they represent a certain section of Indian opinion, and because it is good in a House of this kind to have a vigorous opposition so that whether it is Government or the majority party, they do not become complacent. If I may strike a personal note, regardless of the present differences, when I see many faces of old comrades who belong to the opposition now, some memories of the past come to me. I do not wish to forget them, and I cannot imagine that ways may not be found for a measure of cooperation with those with whom we have cooperated in the past. It is in this spirit that I approach this problem.

It would be easy for me, or perhaps not so difficult, to address my friends in a spirit of argument of bandying words and making debating points as other hon. Members have rightly done. But, I do feel the importance of this occasion because the matters that we are considering are of grave import.

An hon. Member told me that I had lost my place in history because of the attraction of some tinsel, something or other. Well, it is a matter of little consequence, what happens to me in history. It is a matter of little consequence ultimately what happens to any individual present here in history. But, it is a matter of very large consequence what happens to India and her millions of people. Therefore, forgetting the personal aspect, I should like to direct your attention to certain basic facts of the situation.

Perhaps, when we consider certain important issues like the economic issues confronting our country, there might be differences; there might be a very large measure of agreement as to ideals and objectives; the differences may be about the methods to achieve them: maybe the speed, maybe the cost, and many other things. But, there is a certain vital method of approach to these problems, which has obsessed my mind, if I may say so.

Just think of the state of affairs in India four and a half years ago when Independence came, because, you have to judge of every situation in a particular context. You may have principles; you may have ideals; but, you cannot divorce ideals or principles from the particular context in which you are working. The Communist Party in India has changed its policy many times in the last few years. It is open to it to do so. It is not for me to lay down their policy. But, I am merely pointing out how they have changed their policy repeatedly, because they found themselves off the track, because they found themselves losing what they thought was so important, that is, the confidence of the Indian people which they aimed at getting. So, compelled by circumstances they had to give up something about which they were shouting so loudly a few months before. Ultimately, you have to adapt yourself. You have to have

certain ideals and certain objectives. You have to give certain priorities to them. But, you cannot carry on an ideal regardless of the context, regardless of the consequences, because, if you do so, the ideals may go and may take with them many other things that you thought were quite safe.

Many of the hon. Members present here know recent history in Europe and elsewhere, and know how at the end of certain conflict between progressive forces in great countries, there came out not the victory of those forces, but a victory of the most naked fascism. That thing occurs. People talk about revolution, believe in it, maybe, and work it out, maybe. But, because, they do not judge the circumstances properly, because they act wrongly, they actually open the door to counter revolution. It is not good enough that you try for great objectives; it is equally important, if not more so, that you try to achieve them through right methods. That is, of course, I should be told, a platitude, as we have been told that the President's address contains platitudes. All the great truths of the world are platitudes. But it is no answer to meet an ancient platitude which is true by wellworn cliches which sometimes hon. Members of the opposition indulge in.

So we have seen that in spite of progressive movements trying to attain certain ideals they have lost ground and something completely reactionary has come into the field as in some countries of Europe. Now with this background look at India four and a half years ago, four years nine months, whatever the period is—August, 1947. How many Members—remember that period vividly? It is a matter of history now, and public memory is short. That was a period when independence suddenly came to us and came peacefully so far as the British were concerned, and that was an advantage because it is easier to build after a peaceful transfer than otherwise. But it was followed by enormous upheavals, migrations, violence, massacres, etc. in Pakistan, on our side of the border and on their side. We had suddenly to face apart from these upheavals a new country where everything was split up—army, police, services, telephones, telegraphs, wireless, railway system, transport, everything was split up suddenly overnight and on top of that came these upheavals and mass violence on a prodigious scale. And then these migrations of unhappy people, losing everything, coming in their millions. I do not know of a single instance in history where a country had to face exactly this kind of a thing. Well, we had to face it and we had to face something much more. All kinds of reactionary forces not liking the changeover from the British power to the new nationalist Government wanted to upset that Government. It had nothing to do with the fact—if I may say so, forget it for the moment—that it was dominated by the Congress Party. It is immaterial, it was a national, a more or less progressive Government. All kinds of reactionary forces did not like that—feudal forces, communal forces, other forces—because they thought, rightly or wrongly that this new Government is going to work for social and economic change — they did not want that. So behind the power of that communal upheaval in India there arose all kinds of counterrevolutionary violent movements all over northern India. Our friends who come from the South may have no conception of this because they were far away from the scene of action but here in northern India we lived in the middle of

this upheaval where all the reactionary forces were fighting for mastery. They could not have succeeded, of course, in the sense of really gaining mastery as a whole because they did not have that strength. But they did have strength in that particular context to break up things, a destructive strength, and it was touch and go whether that would succeed because if that had succeeded it would undoubtedly have spread all over India. Of course we would have got over it because I think India and the people of India are fundamentally sound, but we would have had a considerable period of anarchic violence, not even violence for any supposed noble cause but just anarchic violence where every man with a band of hundred men behind him is the master of a particular patch of land. We would have gone on to that period of history which brought in the British power to India, when India was disrupted, States fighting each other, not thinking of the whole country.

And so we had to face this situation. We had to face it not for a day or week but for a lengthy period. Gradually, we overcame it at tremendous cost not only in the shape of human suffering, in the shape of migrations etc. but at tremendous cost in other ways and that took many, many months. But in a sense it took years—I mean in the sense of controlling this grave situation, arranging for the rehabilitation of the refugees and the rest. What was the basic duty of any Government that India might have possessed then? The phrase “Law and order” is often used. May I say with all respect to my colleague the Home Minister that I dislike that phrase. I do not dislike the meaning behind it, but I dislike that phrase. I dislike it because others have used it on other occasions and at other times wrongly. Do not call it law and order. If you like, say that it is an essential thing that at a time like this the unity and stability of the country should be maintained. Therefore if I may speak in terms of history, the first priority was for the unity and stability of India to be maintained. It just did not matter what economic or social ideals you might have had, because they could not flourish and you could make no advance along those lines unless there was this cohesion of India, unless India held together, and there was a measure of peace and a measure of stability about her. Therefore, from this consideration of priorities, it became quite essential to lay the greatest stress on that.

Now, what did many of our friends do at that time? I have not mentioned the other difficulties that we had. I did not mention that Kashmir came into the picture and later Hyderabad. I am also not referring for the moment to the Telengana movement. But we had the old, feudal Hyderabad and behind this picture always there were conflicts with Pakistan and I should be quite frank with you and say that no man knew at what moment there might not be war with Pakistan in those years. So, we lived on the verge of this conflict. We did not know whether the Kashmir struggle might extend to a large war; whether Pakistan or Hyderabad might lead to it. or something else. We were not going to war with Pakistan, but we did not know what the people of Pakistan, or the Government of Pakistan might or might not do. We had to be prepared for all contingencies— naturally. So, here is the background. Now, what cooperation did we get in this moment of great national peril,— not Congress peril, not a party matter, but a national peril,—what help did we get from many of the

groups and parties represented on the other side? There were the communal parties; each aided and abetted these disruptive tendencies. There were our friends of the Communist Party who tried to take advantage of that national difficulty, by giving trouble in small ways and big. all over the country, and ultimately in a few months' time while this peril lasted and was at its highest, by the development of this Telengana business. Think of the background. I cannot conceive how hon. Members opposite who are so intelligent and so eloquent could have been ignorant of this background. They did something which might have shattered India and made it go to pieces. It just does not matter how noble their sympathies were for any cause and how that cause was influenced, because that cause itself was bound to suffer and fail if they did not take this larger view of things in India. Therefore, it is not a question of my arguing with hon. Members about certain noble ideals that they might have had.

Hon. Members talk about the current of history and historic forces. I agree. Let us judge things by the current of history and historic forces. Let us see where the current is leading us, and what is the first thing and what is the first priority; because if that current itself somehow falls over a precipice and is dashed into a thousand little streamlets, then it ceases to be a current and I say that at that moment the first and the most essential objective that an India should have had was to hold together India, was to keep the unity of India and then, at the same time, if you like go ahead as far as you can maintain the other most important thing, the social and economic progress of India.

Hon. Members often draw parallels with other countries. Here again I am at a disadvantage, because I do not wish to make invidious comparisons and I do not wish to say ill of any country. I am not afraid of any parallel that you might draw with any country. I do not mean to say that we as a Government have not made mistakes; that we could not have done many things which we could have done or that we should have avoided doing something which we ought not to have done. I admit that failing. But I do submit to this House that this Government—and if I may say so, this party, the Congress—has performed a certain historic function which was essential and that historic function was to hold India together, to lay down certain basic foundations on which you can build the future social and economic fabric of India, because without those foundations all your attempts would have failed. We did that. And if I may again carry on that metaphor, even to this day the Congress represents a certain historic need in this country in that respect it has gained and continues to gain a large measure of sympathy from our public. The moment it ceases to perform that historic task and does not change itself to perform the new historic task, that moment the Congress or any party will cease to function effectively. Let us admit that. It is not a matter of individuals, however bright or clever they may be, or of election organisation and the like, but of putting yourself parallel, and in tune, with the current of human events and history. If you do that, well you are doing something important. If, on the other hand, you get divorced from it, then you stagnate and cease to be—whether it is the Congress or the Communist Party or any other. That matter is not going to be judged by the slogans and cliches that people may use.

With respect to the Communist Party. I would repeat something that I have said at other times. I recognise the worth of many individuals in the Communist Party. They are brave people. But with all respect to them they sometimes appear to be completely out of date. A strange thing to say of a party which considers itself the vanguard of human progress! They have something about them which is the vanguard—I admit it—in communist theory something towards which the world will go inevitably, I think, unless it breaks up before that. But they have something else with them which makes them rigid like the old bigots of religions. Well, so far as I am concerned, I have refused to bow down to the bigotry of any religion and I refuse to bow down to the bigotry of this new religion.

But let us understand these historic currents, especially in the present phase of human history, when we stand on a verge which may lead to grave disaster or which may lead to a new world. And in this how are we to help? How are we to decide which way the world should go or to put our weight on that side? I do not know exactly; but I know generally the direction in which we should try to do that—we or any country. Of one thing I am quite positive in my mind—that the way of War is not the way which we or any country should pursue. Now when I say that I mean something a little more than actual warfare—of course, I mean actual warfare between countries—what is called nowadays ‘cold’ war. which I think, not only leads to a shooting war, but essentially from another point of view it is almost as bad, because it coarsens people, it degrades people, as it is coarsening and degrading humanity because we tend gradually to lead a life surrounded by hatred, anger and violence.

Now I cannot offer any logical proof of this, but of this I am absolutely convinced that any way which depends on hatred and violence or anger is bound to lead to wrong results and consequences. And indeed history shows us—recent history, if not past, and in the present one can see and one can judge mathematically, if you like—when a shooting war or a cold war continues, you may balance and say this party is more to blame than the other. It may be so. We may have our private or public opinions, but the fact remains that the result is the same. The fact is that if you have a war, it will bring the most disastrous results for humanity and it passes my comprehension how after a terrific war you can build up any social or economic order that you may aim at, because it will take generations just, perhaps, to get rid of the ravages of war and to come back to some low stage of human existence. It passes my comprehension how some people who dislike communism and make it an enemy, how they think they are going to put an end to communism by war. What will happen after that war I do not know, except that there will be large scale, vast, destruction, a large measure of anarchy over a large part of the world, lower standards and so on and so forth.

So, I do not think that it is right for us as individuals or as a nation to follow a path which coarsens and degrades us and which leads to this international vulgarity that we see all around us. If hon. Members opposite will forgive me, the methods they adopt in the national sphere, however noble their motives might be, coarsen and degrade them. I do not say that the methods, as individuals or as a group, my colleagues on this side of the House “adopt, are always good or pure or do not coarsen. They do

often enough. We have to meet this challenge. But there is a difference in deliberately adopting a method as a group, or as a party which coarsens and degrades and in others slipping in through the weakness of human nature. Therefore, I am prepared to have the largest measure of cooperation, but with violence and coarseness and vulgarity. I hope there will be no cooperation.

And I would appeal to hon. Members opposite also to feel that way and to act that way. Let them hold on to their principles, whatever they are, completely, because apart from the obvious fact, if I may say so, that violence and vulgarity and coarseness affect and degrade people—once you let them enter into you, it is not easy to get rid of them—and apart from that fact, India as she is constituted is a large and varied country, and there are many forces in it which have held it together, held it intellectually together even if it was physically separated, held it culturally together when it was divided into many bits. There are many disruptive tendencies and forces in India also. In the past it perhaps did not matter so much, but in the present it is a matter of the utmost consequence that the disruptive forces in India do not gain strength. Even though each particular force may have some justification, nevertheless if it is a disruptive force in the larger context of things, it tends to break up India at a critical moment when India must hold together. There again, if violence is indulged in even for a supposed good cause, I have not the shadow of a doubt that it means disruption. It means civil war, and if you have civil war, it is worse than international war in so far as vulgarity, coarseness and the spirit of violence are concerned. It is because of this that it becomes a part of the normal business as others may say of promoting law and order, which words as I said I do not fancy very much, but from this larger point of view it is the bounden duty of any Government, any group, any individual who thinks rightly along these lines to prevent violence, to prevent the degradation of our public life, the splitting up of our public life, the civil conflicts that it may bring about. Quite apart, of course, from this fact, all idea of economic progress itself is undermined.

You cannot have both. At the most you can say: we will have civil conflict first; after we have won that, we will have economic progress, after we have paid a terrific price for it.

Other countries are mentioned, and I admire the achievements of other great countries like Russia, China etc. I do not admire everything that has happened there. First of all, it is well to remember the terrific price that was paid in the Russian Revolution. How far we are prepared—by we I mean the people of India—to pay that price I do not know. Certainly, I rather doubt—I say so with all respect for the leaders of the Russian people—if they had another chance to pay that price, they would try other ways of achieving their ideals. I rather doubt that they would. However, that is a matter of opinion. But it was a terrific price they paid. Let us not forget that. Also let us not forget that it is 35 years or so since their revolution. It is not fair to compare results of this long period of intense working—they were working on a clean slate and with full power to do whatever they wanted to, still it has taken a considerable time.

An hon. Member Spoke about education. Education is highly important, of course, and I deeply regret that we are not doing in the field of education what we should do. Yet, may I mention a simple fact? The Russian people and the Russian leaders after the Revolution attached the greatest importance to education, rightly of course—the greatest importance to compulsory education of every single individual there. And yet, if I remember rightly, it took them 13 years to introduce it to every place of that great country with all their desire, with all their intense wish to do so. It takes time—and they were working at high pressure all the time. I know that in the early days of the Russian revolution there were years of civil war and difficulty and all that and outside forces were attacking, but then that is just the difficulty. If you take to the sword and if I take to the sword, others take to the sword also. In India, if we take to the sword, others take to the sword. It may be that nobody knows whose sword will be the longest in the end. But anyhow, whatever the result may be, you lose enormously. Apart from time, you pay in human misery, in human resources, and you delay that time that would make for progress. Take China, a country for which I have the greatest admiration. Now, there have been big changes there. My hon. friend opposite, Mr. Hiren Mukerjee, asked us to copy China. I do not mind copying China in so far as I can copy it: I will be glad to do so. May I remind him that a little while ago, maybe, a year ago, China was held up as a place where corruption and black marketing and everything bad had been completely and absolutely out an end to? A wonderful example it was. Six months ago, the Government of China said that they were shocked and amazed at the amount of corruption in China, and they started a great movement, in which the biggest people were involved; they took effective steps. My point is that the picture that we saw a year ago was not quite the same, as the Government themselves said. It may be that they are a more effective Government and they take more effective steps. Possibly. I agree. Let us be more effective. But the distant pictures that we see may not exactly be as they appear today.

So, I come back to this period of history through which we have been passing, where we have had constantly to face difficulties, turmoil, and trouble. There were the postwar difficulties, of course. There were the difficulties of the partition. There were the difficulties of the constant tension with Pakistan. There was the Kashmir issue, and the Hyderabad issue, and many other issues apart from our internal natural disasters that we have had in the shape of earthquakes, floods, droughts and the like. There were so many of them. We should, of course, expect some natural disaster every year and provide for it. But I must say we have been peculiarly unfortunate in the succession of these. Now, with this background, how did many of our groups or parties represented here in the Opposition— how have they functioned during these past few years? We are asked to extend our cooperation. I extend my hand of cooperation. How far have they cooperated during these four or five years, not in high policy where they might disagree, but in the day to day happenings? Take food procurement—an essential thing. We talk of food subsidies and this and that, and we go in for food procurement, and many people, respected people, go about preventing that from happening. Many of them even advocate a scorched earth policy. Just imagine that! It is an amazing thing. Scorched earth policy, so that the Government cannot have food!

The House will see that the whole outlook, far from cooperation, was to injure the Government. And injure the Government—how?

By injuring the people of India, and thereby injuring the Government. Now it is open to any Opposition to go against the Government. But it is a dangerous thing, and I say a bad thing if; in order to shake or weaken a Government you go and hit the very people of India whom you seek to serve.

And so, we have had to contend during these last four or five years with a continuous barrage of propaganda against us of vituperation, of condemnation and the like. I honestly put it to hon. Members opposite: Is that propaganda justified in truth? I am perfectly prepared to stand comparison with any country about our achievements, about what has been done in the last four or five years in this country. I remember, some years back—was it 20, or 24, years ago—when in the first five year plan of the Soviet Plan they started that very great scheme of the Dneperstroï Dam, the whole of the Soviet Union rang with this great work, because they knew at that time that it was going to be the foundation of many other schemes. And quite rightly. But we do something here, something bigger, and we are condemned and criticised. We have got at least three of our major schemes today which are much bigger than that, to serve a much bigger area. I am not comparing invidiously; I am merely stating a fact. But what we get is criticism of it, although that very thing, I am quite sure, if it had happened in China or Russia, would have evoked Praise from hon. Members opposite.

If that thing had happened,—I am not quite sure that it has happened in China or Russia—hon. Members opposite will have praised it, “See how China is progressing, how Russia is progressing? Now, does that not indicate, if I may say so with all respect, a perverted outlook and a jaundiced view of things and a closed mind. True, I agree entirely that we should not think much with our limited resources of grandiose schemes. We must think of small schemes which will bring quick results. I agree; certainly let us do it. But at the same time we have to think of some grandiose schemes too; because remember, if we think in terms of industrialisation, industrialisation means and is measured by the amount of electric power that you produce. Hon. Members opposite will certainly remember what Lenin was supposed to have said about Communism being Soviet Russia plus electricity or electric power. It is an essential thing for us to have this electric power if our industry is to grow. For that electric power we have to have these hydroelectric works quite apart from agricultural or other purposes which are so important. My point is that what has been done in India is not a small thing. If I may venture to say that, people who have come from abroad—and among them are not small people—not only from America, England, Germany and Turkey and other countries, but people who have come even from the great land of Russia and the great land of China have expressed often enough their surprise at the measure of achievement that we have had. I do not say they liked our policy or anything, but they were surprised. They did not know that. Why did they not know it? Because, unfortunately, their means of getting knowledge of India is somewhat limited and those who supply the knowledge about India supply not facts

but their own idea of what those facts are or might be and that too always full of condemnation of everything. Surely in these four or five years has everything that the Government has done been bad? It is a fact that if you condemn wholesale your condemnation is not worth much. It is only if you look at the full picture and give credit where credit is due and discredit where it is due, that there is something true in it. I should like hon. Members to go and see some of these great river valley schemes. We shall welcome them. I should like them to visit, here in Delhi if they like, some of our great laboratories. Everybody who has seen them from any country has been amazed—not at the fact of the buildings—there is nothing at all in it—but at the fact that we are laying the foundations in this scientific age, we are laying the foundations of scientific progress—because without it you cannot progress. We are not going to depend greatly on the help of America, Russia or China all the time. We hope to build our own resources and our own scientific men and knowledge; I wish it could be more. I wish our Universities could be helped more—that is a different matter. However, of what we have done. I do speak without much knowledge of what is happening in other parts of the world, but nevertheless with some confidence that there is hardly any country perhaps including Russia which has made that solid progress in building scientific laboratories as we have done in this short period of time. Of course, they are infinitely more in advance of us. I am talking about the initial stages. Once you go ahead, you progress. For instance, take this enormous undertaking in Sindri our telephone factory in Bangalore, our Chittaranjan locomotive workshop—all these things are really worthwhile things; it is a man's job that we have done there: it is not good to cavil at those things. Cavil at other things, if you like.

Many of our countrymen have gone abroad—I am not referring to hon. Members opposite only, there are others also whose chief function has been to run down our country abroad. It is not the usual practice of other countries to do so; they keep their quarrels at home: when they go abroad, they speak favourably about their own country, and not run it down before foreigners. There are others who have struck against certain basic facts of ours: whether it is our National flag, whether it is our national emblem, the Asoka Chakra, or whether it is our National Anthem, they are not party symbols; they are national symbols. If any group or party does not accept them, that group or party offends against the national idea (Hear, hear). It is one thing to admire other countries, and seek to learn from them. Let us do so by all means. It is totally a different thing to think of that country as more one's own than one's own country.

Right at the beginning of this debate, hon. Members opposite started by saying something which had been referred to later as well, which seemed to me to be perfectly remarkable; an hon. Member referred to the President's address as being a declaration of war on the people of India. He has every right to use that phrase. It is parliamentary. I suppose. If he feels that way, then there is war between him and us. (Hear, hear). I say so plainly, because anything more fantastic, more nonsensical, and more perverted, I cannot imagine; I challenge him to sit down with me here or elsewhere, to take the President's address and point out to me phrase by phrase, word by word, what he

means by that statement. There was another hon. Member who talked about it as being callous, I believe. He has got every right to say that the President's address is full of platitudes. You may have it as your judgement. But what exactly does it mean? Who are the people referred to in 'the declaration of war'? War against what people? Are they the people of India? In spite of the 47 or 49 per cent, or whatever percentage it may be, we also happen to represent the people of India here, (Hear, hear). Our President also has been elected by the people of India. Are we being told that hon. Members opposite are the sole repositories of the confidence of the people of India here and they alone could speak on their behalf? It is an amazing proposition like the story of 'The three tailors of the Tooley street'. You can advance an economic theory and say that the government is wrong. I can understand that. But to talk like this is simply nonsensical and absurd.

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I am surprised that the hon. Member should object to the word 'nonsensical'. I can use any other word, if he prefers. The English language is rich in words, I can choose any other word. But I do wish to convey my sense without any offence. That it is wrong on their part to have used such phrases in regard to the President's address. The idea was the result, if I may say so, of loose thinking or not thinking at all or of a completely perverted outlook. That is the difficulty we find in regard to many other matters. I say so in all earnestness. I do not mind what the past has been. I am prepared to erase the past. But look at the picture we had in the last few weeks. It does not apply only to the party which the hon. Members, some of them, represent but others too. We have seen repeatedly what are called walkouts in various Assemblies when the Governor or the Rajpramukh came in. It is an extraordinary thing. Here is a Governor, whom you may like or dislike — it is not a personal matter—representing the headship of that particular State. He comes in, and normally one pays respect to the head of the State — one may dislike him intensely. But here is a deliberate affront offered to the heads of States like this till one almost thinks that it is a profession of some parties to walk in and out—a walkout party! I do not just understand it. Is this the way people seek cooperation? I do not mind much, because I hope that these days will be given up, they are relics of the past.

In India we have very grave problems to face, chiefly economic, and others also. Unless this Government or any other Government can solve them, that Government ceases to perform any useful function. Solving them does not mean solving them by magic, by some magic wand. Let me put myself differently, that so long as this Government or this party which forms the Government represents a liberating force in this country it is good and it will function. Once it becomes what hon. Members think it has become, that is. It ceases to be a liberating force and becomes a restrictive and repressive force, then it will fade out. It will fade out by the process of history. But the mere fact that we have come back here after one of the biggest elections in history shows that the people of India, or a very large number of them, still think of us as a liberating force.

I have no doubt they do not think of the hon. Member who said 'No', in that connection. We are thinking about others, not you. So. it will not require votes in this House. Other forces will work which will put an end to any party or group which has ceased to perform that function.

There were a number of matters to which I should like to refer very briefly. Dr. Mookerjee referred to this business of passports between East Bengal and West Bengal and Assam etc. about which we have had a conference, and in that conference thus far we have arrived at no agreement. I cannot say much about it. But the House knows that we, that is the Government of India, have not liked this proposal to introduce a passport system in the East, because that will restrict traffic between Eastern Pakistan and Bengal and Assam. And that was the very object of the agreement of the Prime Ministers two and a half years ago. We opposed it but if Pakistan introduces some kind of passport system on the other side, we shall have to take the necessary measures on this side. That is obvious, and there is no doubt at all about the fact that the minorities in Eastern Bengal have had a very raw deal and continue to have a raw deal and all the sympathy of this House and a large number of people of this country are with them. We have tried to evolve some machinery to help them and as far as we can, we shall continue to do that. There are certain limitations. When two independent countries deal with each other, they can bring diplomatic pressure: they can bring other kinds of pressure and only the other type of pressure is a thing which we do not wish to bring because it can only bring misery.

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I agree with the hon. Member that it is not a question of Hindu or Muslim but all these people wanted free intercourse between the two countries and I think this passport system is a very undesirable thing.

Then there is the question of linguistic provinces a question about which we have made our position clear repeatedly. I shall be quite frank with this House that the linguistic provinces from some points of view are good, but it is immaterial whether I consider them good or bad and if people want them, they will have them. We are not going to come in their way. Personally I think, especially in these last few years, when our first effort was to consolidate India, anything that might help the process of disruption was bad. So, even though linguistic provinces might be good here and there, the timing of it was bad when we were struggling for this consolidation and when the right time comes, have it by all means. Also the rule that we laid down was that there should be a large measure of agreement between those concerned, between the provinces concerned, because each such formation or division inevitably involves interests of groups and provinces, all round. We have been asked sometimes to impose our will upon others, do not and that I think it is completely wrong. If we have this large measure of agreement, we shall do it, although we would like this to be done in a way so as not to upset all kinds of things. Financial considerations and everything else will arise and that will delay the economic progress of that part as well as, may be, other parts of the country.

Then, I refer to the question of the tribal people. I personally attach the greatest importance to this. They have suffered very greatly in Assam and elsewhere by the Partition. So many consequences of the Partition pursue us still. Many of them are almost cut off from their normal ways of gaining their livelihood since the Partition. To build roads on mountainous tracks is very expensive. We have built a number of roads; we are building them. But, it is a matter of terrific expenses. In about a fortnight's time, there is a conference being held to consider this tribal question.

The hon. Member from Manipur talked about some compensation for war damage. As a matter of fact, I do not know its early history. Normally speaking, it was the business of the British Government to give compensation for war damage. However, we undertook that liability to some extent there and we have, I believe, paid compensation to the tune of 25 or 30 lakhs. An attempt has been made to pay it fairly. I cannot obviously say that this has wholly succeeded; I cannot guarantee it from here. Some Claims Officers have been appointed, and in consultation with the local councils of the local people, it is being paid. In fact, the process is going on and claims are still being considered.

An hon. Member from Travancore said, something about monazite. Well, monazite used to be sold in large quantities almost for a song, till recent years. Then, it became a highly strategic and valuable mineral. For a variety of reasons, lately we stopped its export, although some of it is still going under licence. It is not quite as expensive as the hon. Member mentioned. He said it was £250 per ton. In America, at present, its price is half of that. We have as a matter of fact built a factory at Alwaye to separate monazite from ilmenite and other rare earths and this factory is going to be a great advantage to the State of Travancore and to India. We are keeping this under consideration all the time as what quantities we can export. It was our policy laid down a little while ago that anything that is used for the manufacture of atomic bombs should not be exported from India, because, we did not wish to get entangled in this business of other countries manufacturing atomic bombs with material taken from us. But where this question does not arise, we can consider what quantity of monazite we can send abroad and gain foreign exchange for it.

Reference was made to Kashmir. Much has been said about it. I should like to remind the House that much of the arguments has not been about facts, but rather about certain speeches that Sheikh Abdullah delivered, which were corrected subsequently. Let us not go into that. If people know the past history of Kashmir during the last 4 or 5 years, one can understand many of the forces at play there, the background of it, and how certain communal elements have been carrying on a very wrong and harmful propaganda. There is no personal issue about Sheikh Abdullah, but something which has helped Pakistan greatly. It is in that context that one has to see some of the speeches delivered.

Dr. Mookerjee asked question about the constitutional position of Kashmir, whether Kashmiris are Indians or what they were. Of course, they are Indians constitutionally and legally. If they want a passport to go abroad, they have to take an Indian passport. The House will remember that four or five years ago, when this

question of the merger of the States was first tackled, almost all the old Indian States acceded in three subjects only, that is, foreign affairs, defence and communications. Every State did that. A little later, when the raid took place in Kashmir, Kashmir also acceded on these three subjects. Later, developments took place in regard to other States and they acceded in regard to more subjects and the new picture has arisen. But, during this period, so far as Kashmir is concerned, there has been this conflict with Pakistan, the raid, the war, etc., and the reference to the United Nations. Now it is quite impossible, not at all feasible, for any other changes to take place in regard to the relation of Kashmir and India during this period of turmoil and war and reference to the United Nations. Those are the basic subjects—Kashmir has acceded and is a part of India—but in regard to other subjects obviously the people of Kashmir, that is then Constituent Assembly has every right to pass any law it chooses. That is the constitutional position and there is no difficulty about it, that is the natural position at present. There are matters at issue which we are discussing such as financial integration and the like and they will gradually be solved. Naturally this question has always had to be viewed with its background of international conflict and that has created great difficulties.

About the rehabilitation of refugees, if I may remind the House while we are deeply conscious of a fairly large number of refugees, especially coming from East Bengal, who require rehabilitation, help etc. taking the picture as a whole, and more especially the picture of those who have come from Western Pakistan, I think I am not exaggerating when I say that the work of rehabilitation that has been done has been remarkable. There has been this question of rehabilitation and refugees in large parts of the world and the United Nations has spent large sums of money over it, and other countries have done it and all that and experts in this work have come here from various countries and they have seen our work and they have expressed their amazement at our achievements in that regard. And we have, achieved that, I should like the House to remember, without the slightest financial or other help from abroad, from the United Nations or anybody. We have borne the whole burden. I will say this that no Government could have succeeded in that way if large numbers of those displaced persons themselves had not played up and down their work. You cannot do it in a one-sided way. They showed enterprise and courage and therefore they built themselves no and ultimately this very great tragedy of the migrations has really been a sign of hope for us. It has shown how our people can face tragedy and overcome it.

I have taken a great deal of the time of the House. I apologise for it and I am grateful for the indulgence shown to me. I shall repeat again that so far as our Government is concerned we welcome help and cooperation. I had not I regret, the time to deal with many important matters like foreign policy and the food policy and the rest. They have been dealt with elsewhere and I hope occasion will arise when we can deal with them here in a more leisurely way.

BACK NOTE

I. Reply on Motion of Thanks to President's Address, 22 May 1952

1. SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE: On a point of order Sir, is the expression 'nonsensical' parliamentary?

Mr. Speaker: It is absolutely parliamentary.

2. SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA (Calcutta North-West): It is not only the minorities of Eastern Bengal who have expressed disagreement with this passport system but a large number of Muslim representatives from West Bengal also who have expressed their apprehension that this will lead to the worsening of the conditions. I refer to a deputation led by Nawab Mussaraf Hosein and others.

Mr. Speaker: He is only referring to that.

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS

12 June, 1952

Since yesterday we have been discussing what is called Foreign Policy and many aspects of it have been mentioned. We have discussed the Foreign Service, the failings or the virtues of our diplomatic personnel, the money we spend or the waste we indulge in or do not indulge in. We have also discussed other matters. I listened with respect and attention to the speeches that were being made and, if I may say so, the level of the debate since yesterday has been high.

As I listened today, the background of this tormented world came before me; because after all, when we talk about foreign policy, we talk about the world or bits of the world, or we talk of this world which for years has hung on the edge of a catastrophe. People talk of the success of our foreign policy. How they measure success and how they wish to achieve success in Ceylon or Goa, I would like to know. People have talked about the policy that our Government has pursued as not yielding success or being driven into this camp or that camp, and that problem remain unsolved, whether it is in Kashmir or elsewhere. Some hon. Members have criticised our policy; but I have wanted these two days for one concrete suggestion, a positive suggestion of what one can do, apart from what is being done.

Brave words! yes; forensic eloquence, yes; mebourama, yes; but what do you want us to do: I ask hon. Members to ponder over this question. There are many problems in the world today, whether you go to Korea, whether you go to Iran or Egypt or Tunisia or America or Germany, almost anywhere you go, are problems, and every problem is an unsolved problem, because every problem is connected with the whole world situation in all its complexity and this whole world situation may sometimes taste a turn for the better and sometimes for the worse. But as a whole, it presents a very tragic aspect. So, do you expect the solution of these problems? If I may say so with all respect, it means a total lack of comprehension of what the problem of the world as success may come, but I do not cum success. Our policy may have led to failure here and there. It is not that. But I do wish this House to consider the issue not from the point of view of debate or of eloquence out from the point of view of considering some of the most tremendous problems of the age; for it is a tremendous responsibility for anyone, whether it is an individual or a Government or this Parliament to have to face and consider these problems and to decide what we are to do about them. We cannot decide these problems. That is, shall I say, sheer arrogance for any of us to think that even this great country of India is going to decide the fate of the world. Of course, not. It may be, however, that we may make a difference, that we may help towards a decision, that we may make that final difference which may come between war and peace, and that will be a great service if we can do that to the world.

Therefore, I approach these problems in all humility. Hon. Members have talked about my whims and caprices which fashion our foreign policy. It is a small matter,

how they refer to me: but it is not a small matter when they refer to the policy of this great nation as the whim and caprice of an individual, whoever he might be. It is not a fitting thing for us to say and it is not a fact. Our policy, as I have said repeatedly has grown out of our past way of thinking and our declaration and I do say that we have stuck to those declarations and to those past ways of thinking. In so far as we can stick to them in the changed circumstances, we have stuck to them and those hon. Members who think otherwise are mistaken entirely and completely. I cannot and nobody can judge himself. It is for others to see, but so far as I can understand whatever we have stood for and whatever I personally stood for in the real of international affairs, I have stuck to them to the uttermost limit without the slightest wavering or deviation to the right or left.

Personally, I am quite clear about that. Of course, I may be wrong; others may be better judges. Whether it is relation to the type of partnership or about our remaining in the Commonwealth, I wish to stick to every word I have uttered and those who make this charge do not understand what they are talking about or what I said then or what I say now. It is amazing how some hon. Members opposite with and their eloquence, with all their fine qualities have somehow lost all knowledge to understand the changed position. They are like the religious fundamentalists who will not see to the right or left but who will only go in one direction. The world may change but their mental habits and thoughts will not change. It does not matter to them whether it is morning, noon or night. Theirs is not to reason why or say anything. They will keep repeating the same slogan, the same everything, although the world may go on changing.

Take this business of peace. We all want peace, of course but unfortunately the great powers and the great blocs of nations today, they all talk peace and yet in some great countries peace is considered a dangerous word. If you talk of peace one almost suspects your loyalty. In other countries peace is talked about so much in such tones that they deafen and they almost sound like war. After all peace is not PEACE; it is a quality; it is a way of approach; it is a way of doing things; it is the objective which you want to reach. If in talking of peace, you are preparing for war then surely, there is something wrong in the peace you talk about. Are you going to get peace by meetings and by conferences? We have plenty of peace conferences nowadays. Perhaps some hon. Members may have seen an advertisement in England, "Join the British Navy and see the world". You might very well say: "Join the peace movement and have free trips over the world". There are conferences all the time and people are rushing backwards and forwards free of charge. I do not know who pays. All for the sake of peace they travel, suffer extreme discomforts and go to the uttermost ends of the earth. I do not understand this and I do not think it is dignified for people to rush about like this, Indians or anybody, at the cost of other people and other countries. But is this the way you are going to have peace? Are you going to have peace by merely shouting by the roadside and the market square "Peace, Peace", and banging other peoples' heads and saying "a person who does this will be punished" ?

Surely, let us function as mature people and as a mature nation. We are not children; we are not in a debating society to match each other's forensic skill, regardless of facts and regardless of what the effect of our words is. It is very easy to talk of anti-imperialism and that kind of thing. Imperialism does exist today, but I do venture to say that Imperialism, as it exists today, is something surely and absolutely different from what it was and about which some of the hon. Members talked. Let them understand what it is. Let them also understand that there are other Imperialisms growing. Take the British Imperialism. Does any man in this House think that British Imperialism is the same thing as it was in the past?

I know about Malaya and I say British imperialism flourishes in Malaya, in Africa and elsewhere but British Imperialism today is an exhausted thing. England is a country for which, I hope, this House has respect for the way it has fought its problems since the war was over, and for the courage with which it has faced them. It certainly and undoubtedly in many places does things with which this House or I do not agree. That is not the point. Let us see things in the historical perspective. "To talk about the British power as it was before the last war, as if it was the same today, is either complete misunderstanding and ignorance of what is happening or trying to delude others". It is not so. Today, there are other powers, great powers, for good or ill. I repeat that for England, since those war years. I have nurtured considerable respect, because I like brave people fighting against odds and the British people have fought against great odds. That does not mean that I agree with England in this or in that. That is not the point. But to talk about British Imperialism today in the same context as of old is to talk about something which does not exist.

I will go a step further and take other countries. There are still some imperial powers, colonial powers. Undoubtedly, all these colonies should be put an end to, whether they are British or French or Dutch or Belgians or any other. I quite agree. But the position today nevertheless remains that all these colonial powers have no strength behind them. They have the strength of tradition; they have the strength of being helped by other people, and all manner of things. But, they have inherently no strength. Let us certainly by all means help in putting an end to the remaining elements of colonialism in Asia, in Africa, wherever it is. Let us understand what the real conflict is about today. Let us understand this marshalling of forces. Let us understand that if the conflict once takes place, then the whole world will be mightily changed, and whatever the change may be the change will not be for the good because of the uttermost destruction and the rest of it. Therefore, that does not much good. Let us analyse each problem by itself. It does not help in the slightest to repeat the slogans of yesterday, thinking that they take the place of thought and action. It is a complicated, difficult, tormented world today. All we can do is to approach these problems with great humility, not with a certitude of success—I have none—and try to help where we can, try to be good, try to put in a good word and try to avoid evil at any rate, and try to go ahead faster where you have the chance to do so.

It is all very well to talk bravely even about small matters. It does not become people to be brave, to be melodramatic and convert this hon. House as if it was a

meeting in the Ram Lila Grounds in Delhi. We are the Parliament of India talking about great problems; we should not put on melodramatic poses and forensic attitudes, repeating the slogans of the market place here. A high responsibility rests on us. So I beg this House to consider the foreign policy, not in terms of petty success, not in terms of future: because the success or failure of foreign policy today of every country is involved in the success or failure of this world of ours. No man can say whether this world will survive peacefully for the next few years or will not. No man can say what will happen if disaster comes to it. It just does not matter what your policy or my policy is. When disaster comes, it comes to the world. It is true that even so, our policy should be, firstly to prevent that disaster, secondly to avoid it, and thirdly, even if it comes, to retain a position in which we are able to stop it even after it has started.

I want to be perfectly frank with this House. I should like an everwidening area in this world, an everwidening area of countries in Asia which decide that they will not enter the war whatever happens. I should like the countries in Asia, and other countries also—I speak about our neighbours—I should like the countries in Asia to make it clear to those warring factions, those great countries who are so much exercised by passion against each other, that they will remain cool and whatever happens, they will not enter the arena of warfare and that they will try at least to restrict the war to other regions and save their regions and try to save the rest. I should like also, in so far as we can to declare ourselves and get other countries to declare against the use of these horrible modern weapons. You have heard of the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb which has not exactly come into existence but which is said to be far worse. Hon. Members talked about bacteriological warfare and have expected Government, if I may say so, to function as if it was an organisation which rushes in and expresses its opinions like hon. Members do, without taking the trouble to find out exactly what to say, when to say it, and what weight to attach to anything. Governments do not function in that way. Governments weigh their words; Governments weigh the evidence. Governments do not go about condemning people or nations until they are absolutely convinced. Even when Governments feel that there is adequate evidence, they cannot do so till the proper moment comes or till they are quite satisfied about it. We should undoubtedly, and I think nations should raise their voice against any application of germ or bacteriological warfare in any country. Take something which has been used in the recent past; some kind of grenade or something like that, the Napalam bomb, a horrible thing. All these things are there.

But how are you going to put a stop to this drift towards catastrophe and disaster? It is not an easy matter. When the world is worked up by passion and prejudice, one thing I am dead certain is that you do not put an end to it by yourself joining that crowd of passionate and excited people shouting at the top of their voice. That does not help. It merely increases the din and increases the passion. It does not matter if the word you shout is peace. Even then, it increases the din and shouting. You have to be a little quiet and go about speaking to smaller voices so that it could be heard by more people. You have to try somehow to make the people less excited.

You may be convinced that you are right. But, if it is your object, not merely to show off that you are right and that you are very strong about being right, but to gain results in the world, to calm down, others, to prevent them from fighting, you have to set about winning them over. You have to see about winning them over even though they are in the wrong, not by going and telling them that they are bad, very bad and that they should be punished and crushed. That is not the way of calming them and winning anybody over. I do not mean to say that we should not condemn the wrong. We should. But, I have not been taught that it is civilized behaviour among individuals, much less among nations, to go about condemning people. It is far better to talk about our own weaknesses than point out others' weaknesses and others' failings.

So, I submit that this is my approach to foreign policy. You may call it neutral or you may call it whatever you like. I do not see where neutrality comes in, in this picture at all. It is not neutrality. The word neutrality is completely wrong except in times of war. There is no neutrality except when there is a war. If you think there is a war on today, we are neutral. If you think there is a cold war today, certainly we are neutral. We are not going to indulge in cold war which, if I may say so, is in some ways worse than shooting war. A shooting war is infinitely disastrous; but this is worse in the sense that it is more degraded. It lowers the standards all the time. We do not propose to join that war. It does not matter who is right and who is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse.

Now, there are so many subjects which have been referred to in the course of this debate. I do not wish to get, if I may say so, rather lost in this maze of subjects, but there are one or two major aspects which I should like to put to this House. There has been repeated reference to our inclining more and more towards what is called the AngloAmerican bloc. Now, it is perfectly true that our economic and some other bonds have been in the last few years far more with the United Kingdom, with the United States of America and other countries of the West. That is something that we have inherited, and unless we put an end to this and develop some other bonds, somewhere else, we have to continue them. Obviously we had to continue them. We could not live in isolation. We wanted certain things. We could not get them from elsewhere. So, in normal practice, any country would continue those. We had to continue them; we propose to continue them. I see no reason at all except the passion and prejudice of somebody who does not like it. I see no reason at all why we should break any bond which is of advantage to us.

"Now, it is true, that where a country begins to depend upon another country, there is always a danger and risk. Dependence is always bad, whatever form that dependence might take, and one should be guarded about it". And yet a country, placed as India is today, and many other countries, inevitably depends on other countries for certain essential things. We are not industrialised enough. We do not produce important things. We talk about our Army, Navy and Air Force, and yet we have to depend upon other countries for the major things that an Army or an Air Force or a Navy requires. We are dependent. Hon. Members talk about a big army. It does not matter in the least how big an army you have, if you do not have the

equipment for the Army. It does not matter, in the ultimate analysis, how many people you train up unless you have got the entire background for that army in the country. Well, we try to build that up as far as we can. Till we build it up, what are we to do? We have got to get the essential things from abroad from one country or other, from everywhere. It is not good to rely on any one country; and to begin with, we have got to do things which are necessary to build up basic industries in this country. Now, we have tried to get them from certain countries because it was easier to get them from there, because of our economic contacts there, because our trade and commerce are in those channels. It is all very well to suggest other channels. It is very difficult for us to build new channels overnight. We are perfectly prepared to have new channels with other countries; we are perfectly prepared to deal with the Soviet Union or other countries which can supply us with the particular goods we need and supply them with our goods. But the fact remains that it is simpler for us, easier for us, to get things from America or England or France or other countries at the moment.

Take our defence services. We have inherited them. They have been built up after a certain model. Now, we may change that model later on or not. It is a good model so far as it goes, *i.e.*, our defence services are efficient, our army is a good one. Inevitably it has been built up in the British way, because the British started it and built it up for a large number of years. Now, do you expect us to break it up and start building up afresh? I can understand the argument that the army should be made more and more popular. That I can understand. Let us consider it by all means, let us explore it. But, you want us to break up this magnificent fighting unit that we have got today built up on a certain model just to show off our dissatisfaction with the fact that the British built it up or that it rather approximates to the British model of an Army. That would be childish. We have to keep it going as it is. And because we have got to keep it going—we can gradually change it or make it after our own way, whatever it is,—we have to get the equipment for it. Inevitably it is easier for us to get the equipment from certain sources which can supply that equipment than it is to get entirely new types of equipment, entirely new types of arms which do not fit in even with the arms we are producing in this country. That will create all kinds of difficulties.

Some hon. Member said: Why do you get British advisers? Why not get a German or Japanese or somebody else? Well, certainly; but things are not done in that way. It is not a question of getting odd people to come and advise us in an odd manner. Here is a machine working in a particular way, and you have to work it apart from everything else. You cannot mix up people or advisers thinking on different lines, different equipment, different types of munitions, coming here and quarrelling with each other while they advise us. We must follow a single system till we change it.

The House will remember that we attained independence in a cooperative way, ultimately in a friendly way, with the British power, and I think history will record that to our credit, and to England's credit—I am not ashamed to say to England's credit also. Having done that we went step by step. The House will remember that for the

first two years while we were formulating our Constitution, we were a Dominion. But from the very first day our Constituent Assembly met, we declared that our objective was a Republic. That was in December 1946. And as soon as our Constitution was completed and given effect to, we became the Republic of India. Later, the question arose about our being in the Commonwealth or not. Now, is it not a very different thing for the Republic of India which has nothing to do with England constitutionally, legally or in any other way except such normal bonds as two countries may have in the economic sphere or in the cultural sphere, whatever it may be, to decide to remain associated with England or with a group of countries without the least inhibition, without the least binding factor in it? I should like hon. Members to point out to me—the hon. Member Dr. Mukerjee who was himself in the Cabinet when these questions were considered said that the time had come for us to do this or that or to leave the Commonwealth—In what way, at any time, at any moment, during the last three or four years, the fact of our being associated with the Commonwealth has affected our policy, has varied it this way or that in the slightest degree, I should like to know that. I say, therefore, it becomes purely a question, if I may say so, of acting in a sentimental huff. I must say nations do not act either on sentiment or in a huff. They act with dignity and strength, and considering what is the right course, they adopt it and go by it. Now, it open to our country as it is to any other to be associated in an alliance with any other country. We have avoided alliances which entangle us. Dr. Lanka Sundaram referred to a number of Treaties of Friendship which we have entered into and pointed out some minor differences in phraseology. I hope hon. Members will excuse me if I do not go into these rather trivial points, because they have no importance whatsoever. So far as we are concerned, we are prepared to enter into a treaty of friendship forever with every country in the world. It is open to us to enter into any alliance with any country. In an alliance, invariably you give something and you take something. Each country binds itself down to a certain extent. If you put it this way, it gives up the freedom of action to the extent to which it is committed by and alliance or an agreement. That is not coming in the way of the independence of that country.

Our association with the Commonwealth is rather remarkable. It does not bind ourselves down in the slightest degree in any way whatever, and it has not had that effect during these last two or three years either. It has given us certain advantages, and it has not meant any disadvantages in the slightest degree. I should like hon. Members to point out to me now or later how and in what way it has open disadvantageous, except in the way that they just do not like the look of it. I cannot help their likes and dislikes. We are concerned with the advantages to controversy. And if I am told "See what, is happening in Ceylon or in South Africa, they are in the Commonwealth and yet you put up with this kind of thing," then I venture to say that that is the very reason I remain there. May I explain? I do not want this Commonwealth to be an interfering Commonwealth. I shall say what the Commonwealth means to me. It means an occasional meeting together once a year or twice a year. It means occasional consultation and reference to each other. It means certain advantages which I get by

being able to influence larger policies, apart from the normal method of doing so. Otherwise it does not come in my way at all.

Now, if I admitted the right of the Commonwealth to interfere with any country in the Commonwealth, then I cease to be in the Commonwealth at all, I am not prepared for their Saying anything to me. I am not prepared to accept' anything from them at all. It is very important and clear that the Commonwealth, or whatever it is, is some kind of an unsubstantial thing, unknown in any other constitution. But what we have to consider is, in the balance, is it advantageous for us or disadvantageous? I am perfectly clear in my mind that in no sense at all does it come in our way in any policy, political, economic, peace or war. If any hon. Member seems to think that we have got some kind of common war or defence policies, allow me to assure them that they are completely mistaken. We have never discussed defence policies in the Commonwealth, either jointly or separately.

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I shall again repeat that our system, our army's model is inevitably after the British system. It helps us as we want things from England. We have got a very big military stores department in London. We have to keep it up because the same type of things have to come to us; we have sometimes to get them through the good offices of the British War Office. Our Commander-in-Chief goes there in order to consider these matters. Our commanders do not discuss policies, ministers discuss policies. But the real thing is, if I may draw the attention of the House to this, in many matters we have inherited certain ways from the British period and we can decide either to reject them or accept them. We have given up many; we have decided to keep many till we change them as we want to change them.

Now one of the things we have inherited, to the use of which hon. Members opposite have not objected to, and it is a sign, if I may say so, of mental subservience about which we are repeatedly told, is the English language. I have not heard any word of protest from the Opposition benches to the use of the English language. I have not heard being told that we are subservient to the AngloAmerican bloc because we are using their language all the time here. I have no doubt at all that English language is the greatest thing which ties us to the AngloAmerican bloc. The English language inevitably brings nearer to us their thoughts, their activities, their books, newspapers, cultural standards; while the rest of the world with which we are not acquainted linguistically is cut off from us. It is a sad thing. I should like our country, apart from developing our own language, of course, to know other languages of the world, so that we may develop and come into contact with them. And here it is a strange fact that some hon. Members opposite object to every thing, to even those things that are advantageous to us, because they happen to emanate from America or England or some country in the West, but they swallow wholesale the English language which is the real and ultimate bond which has tied us to them mentally and otherwise. I have no objection to the use of the English language, of course. I do not mean

anything against it. But my argument was that we have inherited certain things, and it is not a good thing to break a good thing, to upset something that is good. We change it because we have decided, for instance, to change it gradually in our country during the next few years and to use our own language ultimately and fully. I hope English will remain even after that, not as a language we use in our official way, but because it is a great language. I hope other world languages will come in too here. That is all right. But this general approach of suspecting everything that comes from England or America is not helpful at all. I submit that it will be found that whatever step we have taken in foreign policy and many other subjects may have been wrong in a small way. But whatever step we have taken has always been measured by this rod, whether it helps India's interests and whether it helps the course of world's peace.

We have often expressed ourselves in a way that displeased the great nations and filled them with anger, but we have preferred that to going any other way. Hon. Members are acquainted with recent history, how great nations have changed their allegiance rather suddenly; how they have had alliances and how enemies have come together and become allies and then enemies again. Even in the course of the last great war, the Soviet Union was allied to Nazi Germany; a little later it was attacked by Nazi Germany and it fought with enormous endurance and courage against Hitler's armies. Now, I am not condemning any country; I am merely pointing out that at that time the rulers of the Soviet Union thought it right and desirable to have a close alliance with a country which previously they had condemned and which they were to fight a little later and fight to the death also. Now, I have not heard all the predecessors of the hon. Members opposite in their organisation ever criticising that as they might well have done.

There is one difficulty that I have to face and that is that I am liable to error. Very much so. All I can do is to try to avoid it. I think any of us is liable to error. When I am approached from the point of view of infallibility of an organisation, an idea, a country, then I rebel against that. I think any such idea may yield results for the time being, but ultimately it is fatal to the growth of a nation. It curbs the spirit and the mind and stunts the community. So judge the present day difficulties of the world not from the point of view of inevitably some country being right or wrong. Judge of each point separately and secondly, do not induce in vilification of any country. It does not, help. Let us certainly point out, when the situation demands our pointing out, that a policy is wrong or something else should be done; but merely to go about slanging other countries does not create the atmosphere for the peace that we desire.

So, I submit that so far as our policy is concerned, in spite of the fact that we deal largely with the United Kingdom or the USA—we buy our things from them and we have accepted help from them—we have not swerved at all from our policy of not aligning with any group. *"And, if I may say so it is because we are stuck to that policy and in doing so. Were denied help and we stuck to that still policy, that people realised and countries realised that we could not be bought by money or made to change our policy."* It was then—not because we went begging for it. We have not

done so at any time—that help came to us and we gladly accepted it; and we shall accept it all the time provided there are no strings, provided our policy is perfectly clear and above board and is not affected by it. I realise—I frankly admit—that there are always certain risks involved; not risks on paper but risks in the sense that certain obligations might be felt which might affect our policy without our knowing it. These risks are there. All I can say is that we should be wide awake and try to avoid our committing any mistake because of these risks. If the Government at all makes a mistake, this House, I am sure, will pull it up.

We have no big armies and we are no great power. The next generation will no doubt, I hope, be stronger than us, but even in the present generation which I represent, we may make many mistakes. But we have not known to bow down to threats. We have spent our lives in resistance. A word from us would have brought us many of the good things of life. We refused to give that; we preferred not to give it, not we, a few individuals, but millions in this country. So if, any country imagines that we are going to change our policies and sell ourselves for a mess of pottage from any other country, it is, I submit, completely mistaken. I am quite sure in my mind that if at any time any help from abroad depends upon the slightest variation of our policy, we shall give up that help, the whole of it, and prefer starvation and everything to it. So it is in this way that we accept help and, I think, the world knows it well enough.

Now there is one other aspect to which I should like to refer to. Dr. Lanka Sundaram asked whether a Standing Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs was going to be constituted. Well, Standing Committees were constituted in the old British days in a peculiar way for a special purpose. As they were constituted, they serve no useful purpose now. I do not know if it will be appointed—that is a matter for the House to decide— but I should like to assure this House and specially the Opposition that as Minister for Foreign Affairs I should gladly welcome frequent consultations with them and talks with them about any matter appertaining to foreign affairs. We can think about it and evolve some method, not only discuss the general International position, but discuss specific problems as they arise.

"Now in the larger world today we have associated ourselves with the United Nations. Our association with the United Nations does not take away from our independence". But to a certain extent it does, if I may say so, as it does of every member country, because once you limit your field of action by joining an organisation like that, to that extent your independence is limited just as other alliances limit it. It is just a mutual limitation. It is a far greater limitation than our being vaguely associated with the Commonwealth of Nations—with England and others. There is nothing in that at all. In fact, it is almost an airy association because it is not written down on paper or Constitution or anywhere; so long as we wish to be there, we are there.

To come back to the United Nations, we associated ourselves with the United Nations because we felt that some such world organisation was essential. The League of Nations had failed. Here was another attempt under wider and perhaps better auspices and we joined it. And, I think that the Charter of the United Nations is still a very fine and noble document. An hon. Member used the words "go and scrap the

Charter". I do not understand that. I think the Charter is a very fine thing. But it is true and I feel it more and more that the Charter is not being lived upto; that the United Nations somehow swerved away from the basic provisions of that Charter in theory as well as in practice. And I think that is a very serious matter for us and for other countries to consider.

There was the Atlantic Pact of certain Western Atlantic countries. It is not my concern as to what certain countries do for their defence. We cannot as a Government come into the picture or object to anything that they do. But there is one aspect of that Atlantic Pact which has been coming into evidence more and more. Whether it is the formal aspect of it or just an informal one. I do not know. But it began—this community of Atlantic nations—as a defence against aggression. Well, no one can object to that. It has extended itself apparently as a defence of the colonial possessions of those nations and that is a very serious matter so far as we are concerned. It means various countries giving assurances, whether formal or informal, for the protection and maintenance of colonial rule wherever it exists. Now, to colonial rule wherever it might exist; we are, as you know, unalterably opposed.

So I wish to point that out to hon. Members of this House that we have taken a serious view of this as we took a very serious view of the denial of a discussion in the Security Council on the Tunisian question. Apart from the merits of the Tunisian question, it is an amazing thing that nearly every country of Asia and many countries of Africa are wanting a discussion—a consideration—of the Tunisian issue, apart from the determination of it, and this is being denied and denied by two countries Noting against it. Now, that is a very extraordinary state of affairs. If the whole of Asia and Africa combined cannot get a subject discussed in the Security Council because two or three great Powers object to it, well then, a time may well come when those countries of Asia and Africa might feel that they are happier in their own countries and not in the United Nations. That would be a tragic decision; because I do feel that in spite of these faults, the United Nations serve an essential purpose and if we did not have it today, undoubtedly countries will have to come together to build up something like it again. I do not want that to happen. I do attach the greatest importance to the United Nations, but I repeat the way the United Nations have swerved from its original moorings and become gradually a protector of colonialism in this indirect way is a dangerous deviation and also how slowly instead of being a great organisation for peace, some of the members have begun to think of it more and more as an organisation for waging war. Now that was not the conception behind the United Nations and though the old Charter remains, somehow facts begin to belie it more and more. We have ventured to point this out to the member countries of the United Nations and I think that our words have created some effect in their minds. I mention this to this House because inevitably the action we take from time to time, whether in regard to a particular issue, whatever it may be and whatever country might be involved, or whether it is the larger issue of world peace, is not shouted from the market place. We are a responsible Government dealing with other Governments and if we shout in public, the whole effect of our approach goes. That is not the way modern diplomacy

is carried on. Because we do not shout, the hon. Members opposite might perhaps think that we remain supine; apparently their idea of diplomacy is the holding of public meetings and the passing of big resolutions—big banners and big flags of a particular type.

Yes, I mentioned just now a flag and my mind goes back to the incident that took place a few days ago. Hon. Members have referred to the putting up of the Union Jack some days ago over this Parliament building. Some two or three years ago the matter came before us and we decided that as a matter of courtesy, on a certain day in the year, we would allow the Union Jack to be put up on one of our essential buildings like the Secretariat. It was no request to us from anybody else. It was a matter of courtesy. We gave instructions. There was no question at that time of putting up the flag on the Parliament House as the Parliament was not sitting and I must confess that when I saw the flag on the Parliament House, I was myself a little surprised because I had expected it to be on the Secretariat building and not on Parliament House. But the instructions given two years ago were not properly understood by the person in-charge and the flag was put up on the Parliament House. I do feel that while it is perfectly right for us to show courtesy and to put up the Union Jack, I do believe that over Parliament House no flag but the Indian flag should be put up (Hear, hear) and instructions have been issued to that effect.

May I also say one word about the situation in Korea? I am not at the moment referring to the truce negotiations which have gone on for such a long time, although they are exceedingly important and one might say that the future of not only the Far East but of the world depends on what turn those negotiations take; and it seems an amazing tragedy that we should get stuck up there month after month and year after year. So far as we are concerned we have not been completely out of the picture in the sense that we have tried to keep in touch with the major parties concerned. We had special opportunities of doing so and we had played some part in this in the hope that perhaps some way of bringing about peace might be found. But I should like to say that I have been deeply concerned at certain internal developments in South Korea. We have nothing to do with South Korea. We have never recognised the Government of South Korea. So it is not our concern. Nevertheless, indirectly, because we are members of the United Nations and the United Nations is functioning in South Korea, it is a matter of concern to us what happens there. And the recent developments connected with the activities of President Syngman Rhee are not only very remarkable, but, I think, should make the United Nations and every country connected with it think of the undesirability of any association with a person like President Rhee who functions in that way. Any support of the regime of President Rhee means the support of the very things which the United Nations is supposed to stand against.

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BACK NOTE

II. Demands for Grants, 12 June, 1952

1. SHRI NAMBIAR: But why did you allow the Commander-in-Chief to go to London?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Our Commander-in-Chief goes to London to take part sometimes in what are called 'military exercises'. Perhaps the hon. Member does not understand these things.

2. SHRI NAMBIAR: Withdraw the medical mission.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The Medical mission has not gone to President Rhee.

I am sorry that I cannot deal with the large number of matters referred to, but I hope, either in this House or elsewhere, to deal with the other matters which hon. Members have mentioned here. I am grateful for the indulgence of the House.

RESOLUTION REGARDING LINGUISTIC STATES

7 July, 1952

What I wished to say was this. If the House so desires, so far as Government is concerned, we shall give every facility for its continuance. I am intervening; therefore, in the middle of this debate and I hope my colleague and near neighbour at the present moment will at a later stage reply to the rest of the debate.

I shall refer to some points that have been mentioned and some ideas which I have on the subject. Right from the beginning it was said—I think it was Dr. Lanka Sundaram who said it—that we should keep away from passion and prejudice. I entirely agree with him. Dr. Mookerjee said that this is not a matter which might be considered a party matter. I also entirely agree with him. And yet, may I say, that perhaps it would have been better if it was a party matter. I shall explain myself. Not that I want things to become party matters, but a party matter is something that cuts across provincial feelings. It may be good, or it may be bad. But anyhow it is not on a provincial basis that a party would consider it. Well, this particular question is in the nature of things a provincial question. Therefore, where division comes or where friction comes as between representatives of one province and another—which I think is worse than party divisions—perhaps it would have been better if it was a party matter, if it is considered on the basis of some principle, if you like. There are different ways of looking at it but not on the basis of provincial differences, or thinking.

Now, an hon. Member—one of the noted poets we have in this House—referred to the policy, the old British policy of divide and rule. He seemed to conclude, to hint that in this matter of linguistic provinces, the policy of the present Government is a continuation of this divide and rule policy. Now I must confess that I have failed to understand that it may be a flight of poetic fancy, perhaps. Whatever one's view on this question may be, how it is a policy of divide and rule I do not understand.

Now repeated references have been made to the Congress policy for a large number of years and one hon. Member said that some time or other in the past I used to go about shouting from the Housetops or street corners about linguistic provinces. I am not aware of having done so at all. In fact, I have never been very anxious about linguistic provinces. I might say—and this is entirely, if I may say so, a confidential aside to the House—I have had peculiar views about our provinces and coming as I do from the biggest of India's provinces. I think that provinces should be very small in this country, but not provinces as we have them today with all the paraphernalia of a Governor, a High Court and this and that. But my voice has been a lonely voice, even when the Constituent Assembly was considering it. We were so used to existing conditions that we followed more or less what we have been used to.

Now talking about the Congress, everybody knows that thirty years ago or thereabouts, the Congress stood for linguistic provinces. Then skipping over the period, in 1945-46 (seven years ago) the Congress in its election manifesto said:

“It [the Congress] has also stood for the freedom of each group and territorial area within the nation to develop its own life and culture within the larger framework and it is stated that for this purpose such territorial areas or provinces should be constituted, as far as possible, on a linguistic and cultural basis.”

That was seven years ago. The latest position is as embodied in the election manifesto of the last General Elections drawn up at Bangalore. May I read that out?

“The demand for a redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis has been persistently made in the South and West of India. The Congress expressed itself in favour of linguistic provinces many years ago. A decision on this question ultimately depends upon the wishes of the people concerned. While linguistic reasons have undoubtedly cultural and other importance, there are other factors also, such as, economic, administrative and financial, which have to be taken into consideration. Where such a demand represents the agreed views of the people concerned, the necessary steps prescribed by the Constitution, including the appointment of a boundary Commission, should be taken.”

That more or less represents the policy and the position of Government in this matter.

Now, in regard to the Andhra Province, for instance, hon. Member have said: go and take a vote or plebiscite; 95 or 97 per cent, would vote for it. I entirely agree. But that does not get over my difficulties. I am all in favour of the Andhra province. But what will happen if you take the votes of the Andhras and the Tamilians and others in regard to the issue and conflict like Madras city? Then you will not get 90 per cent, this way or that. It is quite clear that if you take the vote of the Andhras on the Andhra province on principle they will vote for it *en bloc*. And rightly so. if I may say so: just as if you take the votes of large numbers of our friends on the Karnataka question they will vote for the Karnataka province. I have no doubt about that. Or Maharashtra. If they did not do so, or if they were not expected to do so. the question does not arise for our discussion. So we proceed on the basis, on the assumption that considerable numbers of people in certain areas desire a province—more or less a linguistic province you may call it, although it is too limited a phrase—but they want a province where more or less their language prevails.

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At that time, naturally, we gave expression to something which was fundamentally a sound matter of principle. But in giving effect to that, where there is conflict you have to resolve that conflict. How are you to resolve it? You may resolve it, as somebody suggested, on a straight vote in that particular area in that particular issue. But some questions cannot be decided by a straight vote of that type. You have to consider,

you have to find ways and means of resolving that difficulty, and you have to prepare a suitable atmosphere for it.

Speaking for myself, I have been overburdened by the thought that in these critical days or years we must give topmost priority to developing a sense of unity in India and that anything that might come in the way of that unity might perhaps be delayed a little, till we have laid that strong foundation. Because of that I have, frankly—and I should be quite frank with this House—not taken any aggressive or positive step for my own part in regard to the formation of these linguistic provinces. Although I agreed with the demand in many cases I left it at that, and if there is general consent, well and good, we will do it and are prepared to do it. Two and a half years ago or a little more, that is towards the end of 1949 we had practically come to the conclusion to have an Andhra Province, because most matters had been settled not by compulsion by us, but by other people concerned, the Tamil people, the Andhras and others. I think a Committee was formed and the Local Government had practically settled matters, when suddenly we found that two or three important matters, very vital matters, were not settled. Were we to give some kind of a decision to compel acceptance of that? This was just on the eve of the New Constitution of the Republic. The question was whether in this New Constitution we should not include Andhra as a separate Province. We as a Government were perfectly prepared to do it. But we could not do it when at the last moment conflicts arose: so that for the last two and a half years or more we were on the verge of doing this, but something happened outside our own competence that delayed matters. I have no doubt at all in my mind, taking an individual case like the Andhra Province, that there is a great deal of justification for it. It is bound to come, and I have no doubt that the Andhras want it. And in the final analysis that is the final justification for it.

But when we get into difficulties about the City of Madras or Rayalaseema—I am not putting this just trying to create difficulties, I hope the question of Rayalaseema would by mutual consent be settled—whatever it is, when you get into these difficulties what is the Government to do, except that it can follow two courses. One is to allow a better atmosphere and to try to encourage a settlement by consent. The other is to come down with a heavy hand and overrule this party or that and give its own consent. The second can be done. Governments do it. But in a matter of this kind hon. Members will no doubt realize that strong feelings are roused, and if we make a new province by some kind of coercive method and leave a trace of intense bitterness behind between those two provinces which used to be one and were divided up later, it would not be good for either to start with that trail of inheritance of illwill and bitterness against your neighbours just at the time when you are starting from scratch, when you have to settle down and build yourself anew. Therefore it is infinitely better, even though it takes a little more time, to do it with the goodwill and consent of your neighbours and others.

That was our general approach. And I submit that is the right approach because it will ultimately save you more time this way than to try to do something apparently quickly but in effect by a method which may entangle you into long arguments for

years. After all, even the simplest of partitions brings problems and all kinds of difficulties, administrative, financial, this, that and the other. The Burma partition was very different, of course. Nevertheless, it was a complete partition with our goodwill. There "was no conflict in it Still it took ten years, I think, to work itself out gradually, while it has not quite worked out yet in some ways. And those other partitions, the unfortunate ones, which happened in this country undoubtedly made many of us and many in the country become rather hesitant about changing the map of India too much. It is not in that way, of course, and I am not comparing it with that. But it does rather upset things. Of course, where it is necessary, let us change it. I am perfectly agreeable that it is necessary in some cases. But. the resolution that has been put forward, as it is worded, seems to me, not only completely unacceptable, but, if I may add, completely objectionable. It is all very well for our friends from Andhra, or Maharashtra or Kerala or Karnataka, to put forward a definite proposal which could be considered and then accepted or not. But, a general proposition saying "let us take the map of India, and on the basis of language, let us reshape and cut it up anew," is one, which, I submit, no reasonable person can support. Because, it means your cutting up everything that you have got, upsetting everything that you have got, and just at the moment when you are more or less settling down in some way or other, unsettling everything. It will be dangerous at any time. More so, at a time when the world hangs on the verge of a crisis,— *one does not know what tomorrow or the day after might bring—for us to unsettle and uproot the whole of India for a theoretical approach or a linguistic division seems to me an extraordinarily unwise thing.*

Then, again, in this matter, we have got a magnificent inheritance of India. We want, of course, to better that inheritance, to further it, to advance it in doing so, if we think too much parochially or provincially, which is sometimes justified.—I do not say that one should not think of his parish or his province; one should—if one applies that parochial way of looking at the whole of India, it is a dangerous thing. This resolution is for transferring the parochial or provincial outlook to the whole of India, and upsetting everything.

My hon. friend Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee spoke eloquently about West Bengal. I have no doubt that every Member in this House realises the tremendous burdens that West Bengal has had to shoulder and face. I have no doubt at all that of all the States in India, West Bengal has had to shoulder more burdens than any other as a result of the partition and the rest of it, and other matters connected with that. I am sorry that he rather strayed away into other matters in regard to East Bengal; those are other questions. He advanced an argument that because of the heavy population of West Bengal, some adjoining areas may be added on to it. Now, I am not giving an opinion. Logically or theoretically speaking, that seems to be a valid argument. But, you cannot always be logical in these matters. I am quite sure that Members from Bihar did not wholly approve of what Dr. Mookerjee might have said, regardless of party or anything else. I am not going into whether they are right or he is right.

Let us take another thing. Dr. Mookerjee talked about certain districts, etc. Two or three months ago, I was in the Darjeeling area of North Bengal, and there was a

deputation from the Gurkha league demanding a Gurkha or Nepali province in North Bengal. Now, I am quite sure Dr. Mookerjee does not approve of that. It means taking away something even from this restricted Bengal. I might inform the House my own reactions to that. But, instead of using my own words, I shall read out an answer that Sardar Patel gave in this House, with which I entirely agree. When this question of Gurkha province or Uttarkhand came up, his answer was:

“The Government of India consider this move of Uttarakhand in North Bengal as unreal, misconceived and harmful to national interests. The Government of India are determined not to give any quarter to any agitation for the formation of any such province and will not allow the solidarity of the country to be disturbed by such mischievous moves.”

In this matter, Dr. Mookerjee and I are in complete hundred per cent, agreement. My point is this. If Dr. Mookerjee starts the question of redistribution round about Bengal, all these questions arise, not only in the west, but in the north too. Everything comes up in the boiling cauldron of distribution all over India and one does not know what will emerge out of it ultimately.

It is all very well to say, as some hon. Members have said, as Dr. Mookerjee has said, as Dr. Khare has said, ‘decide this question this way or that way; do not leave it undecided’. Well, I confess I do not understand that. I can understand even a specific matter being decided. But, a general question of redistribution in India being decided this way or that. I do not understand. In fact, such things, normally, are not decided this way or that way. You may lay down some general principles if you like. But, principles come into clash. There is the principle of linguistic provinces. There is the principle of economic selfsufficiency or whatever it is. There are financial considerations; this, that and the other; there are so many considerations. You have to balance all these things and then come to a particular decision in a particular place. No single general principle will apply. Normally speaking, you take what you have got. You have got the present structure of India, geographically. In fact, in the last three, four or five years, it has changed very greatly. First of all by the Partition which took away a part of India, and secondly by the merger of a large number of the old Indian States, the picture has changed greatly. But, nevertheless, roughly speaking, the old provinces of India remain more or less the same. That does not mean that they should not change. Certainly, they may change. You start with the basis that you do not upset it. You take one particular demand, and if it is reasonable, you consider it and give effect to it, if you like. But, to say, that you should give effect to the principle all over India, there is no particular meaning.

In great countries like India, like China, there is always this great difficulty about provincialism. They are huge countries and inevitably, different parts of the country differ from other parts, sometimes in language, sometimes in ways of living and so many other things. In China they have some great advantages over us. They have, at any rate, one written language for the whole of China although the spoken language differs. Both these great countries have had to contend against provincialism.

I do not know enough about the past or the recent history of China as to how they have dealt with this question for me to go into details about it. But, generally speaking, they have tried to get over it by getting rid of the provinces themselves. I believe they have divided China into a number of what they call Zones, five or six or seven or eight, whatever the number may be. Apart from two or three autonomous areas, which are Mongolia and Tibet, the rest are Zones, which, presumably, cut across the old provincial boundaries. I cannot judge about China: I merely mention this because the problem is in regard to size and provinces, much the same here. May be. it is more difficult here or more different here. But, our thinking too much in terms of anything that leads to an intensification of provincial feelings will, undoubtedly, weaken the conception of India as a whole. That is one aspect of it.

Another aspect, which is equally important, is that we have certain very important languages in India. A language by itself may be good or bad; but round that language clusters ways of living, sometimes ways of thought and all kinds of ways have grown round it and it is but right that that particular aspect of cultural manifestation should have an opportunity for full growth.

So far as language is concerned. I think that we should encourage almost every hill dialect in India. I am not in favour of suppressing these languages, and certainly the major languages must go ahead. So, in order to encourage the growth of the people, the best way is through the language they speak, and every State should do that if it is multilingual, it should do it in the different languages, whatever it is. Why the political boundary should necessarily be a linguistic one, I do not see. If there are within the same boundary different languages, they can have pride of place and be given full opportunity. But I think that although the linguistic demand is mentioned so often, it is not really the question of language that counts in this. Here and there it does, but behind that there is something which is a little more difficult to deal with. It is a feeling of not having a square deal, if I may say so. That feeling comes in; otherwise, probably the language issue would not arise—a feeling that if they were separate and managed their own affairs, well, they will see to it that they get the square deal. If the feeling is there—and it is there—I cannot say whether there is much justification or not but the mere fact of feeling, it should not be there. That is bad for us. That we should still function in this narrow provincial way of showing favour to one group and distinguishing the other group from it—that certainly is a bad thing which means that we are still limited in our outlook, and however big our talk may be, we do not really think or function in a national way. We have to admit that. Having admitted it, we have to try to get over it. If we get over it, we should not do something which encourages that rather limited outlook. So you come up against two things. One is that we should not encourage that limited and limiting outlook; secondly, we must encourage the growth of the people in every way through their own language—cultural and other growth. You can balance these things. As a matter of fact, roughly speaking, part of the south of India, certain parts of the south of India—there is more or less a linguistic division in India; it may overlap here and there, but it is there—in the south you have two great States, Bombay and Madras which are multilingual.

I should have thought that to live in a multilingual State gave greater opportunities of growth and for developing the wider outlook than to live in this, if I may say so, as somebody said, big leviathan of a State like Uttar Pradesh. Then you will find, because you will find in history and elsewhere, that countries, small States are forced to think in large terms. The people living in small States are forced to think in large terms. They are forced to learn languages of other States. Because people live in huge States and countries, they become so content with the vast area that they do not think of the other areas or other people. They become self-complacent and all that. It is not a good thing, this business of size by itself. It never connoted either intelligence or anything else. I do not know why people are intent on greatness in size, geographically or otherwise. This idea of size, if I may say so, comes from olden days and is connected with land: a man owning more and more land, therefore getting more and more income; therefore, if he is a King, more and more people calling him Your Majesty or whatever it is. The size does not mean growth in any sense, but still we seem to think so—I am quite sure, for my part I am perfectly agreeable for Uttar Pradesh to be made into four provinces if you like; have three, four or as many as you like, but I doubt very much if many of my colleagues of Uttar Pradesh will relish that idea, and they probably would like another chunk from another province.

Some hon. Members referred to Hyderabad and the desirability or necessity for it to be cut up. May I say that I think it would be undesirable and unfortunate and injurious for Hyderabad to be disintegrated. Some hon. Members may not agree with me. That is a different matter. I am not challenging their *bona fides* in this matter, and I am not speaking about ever and ever. I am speaking of the present and the near future, and I think any attempt at splitting up Hyderabad would upset the whole structure of South India.

I am expressing my opinion. It would upset the whole structure of South India. For years you go about trying gradually to settle down. Here you have got a certain administrative and other continuity. As a matter of fact, we should have thought in terms of these provinces or States purely as administrative units and nothing more. Whatever is convenient we have. In regard to other matters we do not think in terms of the provinces necessarily.

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I do not agree with the suggestion that this will have any large upsetting effect if that is done there. I do not see any upsetting effect in what happens to an individual here and there, however big he may be. It does not upset the country. What would happen to millions of people that upsets the country. But, if any right move is taken in Kashmir, they may try to like the consequences of that in the rest of India. The position, therefore, of Government in this matter is this: that we feel, that we realise that there is a strong demand by large numbers of people for certain linguistic provinces in India to be constituted. More or less this is so in South India—in other parts also as Dr. Mookerjee has pointed out. Almost every province has some petty demand, but those are not important.

Now in regard to these demands in South India which are old demands, which have great justification behind them, we are perfectly prepared to go ahead. We are not going to take up the question of India and shape it on a linguistic basis, but we are prepared to take up any particular matter, to consider it and I would repeat what we have said before, in regard to them nobody expects agreement by everybody, 100 per cent, agreement, but in regard to the major matters which are at the present moment dividing the States concerned, on that there should be a fair measure of agreement. If that is so, if I may give an example with regard to the Andhra claim. I believe it was Dr. Lankasundaram who said that no Andhra will ever give up his claim to the city of Madras. I am quite sure the Members of this House here from the other parts.

I am sure many Members from the Tamil areas would equally vehemently assert something to the contrary. But there it is. Let them come together and come to some kind of settlement. So far as I am concerned, or so far as we are concerned as a Government, I do not suggest that we should remain passive in this matter. I am prepared to do all I can to help in that settlement, I am certainly prepared to bring them together, but I just cannot see how I can go with a flaming sword to the Tamils or the Andhras and say "You must submit to the other's demand." That I find very difficult to do. If I do that, even so the result will be not good, because you leave this trail of bitter memories behind, then may be they will have a feeling of recovering the lost territory later on from another province. But the difficulty is this. We talk about Vishala Andhra, the Maha Gujarat, or the Samyukth Maharashtra. If we see a map, we find that they all overlap.

If you look at the maps of Maha Gujarat, the Vishala Andhra or the Samyukth Maharashtra, you find that they overlap and come into conflict with each other. So long as you are discussing the theory of it, many people from the Maha Gujarat will vote for the Vishala Andhra and so on. But as soon as they see the maps, they will come, the poet said, as to brass tacks—it is not very poetical, if I may say so. As soon as they come to brass tacks, then you find conflicts arising all over.

And we may be told, and ancient history may be invoked to say that "in the year 1000 A.D. or something like that, Maha Gujarat spread right up to there," or "Look at history, at the time of the Rashtrakutas, the Maharashtra empire was up to here or there." It was there; very interesting history no doubt, to say that the Andhra Empire at the time of Ashoka or later had spread up to. We get back to these ancient historical memories, and try to claim that territory. Those ancient empires in their day were rather warring empires or imperial entities conquering other places. If the Andhras think of the ancient Andhra empire, and if the Maharashtras think of the old Maharashtra empire and so on.

I am not accusing anybody. I merely say that this is something where no Member of this House thinks that way. But this talk of linguistic provinces and historical parallels of where they were, leads quite inevitably to thinking that way and of spreading out in a sense, not a dominating one, but still of being in a more important position

vis-a-vis the neighbour. Obviously you cannot possibly produce all those things. You cannot divide and give the same territory to two provinces, because they overlap. So there are all these difficulties.

Why have an agitation to convince me? I am convinced. If you are in Andhra go and talk to the Tamils or others who are concerned, and I will join the talks too if necessary, not that I want to keep out of it. It is no good trying to convince me because I am convinced about the same. I am not convinced about the same, as I said, if somebody talks to me about Uttarakhand. I am very much opposed to it; if somebody else talks of a Sikh province, I say "Nothing doing". I am not going to play about with my frontiers there. That is a different matter. But in regard to these major claims like Andhra or Karnataka or Kerala or Maharashtra.

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BACK NOTE

III. Resolution regarding Linguistic States, 7 July 1952

1. But the other question is where two such areas overlap, where they come into some friction with each other how is one to decide about that overlapping and that friction?

SHRI NAMBIAR (Mayuram): Votes can be taken there.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Possibly. That is a suggestion.

Therefore, the policy that Government stated previously, a year ago and more, was this that where a demand is made which is by general consent— of course, it was taken for granted that the people of that area as a whole more or less wanted it, but the consent meant of those who were concerned in regard to those overlapping and border areas,—if that is obtained, then one can go ahead.

SHRI S. S. MORE: If these difficulties were there, why did the Congress in 1927 at its Madras session pass a resolution that “time has come for the creation of Andhra, Karnataka and Sind provinces”?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: My hon. friend talks about 1927.

SHRI S. S. MORE: Yes.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, much has happened since then. I am prepared to say, time has come today. I am not challenging that statement.

SHRI S. S. MORE: Did you not visualize these difficulties then? That is my question.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No. Certainly not. Because the question was not a question which might be called a practical question which could be given effect to then.

2. DR. N. B. KHARE: On a point of information. Will not the abolition of monarchy in Kashmir affect the whole structure of the whole of India?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I, first of all suggest that the hon. Member’s use of the word “monarchy” is not first accurate or precise? There are no monarchy in India of any kind. There are certain persons who had a limited authority in their States under the British power in the old days, and even that limited authority has gone, and they have been given some kind of honoured place without the slightest power or authority. That is the present position.

DR. N. B. KHARE: I meant the same thing by the word. I used the word “monarchy” because there is no other simple word.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I quite agree with the hon. Member.

3. DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: And of West Bengal.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: West Bengal and other places are not questions of new provinces. They are merely questions of frontier rectification, if you like it to put it that way. I have no objection to that. I do not myself see why conditions should arise between the State of Bihar and the State of Bengal such that people should feel unhappy in crossing over from this side or that, either refugees or others. I think it is all one country.

SHRI SYAMNANDAN SAHAYA [Muzaffarpur Central]: There is no such difficulty.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not think that there is universal agreement in that matter. However, we shall consider that separately, but again that has to be considered, in a spirit of goodwill, because the odd thing is that the more the one side agitates about it, the more the other side gets rigid, because you are not dealing with.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: That is why we want your intervention.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: My intervention? Not intervention, but my help I am prepared to give, because I do, as everybody else here, want to solve these problems. But it must be realised that this kind of onesided agitation really comes in the way of the solution of these problems, because the people of the other provinces get excited the other way.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: To solve, not to avoid the issue.

DR. RAMA RAO [Kakinada] : What is your objection to holding a plebiscite?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Plebiscite of the population of Madras about Madras?

DR. RAMA RAO: In all disputed areas.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That too, if the States concerned, agree to the plebiscite, let us have it, but imposing a plebiscite where it may be a decision, let us say, by 45 to 55 or something like that, would not help, bitterness will remain and you cannot dispose of all these things normally by plebiscite.

SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA [Calcutta North West]: May I just point out that Soviet Russia had all these multilingual problems, and they had solved it very satisfactorily and it has been working for the last 30 years?

SHRI B. S. MURTHY [Eluru]: As far as the Andhra Province is concerned, there was a partition Committee, and the hon. the Prime Minister has admitted that almost all the questions have been solved except one or two—such as the city of Madras etc. May I know what prevents the Government now from postponing these two issues like the Madras City and others, to a later date, but meanwhile form the Andhra province in regard to which he has accepted that every Andhra is very keen.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Prof. Saha referred to the case of the Soviet Union. Well I do not think it applies here. That is helpful, no doubt, but not very

much so. First of all, the Soviet Union emerged as it is today after years of fire and civil war and slaughter. All kinds of things happened there. There was invasion from outside, and what not. Out of that it is in a sense easier to build up. Secondly, India is much more, if I may say so, of a unity than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is no longer an Empire as a whole, but it is a collection of a number of totally different countries, Russia plus other countries and Siberia. They have formed a political unit and are happy about it. That is very good. So they proceeded on a different basis, on the basis, in theory of independent republics federating together. Now, India is completely different from that position. You cannot have that here, on the basis of independent republics federating together. We are a much more unified country. The question would arise if you took Russia, that is, not the Soviet Union, but Russia which is more of a unified country, and compare that to India. That will be a better comparison than taking large tracts of Asia which belong to the Soviet Union, which have been added to it, and which follow a common policy etc. Even so, as a matter of fact probably the theory there is somewhat different from the practice— I mean the theory of secession. I think it is perfectly clear that no part of it can secede at all and as it happens, there has been a progressive decentralisation there. In spite of the theory of secession, the process of centralisation has gone pretty far.

STATEMENT ON EMINENT SCIENTIST PROF. SAHA

11 July, 1952

Sir, I seek your indulgence to say a few words, because the two statements that have been read out relate to what I said on a previous occasion. May I first deal with the somewhat longer statement of my hon. friend Prof. Saha? Prof. Saha, as everyone knows in this House and outside is a very eminent scientist and a very eminent physicist, whose work has brought credit to this country. There is no question of challenging Prof. Saha's eminence in science, but it is because of that very eminence in science that one expects the scientific temper to be brought into the domain of politics also. We cannot keep science separately and leave science far behind, or rather the temper of science and the approach of science and the mental climate of science far behind, when we come into a political chamber.

What I had said on that occasion was that I wished to protest against the use of the word "Fascism" in relation to our Government by the hon. Member. Perhaps, if you, Sir, and the House agree, I will read out two or three sentences from what I said on that occasion. I said:-

"Now the other point is and I must point out-I won't say I protest-but I must express my surprise at the loose way hon. Members who ought to know better, use words. Dr. Saha, an eminent scientist, threw about the word "Fascist" in a way which only leads me to think that the hon. Member does not know the meaning of the word "Fascist". I may call him as a "Fascist" too as a term of abuse. But surely these are words of meaning and cannot be used by scientists unless they have forgotten science and lost touch with their science. They cannot use loose words and vague words. It is a degradation of science, if I may say so. He talked about "Fascism" in this House. Why? What is "Fascism" here? Because we have not got Standing Committees of the Legislature?"

The subject before the House was whether we should have Standing Committees of the Parliament or not. Now, it is open to the House to have them or not. It is open to us even now to evolve some method of having those committees, but it did seem to me that the use of the word "Fascism" in that connection had absolutely no logic or relevance. If I may say so with respect to the other Members of the House, if any other hon. Members had used the word "Fascism" rather loosely, I would not have perhaps thought about it very much, but expecting as I did a degree of precision from an eminent scientist I was a little surprised at the loose way he used that word.

Dr. Saha told us how he gathered his knowledge of Fascism by attending a party given by Signor Mussolini. My own knowledge of Fascism was derived by keeping away from Signor Mussolini. Indeed, on one occasion when I was in Rome, in spite of Signor Mussolini's repeated invitations I found myself unable to accept them. But

that is a minor matter. Dr. Saha, no doubt, reacts strongly against what is considered Fascism and I hope that most, if not all, Members of this House react just as strongly as he does against what is considered Fascism. What I submit is that these words are used more in a denunciatory sense than as if they had any particular meaning. I find that happening very often in the newspapers. But for our part, we should be precise.

Then, Dr. Saha referred to a certain Conference to which he had been invited and to which he could not go. May I explain the position? Of course, I do not know anything about that Conference. But as Dr. Saha knows, a number of people are sent to such Conference and it is natural for the Finance Ministry to screen the requests. This particular request came at the last moment, when there were only two or three days more, and as far as I can gather, the Finance Ministry thought that they could not sanction this particular visit. They sanction many; they do not sanction some; but this has nothing to do with any particular Conference. They do it with reference to the context of things. As the House perhaps knows, we send large numbers of scientists abroad, and Prof. Saha has often gone to these International Conferences and the Government has gladly welcomed his going.

May I now refer to the first statement, which I confess has somewhat surprised me? I am glad, of course, that the hon. Member is so anxious to maintain the dignity of this House. That should be the first duty of all hon. Members. I did not notice that particular desire previously expressed in words or action. So, I am glad of that assurance. I am supposed to have offended against the dignity of the House by saying: "I do expect, if I may say so, a modicum of intelligence in the Opposition." Now, first of all, the Opposition, as it is constituted here, consists of a very large number of groups of different ways of thinking and a large number of independent Members also of different ways of thinking. It is not one single group, or one single way of thinking. And anything that may be said about the Opposition cannot possibly apply to everybody, because they are so different from each other, except possibly for a negative quality which applies to oppositions, whatever group they may belong to.

In this particular instance, I do submit that what I said was completely not only parliamentary but also justified in the sense of language. I mean, I am rather careful in the use of language. Occasionally it is possible, of course, that I may make a mistake. If that happens, you will no doubt pull any one up who makes such a mistake. But I do submit that if it is a question of language it would be worthwhile to make a list of the epithets that have been hurled at this Government and at this side of the House by the Opposition in the course of the last few last few weeks. It would be a large vocabulary and not pleasant reading. We have not come here to make statements protesting against all these epithets, although they were not pleasant to hear. In fact, most opposition has become a string of epithets. And when I venture to say at a particular moment, in a particular context, in regard to a particular interruption that it shows little intelligence, then a statement has to be made by the hon. Member.

As a matter of fact, if the hon. Member will refer back to the reports of that day, that particular remark was made by me not in regard to him, or his group, but in

regard to another gentleman and another hon. Member, whose looks belie his words very greatly and who has got a habit of interrupting in season and out of season, relevantly or irrelevantly. In the course of about a minute and a half he interrupted me three times and I confess that my mind could not quite grasp the logic or reason of his interruption. Therefore, I ventured to say this in that context. Now, if any Member of the Opposition, belonging as far as I know to about twenty-five groups or thirty groups, including independents –each independent is a single group in himself- if all of them want to take this remark to heart, as I said on a particular occasion. I do not wish to deny them the satisfaction of doing so. But surely I would like- and I am perfectly serious in this matter- this House to consider this. Much has been said in this House about lack of decorum but the way some hon. Members have encouraged and even participated in demonstrations at the door of this House to influence Members does not add to the dignity of the House or of the Members of this House.

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I have not protested against it. I am merely pointing out that it does not add to the dignity of this House or of the Members of this House. And when I comment on a behavior which I think was not very decorous, then I am told that it affects the dignity of this House and the country. I regret to say that my understanding both of the English language and of decorous behaviour is different from that of some Members of the Opposition.

BACK NOTE

IV. Statement on Eminent Scientist Prof. Saha, 11 July 1952

1. DR. S.P. MOOKERJEE (Calcutta South East): It is allowed, and recognized everywhere.

STATEMENT REGARDING KASHMIR

24 July, 1952

Sir, I am grateful to you for this opportunity to make a statement in regard to affairs relating to the Jammu and Kashmir State. The House has been interested and the wider public is also interested in these developments and therefore, with your permission, Sir, I shall take a little time of the House to state not only the present position, but go somewhat into the background, because we are apt to forget what has happened in the recent past. Public memory is short and unless we remember that past it is sometimes a little difficult to understand the present.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir for long years was a delectable playground for those who could afford it, one of the famous playgrounds of the world, and though the people living there were for the great part poverty-stricken, it drew many people from the rest of the world. This Kashmir, which was politically-speaking a backwater for these long years, was suddenly thrust into the current of history and since then events have happened there, many developments have taken place—good and bad—and naturally public attention has been drawn to them and it has become an international affair. For us in India it is, of course, something much more than that not only because of our long contacts ranging over a thousand years; but also because of these recent developments which have brought us nearer to one another. So, therefore, I would ask the indulgence of the House, if I may put it so, for some background information.

First of all, I would like the House just to form a mental picture of the geography—the geographical situation. From the southern tip of India, Kanya Kumari. Kashmir is just about or a little over two thousand miles. It is a far cry. Roughly speaking, Kashmir is about a thousand miles from the sea. While a part of India it is, in fact, the heart of Asia, geographically speaking, and for countless ages great caravans have passed from India right up to Central Asia through this State. It is essentially, and it has been for two thousand years or more, very closely connected with India culturally and politically often enough. It is also connected in various ways with Central Asia. Even now I wonder how many people realise that Kashmir is further north than Tibet. So one has to think of Kashmir in that peculiar geographical position apart from the other factors in the case.

Now Kashmir, as I said, was suddenly thrust into this current of history. This current is moving very rapidly in many parts of the world and sometimes it becomes a rushing and raging torrent in some parts. We seem, all of us or most of us all over the world, to live on a thin crust of peace and the crust threatens to crack up often enough and does crack up sometimes. Even this morning's news will bring this picture to the minds of hon. Members—the happenings in some States in Western

Asia, the *coup d'état* and the rest taking place and the lack of stability. We in India are perhaps a little fortunate in this respect, because in spite of many things that some hon. Members may complain of, or protest against, there is, it is widely recognised, a large measure of stability in our machinery of Government and affairs in the country and a continuous, progressive development, without those cracks appearing. This is a matter of good fortune for us. But at the same time nobody in this wide world can afford to forget this cracking and sometimes, as it appears, disintegrating world of ours. That is the major background to be remembered.

Now in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as in other Indian States of old, there were strivings for freedom against the feudal rule that existed there. As in other States again, they took their inspiration from the great nationalist movement of India. In essence, they were the outcome of that very movement and the off-shoots of that movement and their ideals and objectives also very largely came from that big movement and that great leader, Mahatma Gandhi. I think I would be right in saying that of all the various State movements in India during the last twenty or thirty years probably the State movement that developed in the Jammu and Kashmir State, the popular movement I mean that developed there was the most powerful and grew up to be the best organised. It came in conflict, inevitably, with the State Government there as all such movements did elsewhere. This movement was intimately connected with what was known as the All-India States People's Conference. Thereby it became a part of that allied movement in India which affected all the States in the country. It was closely connected with it. This is the background.

There were during these years, as in the rest of India, conflicts with the State machinery and the people there and the popular organisation there went through a great deal of torment and suffering. There is much to be said about that period, but I shall now come to more recent times.

When, or a little before, independence and partition came, the House will remember that we were faced by this big problem of the six hundred and odd Indian States in India. It was a terrific problem and we had to solve it with great rapidity. The announcement that the British Government had made—I think it was round about early in June 1947—had left the position of these States vague. We did not like that part of the British Government's announcement, because, in a sense it almost encouraged fissiparous tendencies in these States. It almost led some people to think or imagine in these States all over India— I am talking about the Rulers there —to think that they could function more or less independently.

So, in those months of July and August 1947 we had to face this major problem. Fortunately, we had a man big enough to face it—Sardar Patel. And then during those two or three weeks preceding Independence we saw nearly all these States in India acceding to the Union of India, or to the Dominion of India as it then was nearly all, barring two or three, barring Hyderabad, barring Kashmir and one or two small ones. Hyderabad's case, as the House well knows, was a very special one. Kashmir, I am dealing with. The other small ones did not count much. So practically all these States

acceded to India with great rapidity. And I should like to say that we were helped greatly in that process by the then Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten. That help had great effect because it proved to all these Rulers in these States that they could not rely upon the British Government, as against India. And so they were faced by this coming Independence of India, of which they were afraid. They were faced by their own people who were dissatisfied with them and wanted a change. And when the last support which they perhaps looked up to, that is the British Government, also failed them they had no prop left, and hence the rapidity of their accession to India. They acceded on three basic subjects, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. All the States did that. And so the Dominion of India started on the 15th August 1947 with all these States having acceded to it, excepting Hyderabad on the one side, Kashmir on the other, and one or two small ones.

In regard to Kashmir, even before the 15th August, I should imagine in July, the question came up before us informally. And the advice we gave was that the State of Jammu and Kashmir, for a variety of reasons, occupied a very special place. May I add here that even in regard to the other States in India the Government of India had declared its policy-the Minister of States, Sardar Patel, had declared our policy clearly-that where in regard to any State there was any doubt as to the wishes of the people, those people should be consulted. That is to say, normally speaking there was no doubt that these States wanted to become parts of the Union of India-there was no question of consultation, no doubt-but where there was any doubt we declared that we will consult the people and abide by their wishes. That general policy and principle applied to every State in India. But there were hardly any cases where this question arose and that is a different matter. So that, when the question of Kashmir at first informally came up before us-it was always before us in a sense, but it came up before us informally round about July or the middle of July-the advice we gave to Kashmir State was-and, if I may say so, we had contacts with the popular organization there, the National Conference, and its leaders, and we had contacts with the Maharaja's Government also, rather vague contacts, but they dealt with us-the advice we gave of both was that Kashmir is a special case and it would not be right or proper to try to rush things there, and the general principle we had laid down that the people of the State should be consulted specially applied to Kashmir. This was before Partition, before the actual coming of Independence. We made it clear that even if the Maharaja and his Government then wanted to accede to India, we would like something much more, that is, popular approval of it before we took that step. We did not wish by some clever tactics to gain something on paper. We were after something much bigger, that is to gain the hearts of the people there to have a real union. Indeed, the basis and the foundation for that real union had been laid in the past-a much more enduring basis than even any legal or constitutional document. That basis had been these national movements there and here, our working together in co-operation for common ideals, and our having to endure common suffering. That was the real basis. So we made it clear in the month of July 1947 that the State of Jammu and Kashmir should not be hustled into taking any action, though many of their leaders were

personally inclined, but they knew their people too and they said that the initiative should come from the people and not merely from the Maharaja's Government, only then it will endure. We accepted that entirely. And so we informed the Maharaja's Government as well as the leaders of the popular movement there that this matter of accession should not be hurried, that it should wait over till some method was found of consulting the people. And at that time what we envisaged was some kind of Constituent Assembly being elected there. In fact we envisaged that for other places too, wherever such a question arose. And we advised that meanwhile there should be Standstill Agreements with India and Pakistan that was going to come soon, so that no change need be made, except minor changes, and a little later, at leisure, this question could be considered further.

Well, of course there was little of leisure that we had after the 15th August 1947. Upheavals took place in Pakistan, in the States of India bordering on Pakistan, and we had to pass through much pain and torment during that period. We could not think of Kashmir or any other place. We had to deal with the immediate issues that faced us from morning to evening.

Suddenly, the House will remember, in the last week of October 1947 an invasion took place of Kashmir through Pakistan. Now, it has been said in Pakistan often enough that there was some deep conspiracy on the part of India, allied with the leaders of Kashmir, to create trouble in various parts of the State, in the Poonch area and the rest. It has also been said, some people have said, that we knew all about what was happening—this invasion, I mean. The fact of the matter is that when we first heard the news of this invasion it came to us as a complete surprise. In fact, even the news did not reach us properly, because communications were not working properly. And when this dawned upon us we were taken much aback. For a day or two we gave very serious thought to this matter, and we did not quite know what we could do about it. We were far out of reach. Physically it was difficult. We were terribly busy with our own troubles here. However, as this raid and invasion developed, news came to us of rapine, killing and arson that was going on in its train, and naturally there was a great public feeling in India. Public feeling was aroused and the House can well imagine what the state of public feeling in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was at the time. At that time we received independent appeals both from the Maharaja's Government and from the popular organisation of Kashmir. The appeals were for help and for accession to India. We gave long and very anxious consideration to these, tried to consider and think out the implications etc., and we had to come to a quick decision. I remember, it must have been the 27th of October, after practically an all day sitting in the evening we came to the conclusion that in spite of all the risks and dangers involved, we could not say "No" to that appeal and that we had to go there to help them. It was not an easy matter because we could only go by air. We did not even know if the one and only temporary air-field was working or was in the hands of our foes. There was no other way to get there immediately and time was important, because every day brought further news of the depredations of those raiders. We decided to go to their

help with all its consequences and within 12 hours of our decision our troops were on the way by air. That was a fine piece of staff work on the part of our Army and Air Force. They arrived just in time; indeed it is possible that if they had arrived 24 hours late, the air-field would have been in the enemy's possession and that would have made matters much more difficult. From the air-field they went straight within a few miles to oppose these raiders. The raiders were driven back. Those raiders were supposed by us to be tribal people, no doubt, encouraged and abetted by Pakistan. At first we did not think it was a major military operation to drive out these tribal people. May I add here that before our forces reached there, probably before three or four days, the administration of Kashmir had completely collapsed. There was no administration. There was nobody-I cannot say definitely, but I hardly think there was any police force left or anything else. During these very critical days when this ruthless enemy was advancing on the famous city of Srinagar, the people of Srinagar, had nobody to protect them, either big or small, and it was only the popular effort of the people, the volunteers of the National Conference that protected that city and protected it, not so much from armed forces-they could not do that because they had no arms-but they gave the necessary moral stimulus to the people and it is a fact worth remembering that when the enemy was within ten or twelve miles of Srinagar city, not a shop in Srinagar was closed. They were functioning. That showed the morale of the people and of the National movement at the moment of severe crisis. We drove back these raiders and when we drove them back to a place called Uri, where only a year or more earlier, I had been a prisoner of the Maharaja's Government, suddenly our forces discovered that a little beyond Uri they were not dealing with the tribal raiders, but with the armed might of the Pakistan army. That was a different matter that had to be dealt with on a different plane and so for the moment our armed forces stopped there.

Well, since then-this was in November 1947-war continued there and elsewhere in the State, on the Jammu side, on the Kashmir side and on the northern side. It continued for a year and a half nearly. Round about December when we saw that we were up against the regular forces of the Pakistan army, immediately we felt that this matter was likely to become much bigger than we had imagined, that it might very well lead us to a full-scale war with Pakistan.

I should like the House to remember that time because we must judge every event in the context of that period. It was a period when soon after Partition with all the troubles we had due to the Partition and even our armies and services, everything else was split up, we wanted to settle down and apart from that, so far as we are concerned, we are averse to war, if we can help it. When we saw this matter might well develop into a full-scale war against Pakistan, we decided to refer the matter to the United Nations, I think, round about December 1947. Our reference was that certain tribal people had invaded the Kashmir State territory, behaved ruthlessly etc., that they had come through Pakistan territory and that Pakistan had aided and abetted them in doing so. Our request to the United Nations or the Security Council was

that they should inform Pakistan not to aid and abet these people. That was our request and that was the question we put. For the rest we proposed to deal with the situation ourselves. Our object was that this war should not spread in this way. We had, of course, asked Pakistan directly this question. But Pakistan had stoutly denied having anything to do with the matter. It was rather difficult to understand how a few thousand people could march through Pakistan territory almost unaware so far as the Pakistan Government was concerned. However they denied that the tribal people had marched through their territory with their help at all and they denied absolutely then and for some months afterwards, that any Pakistan force or any part of the Pakistan Army had taken part in this Kashmir invasion. Later, we had plenty of evidence of this and in Delhi city a little museum, was opened by our Defence people, showing the participation of the Pakistan army when they were doing it, because we had all kinds of captured materials, diaries of soldiers, insignia, etc.

In 1948 these military operations went on fiercely throughout the winter. It is a very difficult time in those high valleys of the Kashmir State during winter when you have to go up 15,000 feet or so. Simultaneously, the Security Council came into the picture. At first, for many months they talked and argued in New York. We were surprised because the question we had put was a very simple one and admitted only of a simple answer. We had not asked them to take our word for it, if it was challenged, as it was challenged, by Pakistan. The obvious course was to find out for themselves if we were telling the truth or Pakistan was telling the truth in this matter. During these four or five years of discussion, negotiation and mediation that simple question that we put at the end of 1947 has not been answered and has not been considered in that way. It has been answered in a sense rather indirectly by the Resolution of the United Nations Commission that came here in 1948, when they said that a new situation had arisen because Pakistan troops were in Kashmir. They did say that, because till the very eve of this statement, Pakistan Government had firmly denied the fact that their troops were there. That is an amazing instance of continuing to repeat what was patently false, and without foundation and which was found to be so by this United Nations Commission.

If I may just for a moment go back a little, on 31st December 1948, a cease fire was agreed to between the parties. Since then, there has been no military operation on any major scale. There have been petty raids; but, otherwise, there has been no serious fighting. That has been the position since then. Apart from local troubles and infiltrations-if you take that kind of thing, there is plenty of that-the scene has shifted to the Security Council of the United Nations, the United Nations Commission, United Nations representatives and the like, who have been visiting India from time to time. I shall not go into that history.

The latest mediator has been Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham has been here twice and has had long consultations with us and with the Pakistan, Government, and is at the present moment in New York still continuing these conversations. He confined his enquiries almost entirely to what he called the demilitarization of the State. That word

is hardly a happy word; but, nevertheless, for the sake of convenience we may use it. The position that we had agreed to when the United Nations Commission was here was this. In our desire to have peace, we had agreed to this, that, first of all, Pakistan armies, auxiliaries and the rest should withdraw from every inch of State territory. In fact, we had laid the greatest stress on it, not merely for military reasons, but much more so for moral reasons. They had no business to be there. They had to withdraw. They had invaded. Even if Pakistan challenged the accession of Kashmir to India, and as the House knows, they have challenged it and called it a bogus accession and all that kind of thing even leaving it apart, I shall deal with it a little later-whatever India's position in Kashmir might be, one thing is dead clear and dead certain, that Pakistan had no position there; moral, political, constitutional or anything else, and Pakistan had no business to send any forces or abet any forces going there. So that, we made it an essential condition pre-requisite of any kind of approach to a settlement with Pakistan, their withdrawal completely from that area which they had invaded and occupied. That was the thing agreed to in that Resolution of the United Nations Commission.

Meanwhile something else had happened and that was the building up in the Western area of the State, which was occupied by Pakistan, of forces sometimes called the Azad Kashmir forces. They had built up local levels called Azad Kashmir forces. At that time, that is in 1948, we did not have too much information about that, although we knew about it. We asked that these levels should be disbanded and disarmed. We could not ask them to go away from the State because the people lived in the State. We asked that they should be disbanded and disarmed. The form that the Commission put it later in the Resolution was, large scale disbandment and disarmament of Azad Kashmir forces. There has always been an argument between us and Pakistan on that issue. We have insisted that this meant, and we meant, a complete disbandment and disarmament: complete in the sense as far as could be. Some people may not give up arms: some may hide them, that is a different matter. Officially it must be complete. Pakistan did not agree to that interpretation. And, this has been one of the arguments coming in the way of the conversion of the Cease Fire into a Truce Agreement. This was what Pakistan had to do. On our side, we had agreed to withdraw the bulk of our forces, mark the word "bulk", from the State territory provided that we keep enough forces there to maintain the security of Kashmir from external invasion or any other internal troubles. It was always a condition that we must have enough forces, and we were the judges of that. We had said that we will withdraw the bulk of our forces, that is, when Pakistan armies had gone to Pakistan. We felt we could do that. This was more or less the position. Then came the Cease fire and these talks are taking place. These talks had got rather struck up over the interpretation of the Resolutions passed in August 1948 and January 1949, by the United Nations Commission. I shall not go into those details.

Now, Dr Graham has been dealing solely with this so-called demilitarization problem. He laid down at one time 12 proposals. I think, as far as I can remember, was

agreed to eight, about one or two, we wanted some change, and we did not agree to one or two.

May I go back a little? We had agreed to two proposals of the United Nations Commission in 1948 and 1949. The other things happened in between. But, at a later period, the Security Council passed a Resolution with which we did not agree and we made it perfectly clear in the Security Council that we could not possibly accept that Resolution because, apart from the fact that it went against all that we have stood for and all the assurances we had given to our people and the people of Kashmir, and our responsibility for the defence of Kashmir, we felt that it went against even the Resolutions passed by the Security Council itself at the instance of the Kashmir Commission. It was going back on that. So, we never accepted that Resolution, or parts of that Resolution. Dr. Graham was appointed in terms of it later. We made it clear to Dr. Graham.....

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I am not going into all matters. Other people came in between. I am saying that we did not accept that Resolution. But, it has always been our point of view in the Security Council and elsewhere that we shall gladly-because we want peace and settlement-discuss this matter with anybody, certainly with a representative of the United Nations, and we are prepared to treat him as a mediator, but on no account are we prepared to agree to something which was imposed upon us. We are not prepared to have anything imposed upon us, and we are not prepared to accept anything which goes against our own responsibilities in this matter. So, when Dr. Graham came—he came here as a mediator, not in furtherance, so far as we are concerned, of that Resolution of the Security Council which we had not accepted. I might add that throughout his stay here, his visits here, Dr. Graham has never mentioned that Resolution here. So, he concentrated his attention on the demilitarization-what is called demilitarization-of the State, and although we agreed to many things that he said, there has always been a gap between our position and the position taken up by Pakistan. That gap has not yet been bridged.

I should like to express, if I may, my admiration for Dr. Graham and his sincere efforts and extraordinary Patience. He has, undoubtedly, I believe, tried his utmost to achieve results, he desires it, and in some matters he has made progress too, but a certain gap still remains. So far as we are concerned, if I may say so with all respect, we have also been very patient, and we are prepared to match our patience with others' patience, because the consequences of being impatient are bad. So, these talks are going on, and certain reports appear in the newspapers. They are sometimes partly true, partly not true; it becomes very difficult for us to deal with these reports which are not made by any official source, but get out nevertheless. Now, that is so far as Dr. Graham is concerned.

Now, to go back to the other aspect. The position in 1948 in regard to Kashmir and all other States, the acceding States, was that they had acceded on three basic

subjects-Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. But, then, the other States in India, all of them almost, were more closely integrated-the process of closer integration started, and was achieved, very largely again at the instance of Sardar Patel. So that we had a picture in India of-practically we had removed any difference between the old States and the old Provinces. It is true that provisionally some States were called B States, some were called A States, and some C States, but that is exceedingly temporary, and that goes, that must go and it is going. In effect, that difference which marked a Province and an old State was gone, and India became a much more closely integrated State.

Now, while that process was going on in regard to other States, it did not go on in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State, deliberately, for a variety of reasons. Well, reason number one, because, one reason was, that the whole matter was in a fluid state, before the United Nations etc. Reason number two equally important, that from the very beginning, for obvious factors, we had recognized that the position of Kashmir was somewhat different. Thirdly, that from the very beginning we had repeated that-from even before the Partition, I may inform the House-that no step will be taken about Jammu and Kashmir State without the concurrence and consent of the people of Kashmir. So, deliberately, Kashmir remained with those three subjects, and those three subjects only. Of course, when I say three subjects like Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs, please remember that each subject itself is a category of subjects. It is not a category, if you go into details. We did not touch that. And Sardar Patel was all this time dealing with these matters.

This came to an end in November, I think, of 1949 when we were designing our Constitution in the Constituent Assembly. Well, we could not leave everything quite vague and fluid there. Something had to be stated in our Constitution about Jammu and Kashmir State. That problem had to be faced by Sardar Patel. Now, he did not wish to say very much, he wanted to leave it, we all wanted to leave it in a fluid condition because of these various factors, and gradually to develop those relations, those legal and constitutional relations, and not to force the pace in any way. As a result of this, a rather unusual provision was made in our Constitution relating to Jammu and Kashmir. That provision is now in article 370 in Part XXI, Temporary and Transitional Provisions. Now, that article if you will look into it-I will not trouble you by reading it. If you refer to it, if you are interested, you will see the position that emerged at the time of our finalising our Constitution. And I might say that article 370, although it is by no means a final article, nevertheless, it defined more precisely the relationship of that unit, that constituent unit, with the Union of India. After that on the 26th of January, the President issued an Order in terms of that article 370, a President's Order defining the categories of subjects and parts of the Constitution that should be applicable to the Jammu and Kashmir State. Now, the position since the Constitution was framed is thus contained in article 370 and in the President's Order following it. Article 370 was obviously of a transitional nature, and it allowed the President to make any additions to it, any variations to it, later on, the object being

that if any change or addition was required, we need not have to go through the cumbersome process of amending our Constitution, but the President was given authority to amend it in the sense of adding a subject, part of a subject, whatever, it was, to the other subjects in regard to Kashmir. But in article 370, the old principle was repeated and emphasized that all these changes or any change required the approval of the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Now, when this was put down in our Constitution, there was no Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State, but we envisaged it. We had envisaged it for a long time. And if the Constituent Assembly was not there, then, it required the consent of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. So, that was the position.

The House will appreciate that throughout our position has been, from before partition, that we will not take any step which might be considered a step in the nature of compulsion or coercion, that everything should flow with the consent of the people concerned. That was the basis position. In addition to that fact, when this became an international issue, we did not wish to do anything which might be thought as if we were trying to override or bypass any assurance that we had given to the United Nations. This rather fluid condition continued, and our relationship was fluid in this sense, namely legally fluid: otherwise there was no difficulty and we carried on. It might have continued some time longer, one year, or two years, or three years. There is nothing to compel us. We were getting on in an ordinarily friendly and cooperative way. There was no other difficulty. There were minor matters. We discussed them and decided them.

Then came actually the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir into being, and it came into being with our goodwill some time last year. When the subject that the first elections to the Constituent Assembly were going to take place was mentioned, there was a good deal of opposition to this idea in some foreign countries, which was voiced in the Security Council. And I need not say that Pakistan disliked it intensely. However, I saw no reason why and I see no reason now as to why any foreign country should interfere with the internal relationship of Kashmir with India, and what the people of Kashmir do to themselves. If other countries objected to that, we objected strongly to their objection, and we carried on. So, this Constituent Assembly came into existence last year and it has done various things, various important reforms it has introduced, but then it set down to itself the major task of drawing up a Constitution for the Jammu and Kashmir State. Now, immediately we were faced with this problem. It is all right to have a fluid state for some time, but when you draw up a precise Constitution you have to be precise. This was the background and the reason for the talks we have been having amongst ourselves and with the leading members of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. We had no desire to make the relationship as a static unchanging, or a finalised one: because the position is a dynamic one, a changing one. Nevertheless, it was perhaps too fluid and once a Constitution is going to be framed, a greater precision was necessary and it was obviously necessary that there should not be any contradictory provision in that which might not conform to the

provisions of our Constitution. Hence these talks. Well, we had these talks for the last few days and I am going to tell you now what has emerged from these talks.

But before I say that, I would like to remind you that one of the first things that this Constituent Assembly did was to tackle the land reform question, and in the course of a few months, they have successfully accomplished them or almost accomplished them. I confess that I look with some envy on the speed and celerity with which they have performed this task there, considering the enormous trouble we have had in the various States in India, the difficulties, the obstructions and the delays that we have had to face, and so I became a little envious when I saw how this was done in Kashmir State. Now I might just give you some indication of what was done there. It is said that they have expropriated the landlords there. That is not quite correct. They have put a ceiling on land holdings, the ceiling is roughly 23 acres, plus orchards. They did not touch orchards. They have allowed, about 23 acres to remain with every person possessing land, plus the orchards he possesses. They have not touched them at all. And the House ought to remember that orchards are very important in Kashmir which is a great fruit-growing country. Then there are some other lands, grazing lands etc.; they are also still with the landholders. That matter will be considered further later. I said that each person has been allowed 23 acres. It should be remembered that the average holding of land in Kashmir State is barely two acres, and so the 23 acres is a fairly generous holding ceiling that has been given.

Now in regard to the talks we have had, the position, obviously the admitted position, is that the Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent part or unit of the Indian Republic. It is a unit of India and is therefore a part of the territory of India. That is the basic position.

The question of citizenship arose obviously. Full citizenship applies there. But our friends from Kashmir were very apprehensive about one or two matters. For a long time past, in the Maharaja's time, there had been laws there preventing any outsider, that is, any person from outside Kashmir, from acquiring or holding land in Kashmir. If I may mention it, in the old days the Maharaja was very much afraid of a large number of Englishmen coming and settling down there, because the climate is delectable, and acquiring property. So, although most of their rights were taken away from the Maharaja under the British rule, the Maharaja struck to this that nobody from outside should acquire land there. And that continues. And in the State subjects notification by the Maharaja, they have defined four grades of subjects, Class number one, Class two, Class three and Class four. And unless you come in one of these classes, you just cannot acquire land there, or any immovable property. So the present Government of Kashmir is very anxious to preserve that right because they are afraid, and I think rightly afraid, that Kashmir would be overrun by people whose sole qualification might be the possession of too much money and nothing else, who might buy up and get the delectable places. Now they want to vary the old Maharaja's law to liberalize it, but nevertheless to have checks on the acquisition of lands by

persons from outside. So far as we are concerned, I agree that under article 19, clause (5) of our Constitution, we think it is clearly permissible both in regard to the existing law and any subsequent legislation. However, we agreed that this should be cleared up. The old State's subjects definition gave certain privileges regarding this acquisition of land, the services, and other minor things, I think, state scholarships and the rest. So, we agreed and noted down this:

“The State Legislature shall have power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State, more especially in regard to the acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters. Till then the existing State law should apply.”

Then there was another matter relating to citizenship, because owing to these troubles in Kashmir since 1947 and a little before and after, there have been large numbers of people who have gone out of Kashmir but want to return. So there must be provision made for them to return. In fact in our own Constitution, some provision has been made, and I might inform the House that this question was raised early this year or last year about the inclusion of a large number of migrants from East Bengal. We could not include them in our electoral rolls, because they came too late. We are including them now. Those that fulfil the conditions will all come in. So those who had gone away from Kashmir into Pakistan or elsewhere and who normally speaking might not be eligible for citizenship should be provided for, if they want to return. So we said:

“Special provision should be made in the laws governing citizenship for the return of those permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir State, who went to Pakistan in connection with the disturbances of 1947 or earlier in fear of them, and could not return. If they return they should be entitled to the rights and privileges and obligations of citizenship”.

Then came the question of fundamental rights. Now there was general agreement that there should be fundamental rights and these fundamental rights should apply to the State. But again there were great apprehensions in the minds of our friends from Kashmir. First of all, the question was how far these fundamental rights might not come in the way of their land legislation now or any later development of it. Certainly we did not want them to come in the way of their land legislation. We like their land legislation. We thought it was very good. In fact it is quite impossible to upset a thing that has been done, but we said the matter should be cleared. The second thing was this. Owing to all this business of invasion of Kashmir State, war, ceasefire, all kinds of continuing tensions, difficulties due to infiltration etc.-constant attempts are made by infiltration, espionage cases are repeatedly heard there is sabotage and the rest, but if you go to that State, you find normalcy there, that is to say, the State is functioning adequately normally, but behind that normalcy there is this tension, constant tension of an enemy trying to come in to create trouble, to disturb, and all that. And the State Government has to be wary and watchful all the time, and so we were told that it was possible that some part of the fundamental rights provisions

might very well hamper the activities of the State Government from taking these precautions and these measures. We agreed that it was essential and in the interests of Kashmir situated as the State is now, that the State Government should have that authority. So subject to this, further consideration can be given to it as to how this could be done, so that a fuller consideration of this and like matters was necessary so that the fundamental rights might be applied with such modifications and exceptions as might be considered necessary from this point of view, and agreed upon.

Then in regard to the Supreme Court, it was agreed that the Supreme Court, it was agreed that the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction in respect of disputes mentioned in article 131 of the Constitution of India. It was further agreed that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction in regard to fundamental rights which are applied to that State. On behalf of the Government of India we recommended that the advisory tribunal in the State which is designated as His Highness's Board of Judicial Advisers should be abolished, and the jurisdiction exercised by it should be vested in the Supreme Court of India, that is to say, that the Supreme Court should be the final Court of Appeal in all civil and criminal matters as laid down in the Constitution of India. The Kashmir Government delegation had no objection to this. They were prepared to agree but they said they would like to consider the matter in some detail further.

Now I come to the question which has been much discussed and referred to in the newspapers, the question of the Head of the State.

I might mention that apart from past history when this Constituent Assembly met in Kashmir, the inaugural address to that Assembly stated quite clearly some of the policies that they were going to pursue, and among these policies was the election, by democratic process, of the Head of the State. That has been the declared policy of the National Conference Organisation in Kashmir for a long time. We had no objection with regard to the enunciation of that principle then. Now, after careful consideration—because we have always had to consider two matters: firstly to give effect to the wishes of the people of the State and secondly, to give effect to our own Constitution—we have come to an agreed formula. Of course, you will not attach too much importance to the language—a word here or there. For legal and constitutional purposes the words may be changed, but it describes the way we have been thinking and what we have agreed to. Now it was agreed: (1) that the Head of the State shall be the person recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State. [How the Legislature of the State recommends is a matter for the Legislature. Whether it is by the process of election or not it is for them to decide: it may be the process of a majority, or two-thirds majority; it is entirely for them to decide. Anyhow they recommend and then it is for the President to recognise]. (2) He, that is, the Head of the State, shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. (3) He—the Head of the State—may by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office (4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office, provided that

he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office. That is so far as the Head of the State is concerned.

Then there has been a good deal of misunderstanding in regard to the National Flag. This has been cleared up, I think, adequately by public statements made. Nevertheless, we thought that this should be further cleared up. Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, had stated publicly that the question did not arise so far as they were concerned, because the National Flag was the supreme flag and it had exactly the same status and position in the Jammu and Kashmir State as in any other part of India. The State Flag was in no sense a rival to the National Flag, but for historical and sentimental reasons connected with their struggle for freedom in Kashmir, they wanted this State symbol to continue. This was agreed to. It was added that this should be made clear in a formal manner, preferably by the Constituent Assembly of the State.

Then in regard to the President of India, it was agreed that the powers to reprieve and commute death sentence etc. should belong to the President of India.

There has been some talk about financial integration. It was decided that such financial arrangements between the State and the Government of India should be considered further and details worked out. The position, as I said, is a dynamic changing one. Matters have to be gone into in some detail; so whatever the financial arrangements might be, we shall gradually work them out.

Then there is the question of emergency powers contained in our Constitution, more especially in our article 352 of the Constitution. It was agreed to: I will remind the House what article 352 is; in case of invasion, external danger or internal disturbance, the President has power to declare a state of emergency, and then various consequences flow from it. This Parliament is then seized of the position. Now this was agreed to; but the friends from Kashmir were slightly apprehensive of what 'internal disturbances' meant there. For the rest they have said, of course, if there is a grave emergency this should happen. So, with regard to adding some words to clear up, not to clear up that matter but rather to bring in the fact that in the case of internal disturbances any action taken should be with the concurrence of the Government of the State. It was agreed that article 352 of the Constitution should apply to the State with the addition at the end of the first paragraph of the following words:

“but in regard to internal disturbances, at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State”

That is, the state of emergency will be declared with the concurrence of the Government of the State.

These are the principal things that have been discussed and I think that we have arrived at very satisfactory decisions-agreements which are in consonance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir and in consonance with our Constitution. I would repeat that there is nothing final about this and gradually we can fill in other details later. I presume that at the present moment, as I said, the relationship of Kashmir with

the Union of India is governed more or less by article 370 of our Constitution. Now the accession has been complete. There is a certain confusion in people's minds. The accession is complete in law and in fact, Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent unit like any other, it is a part of the territory of India, the people of Jammu and Kashmir are citizens of India like any other. But the fact that the subjects to which Jammu and Kashmir has acceded are limited, or less than those applying to other States, that fact produces this misunderstanding as if there was partial accession. That is not so: Accession is quite complete. In fact, all the States acceded only in regard to these three subjects to begin with. It may be that we may have more subjects later, but we are proceeding and we propose to proceed always in such matters with the consent of the other parties concerned. Now, presumably the President of the Union will have to issue some order under article 370 of the Constitution to give effect to any of these Modifications or changes that we have suggested.

I am very grateful to you, Sir, and to the House for the indulgence shown to me.

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Yes, Sir, Government is perfectly prepared to give time or a day for consideration of these matters, for a full discussion. I hope that hon. Members will be prepared to stay on here as long as necessary for this and other purposes.

BACK NOTE

V. Statement Regarding Kashmir, 24 July 1952

1. PANDIT L.K. MAITRA (Nabadwip): Dixon's report preceded that.
2. SHRI. N.C. CHATTERJEE (Hoogly): Sir, on the 26th June the hon. Prime Minister, while speaking on Kashmir, gave some kind of an assurance to the House that the House would have an opportunity of a full-dress debate on Kashmir. Having regard to the important matters we now heard from the Prime Minister we want an assurance. Sir, that undertaking will be fulfilled and the House will be given an opportunity of discussing the matter through a full-dress debate, especially when there are certain things proposed which will mean the amendment of the Constitution.....

MR. SPEAKER: ORDER, ORDER. That argument could not be gone into at this stage. The only request is whether Government will give some time for a further discussion of this question.

THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION (SECOND AMENDMENT) BILL

02 August, 1952

We have listened to a large number of speeches in this debate. Many of them have been eloquent. Many have been full of individual instances, and sometimes personal autobiography. Many have referred to democratic principles, and how this Bill is a breach of those principles. I confess, Sir, that I have had a feeling during this debate, a feeling of unreality as if—I say so with all respect to the House—we were discussing something that is not this particular Bill before the House, but something entirely different which we had in our minds, our own personal experiences, may be, or our future hopes of what we should do or should not do, and we have bypassed this Bill, the context of this Bill in the country, and even the language of this Bill. We have discussed these high concepts of democracy and I claim I have some feeling for democracy. Democracy as I know it is not merely a certain structure of government—though that is important of course—it is not merely certain laws and the rest of it, though they are important also, but it is essentially a sense of values and standards in life. It is an organic growth, it is how you act, how you think, whether as an individual or a group or a nation. I do not mean to say everybody thinks alike or should think alike. But I do mean to say that there is a fundamental approach to political and other problems which may be called the democratic approach, and there are other approaches which are not democratic. Now if that is the test, 'let us examine not only this Bill, but the context of things in India from that point of view. That might lead us to some results and if there is anything basically wrong in the Bill, let us scrap it by all means.

So far as I am concerned, and so far as all my colleagues in the Cabinet are concerned, we gave the most earnest consideration to this measure as we have had to, because such a measure which apparently or really limits in a measure the normal freedom which the citizen enjoys must be looked at with the greatest care and it is right that this House should look upon it with the greatest care and vigilance. So we in the Cabinet considered it very carefully, considered the old Act as it was, considered the amendments that we wanted to bring in and finally came to certain conclusions. We came to the conclusion that it is necessary, not only desirable but necessary to have some such measure at the present moment in India, or if you like, to continue the old measure with certain important and basic changes in it. Now then if that was once agreed to or understood, then the other question remains as to what the changes should be, and how far we should go in ensuring that this Act or legislation was not misused. Hon. Members have pointed many cases where according to them it was misused. I have no doubt—I do not know of those individual cases—that in many cases it may have been misused. I agree and I accept that for the moment without going into details. Let us again consider whether it is possible to prevent any such misuse in so far as we can assure that. Nobody can be absolutely certain, but we can

have safeguards to prevent such misuse. But when one talks about misuse of a measure, one must not think in vacuo one must always think of the particular set of circumstances when that act was used. An hon. Member has pointed out 'Let us see what happened in Hyderabad and in the Telangana.' I accept that for the moment without analysing each case, and as I said, there were a number of cases of misuse, or if you like, of grave misuse.

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I am putting it to the House. When arms are used on two sides by troops, that is normally called war, it may be civil war. It may be international war or it may be a private war, if you like. Whatever that may be, arms were used and deliberately used, and if I may remind the House, up to this day there is a refusal to give up those arms. Is that not a very extraordinary thing? I accept that those arms are not used at the present moment. I accept that there is a great change for the better. Undoubtedly so. And if there is a great change for the better, I should like the House to consider how far the Government, which I have the honour to represent is to be given credit for that change for the better and the policy they have proceeded with. The change for the better has not come off by itself, but because a certain policy was pursued by this Government month after month and year after year under circumstances of great strain and stress. So, it is better, but even so the fact remains— and it is a large fact— that groups of persons in this country who are known to have arms want to lay down conditions before they lay down these arms. I have heard and the House also knows that there are all kinds of truce parleys in Pan Mun Jon. Are we supposed to be dealing with independent entities or independent nations here having arms, fighting the Republic of India and dealing with the Republic of India who say "on this condition we lay down arms only if you do this or that". Sir, it is an amazing conception. And hon. Members come here and talk of democratic principle and the freedom of speech and all that, when they possess arms. If you possess arms, and you do not give them up, why do you not give them up? It is because at the back of your mind you want to use them at some time or other. Why else? You want to use them under certain circumstances. Whatever that may be, I do not mean to say that hon. Members who have changed their policy recently do not mean to abide by that change. I accept that change, I welcome it, and I am glad of it, and I welcome them here, but I do say that undoubtedly at the back of their minds, there must be that thought. Otherwise why not deliver up those arms? I do not wish to lay any great stress on this matter, but I merely mentioned it in passing.

The point is that we are discussing this question in rather academic terms of— if I may call it so—the British nineteenth century democracy. We are in the middle of the 20th century and in the territory of India. How far those terms are applicable in vacuo to any situation, I do not know. I accept hundred per cent, the basic principles of that democratic approach to life, that is a sense of democratic values and standards, and I hope that this Government which I have the honour to serve will always accept those principles and I hope other Governments that come will also agree with them,

but that does not mean that we should merely think in terms of phrases and cliches forgetting those very principles which are represented by those terms and phrases. I ask, not only the Members of the Opposition but even my colleagues on this side of the House, how many of us accept those basic values in life which are termed 'democracy'? And in the present moment especially when we talk of democracy, this structure of democracy, this spirit of democracy and this approach of democracy, how far and in what continents of this wide world, how many countries do that? I put it to this House to look at it and say how many countries in this wide continent of Asia do that or in Europe, for the matter of that? There are some, undoubtedly. But this whole concept is coming up against all kinds of inner difficulties. My hon. friends opposite or at least some of them will call it "inner contradictions". Well, I admit that whatever it is. Let us examine it. Let us not use a certain phrase in one context and act in a completely different way in another context. Here I am Prime Minister of this great country with a tremendous responsibility to shoulder, and with my colleagues sharing that responsibility. Are we merely, to appease somebody, to forget that responsibility?

The House knows very well that any Government that brings forward a Bill of this kind which can easily be attacked and which can easily be criticised, can make the Government unpopular and it is a matter, if I may say so, with all respect, of courage for a Government to bring forward such a Bill. [Applause and laughter]. Hon. Members laugh. Their laughter, I am sorry to say, is rather cheap. One should not laugh too soon. Here a Bill like this could only be brought forward by a Government that feels an utter responsibility for the burden it shoulders. It may err, it may make mistakes; that is a different matter, we are all liable to err. But it can only do so if it feels that responsibility and wishes to discharge that responsibility, come what may. If the people of India do not want us, well they can push us out. It is all very well for an hon. Member here or there to issue challenges about the elections and the like. Surely we have had the elections only a little while ago; it is not so long. Surely this very Detention Act was very much harder than the one we are now dropping; it was talked about and criticised by Members of the Opposition in this election campaign all the time.

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So in another place there was some other issue. In this great country, normally elections were governed by local issues, but this broad fact, the record of this Government generally and the record of this Government in regard to this particular Bill was talked *ad nauseam* in many places in this election. And yet the result of the election was what you see.

Hon. Members talk glibly about a police State. I put it to them, to think a little more calmly in their calmer moments, if there is the remotest justification for the use of that word in regard to the present structure of the Government of India. I put it to them to compare the structure with many other structures. It is not my function, nor do I like to criticise any other country; they are not my responsibility and it is

unbecoming for me to criticise the ways or structure of a Government or the policies pursued by any other country, big or small. I do not know what their problems are. It may be that their way is right for their country; I cannot judge for them. I know what my problems are; I judge about it and I shall certainly refuse to submit to anyone imposing his way on me. That is a different matter. Therefore, I do not criticise, but I do submit, when you talk about a police State, look around all the countries in Asia, look around the countries of Europe. I do not say there are not some countries that have in a good measure this democratic setup that we are following; nevertheless, compare what India is and compare the functioning and the authoritarian ways—I am not saying it from the point of view of criticism, but mere comparison—of some countries, and what I object to, if I may say so, with all respect, is the use of this loose language. Was it a police State which had an election in which we were returned and in which the hon. Members opposite came in? So it is in this context that I should like this House to consider this.

Now, when you consider this Bill with a large number of individual cases or instances, good, bad or indifferent—let us treat them separately if you like, let us give punishment where that is due, that is a separate thing entirely—but we have to consider this fact, whether in the totality of circumstances in India today it is desirable to have some measure like this in the armoury of the State's laws? If so, then the other question arises, how far we should try and safeguard the rights of the individual citizen, so that as far as human ingenuity can devise, he should not be subjected to harassment and injustice. Those are the two major questions to be considered.

Now, somehow or other this question has been dealt with rather as if this Bill was aimed at the activities or the future activities, if I may say so of a certain group or party. Well I think that is a wrong view to take of it. I am perfectly straight about what I say. We have “had in India, broadly speaking, four types of what I call antisocial activities. There is the communal activity—I am only referring to activities indulged in with violence, for the moment, not expressions of views—then there is the Communist activity—and when I say Communist I am not confining my words to the Communist Party's activities, it is a loose word I have used because there are so many groups and parties separate from one another, I do not know all their names, we can make a long list of them such as, R.S.P. etc. with all respect, is the use of this any number of groups which float in and out of the scene of action, which are under no discipline, not even their own discipline and which create an enormous amount of trouble—thirdly there are what I may call purely terrorist activities and lastly there are what I would call.—broadly speaking again—the Jagirdari activities. These are the four main, violent approaches.

The hon. Member can also make a long list of violent activities if he reads the reports in the courts everyday of cases going on. We are not talking of individual misdeeds. There may be—the hon. Member may be right—some cases of misbehaviour on the part of Congressmen. He may be right. Obviously, in the very nature of things, the Congress cannot, live apart from its training and principles, cannot live differently and indulge in mass violence. It is patent, on the face of it. It may indulge

in wrong activity, it may indulge in occasional suppression of an individual, I mean the Government party. But let us examine it. These are the four heads and—I repeat them—Communal, then Communist— but as I said it goes beyond the Communist Party and the Communist Party is not responsible for all those marginal groups which function in this way—then terrorist and lastly Jagirdari.

Now, the other day an hon. Member opposite referring to what happened, I think, in Calcutta mentioned those “broad masses in action”, “the sweep of history putting the masses in action!” Well, broad masses have been in action and have brought about big changes for good or bad. But to call the kind of thing we have seen in Calcutta or elsewhere occasionally as the broad masses in action, seems to me not only a complete misjudgment of what is happening but a complete misuse of words. Let us take this Calcutta incident, that very thing, to which my hon. friend referred. It was a most amazing thing. The demand was that a certain assurance given by the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal in regard to a food problem in Calcutta and West Bengal had not been fulfilled. Now, on analysis we found that the question of fulfilment—if you like—or part of it would have come six months later. At that time every single part of that programme had been fulfilled by the Government of India and the West Bengal Government. Calcutta had plenty of wheat—not only wheat but rice. The question arose as to whether six months later a certain part of the programme would be fulfilled or not, and, if I may say so, a notice was issued that marches would take place to demonstrate. I was amazed because the reason for it was that the assurance of the Government of India had not been fulfilled. I was astounded because we had fulfilled it. The leaders of those people who had issued notices were sent for by the Chief Minister of West Bengal. He gave them facts and figures. They said, “You are right, you have fulfilled it.” They agreed to it. They saw that their position was wrong. They went back and next day came back with that procession and there was this trouble. In a City like Calcutta hon. Members can well imagine that it is very easy for a hundred or two hundred or five hundred persons to create trouble, if they are so inclined. If that is called the broad masses in action, I do not know the meaning of that phrase. I remember, two or three years ago, when, again, in Calcutta City—this great City of three or four million people, facing grave difficulties, terrible difficulties, because of the large influx from East Bengal, because of the housing problem, because of so many other difficulties—there was a state of semiterror because every day some odd bomb would be thrown at somebody, at a policeman, at a shop, at a tramcar, tramcars would be burnt. An extraordinary state of affairs that in a great city life should be interfered with and should be held up—the broad masses were functioning by occasionally throwing a bomb here or there or at a policeman! Just about that time I went to Calcutta and I saw the broad masses. They came to my meeting, a million of them, and at that very meeting a bomb was thrown, a live bomb, which resulted in the killing of a police inspector and two or three others as well as wounding the man who threw it. But that vast audience that was there behaved with discipline. I had told them beforehand, “It does not matter if there is murder or if anything happens, you must not move, you must behave with discipline, we will deal

with the situation.” And they behaved with discipline. And I spoke to them, and after that the broad masses began to take action against the bomb throwers. They did not like them at all, they said, “We are not going to be imposed upon by these individual terrorists”, and all this stopped. That is what I call the broad masses in action against those elements who create trouble.

Now are you going to have the City of Calcutta or the City of Delhi or the City of Bombay held up by one hundred people or by five hundred or one thousand, and thus hold up the life of millions? I submit life would be impossible in these Cities if that happens. Here in the City of Delhi the other day—was it two or three weeks ago or a month ago—there was an incident, an entirely private affair, of some proposed marriage, in which nobody was greatly interested—whether it was right or wrong it was none of our concern. I never heard of it till these incidents occurred. Now, I observed certain elements in the City immediately go and start breaking the windows of the courthouse, hitting people in Chandni Chowk and generally creating trouble. If the Delhi police had relaxed on that occasion, no doubt, disturbances would have spread and you would have found in large parts of Delhi this kind of thing happening. We had not forgotten yet what happened from Delhi up to East Punjab and in the Pakistan areas from August to September and October, 1947. I shall never forget it, the horror of it which I saw whether it was in Pakistan, whether it was in East Punjab or whether it was in Delhi. People were incited to do this, good people incited to do this kind of inhuman things, barbarities. It is easy to incite them, and it is easy to do all these kinds of things. And if in the name of democracy you want to undermine all the structure, this proud structure of the democratic State we have built up, you are welcome to it, but that is not my conception of democracy.

Therefore we have to look at these things in this context of India as it is. Let us examine—It is our duty to protect the liberty of the individual to see that there is no misuse of the law, to see that there is every safeguard that we can think of provided, but let us also at the same time remember that the major safeguard that we have to think of is the safety of the country and the community. And it is that major responsibility that this Government has to shoulder, and to the best of its ability it is going to shoulder it. Unless the State is perfect and every individual is perfect there is always some conflict between the freedom of the individual and the needs and the security of the State. You have extreme cases, as you have in some countries, of the State being put above everything, above every single individual freedom—the State becomes the God there. We have in great countries those cases—it is not for me to criticise them. For my part I cherish the freedom of the individual. I do not want even in the name of the State the freedom of the individual to be crushed. But undoubtedly the freedom of certain individuals has to be curbed for the safety of the State, if occasion arises. After all in time of war every democratic country curbs the freedom of the individual because the State is in danger. I do not mean to say that we are living in times of war in India. Undoubtedly we have progressed a great deal—and many hon. Members of the Opposition have stated how greatly we have progressed in this respect and how stable our country is compared to many other countries. Probably, if they had been speaking in some other context they would have said that we have

made no progress at all. In fact, they do say that, but in this particular context we get quite a number of bouquets about the progress we have made in stability and security. Well, I am grateful for those bouquets and we hope that we shall go further in that direction. But the essential question remains about the conflict between the security of the State and the liberty of the individual and the line to be drawn varies according to circumstances. In war it goes far towards the State, in peace time it should go far towards the individual, the State always being there—you cannot ignore the State or endanger the State. Now, we have taken a good part of our Parliament and many of our laws too from the practice which has long prevailed in the United Kingdom. Hon. Members opposite refer to the practice in the United Kingdom in this matter or in any other, and rightly—they are perfectly entitled to do so. Yet, I do submit that there is an essential difference between our country and that compact little Island called England and Scotland, with a long background of disciplined behaviour, a long background of following certain conventions and laws and practices and imposing self-discipline, which I admire. Only in the last few years has our great country emerged from a state of servitude, struggling hard to make good, making good certainly here and there, advancing, sometimes stumbling, still picking itself up and going forward amidst all kinds of forces, all kinds of disruptive tendencies, whether they are provincial, State, or communal, religious, social or economic. We have to hold together and as I have stated before in this House, the basic thing that this House, this Parliament and this Government have to torn before them always is the integration of India—not geographically, not politically, the map is there, but an integration of minds and hearts, the psychological integration of the people of India. We have to consider the various problems in their particular context, whether it is linguistic provinces, or whether it is something else. But behind these problems you see these different pulls; you see these disruptive forces and so long as you do not get over these pulls and until all of us begin to think more and more in a unified way, there is always danger of perhaps, sometimes, the disruptive influences overcoming the country.

Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to look at this broad picture and looking at that broad picture, I came to the conclusion that some such measure is essential at the present moment. Having done so we gave serious thought to this measure before we placed it before this Parliament. It is another matter as to how the details are worked out by this House; but even in regard to those details we considered them with the greatest care. May be of course that something escaped our mind; other suggestions if they had been made we might have accepted them. Anyhow it is not like some Bills which are occasionally passed by us in a hurry. It is a very serious measure for us to rush through the House.

Hon. Members, some of them, said that in the Joint Committee not many changes have been made. It is true some important ones have been made. In the Joint Committee many changes have not been made, because before the Bill went to the Joint Committee many an informal Committee thought about it and talked about it and discussed it and looked at it from many aspects. Because it had passed through so many sieves of thought, it represented the concentrated effort of ours. Of course, that does not mean that it cannot be changed or improved. That is a different matter. But it does

show that it was a carefully thoughtout measure that was placed before this House and placed before the Joint Committee.

About one matter great stress has been laid—about lawyers and legal advice being available. I am afraid I am getting a bad reputation in that large and very estimable community of lawyers in India, because estimable as they are, I do not admire their profession. It is not their fault of course. It is the structure, the judicial structure that we have inherited from the British, which encourages inordinate delay, inordinate expense and anything however good it is, if it means delay and expense means injustice in the end. But I shall not go into that matter.

I would submit to the House that if you like to have a fullfledged trial have it by all means; but do not mix up these ideas. It is a peculiar mixture. Here you have, as suggested now. Three eminent people, Judges of the High Court and the like, and the House knows very well that the Judges of the High Court and the Judges of the Supreme Court are not in the slightest bit dependent on the executive authority. They have been very critical of the executive authority. Therefore, whatever else might be said about them, they are not likely to favour executive authority in this matter. They will be impartial. They look at cases from their point of view. If you leave the burden on them and the accused goes before them and they speak to him, listen to him and get such other information as they can, they are much more likely to be favourably inclined and take a lenient view of the detenu or the proposed detenu. If you convert it into a semitrial, the Judge although he is responsible does not feel that sympathy for the person before him on account of the presence of the counsel on either side. Anyhow, how can you, I do submit, in all cases like this have this semitrial staged there? If you have lawyers on the one side there are lawyers on the other too. Then, I submit that the whole purpose of this measure is defeated. Of course we must give the detenu or the proposed detenu facilities to go there, see them, and see what the charges against them are and such other facilities that might be possible. That is entirely a different matter.

There is another point which this House should consider. In normal trials the facts are established by evidence of witnesses or documents. Now, in the nature of things, in cases of this kind and it does not matter in what category the particular detenu falls in the four categories I put to this House.

My hon. friend reminds me of blackmarketeers. In whatever category he falls the witness stands in danger of his life.

The House will remember that even in the last General Elections in Rajasthan and Saurashtra men were killed, openly killed, so that they might not vote for a particular party, that is the Congress, by the jagirdar elements there. It was openly stated in posters— it is not a hint that I am giving that he who votes for the Congress would be killed and many people were killed. Now, if that was so about voting, can you imagine then, if we have an enquiry into the Saurashtra affair in open court, where many jagirdars and princes are brought in, what the fate of that unhappy wretch would be who gives evidence against his boss, against the jagirdar or the

prince. So that, on the face of it if you start doing this and bringing in this question of evidence, etc., you will either not get that evidence, or you will have to organise an enormous system of protection of individual witnesses and in effect you will have to put in detention practically every witness that you may have. So that the whole conception of this falls to the ground. Here the sole conception depends on two or three factors. I would beg the House for the moment to forget—for the moment, I say—to forget the past. Look at this Bill as it is, with its various safeguards.

Much has been said about the district magistrate, about the police. Now, I am not here as an apologist for every district magistrate or every policeman. But I do submit to this House that it is not right and not fair to run down our services *en bloc* like this. There are good, and there may be bad and indifferent people—like all of us anywhere. But this method of running down people who have to shoulder heavy responsibilities and have often to face crises and difficult situations, who may occasionally make a mistake, make an error but who try to function according to the best of their lights, I submit, is not fair to them. They cannot answer back or explain their actions unless privately, if we ask.

Something has been said about our State Governments. Our State Governments too have to shoulder directly an immediate responsibility which we of the Government of India sitting in New Delhi do not. We have to shoulder the broad responsibility of India; they have to shoulder the responsibility of the day to day life of their people and their problems. And I should like to pay a tribute to our State Governments for the way they have discharged those responsibilities. And may I say specially, because I understand an hon. Member spoke harsh words about the Government of Saurashtra, that the Saurashtra Government is one of the most efficient and able Governments in India? I want to tell this House that the Saurashtra Government was so reluctant to take action in Saurashtra that repeatedly I had to write to the Chief Minister and tell him, “You must not allow the situation to develop, you must take action”. And now I am told that he goes about arresting people and behaving like some Chengiz Khan or Tamurlane or what not, I do not understand. I do not know how many hon. Members know the Chief Minister of Saurashtra. He is one of the humblest and ablest and quietest of men in India.

So, these State Governments and our services have to deal with the situation. They may make mistakes. Let us make a law which will prevent that. Now, whether the district magistrate takes action straight off or not, almost in all cases except in a case of grave emergency he does not take action till he refers the matter to his Home Minister. The Home Minister comes into the picture there. Suppose in a case of emergency he does not refer it to the Home Minister. You provide for him to come into the picture in twelve days, or whatever it is. You Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the main becomes then of the State Government. You provide for reference to the Advisory Council. You provide for intimation to be sent to the Government of India. And you provide for the Advisory Council to consist of three eminent Judges or persons of judicial experience. I submit that you may vary, add something or not to them. But I

do submit that you have given quite enough safeguards to prevent injustice being done. And if suppose injustice is done, even so—as it might be done. I cannot guarantee it—surely, this House is here, the hon. Members of the Opposition are here. They will not let a single case go by without drawing the attention of the wide world to it, if injustice is done. And I welcome their drawing attention our attention, India's attention, to it. So that, it is here. And in State Governments there are Assemblies where attention will be drawn. So that, if you analyse it, it becomes an exceedingly difficult thing in this set of circumstances, first of all that injustice will be done, secondly that if any injustice is done it can endure for long. Somebody will have to be pulled up and it will have to be remedied.

I therefore submit that subject to such minor amendments and variations as in the judgment and wisdom of the House are to be accepted, the main approach of this Bill is not only right but is fully democratic.

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BACK NOTE

VI. The Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Bill, 02 August, 1952

1. SHRI VITTAL RAO (Khammam): What action has been taken against those who have misused it?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: But I should like the House to remember again the context of this—the context of the greatest misuse of any kind of liberty that an individual achieved in this country. The context was something near approaching war and challenges to the authority of the State, the context was civil war.

SHRI VITTAL RAO: Nothing of that kind.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not wish to import any heat or passion in this debate. If they do not like the word 'war' I would not use it. The context was armed fight, with arms on both sides.

SHRI VITTAL RAO : What is there? It was armed selfdefence.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: I would not allow this kind of interruptions any more.

2. SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE (Calcutta North East): Was that an issue in the elections? Did any Congressman anywhere defend the Detention Act?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Was this an issue? There were a hundred issues in the election. If you want one, in my city of Allahabad the major issue was the Hindu Code Bill.

PANDIT THAKUR DAS BHARGAVA (Gurgoan): In the whole country it was.

SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA (Vijayavada): Where is it now?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Where is it now! Hon. Members know that it is in the programme of Government and Government is going through with it.

3. DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE (Calcutta South East): Sir, the Prime Minister has spoken today very frankly, very eloquently, and there is much in the general estimate which he has made of the great problems which confront the country today with which I shall be in agreement. I shall deal with a few of them a little later.

But there is one aspect of his speech which I consider to be most unfortunate. He started by saying that the debate on this Bill has gone on and many irrelevant things have been mentioned but very little has been said about the provisions of the Bill.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I did not use the word 'irrelevant'.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Well, 'unnecessary'.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: 'Academic' I said.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Sir, I stand corrected. He said that many academic things were said. I am glad he reminded me about that, because his speech itself was an academic essay and was hardly relevant to the main provisions of the Bill.

MOTION REGARDING KASHMIR STATE

07 August, 1952

“That the statement made by the Prime Minister on the 24th July, 1952 in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State, be taken into consideration.”

The House will remember that a few days ago I made a fairly lengthy statement in this House about the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir State. I do not propose to weary the House by a repetition of what I said then. But at this stage I should like to emphasize certain aspects of this problem.

For the last nearly five years now we have been seized “of this problem— and it has been one of the heaviest burdens that the Government has had to carry. It has been a heavy burden because the problem was a complicated one, a problem in which our saying ‘aye’ or ‘nay’ was not quite enough. Other factors were involve’d. There are many things in this world which we would like to have as we wish them to be. But we cannot shape the World to our will. We live, as the House well knows, on the eve of what appears to be a tragedy in the world and we try—and when I say ‘we’ I do not mean we in this House but people all over the world—to avert the tragedy and somehow to assure peace for this world. But nobody can control events completely; he tries to mould them to a certain extent, tries to affect them slightly; but what the ultimate resultant of the various forces and passions and prejudices is likely to be no man knows. It is in this large picture of this world that we have functioned during these last five years or more. And to the misfortune of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and our misfortune, the problem of the State has become a part, may be a small part but nevertheless a part, of this larger picture of the world. And, therefore, the difficulties in our way have increased greatly. It is an international problem. It would be an international problem anyhow if it concerned any other nation besides India, and it does. It became further an international problem because a large number of other countries also took interest and gave advice.

Well, we have tried to fashion our action in regard to this problem, keeping in view always certain obligations and responsibilities that we had. What were those obligations and responsibilities? Number one: To protect and safeguard the territory of India from every invasion. That is the primary responsibility of the State. Secondly, to honour the pledge we have to the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. And that pledge was a two-fold pledge. One was again, to protect them from invasion and rape and loot and arson and everything that accompanied that invasion. That was one part of the pledge. The second part of the pledge was unilaterally given by us that it will be for them to decide finally what their future is to be. That is the second obligation. The third was to honour the assurances we gave to the United Nations. And the fourth was to work for a peaceful settlement. That was no pledge to anybody, but, it was the policy we had tried to pursue right from the beginning, because it is in the nature of things that we should pursue that policy being wedded to the ideals of peace. And

apart from that it was necessary that we should do so because in this world, as I have just hinted to this House, we live, we appear to live on the edge of a precipice, and one has to be very careful in taking any step which might perhaps make the world tumble over that precipice.

So these were the four major considerations that we had to keep in view, and sometimes it was difficult to balance them. Sometimes they seemed to lead in different directions. It would have been an easy matter if all these factors led us to the same conclusion. But when they pull in different directions our obligations and responsibilities lead us to think not in one line of action but in several. Then difficulties arise. Well, we have faced these difficulties and we have had the hard time sometimes to decide what we should do and what we should not do. I should like the House therefore to think in terms of balancing these very important assurances, pledges, and factors in the situation.

In the course of these years I have come up repeatedly before this House and placed the situation before this House and it is with the concurrence and the support of this House that we have continued to pursue the policy that we have pursued. It has been my belief that in this matter, more even than in other matters, the great majority—of the people of this country have approved of the policy that we have pursued. And that approval has been shown to us from time to time by this House or the House that preceded it. We have received advice from innumerable people, friends and critics in this country, and we have always welcomed that advice, even though some of it did not appear to be feasible or right. We have received advice from innumerable people outside this country, from other countries. From them too we welcome advice when it is friendly advice. We do not welcome it when it comes from unfriendly minds or is accompanied by any hint of threat. So we welcome the friendly advice from abroad; we reject the advice that is accompanied by a threat and so we have carried on. We took this matter to the United Nations four years and eight months ago, in the belief that thereby we were serving the cause of peace and thereby we would settle this question of Kashmir by way of agreement, by way of a peaceful settlement. We have not settled that yet, in spite of the labours of the United Nations and their various organs. I do not wish to blame anybody and certainly, I would like to repeat what I said on the last occasion in this House, when I paid a tribute to Dr. Frank Graham, who has shown enormous patience, enormous perseverance in his pursuit of a peaceful settlement, and so far as we are concerned, we shall help him to the end even though people may get tired of our pursuing the same path, because a peaceful settlement and peace are always worth pursuing, however tired we may get in the process. Many of our colleagues and friends in the country have perhaps not weary of this process and I can very well understand their weariness, but that weariness which they have is much less than the weariness that possesses those in charge of this business, when day after day, week after week, month after month, we have had to carry this heavy burden. However weary sometimes unconsciously we may have got, we dare not act in a hurry, we dare not act in a temper, we dare not allow ourselves to be led by passion, because the consequences of acting in a temper are bad for an

individual; they are infinitely worse for a nation. Therefore, we have restrained ourselves; we have restrained ourselves when from across the border from Pakistan loud cries of war and loud threats arose. We restrained ourselves and I am glad to say that generally speaking our people in this country, our press in this country restrained themselves. So we have proceeded and I have every sympathy and every understanding for those who sometimes felt that we should do something, shall I say, more active, less restrained. One can understand that and I was sure then and I am dead sure now that to have acted otherwise would have been utterly wrong. I am not talking about any minor step here or there but rather about the major trend of the policy that we pursued. As before, we have now to keep these four major obligations in our minds.

Having gone to the United Nations, we have pursued that course some friends have advised us to withdraw this matter from the United Nations. I am not quite sure if they have studied this subject or considered how it is possible to withdraw this or any such matter from the United Nations, except indeed if the party itself withdraws from the United Nations. When the United Nations is seized of such a matter, it was seized of it at our instance. That is true, but if we had not moved the United Nations, others might have moved it and others can move it. It continues to be seized of it. If we said "we withdraw from the United Nations" it would only be a sign of impatience and temper on our part without resulting in what perhaps some people hope. Therefore, the question of withdrawal from there does not arise, unless, of course, this House wishes that we the Government of India and the Union of India itself withdraws from the United Nations and face all the consequences that it brings. That is a thing, I suppose, this House does not wish, as I do not wish it.

I have ventured, in all humility sometimes to criticise the new developments in the United Nations, which seemed to me to be out of keeping with its Charter and its past record and professions. Nevertheless, I have believed, and I do believe that the United Nations in spite of its many faults, in spite of its having perhaps deviated, partly gone sometimes in what I consider not a right direction, is a basic and fundamental thing in the structure of the world today and not to have it would be a tragedy for the world. Therefore, I do not wish this country of ours to do anything which weakens the gradual development of some kind of a world structure. It may be that the real world structure will not come in the life time of many of us, but unless that world structure comes, there is no hope for this world because the only alternative is world conflict on a prodigious and tremendous scale. Therefore, it would be wrong, I submit to this House, for us to do anything to weaken those beginnings of a world structure that we see, even though we may disagree with it and even though we may sometimes criticise it, as we have done. Therefore, for these and other reasons. I do not understand this cry of our withdrawing this matter of Kashmir from the United Nations. It is not a question of withdrawing it from some law court to the other. This matter is not before the United Nations as a forum. It is before the Nations of the world, whether they are united or disunited and whether they are a forum or not. It is an international matter. It is a matter in the minds of millions of men. How can you withdraw it from the minds of millions of men by some legal withdrawal or otherwise, from some

forum? The question does not arise. We have to face the world; we have to face our people; we have to face facts and we have to solve them.

Then again some friends seem to imagine that the easiest way of solution is by some exhibition of armed might—"Let us march our armies." That, I submit, in this case as in every case all over the world is never a solution and the more I live and the longer I grow in experience, the more convinced I become of the futility and the wickedness of war to solve a problem. I regret that it is my misfortune even so to spend money on armaments, to keep armies and navies and air forces and the like, because in the world as it is constituted today, one has to take those precautions. Any person in a position of responsibility must take those precautions and if we take those precautions, we have to take them adequately, effectively, and to keep a fine Army, a fine Navy and a fine Air Force. That is so. But to think in terms of throwing our brave boys into warfare, indulging in warfare, is not a thought I indulge in unless circumstances force my hands as they forced my hands on a late evening in October, 1947, and it was after the most painful thought and consultation, and if, I may, in all humility and without sacrilege, say after consulting the Father of the Nation, that I came to that conclusion.

So we did that. Although friends— may talk about defending the territory of India and may say: A part of the territory of India has been invaded: It is held by the enemy; what about that? Did you defend that territory of India? You have failed in your defence. That argument would be perfectly justified, that criticism would be right in so far as it goes, and it was our duty and it is our duty to rid and push out the enemy from every part and that particular part of the territory of India also. That is where there comes a certain conflict between various obligations and responsibilities. We decided, right at the beginning we had decided as the House knows, that we were agreeable to a plebiscite in which all the people of Jammu and Kashmir State would take part. And it was a curious thing that having so decided, that this war should have to be continued, because there was war for 14 or 15 months from the beginning, from the end of October, 1947 to the end of December, 1948; It continued, and it was for us to decide at the end of 1948 or the beginning of 1949 whether we should carry this war to a bitter end and thereby recover this lost territory, however long it may take, of whether we should call a halt to active military operations and try some other and more peaceful method. We decided, conditioned as we were, and I submit we decided rightly, to put an end to active military operations, and try other methods. Those other methods have not brought a solution in their train thus far. And yet, I think it would be right to say, that the mere fact that such an extraordinarily explosive situation as in the Jammu and Kashmir State during the last few years, has been halted, itself is no small success. We see in other parts of the world how other countries have functioned and how they have got more and more tied up and sunk in to all kinds of morasses and how it becomes a more and more difficult—if you pursue the path of war—risk to take yourself out of it. We had the courage, and in all humility I say, the wisdom to pull ourselves out of continuing an unending war before it was too late so

that we might think more calmly, more patiently, more wisely. Well, whether it has yielded any result yet or not, this fact remains that it has yielded this result, that we have not been having a war for the last 3.5 years, or whatever the period may be. That is not a bad result, although it may not be the full result hoped for.

Then later we declared that any further aggression or attack—I say any further because there had been aggression and there was continuing aggression—any further aggression or attack or military operations in regard to Kashmir, if such takes place by the other side, that would mean allowed war not in Kashmir only, but elsewhere too. That too was a decision not lightly undertaken, but after serious thought and careful consultation. We said that knowing full well the consequences of what we said, balancing them and yet coming to that conclusion, and I believe it is because we came to that serious conclusion— which was no threat, but which was a statement of an absolute fact in our minds, because there could be no attack on Kashmir, any further attack, without this matter becoming a major war so far as India was concerned— having made that perfectly clear. I think we succeeded in stopping many a possible attack that would have taken place on Kashmir in the hope that the opposite party would have come off with it, and tried to repeat what had been done in the later weeks of October, 1947. So, that has been the position.

Now, two or three basic things follow from this. One is that in so far as the United Nations are concerned, we shall continue, unless this House decides otherwise, we shall continue, to deal with them in the manner we have dealt with them. That manner has been to try our utmost for a peaceful settlement but not to give in on any vital point, not to give up any of the responsibilities or obligations that we shoulder. That has been our position, that is, not to dishonour the pledges that we have given to the people of Kashmir or to the people of India as a whole. So, we shall carry on with them.

The House knows that we accepted certain resolutions of the United Nations and of the U.N. Commission that came here. We accepted them, not that we liked every part of them, but because in our earnest desire for a peaceful settlement, we accepted them, but even in doing so, we made it perfectly clear that we would not bypass the pledges we had given or the responsibilities we had undertaken. At a later stage, much later, another Resolution was passed, by the Security Council which tried to impose an arbitration on us. We rejected that Resolution or that part of it because it was one thing for us to agree to a certain proposal having balanced all factors, but it was a completely wrong thing for us to give up our responsibilities, duties, obligations and pledges and assurances, and put the matter in the hands of another person whoever he might be. That we could never do. It was quite another thing for us to hand over the faith of the four million people of Jammu and Kashmir State to the decision of an arbitrator. Great political questions—and this was a great political question—are not handed over in this way to arbitrators from foreign countries or any country. So we had to reject that resolution of the United Nations. And we stand by that rejection, and we are not going to agree to anything which comes in the way, which prevents us from honouring the pledges or the assurances we have given.

Subject to that, we shall go all out to seek a peaceful settlement. Now among the assurances and pledges that we have given has been the pledge which really flowed from our policy which was no new thing for us, the Pledge that the people of Jammu and Kashmir State would decide their future. Let me be quite clear about something about which there seems to be a good deal of misunderstanding, namely this business of accession to India. The other day I said in this House that this accession was complete in law and in fact. Some people, and some newspapers chiefly abroad seem to think that something that had happened in the last week or fortnight or three weeks had made this accession complete according to my views. What I said was that this accession was complete in law and in fact in October 1947. It is patent and no argument is required because every accession of every State in India was complete on those very terms in July, August or September or later in that year. They all came in on these three basic subjects, foreign affairs, communications and defence. Can anybody say that the accession of any State of India was incomplete in the month of August or September or October or November of 1947, because they came only on these three subjects? Of course not. It was a complete accession in law and in fact. So was the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State in law and in fact on a certain late date in October, probably the 26th or 27th if I get the exact date.

It is not open to doubt or challenge. I am surprised that anybody here or elsewhere in the world should challenge it. I was telling the House that when the first United Nations Commission came here accompanied by legal advisers and others, it was open to them to do so. But it was quite clear to them, and their legal advisers said that there could be no challenging the legal validity of that accession apart from everything else. So while the accession was complete in law and in fact, the other fact which has nothing to do with law also remains, namely our pledge to the people of Kashmir—if you like, to the people of the world—that this matter can be reaffirmed or cancelled or cut out by the people of Kashmir if they so wish. "We do not want to win people against their will and with the help of armed force, and if the people of Jammu and Kashmir State so wish it, to part company from us, they can go their way, and we shall go our way." We want no forced marriages, no forced unions like this. I hope this great republic of India is a free, voluntary friendly and affectionate union of the States of India. I do believe that the people of Jammu and Kashmir State not only came to us as they did. But indeed it was at their request that we took them. It was not under pressure, but it was at their request that we took them into our large family of States, and I believe that they have those friendly feelings which the other States, have towards us. I believe that on repeated occasions they have shown this fact and even in the election of this Constituent Assembly that took place nearly a year ago, they exhibited that feeling of friendship and union with India. And I am personally convinced that if at any time there is any other method of ascertaining their feelings, they will decide in the same way. But that is my personal opinion, it may be your opinion or the House's opinion but the fact remains that we said openly to them and to the world that we will give them a chance to decide, and we will stand by their decision in this matter. Therefore we must honour that pledge. Within the limits of these assurances

and pledges, we shall pursue the policy that we have pursued and I submit it is in keeping with all these assurances, pledges and policies that a short while ago we met the representatives of the Government of Kashmir, who are not merely the representatives of the Government but who undoubtedly are the popular leaders of Kashmir. We met them, we talked to them, and we discussed many matters with them. We did not discuss with them in a spirit of bargaining or in a spirit of two opposite parties meeting and trying to pull each in its own direction. We discussed matters with them, with a view to solving our intricate problems, with a view to unravelling the knots, and with a view to finding some way which would fit in with the various assurances that we had given and they had given, and with the policies they stood for and we stood for—many of these policies were of course common. So we discussed with them in a friendly way and we came to certain agreements which I placed before this House during the last occasion. It is obvious that those agreements do not finalise the picture. Much has to be done, and much has to be thought out, but two or three facts remain. One is that in the nature of things at the present moment, it is necessary to consider the case of Jammu and Kashmir State on a somewhat separate footing from the other States in India, It is inevitable that we should do so. If you bear in mind this past history of four or five years, the assurances we had given and the fact that Kashmir has become an international issue, apart from being a national one. So we have to treat it on a somewhat separate footing; that does not mean any special right or privilege except in so far as it may mean, some slightly greater measure of internal autonomy. Certainly it does mean that. It may be that it is a developing, dynamic situation. One may change it gradually more and more but it is not right under existing circumstances for us to try to do something by any kind of mental coercion or pressure exercised to that effect. That would defeat our object and that indeed would be playing into the hands of those who criticise us.

So that is the method we have employed and it is in the full freedom of friendly discussion that we arrived at certain agreements which I placed before the House. And I trust that today in this debate the House will consider all these various aspects of this question and give us its support.

We need not wait. There is plenty of work to be done on that day.

But may I suggest something. Sir? Of course, it is for you and the House to decide. It is better that if necessary we sit both in the morning and in the afternoon tomorrow and have Saturday off. Otherwise, to sit for half a day tomorrow and another half a day on Saturday may not be so convenient.

I must express my gratitude to the many hon. Members who have spoken in the course of this debate, and spoken generously, about the policy that the Government has pursued in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We have had today an abundance of generous acknowledgment of that policy. We have had criticism also, and I welcome it, because criticism is always a little helpful in understanding a particular position, and in this very difficult and delicate matter the more aspects we examine the more light is thrown upon it and the better it is for all of us. We have dealt with this matter for near upon five years now. We have fought the good fight about

Kashmir, on the field of battle for over a year there and many of our brave young men went there and remained there. We have fought this fight in many a Chancellory of the world and in the United Nations but above all, we have fought this fight in the hearts of men and women, above all in the hearts of men and women of that State of Jammu and Kashmir. Because ultimately—I say so with all deference to this Parliament—the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir, neither in this Parliament nor in the United Nations nor by anybody else. So, we have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways in various fields of action and we have not solved it. We may have gone on in a particular direction but we have not yet solved it. and I want to be perfectly frank with, this House. I promise no speedy solution. Why should I make promises which I might not be able to keep? And may I remind this House that in the world today there are ever so many problems, big problems, affecting the world's future which remain unsolved . Which go on from month to month and year to year and are not solved? It is mercy enough in this world that they do not go much worse. That itself supposed to be a great mercy and a blessing. It is all very well when some people in foreign countries who occasionally think it their duty to give us good advice tell us. “Why do you not solve this question of Kashmir which may lead to, well, big things, to a world conflict and all that?” There are many people who are generous with their advice to us in foreign countries. One feels tempted to say to them that they are also engaged in some problems, whether it is in the Far East or in Europe or elsewhere, that somehow carry on from day to day and year to year. Why do they not find a solution of them? Why is it that we are at fault because we cannot solve the question of Kashmir, but they are right in carrying on not only these problems but preparations for future creation of problems? But that would be a cheap reply for us to make to them, because we are all in difficulties struggling against all manner of developments in the world which perhaps are not entirely within the power of any one country or any one people.

So, I should like this House to consider this problem, as it has considered it, in all its aspects and to forget for the moment the minor things, the lawyers' points if I may so call them with all respect to the lawyers who have their particular place provided they keep it. There are many things that have been said. My hon. friend. Dr. Mookerjee has said a great deal about this clause and that clause. If I have the time I may deal with them, but really it is of little importance what this clause or that clause says or does. What is important is your approach to this problem, what is important is the fundamental basis of it—whether you understand it or not—what is important is what is your objective really and what is the way to gain that objective. If it is your objective—as I claim it must be and should be and there can be none other—that this problem has to be decided by the people of Kashmir, by their goodwill, by their minds and hearts being with you, then you must adopt a policy to gain that end, there is no other policy? Why issue threats? Why talk to them and say, “You must do this, you must not do that”? It does not matter. I am called a Kashmiri in the sense that ten generations ago my people came down from Kashmir to India. It is not that bond that counts in my mind today but other bonds, bonds which have arisen much more in

these five years or so, bonds which have tied us much closer. Not me only—I am a symbol for the moment. Vast numbers of people in India and Kashmir have been bound together in these five years of conflict against a common adversary. So, we accept this basic proposition that this question is going to be decided finally by the goodwill and pleasure of the people of Kashmir, not, I say, by the goodwill and pleasure of even this Parliament if it so chooses, not because this Parliament may not have the strength to decide it,—I do not deny that—but because this Parliament does not function in this way and rightly so, because this Parliament has not only laid down in this particular matter that a certain policy will be pursued in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State but it has been our policy, it has been our heritage that we would not impose our will against the wishes of other people. We choose other methods, other approaches, we follow other policies.

Therefore, we must be clear in our minds that this question in regard to the future of Jammu and Kashmir State can ultimately only be decided by the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. Having come to that conclusion then let us fashion our other policies accordingly, then let us not find fault with something here and there because it does not fit in with our wishes. Many things have happened in Jammu and Kashmir which I do not approve of—there it is. I have no doubt many things have happened and will happen that my hon. friend opposite may not approve of and I may not approve of just as many things happen not only in Jammu and Kashmir State but in the rest of India that I do not approve of. I do not control everything that happens in India—I do not presume to do so. I put up with it. But what is our approach going to be? If that is our approach then we must not do anything which counters that approach, which undermines it, which uproots it. which really encourages the hands of those who are opposed to us—our enemies, our opponents, our adversaries and the like. That is the basic thing which we must understand. Let us be clear about it. You can criticise Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah is no God—he commits many errors, he will commit many more. He is a brave man and a great leader of his people. That is a big enough thing. He has led his people through weal and woe, he has led them when they were facing grave disaster. He did not shrink from leadership at that time—that is a big enough thing to be said about any man. If he has failings, if he has made a mistake here or there, if he has delivered a speech which we do not like, what of that? Bigness is bigness in spite of a hundred mistakes. It is not a matter of Sheikh Abdullah or anyone else. It is a bigger matter than any individual and in a sense this question of Kashmir, as this House well knows, has not been for us—certainly it has not been for us—a question of territory. We gain nothing. Financially, in money matters, we gain nothing—it may cost us much until ultimately it develops; because it is a rich country ultimately, undoubtedly, it will develop. But any how we have not cast covetous eyes upon Kashmir because of any gain. We have cast eyes on Kashmir because of old bonds, old sentiments and, well, new sentiments also, and it has become very close to our minds and hearts. And if it so happens that by some decree of adverse fortune Kashmir goes out of India, it would be a wrench and a pain and a torment to us. But whether it is a pain and a torment, if the people of Kashmir

want to go out, let them go because we will not keep them against their will however painful it may be to us. That is the policy that India will pursue and because India will pursue that policy people will not leave her, people will leave to her and come to her. Because the strongest bonds that bind will not be the bonds of your armies or even of your Constitution to which so much reference has been made, but bonds which are stronger than the Constitution and laws and armies —bonds that bind through love and affection and understanding of various peoples.

That being the approach, many of the arguments that some hon. Members opposite have advanced seem to me to be inapplicable. They do not apply. I can easily criticise many things that have happened I should like some things to happen which have not happened—that is easy enough. I might try to better it. but that, is a different matter. But the point is: whether in doing so you are trying to get what you are aiming at, or are you really coming in the way of your very objective? The hon. Member from Kashmir who spoke last—he is a representative of the minority community of Srinagar, a Kashmiri pandit, much more so than I am— gave you some kind of a graphic account of those days when everybody in the vale of Kashmir. Muslim or Hindu but more especially the Hindus and the Sikhs, stood in terror of the morrow. Nobody knew what might happen—or perhaps they knew too well. The people of Kashmir, and the women of Kashmir especially, have a certain reputation outside Kashmir also. And mind you, the women of Kashmir, Hindu and Muslim, in considerable numbers were “taken away by these raiders and others, they were spread out way up to Afghanistan and beyond even, and sometimes sold for a pittance. Hon. Members should think how these stories and these accounts must have affected the people of Kashmir and those connected with Kashmir and how they must have thought that this might be the fate on the morrow of their own sisters and mothers and wives, etc. Now, they have gone through that and they faced that; they did not run away from it—it is not particularly easy to run across mountains unless you have cars. etc. So, during these five years there have been these ups and downs. No doubt many mistakes may have been committed, but looking back on these five years I think that the people of Kashmir, the people of India and with all humility if I may say so, the Government of India, in spite of numerous small mistakes that they may have committed have stuck to the right path, broadly speaking. They have not given up the straight and narrow path. They have stuck to it sometimes even when it appeared not very opportune; sometimes when others were displeased; sometimes when a little swerving to the right or to the left may have gained some advantage to us in foreign countries, and the like. And foreign countries began to count for us. It did not matter much what we thought of them, but there they were sitting in the Security Council and talking a great deal, sometimes some sense, sometimes not sense. That was happening all the time, and we had to put up with these people trying to judge us, trying to judge a thing which was so important to us, not because of territory as somebody suggested but for other reasons I have mentioned. They thought of Kashmir as a geographical unit, as a plaything for them. Here was Kashmir, very much in our hearts. Due to all those circumstances, it had become so much tied up with our feelings, emotions, thoughts and passions that it was a part of our being. And we saw

these foreign countries dealing with it in this casual way, and talking about India's imperialism, about India trying to conquer Kashmir etc. We restrained ourselves, but very often there was anger in our hearts, anger at this intolerant criticism, at the way people have the presumption to talk to us, to this great country of India. They were talking of imperialism to us when they were carrying on their own imperialism and their own wars and all that and were preparing for future wars. They talked to India like that, and because we went there to protect Kashmir from territorial invasion, they dared and had the temerity to talk of India's imperialism. Well, as I said, we restrained ourselves and we shall endeavour to restrain ourselves still in future but restraint does not mean weakness. It does not mean giving in this business. To the end we knew, because we were firm and convinced of the Tightness of our position, because as I said—and I said it with all honesty of purpose — I have searched my heart and I have looked into every single step that I have taken in this Kashmir matter and while of course my Government is responsible for it ultimately I have been personally concerned with every single step during the last nearly five years. Looking back over those five years, I think, that there are some things that I may have done otherwise — may be some minor things—but I do not see any major step that we have taken which could have been otherwise than what we have done. It may be that there may have been a miscalculation, but it was a fundamentally right step demanded by circumstances from that first day when we sent our young men flying over the mountains to Kashmir in the end of October 1947. In other steps we may have erred sometimes in the cause of peace, in the cause of avoidance of war, if you like. I want to err in that way always, but for people to accuse us of avarice or covetousness, of imperialism, of breaking our words and pledges,—well, I say and I repeat it that every single step that we have taken, every single word that we have given to the United Nations, to the United Nations Commission or to anybody else who has come here,—every single word and pledge that we gave and every assurance that we have given we have kept to the uttermost letter, which is much more than can be said for Pakistan in this matter, because this whole Kashmir business is based on a fundamental lie, the lie of Pakistan in entering Kashmir and denying it. I do not mind if they want to go there. Let them go there and fight. But why lie? For six months they did it and they did it and then said they did not do it. When you base a case on a lie, the lie is repeated and it was repeated in the Security Council month after month. There were their armies, and their Foreign Minister went on saying that they were not there—an astonishing thing—and when the United Nations Commission was here and was on the point of going to the front, of course there was no possibility of concealing this fact. Then they admitted it, and admitted it how? They had to admit it anyhow, and a paper was put in by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army and that Commander-in-Chief was a well known British officer. That Commander-in-Chief put in a paper saying that he had been compelled in the interests of protecting Pakistan to send his armies—the Pakistan armies—into Kashmir because he was afraid that India was going to invade Pakistan across Kashmir somewhere down from Central Asia. Now, that is the beginning of this extraordinary story of Kashmir and it is as well that this is

repeated again and again, because people forget it—not hon. Members, but other people—and this matter has become international and it is talked about in the various capitals of the world. This simple story, these simple facts of invasion, of brigandage, loot and arson are forgotten and passed over and other discussions take place. It has been an amazing education for many of us these five years over this Kashmir question—education, if I may say so, in world politics; education in how nations behave; education in how great countries get distorted visions and cannot see straight in the simplest matter when it so suits them. Well, I am perhaps talking a little apart from my present brief, but I would like to come back to this very matter and say that it is not merely that we have stated it to the United Nations or to the people of Kashmir, but in the very nature of things, in the very nature of the policy we have pursued not in Kashmir alone but everywhere, it follows that the people of Kashmir only can decide and that if I may say, in spite of our five years of trouble and expense and all that we have done, if it was made clear to us tomorrow that the people of Kashmir wanted us to depart from there, back we will come, however sad we may feel about, because we are not going to stay there against their wishes. We are not going to impose ourselves there at the point of the bayonet. If that is so, then the ultimate thing, the final thing, the chief thing that counts is their wishes.

It is true that their wishes do not mean that we should do the wrong thing. Suppose they want us to do something wrong in Kashmir. We refuse. We cannot do it. We may even say, “Well, we prefer rather not to have this kind of wrong association at all”. It is a conceivable thing. We do not want a wrong association. Nobody can force us into a wrong association, just as we cannot force them into an association against their will. An association is a matter of mutual understanding, affection, union etc., and if there is going to be an association, our wishes and willingness count. In our desire to gain the goodwill of the people of Kashmir we cannot gain our own ill-will and take the wrong path. That is a different matter. We are not considering this matter as a bargain, as a matter between strangers, but as between partners, between part of ourselves, who consider it a difficult and delicate problem and try to find a way out. The way out may not be completely logical; it may not be completely reasonable from the point of view of this law or that Constitution, but if it is effective, then it is a good way out. whether it offends against some legalistic arguments or logical arguments or not.

My hon. friend referred to various matters. One thing I should like to say in this connection, although it is rather perhaps not to the point and I am afraid of saying it because of so many lawyers here. When the British went away from here there was a good deal of misunderstanding as to the situation that was then created in India, because of the partition and because of the statement issued by the United Kingdom about the Indian States, etc. Now I may venture to put forward my own view, for the moment functioning as a jurist and constitutional lawyer. It is this. The partition took away a certain part of India, separated it from us with our consent. But all the rest of India, including the States, remained as a continuing entity. Till something happened to take them away, we were a continuing entity; we are a continuing entity. We did not come out of partition. Pakistan was cut off at the time of partition. India

came—the communal troubles, after August 15, which were really largely political in their nature—some of these people and their families and cousins and uncles did a lot of harm and injury and participated in them and gave money and gave guns and gave gangs of rowdies to go about creating mischief. Now, that was the position: there were these hundreds and hundreds of States all over India, big and small, not knowing what their future was going to be, afraid of their own people, afraid of the Government of India, left in the lurch by the protecting hand of the British power. We could have decided many things at that time. We could have decided, if you like, to remove them completely from the scene or to come to terms with them and thereby buy immediate peace at a moment of great peril to our country. I think Sardar Patel acted very wisely. It is very well for us to be wise after the event and say ‘this might have been done this way and that might have been done another way’. But if you remember that particular context, when there was grave danger, possibly of India going to pieces, under the stress and strain of the passions raised by the partition and the huge killings all over, the communal things, and all these reactionary Jagirdari and feudal elements throwing themselves into the picture just to create trouble and disruption and hoping—some of them, I know for a fact—in the confusion to enlarge their domain,—it was foolish of them to hope that, but nevertheless hoping that way,—well, one had to come to some decisions. And Sardar Patel chiefly, and all of us also partly, came to the decision that it is better to consolidate India quickly and rapidly even at the cost of some money than to allow this wasteful fratricidal warfare and civil wars to continue, because apart from other things, even from the point of view of cost they are much more costly, and then they leave a trail of tremendous bitterness behind. So we came to these conclusions and came to certain settlements which by themselves are hardly just, financially or otherwise, but which were the price we paid for a quick settlement of a very difficult and vital problem.

Now, I am not going into the question as to how we are going to deal with all these matters in the future. That does not arise now. Obviously, the matters will have to be dealt with in the future, dealt with I hope in a friendly spirit by all those concerned. Obviously also, what happens in one place has its reactions and repercussions on another. And undoubtedly, what is happening or is likely to happen in Kashmir must have its reactions elsewhere.

Now, the hon. Member Dr. Mookerjee referred to various things. About article 352 he said a great deal and he asked me whether certain other articles dealing with financial chaos or financial emergency or the Constitution breaking down would be applied. I shall answer it. As we are concerned at present, we are not applying those articles. We have not even put them forward for consideration. I would beg the House to remember that we have to proceed on a certain basis, a basis it so happens—I am not excusing myself but it so happens—a basis which was made in my absence from India—I was in America at the time—and laid by that stout builder of this nation, Sardar Patel. At that time when this new Constitution—I have said this before but I repeat it—was being finalised, when the question of Kashmir came up, it was dealt with in article 370 of the Constitution. I would beg of you to read that article 370,

because if you discuss this question now, you must discuss it on the basis of the article which we agreed to, which is part of our very Constitution. Do not say that we go outside the Constitution. We go to the Constitution itself to find out how to deal with Kashmir.

That is what the Constitution says. It is true, as has been pointed out, that that article was not a final and absolute provision. That article itself was a transitional article. But it laid down, the method of decision in the future. It laid down the mode of how we should proceed in the future, and if more things are to be added on to the subjects or anything how it should be done. And everywhere throughout . you will see two classes of subjects. One was something in relation to the three major subjects or rather to the three categories of subjects, namely, Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs. In relation to them if any change was to be made in their interpretation, the President was to do it 'in consultation with' the Kashmir Government or the Constituent Assembly there. In regard to anything else the words used were not 'in consultation with' but with the concurrence of. Those were laid down in the year 1949 in November or December. And that is part of our Constitution.

Why then should anybody complain that we are going outside the Constitution, that we or the people or the Government of Kashmir are committing a breach of the Constitution? It may well be that the Government of Kashmir may ask us to do something which we do not consider proper. May be, but then it is a question of our talking to each other and finding a way which both we and they consider proper. And if we do not consider anything proper, well then it does not happen and the consequences are faced, whatever the consequences are, obviously. And the consequences may not be agreeable to them or to us. There is no other way. There is no question— as some of the amendments of hon. Members say—of our issuing some kind of a fiat, decree or sending some compulsory order "Obey, or you will suffer for it". That is not the way to deal with this matter. That is not the way we can deal with this matter. We have either to come to an agreement or we do not come to an agreement and face the consequences. But I do submit that we approached this matter and we shall, I hope, always approach this matter in a spirit of friendship because we have to remember that there are so many aspects of this question— external and internal. The 'internal' aspect is at present under the Kashmir Government. The effect of what they do in that part which is called wrongly Azad Kashmir, which is under Pakistan, the effect of that on others, the effect of foreign countries on India— there are so many aspects of the thing that you cannot just look at it from your own point of view. You must consider all these matters. It may be that the people in Kashmir have a particular aspect in view and it may be that you have not considered it and if you consider it, you may be convinced. May I point out to hon. Members that Dr. Mookerjee complained that he was not consulted.

He mentioned about it, if I may say so and yet only a little later he said that Sheikh Abdullah wrote to him and wanted to meet him and consult him.

That is true; it is difficult; surely Dr. Mookerjee will not expect Sheikh Abdullah or a member of this Government in the course of any important talks to be constantly consulting others. It is impossible; it cannot be done. If I may say so, members of my Cabinet were hardly consulted, and apart from those members who had a particular commission to deal with this matter, others were consulted after the talks were over. We discussed with them and we got their agreement to it. What I was going to say was this: Sheikh Abdullah was anxious to meet the Members of the Opposition. He did not have the advantage of meeting Dr. Mookerjee, but he did meet his colleague Mr. Chatterjee and he had a two hour talk with him. I was not present at the talk, but Mr. Chatterjee was good enough to write to me and to inform me that he had this talk and that he had been influenced by what Sheikh Abdullah had told him. That is what he wrote to me, that he now realised that there were many other aspects which had not been put before him previously. You see there are many aspects to this question; Then there is another thing. I refer to article 352 which deals with Proclamation of Emergency: it reads as follows:—

“If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation make a declaration to that effect.”

In a sense the President can do all manner of things including taking charge of the whole State. What in these talks we suggested and we agreed to at the request of our friends from Kashmir was that where there was reference to internal disturbance, this action should be taken with the concurrence of the Government, and whether it is external aggression or war or other things, then their concurrence is not necessary. Undoubtedly that is a variation in favour of that Government, and hon. Members are entitled to criticise it. Will hon. Members remember again the basis from which we start? We start from article 370 for the present moment. Article 370 rules out article 352 and all the other articles, that is, at the present moment, keeping strictly to the Constitution as it is applicable to Kashmir State, none of these provisions apply, so that what we have said whether in regard to this matter or in regard to the Supreme Court or in regard to the President's other powers—these are all new things added on to Kashmir, that is the supremacy of the President or this Parliament or the Supreme Court to the extent that they accept it. These are all new things added on to that extent. So it is not as if we are giving up some thing. We have very specifically laid down this very important provision of the Constitution, ‘that the President can take charge of the whole State itself under a grave emergency’ should apply to that State but in case of internal disturbance with the concurrence. This seems very odd and some people say: How can you ask or wait for their concurrence? It is not such an odd provision. As a matter of fact, if the whole is in a chaos, then nobody waits for anybody's concurrence; he takes the steps, but I might say that this particular phraseology is taken from the American Constitution, where the Federal Government can take charge in an emergency of the State with the concurrence of the State Government. So it is not very new and undoubtedly it is open to members to criticise

or not. But the point is that there is nothing very odd or very special about it and in all the circumstances, we felt that it is better for us to take it in this form than to leave it.

That was not so rhetorical.

The rhetorical part was: Is Kashmir subordinate to this Parliament of India.

The mere fact that all these provisions that we have been considering whether they are emergency provisions, whether it is the President's special powers, whether this is Parliament's powers in a certain domain or whether the Supreme Court comes in, surely indicates that it does not require any other answer as to where a certain measure of sovereignty lies. I am being rash— I am talking about the Constitution and all legal matters, but obviously in a federal Constitution, sovereignty is divided between a State and the Federal centre. In a moment of crisis, it may vest with the Federation or in the Centre. It is a different matter. I see that the Law Minister apparently does not agree with this. I am not quite sure, but anyhow whatever it is, it is a small matter. In a Federation it is an old argument, whether it is divided or not. Take your own Constitution.

There are parts of the Constitution, List III or whatever the list may be, which is within the power of the States completely.

I know there is a certain List, whatever it is: it is the State List. List I is the Union List. List III is the Concurrent List. So that there is a sphere of State sovereignty which may be upset in the final analysis, which may be put an end to. In that sense I may say that the Centre is sovereign. Federations may differ about this and there is a tendency for the federal Centre to become stronger all over the world. Therefore, the question—the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, if I may say so, in one respect can certainly be termed sovereign—not in law, I am not talking about law,—just as, if I may say so, I started with this presumption that it is for the people of Kashmir to decide finally about their own future. We will not compel them. In that sense, the people of Kashmir are sovereign to decide their future—whether they are with us or not. They are not sovereign in the sense of accepting the Constitution and breaking it, in the sense of coming into partnership with us in our Constitution and accepting that part over which we are sovereign and then trying to get out of it. But they are sovereign in that sense that they may accept the whole or not at all, or they may come to an agreement with us about other matters.

Now, there is one thing, if I may say, which I was rather distressed to hear. The hon. Dr. Mookerjee referred in rather contemptuous terms to our Governors, as dismissed and rejected people.

These were the hon. Member's words.

And a short while ago, on another occasion, an hon. Member opposite, another hon. Member, referred to one whom I think I can say with a great deal of assurance, all of us have honoured and respected very greatly, a lady—he referred to her in terms of great disrespect.

The hon. Member did not refer to her, but another Member. She is not now a Member of this House. She is a Member of the Planning Commission, and she was referred to in terms which did not affect her, which I am sure, nor us, but which did a certain amount of discredit to the hon. Member who said that, as if she was a person who was being provided with jobs, as if nepotism was being shown to those who had been defeated in the elections. I submit that this kind of thing is wholly and totally unbecoming and improper, and especially in the case of people who are not here, who cannot say anything to defend themselves.

Now, I have taken a lot of time of this House. I am sorry for it. In a few days time my colleague, Mr. Gopaldaswamy Ayyangar will be going from here to Geneva. I will not be very truthful if I say that I expect great things to happen at Geneva, but we have to carry on with this business, with the rough and the smooth of it and not run away from it. Well, our good wishes go with him, but, above all, our good wishes should go to the people of Jammu and Kashmir State who have become the plaything of international politics, and even our debates.

BACK NOTE

VII. Motion Regarding Kashmir State, 07 August, 1952

1. DR. S.P. MOOKERJEE: He was referring to Mirpur-Poonj—that is in Jammu and Kashmir.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There is no doubt that people were killed in Mirpur—I do not know about the numbers. I rather doubt the correctness of his numbers, because the whole population of Mirpur was not that much. There is no doubt that there was killing there when the Pakistan troops and residents came there.

There has been a good deal of the use of the word “monarchy”. I do not just understand the sense in which it was used. We have no monarchs in India. I understand the meaning of the word “monarchy”. I do not know why these wrong words are used to delude us. We have got some persons, who by the generosity of our States Ministry are still called ‘Rulers’. Why, I do not know, because they rule nobody. Our States Ministry in the last three or four years has been known for its generosity and I am afraid we shall suffer for that generosity for a long time to come.

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS AND STATES (DR. KATJU): They are known as exrulers, not rulers.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I think they are known as Rulers.

DR. KATJU: I always use the word ‘Exrulers’.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I remember sometime ago I was told by the States Ministry: ‘Of course they have no position left. They are pensioners. Would you mind, just to please their vanity, if we call them rulers still?’ I said, please yourself. But it is really wrong for us to use these terms which mislead, for example monarchy.

There is no monarchy in India. There are in certain places, certain families, princely families if you like, who have got large endowments, very large, unnecessarily large. They hope to live on those endowments for generations to come. Then there are a few Rajpramukhs. There are now three States headed by Rajpramukh in other places there are groups of States and one of the rulers or exrulers has been chosen to be Rajpramukh for life.

PANDIT THAKUR DAS BHARGAVA: They are not exrulers. They are rulers as defined in the Constitution itself.

MOTION REGARDING FOOD SITUATION

18 November, 1952

Sir, I have hesitated to intervene in this debate because I wanted hon. Members to have as much time as possible to discuss this most important matter. My colleague the Food Minister will reply to the debate fully later on. Yesterday my colleague the Finance Minister gave a very lucid analysis of the situation and made clear what the basic policy of Government was. He spoke not only on behalf of Government but also of the Planning Commission—not that the two are separate from each other or are in opposition to each other—nevertheless he spoke with authority on the part of both, of Government and the Planning Commission of which he has to bear a considerable burden. Yet I decided to speak, to say a few words, because there has been in the recent past some confusion in the public mind on this issue, and many things have been said which appear to me to have no justification whatever, that is in so far as the Government is concerned. And that was one reason why I welcomed this debate in this House. When I was asked earlier in this session if we would have a debate, probably the hon. Member who put me that question was under the impression that some big changes were under contemplation. In fact he asked me if big changes would be introduced and the debate will take place afterward—a kind of postmortem—or before. As a matter of fact, as the House will realize, no change in policy was intended or is suggested. Certain changes are certainly suggested, but they have nothing to do with the basic policy that Government has attempted to follow and intends to pursue in future. But this confusion was caused and some of our friends in the newspapers gave big headlines and imagined many things which did not exist.

Now, this question of food has been one of our most difficult questions during the last few years, and I suppose the Food Ministry, whoever has been the incumbent of it, has had to face very difficult problems, as the House knows. We have all, of course, shared, that is the Government and the Cabinet have shared to some extent in the burdens that the Food Ministry carried, but ultimately it had to be carried by the Food Minister of the day. We have, I suppose, in the course of the past few years made mistakes. We try to profit by them. It has been an exceedingly difficult situation. On the whole we are somewhat better off: we are in a somewhat more favourable situation. Of course the favourable situation is not so much due merely to Government policy; it is due to other factors also. But naturally to some extent I think we are justified in saying that it is to that extent a result of Government policy also. And I should like in this connection to pay my tribute to my colleague, the Food Minister who has approached this very difficult and complicated subject with an energy and a vitality and an awareness which I think, have produced certain results all over the country.

Now, I do not propose to go into any detailed analysis of figures. The House has had perhaps a fair dose of them already. But what is necessary for us not to get

lost, not to forget the wood for the trees. In such a debate each hon. Member is naturally concerned more with the particular situation that exists in his State or his particular area. And it is right that he should lay stress upon it. Nevertheless, the most important thing is that we should keep this whole picture of India, this whole question of food as a whole, and to remember what our basic policy is.

The House can discuss, of course, the basic policy. So far as we are concerned, no question has arisen to discuss it or to change it. And so far as we can see, no question is likely to arise when we should change that basic policy. I would add that however much you may vary, however much you may bring relaxations or adjustments here and there, that basic approach will continue even though the food position may be much better. I might even go so far as to look into the future somewhat and say that instead of our being deficit in food as we are at present—at least to some extent we are, or at any rate (although statistics apparently differ even about that) let us presume that we are deficit in food, but I would go a step further and say that—if we are clearly and demonstrably surplus in food, even then the basic approach would continue. You may change the method of approach, you may change many things, but the basic approach will have to continue, I think.

Why do I say so? Well, my colleague the Finance Minister referred of course to the interconnection with planning. That is there. I put it in a more homely way: it is a kind of housekeeping for the nation. Now we are not going to give up housekeeping for the nation and leave it to all kinds of odd forces even though we might be better off. Of course, if the method of housekeeping is wrong — we have to improve the method. But in regard to food supply and in regard to other necessities of life, if we are to plan we have to look after this housekeeping for the entire community. We have not merely to see, first of all, that there is a fair distribution, that some people do not suffer at the cost of others and so on and so forth, but we have to see also—there is an aspect of it—that we get the best out of it for our development and planning programmes. That is to say, suppose we become a surplus nation in food. Well, we would not like all our surplus to be, in a sense, not used to the best advantage. We would of course like better feeding, etc. but, if I may say so with all respect, even that with some limitations. Because, the pressure on us for development is so great and we want to develop the country, we would like to use some of the surplus we get for export, if necessary—there is no question of export now; I am merely putting the argument before the House—so as to get more capacity for importing essential goods like machinery, or whatever it may be. Perhaps the House may remember that many years ago about twenty years ago or slightly less, in Germany there was a phrase which became rather notorious: guns versus butter. That is the Nazi Germany of the day said they preferred guns to butter; they would rather do away with butter, export it, get money for it so that they could get guns. Well, we are not interested in guns that way, and we are not going to give up butter for guns, too.

We might have to give up butter for something more useful for our economic development. In regard to development I think the country should realise that we should be prepared to tighten our belt here and there even though we may possess

the thing necessary in order to get something more necessary, something quite vital for future growth. Of course there are limitations to that. We want the entire community to have adequate food, healthy food, and we must provide for that, but I see no reason why we should waste food and allow circumstances to flourish which involve wastage of food and all that, or something which may not be absolute waste. Therefore all this requires careful housekeeping. Now it is a difficult matter, I suppose at least for some of us even to be in charge of our own housekeeping, and to think about housekeeping of the entire nation becomes a very intricate and a very difficult matter; but the principle remains that we must housekeep for the entire nation and the basic issue before the House therefore is whether we can entrust these vital and important matters to what is called free enterprise and an absolutely free market. The whole conception of free enterprise and an absolutely free market is today out of date. It goes out of control. Things happen and in a country like India where our resources are limited, where we have to spread them out, we cannot allow this business of free enterprise and an absolutely free market. That again does not mean that there is no free market left for anything. Inevitably we have to control strategic points so that we may control the basic economic situation in the country. That applies to food. Now I am not prepared to say that there should be no free market in food certainly there might be. I am not prepared to say that this particular control elsewhere should not be relaxed. It may be, it depends on circumstances. Let us discuss them. I am prepared to say we must keep the tightest grip of the situation in regard to food and as regards other matters we must always be in a position to control the situation. How can we do that? It is a matter of circumstances and factual data. I may give the House a military parallel. An Army controls an area or a State. He would be a foolish General who spreads his army in every village and every part of it to control every independent individual there. He cannot really control the situation as effectively as if he controls the strategic points. He has a firm grip on them. He can swoop down on any place when any untoward incidents take place. He is in complete control of the situation and yet it is really that he controls the strategic points. What the strategic points are is a question to be considered. But the point is that the strategic points have to be controlled and we cannot allow forces, very important forces to be set in motion which will upset our basic policy, upset our basic policy of proper food distribution, etc. So, I wish the House to appreciate fully that now and later even though there might be—and, as I hope, there will be—a continuing improvement in the food situation, I cannot base any policy on a hope. I must base a policy on the possibility or even the probability of untoward contingencies and we cannot obviously build up a firm policy hoping for a good harvest for all the time. Take Pakistan. Pakistan flourished like the green bay tree in regard to food for three years or more. Then prices shot up because of the Korean war and they made lots of money and very unfavourable comparisons were made between India and Pakistan in regard to the food situation. It is not for me to criticise their policy. I do not know the details but it is obvious that one bad season has upset them completely this year. They have had

a bad time in regard to food; and here is a country which is surplus in food suddenly becoming deficit and having to go to the extreme course of bringing food from the far corners of the earth. Therefore we cannot base any policy on hopes. Let us by all means work up to realise that. We have to base a policy expecting that untoward occurrences will take place. I go a step further. Even if we are fairly satisfied that our hopes will be realised, that circumstances are better and will be better, even then we cannot let go of the strategic points from every point of view. I would like to make it clear therefore that strategic controls over the food situation must remain.

The only other question that is to be considered is the application of those strategic controls or the relaxation from time to time of non-strategic controls. It really is a detail although it is a very important detail and one has to see whether that does not affect the strategic control somewhere. Now, again, it does not necessarily follow that any absolutely uniform policy is essential or necessary for the whole country. Conditions vary in different States and one has to adapt oneself to those circumstances keeping in view that basic thing. The basic approach is the same but the implementation of that basic approach in any part of the country, in any State, may vary, may differ due to so many conditions. That has to be remembered because I find that there is a slight confusion in the basic approach, of its particular implementation in a particular area or State. That implementation will depend on so many factors which are peculiar to a State, more especially on the food situation, but some other factors too have to be considered. Then again while you have these strategic controls, if you spread them out too much, as in the case of military control, it means less control. I am talking in terms of military analogy. A spreadout army is a weak army. It is not controlling the situation. Therefore look at that from this point of view. I heard the other day that in one State the Government was proceeding against a large number of, I think it was 15,000 young men, boys, for the pettiest offences of carrying a handful of rice or wheat from here to there. It was an offence. Now when a State spends all its energies in catching little boys, there is something wrong in the method of approach. There is nothing wrong in the controls. That is a different thing. But there is something wrong in the energy being spent while probably the major offenders get away. It is far better to impose some kind of procedure which, if I may repeat here again, gives you control over the strategic points, and not to catch hold of every boy and girl for technical breaches. Now, if the proposal that has been placed before the House, with this small provision added, that head-loads will be free of movement— head-loads are obviously not going to change the general food position in the country.

This applies to millets only. However much people may carry in head-loads, that cannot much affect the major situation. It is a nuisance if you think of it. After all, we talk of this State and that State. There is a tendency for each State to consider itself as something apart from the rest. But, the poor men who live in the borders of the States have possibly no such distinctive feeling. They may have their relatives on the other side; they may have their land on the other side; the nearest market may be on the

other side of the border and it will be natural for them to go there. So the less we upset the normal functions on the border, the better. It is a needless burden and a most harassing situation is created without any effect on the basic economy that you are trying to pursue. You may utilise that analogy elsewhere. In that sense, if you relax the control here and there, it is worth while provided it does not affect your basic control of the situation. You can examine this from time to time and see how far, in view of the situation, you can adjust yourself or relax something here or there, always remembering that the basic policy to be pursued remains the same and has to remain the same.

We are not dealing at the present moment with rice and wheat. It must be made perfectly clear that this has nothing to do with rice or wheat where the situation remains exactly where it was. We are dealing with millets. Millets form a fairly considerable part of our food consumption, about 40 per cent or thereabout. Whatever that may be, nevertheless, millets, normally have been produced for local consumption. A large part of the millets are consumed locally. Movement of millets has been much less than the movement of rice and wheat, and it has not affected the situation so much as the movement of rice and wheat does. Although forming 40 per cent, of our food consumption,—I speak subject to correction—actually, within the rationing system, only about eight per cent, came in.

I am merely saying that any step that we may take, we should examine from the point of view of the effect of that step on the general situation, and on the rice or wheat situation. As far as one can see, the millet situation does affect, but does not affect very much. If you go a step further and if, as is proposed, you maintain State barriers for millets, and there is only internal freedom of movement and you only allow one State Government to purchase from the other State Government, you are really maintaining quite a great deal of control even on the millet situation, although the millet situation by itself does not affect very largely the entire situation. It does affect somewhat, but it does not affect as much as wheat or rice, though it forms 40 per cent of our food consumption. Even that you are controlling. So that, step that we are taking, from the point of view of the larger policy, appears to be a fairly safe step. At the same time, it removes a good deal of petty troubles and petty harassment. It allows us to see how things develop and if they do not develop rightly, it is always open to us to go back and do something else. I suggest to the House that that is the proper approach to the question. I believe there is one amendment that has been put into the effect: accepting and approving of the general policy of controls, but accepting also adjustments or modifications keeping in view that basic policy. The amendment runs thus:

“and having considered the same, this House approves of the policy of Government regarding general control of foodgrains and welcomes the desire of the Government to adjust the same to suit local or temporary conditions without prejudice to the basic objectives.”

I think that amendment represents correctly the position of the Government.

It is a question of wording. I did not draft this amendment. I should like it as it is. It is good enough. It may have been slightly differently worded. That is immaterial. The main thing is, I should like the House to lay stress that the basic fact of controlling the foodgrains remains. At the same time, recognizing that our approach is not merely a decrainaire approach, which has no relation to changing facts and changing situations, an approach which merely harasses people without producing results, we adjust it from time to time, always keeping that basic thing in view.

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BACK NOTE

VIII. Motion Regarding Food Situation, 18 November, 1952

1. PANDIT L.K. MAITRA: (Nabadwip): May I ask for some clarification. Sir? The hon. Prime Minister has explained the effect of the continuance of this new scheme. I want to know whether the policy that is going to be pursued from now onwards, will have some salutary effect on the general consumers. You know, at the moment, in the whole of India, the total rationed population is about twelve per cent. The rest, *i.e.*, 88 per cent, are not under rationing. In the case of State Governments, their Food Ministers feel that if they can meet the statutory requirements, their work is over. For instance, in the city of Calcutta rice is sold at Rs. 17/8/ a maund. Ten miles outside Calcutta, or in the district from which I come, for the last six months, price of rice have been ranging between Rs. 30 and 38. The purchasing power in the city of Calcutta is much higher than in the rural areas. The general thing is, the Government always thinks in terms of the statutory requirements, as necessitated by statutory rationing. As was pointed out to the hon. Mr. Kidwai, take for instance, Bihar, Jamshedpur is rationed. The coal field area is also rationed. Elsewhere, where there is free movement of grains, they somehow get them at cheaper rates. In West Bengal, for instance. Calcutta and other industrial areas, such as Darjeeling, Asansol, Kalimpong, etc. are areas under statutory rationing. In the rest of the places, 88 per cent, of the population, has to pay more throughout the year much more—sometimes twice the price in the rationed area—excuse me, for the strong language, but I am not speaking perfervid language. You can have it verified any time you like. Even today, prices range about Rs. 30.

SHRI VELAYUDHAN (Quilon cum Mavelikkara—Reserved—Sch. Castes): There is no rationing?

PANDIT L.K. MAITRA: Sometimes there is a sort of modified rationing.

Sometimes people of these areas get some foodstuffs at controlled rates. Normally, that is not the case. There are classifications of consumers and a certain limited percentage only gets the benefit under modified rationing. Under the present scheme, as propounded by the hon. Prime Minister, elucidating the position after other Ministers and Mr. Kidwai have spoken, I am not clear in my mind whether the common men who is not fortunate enough to live in Calcutta with a higher purchasing power, or in Bombay, whether the common man living within 20 or 13 miles away from Calcutta or their cordoned of rationed areas, is going to benefit by it. High hopes were raised that if these internal barriers were lifted, and sufficient buffer stocks rushed, prices, would go down.

SHRI BANSAL (JhajjarRewari): Is it a speech or a point or order?

PANDIT L.K. MAITRA: It is only seeking clarification. Why are you worried? The Chair is there. I was just asking. Sir, whether it would be possible for him to throw light on it. If it is a speech, I cannot help it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I think that the point mentioned by my hon. friend. Pandit L. K. Maitra, is very important, and must be borne in mind. We cannot just function by thinking in terms of ten or fifteen percent, of the population, forgetting the others. Well, among the others, there are a large number of those who are food producers. The real difficulty comes in the case of the others who are neither food producers, nor city dwellers or dwellers in rationed areas. They get into these difficulties. Any policy that we frame must keep that in mind, *i.e.*, to keep the price down for these people too'. Obviously, the point suggested by the hon. Member has to be borne in mind. How it is to be worked out, of course, is a different matter. In fact, suppose there is internal free movement of millets in the States, that itself, so far as millets are concerned, will probably equalise things. The other points also must be taken into account, but my main point was that essentially control must remain because, after all, what are we working for? We are working for a steady and as quick as possible, reduction of imports of foodstuffs from outside by growing more in our own country, and by better distribution of it.

Hon. Member Dr. Lanka Sundaram yesterday reminded me of a statement I made—not a statement, but repeated statements—three years ago.

I think, it was, to the effect that we must put an end to food imports by 1952—March or April, 1952. I said that, I think, in 1950 or 1949—I forget when—and when I made that statement. I did so with all honesty of purpose, and with every intention that we should try our best, but I regret that my words were falsified, and I felt thoroughly ashamed of myself for having made that kind of, almost, a pledge to the country and therefore. I am very much averse to making any definite statement or pledge now.

SHRI GADGIL (Poona Central): An occasion for experiment?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU : But I do not see why I should not say that we intend making every effort to reduce these food imports, and, if possible, within the period of the plan, put an end to them, except in a very grave emergency. That is our intention, and statistics, as they appear now, give us some hope that is a feasible proposition. That is all I can say.

PANDIT L. K. MAITRA: Have you got any idea of progressive decontrol?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: When you say “progressive decontrol”, I would say “progressive adjustments”, but always the full strategy, particularly strategic positions, must remain in control: otherwise, you can only progress round about the outskirts.

SHRI T. K. CHANDHURI: May I seek another clarification, Sir? The Food Minister, in his speech, criticised the procurement system both in north and south India. Do the Government have in contemplation an overall revision of the procurement system, because in the rural parts, control means procurement. In the deficit States, control means procurement. I recognise there is necessity for retaining some sort of procurement, so long as controls are there, so long as the Government is under statutory obligation to feed a certain part of the population. But my specific point is whether there is going to be an overall revision of the procurement system?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I think it was made clear—the Finance Minister also made it clear—that any attempt to have uniformity all over is very difficult, and I think it is undesirable to have the same method everywhere. The conditions are different, and after all we have to work through the State Governments, and it is largely for the State Governments to consider and decide. There is no doubt that procurement must continue, I would go a step further. It is perhaps not quite self-contradictory to say that even if we have do control, we require procurement. We must keep enough stocks in our hands. We must supply stocks to the deficit areas. There are obviously deficit areas in the country. Conditions have improved generally, but, for instance, the State of Madras has been peculiarly unfortunate year after year, and the situation there is bad, at the present moment—bad in the sense there has been no rain again, and they have to go through the next few months, and we have to face that. Some of the Karnatak districts, and some other areas of India, are deficit areas. They have not been having rain or something has happened. We have to supply them. Where are you going to supply from? Obviously, either from purchases abroad, or procurement locally. We want to restrict food imports from abroad. Anyhow, we cannot buy everything from abroad. Procurement has to continue and stocks have to be got, whatever methods of local control there might be. It is a matter of adjustment and suitability.

STATEMENT REGARDING COMMONWEALTH ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

19 November, 1952

Some months ago the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom informed me that it was proposed to hold a Conference of Prime Ministers of Commonwealth countries to discuss economic matters of common concern. It was proposed to hold this Conference some time in November of this year and the Prime Minister of the U.K. pointed out the importance of the subjects to be discussed and was anxious that India should be represented at this Conference by her Prime Minister. I recognised the importance of this Conference, but it was very difficult for me to leave India at a time when Parliament was meeting and there were other important matters which required my presence here. In the course of my reply, therefore, I expressed my inability to attend the Conference in London. I added however, that I hoped that India would be represented at this Conference. It has now been decided that our Minister of Finance, Shri Chintaman Deshmukh should represent us at the Conference together with our High Commissioner in London, Shri B. G. Kher. They will be assisted by the Governor of the Reserve Bank and senior officials.

The House will recall that the Finance Minister of the Commonwealth countries met in a Conference early this year to discuss emergent measures that were necessary to avoid a serious threat to the trade and payments of the Sterling Area caused by a rapid decline in its central gold and dollar reserves since July, 1951. As a result of the measures taken by the Governments of the Sterling Area countries, on the recommendation of this Conference, the drain on the central gold and dollar reserves of the sterling area has been halted since March, 1952.

Apart from recommending short-term and emergent action to overcome this threat, the Finance Minister's Conference had also given consideration to the long-term policies which the Sterling Area countries could adopt in order to avoid a recurrence of a similar crisis. It was considered that the productive power of the Sterling Area countries should be rapidly developed and that measures should be devised to avoid violent fluctuations in commodity prices. Further, it had come to the conclusion that the objectives of the economic policies of the Sterling Area countries should be to achieve convertibility of sterling and to work towards that goal by progressive steps for creating conditions in which sterling could be made convertible and its convertibility could be maintained. Sterling being an international medium of payments for a substantial part of the world trade, its convertibility was an essential step towards achieving a high level of international trade on the basis of multilateral payments.

The purpose of the Commonwealth Economic Conference now to be held is to have further consultations on these long-term problems and to examine whether it is possible for the Sterling Area countries to take any steps in these directions.

The agenda of this Conference, which will open in London on the 27th November, is as follows:

- (1) Review of economic development in recent years and future prospects.
- (2) Objectives in external economic policy.
- (3) Aspects of these objectives and of the means for achieving them:
 - (a) Financial policy:
 - (b) Economic development:
 - (c) Trade Policy.
 - (d) Commodity Policy;
 - (e) International Institutions.
- (4) Cooperation with other countries.
- (5) Short-term balance of payments prospects of the Sterling Area and policy for 1953.

The Finance Minister proposes to leave for the United Kingdom on the 23rd November, 1952.

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I submit, Sir, it is rather an extraordinary suggestion to make. So long as we are dealing with sterling we are intimately connected with the developments there and it would be unwise not to attend these conferences and for things to happen which might affect us. It is a different matter if basically and fundamentally we became dissociated with it or associated with something else. But so long as that does not happen I do submit, Sir, the question does not arise.

BACK NOTE

IX. Statement Regarding Commonwealth Economic Conference, 19 November, 1952

1. SHRI B. DAS (Jajpur-Keonjhar): I suggest the House may be allowed to discuss whether India should at all participate in the Commonwealth Conference.

MR. SPEAKER: He wants a discussion as to whether India should at all participate in the Conference.

STATEMENT REGARDING KOREAN SITUATION

21 November, 1952

May I intervene, Sir, to say a few words about a matter which is not on the agenda of Parliament, but which, nevertheless, is exercising the minds of all of us here as well as in the country and indeed in a great part of the world. At this moment momentous issues affecting the peace of the world are being debated in the United Nations. In furtherance of India's policy to serve the cause of peace, our delegation in the United Nations has put forward, with our full concurrence, a resolution relating to the Korean situation. In this resolution we have endeavoured to the utmost of our ability, to suggest an honourable way out of the difficulties that have thus far come in the way of a settlement. This resolution does not settle everything. It is a step, we hope, in the right direction which, if accepted in the spirit in which we have put it forward, might well lead to a lightening of the tremendous burden that is oppressing humanity. We have offered this resolution in all humility of spirit, and I am happy that the distinguished representatives of the nations assembled in New York are viewing it with favour.

A moment comes in the life of a nation, and sometimes of the world, when the future hangs on a decision that might be taken. That moment is here, and on the United Nations has been cast the great responsibility at this critical juncture of seizing this moment with courage and determination and thus justifying the great purpose for which it was started. The noble words of the Charter of the United Nations ring in our ears and we remember the great hopes that those words raised in the minds of the peoples of the world. Since then some adverse fate has pursued us and baffled our best endeavours, and instead of achieving the peace that was sought, the world struggles with the shadow of war. Fear and hatred and violence raise their ugly heads and tortured humanity looks helplessly on these tragic developments. The lights have grown dim.

Yet, the light is there which can disperse the shadows that threaten to overwhelm us and it is given to the United Nations today to light up that bright flame afresh and bring back to people's minds the great purpose for which it was founded. At this crisis I would earnestly appeal to the nations represented at the General Assembly of the United Nations, as well as those nations who are not present there but who are so intimately concerned with this matter, to justify the hopes that the peoples of the world place on them, and by a joint effort, to exercise the spirit of war and raise up the banner of peace in the world. Thus will the United Nations prove true to its ideals and to its purpose; thus will the present generation justify itself.

I am sure that in this matter I speak with the full concurrence of every Member of this House to whatever group or party he or she might belong, and indeed with the full and ardent approval of the millions of our people.

On our delegation in the United Nations is cast a heavy responsibility. I should like this House to send them a message of encouragement and goodwill which would strengthen them in the difficult task they have undertaken.

I speak these words not only with anxious hope but with a prayer in my heart that we of this generation might prove worthy of our inheritance; of the passionate hopes and aspirations of innumerable people who hunger for peace, and of the future that we claim to build.

BACK NOTE

X. Statement Regarding Korean Situation, 21 November, 1952

NIL

STATEMENT REGARDING INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION

27 November, 1952

With your permission. I should like to say a few words about a matter that came up before the House Yesterday. I was not present then, but my colleagues informed me of it. It came up when the House was discussing the Industrial Finance Corporation (Amendment) Bill, I understand that some Members of the House desired that the names of the industrial concerns to which the Corporation has advanced loans should be communicated to the House, and my colleague who was in charge of that Bill found some difficulty in doing so, because of the policy thus far pursued in this matter. Indeed only a few days ago, I think on the 7th November, my colleague the hon. Finance Minister in answering a question by an hon. Member of the House as to whether a certain firm had been granted a loan, stated as follows:

“The borrowing concerns are entitled to such secrecy which is customary between a banker and the customer with regard to their banking transactions, and it would not therefore be in the public interest to furnish this information”.

Now, I am no expert in regard to the conduct of banks, either from the borrowing or the other point of view. So I tried to bring a fresh layman's mind to bear on this question. The first thing that obviously struck me was this. When we have followed a policy and proceeded on the basis of that and given certain assurance to parties, it would not be fair, regardless of other considerations, for us to go behind those assurances, in so far as they have been given with the consent of the parties concerned.

Secondly, when my hon. colleague the Finance Minister, who is most intimately concerned with this matter and has been following this policy, I should not like without consulting him, to say anything definite about this matter. Nevertheless, I realise completely that there is force in what some hon. Members stated in this House that this matter should be considered fully at a little later stage, when, if I may say so, my colleague the Finance Minister is here. It should be remembered that these firms, first of all, this Industrial Finance Corporation is an autonomous corporation, no doubt, responsible to Government. Normally speaking in regard to an autonomous organization, Parliament does not interfere in their normal day to day activities. Of course, it can wind them up if necessary, or inquire into any serious misfeasance. That is a different matter, but the very idea of putting up an autonomous organization is that they should have freedom to carry on their businesses, subject to certain overall policy or control of Government or of Parliament. That is one point.

Secondly, in regard to the firms to whom the money has been lent, I understand they are public limited companies. Now this relationship is somewhat different on the one hand from the relationship, let us say, of the Damodar Valley Corporation and

the Government-the Damodar Valley Corporation is a completely Government organization-on the other hand, the relationship of the Industrial Finance Corporation which lent the money to these people cannot be equated entirely, as far as I can see, with that of a private banker doing it. So this stands in a third category, and because it is an intermediate category, considerations on the other side can be advanced. And for the moment, I do not like to say anything definite as to what the future policy in regard to this matter should be. But I would submit that we should not like, if any undertakings have been given, assurances given, or policies stated to go behind them so far as the part is concerned, without consulting the parties concerned, and more especially the hon. Finance Minister when he comes back. And then the future policy can also be considered and laid before the House.

It is not merely question of stating the names of those to whom money has been lent, but the question may arise of putting forward the names of those firms to whom money has not been given or whose applications have been rejected. Now that creates a further difficulty. If we publicise that we have not given money to a particular firm, there may be many reasons, and it may hurt their trading. It may be that we did not think it worthwhile, or whatever the reason may be, it may hurt their trading.

Then again, if we discuss the internal affairs of a public limited company to whom we had given money, I submit that it would not be in keeping with the normal practice of this House that we should go into details of this kind, and various difficulties would arise.

I would submit to the House, that these questions having been raised, we hope to take them up and consider them, when the hon. Finance Minister comes back, and we should consult representatives of the House too at that time and have their views and then inform the House too about this matter.

Secondly, if any Member says that he has information to his possession, which leads him to suspect that something wrong has occurred, we shall very gladly inquire into the matter, if he will place that information before us.

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May I say a word, Sir? As the hon. Member has asked me for a day, I am very happy that the House discusses any subject, but it is beyond my capacity to increase the number of days in the year or the month or the number of hours in the day. And we have got not too many days left, we are full up.

On this particular matter that I referred to in my statement, as far as I can see, it has nothing to do with the Bill. It is a separate matter which can be taken up and decided: the question whether information about certain names be given or not does not affect the larger policy of any Bill, or our industrial policy.

BACK NOTE

XI. Statement Regarding Industrial Finance Corporation, 27 November, 1952

1. SHRI H.N. MUKERJEE (Calcutta North-East): May I make a submission, Sir?

Mr. Speaker: Not at this stage. We shall take it up when the Bill comes up for discussion.

SHRI H.N. MUKERJEE: May I submit that in view of the Government's attitude in regard to this matter, it might be advisable to postpone the discussion of this Bill till such time as the hon. Finance Minister returns?

Mr. Speaker: Unfortunately the Bill is not before the House now.

SHRI H.N. MUKERJEE: In that case, I would like to ask, in view of the Industrial Finance Corporation (Amendment) Bill, as well as certain other Bills dealing with the industrial policy of the Government being pending before the House, would Government consider the desirability of allotting a day or more for discussing industrial policy. As a matter of fact, in the course of the discussion of such Bills as the Sugar (Additional Excise Duty) Bill, the hon. Deputy Speaker actually suggested that it will be a good thing if the House could have a day for discussion on industrial policy, and that in view of all these questions coming up from time to time, it might very well be advisable for the hon. Prime Minister to agree to the allotment of a day or more for the discussion of the basic points of industrial policy.

RESOLUTION REGARDING FIVE YEAR PLAN

15 December, 1952

I beg to move:

“This House records its general approval of the principles, objectives and programme of development contained in the Five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission.”

In moving this resolution, I have a feeling, first of all, of the stage of a journey being completed, of a duty done, and if I may say so, well done, and at the same time I have another and more powerful sensation of a harder duty and more difficult work ahead, of another journey immediately to be undertaken, because ultimately there are no resting places in the journey we have undertaken.

So far as this present plan is concerned, it may be said to have had its beginning in preparation when the Planning Commission first came into existence. Of course, much thought had been given to this question of Planning in India even previously and discussions had taken place in this very House or the Parliament before. But this particular attempt was begun when this Planning Commission came into existence two and a half years ago. Now perhaps, I may speak in this matter without any offence against modesty, because my own connection with the Planning Commission, though intimate, nevertheless, was one in which the burden of work fell lightly upon me. Others carried the burden, and therefore if I may praise that work. I do not praise myself or what I have done in regard to it. Therefore I said I can speak a little more freely about that matter than if I had myself been possibly a recipient of that praise.

The Planning Commission, and as such the staff of the Planning Commission when I say the staff, I include all the members of it whatever their degree or status might be—have worked very hard, very conscientiously very vigorously and with something of the crusading spirit, in preparing this Plan.

I should like, therefore to pay my tribute to them, not merely an empty tribute without knowledge but with due knowledge of what they have done. And that, if I may say so, need not necessarily have any relation to what we may agree or disagree with any particular chapter or particular part of the Report. This work was, in a sense the first of its kind, certainly the first of its kind so far as we were concerned and I think we might justifiably say that in this particular context it was the first of its kind anywhere. We know very well, of course, that planning became well known and rather fashionable ever since over 20 years ago when the first Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union came into the field and was much talked about. Gradually planning became a popular subject for people to talk about, though very often those who talked about it talked perhaps without really understanding what they were talking about.

What I mean is this. People talk about planning sometimes in limited spheres. Of course, there can be planning for a nation, it is something infinitely more than that

planning in bits and spurts here and there. It becomes an integrated way of approaching this question of a nation's manifold actively. But the difference in the way of our approach and the way of the old Soviet approach—I am not comparing the two, I am merely mentioning it— has been a certain difference in our objectives, somewhat, though not perhaps so great ultimately as might be thought, but much more so in the methods adopted. And in view of the fact that we function under a democratic set up which we have deliberately adopted and enshrined in our Constitution and in this Parliament, naturally any planning that takes place must be within that set up and no Planning Commission has any right to go about producing something which has no relation to our Constitution or the set up under which we are functioning.

Now, that puts certain self-imposed limitations on a plan, but I would like to say that those limitations are not final limitations. And I do not think it would be right to say that democratic functioning necessarily puts any limitations at all. It may make the way a little more difficult: the procedure adopted may be a little more complicated. But a democratic set up, properly worked, should permit of anything that we desire to be done. And possibly that, I suppose, is the Justification of that democratic set up, apart from other justifications, that what it does, even though it might take a little more time. It does perhaps build on more firm foundation and in particular, it builds on a foundation of an individual, and not entirely targeting the individual. However, that is not a point I wish to labour. What I wish to say is that accepting the democratic set up and accepting the functioning of this Parliament etc. we must consider this Plan, on that basis. We have made a Constitution and we should abide by that Constitution.

Nevertheless let it not be said that Constitution, every part of it, every chapter and corner of it, is something that is so sacrosanct that it cannot be changed the needs of the country or the nation so desire. Undoubtedly it can be changed wherever necessary, not lightly but after full thought, if it is thought that that part of the Constitution comes in the way of the nation's progress. But, generally speaking, we have to plan in accordance with that Constitution.

Now this Plan was produced, or rather the parent of it—the Draft Outline—was placed before the country a little over a year ago and placed before this Parliament also, and it was approved generally by Parliament then and it has been the subject of approval and criticism and, to a slight extent, condemnation in certain parts but much more so of approval generally all over the country during this year. And the Planning Commission has profited greatly by that criticism and even by the partial condemnation of parts of the Plan, that has been placed before it. I doubt if there has been greater consultation of various, not only organisations, parties, States, but opinions, viewpoints etc. I doubt if there has been a greater consultation of the various elements that go to make up the nation's life anywhere in this matter than we have had in this particular Plan during the first year and a quarter. In that sense, therefore, it might be said to be not, the production of five or six members of the Planning Commission, but rather a joint effort in which a large part of the nation has taken part and therefore, it represents

something much more than the opinions of the members of the Planning Commission. They had to deal with a very difficult problem. Of course, the country is big, but apart from the bigness of the country, we had to deal with a federal structure the Centre and the great States, and the various States also divided in various degrees. We have to deal with an economy which is in many ways a very backward economy. We have to suffer the consequences of past acts and many things that have happened in the past. We have to deal with a new social consciousness which is very desirable. We have to deal with great ambitions, which we all share, to progress rapidly and we have to deal with limited resources to further those great ambitions. We have had to and have to deal with looking at the world in a period of storm and trial and crisis and change, and generally speaking, disaster round the corner. We have to deal in India often enough with thinking in old ruts, with sometimes superstitions and outlooks which come in the way of progress. We have to deal even, if I may say so with all respect, with the reformer of yesterday who is a conservative today, the revolutionary of yesterday forgetting that today is different from yesterday. In other words, we had to deal with a dynamic and live situation, ever changing, which could not be resolved by any dogma, whether of religion or, of economic or, of anything else.

Apart from that fact, when you deal with a great country like India, you have to deal with India only and not with any other country or the conditions that exist in any other country and try to repeat them here. Of course, there are certain principles, certain ideals, certain objectives which hold for various countries, which hold for various ages too; they do not change. India herself has represented various principles of that type and I hope she will hold to them, while, at the same time. I hope and say that with emphasis, that she will give up a large number of superstitions and evil ways of old which have impeded her growth and which are taken advantage of even today to divert people from the principal subjects that we should consider here. So, for all this amalgum and variety that we have in India, we have to form a plan for future progress. And when I think of this for a moment, I forget these two heavy and fat volumes of the Report of the Planning Commission and something much vaster comes before me. The mighty theme of a nation building itself, remaking itself, all of us working together to make a new India—that is a big job—all of us working together, not abstractly for a nation but for the 360 million people as individuals or as groups going ahead.

In fact, we are trying to catch up as far as we can with the Industrial Revolution which came long years ago in western countries and made great changes in the course of a century or more, which ultimately has branched off in two directions from the same tree, if I may say so, the two directions at present being represented by the very high degree of technological development represented by the United States of America and other represented by the Soviet Union, branches of the same tree even though they might quarrel with each other. Now, this Industrial Revolution has a long history in the past and we apt to think in terms of European history when we look at India. Why we should repeat the errors of the past is not clear to me. Obviously we have to learn from the past and avoid these errors.

Now, we talk in terms of industrialisation and it is obvious to me that we have to industrialise India as rapidly as possible. And, when I use the word industrialise, I include, of course, in it all kinds of Industry, major, middling, small, village and cottage. The biggest step that we can take in the industrialisation of the country can absorb only —by any imputation you like—a small part of the population of this country in the next ten, twenty or even thirty years, put it whatever you like. Yet hundreds of millions remain over who will be employed chiefly in agriculture but who, also have to be employed in smaller industries, in cottage industries, and the like. And, therefore, the importance of village and cottage industries. I think, the argument that often takes place, the argument of big industry *versus* cottage industry and village Industry is rather misconceived, I have no doubt at all that without the development of major industry in this country, we cannot raise our levels of existence. In fact, I will go further: we cannot remain a free country because certain things are essential to freedom: Defence—leave out other things — which if we do have, we cannot remain a free country. Therefore, we have to develop industry in that major ways but always remembering that all the development of industry in that major way does not by itself solve the problem of the hundreds of millions of this country and we have to increase the smaller village industry and cottage industry in a big way also remembering that in trying to develop industry, big or small, we do not forget the human factor. We are not out merely to get more money and more products on. We want not merely more production but ultimately we want better human beings. In this country with greater opportunities not only economic and the rest but at other levels also. We have seen in other countries that economic growth by itself does not necessarily mean human growth, does not necessarily mean national growth. So, we have to keep this particular picture and not think that the growth of the nation comes merely from the shouting that takes place in the market places and the stock exchanges of the country. So, to balance all these, to produce some kind of integrated plan for the economic growth of the country, for the growth of the individual, for greater opportunities to every individual for the greater freedom of the country, you have to do all this within the framework of political democracy. Political democracy, ultimately of course, will only justify itself or be justified if it success in producing these results. If it does not, political democracy will yield place to some other form of economic or social structure, does not matter how much any of us like it or not. Ultimately, it is results that will decide the fate of what structure we may adopt in this country or in any country of the world. When we talk of political democracy we must remember that it is ceasing to have that particular significance which it had, say in the 19th century. Political democracy, if it is to have any meaning must gradually, or, if you like, rapidly lead to economic democracy. Without that, if there is great inequality in the country, all the political democracy and all the adult suffrage in the world does not bring about the real essence of democracy. Therefore, your objective has to be— call it economic democracy, call it the putting an end to all these great differences between class and class—the bringing about of more equality, and a more unitary society. In other words, it has gradually to put an end to the various classes that

subsist and ultimately develop into classless societies. That may be a little far off, I do not know. But you must keep that in view.

Now, it is clear that you cannot approach that by way of conflict and violence, so far as this country is concerned. We have achieved many things by way of peace and there is no particular reason why we should give that up and go into violent methods. There is a very particular reason why we should not do so because I am quite convinced that, however high our ideals might be, and our objectives. If we try to solve them by methods of violence, it will delay matters very greatly. It will help the growth of the very evils that we are fighting against. India is not only a big country, but a varied country, and if anyone takes to the sword, he will inevitably be met by the sword of someone else. Therefore, it becomes a clash between swords, or violence, and all the limited energies of the nation are destroyed in that process, or greatly lessened.

Now, the method of peaceful progress is a method ultimately of democratic progress. But keeping in mind the ultimate aim of democratic thought, it is not enough for us to say that we have given votes to all and let the rest remain. The ultimate aim is economic democracy. The ultimate aim is putting an end to these great differences between the rich and the poor; the people who have opportunities and those who have none or very little. That must be kept in mind. In the ultimate analysis, everything that come in the way of that aim must be removed—removed in a friendly way; removed in a cooperative way; removed by State pressure; removed by law—because nothing should be allowed ultimately to come in the way of your achieving that social objective.

So, a plan of this type is not merely the putting up of a number of factories here and there; not merely showing greater production here and there—which is necessary, of course—but something more with a deeper significance; something aiming at a certain kind of structure of society that you want gradually to develop, of course, you and I cannot lay down what will happen or what the next generation might do. You and I cannot even say what the next generation will be like. In these days of very rapid technological advance, no man knows what the world would be like some time hence. We are technologically backward. Therefore, sometimes when we discuss big problems, we discuss them—if I may say so with all respect—in a rather static way, forgetting that the very ground underneath our feet is changing or slipping away. Unless we move with it, we may tumble over or be left behind. The enormous pace of technological advance ever since the Industrial Revolution is generally known and appreciated, but nevertheless we are not emotionally aware of what is happening from day to day, and it may well be that in the course of the next ten years, or twenty years, or more, this technological advance might change the whole aspect of the things in the world, and that affects the life of human beings tremendously. It affects their thinking. It affects their economic structure. It affects their social structure. Ultimately, it affects their political structure also. Anything may come. We cannot hind the future. For the present, we have to deal with facts as they are.

But I mention these broader factors, so that our mind must have that dynamic quality, that quality of vision, that revolutionary quality which not only the average laymen, but even our experts—whether they are economists, or even planners—lack. They have become very static in their approach. I do not see this mighty change. We talk of revolutions and think of perhaps that a revolution is a process where you can break each other's head. That is not a revolution. It may be or may not be—that is a side show. Good or bad, a revolution is something which changes fundamentally the structure—political and economic—of the society, so that with this background we have to take into consideration this first attempt of ours to make a plan.

Naturally, it is not perfect. I do not claim perfection. Perfection is a big word. I think that it is quite easy to pick holes in it. It is quite easy to demonstrate that it is wrong somewhere or not right elsewhere, or that much could have been done, or something which could have been said has not been said, or that something which need not have been said has been said, and so on. All this can be done, and no doubt will be done, I have no doubt that after it has been done, the Planning Commission itself may like to profit by what has been said. But look at it in this broader context and not from the point of view of more criticism. This is the first attempt in India to bring this whole picture of India—agricultural, industrial, social, economic etc.—into one framework of thinking. That is a very important thing, and I say that even if that thinking is wrong partly here and there—even then, it is a tremendous thing attempted and done. It has made not only those who have participated in it, not only Members of this House who have to deal with these big matters, but to some extent the whole country “planning—conscious”. It has made them think of this country as a whole, because I do think that one of the biggest things in this country at present is for you; to make the country which is politically united and which is in many other ways united but which is not yet mentally and emotionally united to that extent to be united in that respect also. We often go off at tangents whether they are provincial tangents. Whether they are communal or religious tangents, whether they are caste tangents, or whether they are all kinds of other things. We do not have that emotional awareness of the unity of the country which we should have. It is planning and viewing these problems as a whole that will help greatly in producing that emotional awareness of our problems as a whole apart from our separate problems in our villages or districts or even provinces. Therefore, the mere act of this planning the mere act of having approached this question in this way and produced a report of this type is something for which we might, I think, congratulate ourselves.

Remember this. When we talked about planning two or three years ago, powerful voices were raised against it. The idea of planning, to some people, was just helping industry, by let us say, tariffs or giving them money etc., and leaving it to them to do what they like. They did not like being controlled in any way. While the essence of planning is this broad picture of some kind of control of the whole economy of the country, this Plan talks about a public sector and a private sector. But the House must remember and everybody should remember, that the private sector is going to be a controlled sector also, not of course to the same extent, but it will have to be a

controlled sector in many ways and an increasingly controlled sector as time goes on. It may be controlled, of course, in regard to the dividends and the profits that it makes, but It will have to be something more than that, because we have to control the strategic points of the economy of the country, and this report—rightly I think—is cautious about many matters. But if you read it carefully, you will find that it has stated what can be done and what should be done without definitely saying “Do it because it has left the door open”. Take important subjects like banking and insurance. They are highly important in the economy of a country. Strategically, they must be controlled in any economy. Well, how to do it, and what to do etc. have not been dealt with, because the Planning Commission did not think itself justified in laying down the details. But if you read the earlier chapters of this report, the Planning Commission has said that these are important and these have to be kept in view and steps will have to be taken to bring them in some form or other under control so as to fit in them more and more within the purview and sphere of a controlled economy.

So, this Plan suggests something definite to be done and also suggests many other things which can be done and should be done, but it does not go into details as to how it should be done or when it should be done. That, of course, can be done during the period of the Plan, and not afterwards, because after all the method of planning or the method of working out a plan is ultimately the method of trial and error. The best of us can only see dimly into the future, if at all. We can proceed by analogy. We can proceed by past experience. But, ultimately, you have to deal not with steel and cement and things that you can measure. But you have to deal with 360 million individual human beings in this country, each different from the other. All the statisticians in the world and all the economists in the world cannot say what a multitude of individuals may or may not feel, or may or may not do. You have to proceed by the method of trial and error. I have no doubt that when the time comes for a second Five Year Plan, we would be in a far better position, and on far firmer ground, because we would have gone through this process of thinking and what will follow from it. Again, the process of working and trying to build according to this Plan would have been there, and we would have learnt much by it. The second Plan therefore will be a much more effective and far reaching Plan, based on greater knowledge, and derived not from theory but from practice.

Now, remember this also, that we call this a Five Year Plan, but two years out of the five are over. Therefore, it really is a plan for the next three years or so. We started with this Plan under certain limitations, because we had to accept what was done. We did not start from scratch. We had to accept them. Our resources were tied up with things that were done: we had to accept that naturally, and with the balance of resources left we had to deal with the next period.

So that this Five Year Plan is partly in action and it would be over in the next three years or so. Also remember that this Plan is essentially if I may say so, a preparatory plan for greater and more rapid progress in future. As I said, the second Five Year Plan, if we build our foundations well, could proceed at a much faster pace, or rate of progress than we have indicated here. We have indicated the various places.

People calculate them in their own way. Some people say it is too slow a rate. Others ask: "Can you do it?—it is too fast". It is based on intelligent anticipations and calculations. If we can better it, certainly we will try to better it.

We talk about industrialisation. You will see in the earlier Chapters certain figures are given as to how much will go to industry, how much to agriculture, how much to social service, transport and the rest. Industry does not seem to come very well off in that picture. Agriculture takes a great deal. As far as I remember irrigation takes a very big sum. We attach the greatest importance to industry, but we attach, if I may say so, greater importance in the present context to agriculture and food, and other matters pertaining to agriculture, because if we do not have our agricultural foundation strong then the industry we seek to build will not be on a strong basis. Apart from that fact, in the country as it is situated today, if our food front cracks up everything cracks. So, we have to keep a strong food front; we dare not weaken it. If our agriculture, as we hope, becomes strongly entrenched and is in a good way then it becomes relatively easy for us to go faster on the industrial front, while if we try to go faster in regard to our industry now and leave agriculture in a weak condition, we make industry weaken still. Therefore, first attention has been given to agriculture and food and I think it is quite essential in a country like India at the present moment.

But even so, certain basic industries, key industries, have been thought of and brought in. The basic thing even for the development of industry is power—electric power. You cannot develop industry, or anything, unless you have adequate power. You can judge the progress made by any country by how much electric power it has. That is a good test of the growth of any country. Now, we will get electric power by these various hydroelectric schemes, river valley schemes, multipurpose schemes and the like.

I do not propose to go through these two big volumes in my preliminary remarks. I have no doubt that hon. Members would be studying them with great care, and make their suggestions in the course of the debate. If I may suggest with all respect, the Chapters that might be studied more than the others and might be dealt with in debate more than the others are the earlier chapters which lay down the general approach, the principles, the objectives and the structure of the Plan—the first four Chapters and if you like a few others. The rest, though very important, is after all working out the details of that and no Parliament can sit down to work out details or priorities. Parliament must lay down the objectives, the general structure, that we should follow.

So, I submit, Sir, that in approaching this question we should bear these general principles and objectives in mind. We should determine the methods. If I may say so, or if you like, we have already determined the methods and we are working along these methods—that is the general democratic approach to this problem. Although this is so, I wish to make it perfectly clear what our conception of democracy is. It is not limited to political democracy. We do not think that democracy means, as is

sometimes said in some other countries, what is called *laissez faire* doctrine in economics. That doctrine may remain in some people's mind still. But as a matter of fact it is almost as dead as the nineteenth century which produced it—dead even in the countries where people talk about it most. It is totally unsuited to the conditions in the world today. In any event, so far as we in India, are concerned, we reject it completely. We are not going to have anything to do with it.

That does not mean, of course, that the State is taking charge of everything. The State is not, because we have a public sector and a private sector. But, as I said, the private sector itself which we wish to encourage must fit in with controlled economy. In that sense its freedom of enterprise will be somewhat limited. Now, in this context, I would ask this House to consider this plan.

This Plan—I am not going into figures—provides for two thousand and odd crores of rupees—about several hundreds crores more than provided for in the Draft Plan. There is a big gap between the estimate of our resources and the Rs. 2,000 crores. It is hoped that we may be able perhaps to find more resources. We may get some help from outside. We have got some already. Some hon. Members have occasionally expressed their fear that this help from outside may interfere with our freedom as to what we should do and should not do in this country. Well it is perfectly true that when in any matter one depends upon an outside authority, to that extent there is a risk. If we depend on outside authorities, let us say, to supply us with weapons of war for our army, well, to some extent, there is risk—whatever it may be. If we depend for our economic advancement on other countries, well, we are depending on them. And I am quite clear in my own mind that I would rather wish that our advance was slower than we become dependent on the aid of other countries.

Having said that, I really do not see why we should be afraid, provided we are strong enough ourselves, of raking this type of aid from other countries which obviously helps us to go more rapidly ahead. There are so many things which we could do with that aid which we have to postpone without that aid. On the one hand there is a slight risk, not a risk of being tied down, but if you like to put it, a slight moral risk, or whatever risk you like to call it. On the other hand, it is for us, for this Parliament, for this country to be quite clear of what it wants to do and not allow ourselves to be pushed this way and that way. After all almost every country has gone ahead with help in various ways from other countries in the past and I do not see any reason why we should prefer not to take aid even though that aid does not influence our policy or our activities in the slightest.

Sir, it is late now and this subject is a very big one. But I intended my remarks to be more of a preamble to the consideration by this House of this voluminous report and not to go into the details. I have no doubt that in the course of this debate many points will arise which will require dealing with, and my colleagues or other Members of this House or myself may deal with them at a later stage.

But I would like to impress upon the House somewhat the feeling I have on this occasion, the feeling of dealing with this great theme of remaking this country of ours, that we are engaged in a tremendous task which requires not only all our united effort, but united effort with enthusiasm and a crusader's spirit attached to it. I have no doubt that if this House accepts this report in that spirit, and when all of us go to our respective constituencies and other parts of the country we go with this message from this House and from this Parliament, this Five Year Plan, and try to work it out, I have no doubt that this Plan from being something on paper, you will see it gradually rising and taking effect in the country. And as you do this I think it may well be possible for us to overreach this Plan and go further ahead than even the Plan Commissioners have laid down.

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BACK NOTE

XII. Resolution Regarding Five Year Plan, 15 December, 1952

1. MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: Resolution moved:

“This House records its general approval of the principles, objectives and programme of development, contained in the Five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission.”

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE (Calcutta North-East): Sir, before we proceed with a discussion of this motion I would like to make a suggestion to you for your consideration. We have tried to go through the volumes of the report supplied to us as carefully as we could, but we feel we have had rather very short notice. We have had a full legislative programme throughout the week and this has made it rather difficult for us to study what we wish to study in the short compass of time which is allowed to us. That is why I suggest that we may have at least four days of discussion of this report, that means Tuesday to Friday, and also that, if necessary, you might be pleased to adjourn the discussion of this till tomorrow morning so that we may be better prepared not only to consider what we have already read but also the remarks made by the Prime Minister.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: So far as the number of days is concerned, even at the outset, anticipating that a number of hon. Members would be interested in taking part in the debate. I agreed to the House sitting from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. with the usual interval for lunch. At present it is scheduled to go on for the 15th, 16th and 17th. As we proceed let us see what the progress is. I am sure we will be able.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE (Calcutta SouthEast): 18th also.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: Originally it was fixed for the 15th, 16th and 17th. That was the time that was prescribed. We have given to ourselves one more day at the rate of nearly two hours a day, about one extra hour in the morning and one hour in the afternoon.

SHRI A. C. GUHA (Santipur): On the previous day the Prime Minister was agreeable to four days.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: The extended periods put together give us another day. Therefore this programme will stand till the 17th. Let us see the progress.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: So far as we are concerned we should like—I understand that the latest date up to which this Parliament session is to go on is the 20th: it will be difficult to go beyond that—we should like two clear days, 19th and 20th to finish up some important legislation pending. Apart from that I am in your hands and the hands of the House. You have already been good enough to extend the hours of sitting. If necessary, and if the House agrees. We may drop the Question Hour, to discuss this problem, for a day or two.

HON. MEMBER: It is a very good proposal.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: The Prime Minister says he would like to have two days for the other legislation. Then this debate can continue till the 18th evening. That he can easily agree to.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, as a matter of fact what you Sir, said was, I believe, that after a couple of days you will decide. So far as we are concerned we are prepared to go on till the 18th, provided it does not go beyond the 18th.

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE: The legislative programme still outstanding is not of a particularly considerable character and in one day or one and a half days at the most we can dispose of it.

MR DEPUTY SPEAKER: We can consider. It will be not beyond the 18th in any case.

REPLY ON MOTION OF THANKS TO THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

18 February, 1953

For four days, this House has been debating this motion and we have covered many subjects, big and small. We have ranged all over the world and considered problems of India. But, I find a little difficulty in this maze of subjects that have been raised, to deal with many of them in the course of my reply. The House will permit me therefore, if I may say so to pick and choose and deal with what I think are the more important things that have been raised in this debate. I would have preferred, if I may say so with all respect, that attention was directed to those important aspects, national or international, rather than diverted to a maze of minor subjects, which, important in themselves no doubt, nevertheless, if looked at in a proper perspective, are unimportant in the scheme of things today.

Before I proceed further, I should like to say that I have endeavoured with a large measure of success, but sometimes with lack of success, to consider these matters as dispassionately as possible, as objectively as possible, and tried to profit by the comments and criticisms which hon. Members have made. One thing, if I may say so, I would repudiate, if that is not too strong a word to use: the accusation that my colleagues and I are complacent or smug. Well I am no judge of whether I am smug or not. But, I cannot imagine any person charged with responsibility being complacent today in this world. Even if he were so inclined, he cannot be so. Certainly I have no sensation of complacency when I view the problems of this country or the world. I have sometimes a feeling, if you like to call it of excitement at this tremendous drama that is taking place in the world, or a sense of high adventure at what we are endeavouring to do in this country, and also a sense of the tremendous difficulties that confront us all the time. Nobody can afford to be complacent. If hon. Members ever take the trouble to read what I sometimes say outside this House, they will find that I am always warning my colleagues outside, people outside against complacency. So, we are not complacent. We do not think in the slightest that we have all the wisdom, that we know everything about everything in the world today. Any person who is dogmatic, if I may say so, is complacent. Complacency comes from some kind of a closed mind accepting a dogmatic phase, whatever it may be. It is a narrowness of outlook in a changing world. None of us is complacent. Therefore, I have listened to the criticisms and comments in this House as in the other, with a view to understand, with a view to learn how we can better what we are doing, or change what we are doing.

I can also assure the House that in this matter there is no question of pride or prestige involved. We are all in this House, not the Government only, charged with a

heavy and great responsibility and we would be small men indeed if we stick in small matters on prestige or consider matters from any narrow point of view of party or group. So, I have endeavoured to consider these matters dispassionately. I would like, Sir, to express to you and to the House and to the hon. Member opposite, Dr. Mookerjee, my regret that I was not quite so dispassionate for a moment yesterday and that I felt myself provoked into intemperance.

Before I proceed further. I should just like to deal with a point which was raised by another hon. Member opposite, which, at that time, also provoked me into an interruption of amazement. The hon. Member, Prof. Mukerjee, referred to the landing of thousands of American military aircraft at Dum Dum. I was surprised and I enquired into this matter. I shall read out what the hon. Member said. He referred to a US Super Fortress landing at the IAF station, Agra early in December, 1952. He went on to say:

“Why is it that we hear.....

I want to be corrected later by the Prime Minister, if I am wrong —that in October 1952,” (Mind you, in October, 1952) “there were as many as 3250 military landings at Dum Dum Airport, out of which the contribution of the Indian Air Force was only 25 while that of the United States Air Force came to the tune of 1200.”

Now, if the facts were as stated above one would imagine that a big scale invasion of India was taking place. The facts as ascertained are as follows: No Super Fortress visited Agra in December or any other date. But, an old military type of aircraft converted to civilian use is kept by the American Embassy and is based at Palam. This aircraft visited Agra aerodrome on the 9th December and returned to Delhi the same day. Then, with regard to Dum Dum aerodrome near Calcutta, this aerodrome as the House knows, is on the international route end, is visited by a very large number of aircraft daily belonging to different international lines flying from east to west and west to east. All these flights are regulated by the rules of each country as well as by international rules and usage. Sometimes, though rarely, permission is given to fly over India without landing anywhere in the country. Normally, foreign aircraft have to land at some airport in India for examination and checks of various kinds. Military aircraft belonging to foreign States can fly to and across India only with the prior approval of the Government of India, and in accordance with an agreement entered into by that State with the Government of India. Permission is given in each case after information of various kinds is supplied. In the whole of the year—not in October only—in the whole of the year 1952, 459 military aircraft, both foreign and Indian landed at Dum Dum. Of these, 118 belonged to the U.S. Air Force. None of these American aircraft carried arms or ammunition or personnel in uniform. The Indian Air Force has its headquarters at Palam, and, therefore, relatively few landings take place at Dum Dum.

Now we are faced with two major problems, or two major categories of problems. There is the international situation, and there is the domestic situation. Practically

everything falls within those two categories. And although we may consider them separately, they are to some extent connected together and have their reactions on each other. So far as we are concerned, our natural interest is in the domestic situation because we have to face those problems, because it is our desire to raise the level of our country in the sense of improving the lot of our people here, their standard of living etc. to put an end to the curse of poverty, to go as far as we can in the ideal of the welfare State that we have put forward, and to which the President made reference. I do not suppose anybody in this House will differ in that ideal. The question, therefore, is how to attain it. And certainly, there might be differences of opinion in regard to that. There is no reason why there should not be or, if you like, placing greater emphasis on one aspect or the other. Anyhow, here is this tremendous adventure of building up a new India, a new welfare State in this great country whereby we raise the level of hundreds of millions of people. Can there be anything more exciting than this adventure? And yet, we all know the great difficulties that we have to face—difficulties, partly because we faced a situation after a fairly long period of suppressed growth, when the country did not grow naturally as it might have done. And so when we face this question, we have to face a number of problems, all together. We have to face, if you take the whole of India, a number of centuries all jostled up together suddenly hurled into the middle of the 20th century. It is not an easy matter for an academic debate to decide. There are vast regions in India, different stages of economic growth, industrial condition, agricultural condition, and we are trying to raise all of them up and if we do not bring about some change by magic to all these people, well, we can hardly be blamed. Therefore while we are engaged in this tremendous adventure full of difficulties, we have little time to spare, and little energy to give, to international affairs. But there is little choice left to us because international affairs hit us in the face all the time, because they might very well affect our individual lives intimately, because it is the inevitability of destiny that India should take her part in these affairs like other countries. Therefore, whether we wish it or not, we have to take part in them. We are part of the international community, and no country much less a great, big country like India, can be isolated from that, or keep herself away from it. So we play a part in these international affairs which grow more and more complicated from day to day.

The United Nations came into existence seven, eight years ago, and it represented the old urge of humanity to seek for peace and cooperation in this world. It tried to profit by the failures of the old League of Nations. The old League of Nations, even at its commencement, was not what might be called a universal organization, an international organization with a universal background. Great countries kept out of it and were kept out of it. The United Nations started at least with the assumption of universality; and countries differing from each other entirely in their structure of Government, economic or political policy, all came together under that common umbrella of the United Nations. So, one attribute of the United Nations—supposed attribute—was universality. The other, of course,—the main objective— was the maintenance of peace, and the growth of cooperative effort among the nations, and the solution of

disputes by peaceful means as far as possible. The United Nations, the House will remember, laid down a rule about the veto of certain so called great powers. Now. it is very easy to criticise that rule as illogical, undemocratic and all that, but, as a matter of fact, it represented the reality of the moment. It meant ultimately that the United Nations could not adopt sanctions against one of the great powers, because that power could veto it. because having sanctions against one of those great powers itself meant a world war. Now, that may not be logical, but it was a fact that it meant a world war. If the United Nations was to avoid a world war, it had to bring in some such clause. It may appear illogical. Now, let us see how this has developed.

First of all, we find that that principle of universality with which the United Nations started has been departed from. Well, the most patent departure is the fact that a great country like China is not there, and is not recognized by some great countries. This is not a question of any one of us liking or disliking the present Government in China or approving or disapproving of China's revolution, but it is a question of one of the biggest countries in the world not being represented there, not being recognized there. Therefore, it comes in the way of that basic principle of universality, and, in fact, the United Nations, to that extent, goes back to something which made the League of Nations fail. Now, that, I think, is one of the grave difficulties that face us, and much has flown from that, many new fresh problems have come from that. And it is not a question of my saying or any country saying "Let us agree that China should be there", or some saying "Let it not be there". It is not a question of expressing an academic opinion, but realizing that one of the basic facts of the world situation is this, that the United Nations which presumes to be a universal organization in this world has ceased to be that because of this first major fact that a great country which is obviously a running country, obviously a stable and strong country is not represented there. Then again, a difficulty has arisen. For the moment, I am not blaming anybody. But this great organisation built up for peace is itself today engaged in war sponsoring,—however small it may be does not matter—and to the extent that it is a sponsor of war and it is connected with it. Naturally its functions of peacemaking become less. It is difficult to exercise that function adequately, if you yourself are a party to war. Now that is a great difficulty; the difficulty may have arisen because of nobody's fault or somebody's fault. That does not matter. We are trying to analyse the situation as objectively as possible, without casting blame on anybody. And the problem arises whether we have grown up, whether the world has grown up adequately enough to have an international organisation of the type aimed at. I do not know people talk about one world, about world federalism and the like, and many wise and intelligent and ardent people agree with that ideal. I think most members in this House will agree. But it is one thing to agree with that, and quite another thing to give effect to it and we see, far from this kind of world government, even the United Nations, as it was started, continually coming into difficulties because of various factors, because of a sovereign State still thinking of a sovereign State, and because of other factors and conflicts. The question arises: Is it a fact, is it a possibility that countries entirely different from each other in their political, economic and other policies, can

cooperate in a new organisation, or must they remain apart? In the old days, centuries ago, it did not much matter, because they kept apart, they did not come in contact; but today that has become impossible, because they are continuously in contact. If there is continuous contact, that contact may be friendly contact: if not, a hostile contact, and the question arises: Can an international organisation exist which can contain within its core countries aiming entirely differently? Well, I suppose, one could answer it. There is no reason why it should not function with all those countries in it. That was the ideal. After all, when the United Nations was started, countries like the United States of America and the U. S. S. R, entirely different in outlook and ways did cooperate and come together, and did function for a period, till they gradually drifted apart. For my part. I do not see why they should not function in an organisation, provided, of course, that each one of them did not. If I may say so, interfere with the others, and so long as each could carry on any policy it chose for itself. But difficulties come in, where there are attempts at interfering with others. Then, of course, there is conflict, and one party or both interfere, or one begins interfering and the other starts also interfering. Then again, as the House knows, it is very difficult to know, in such a matter, who started. Charges and countercharges are made. I am merely placing all these problems before the House so that it might be able to look at this international picture in broad historical perspective.

There is another matter, of course, which is most important in our understanding things today, and that is the pace of technological development, which is tremendous, which we who live in this technological world do not wholly realise, but which is making all the difference to this world, most particularly in regard to the development of communications, in the development of the art of warfare and all that, which throw us into each other's laps all the time, and which has resulted in creating a situation when any real major conflict or a world war would be of such tremendous significance and destruction that no objective for which that war is fought can ever be realised through it. Now that is the basic fact too. You may have the best of objectives, but war has become such that you will not realise that objective, and you will get something which, well, you do not like, in spite of so called victory.

Now, here are certain broad aspects which I should like the House to keep in mind. Therefore, what can a country like India do? We cannot influence other countries by force of arms or pressure of money; we can negatively do something, we can positively do also a little occasionally, but to imagine that we are going to shake the world or control international affairs according to our thinking, as sometimes hon. Members seem to hint, that we should issue something in the nature of an ultimatum to this country or that country, or demand from this country or that country, or express our views in strong language to the world at large, has little meaning, unless you can do something afterwards. Hon. Members opposite have repeatedly said in their comments that the President has used weak language, circumspect language, and why not come out strongly in favour of this or that. I would beg of them to remember that in the modern world strength does not reside in strong language at all. In the problems of modern world and international affairs, strength does not reside in strong

language at all. Strength reside somewhere else. Nor does it reside in slogans. We must have strength somewhere before we take to any step. Otherwise we make ourselves ridiculous. And apart from strength a nation—and I hope India is a mature nation, with all our failings, and we have a few thousand years of growth in restraint and all that a mature nation does not and should not shout too much. Strength does not come from shouting. It is not a sign of maturity. I regret that there is far too much shouting and cursing in the world today. It may or may not be justified. But it is not good all the same, you have come up against all these problems of, apart from the other countries, two giant countries disliking each other, trying to undermine each other, and yet terribly afraid of each other. It is a most extraordinary situation, and we live in this psychosis of fear, of fear and hatred, and there can be no worse companions for a country than fear and hatred.

Therefore, one of the approaches at least in which we can help is to try to lessen this atmosphere of fear and hatred. But how far? We cannot do very much about it. But at least we can, negatively; first of all, we may not do anything or say anything which increases that. That is within our power certainly. At least we should not indulge in that shouting and cursing and slandering match which seems to have taken the place of old time diplomacy. That is something though it does not or may not achieve much result. At least, we have not added to the illness of the world. Positively, where we can help also, we should help, although in taking any positive step, there are always certain risks involved that it may fail. "We had been very cautious about our positive steps. Negatively we have endeavoured, I think, with a great deal of success, not to take part in these controversies, by merely running other nations down. We do not agree with a great deal of what some other countries say or do. But when the time comes we try to point that out in as friendly a language as possible, because we are quite certain that by using stronger language we do not help anybody, not the cause of peace certainly. So the positive steps we have taken, we have also taken as cautiously as possible. We have tried not to, and no step of ours has been taken just to put this party in the right or the other party in the wrong. We may have failed—that is a different matter—in the step we took. But we have tried always to do something in the hope of success and tried to find out as far as we could the opinions of the other parties concerned.

There was this Korean Resolution. Now, I do not wish to take the time of the House on this occasion as I have spoken about this in the past. We tried our utmost in that matter to find out what the other countries concerned were prepared to accept or to do. It is impossible to find out everything. One may make a mistake, but we did proceed on a sound enough basis of finding out a good deal, and about 90 or 95 per cent, of what we put forward in that Resolution was, if I may say so, taken down sentence by sentence from what had been said to us by the parties concerned, not in a joint form, but separately; we had to put it together. My point is this. I am not justifying anything except to say that the earnest attempt we have always made was to try to compose things and put one party's viewpoint before the other without compromising anything. Well, we failed: we must suffer for that failure. But I do submit to the House that it is grossly unfair for any person to accuse us of partiality and the like in this matter.

Some hon. Members on the other side are constantly repeating like some 'mantram' which they have learnt without understanding what it means, that we are stooges of the Americans, we are a part of the AngloAmerican bloc, etc. Of course, that kind of statement normally, in the case of persons who are less restrained than I am, might lead to a report in kind. But I do not wish to say that. But I should like them and others to try to keep out of the habit of learning some slogans and phrases and repeating them again and again. It becomes rather stale work. It is not interesting or exciting to hear the same phrase repeated again and again, whether it has any relevance or meaning or not.

My point is that if we or any country seeks for peace, peace requires peaceful methods. The House will remember a thing which Gandhiji laid stress on always, of means and ends. I am not entering into a metaphysical argument, but surely if you demand peace, you must work for it peacefully. It is quite absurd to work for peace in a warlike manner. I am not referring to any particular group, but unfortunately some people seem to think I am talking about them. Because the fact is that today — and I say so with respect—quite a large number of countries, big and small, talk about peace in the most aggressive and warlike manner. This does not apply to one group or another: it applies to everybody almost. In fact, one might almost say that peace is now spelt WAR.

We are becoming enveloped, all of us, not so much in this country —I am talking about other countries—by a mentality which might be called the military mentality. That is, statesmanship is taking a second place and is governed more by military factors than the normal factors which statesmen consider. Now, that is a dangerous thing.

Now, a soldier is a very excellent person in his own domain, but as somebody, I think a French statesman, once said, war,—even war is too serious a thing to be handed over to a soldier to control, much less peace. Now, this intrusion of the military mentality in the Chancellories of the world is a dangerous development of today. And how are we to meet it? Frankly, I confess that we in India cannot make too much of a difference. I do not wish this House to imagine that we can take this on our shoulders and remodel it to our heart's desire; we just cannot do it. But we can do something; we can cooperate with, others, we can help in creating a climate of peace and thereby, possibly, help in going some way towards our objective. We try; if we fail, well, the world itself fails. There the matter ends.

Now another factor is that we talk about peace and war, and there are many causes, no doubt, of this war, some often discussed, others rather hidden. But surely one should realise that owing to a number of factors in this world, chiefly technological developments, political developments and the like, nationalist movements and the like, people all over the world, vast masses of people, have ceased to be quiescent. Now, it is a good thing. They are not prepared to suffer, to put up with their condition; people in colonial countries are not prepared to put up with what had been done in the past. Therefore, they look at anything that appears to them as a liberating force;

they are attracted by it. It is a patent thing. May be that liberating force may not liberate; may be it, might be worse—that is immaterial. But the point is that the whole world is in a fluid condition and men's minds have been moved and perturbed and they seek something to support them and to guide them ahead.

Now, in this state of affairs one would have thought that one of the earliest steps to be taken is to remove certain patent grievances and certain patent structures of government which put down masses of people. In other words the problem of colonialism in the world which has been certainly tackled to a considerable extent in the past few years since the war ended, should be tackled still further, and thus at least one cause of making large numbers of people utterly dissatisfied should be removed. Well, it has not been removed. And there is another thing also which is slightly allied to it, though not the same, and that is, a way of looking at the countries of Asia as if they were an outer fringe, a distant outer fringe, which should fall in line with the others. Well, one of the most important developments of the age has been what has taken place in Asia and what is likely to take place in Asia. There is no doubt about it whether for good or ill. The whole of Asia is very wide awake, resurgent, active and somewhat rebellious. Now, how are you going to deal with it? All these problems are problems ultimately not of military might but of men's minds. They cannot be dealt with by guns; sometimes guns may be necessary. I do not know. But certainly they are problems of psychological approach to vast numbers of human beings, whether it is in Asia, whether it is in Africa. The approach that is being made in Africa, in large parts of Africa, whatever its virtue in the minds of those who are doing it may be for the present, one thing is dead certain that it is bound to fail ultimately, tomorrow or the day after. There is no shadow of doubt about it. It does not require a prophet to say that this approach will lead to the most dangerous consequences in racial conflicts. Take the question of the steps that are being taken in South Africa. These are basic facts which may not be related to the circumstances in the Far East or in Central Europe and Germany but they are basic facts which may do much to shape the world of tomorrow. Now, therefore, what policy can India pursue in this matter? As I said, whatever policy it pursues it should talk in a quiet voice, it should not shout. It should talk in terms of peace, not of threats or cursing or war. I would like others to do so, too. Anyhow we should try to do so. We should not merely show our temper to other nations even though we may feel strongly. Let us convert our feeling into strength, not into temper, and that applies in the world at large. That applies to our relations with Pakistan. We have endeavoured to do that with more or less success. It does not matter what temper the other party shows. Obviously, we have to protect our interests, we must protect them and we must protect them. But even in trying to protect them it does not help to show temper. There are two ways of approaching this question. One is the conviction that war must come. We try to avoid it but it is bound to come. Therefore, we should prepare for it. And, well, when it comes, join it this way or that way. The other way is trying our utmost to avoid it, feeling that it can be avoided. Now, there is a great difference in those two approaches. If mentally you are convinced that it is bound to come, well, you accustom yourself to that idea and you

work to that end even though you may not like it. You are not working for peace but you are convinced absolutely that war is coming; it is inevitable and therefore let us work for war. On the other hand, in trying to work for avoidance of war you must believe in it. A phrase here and there is not enough because otherwise you are always working to the other end. People work for it. Naturally no country can forget the possibility of being entangled in war,—that is a different matter—and taking such precautions as it ought to. There is, I think, a great deal of difference in these two approaches. I have a sensation that many great countries today apparently have come to the conclusion that war is inevitable—not that they want it. I do not think people anywhere want it. I hardly think that many statesmen want it but still somehow they have come to that conclusion. Well, so far as we are concerned, we believe that war is not inevitable, it is a dangerous possibility—sometimes it becomes a probability—but it is not inevitable and therefore to the utmost and to the end one should work for its avoidance. One can work for avoidance apart from the political or diplomatic field, essentially in the human, psychological field, in so far as we can. Naturally, we cannot do much but we try to do what we can in this matter.

Now, the House knows that certain recent developments have taken place. Certain statements have been made in the United States of America by the highest authorities in regard to the Far East which have caused grave concern not only to us here but in many countries all over the world. I confess that it is not clear to me even now exactly what the full consequences of those statements are. But, whatever the meaning behind them, there is no doubt of the impression they have created and the reactions produced. From the point of view of psychosis of fear and world psychology, they have had a bad effect apart from anything else. All this talk of the blockade of China or other such steps obviously is not talk that leads to peace or settlement, whatever else it might lead to. It is easy for any party to justify what it says by arguments and by what the other party said. Are we to remain silent? That may be done. But it is too serious a matter for this kind of justification of statesmen and politicians, much too serious a matter affecting the world. I do confess that we as a Government and, I am sure, as a people, view these developments with the greatest concern. Now, again what can we do about them? It is no good my using strong language. That will not impress anybody more than the more quiet statements that we might make. In so far as our opinion is concerned, it is conveyed quite clearly. Our test is always this. Does this help in lessening the tensions of today or does it add to those tensions? That is our major test. If it adds to these tensions we are against it. If it worsens the situation we are against it. If it somehow helps, if it goes far, that is all the better. So that is the test that we apply whether in the United Nations or elsewhere.

Now, coming to our domestic policy, I do not wish to go into details. But hon. Members opposite have talked a great deal about hunger and starvation in India and the economic condition and the like. I believe there is an amendment to the effect that the economic situation has deteriorated. Now, that is a question, to some extent, of facts and figures. It is completely easy in this great land of India to make a list of suffering and distress and poverty. That is our misfortune. It is there. Nobody can

crowd, if I may say so? Five and a half years ago here in this city of Delhi, apart from Punjab and the whole of Pakistan, what was happening? Was that democracy functioning?—when people were killing each other and driving each other and doing all kinds of atrocities, in Pakistan and in this part of India, when millions went from this side to that and from that side to this? Democracy functioning! People were functioning! I do not blame those poor people. But I am saying that democracy goes mad; democracy can be excited to do the wrong things. Democracy, in fact, perhaps sometimes, is more warlike, even than the others, than individuals. Individuals after all have some training. But that very democracy of yours can be excited to do all things, their passions excited, and then it is more difficult to control a democracy in war than perhaps it was a statesman of older days.

So we have to function. Here are these mighty experiments going on, and we have to build India according to democratic methods. That we have decided, because ultimately we feel that democracy has something of the highest values, highest human values. We believe that.

Now again we talk of human values. It is true. Many hon. Members must have thought of the effect on human values of war itself. People say that democracy has human values. Of course. But then war puts an end to those very values that democracy cherishes. Democracy, in fact, is if not a casualty of war at any rate a partial casualty of war. It does not function properly. Then all standards of human values that we cherish go down in war. In fact, the tragedy of the situation is this: that we go to war to protect democracy, to protect human values and standards, but because we have adopted a wrong method to protect them, we achieve wrong ends. We do not achieve what we are aiming at. That has been the tragedy of the last two world wars and something infinitely worse is likely to happen if there is another war.

So, in judging the economic condition of the country, I would beg hon. Members to take this fact into consideration. I have no objection to their criticising the Government, or even condemning it. We are all engaged in this task of building up this country. And it is too serious a matter for any of us merely to take a negative line and help in creating an atmosphere of depression in the country. Atmosphere counts. The psychology of the people is more important than any decree of Government. In that connection I am glad to say this. I am giving my own impression of this country and that cannot be hundred per cent, true of the whole country. But I know something of my people. I go about and understand them and it has been my high privilege to have their affection and confidence also. I have found during the last five or six months people in their enthusiasm undertaking, often with voluntary labour, almost all the plans that we have put forward. The few hundreds of miles of road they have made, or the tanks they have dug, are important in themselves. But infinitely more important was the spirit, the crusading spirit which went into this work. Now it is that spirit which we count on and it is that spirit which will make our Five Year Plan or other Plans a success. If that is not there, admit that no kind of Government decree, or Government organisation will take us too far.

So, I would beg hon. Members in every section of the House to realise this that they can help in creating this spirit in this country or hinder it. And this constant

attempt to produce an atmosphere of frustration and depression in the country, surely cannot achieve any objective which anyone in this House has at heart.

I referred just now to the Five Year Plan. Well, most hon. Members by now would have read it. Many have criticised it. Now, as I have said before, there is nothing sacrosanct about that Plan. I think the mere making of that Plan itself is a great effort. It was an inevitable and right thing, for without that foundation, without that investigation, that basis of calculation of resources, etc., and of priorities, we could not get going. We may talk academically as in a schoolboys' debate. It is essential. We have laid down some policies about land, food, etc. I think they are good policies. Convince us—we will vary them. There is no difficulty about it. It is not a law which cannot be touched. We want to go as fast as we can. But it is not good enough to tell us to do something which is beyond our resources. We want to stretch our resources: we are prepared to take risks, but intelligent risks. After all the responsibility of carrying out this Plan is a heavy responsibility. We cannot gamble with it. We cannot take undue risks. Every legitimate risk has to be taken, for we realise that the policy of being too cautious is the greatest risk of all. Therefore, look at this Five Year Plan in that spirit. I am quite sure that nobody in this House can disagree with, let us say, 80 per cent or 90 per cent of that Plan. They may disagree with some policy. Well, when the time comes talk about it, discuss it, improve it, do what you like but get going. Let us get going with it.

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee referred yesterday briefly to the community projects. Well, I have got a list of community projects.

I will just say a few sentences. We believe that it is essential for India to be industrialised. We believe, secondly, that the industrial policy should be based on the development of basic industries—steel, etc., etc. But we also believe that any industrial development will have a weak foundation without a strong agricultural economy. Therefore, we cannot develop industry without considering and strengthening agriculture. The food part of it is important enough: if we have not food in the country and if we depend on other countries it would be an ill day for us. We must make our country self-sufficient in food, and make our agricultural economy good. Otherwise, any industrial structure that we build up in the present day may topple over, because of the weakness of our agricultural economy. I cannot go into this question at the moment.

But let no one here imagine that we do not attach enough importance to industrial development. We do. It may be that the hon. Member can make some bright suggestions to us which will make us go ahead in respect of both functions with speed: we shall gladly accept them.

Community Projects. I was just saying this, that these projects have been in existence for the last two to three months may be a little more, in some places only a month, in some places three months. And I think they vary greatly. Some are

functioning extraordinarily well, some moderately well, some not well. It is true. On the whole—I am merely informing the House of my own reactions to the reports we have received—on the whole I think we are doing very well. It is true that some projects are behind hand, little has been done. But taking the whole of India I think we are doing very well. It is a new experiment, it is difficult. But the test of it really in the type of workers who go there. On the whole, again, I think that we have got a fairly good number of workers there.

Now, may I say a few words in regard to the subject which occupied the hon. Member opposite. Dr. Mookerjee's speech, practically the whole of his speech, yesterday, that is the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu? The hon. Member spoke on this subject most of the time yesterday, and I have no doubt that in the context of things it is a matter of importance to be dealt with. Nevertheless, I think we should always remember the relative importance of things. When we draw up a plan, the Five year Plan, we consider priorities. That is important. But ultimately everything is a question of priority in this world. We cannot do everything. An eminent person said long ago: it makes all the difference in the world whether you put truth in the first place or in the second place. You do not discard truth: it is there. But the point is whether it has the top place or a second place. So also in considering a problem, whether it is a political problem or an economic problem, it is most important what order of priority you give to it. It is important for this House, which has to shoulder the burden of the governance of India, to have some order of priority in its mind—all India priority. Of course we have to think of the details too. But if once we lose sight of that, then we get lost in a maze, and in the trees we forget the wood. There is always that danger.

Now, I said that because in considering this Jammu problem and in the context that the hon. Member put it, one would imagine that of all the great national and international problems that was the dominant problem of the day. Well, I recognize its importance in its sphere. But, surely, let us see it in its proper perspective and not get unduly excited about something and forget the more important things.

Now, here is a situation, which the hon. Member himself realizes, when the world is, I will not say (because I do not think it is) on the brink of war—it is not correct, so far as I can judge of the situation, but certainly it hovers about over the brink of all kinds of precipices all the time. One does not know at what moment something may happen. Look at the international situation. Look at those mighty things that are happening in India, that we are trying to build up. In that context let us look at this Jammu problem. I think to do anything else is to upset all our priorities and all our perspective.

The hon. Member was very indignant at what he said were the abuses hurled at him or his colleagues. The main abuse that he took exception to was being called communal. First of all, let me express my pleasure at the fact that he considers communalism as something to be disliked and an abusive term, because it is a bad

thing. I hope gradually he will convert his colleague on his left to this viewpoint, because I seem to remember that he takes pride for being communal.

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Now, the hon. Member suggested: What is this business of communalism? Who is communal? Let us sit round a table and thrash it out. Well, let us by all means sit round a table, whenever we can, and thrash things out. But I was taken aback by the statement, because many of us have lived through the last thirty years of India's history—if not thirty, twenty—and seen and participated in the ups and downs of the national movement. We have seen how organisations which have been called communal have functioned, whether they have been Muslim, Hindu or Sikh. We have all got that past history before us. We have got before us also something to which I referred a little while ago, the occurrences in August, September, October, 1947. And finally we remember the 30th January also when the greatest of us was shot down by a foolish youth. Now I do not quite know what interpretation of India's 30 years' history and all those events that took place my hon. friend gives but the normal analysis has been that there are in India all kinds of forces—to use the terms of Europe, some Rightists, some Leftists, some central, whatever it is—and among them, the normal Rightist groups gradually finding that they cannot well have much influence purely in the social plane, have taken advantage of the cloak of religion to cover up their other reactionary policies and have exploited the name of religion in politics and have excited people's passions in that name. That was done, as we all know, with a tremendous degree by the Muslim League.

That was done by other organisations of Hindus and Sikhs. I am not concerned with it. It is no good for me to be told that this evil is the reaction of any other evil. I am concerned with my own evil, not other's evil. And apart from this, there is a basic—I say so with all respect—weakness in us as a community, the national community I am referring to. We have had many virtues which have kept us going through the ages but we have had failings too which have made us stumble and fall through many times and among the failings is our living in compartments, our caste system, our provincialism, our regionalism, all these things. We are going out of them. I am glad to say. Nevertheless, they are here. People can exploit them and they have exploited them in the name of religion or caste, etc., because many of our folk, whether he is a peasant or a worker, can be excited in the name of religion. Certainly they get excited wrongly and repent afterwards. All this is communalism which is something utterly bad. I have no doubt that if there had been no communalism, there would have been no partition of India. I have no doubt that many other things would not have happened. Take the Punjab or take any other place in India. It is this narrow outlook always trying to gain a favour for this group or that community forgetting the larger good that has weakened us in the past. It was only in the measure that we got over it—and we got over it in the past on account of our national movement—that we gained our freedom but we did not get over it adequately and sufficiently to prevent the partition, to affect certain groups in India which were affected by the

or casteism, or parochialism and regional feelings and the like. They are tremendous. Of course, ours is a big country. It is a question whether the unifying influence is stronger than the disruptive influence. I think the unifying influence is strong. But, the danger is that the people who do not give full thought, feel secure that they are united. That is all right. They pursue the disruptive tendencies till they go far and then they cannot check them. Therefore, the great problem is the real integration of the minds and hearts of the people of India. That is not a matter of law or constitution. The law and the constitution come in their place, of course, to register the decrees of the mind and the heart when they are properly done. It is from that point of view that this question of Jammu and Kashmir has to be approached also, and no other.

I should like just to remind me House of a little past history. When the Jammu and Kashmir State acceded to India, they acceded in an identical manner like any other State in India had acceded. There was no difference, in the quantum of accession—it was full—or in the manner of accession. The Governor General here then Lord Mountbatten signed the paper and the Maharaja on the other side signed the paper. It was just like any other State. Immediately, there was war in Kashmir and naturally it became a special case, because of that and other reasons. A little later, it was referred to the United Nations. Now, our policy had been, even before all this happened and before this accession took place, declared formally by the Government, by Sardar Patel and by me, that in any State which wants to accede, naturally, the formal way is for the Ruler of the State to accede, but where there is any doubt or challenge, the people of the State can decide. That was the policy stated, regardless of Kashmir. We did not even think of Kashmir. It was an independent policy. Naturally when the question of Kashmir came, we had to apply the policy which we had stated. It was patent there were other circumstances too. So, I stated on behalf of our Government, when I announced the accession of Kashmir to India, that the accession is complete and whole. There is no lacuna in it. But, in accordance with our own policy, it is for the people of Kashmir to decide otherwise if they so chose. Even in accepting the accession, although it was good enough for the Maharaja to agree, and for us to accept his signature, we took care to have the approval of the largest popular organisation, the National organisation there, and then we accepted it. This was the background.

A year later or more, the question of the other States was considered as to how far we should go and what further steps should be taken in regard to their integration. May I beg the House to remember the difference between accession and integration? Accession is complete. Accession makes the territory completely a part of the territory of India. From accession, therefore, Indian citizenship, etc., whatever flows from being Indian territory, follow. Integration is the degree of relationship or autonomy enjoyed by that State. You may say that a Part A State is integrated in a particular degree, a Part B State in another degree and a Part C State in another degree. A Part C State is integrated even more than a Part A State. It is a bit of the Government of India stretched out. There are degrees of integration and degrees of autonomy in each State. It was an open question for a long time, what shall be the position of a Part B

State, and what position they should occupy in our Constitution, and what shall be the degree of their autonomy. It was a doubtful question whether they should all enjoy the same uniform measure or in varying degrees. Because the situation was not alike. It differed from place to place. But, fortunately for us, these matters came up when we were rather fresh. I mean to say things were going on with a certain momentum, a certain rush, and much could be done which cannot be done now easily, and Sardar Patel, therefore, brought this about with his great energy and ability—this closer integration of the other States, and a certain uniformity in the other States in somewhat of a rush. Now, I put it to hon. Members if we have to face this problem of the other big States today, it would not be such an easy matter. I do not mean to say that they are against any basic principle of ours—not that—but it would be a much more difficult matter. It is all very well for a subcommittee to be appointed to consider financial matters and economic matters, and then have the whole thing put down quickly in the first year or so, but now if we did it, it would take a much longer time, and much longer argument with each State. In fact, my colleague, the Finance Minister, has to face argument now in spite of all that, because fresh things come to light. So that, if this argument applies to all the other States which have no basic question involved as Kashmir has, we should remember that to talk of deciding of additional subjects and financial matters and financial integration and all that—is no simple matter; it is a very complicated matter, apart from any differences of opinion, even if you start with the same opinion.

The hon. Member said repeatedly that I had refused to meet the Praja Parishad people and that I treated them as political untouchables. Now, what are the facts? About a year ago—may be a little more—as a matter of fact, I did meet the President of the Praja Parishad, Pandit Premnath Dogra. I did meet him here in Delhi and had a long talk with him. Of course, this present agitation was not there. We talked about other basic matters affecting Jammu and Kashmir, because there was some kind of agitation then. And after my talk, he, I felt, accepted my viewpoint and agreed to what I said. And what I told him was that the method he was pursuing was bad not only for the Jammu and Kashmir State, but for Jammu specially and for the very objective that he was seeking to achieve. I thought he had appreciated my argument. He said “yes”. Two days later, I saw a statement in the press issued by him which to my amazement said the opposite. It, in fact, said that practically I had accepted his argument, which was a most amazing thing—not exactly that, I mean, but it created that impression. Well, needless to say, it rather upset me. Letters were sent to him that it was very wrong of him to do that. That did make me feel that he was not a safe person to see often, because every meeting would be exploited, and then I have to go about explaining what has happened. Once soon after—by “soon after” I mean about two months after that—again nothing to do with this present agitation—he did ask to see me and I sent word to him that our last interview was not a great success, and, in fact it created difficulties—and also I was very busy with Parliament—“I am sorry. I can’t see you now”. These are the two occasions. There has been no third occasion when the question has even arisen.

And the old Kashmir army was full of people from Jammu, from Hindus and Muslims both alike; so that, it is not easy to get a Kashmiri into the Militia for he is not used to it, and a great difficulty has thus grown up in the Kashmir Valley. In Jammu it is largely, almost entirely, a Hindu force.

I do not wish to go into this Praja Parishad movement. First of all, I entirely recognise that repression does not do; secondly, the grievances of the people concerned—I am talking about the larger number of people, the masses, and when I say grievances, I am referring to economic and like grievances at the moment—should be met, and to use the words of Acharya Narendra Dev, they should be separated from the wrong leadership that has misled them.

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Now, there are two parts of this problem, the economic etc., dealing with land reforms and the rest, and the other which is purely political and constitutional. It seems to me an extraordinary thing that the agitation of a group in Jammu—a large group, if you like wants to affect the Constitution of India, wants to affect all kinds of problems, not only as between the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and India but affecting our relations with Pakistan or our relations with the United Nations and everything else. It is an extraordinary thing that we should be called upon, or that a demand should be made upon us to do something, or if not to do something, to give assurances that we will do something, which has all these powerful and far reaching consequences. It is a matter which five or six months back was carefully considered here, between the Government of India and the representatives of the Government of Kashmir; certain agreements were arrived at which we thought, in the circumstances, good and adequate. Many of us wanted something mere. That is a different matter. But in the balance, having discussed everything, we found that that was adequate, and that it increased much more the old quantum of integration than previously. In fact there is no doubt about it. That whatever financial or other integration might be necessary will have to take place. There is no lessening of the bond between Kashmir and India. In every way they are tied up to us.

But then again, we are asked about the United Nations and the rest. I am placed in a difficulty here. I do not want to go into the question of the rightness or wrongness of some actions taken some four or five years ago. But here we are at the present moment. I want the Government of India to keep its face. I do not want to undo anything or withdraw anything that I have said at any time. We have a reputation, and a high reputation, and I do not think it does any good to a country to behave in a way which might discredit that reputation in the slightest. We gave our pledge in regard

to Kashmir, to the United Nations. Well, it is true, if I may say so, that we have not had what I consider a very fair deal from them, and some great countries particularly have seemed to take a particular delight in putting forward propositions to which we cannot agree, because the basis of their thought is different. But there it is. My hon. friend asked me to send for the Praja Parishad leaders to discuss these matters of international and national concern. How can I discuss these matters with any person? What we are going to do is an intricate matter.

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Then again, may I point out that every State in India has a large measure of autonomy? If Uttar Pradesh or West Bengal or any other State had trouble, we will advise them. But we do not jump and interfere. It will be amazing if we send for the opposition of Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy's Government in Bengal, to Delhi, to deal with it here. It is fantastic. How can any Government in any State carry on, when the Central Government starts dealing with the Opposition in that State, an Opposition not even in the Assembly there, but an Opposition outside? These are difficult things. It is not a question of prestige at all. Let me assure the House. There is no prestige, involved, and if any, it must be pretty fickle, and pretty fragile. So, to talk on these matters, it is not a question of prestige at all. But it is certainly a matter of doing it efficiently and in the right way, not by bypassing the Government there. We cannot deal with that in that manner.

I have taken an enormous amount of time, and I am very grateful to this House for the indulgence with which it has listened to me.

BACK NOTE

XIII. Reply on Motion of Thanks to the President's Address, 18 February 1953

1. SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA: For the few.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No. For everybody, I say, barring a few.

SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA: What about unemployment? What about the Negroes?

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: Are we to be settling this matter by bandying about words across the floor of the House?

SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA: There is no bandying about of words.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: Every hon. Member has got the right to say what he feels. If another hon. Member does not agree, let him not agree. But let him keep quiet.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: If hon. Members will listen to the end of my argument, then they will perhaps grasp more of what I say. I will put it in another way. The Russian Revolution took place in November 1917. Ten years later, let us say, in 1927..... [An Hon. Member: When these people were not born.].....what was the state in Russia? What was the progress made? Certainly, they had civil wars and tremendous difficulties. I admire the progress that they have made, but what I am pointing out is that when you look at the progress made by the Soviet Union you should not go and compare it with America's. You should compare it from where it started at the time of the Revolution. Then it is a fair comparison. Say, in 1917 it was this: in 1927 it was that and in 1937 or 1947 it was this—that is a fair comparison to judge the pace of growth. It is no good saying that the American standards of living are higher. It has no particular meaning in this context, because America has had other reasons for growth. She has had 150 years for growth. Therefore, you have always to consider the starting point. In the same way, it is no good comparing the India of today after five years of Independence and all this business of partition.....[An Hon. Member: See China.]

PANDIT BALKRISJULA SHARMA (Kanpur Distt. South-cum-Etawah Distt. East): Oh, China? Do not talk of China.

I would beg hon. Members not to interrupt. If they would interrupt, I hope it will be in a more musical voice.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Why not in a poetic language? He is a poet.

2. DR. N. B. KHARE (Gwalior): I think the Prime Minister means China minus Chiang-Kei-Shek.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member's history is rather out of date.

3. AN HON. MEMBER. What about the wastage?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member lives in a sea of wastage and his mind also does not see what is being done. If there is waste, stop it by all means. But the point is: do you see what is being done?

4. BABU RAMNARAYAN SINGH (Hazaribagh West): Hear, hear.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member who made that interjection is himself a patent example. He is never right whatever happens.

5. DR. N. B. KHARE: Of the right type, Sir.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I improve that phrase? Of the rightest type; (Dr. N. B. Khare: Righteous type.) as right as possible, in fact so right that it has terrible reaction.

6. DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Where did it happen? You are making a very serious allegation. We have never heard of it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not accusing any hon. Member here I say that here in Delhi, I can give you two or three specific instances of these cries being raised. I am not making any hon. Member here responsible for it. I say an atmosphere is created where people's passions are roused and they say these things.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Please do not trust all your informers. That is my humble request.

SHRI A. GHOSH (Burdwan): There was a procession in Calcutta at the time of the Hindu Mahasabha conference when posters saying "Long live Godse" were carried.

SHRI RAGHUNATH SINGH (Banaras Distt.—Central): In Banaras also.

PANDIT C. N. MALVIYA (Ralsen): I come from Bhopal. There was a procession led by Dr. Khare, Shri N. C. Chatterjee and Shri Deshpande. This slogan was raised:

SHRI N. C. CHATTERJEE (Hooghly): It is an absolutely unfounded charge. It is a fabricated statement.

PANDIT C. N. MALVIYA: It is quite right Sir. I say it with full responsibility.

SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE (Guna): I say it is an unfounded statement.

MR. DEPUTYSPEAKER: Order, order.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I continue? I was not relying, if the hon. Member thought so, on any, what might be called, police or intelligence reports. In this matter, I was relying on what hon. colleagues here in Parliament have told me.

SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE: We are also hon. Members. We say that is not true.

SHRI C. K. NAIR (Outer Delhi): Why do these hon. Members defend. I wonder.

7. DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Including Kashmir.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I explain the proper integration of India, meaning, not just the constitutional and the legal—the map shows integrated India—but the integration of the people of India in their minds and hearts. It is not enough merely to talk it out. We have inherited a strong tendency, I am glad to say, of unity, largely built on two contradictory factors, opposed factors: (i) subjection to British

rule and the British imposed unity of India, and (ii) the unity of the national movement contending against the British rule.

SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE: And the Hindu culture, the third.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member is mistaken. What he is saying is important in another context, not in this, because that did not lead to political unity, but led to cultural unity, which is a different thing.

8. DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: And then later on the suggestion he makes for a settlement? Please proceed to the end. "Repression will not do" etc.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Oh yes. Of course. Naturally. I can assure the hon. Member that repression never solves a problem. I naturally accept that. There is no doubt about that.

DR. N. B. KHARE: Hearty congratulations.

9. Dr. S. P. Mookerjee: Leave it to them to decide.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I cannot decide it.

DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Who is right and who is wrong?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I cannot decide it. They will decide, of course. The decision has to come from them, not from me. That is true.

10. DR. S. P. MOOKERJEE: Not even to discuss and to explain to them, so as to dispel their fears?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: As I have said, I am perfectly prepared to do it. I have done that once, as I said.

DR. N. B. KHARE: If you do it again, you will succeed.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am perfectly prepared to explain things, to any person and to dispel fears, in so far as I can.

STATEMENT REGARDING FORMATION OF ANDHRA PRADESH

25 March, 1953

On December 19, 1952, I informed this House that the Government of India had decided to establish an Andhra State, consisting of the Telugu speaking areas of the present Madras State, but not including the City of Madras, and that the Government were appointing Mr. Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, to consider and report on the financial and other implications of this decision and the questions to be considered in implementing it.

Mr. Justice Wanchoo conducted this enquiry and presented his report on the 7th February 1953. A copy of this report is placed on the Table of the House. [*Placed in Library, See No. IVC.C. (149)*]. Other copies will be available to Members. Government have given the most careful consideration to Mr. Justice Wanchoo's report and to the other matters connected with the establishment of the Andhra State. Some of these matters, more especially those relating to financial implications and the effect on the services, require further detailed consideration which they are receiving. There are, however, certain questions of a political nature, which have given rise to some controversy, and which have to be decided immediately so that further progress may be made. In regard to these, the Government have arrived at certain decisions.

The basic considerations which have to be kept in view are that an Andhra State has to be established and that it should consist of the Telugu speaking areas of the present Madras State. Further that the City of Madras is not to be included in the proposed Andhra State. The Andhra State, therefore, is to consist of what might be called the undisputed Telugu speaking areas of the present Madras State. At a subsequent stage, as I shall indicate later, a Boundary Commission or Commissions may have to be appointed to determine the exact boundaries of this new State. As this investigation might involve some delay, it is desirable that the State should be constituted as early as possible on the basis of existing boundaries of the districts except, in one case, where the boundary might be according to *taluqs*.

The Andhra State will consist of the following eleven districts: (1) Srikakulam, (2) Visakhapatnam, (3) East Godavari, (4) West Godavari, (5) Krishna, (6) Guntur, (7) Nellore, (8) Kurnool, (9) Anantapur, (10) Cuddapah and (11) Chittoor. It will also consist of a part of Bellary district as I shall indicate later.

It is clear that the capital of the Andhra State has to be in the territory of the new State. The Government are of opinion that the site of this capital should be determined by the Andhra people themselves through their Legislative Assembly.

A question has arisen about the temporary capital of the Andhra State till adequate arrangements are made for the functioning of the permanent capital. It has been suggested that there is some convenience in this temporary capital being located in the City of Madras. While it is true that certain conveniences in regard to accommodation etc., will result from this temporary location in the City of Madras, there are important and, in the opinion of the Government, over-riding considerations against this proposal. It is desirable that, right from the inauguration of the new State, it should have its political headquarters in the State itself and should be enabled to function as a complete unit, freely and unhampered by any other considerations. The full integration and progress of the new State will thus be facilitated and any possible friction and complications, which might arise from the temporary location of the capital in the territory of another State, would be avoided. The location of the political capital of the Andhra State in Andhra territory, right from the commencement, will also result in the development of normal and cooperative relations between the new State and the residuary State.

The Government, therefore, are of opinion that the temporary capital of the Andhra State should be located in Andhra territory. This means that the seat of the Governor, the Ministers and the Legislature should be located in the territory of the new Andhra State. The decision as to the site of this temporary capital should be left to the Andhra people themselves and may be taken by the Andhra Members of the Madras Legislature, who are likely, at a later stage, to form the Legislative Assembly of the new State. This decision should be indicated to the Government of India by the beginning of July 1953.

While the capital of the State should be located within the territory of the new State from the date of the inauguration of that State, it is not necessary that all the offices pertaining to the Andhra State should also be transferred to the territory of the new State from that date. Some offices of the Andhra State might continue to be located in the City of Madras till arrangements are made for their transfer to Andhra territory. The Government are assured that the residuary State of Madras will make every effort to accommodate such offices.

The new Andhra State will be inaugurated in October 1, 1953, which is considered a suitable and convenient date for this purpose.

It should be clearly understood that any proposals involving financial assistance from the Central Government would require the approval of the Central Government and would depend upon the capacity of the Central Government to render help. Therefore, any decision about the capital or any other matter involving financial assistance would require the approval of the Central Government in so far as that financial assistance is concerned.

The Andhra Legislature, after the inauguration of the new State, should decide upon, the location of the High Court within the territory of the new State. Till such decision is taken, the present Madras High Court will continue to function also as the High Court of the Andhra State. During this period, certain necessary conventions

may be observed in regard to the administrative side of the High Court relating to Andhra as well as such other matters as may be considered necessary.

The Legislature of the Andhra State will consist of one Chamber only, that is, the Legislative Assembly, and there will be no second Chamber. As regards the residuary State of Madras, it should be left to that State to decide the future of its second Chamber.

The Members elected to the present Madras Legislative Assembly from the areas which would form part of the new Andhra State, should constitute, to begin with, the new Andhra State Legislative Assembly.

The case of Bellary district has to be considered specially and it cannot be treated as a single unit for attachment to any State. It is bilingual and a considerable part of it has a clear majority of Kannada speaking people. There are at present ten *taluqs* in this district. Six of these *taluqs*, namely, Harpanahalli, Hadagalli, Hospet North, Hospet South, Sandur, and Siruguppa, have, each of them, a very large Kannada speaking population. Three *taluqs*, namely, Adoni, Alur, and Rayadrug, have each a large majority of Telugu speaking people. The remaining *taluq* of Bellary has a very mixed population and there are certain other factors also to be considered. The Government have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the three *taluqs* of Adoni, Alur and Rayadrug should form part of the new Andhra State and the six Kannada speaking *taluqs*, mentioned previously should form part of the Mysore State. In regard to Bellary *taluq*, Government propose to consider the matter further and come to a decision later.

One part of the Tungabhadra Project is situated in Hospet North *taluq*. The other part of it is in Hyderabad State. That part of the project in Hospet North *taluq* will thus be in Mysore State after the establishment of the Andhra State. This great project will feed not only those areas which go to the Mysore State but also some areas in Andhra State. Both these States will be especially interested in this scheme. Special arrangements should, therefore, be made for the joint control and supervision of the project by the State concerned in cooperation with the Central Government. The Ministry of Irrigation and Power will, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission and the States concerned, work out the necessary financial and other arrangements and prepare a scheme for the purpose. Till the date of inauguration of the new State, the Madras Government will continue the work on the Tungabhadra Project, as before. From the 1st October, the States concerned will manage it with the assistance of the Central Government, in accordance with the scheme drawn up therefore. It is desirable that the work on the project should be continued under the present set-up till it is completed.

A Boundary Commission or Commissions will be appointed some time after the establishment of the Andhra State to determine the exact boundaries of that State and to recommend such adjustments as may be considered necessary in regard to the boundaries of that State with the residuary State of Madras and the Mysore State.

The question of services and the financial implications of the formation of the Andhra State will be considered separately later. As far as possible, the officers now serving in the Andhra area should continue. A committee of senior officers of the present Madras Government should, in consultation with an officer appointed by the Central Government, consider the adjustments that might be necessary between the Andhra State and the residuary State of Madras in respect of the services.

Legislation to give effect to the decision to form an Andhra State will be undertaken during the next session of Parliament. Before the introduction of such legislation, the views of the State Legislatures concerned will be obtained, as required under article 3 of the Constitution.

Government earnestly trust that the creation of this new State, so long desired by the people of Andhra, will take place in a spirit of friendly cooperation between all the people concerned, so that the State might start under the most favourable auspices and lead to the progress and happiness of its people. The formation of the new State should not and will not come in the way of the cultural life of the City of Madras in which the people of Andhra have had such a great share. Full assurances have already been given, by those in a position to give them, that educational, hospital and other facilities will continue to be open to the Andhras in Madras City.

I earnestly hope that the controversy, which has accompanied this issue of the formation of the Andhra State, will now end and our united efforts will be directed to the successful establishment and working of this State.

BACK NOTE

**XIV. Statement Regarding Formation of Andhra Pradesh,
25 March, 1953**

NIL

REGARDING SPEAKERS CERTIFICATE ON INDIAN INCOME TAX (AMENDMENT) BILL

06 May, 1953

I crave your leave, Sir, and the indulgence of the House, to refer to certain incidents which took place in this House as well as the other House in the course of the last week, and which somewhat disturbed the normal serenity of the work of Parliament. Unfortunately I was not here then, but since my return, I have endeavoured to acquaint myself fully with what happened in both of the Houses of Parliament.

Under our Constitution, Parliament 'consists of our two Houses, each functioning in the allotted sphere laid down in that Constitution. We derive authority from that Constitution. Sometimes we refer back to the practice and conventions prevailing in the Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom and even refer erroneously to an Upper House and a Lower House. I do not think that is correct nor is it helpful always to refer back to the procedure of the British Parliament which has grown up in the course of several hundred years and as a result of conflicts originally with the authority of the King and later between the Commons and the Lords. We have no such history behind us, though in making our Constitution we have profited by the experience of others. Our guide must, therefore, be our own Constitution which has clearly specified the functions of the House of the People and the Council of States. To call either of these Houses an Upper House or a Lower House is not correct. Each House has full authority to regulate its own procedure within the limits of the Constitution. Neither House, by itself, constitutes Parliament. It is the two Houses together that are the Parliament of India.

The successful working of our Constitution, as of any democratic structure, demands the closest cooperation between the two Houses. They are in fact parts of the same structure and any lack of that spirit of cooperation and accommodation would lead to difficulties and come in the way of the proper functioning of our Constitution. It is therefore, peculiarly to be regretted that any sense of conflict should arise between the two Houses. For those who are interested in the success of the great experiment in nation building that we have embarked upon, it is a paramount duty to bring about this close cooperation and respect for each other. There can be no constitutional differences between the two Houses, because the final authority is the Constitution itself. That Constitution treats the two Houses equally, except in certain financial matters which are to be the sole purview of the House of the People. In regard to what these are, the Speaker is the final authority.

This position is perfectly clear and cannot be and has not been challenged at any stage. Unfortunately, some words were used by, my colleague, the Law Minister, in speaking in the Council of States on April 29th, which led to a misunderstanding. That misunderstanding could have been easily removed by a direct reference to him.

This was not done and the matter was raised in the House. Further misunderstanding then arose as between the two Houses and questions of privilege were raised and it was stated that the dignity of this House had been affected.

All of us are zealous of maintaining the dignity and authority of this House and of the Speaker who represents this House. Indeed, all of us are anxious to maintain the dignity and authority of both Houses which constitute Parliament. My colleague, the Law Minister, is as anxious as any of us to maintain that dignity and authority and it has been a matter of the greatest regret to him that any words of his should have led people to believe otherwise and further led to certain occurrences in both Houses which disturbed for a while the cooperative and friendly atmosphere which must of necessity prevail in both Houses of Parliament. Owing to some of these occurrences, he was placed in an embarrassing position, where to carry out the directions of one House might appear as if he had ignored the directions of the other. In this dilemma he might have produced an impression of not having shown the usual consideration which is the duty of every Member. But that was far from his intention and he regrets it and trusts that the House will accept his apology for any mistake which he might have inadvertently committed.

So far as the facts are concerned, they are clear, although unfortunately my colleague, the Law Minister, was not aware of all of them at the time the first reference was made to this matter in the Council of States. It is clear and beyond possibility of dispute that the Speaker's authority is final in declaring that a Bill is a Money Bill. When the Speaker gives his certificate to this effect, this cannot be challenged. The Speaker has no obligation to commit anyone in coming to a decision or in giving his certificate. But he has himself decided to ask for the opinion of the Law Ministry in every case that has arisen since the commencement of the Constitution in 1953, before he records his decision. In the present case, namely the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Bill, when the Bill was first received, the Law Ministry advised that it was a Money Bill. It was subsequently referred to the Select Committee and thereafter considered by the House of the People on the 23rd April, 1953. The Speaker raised the question himself as to whether the Bill as amended by the Select Committee was a Money Bill and directed that the Law Ministry be approached and asked again to reexamine the position as also to give the grounds on which they think that the Bill was a Money Bill. The Ministry of Law replied on the 24th April, 1953 saying that the Bill as amended by the Select Committee was a Money Bill and gave reasons for their advice. Thereupon the Speaker came to the decision on the 25th April, 1953 that the Bill as passed by the House of the People was a Money Bill and later signed the certificate embodying this decision.

It will be observed that every care was taken by the Speaker to seek the advice of the Law Ministry at various stages, although there was no obligation on him to do so. Unfortunately, the Law Minister himself though undoubtedly responsible for the advice of his Ministry, was not himself aware of these references at that time. As soon as the Law Minister became aware of this on April 30th he brought these facts to the notice of the Chairman of the Council of States.

These are the facts. An error, which is regretted, led to a good deal of misapprehension and some feeling in both Houses. The dignity of either House of Parliament is precious to everyone of us. Not only is each House anxious to maintain its own dignity but I am sure, that it is equally anxious to maintain the dignity of the House which is equally a part of Parliament. The dignity of each House is represented by the Speaker and the Chairman and every Member of Parliament. In whichever House he may be, must respect that dignity and authority.

I earnestly trust that these unfortunate incidents will be treated as closed now and that any feeling of resentment that might have arisen will pass away and the the House will function with friendship and cooperation, maintaining the high dignity of Parliament and furthering the public good.

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Sir, I am not aware fully of what exactly you were good enough to say on a previous occasion. That is for you to determine Sir. On my coming back here day before yesterday I took the earliest opportunity to acquaint myself with the situation and I thought it only right that I should place my views, with all respect, before this House—which I have done now, after acquainting myself with the facts. And in the course of the statement I have made a further suggestion that this particular matter might end.

As for any other consideration, apart from this particular matter, it is open to you. Sir, to take any such steps as you may desire.

BACK NOTE

XV. Regarding Speaker's Certificate on Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Bill, 06 May, 1953

1. THE MINISTER OF LAW AND MINORITY AFFAIRS (Shri Biswas): May I be permitted to say just a few words to completely associate myself with the statement which the Prime Minister has made? Nobody will deeply regret than myself the unfortunate incidents which marred the serenity, and, if I may add without disrespect, the dignity of either House of Parliament during the last weekend. It grieves me to think that I should have happened to be the cause of all this trouble. I had already assured this House at the earliest opportunity I had to do so that it had never been my intention to cast any reflection upon the Speaker or upon the dignity of the House. All that I can do today is to repeat that assurance, and to say that if by my words or, actions I had unwittingly given any offence to anybody or to the House, I am sincerely sorry, and offer my profoundest apology for it. I hope the curtain will now finally be rung down on this episode, and relations of the utmost cordiality will be restored between the two Houses.

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE (Calcutta NorthEast): I do not want to discuss the statements which have been made because it is not my intention in the least to disturb the atmosphere sought to be created by those statements. But I wish to recall a suggestion which you, Sir, made yourself. And that was that you wanted to have a meeting of representatives of different groups in Parliament to discuss certain matters which have arisen in connection with these incidents. We do not want those matters to be discussed on the floor of the House but we did think that you would call that meeting where across the table we could sit together and discuss those things and then perhaps the objection which the Prime Minister and the Law Minister have in view would be consolidated. And that is why I request you to see to it that meeting of representatives of different groups along with, I hope, the Leader of the House is arranged as soon as possible so that we can really and truly say goodbye to the rather unsavoury incidents which have happened and write a new chapter in the relations between the two Houses.

B. S. MURTHY (Eluru): As far as this incident is concerned we are all very happy that it has ended well. But there is one important point namely the resolution of the Council of States which is agitating our minds. I would also like to have your consideration as well as the consideration of the Leader of the House on that matter and you may take another opportunity to clarify this.

STATEMENT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

15 May, 1953

Since the last occasion when this House discussed foreign affairs, much has happened in the international sphere and many important developments have taken place. No major problem has been solved, but it may be said that for the first time in several years, large number of people have hoped that solutions might be found. The "cold war" has somewhat toned down.

Many evidences of this new approach have come from the Soviet Union and, however some people might view them, they must be welcomed as helping in lessening the tension of the world. In China also there has been evident a desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

This House will remember that some months ago a Resolution regarding Korea was sponsored by India in the United Nations and was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. That Resolution, as I stated in this House was no mandate but an earnest approach to find a basis for a settlement. The President of the General Assembly of the U.N. communicated it in this spirit to the Chinese and the North Korean Governments. Unfortunately, both the Soviet and the Chinese Governments rejected that Resolution and our hope of settlement suffered a serious setback. Recently, however, new proposals were made by the Chinese Government in regard to Korea which opened the door again to a fresh approach to this problem which was, to some extent in line with the Resolution passed by the U.N. Shortly afterwards, the Chinese Government put forward fresh proposals, referred to as the 8-point proposals, which were a very close approximation to the Indian Resolution passed by the General Assembly of the U.N. we welcomed these proposals because they seemed to afford a promising and solid basis for a solution of the immediate problem, which was in line with the accepted policy of the U.N. Many other powers also welcomed these proposals.

Two or three days ago, the United Nations Command in Korea put forward certain counter proposals. Any constructive approach to this problem is always to be welcomed. We were glad therefore that these attempts were being made to solve a problem which had given so much trouble in the past. On a close examination of these counter proposals, it appears that they diverge considerably from the General Assembly's Resolution to which the U.N. stands committed. It appears that the Chinese and North Korean Governments have expressed their disapproval of some of these proposals and stated that they cannot accept them as they are.

So far as India is concerned, we would welcome any solution which is accepted by the parties concerned. We feel, however, that such a solution is much more likely to be found on the basis of the U.N. Resolution, and the Chinese 8-point proposals approximate so nearly to this Resolution that they should form the

basis for discussion and we hope a solution. It should be possible to amplify them or to vary them by agreement where necessary. We earnestly hope, therefore, that this avenue of approach will not be given up but will be pursued. In any event, we trust that the negotiations at Panmunjom will be carried on, even though there might be occasional setbacks.

The House is aware that India has often been mentioned in some of these proposals and it has been suggested that this country should undertake various responsibilities. We are reluctant to assume distant responsibilities. But if an agreement is arrived at between the parties concerned and the task suggested for us is within our competence and not opposed to any policy that we pursue, we do not wish to escape that responsibility. That responsibility is all the greater because it is India's good fortune to have friendly relations with the great powers who, on either side are parties to the dispute. If India can serve the cause of peace in any way, we shall gladly offer our services. But such services can only be offered if there is an agreement as regards the solution.

I have referred to the new hopes that have been raised in the minds of innumerable people, hopes that the fear of war, which oppresses humanity, will diminish and the cold war, the horror and burden of which was described recently in eloquent and forceful language by the President of the United States, might end. There is undoubtedly a new atmosphere in the world and the outlook is brighter than it has been for a long time. It is for the statesmen of the world, and more especially those shouldering heavy responsibility in the great nations, to seize this opportunity with courage and wisdom, and lead humanity towards peace. I am very glad that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has recently suggested a conference on the highest level between the leading powers of the world, to meet informally and in privacy and without a rigid agenda, to tackle the problems that afflict mankind and to make every effort to rid humanity of the fear of war. I would earnestly commend this suggestion. The stakes are the highest that the world offers and a war-weary and fear-laden humanity will bless those who will rid it of these terrible burdens and lead it to peace and happiness. President Eisenhower is not opposed to this idea of such a conference but has recently said that the time for it is not ripe.

In the Middle East, I regret to say that the situation has gravely deteriorated. India is deeply interested in these countries of the Middle East and has the friendliest ties with them dating back to long ages past. It will be a misfortune, not only for the countries concerned but for the world, if these problems of the Middle East are not solved peacefully and co-operatively.

The great continent of Africa, from its northern Mediterranean coast to the far south, is in process of dynamic change and eruption. In the extreme south, as is well known a racial policy of gross intolerance and arrogance has shocked the world. In other parts of Africa also, in various shades and degrees, this racial policy is in evidence. It comes into conflict with the rising nationalism and consciousness of Africa nations. Unfortunately there has been a great deal of violence on all sides and repression

which has brought misery to vast numbers of people. No solution of the African problem can be based on racial discrimination or in the suppression of the African people, who have suffered so terribly for centuries past and who must command our sympathy. I earnestly hope that methods of violence will cease there, for this can only bring misery to all concerned.

It has been our misfortune during the past five or six years to have strained relations with our neighbor country Pakistan. Any calm and dispassionate consideration of India and Pakistan will lead to the inevitable conclusion that there must be friendly and co-operative relations between them, Geography, past history, common cultural backgrounds and innumerable individual contacts lead to this conclusion. Any other conclusion is fraught with unhappiness and disaster for both. I am happy to inform the House that, during recent weeks, there has been a marked improvement in these relations and many friendly gestures have been made to us from Pakistan which we welcome and reciprocate. We shall make every endeavour to dispel the clouds that have darkened our respective horizons and caused unhappiness to so many people. *(Hear, hear)*

The Governor-General of Pakistan recently stated that the independence and sovereignty of Pakistan must be fully recognized and no attempt should be made to interfere with them. I am surprised that this obvious proposition should have been put forward. There is or can be no desire on the part of any reasonable persons to interfere in any way with the freedom and independence of Pakistan. Certainly India does not wish to do so and desires friendly relations with its neighbor and sister country, each recognizing the other's freedom and integrity. I am aware that there are some misguided persons in India as well as in Pakistan who have continually sown the seeds of hatred and ill will against the other country and who talk wildly about conflict and interference. But this Parliament and the country have denounced and repudiated this mischievous outlook and false ideology.

In recent months, a domestic agitation which influence our foreign relations, has demonstrated how utterly irresponsible and mischievous this outlook is. I refer to what is known as the 'Jammu agitation' which has demonstrated to what lengths irresponsible behaviour harmful to the nation can go. This agitation has not only injured our cause internationally but has made the very solution, which it seeks, more difficult of attainment. It has been a challenge to the authority of Parliament and an attempt to upset by unlawful and often violent means the decisions of our Parliament. It has been a matter of peculiar regret that those whose primary duty must be to uphold the Constitution and have respect for the laws made under the Constitution, should be guilty of inciting people to violate those laws. I am not merely concerned with the moral aspects of this matter but also with the evil consequences, both national and international, that flow from it.

The world is full of problems and a tortured humanity seeks anxiously for some relief from its fears and burdens. In this tragic drama, a measure of responsibility comes to us in this great country. We have enough of our problems here and they

consume our thoughts and energy, but we cannot isolate ourselves from the great brotherhood of the nations and from the common problems that affect humanity. Whether we wish it or not, fate and circumstances have cast this responsibility upon us and we must discharge it. In the manner that we, in common with other countries, discharge it will depend whether our generation and the next will live in peace and bring about the progressive happiness of mankind or suffer irretrievable disaster. That responsibility can only be discharged if we are united and hold together, remembering always our high ideals and objectives and not allowing ourselves to be swept away by the fear or passion of the movement.

BACK NOTES

XVI. Statement on Foreign Affairs, 15 May, 1953

NIL

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

17 September, 1953

I beg to move: "That the present International situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

At almost every session of this Parliament, this subject has come up for debate and the House has been pleased to express its approval of the general policy pursued by the Government of India in regard to international affairs. In the course of each session a considerable number of questions are put which indicate the eager interest that hon. Members take in international affairs. On my part, I should like to express my deep appreciation of this active interest and the support that this House has invariably given in these vital matters which affect our country and the world.

International affairs are not the privilege of a select coterie of diplomats today. They have to be understood— especially by this House and even, I would say, by the general public—not in their intricate details, but in the matter of policies that lie behind them, because international affairs have become of enormous importance even in the lives of the common people today. They might lead to war; they might lead to other developments which are almost as bad as war and thus affect the lives of each one of us.

Now it is all very well to talk about international affairs or about foreign policy as if that was some integrated whole which you can put forward and say 'ayes or 'no' to it. Of course, the House knows that it is a much more complicated affair than that, and the fact is that even a policy, a foreign policy, which may have and should have, of course, certain fixed and more or less definite ideals and objectives, nevertheless is a collection of foreign policies—not one single item—because the world is not fashioned after our liking. All kinds of different problems arise and there are different interests, and we have to adapt ourselves to them keeping in view this basic policy. Apart from that, international affairs have been taking increasingly a stranger turn. There is an element of dogmatic fervour, something resembling the old approach of bigoted religion in them, something resembling that ordered division of "either you are with us, or you are against us", and so we have this, if I may say so with all respect, narrow approach which considers everything in terms of black and white—"those with us or those against us"—and repeating that old, unfortunate bigoted approach of religion which brought about the wars of religion in the past, with not even the saving graces which religion sometimes had provided in the past.

International affairs have ceased to be a game of debonair diplomats discussing some secrets and become something where hard things are said, threats are uttered continuously against each other, and so far as the world is concerned, we live in a precarious state between hope and fear. Some people imagine that a country's policy should be what they call a 'strong' policy—strong policy apparently meaning that we

should go about looking as fierce and ferocious as possible, threatening everybody, telling everybody that we will punish them if they don't behave as we want them to behave. Now that kind of thing may sound very well at a public meeting and may evoke applause, but the fact is that that represents great immaturity in political thinking or understanding. Mature nations—as we are certainly in this matter as in many others do not behave in this way. We have to show our maturity by trying to understand things, by trying to balance them, by trying always to see and act in a manner which helps, not hinder. Now, all these things put some limitations in our way, limitations in the way of expression, especially for a person who is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, because on the one hand I would like to be as frank as possible with this House and with our country, and on the other hand I would not like to say anything which needlessly irritates or angers any country—whether I agree with that country or disagree with it is another matter—because I do not think we shall advance our cause, our country's cause or the world's cause by merely showing irritation against other countries' policies, in New Delhi. Naturally, where we differ fundamentally from them, we have to express our own viewpoints of disagreement or agreement as the case may be. The pace of events has grown progressively faster. Whether all this is due to the fact that we live in an age of some kind of a consummation of the Industrial Revolution that began one hundred or two hundred years ago, or other factors are involved in it, I do not know. But you may symbolise that pace of events by the continuous talk of this latest progeny of the industrial age, the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb, or the cobalt bomb of which some people have begun talking about. All this means a terrific threat overhanging humanity, fear and apprehension all over; and oddly enough, at the same time the hope of an infinitely better life for humanity is offered. We have had some extraordinary things, and the choice before the world is between these two. Well, as I have put it, the choice can only be one. But the fact remains that nobody can be sure whether the choice will be war or peace.

Two days ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations began its sessions and they are having very important problems before them. And may I in this connection say something, in saying which I am sure I will be repeating the sentiments of the House, that we express our pleasure that a Member of this House has been elected to the Presidentship of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and in particular that a representative of Indian womanhood has been so elected?

In considering foreign affairs we are naturally interested in particular problems which affect us intimately, whether it is the question, the old question, of the treatment of people of Indian descent in South Africa or the question, also an old one, of the treatment of people of Indian descent in Ceylon, or other like problems of Indians overseas. We are interested in them. Because, we are concerned with the fate of hundreds and thousands of these people who, though no longer citizens and nationals of India, were in the past connected with India, about whom we have various agreements and assurances and the like, and therefore we have a certain responsibility with regard to them, although they are not our nationals. These problems continue, and must continue to interest the House.

Then there are those other problems of foreign establishments in India, and the House and our country is naturally impatient about them and does not like this delay in their solution. That is true. Nobody likes it. Not only do we not like it in the present from a political point of view, but from many others; they are centres of smuggling, of intrigues and trouble, danger spots even in time of peace. And suppose, unfortunately, some kind of war broke out in parts of the world, they might well become even greater danger spots. We have said quite clearly in this House that if war breaks out anywhere—it does not matter between whom it is—so far as we are concerned, we will not admit the right of any part of India, including those parts that are called foreign establishments. In India, to be associated with that war in any way. I want to make it perfectly clear that if these places are used, directly or indirectly, in connection with a war, we shall have to take action to stop that. I say that not, obviously, in any sense as a threat, but because it is well to make clear somethings so that others may be aware of the consequences of some action they might conceivably indulge in.

Having said that, I have also to put before the House my view as to how we should deal with these problems. Basically, not in detail. That is to say, it is easy enough for us to talk of strong measures, and it will not be difficult to take such measures in their limited significance. But nothing is limited in this matter, more especially when these establishments are connected with nations abroad, some great nations, some small. Then the consequences are far-reaching. And I think that the House agrees with me that to take some step, merely because of our impatience and irritation, some step which might produce these far-reaching consequences, which might entangle us in all kinds of difficulties will not help us in bringing about the solution that we desire. After all, the way of peaceful approach, though it may appear rather humdrum, brings results more speedily and, what is more, does not leave any trail of bitterness which is left among nations even after they have won a victory.

Therefore we have proceeded in regard to these foreign establishments firmly, I think, in the declaration of our policy—in the sense of pursuing that policy in a quite way but at the same time peacefully and at trying to take, what I would call, measures that are not peaceful. We are perfectly alive to the questions relating to them. We are constantly giving thought and taking such action as may appear expedient within the four corners of that peaceful approach. The other day we withdrew our representative from Lisbon and closed our Legation there. That was a gesture, no doubt. But it was an important gesture showing how we are going in a particular direction, step by step. No doubt that step will have to be followed by other steps. I need not, before this House; go into the reasoning about these foreign establishments. But for the sake of others who might perhaps read or hear my words I should like to express my amazement at the fact that any country could still think of holding on any foreign country, could still think of having its footholds in India, holding on any territory in India, after the great changes that have taken place in India and elsewhere. So far as we are concerned, we are against any colonial rule in any part of the world. It is true we do not, because of our—if you like—weakness, do much about it. And because we do not do much about it we do not shout much about it, because shouting without doing does not help.

We are against all forms of colonial rule. We also recognise that in a complicated situation, it is not always easy merely to solve a problem by trying to give effect to a slogan. It may take time. We recognise also that the days of the old imperialisms are obviously ended—in a large measure they have ended. They continue undoubtedly in places in Asia and Africa, and sometimes create much mischief. The old imperialisms are past history. They may carry on in the present for a while. But even though they are past history, it is extraordinary how old vested interests cling on to what they have got to the bitter end. Now, if we are against all forms of colonial domination and rule, how much more must we object to anything actually on the soil of India? If we object even in Africa or a part of Asia, surely our objection will be infinitely greater for anything of that kind in India itself. And therefore, it is quite impossible for us as a Government and as a people to tolerate any foreign foothold in any part of India. But I think, if I may say so with all humility, we have shown a great deal of wisdom in not precipitating these matters and bringing about conflicts in order to solve them because any such attempt, I think, would have led to other problems and more difficult problems. I shall not say much more about these questions.

In regard to Ceylon I would say this, Sir, as the House knows, I had talks with the Prime Minister of Ceylon—friendly talks—in which we tried to understand each other, each other's difficulties, and I am prepared to say to this House that I recognised the difficulties before the Prime Minister of Ceylon. It is not that he has no difficulties and he is just obstinate. He and his Government have got difficulties as we all of us have, but difficulties should not come in the way of what are obviously right solutions. That is another matter. In recognising the difficulties the Prime Minister of Ceylon and his Government had, I went some distance in agreeing, in putting forward suggestions which normally I would not have agreed to. But it has been an axiom of our policy that we should live on friendly and cooperative terms with our neighbouring countries, and Ceylon is very much a neighbour, very much akin to us; and it seems almost, shall I say, a tragedy for me to think of any conflict between a country like Ceylon so akin to us and this great country of India. So, we approached Ceylon in a friendly way, we made clear the limits to which we can go, beyond which we cannot go without sacrificing the interests of hundreds of thousands of people and making them homeless and Stateless wanderers; because, remember, the question is of these people who are no longer Indian citizens or Indian nationals and who, if they are not absorbed in Ceylon, not considered as Ceylon citizens now or later, become Stateless and homeless. I hope that this question of people of Indian descent in Ceylon will be further considered in the same friendly way between the two Governments and between the Prime Minister of Ceylon and me, and that we succeed in finding some solution which must obviously be to the advantage of both countries. It is not a question of Ceylon thinking that India, a great big country to the north of it, is trying to bring any pressure or coercion. I do not wish to put it that way, and that is why I do not like anyone here using the language of threat to or in regard to this question in Ceylon.

Certainly we have to be clear and we have to be firm about our policy, but we have always to put it forward in a friendly way without rousing any apprehension on the other side.

In regard to South Africa, that question has become, shall I say, a frozen or a petrified question which does not show the slightest improvement and shows some continuing deterioration. That question, of course, has passed outside the limited sphere in which, we raised it originally, in which it was. It has become a much wider issue in South Africa. It has become an issue not of people of Indian descent and the White settlers of South Africa, but a question of the great majority of the population of the Union of South Africa, that is the Africans themselves, and a major question of racial discrimination. There is this, racial discrimination in many places in the world, especially in Africa, but more especially in South Africa. In other places it takes place, but there is an element of apology about it, but in South Africa there is no apology. It is blatant. It is shouted out, and no excuse is put forward for it. In fact, this question in South Africa has become one of the major issues, major tests of the world, because there can be not a shadow of a doubt that if that policy of racial discrimination— of a master race dominating over other races, some colonists and settlers from Europe presuming to dominate forever the populations of Asia or Africa—is sought to be justified, then obviously there are forces in this world—not in your or my opinion only, but in this world—which will fight that to the end. Because those days are past when such things were tolerated in theory or even in practice. Therefore, this issue in South Africa, though it apparently lies low today— to some extent it does not lie low, but other problems have somehow overshadowed it—is one of the basic issues in the world today which may well shake up this world. We have seen other aspects of this racial discrimination and colonialism in other parts of Africa. We have been accused—we meaning India, has been accused—of interfering in the affairs of other countries, in Africa. We have also been accused of, well, some kind of imperialist tendency which wants to spread out in Africa and take possession of those delectable lands which now the European settlers occupy. As a matter of fact, this House knows very well that all along, for these many years, we have been laying the greatest stress on something which is rather unique—I think unique in the sense that I am not aware of any other country which has laid stress in that particular way on that policy. I do not mean to say that we are very virtuous and all that, and others, other countries, are not, but we have rather gone out of our way to tell our own people in Africa, in East Africa, or in some other parts of Africa. If that they can expect no help from us, no protection from us if they seek any special rights in Africa which are not in the interests of the people of Africa. We shall help them; we have told them: “We shall help you. Naturally we are interested in protecting you, your dignity or interests but not if you go at all against the people of Africa, because you are their guests and if they do not want you, out you will have to go bag and baggage and we will not come in your way”.

Now, that is a very clear statement which sometimes, naturally, has not been welcomed by our people in East Africa, many of the merchant classes there who have

done well; but it is our firm policy and I want them—our Indians abroad—to realise it, and I want others to realise it too. And if that is our firm policy, we cannot actually remain quiescent when things happen in various parts of Africa which, apart from affecting Indians as such, might create dangerous world situations. In Africa, one sees today in its extreme form both racial discrimination and domination, and the old colonialism at work. Recently in North Africa various developments took place which, well, one used to read about in the histories of the second part of the 19th century, and it is amazing that that kind of thing can continue to be repeated now, in the middle of the 20th century. It may perhaps apparently succeed for a while, but I very much doubt if any such policy can possibly bring any measure of success. Because the fact of the matter is that it has become almost impossible to terrorise the people into submission today, wherever the people may be. We have seen in a country, in a famous country, but in a weak country—a very weak country, either financially or militarily, or otherwise—a weak country in Western Asia which has had ups and downs and troubles in recent years, how many great powers could not force it into coming and following their wishes in some matters. Now, I am not going into the merits of these things. But my point is that it has become almost impossible for this method of coercion to be applied by one country against another. Of course, there are many ways of it, not merely military coercion; there may be promises of reward, there may be help and all that. But the conditions that have arisen today make it increasingly difficult for even the powerful countries to impose their will on the weak. To some extent, they might do it. Now, if that is so, how much more difficult or impossible it is for one powerful country to seek to impose its will on another powerful country? It is patently not possible today, and if one tries to do that, or both try to do that against each other, the result can only be conflict—ultimately war. And that is why we come up against this situation in the world today, this approach of great powers to each other in anger; in fear, in hatred—all this resulting in a continuing thing which has been called ‘cold war’ and which always thinks merely in terms of some future shooting war. And the problem before all of us in the world is, whether a big war is inevitable and, therefore, one must prepare for it and go in for it when it comes, or whether it can be avoided. That is a big problem. Nobody can prophesy; but I have no doubt that vast numbers of people in the world—in fact, I would say, nearly all the people in the world, in every country—obviously desire peace. And yet I must confess that recent events have made me slightly more doubtful of any permanent settlements in the near future, I do not, of course, rule them out; I think there are chances and we should work for them. But when one sees the temper of peoples minds and of statesmen’s minds which are moved, as I said, by that old something, approaching that old religious fervour, without the virtue of religion in it, then anything might happen.

We have heard or read about a long argument, about the shape of a table—whether it should be a round table or a square table or an oblong table. But the real question is of the shape and content of peoples’ minds. It does not matter what kind of table you use or whether you have no table and sit in the good old Indian way of

squatting on a *takht* or a floor. The point is, how to approach these problems, and if you approach them in a spirit of warfare, well, then, naturally the consequences are different.

The House knows that the name of India came up repeatedly before the Political Committee of the United Nations some little while ago and the proposal was made that India might be made a member of the Political Conference that is the child of the armistice in Korea. India was put in a somewhat embarrassing position. We did not put our name forward and— I am perfectly sincere and honest in what I say—we did not want any additional burden. At the same time, we were strongly of opinion—and naturally—that this Political Conference should succeed, that there should be a settlement, a peaceful settlement, in the Far East of Asia, and that if we could help in that, we should not run away from that help, even if it might involve a burden on us. So, placed in this position, we did not put ourselves forward at all. But other countries, thinking that the presence of India there would be helpful, put our name forward. To the last, we made it clear that we could only function if the two major powers to this dispute wanted us to function. We were not interested in being pushed in by one party against the will of the other. And when I say ‘the two major parties’, I do not refer to any particular country, however big it may be, but the two parties being, on the one side, the United Nations, and on the other the Chinese and the North Korean Commands. Those were the two parties which brought about the armistice, and the Political Conference which flows from the armistice would also ultimately be concerned with those two parties as such. I repeat this because there was some confusion which was attached to what we had said about this matter in the United Nations. So, this matter, as the House knows, came to a vote and in the voting there was a considerable majority in favour of India and a big minority against it and a number of abstentions. But there was not the two-thirds majority that would have been necessary if it went to the Plenary Session. At that later stage we begged those who had put our names forward not to press for it and so India was out of it.

But certain interesting consequences flowed from this vote. If that voting is analysed, you will see that apart from the four countries who voted against India, there were 21 votes, 18 of them from the America, 17 from what is called Latin America. Now, I have the greatest respect for the countries of Latin America. Let there be no mistake about it. But the facts stand out that nearly the whole of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted one thing in this political Conference while a number of countries, all the Americas, he did not want it. They have as much right not to want it as they have to want it. But the question that we have been considering is an Asian question, a question of Asia, and is the will of Asia to be flouted, is the will of Asia and Europe jointly to be flouted because some people who really are not concerned with this question so intimately feel that way? That is an extraordinary position.

It is interesting because in spite of the major developments that have taken place in the world during the last few years, somehow it is not realised by many of the great powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, do not propose to be by-passed and certainly do not

anybody. What then is the way out? Well, one, of course, is war, an attempt to coerce one by the other. The other is to give up the idea of coercion, accepting the fact as it is and trying to arrive, if you like, if not at a permanent settlement, at least at a temporary understanding of live and let live. That is possible, because the only other alternative means conflict on a major scale and in these days of atomic and hydrogen bombs the House can well imagine what the result of that will be.

Now, these matters are coming up before the United Nations soon and I understand that the People's Government of China in their reply to the United Nations' proposals have made some counter proposals. First of all, it should be remembered that all the parties agreed to the fact of a Political Conference being held in Korea to carry on the work of the Armistice and to try to settle the problems there. They agreed to the functions of that Conference. The only question that is being considered or is in controversy is the composition of that Conference. It should be remembered also that a Conference like that does not proceed by majority vote. It does not decide that way—obviously not. It has to decide by more or less—if not unanimity—consensus of opinion, and agreement of the major parties concerned. So, it does not much matter whether there are a few more on this side or that side, except that the more there are, a larger crowd may create difficulty in getting down to business: otherwise, there is no particular difficulty.

The real question that arises is whether there should be neutral countries represented in this Conference. It has been our view that it would be helpful if such countries are represented, simply because they can sometimes help in toning down differences and easing a tense situation. The real agreement will naturally have to come between the others. The neutral is not going to bring about an agreement; he will only help in providing a certain atmosphere which, might lead the others to agree. However, that is a matter for the United Nations and the other party to decide and we have absolutely no desire to be there in this Conference. We have undertaken a very heavy burden in Korea as it is. We are in this Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and we have sent our troops there, and they have only begun their work there. But from such information as we have received, they are having to face considerable difficulties. It is not at all an easy matter for them to deal with— not difficulties, if I may say so, from the South Korean people, well, they hardly come in contact with them— but other difficulties. Somehow passions have been so roused among these prisoners that it is not particularly easy to deal with them. But thus far, hon. Members must have seen from reports in the press, the way our officers and men have handled this question has elicited the praise of everybody there and I should like our representatives there in the Commission as well as the officers and men in the Armed Forces to feel that they have the goodwill and active sympathy of this House and of the country.

I would not like to discuss these matters that are before the United Nations in greater detail, because that might well prove embarrassing to our own representatives there or to us or to other countries. They are difficult questions. Some hon. Members suggest in a fit of frustration that we should withdraw from the United Nations. That,

if I may say so with all respect, is immaturity. It is not an understanding of the question. One cannot run away like this from a problem.

The United Nations, inspite of all its failings—and they are many—nevertheless is a great world organisation.

It does contain within it the seeds of hope and peace, and it would be a most unfortunate and rather perverse attitude for any country to try to destroy this structure because it is not to its entire liking. And apart from that, if a country does that, I have no doubt that it is that country which would suffer more than the organisation. So, from the narrowest point of view it is not good. We cannot remain isolated in the world, cut off from everything, and living a life of our own in our limited sphere. Most of us in India are so situated—the House will forgive me for this observation—as to be normally isolated in our minds, in our social habits, in our eating, in our drinking, in our marrying etc. We isolate ourselves in castes, this division and that division, with the result that it is a unique habit in India which does not prevail anywhere else in the world. We live in compartments, and therefore, perhaps naturally, we think in terms of isolation easily as a country too. But the fact is that that isolation in the past has weakened us tremendously and left us rather in the lurch when the world has advanced in terms of science or other developments, and we were left behind. So, it is a dangerous thought—this sought of isolation—and we have to keep in touch with the rest of the world, naturally keeping to our own ways: that way, we may learn things from others. But we cannot be isolated: in fact, no country can be. Therefore, to talk of getting out of the United Nations or of otherwise keeping apart from all these problems is not to take cognisance of the realities of the situation.

There is one other matter to which I should like to refer before I close my present remarks, and that is Kashmir. I have already informed the House—on two occasions, I think—of certain developments in Kashmir in the course of the last five or six weeks. Those developments did not come out of the air or as a result of some secret conspiracy. Those who had been following events in Kashmir saw this crisis developing for several months past, and the crisis was not so much a crisis *vis-a-vis* India—though we may take that aspect also—but it was an internal crisis which had affected all other relations and questions. Before I went to Europe in May, I paid a brief visit to Srinagar. I had always kept myself in fairly close touch with events there. I went at the end of May there, and I was surprise and distressed to see what was happening there—what had happened regarding the state of affairs—economic, political and other—internally. In the past couple of years, Kashmir has been praised by us for various land reforms and they were very good reforms. I do not withdraw my praise for those reforms.

But, unfortunately, while the reforms were good, the manner of giving effect to them was not good. It was not good in two ways; one, that other consequences were not thought of; secondly, in the actual implementation of them, as it appears from subsequent reports, a great deal of injustice was done—it was not fairly done. I refer to this merely to show that a large number of factors, among them being, these,

produced a feeling of grave economic discontent among the people there. Much later a committee was appointed, the Wazir Committee. Its report was published only recently. It brings out much of this discontent, the way the land problem was not properly dealt with and the discontent that arose after hopes had gone up very high among the peasantry and others. There were other matters too: the cooperatives there failed and other things happened.

Now, as a result of all this, which was entirely an internal matter, grave disputes arose within the Government there, within the party, the National Conference, from which the Government draws its sanction. And when I went there towards the end of May I was greatly distressed to see this, because I noticed that gradually the Government of Kashmir was not functioning. It could not function, because of internal conflicts. Naturally, in a friendly way, I advised them to pull together, to lay down one definite policy and carry it out as a Government, and not pull in two or three directions all the time. This was one thing that was happening.

The other thing which gave me some disquiet, a good deal of it, was the fact that over a year ago we had arrived at some kind of an agreement with the Kashmir Government which the House knows well. This House approved of it; the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir approved of it. It was in a very small part given effect to and then the rest remained in cold storage. Now, I could very well understand certain difficulties which, perhaps, the House does not appreciate. So, if there was some delay I would not have minded it. This delay was largely caused by certain events in Jammu which suddenly accentuated a peculiar situation and produced its reactions in the Kashmir valley?

It produced its powerful reactions in the Kashmir Valley and those who are not friends of ours, or friends of the Kashmir Government exploited this position fully. This created another tremendous complication there and delayed the implementation of the agreement.

All these things worked together and, as I said, when I went there in May last I was gravely disturbed. I went away to Europe.

When I was away my respected colleague, the Education Minister who has been closely connected with developments in Kashmir and my colleague the States Minister who also, in his official capacity has been connected with it and who had followed developments there, visited Kashmir. The Education Minister went there at the invitation of the Government and gave them a lot of good advice. Nevertheless conditions continued to deteriorate and when I came back these reports reached me. I invited Sheikh Abdulla to come to Delhi. In fact, even when I was in Europe I had sent word that he should be invited. On return I invited him. He did not come; then he said he would come a little later. Later again this invitation was repeated by telephone, by letter. Ultimately he did not come. Meanwhile—in fact, before I had come back—Sheikh Abdulla and some others began speaking in a way which seemed strange to me and distressed us greatly. I could do nothing about it, except to remonstrate with him and ask him why he did so. Obviously he was troubled by these problems to

which I have referred, economic and others, that had arisen in Kashmir and for which he could not see any easy remedy. There were remedies, of course; there are remedies, but he did not see them. So, he drifted in a different direction, and rather unfairly cast the blame for some of the economic occurrences there on the Government of India—lack of help or whatever it is. Anyhow the position we took throughout was that it is for the Kashmir Government to decide what policy they will follow. Let their party decide, let the Government decide and have one policy. If that policy was in keeping with the Government of India's policy, as we would like it, of course, and as we have always endeavoured is to be, to have a joint policy in regard to matters affecting Kashmir, well and good. If not, if the Kashmir Government had a policy with which we differed completely, then it was up to us, the Government of India—I told Sheikh Abdulla and other members of his Government—to sit together and consider, even if we parted company, what we could do about it.

The fact of the matter was that Sheikh Abdulla himself was in a minority in his Government in these matters, and a still smaller minority in his party. It was that which produced this element of confusion. So, apart from giving good advice and feeling rather distressed, I felt I could do very little. The situation was developing in this way. Ultimately it blew up as the House knows and changes took place.

Now, having been connected with Kashmir, politically speaking, for a trifle over twenty years and having been intimately connected in the Government with all these developments that have occurred during the past six or seven years, the House can well imagine the extreme distress that all these developments have caused me. It is not a personal matter, I mean. We have always considered this Kashmir problem as symbolic for us, as having far-reaching consequences in India. Kashmir was symbolic for us to illustrate that we were a secular State, that Kashmir with a majority, a large majority of Muslims, nevertheless of its own free will wished to be associated with India. It had consequences both in India and Pakistan, because if we disposed of Kashmir on the basis of that old two-nation theory, well, then, obviously millions of people in India and millions in East Pakistan would be powerfully affected. All kinds of consequences would flow from it. Many of those wounds that had healed might open out again. So that, this problem was not, it has never been, a problem of a patch of territory being with India or not. It has been a problem of infinitely deeper consequence.

Kashmir is a place of infinite beauty. What is more, Kashmir is a place of great strategic importance, and it has always been a misfortune for a country to be situated strategically, because envious eyes fall upon it. Certainly, so far as we are concerned, it is desirable for us from a strategic point of view. But however that may be, we cannot impose our desire or wish in this matter. Therefore, we have put it aside and right from the beginning we have laid stress on this that the people of Kashmir should decide this question—not other considerations. We have held by it, and we hold by it still, that they must decide it in the proper way, in the proper context, not in the way that one would imagine some people in the Pakistan Press want it done. We have been pretty well used to the tone and contents of the Pakistan Press and sometimes to the statements of their people, more or less responsible people, in the past few years, but the actuality in the last few weeks has far exceeded the wildest of my

not in Kashmir only. It may be that sometimes it happens even in the city of Delhi. So, I don't think it is right for these wild accusations to be thrown out, and if there is any trifle of evidence of something, well naturally we take action. If there is not, mere shouting is not helpful; in fact, it is definitely harmful.

The House knows that recently I saw the Prime Minister of Pakistan when he was here in Delhi and he issued a statement which was an agreed statement. Soon after the return of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, a tremendous propaganda started there in the Press, partly against me and partly against our country as a whole. Now, I should like to say that Mr. Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and I discussed this question at great length and we discussed it in a very friendly way, trying to find some way out of the difficulty, trying to take at least one step, if we cannot decide about others immediately. And, therefore, I was surprised at this barrage of press propaganda, from Karachi especially and later from Lahore. This was chiefly directed to the subject of Admiral Nimitz being Plebiscite Administrator or not. It so happens that since the day Mr. Mohammed Ali left Delhi—since the day our statement was issued to the Press, I have not discussed this subject in public anywhere till today. I haven't said a word in public—in private or in the Cabinet. I might have mentioned a little of it—but I have not seen a press man as a press man. And an enormous barrage of propaganda started that I was undermining this agreement that I have made with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and undermining it— well, apparently through the devious method of bringing in Admiral Nimitz into it. I confess I have been greatly surprised at this and I found some difficulty in dealing with it in correspondence elsewhere, with a situation which seems to me difficult to understand or grasp. Here I am, quietly sitting here, and I am being accused of this kind of deep conspiracy. Well, I should like to make it perfectly clear, and I am quite certain that Mr. Mohammed Ali has not only not liked this but actively disliked much of this propaganda there.

Now, so far as Admiral Nimitz is concerned, he is a very eminent person and I would hate to see anything at all in criticism of him. He is a person whom I have had the privilege of meeting. He is not only eminent in his own field but otherwise too he struck me as a very admirable person. I have nothing against him. He was appointed as Plebiscite Administrator about more than four years ago. In a sense he functioned, that is to say, he had an office in the United Nations Building, maybe for a year. Then, about three years ago, he himself felt that nothing much was happening and was not likely to happen soon. So far as we are concerned, we thought that in all probability the thing had ended. But apart from this, frankly the reason I put forward before Mr. Mohammed Ali was this: I said much has happened in these three or four years—just then the discussion in the Political Committee was taking place, this argument about India being in the Political Conference in Korea or not—I told him quite frankly that if we are get on with this question of Kashmiri as we want to get on,—we must try to isolate it from big power politics. Big powers are admirable individually, and maybe collectively!

Therefore I said it will not be fair to any of the big powers to ask them to supply a representative as a Plebiscite Administrator, however admirable he may be, because

that would be embarrassing and needlessly creating suspicion, not in my mind necessarily, but in some other big power's mind. I said therefore it is far better for us—there are plenty of countries in Europe and Asia which are fortunately not too big—let us try to select the man from there. That was all that I said, and having said that, as I said in public, it should have gone away anywhere. So, I would beg the House, if I may say so, and the Press and others that in this matter of Kashmir, we should not lose our bearings merely because the Pakistan Press has no bearings at all. We have to keep firm to our position and to hold by the statements we have made and continue functioning calmly and dispassionately. That is the best way of dealing with this situation as indeed with any situation. Whenever any important occurrence takes place, I shall naturally come to the House for the advice of the House, for such guidance as the House can give me. I have taken a good deal of the time of the House and have referred to some matters. It is a confused picture that one sees all over the world. We may not always unravel it; we may often make mistakes here and there as we no doubt made, but if there are certain basic principles which guide us in our policy, I think that on the whole we shall not go far wrong. It is well known to this House that the policy we have pursued in the past—foreign policy—has not only had a very widespread approval in this country—otherwise we could not have pursued it—but has been progressively appreciated in most countries of the world. And even those who have not agreed with it have reluctantly sometimes expressed their appreciation of it, or at any rate, their understanding of it. If that is so, I have no doubt that we shall continue to pursue that basic policy with such variations as may be necessitated from time to time.

BACK NOTE

XVII. Motion Regarding International Situation, 17 September, 1953

1. DR. N.B. KHARE (Gwalior): Is it also unreal, I mean the U.N.O. ?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know what is real or unreal, but the hon. Member's nimble wit is very real.

2. DR. N.B. KHARE: Thank you for once.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I wish Dr. Khare would not behave all the time like a Pakistani.

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS

24 December, 1953

Mr. Speaker, Sir, the House was good enough to show me so much indulgence yesterday by the patience with which it listened to my long address and subsequently. But I feel I will not be justified in taking much more of its time. This is the last day of the session and much work has to be done. Nevertheless, I should like to say a few words, more particularly with reference to what has been said by hon. Members.

Most Members in so far as foreign policy is concerned, or the present developments in this policy are concerned, have not really, in effect, challenged me. They may have emphasised some aspect of it or the other. That is a matter for gratification to me. I must confess, however, that when Mr. V. G. Deshpande said that he saw a silver lining in my policy, I began to feel some doubt as to whether I was quite right, because, normally speaking, we are far apart, and what he considers right, I consider wrong and *vice-versa*. However, there has been undoubtedly a very great deal of agreement on the broad lines of policy, and in fact, many of the criticisms that have been made outside the matters that we were really discussing yesterday. Perhaps some hon. Members felt their style cramped because I had requested them to confine themselves to the two or three subjects which I had mentioned. Normally, sometimes when these debates take place, speeches roam over a wide field; they cover the entire world. And so, because we were supposed to confine ourselves more or less to particular matters, here was this slightly baffling and cramping effect.

My hon. friend opposite, Acharya Kripalani, whose words are always listened to with respect by all of us, had not caught up to the fact that we were discussing foreign affairs. He started discussing the Preventive Detention Act and all that. Now that is my difficulty, that in this changing dynamic world hon. Members opposite do not catch up to events. They still live in a past age, a good age—a very good age, but not of today—without attempting to face the different problems of today. The language, the arguments and the slogans and the reasoning of yesterday do not apply today. It is obvious. It is a patent thing. Yet the same old things are said, the same old arguments are trotted out, whether they have any reference to the discussion or not. Normally speaking, one very favourite argument, when these debates take place, for hon. Members opposite, is the Commonwealth—the Commonwealth connection. Altogether they cannot get rid of them.

If instead of referring to it so much, they spend a little time in understanding what it is, perhaps our paths would be easier and their paths too. But, everything that is ill is traced to the Commonwealth connection. The Commonwealth connection may be good or bad. I think it is extraordinarily good; I stand by it. I still stand by it without agreeing in the slightest with the policy of any country in the Commonwealth or disagreeing with it. It is not that, but, when I am told, oh! this has happened and

that has happened because of the Commonwealth connection, it has no connection, no relevance because the thing might have happened without the Commonwealth connection or with it. You can discuss that, matter independently whether it is good or bad, but don't say that a certain condition is caused by this.

However, I was very glad to find the hon. Member opposite, Prof. Hiren Mukerjee studying the Gita. And, I hope he will continue those studies and reach that part of it in which a question is put by Arjuna and Krishna answers it in noble language—that famous part.

स्थित-प्रज्ञस्य का भाषा समाधि-स्थस्य केशव ।

स्थित-धीः किं प्रभाषेत किमासीत ब्रजेत किम ।।

I hope, all of us in debate or in the rest of our lives will remember these noble words and try to live up, to the best of our ability, to that ideal.

I do not propose to say much about the major subjects that we discussed yesterday; I have said enough. But, some points that were mentioned, not really relating to those subjects. I shall refer to Acharya Kripalani complained that we do not consult other parties in regard to foreign affairs; and he said that in other countries foreign affairs is a national policy in which, to a large extent, all parties agree. Now, I am not personally aware of these other countries where in foreign affairs all parties agree, except in certain countries where other parties are not allowed to exist. But, normally speaking, there is a great difference, It is all right in the old days when foreign affairs was looked upon, if I may say so, from a narrower angle, but nowadays, when foreign affairs is entangled with economic affairs and other matters, that is the very subject on which parties disagree; whether it is any country in Europe, or even in England,—a country which shows a great measure of discipline in such matters,—there is a great deal of difference in outlook—not in everything of course—and indeed policies change when Governments change and even, to some extent, when foreign Ministers change. Perhaps, the hon. Member had in mind, what is often called in the United States of America, the “bipartisan policy” of the United States. I am not competent to say what that “bipartisan policy” is. I find it difficult sometimes to understand that. But, however, that may be, even in that bipartisan policy, there are considerable differences as between one Government and the other. I only point out that it is not quite correct to say or to think that a nation, and the various groups and parties in the nation must necessarily have one policy. I should like to have it, not that I am opposed to it, but I ask hon. Members opposite whether all of them agree to any single policy. Leave out us, I put it to them. There are leaders of parties opposite and several parties; do they agree to any single policy in regard to foreign affairs? I would submit, they do not. In some matters they may agree, in others, they do not. In some matters they may agree, in others, they will disagree, but, by and large, they have no single policy. I want to consult, undoubtedly, and one should consult, and in times of crisis or difficulty or when grave issues are being considered, it is right that the nation should hold together and that there should be the greatest consultations possible, I agree entirely; but, to say that in developing a foreign policy, one must take always

into consideration a large number of heterogeneous ideas and proceed on the basis of consulting numerous groups with different viewpoints, would be to make foreign policy a question of debate between differing groups. As a matter of fact, that type of debate, while it may not yield results in times of crisis it is still more likely to create difficulty. If war is considered a time of crisis, it was said by Macaulay that while wars have sometimes been won by bad generals, it is not known in history that a debating society ever won a battle.

Now, it is suggested that we should reduce the conduct of these high affairs relating to foreign policy to frequent consultation and debate—not debate in this House I mean—I am all in favour of consultation as far as possible, but somebody must shoulder the responsibility for that policy; otherwise, we will find that nobody is responsible and the outcome will be a bit of this and a bit of that, without any coherence, without any logic and trying to satisfy all parties. It is better to have a slightly different policy, a coherent policy and not a policy without any coherence.

Acharya Kripalani said that he is all in favour of the policy of non-alignment, but that we, who proclaimed it forgot it and do not practise it. I do not know what he had in mind. It is perfectly true that we happen to live in this work-a-day world and have to cooperate with our neighbours, our neighbour in the street, our neighbour in the town and our neighbour internationally. We have not, as a nation, or as a Government, taken to sanyasa yet. We have to cooperate with the world; we have to give and take. We have to accept many things that we do not like just as others have to accept from us much they do not like. So that, to say that we must consider ourselves as irreproachable, as blameless, and guiltless and must not touch anybody who does not come up to the particular ideal of ours, whether right or wrong, is a different matter, and is not a realistic approach to anything. We go to the United Nations; all kinds of countries are represented there, and, in our heart of hearts, we like some of them more than others. We meet some parties, we go there, we confer and when we confer in the United Nations or anywhere else in any Committee, there are compromises. We do not say, 'You must take my word, yes, or no, or I go out'. Countries do not behave like that; even individuals, normally do not. So that, often enough, in these matters, whether in the United Nations or elsewhere, we have to compromise about many matters which come up. It may be true that when we support, the process of compromise, there is some danger, that we do not compromise too much; we do not go the slippery path; it may be so. But, there is no help for that; you have to face that and guard against that. You cannot say, 'I would not talk to anybody who does not take my word completely; or I go out'. Let me put it in a rather crude form. I say, I will only talk to people who talk my language, say Hindi. Of course, for a time, for a moment it may have a good effect. But, I may be cut off from the rest of the world, the entire world. Of course, my saying that is severe; but it comes to the same thing in regard to ideas. Suppose, I say I would not talk to anybody who does not hold my ideas, who does not accept my ideas. Again, I cut myself off, because there has to be communion of ideas, there has to be give and take about it, there has to be an understanding in this dynamic, everchanging world of today. Leave out the world;

take your own country. The public of this country,—whether you take them in the North-east of India or right down in Cape Comorin, all kinds of conditions there are,— they are essentially identical, essentially the same. There is a very strong identity, uniformity in the whole of the country, but yet there is a variety, a richness of variety, which is a great thing. We welcome that richness of variety; we cannot drive anybody and everybody with a single stick, with a single idea. We have to adopt ourselves and we have to give them freedom to do things as they do. Therefore, in international affairs, we cannot take up this attitude, ‘Oh, you must agree with me, or I would have nothing to do with you’. The result may be that you can sit in your isolated conditions separately and have nothing to do with others. That is not possible. Even if we wanted it, that is not a possibility. Today, we live in a world—whether you like it or not— we live in the beginning of the atomic age, of the jet planes, and all those kinds of things that rush us past at several miles a minute, and therefore, when we talk about agreeing to something, which may not be quite upto our way of thinking or something that we dislike, it may be—that often happens—that others agree to many things that we do but which they do not like. That is the only way to do things. The point is whether we agree to something basically wrong, Whether that upsets the basic policy that we pursue or other things which are of secondary importance in life. In foreign affairs, especially, what counts is what you place first. Priorities count, and it counts a great deal whether you give a certain thing the first place, or the second place or the third place. If you are always thinking in terms of something in the third order of priority, your first and second go overboard. Therefore, in order to take the first thing, which is most important, you have things to put away the second and the third, in spite of the pain that it may cause you.

Acharya Kripalani said that we should not have gone to Korea and we should not have referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations. I find that the policies of many of my hon. friends opposite are normally a policy of negation—“what we must not do”. Now, am I to argue in the year 1953 what we should have done or not done in the year 1947? Can we ever come to the present in our talks for the understanding of these problems. I can argue that point— what was done in 1947? After all, we are considering the situation today and that is, if I may say so, my difficulty, that hon. Members opposite cannot come to the present. They are so wrapped up in the past events. Let us assume for a moment that we committed not one but a hundred mistakes, 2, 5, or 7 years ago. What about it? We have to face the situation today, or else we shall never come to the present.

Now, hon. Members opposite asked about Korea. Why did we go to Korea? Was it to gain honour, glory and prestige that we went to Korea? We went to Korea because, if we did not go to Korea, the first thing was that there would have been no truce, no cease fire in Korea, the war would have gone on with all the dangers of that war expanding. Regarding our going or not going, I cannot speak, of course, with the prophet’s certainty, but as we saw the problem then—and subsequent events have justified it—the only way at that time to get that Resolution through in the United Nations first, and subsequently between the two Commands, was for India to fill a

gap, which no other country could fill. I am not talking in terms of any virtue of India but it is a factual statement that no other country was agreeable to fill that particular gap. If that gap was not filled, then the agreement did not come off. If that agreement did not come off, then the ceasefire did not take place and that terrible war went on. I am not going into the merits of the war—that presents a different story. Therefore we had to face the problem with the utmost reluctance. We accepted the job and I would accept it not once, but a hundred times again, because I owe a duty not only to my country but to others, and I was amazed to see, not only in this House, but for the last one month or two people say or write in the newspapers, “Call back immediately your troops from Korea”. It surprises me that when they say these things, they do not consider the question with the least degree of responsibility. We are not a great military nation, nor a rich nation, but we have certain standards by which we act as a people, I hope as a nation. Because somebody says something, because President Rhee says something that we do not like, can we call back our troops and upset the whole apple cart, war or no war, massacre or no massacre? That is the height of irresponsibility. We are not going to do that so far as we are in charge of the affairs. We are going to discharge the work to the best of our ability. Our ability may be limited, but in so far as we can do it, we shall do it and we shall discharge it with fairness and impartiality.

Mr. Mukerjee thinks that most of the evils flow from our connection with the Commonwealth Monazite being sent out of our country must have something to do with the Commonwealth Foreign experts come here and Gurkhas are given *Khukris*. Let us examine these great charges.

“Monazite goes out and comes back in the shape of bombs.” I have respect for Mr. Mukerjee, but very often his facts go wrong. We have plenty of monazite and we put a ban on its export, but we do sell it or exchange it for something that we badly require and we take something that we have not got,—something, let us say, even in connection with atomic energy. No country can make progress in this way. If we shut up our shop and do not supply anything that we have, lest it might be used by somebody else, we don’t get what we want. Therefore, that is where judgment comes in as to what we should give, to whom we should give, at what price and in what quantities. That is a matter of judgment. You have to consider the problem at every stage. We have given monazite to others and we have given to half a dozen countries very little quantities, sometimes in exchange for something which we badly needed for the very purpose of developing monazite. But merely to think that we are doing so under the pressure of somebody or just to make money out of it is completely untrue. As a matter of fact, if I may say so, hon. friends here from the Travancore Cochin State will remember that we have had an argument with the Travancore Cochin Government because we wanted to take over—and we have taken over—under the Central Government, in association with the Travancore Cochin Government, some of these factories there of this type and the Travancore Cochin Government has not been, to begin with, very forthcoming in this matter because certain private interests were involved. We did not want private interests to take charge of them and so we

took them over in consultation with and in cooperation with the Travancore Cochin Government. Therefore, sending of monazite has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. Monazite does go and we want it to go for a particular purpose and we think it is an advantage that it should go in exchange for something that we badly need.

We are not interested in, nor have we the capacity for making atomic bombs or using them. The question does not arise, but we are interested in the development of atomic energy for civil use and it is quite possible that in 10 or 15 years time, atomic energy might be used for civil purposes—As a tremendous source of power, easy source of power. When that comes in, it will upset entirely— not immediately but in the course of time—the whole question of power supply.

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I do not know. I am not saying that. I am interested in atomic energy. Our developments are, if I may say so, in the initial stages. It is for the great nations to answer the question which the hon. Member put. She asked: "Are you policing it?" But I am saying that this atomic energy is a tremendous source of power and it is quite certain that it could be used for civil purposes. Though it is not an economical proposition today, yet, in the next ten or fifteen years, relatively in the near future, it can be used. Now, imagine what a tremendous difference it will make to our country? In a country like the United States of America it is not much needed for civilian use, because there are tremendous supplies of power there. They do not want much more. But in countries where power supplies are not so abundant, as in India and other underdeveloped countries, it will make a great difference. 'If we concentrate this power, we can carry it in a suitcase to the deserts of Rajputana and convert Rajasthan into a fertile land; so that it does make a tremendous difference to underdeveloped countries. It is a new source of power. 'Just 150 years ago, the Industrial Revolution came and saved the world out of drudgery. We are on the eve of another greater revolution which will change the world, provided the word survives and provided wars did not destroy it, but it is a different matter. I am not particular about atomic power as such—our country is not interested—but I am interested in the science of it, because, when the time comes, I would be in a position to use atomic energy, and produce it. We do not want to compete—we cannot compete—with the great nations who desire it, but as a matter of fact, we are known to be among the select few nations where good scientific work in the preliminary stages is done on atomic energy.' We are the only country in Asia, at the present moment, which has gone ahead a little—there are some countries in Europe and, of course, in America. So, in doing this work, we use monazite, we preserve it and we give it to some persons who give us the know how to work it. We put up factories; they take the monazite and process and give it to us; the next stage is, we process it ourselves. So, it is not a question of giving something under pressure or to please somebody else.

Then, Mr. Mukerjee referred to foreign experts. Naturally, I cannot discuss the question of any individual expert, good or bad. But I do not understand this business,

he objects not to foreign experts but to a particular nationality of a foreign expert. Obviously he does not object to foreign experts as such. Now it is quite clear that we want to develop our industries, our technique, our sciences. We want to develop them. Obviously, in developing them we want expert guidance. We may conceivably develop without expert guidance too; but only you will take ten times as much time; instead of two years, we would take 15 or 20 years for the same, it is obvious that every country has done it too. We want the best technical advice possible. Let there be no mistake about it. It is not patriotism or nationalism that counts in this matter. If we want a technical expert man from abroad, we ought to get him from abroad—it does not matter whether your man is thrown out of his job or not. We cannot get a second rate man for doing a first rate job. Technically considered, you may have, although it is not good, a second rate administrator, but you just cannot do it if you want a second rate technical man to do a first rate technical job. It would not be done, simply. Therefore, we must have the very best men,—we may make a mistake in choosing the man. But the sooner we get highclass technical experts, the sooner we can ask them to start the plants. It is part of their business to train our people, and it is not a question of ‘lecture’ training, but training by experience in doing big jobs. We have undertaken in this country some of the biggest jobs that are being done in the world. There are the river valley projects. Some hon. Members have seen them, and often they have criticised them. That criticism may be right or wrong in a particular matter, but the fact of the matter is that they are magnificent jobs magnificently done, taken as a whole. Anybody who sees them realises it. It is not a question of argument. Anybody who sees them, whether he comes from any part of India, or from Russia or China, realizes that it is a magnificent job magnificently done, in spite of all the mistakes that have been committed.

Then, to do big things, we have to look and consider them in a big way and remove all trivial failings. You remember the bigness of the job. Remember that it requires courage to take up that big job. You do not do a big job in a pettifogging way. So, we will not entrust them to any persons who are not absolutely top ranking. In that particular respect, from the point of view of experience, I am sure even in the present generation our engineers are very good; they have been exceedingly good; they are improving, that is to say, they are getting experience of these big jobs and they can do the biggest job, I am quite sure, after a few years’ time. But, for the present, it does help us to have good experts from abroad. From the point of view of finance, sometimes it does not matter what you pay him, because he saves you so much. So, the question of foreign experts must be viewed in that light.

Now, about the Gurkhas and the Khukris. Well, the khukris are light, shining instruments. They are hardly instruments of warfare now, much less in this atomic and bombing age. It is true that we allowed the export of a number of khukris to Malaya for the Gurkhas there, because they are more as a part of their ceremonial attire just as the Sikhs have their *kirpans*. It was a private transaction in which we did not want to come in the way.

Now, Dr. Lanka Sundaram gave some facts which rather surprised me. I do not know where his information comes from about the happenings on the IndoTibetan border. He said that 100,000—or, I forget 50,000—troops are concentrated there. I have a few sources of information too, but I have not got that information. I should be very happy if Dr. Lanka Sundaram will supply me with some information on that subject so that I can verify it. I am in intimate touch this way and that way on the border, on both sides, and those figures which he mentioned, so far as I am concerned, are completely wrong, and far out from truth. I would like to say further that in a way, in the way in which Dr. Lanka Sundaram put it, there seems to be some connection with our talks with China which are going to take place in the course of the next week in Peking—some connection between them and the recent developments in regard to the proposals for U.S. military aid to Pakistan.

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As a matter of fact, this question of our talks in Peking has been under correspondence for the last many, many months, and ultimately, I should think, about three months back, we suggested to the Chinese Government that we would like to have some talks with them and that we could have them either in Delhi or in Peking. Thereupon they agreed to Peking. We asked our Ambassador to come here. We have had talks with our Ambassador and now he has gone back: and one or two other officials of our Foreign Office are also going there. I think that before this year is out the talks will begin. But they have no relation to any other problem, except these problems in regard to Tibetan trade, pilgrimage and such like problems.

Now, Dr. Lanka Sundaram also referred to some maps and Chinese claims to suzerainty, and the McMohan line and all that. I cannot speak for the Chinese Government, of course,— what they may have in their minds or not. But I know what has happened in the course of the last two or three years. Repeatedly we have discussed with them these problems, in regard to Tibet especially, because India has some special interests in Tibet, trade, pilgrimage, etc. At no time has any question been raised by them or by anybody about frontier problems. This House knows very well that I have declared here in answer to questions, in foreign affairs debates, repeatedly that so far as we are concerned, there is nothing to discuss about the frontier. The frontier is there: the McMohan line is there. We have nothing to discuss with anybody, with the Chinese Government or any other Government about it. There it remains. The question does not arise. So our people have gone there not to discuss the frontier problem. It is not an issue at all to be discussed.

Dr. Lanka Sundaram also referred to some leaflet of the External Affairs Ministry in which something was said about an undefined border. Now I speak from memory: but, so far as I remember, that refers to the border with Burma. Especially in the Naga territory, there is an area which is not really defined and there have been vague talks

with the Burmese Government, So far as the McMohan line is concerned it was fixed long ago. It is true that having fixed it on the map, it is not fixed in the sense of putting down pillars and the like, there may occasionally be some doubt.

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Well, since these days of the Constituent Assembly our Historical Division has given a great deal of thought to these matters and we know much more about it and this question has not troubled us at all. But as I said, there is a certain undefined area as between Burma and India and there were various proposals too for not merely defining it but also slight exchange of territory to adjust things. But they have remained where they were.

Several hon. Members have talked about our defence industries being speeded up. I shall be very happy to speed them up. In fact the progress we have made and we are making in regard to defence industries is very considerable. These big industries take some years, but it does not matter. Some are functioning, others are being built, others are, if I may say so, in the foundationstone laying stage. I should like to go ahead faster. It is not merely—although that is an important consideration—a question of finance. It is a question of technical training. You cannot have these things for the asking. You have to grow into them to some extent. We grow faster than others, but we have still to grow. Ultimately it becomes a part of the industrial development of the country.

I entirely agree with hon. Members who say that we should not be dependent upon other countries. Of course, nobody can be utterly and absolutely, hundred per cent., independent. Some dependence for something remains and should remain; there is no harm in it. But you must not be dependent to the extent of being enfeebled or unable to function properly because of that dependence. It takes time to build these things up, to build industry up. If you look to other countries, whatever they are, you will see that they took a mighty long time to reach the level they have done now. And I think that the progress we have made in this matter during the last five or six years is very far from negligible.

One thing I should like to say Mr. Deshpande repeatedly referred to our going about with a begging bowl asking for aid of America or some other countries. Now, at no time has any of us ever gone with a begging bowl to any country—I want to make this perfectly clear—and at no time are we going to do it hereafter. We welcome aid on honourable terms, because it helps us to speed our process of change to industrialisation, whatever it is. But, normally speaking, aid has come to us: the initiative even has been on the other side. We have welcomed that; we have discussed it and we have agreed or disagreed, as the case may be, in regard to a particular matter. There is no question of “begging bowl attitude” which is bad for the giver and for the taker.

Also, I did not say that if Pakistan takes military aid that makes war inevitable. I made no such rash suggestion. What I said was that this kind of thing hampers peace. It comes in the way of peace; it is a factor against peace. It is not by itself so important as to bring war or peace, there are many factors which ultimately govern events.

I think, Sir, that I have dealt with most of the important points that were raised in this debate. I agree entirely with the hope expressed by many hon. Members about the unity of the country and the consolidation of the country. That is obvious. That is our purpose and that should be our effort.

Anyhow, apart from any crisis that might arise we have to do that. I do not want this House or the country to imagine on account of the various developments that have taken place, which should make us wary that something is happening which should create any kind of fright or panic. We have to be wary, we have to be vigilant and we have to be united and work together. And in working together, ultimately, it is not so much the number of armed soldiers that counts.

Some hon. Members have put forward amendment about compulsory military service. Now—if I may say so—if there was one special method which could be devised for the weakening of the country it would be compulsory military service. What does it mean—compulsory military service? I am not against it in theory or practice. But just look at it, if we divert all our energies to compulsory military service, it will have one good effect.

It may have one good effect, that many of our people would benefit physically by it. But all the money spent upon it will have to be diverted from somewhere. Inevitably it will have to be diverted from various economic activities that we are trying to carry on. Ultimately the strength of the country will depend more upon our economic progress, plus other things of course: If economically we are weak, then a vast number of people walking about in step will do no good to the country.

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A nation's security depends on many factors. In the first place, defence forces. They are obvious of course, Secondly, industrial potential capacity of the country which keeps the defence forces going. Otherwise defence forces are useless. Thirdly, the economic capacity of the country. And, fourthly, the morale of the country. That is the equation for the defence of a country. And the last two or three are more important even than the first, although the first has to be there.

I am grateful to the House, Sir, for the indulgence with which it has received my motion.

BACK NOTE

XVIII. Motion Regarding International Situations, 24 December, 1953

1. SHRIMITI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY (Basirhat): Can't we police exactly whether it is going for civil use or for bombs?

2. DR. LANKA SUNDARAM: It was not my intention.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It was not your intention, I know, but Members might have thought so.

3. DR. LANKA SUNDARAM: May I interrupt the Prime Minister, Sir. The memorandum I quoted was from Mr. Ramadhyani and the comment was of our External Affairs Ministry to the memorandum. This was submitted to the Constituent Assembly and dealt with the Tibet-Assam border and the Burma border.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I cannot say anything about that, though it is possible.

DR. LANKA SUNDARAM: It is in the Library, Sir.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The gentleman is in the Library or the paper?

DR. LANKA SUNDARAM: The paper.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May be.

4. SHRI S. S. MORE (Sholapur): Can't you not link up the two?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Not two, but many things. That, the hon. Member will realise, is the object of a National Plan—linking up various things and giving priorities. The whole object is linking up various things. The Plan may be deficient, that is a different matter. But that is the whole object of the Plan.

REPLY ON MOTION OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

22 February, 1954

Sir, I am grateful to you for this permission to intervene in this debate at this stage.

During the last few days a great many speeches have been delivered here, and many and diverse subjects discussed. It is rather difficult for me to deal with all those matters, and therefore, with your permission, I will only deal with some of them.

First of all, may I repeat what, I think, I said on a previous occasion in regard to the President's Address. Acharya Kripalani said that the President's Address was 'formal' and not 'inspiring'. Others have also said something to that effect. Now, if I may say so, the President's Address is meant to be formal. Of course, it is always better to be inspiring, but inspiration is not so easy to find as to express. The President's Address is a formal statement, naturally, for which the Government is responsible. Sometimes the hon. Members have thought, and sometimes even the Press outside has criticised it, that the President's Address has repeated what the Government have said. What else can we do? This is a Government statement of broad policy which the President lays before the joint session of the two Houses. It can be nothing else. It cannot be sensational, normally speaking. It cannot state any very novel fact, normally speaking. If any very important step is to be taken by Government, they would naturally come to this House, discuss it here, and not spring it as a surprise on them in the President's Address. Therefore, I would beg the House to consider the context in which the President's Address is delivered.

The hon. Member, Mr. Jaipal Singh, said that the President's Address should not deal with controversial matters. I agree with him, I believe in the sense he meant this, because obviously, if the President's Address refers to controversial legislation, that is a controversial matter. He gave us an instance—the reference in the Address to the Kumbh Mela tragedy and, he said that the President had given a 'chit' or a 'pat' on the back of the U.P. Government. Well, I was surprised to hear that and I looked back on the Address. All that the President said in that connection was that the U.P. Government had taken great pains to make satisfactory arrangements for this great concourse of human beings. But, the trouble occurred. I really do not know how anyone can call that 'lack of prejudging'. The fact that the Government took pains—they might have failed, they might have committed mistakes subsequently—but the fact that it took pains is a fact which nobody can challenge or dispute. It is not a controversial matter. Well, I do not agree with him. Now, this debate has unfortunately been somewhat overshadowed by this Kumbh Mela tragedy which, important as it is and tragic as it was, really bears little relation to the wide topics that we are discussing. As my hon. friend Shri Tandon stated, we should await the results of the enquiry that

is being held there. In regard to one aspect of it, which was specially stressed by Acharya Kripalani, a broader aspect, I hope to say something at a later stage. But, the main subjects that we have to discuss here, I submit, are the broad issues before the country, whether in the international field or in the domestic field and we should avoid going into narrow issues which we can discuss at other times.

If you look at the world today, it is full of problems, tensions and fears. It seems to be wrapped up by a mantle of fear and search for security, and, unfortunately, search for security often leads to an addition of the tension of the world. Obviously, no country, not even the greatest country and the most powerful country in the world, can have it all its own way; much less any country like India, with no power in the sense of military might or financial power, with the only power, if you like to say so, of our faith in some things, if that is any power. Therefore, we may well complain of things that we do not like; but, we should look at things in their true perspective, as to what can be done and what cannot be done, and try to do our best. We cannot always bring about the results which we hope for. But, anyhow, I believe if we try to do our best some good results follow.

Today, we have in Asia especially, special problems which we have to face. The geography of India, centrally situated as we are, apart from any other reason connects us with these problems both in the west of Asia, and in the South-East and East, and inevitably we have to shoulder this responsibility, apart from the mere size of our country, bigness of our population, and our potential resources, and all that. So, we have become tied up occasionally with external matters even though we have tried to avoid involvement as far as possible.

The House knows that only yesterday some of our troops that had been sent to Korea have come back. Others are following within a few days and that chapter in Korea is over, that is, the chapter in which our Custodian Force and our representatives in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission functioned there. I need not say much about that now. Most of the facts are known to Members. They have appeared in the public Press. I hope at some later stage, in a few days time, to place a statement upon the Table of the House, more for record than for any additional information in regard to Korea.

The object aimed at by this Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has not been attained—or fully attained — and unfortunately, most of the problems remain unsolved. That is a misfortune. But I think most people agree that our representatives there on the Commission who had a very very delicate task to face, as well as our Custodian Force, did as well as they could have been possibly expected to do, with the result, I think that however much there might be differences in the view point that was taken up by our representatives, all parties concerned have paid a tribute to their impartiality in this work. The cheering of the House indicates that the House would like to send out its good wishes for their return.

Although all or nearly all the problems remain, Korea had nevertheless one bright feature about it, namely, that the fighting there which was terrible for two or

three years, stopped; at least, that slaughter ended. Only the problems remain, although the problems are difficult enough.

There is one thing in this connection that I might mention. The House probably knows that there was difference of opinion about many matters but more specially as to how this Commission should end its labours about the prisoners of war that were with it, and the opinion of the Chairman, *i.e.*, the representative of India, was that the various processes laid down in the agreement between the two parties had not been gone through; however, there was no alternative left to the Commission but to restore those prisoners of war to their own detaining sides.

One particular difficulty faced us in the past few days. That was in regard to seventeen persons—I am not sure about the figure, but I think it is seventeen — undertrial for very serious crimes including murder. They were being tried under court-martial set up by our forces there. Unfortunately, those trials could not be completed, partly because of lack of cooperation by some parties. The result was that those persons charged with serious crimes raised the problem as to what should be done with them. It was patent that the Indian Custodian Force could not continue with the court martial, because it was not going to remain there. It was patent also that it could not bring them with it to India. On the other hand, it seemed obviously right that the trial of those persons who had been so charged should somehow be completed and they should be punished or acquitted after trial, as the case may be. So, in this dilemma the Indian Custodian Force decided to hand over those persons to their own detaining sides with a strong request that these trials should be proceeded with and completed. I do not know exactly what is likely to happen to them, but I do feel that it would be a travesty of justice if persons who *prima facie* have been shown to have committed those, very serious crimes are merely discharged.

I mentioned Korea, but there are so many other places in the world which offer tremendous problems. Only recently, the House knows that the Four Great powers met in Berlin, and for many many days there was argument about Germany, about Austria and about other matters. Unfortunately, that argument did not yield any substantial results except for one, thing which was a bright spot towards the conclusion, that is, the four Great Powers agreed to hold a Conference in Geneva on the 26th of April to consider the Korean problem and also Indo-China. I presume that the Chinese Government has agreed to this procedure, because it is intimately involved and its presence is obviously essential.

Now, I just mentioned that in Korea, whatever difficulties there might remain, the fact is that war has stopped. It is a very big thing. Unfortunately, in Indo-China war has not stopped and is being continued in a very terrible way. It is six years now since this Indo-China war began and for the present. I do not propose to say anything more about it, because of this that anyhow all of us here—and many others, I have no doubt—would obviously welcome some kind of ending of this actual war, but more especially when it has been proposed to discuss this matter two months hence by the Great Powers concerned. It seems a tremendous pity, that this war should continue when a serious attempt is going to be made to find a way out. Now, it is not for me to

suggest anything, and certainly it is with no desire to intervene in any way or intrude or involve ourselves or anything like that, but I do venture to suggest to all the parties and the Powers concerned that in view of the fact that this matter of Indo-China is going to be discussed at the Geneva conference two months later, it might be desirable—it is desirable, I think—to have some kind of ceasefire without any party giving up its own position, whatever they might consider their right etc., because, once one starts arguing about rights, then, there will be no end to that argument. So, I would make this very earnest appeal in all humility—and I am sure this House will join with me—to the Powers to strive to have a ceasefire there. Then they can discuss it in their own way. I repeat that so far as we are concerned, we have no desire to interfere or to shoulder any burden or responsibility in this connection.

Now, from this Korean war, even, more so the Indo-China war—and if I may mention some other places where not a war of this kind, but nevertheless, continuous military operations have been going on, like in Malaya, like in some parts of Africa—one sees that nowadays once even a little war starts, it goes on and on; military operations start, they go on and on. It is difficult to stop them. It is difficult to conclude them, or to reach at any satisfactory solution of the problem through those means. Now, without going into this question of Indo-China, it is patent that for these last two years the balances have sometimes been weighted this side or that without making too much difference. Sometimes one party advances in a military sense, retreats a little. I do not know exactly what the military position is. I cannot say, but any person can see that for five years they have been fighting and killing each other without any decision being arrived at. That itself, I think, might lead us to certain conclusions. If even in these relatively small wars it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion by military means, what is likely to happen if, unfortunately, a big, global war descended upon us? Would it be an unending affair which went on and on with nobody to end it, no final conclusion arrived at, or what else would it be? It is dangerous today even to start a small war. People may think that it may be a small operation. It is not. It goes on and on regardless of the merits of the case. And therefore it is desirable to keep this in mind, and therefore, in Indo-China certainly, but I hope in the other places I mentioned also, some other approach might be made, at any rate to end this killing, because there can be no doubt that, apart from the horror of this continuous killing in warfare or in military operations, this leaves a tremendous trail of bitterness and conflict behind. It does not matter ultimately what the result of military operation is, if in the minds of millions of people fear or bitterness remains, because that will give rise to all future troubles again, and there is no ending of that. Personally, I am convinced that there can be no true solution of these problems at this stage, by the method of warfare, whether it is in a small way or in a big way. So, I would appeal to the Great Powers and the little Powers and all concerned, perhaps, to make an effort in this direction, and to see in some other way, but anyhow to begin with to try to stop by ceasefire or otherwise these operations.

Now I refer to the Berlin Conference which was recently held, and which, if I may say so with all respect, was rather disappointing, apart from this final conclusion

which we must welcome, *i.e.*, a meeting will be held in Geneva. Nevertheless, I would like the House to consider that even that Berlin Conference, which brought no good result, itself is a good sign; the mere meeting together and discussing and considering various viewpoints—all these, at any rate, not only avoid any more tragic developments like war, but indicate this continued search for peaceful settlements, I have no doubt that the people of all countries in the world hanker after peace, hanker after real peace, not merely an absence of shooting war. What have we got today? We call it the cold war; and the cold war is undoubtedly better than a shooting war, anything would be better than a shooting war. Nevertheless, a cold war is a pretty bad thing. It means obsession against each other, it means fear all the time,—fear of war and fear of losing one's security,—with the result that there is continuous tension; so far as the economic side is concerned, it is upset; of course, because it cannot function normally; politically, there is this tremendous tension, hatreds, dislikes and always living on the verge of violence on a big scale.

I wonder how this generation that is growing up in many parts of the world, thinking always in terms of the cold war, in terms of the possible big war, in terms of hatred of this country and that, those people and these people, will function when it grows up. The environment, the context in which the present day generations are growing up, seem to me a terrible thought. The other day, some hon. Members might have seen the Children's Art Exhibition that was held in Delhi, organised by *Shanker's Weekly* children's Number. There were thousands of pictures from all over the world, produced by children. It was an extraordinary collection, a very fine collection, apart from its artistic merits, showing, what children all over the world were thinking. It was an oppressing thought, when I saw those pictures, how many of those children have produced nightmarish pictures, just some kind of horrible nightmares,— as if they had had. It showed possibly the fear of this environment in which these children are growing up, of hatred, of violence, of possible wars, and all that. So, this is what we are contending against, quite apart from the avoidance of war. Almost, one might think that there is some evil enchantment over the world, which oppresses us and hence oppresses the widespread feeling of people all over the world, for peace and goodwill, and to live their normal lives; and we cannot go out of this enchantment. We meet in conference and the like and sometimes we talk to each other at long distances, much hoping for peace and settlement and some way out but somehow functioning so as to make this difficult. That is the basic problem before the world and with that, you come—that is somewhat complicated for us in Asia—by all kinds of new forces being let loose in Asia and to some extent in Africa. We are interested in the world's problems because they affect us as they affect the whole world. We are interested particularly in Asian problems because we are part of Asia. We are interested in African problems for a variety of reasons, a very minor reason being of course that, whether it is in Africa or parts of Asia outside India, large numbers of Indians live there. We are interested in them. But the real problems are not of Indian overseas but of the people who live in those countries overseas. None of these problems, I venture to say, is going to be settled now by compulsion and

violent compulsion. Somehow, the forces which were kept in check in the past cannot be kept in check now. I may venture to put forward an objective analysis without really going into the merits. My sympathies are clear, the House's sympathies are clear, but apart from sympathies, it is not an objective analysis, I think, one cannot suppress, for whatever reason, these basic forces of nationalism, of freedom, that have arisen in Asia or in Africa or elsewhere. To that, of course, I would add the feeling, the strong feeling, against racialism which exists in those continents.

Now, that is the position. The House knows our policy. It is sometimes miscalled a neutral policy or neutralism, and we are told that we are sitting on the fence, that we are afraid of this country or that country, and that therefore we have not got the courage of our convictions. Well, we lack many things, and sometimes maybe we even lack wisdom but I do not think we lack the capacity to express our thoughts clearly or to express them without being oppressed by fear. I think that people in India, by and large, suffer less at the present moment from this oppressive fear which envelops great continents and countries than those in many other places.

This policy that we have adopted has grown naturally out of our past history, past tradition, past way of thinking, and present conditions. It is a policy which can be justified both on the idealistic grounds and on strictly practical considerations. We do not want to enter into this circle of hatred, violence and fear which the cold war embodies. As far as possible, we do not want other countries that remain out of it, to enter it, because if we are searching for peace, if the world is searching for peace, it may not get the peace it desires, certainly because the problems are terribly complicated. But anyhow one should do two things: one is to avoid doing anything which adds to the tensions of the world today, which adds to the fears of the world today. The other is of course a more positive approach of reducing those tensions. Now, if some step is taken which actually adds to those fears, then it is, I submit, an illservice to the cause of peace. So in this context we have to function in this world, and to function with the courage of our convictions and without fear. At the same time, being friendly to all countries does not mean that we agree with the views or the activities of other countries; we have our own views. But it is my conviction and, I believe the House also agrees with me in this matter, that at any time, and more especially at the present time, it does not help even to say, if you like, even to express your opinion in condemnation of some other country, even though you might think that it is the right opinion; because that merely adds to those tensions, and when people are moved by so much anger and prejudice, their minds are not open to reason or logical argument.

Now, so far as India is concerned, we try to avoid entanglement in foreign issues. We cannot hope to wholly avoid it of course, because we have to play our part in this world, and no country can be isolated, much less India—whether it is in the United Nations or elsewhere. But we are particularly concerned with our neighbour countries, and naturally we wish that our relations with these neighbour countries should be as close and cordial as possible. I am glad to say that they are so, unhappily with one exception. So far as Burma is concerned, we are on terms of great cordiality

and friendship. There are at present some talks going on with the Burmese Government in regard to certain matters, certain issues between the two countries, and I have little doubt that they will result in a satisfactory agreement. So far as Ceylon is concerned, many hon. Members have referred to the recent Indo—Ceylonese Agreement and partly criticised it; partly, they felt that there might be something in it which might lead to wrong results. As a matter of fact, as I have stated previously, this Indo—Ceylonese Agreement in regard to the people of Indian descent in Ceylon is not a settlement of the problem at all; it is a first step towards that. In fact, it repeats what actually is the position: it only repeats that position in a friendly way, in a better way, in a cooperative way. In the solution of this problem, it is perfectly clear that the cooperation of the two Governments and the goodwill of the two Governments and of the people concerned is essential. Now, if this agreement leads to that atmosphere of goodwill and cooperative effort, we have achieved a great thing. Have we given up any vital principle in it? I submit, not. I will not go into the details of it. It is true that in some places in Ceylon some kind of interpretations have taken place which have extended the scope of this agreement. Obviously, we are not bound by interpretations with which we do not agree and which do not flow from that agreement. The main thing is that we have put this question after several years on a different level of approach, a friendly level, and I hope that this will yield results.

The House knows that for some time past, for a month or more, there have been discussions going on in Peking between our representatives and the representatives of the People's Government of China in regard to certain matters affecting Tibet. These discussions are still proceeding. They are proceeding on the whole satisfactorily and I hope that before very long they will also yield a satisfactory result.

Now, so far as these neighbouring countries are concerned, our relations are very good. They are very good with countries of Western Asia and with Egypt. It is unfortunate that with Pakistan, which is not only our close neighbour but which is more closely bound to us by past history, culture tradition and all manner of other bonds than any other country, there should be certain remaining problems which have affected our relationship. I shall not go into these problems.

So far as canal waters issue is concerned, it is still being discussed in Washington between the parties' representatives. I believe, considerable progress has been made, but that is all I can say. I do not know what the final result will be. Other issues like evacuee property are still pending and of late on these matters, there has been a great deal of frustration for us. The major issue remains— Kashmir. I shall deal with this matter a little later; and I shall also refer to certain new developments which have taken place in regard to Pakistan.

I have referred to foreign affairs; but the most vital thing for us, obviously, is our domestic position, the economic progress that we might make or try to make; that is the essential factor. You can measure it by production, per capita consumption, the reduction of unemployment, as you like, because they all go together. This is hardly the time to go into these matters fully. But, I do wish to lay stress that after all

in this variety of problems that we are faced with, this is the most vital and major problem for us. The fact that I do not deal with this at length in this present reply of mine does not indicate that our Government attaches any less importance to it; but it cannot be dealt with in this, scrappy way. For my part, I would welcome the House to discuss any aspect of it more fully, if and when we have the time for it.

But, I would like hon. Members to look at this picture a little objectively. It is the right—and may be the duty— of the Opposition to criticise and condemn. I accept that; I like that. If there is not that criticism—and even harsh criticism; if you like,—any government is likely to become slack. And, therefore, it is not with any desire to limit that criticism of the Opposition that I would submit that we might look at this problem a little objectively. It is very easy, in a very large country like India, passing through these difficult times, facing difficult problems,—to criticise and find fault, and that criticism may well be justified, and the faults that are pointed out may well be there. And, at the same time, you may well find other factors which are admirable or which are praiseworthy or which are worthy of commendation. They are both there and one can pick and choose; in a country like India you can make a list on either side. Ultimately one has to see, in the balance, what is happening, whether we are going on in a particular direction or not and whether it is the right direction. I think that if I could take hon. Members with me on a voyage of discovery of India as it is today, I have no doubt they could show me many things that I am not aware of, but I could also show them many things, of which perhaps they are not fully seized, although they read about them in newspapers. Nevertheless, it does make a difference when we see things actually in practice before us and have some kind of emotional awareness of what is happening instead of merely reading something, because I travel about India and see what is happening there both in regard to vast and magnificent undertakings that are now taking shape and that will give results very soon and in regard to many small things and in regard to what our own people are doing themselves. It is, not governmental effort; it is what the people are doing may be with the help of some governmental effort. I am, excited and I have a sense of exhilaration—I wish to make it clear—not in praise of the Government with which I am associated, though, I think in many matters the Government has done well but I rather think not as the Government functioning but as the people of India functioning. It is a matter of pride to me to see the millions of our countrymen and countrywomen gradually moulding this new India that we are striving for. It is to be moulded—I have no doubt about it—not only in the big places about which you read in the newspapers, but in tens of thousands of the villages of India today, and I hope that those tens of thousands will become hundreds of thousands in a year or two. When Indians in travail of giving birth to new things all the time a new India is taking shape, and I feel that all our old history—whatever it is, 5000, 8000 or 10,000 years—will stand as witness to see what is happening in this old, ancient country of ours which has put on a new garb. It is a magnificent adventure that all of us are engaged in, and when I look at this, I do not think of it as something for which my Government is responsible or the Party with which I am connected is responsible, but as something in which all of us here in

this House and all over the country are responsible in some measure. Therefore, I would beg hon. Members to look at this picture in this way, not in the slightest degree limiting their criticism or condemnation—it is right, it is a democratic way of functioning, and I would welcome it, but nevertheless I think it is unfortunate that in criticising Government, very often hon. Members opposite criticise the people of India too.

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Hon. Members' who do not apparently agree with that statement, if I may say so, simply indicate that they are somewhat out of tune with the people of India. I do not mean to say that the Government's way is the best way. I am not referring to that it may be a better way. This Government may adopt a better way or some other Government may adopt a better way, but after all, the amount of divergence may be considerable. Nevertheless, fundamentally, the work that is being done in India is the work that any Government would have to do and it is the work which the people of India are doing. It is an essential item and I shall come back to it at a somewhat later stage in another connection.

It is an important thing that we should keep in tune with the people of India. My hon. friend Dr. Jaisoorya, was kind enough to say some good words about me, about my modern way of thinking and all that. Well, whether I am modern and to what extent I am modern is a matter which can be considered separately at leisure. But of one thing I am deeply conscious, that in this great journey that we are making,—call it a pilgrimage, towards a better future, we have to go with 360 million companions. It is not my modernity, or anybody else's conservatism, or reactionary tendencies, whatever that might be that matters. I am all for modernity. But remembering that we are fellowtravellers with hundreds of millions of our people, we have to go with them, carry them with us, or be carried by them,—put it as you like—and not isolate ourselves in that ivory tower attitude, or a feeling of being superior to others. We may be superior intellectually. But the journey is of the people of India, not of individuals, or a small group here and there, who may consider themselves superior.

Therefore, in that journey we have to convince them, we have to carry them with us. And how? We have adopted a democratic method here. Apart from this democratic method we have, even in the course of our struggle for freedom adopted a peaceful method. Of course, normally speaking, democratic and peaceful methods have to go together.

I believe the hon. Member does not like the peaceful method! If there are certain basic things within the context of a peaceful and democratic method, I believe much can be done. Indeed I believe that if you go outside that context we are not likely to do much. I am not for the moment discussing economic theories, whatever they might be, and I am not discussing anything for the wide world. I know my India, I hope, a little and I cannot, and I do not presume to advise any other country as to what they should do internally or externally. But looking at the picture of India as we have it, I have no doubt in my mind that any method that is not a peaceful method is

likely to yield terrible results. And if you break up the unity of India, all your efforts at progress will be doomed, naturally. I want to keep these two things apart. I want to appeal to hon. Members opposite for cooperation in the fullest measure in these great tasks, keeping entirely apart their policies, their viewpoints—I do not wish to touch them—and their freedom to express them and to criticise us and condemn us. Nevertheless, try to separate the two things. If there are failures of, if you like, a Government that is not up to your high standards, or any standards, certainly, criticise, by all means. But a Government which for the moment represents the people of India, however humble, however little the members of the Government might be, however many failures they may have to their credit, nevertheless, because they represent the people of India, something of the greatness of the people of India comes to this Government provided we represent the masses. So, I would beg to them, I would beg of the hon. Members to look at this tremendous adventure of India. It is an adventure and at the same times—peaking not only of India but of other countries also—it is, if you may call it, a struggle for survival for many of our countries, in Asia and elsewhere, either from the possibilities of war or from economic troubles. We have to fight this great fight and win—and we are going to win. Then why should we not have a common ground to fight this on all fronts in our democratic, peaceful way, criticising and holding to our different policies as much as we like? I do not suggest that any person or any group should give up his viewpoint; it is necessary that all viewpoints—even those viewpoints with which I may entirely disagree—should be fully expressed.

Some hon. Members spoke; I think it was in connection with the proposed military aid which possibly the United States Government might give to Pakistan and the consequences that might flow from it. They said, referring to this why our Government, or I, do not take them into confidence so that we may all function in unity. Of course I want all of us to function in any grave matter affecting the nation, or for the matter of that, in any other matter—with as large a measure of unity as possible. And for my part, I will be happy to consult any Member of this House or groups in this House on such occasions. But it is obvious that a united policy must be based on some unity of outlook, basic unity of outlook. If there is divergence right at the base, it is difficult to build up a structure of unity and follow a united policy. If some hon. Members in this House tell us that our foreign policy has been completely misconceived and misguided and we should throw it overboard and do something else, obviously there is no unity of approach left there because that policy is not merely a tactical exercise but something based on our growth, our movement and our thinking as well as a number of other considerations. And it has shown good results; that is my judgement—hon. Members may challenge it. There must be some unity of outlook like that.

If I criticise or feel that it is an unfortunate move for the United States of America to give military aid to Pakistan, one hon. Member gets up and says: why don't we also accept military aid from the United States? That shows that either it has been our misfortune not to explain our policy with the precision which could enable him to grasp what it is, or he considers me completely wrong; because, if I consider

that military aid being given to Pakistan is wrong, quite apart from the question of India, from the Asian point, from a number of viewpoints, then if we commit that wrong we will be doomed and we will have no justification left for any policy after that. Therefore, we must be clear about that. Or, some other people would suggest; because the United States of America has done this, rush up to the Soviet Union and get their military aid! The whole thing is based on some kind of inverted thinking. What I mean is this, that the whole thing is entirely opposed to either approach. As I mentioned, it is entirely opposed to the basic policy that we have been pursuing. And if we take any country's aid—I am not going into the merits of it—any outside country's aid, well, our whole policy ends there and we have to consider afresh as to how we should proceed in the matter. Therefore, I submit that there must be some unity of outlook.

Apart from this, there are certain basic things which I submit must be borne in mind. If we are to proceed peacefully and democratically there is, under our Constitution, the authority of Parliament; our President who is the symbol of the State, above party and the rest of it. He may of course, as President in his Address represent what the Government wish to do. It is a different matter. But he is a symbol of the State. There is our Flag; our National Anthem. I am mentioning obvious things. I am mentioning them, and what I say I am not saying by way of complaint but in sorrow: it is a matter of deep grief to me that at the beginning of this session some hon. Members deliberately and ostentatiously kept away when the President addressed the joint session of both Houses of Parliament. I am not going into the merits. But the President is a symbol of the State, of the dignity of the State. And it is not so much here, but in some of our State Assemblies also this is being done with the Governor there, who is also a symbol. It is totally immaterial whether you like the Governor, whether he is beautiful to look at or not so attractive to look at. These are symbols of the State, of the unity of the State. And if we do not respect that symbol we do injury to the conception of the unity of that State. If one party does it and another does it, it may well become a practice for some group or other to act in that way because they do not like something. I do appeal, not only to hon. Members here but elsewhere, that these conventions ought to be observed. Why is there a convention—which we have taken from other Parliaments, notably the British Parliament—for me to say “the hon. Member opposite” or “the learned Member” or “my learned colleague”? These are conventions. It does not quite follow when I say “learned Member” that he is very learned! But these are conventions to promote, if I may use the word, civilised behaviour. Because, if we use these terms, it does pull us up; it keeps up a certain level of conduct which is becoming and dignified. We are the Parliament of India and high dignity attaches to us. And it is right that we should set an example to others.

I will not say much about the economic conditions except to say this on my behalf and on behalf of my Government, that in regard to economic matters we approach them with a completely open mind, with no dogmas, no fixed ideas about them. We are prepared to discuss anything with anybody—about our Five Year Plan, or about our Second Five Year Plan—and prepared to change anything, accept

anything, if we are convinced. Because the problem is a difficult one. And I hope the House will agree that there is no easy remedy for it. It does not matter what policy we pursue so long as we do hard work and have unity. It may be that some other approach other than the one we are pursuing might produce better results. Let us examine it. We are prepared to examine everything.

An hon. Member talked about our administrative machinery and quoted me at some length. Well, we are examining that and I hope that we will be able to improve it in that way. I would like to say this however—because the administration was criticised—that it is easy to criticise it and it is easy to point out some failures here and there. Nevertheless, I think our administrative machinery has adapted itself and is adapting itself to present day conditions, with some considerable success, and that as a whole our administrative machinery— not the machinery, but rather the people, the personnel of that machinery— is as good as you can find in any other country. Naturally, I do not speak for all of them. When they are tens and thousands I cannot speak for all of them; there are people who are excellent, good, fair, and all that. But, taking it by and large it is so, and I submit with some respect that I speak with some knowledge of other countries as well as my own. But, anyhow, we have to improve it and we have to adapt it to the changing conditions. I entirely agree with the hon. Member who said something about our old rules and regulations and all that about the Services and the way the administration should function. I entirely agree that all this should be replaced. In fact, we are at the present moment engaged in that process and I hope, within a measurable distance of time, this would be done. It is a complicated structure and not so easy to change things because one change will bring about another change. Anyhow, I submit to this House that it is at the present moment, open for innumerable criticisms to be made. I criticise my own Government and that too frequently. I do not see why I should not. But, of course, there is a difference between my criticism and perhaps some other criticism. I criticise in a friendly way— often that criticism may be expressed in angry terms actually—because it is a matter between one's colleagues. But, we want to improve. We want the help of everybody to do that. It is a terrific job, this governance of India, at any time, more especially after these vital changes, more especially in the context of the world today. I believe, speaking with all humility, we have done rather a good job of it, in spite of all the failures. Maybe, somebody else would have done it better. But, let us consider this matter, economic, administrative and everything, with a view to find better ways of doing it and adopt that better way.

Now, I should like to refer to the proposed U.S. aid to Pakistan. Recently the House has seen that there has been a Pact between Turkey and Pakistan and it is said that this is likely to be followed by some kind of arrangement between the United States and Pakistan for military aid. I spoke about this matter in December last, before the House adjourned, and expressed our concern about it. That concern was not so much due to any illfeeling against Pakistan—it was not at all due to that—and certainly not due to any illfeeling against America. But I felt then and I have felt strongly ever since that this step is a wrong step and a step which adds to the tensions of the world,

to the fears of the world, a step which if it can be justified at all, can be justified only on one ground that it is a step towards peace and that it is a step towards ensuring security. No doubt I am prepared to accept that that is the feeling governing some of the people behind this step. But, I am quite clear in my mind,—I need not labour that point, it is obvious,—it seems to me that instead of adding to the security of the world or of Asia, it adds to the tension in Asia, it adds to the feelings of insecurity in Asia and it adds, therefore, to the fears and apprehensions in Asia and elsewhere. Therefore, it is a wrong step from the point of view of peace or removal of tensions. It may be that from some military point of view,—I am no soldier—it may be justified, I cannot say that. But, I do submit that soldiers' are very fine persons, and soldiers are very necessary, at any rate, in the present day world, but when it comes to the judging of worked affairs through the soldiers' eyes and ears, it is a dangerous thing. A soldier's idea of security is one thing; a politician's or statesman's may be somewhat different. They have to be coordinated. When war comes, the soldier is supreme and his voice prevails almost, not quite. But, when it comes to the soldier's voice prevailing in peace time, it means that peace is likely to be converted into war.

How then do we balance? Here is this kind of evil enchantment over the world which prevents us from going in the right direction; here is the world with all the strength and power in it to solve the economic problems, poverty and all these things. For the first time in history, it has got strength and power to do it. But, instead of proceeding to do that and having a better future for the whole of humanity, we have these fears, and tensions and representations for war, and maybe war itself. It is an extraordinary thing.

How are we to lessen these tensions? Not by thinking in military terms all the time. I agree, and I accept this, that no country can ignore the military aspect. No country can weaken itself and offer itself as a target to some other country to take advantage of that weakness. Having accepted that, nevertheless, if one is to try for peace, it is not by talking of war, by issuing threats and by all the time preparing for war in a rather loud and aggressive way, whatever the country involved might be.

I have stated before the Prime Minister of Pakistan, I believe and I am convinced, earnestly wishes, as I do, that there should be good relations between India and Pakistan. I have no doubt about his motives in this matter and I hope he has no doubt about mine. It is not a question of motives. If a step is taken which necessarily has some harmful results, all the best motives in the world cannot prevent them. Mr. Mohammed Ali has made various statements about this matter. He has stated, first of all, "Why should India object?" Of course, they are a free country; I cannot prevent them. But, if something affects Asia, India specially, are we to remain silent about it, if something, in our opinion, is a reversal of history after hundreds of years? We have thought in terms of freeing our countries, and one of the symbols of freedom has been the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. Of course, there may be a lack of freedom even then possibly, but, anyhow, an external symbol is the withdrawal of armed forces. And whatever the motive, I say the return of any armed forces or anything like it from any European or any American country is a reversal of the

history of the countries of Asia. It was suggested some two or three years ago in connection with Kashmir—and I saw it was suggested by somebody only the other day—that some other countries send forces to Kashmir, some European or American country, whatever forces they might be. We rejected that completely because, so far as we can see, on no account, whatever the occasion, may be, are we going to allow any foreign forces to land in India.

Now, that is our outlook, and that is something more than Indian outlook. It is an outlook, which, if I may say so, applies to the whole or a large part of this continent of Asia and therefore we viewed with apprehension—we viewed with regret as one views something which may not be perfectly clear but which is pointing in a wrong direction—this business of military aid coming from the United States to Pakistan. I am sure the United States Government had not these considerations before them because they think, naturally, in their own environment, and that is the difficulty. I dare not, and I am not prepared, to express my opinion except in the most philosophical manner, about problems—distant problems—of Europe. I do not consider myself justified. But I do consider myself justified in expressing opinions about my own country, and to a slight extent, about my neighbours, and to a slightly less extent about Asian countries, not because India has the slightest desire for imposing its views or wishes on any other country—I have denied that; we seek no leadership; we are going to have no leadership over any other country—but because we have passed through similar processes of history in the last two hundred years or so, because we have had similar experiences; therefore, we can understand each other a little better. Therefore, if I speak, to some extent I may be in tune with some of my neighbour countries. If the Prime Minister of Burma speaks, he, or the head of any other country round about, is likely to be in tune with my thinking—I do not say I am the leader of Burma or the Prime Minister of Burma is the leader of India—because we have had this common background, common experiences. Therefore, it has led us to think to some extent in a common way, because we have common problems.

Now, the problems of Asia, therefore, have to be solved, and Great Powers and others should necessarily, because they are great Powers, have a great interest in solving them, but if the great Powers think that the problems of Asia can be solved *minus* Asia in a sense, or *minus* the views of Asian countries, then it does seem to be rather odd.

Now, I refer to Kashmir. I should be very brief about Kashmir. First of all, the House knows the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir has just passed certain resolutions, or certain parts of its Constitution which it was considering. This is a process which started two or three years ago. It was halted in between, but it started then. We made it clear then that it is perfectly right, it is perfectly open to the people of Kashmir to frame their Constitution—in fact, they were hanging in the air—but that so far as our international commitments were concerned,—*i.e.* India's—we naturally would honour them, unless something else happened. But the fact that the Constituent Assembly decided something was a fact, an important fact, because it represented the wishes of elected people in Kashmir. But it cannot come in the way of our absolving ourselves

from our international commitments, in regard to the plebiscite, in regard to anything. That was the position, and that remains so. To ask me, as I have been asked by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to repudiate the Constituent Assembly's decision, is manifestly, if I might use the word with all respect, quite absurd. There is no question of my repudiating what the Constituent Assembly expressed as its wishes. But as I said, our international commitments remain, and we are going to proceed with them, in due course, always in consultation with the Government of Kashmir.

Now it is true I said this, and I referred this matter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, that this U.S. aid has somewhat changed the context of events. I do not yet know what this aid will be, what shape it may take, or in what form it will ultimately be. When I expressed with all respect our views about this matter, I dealt with the whole question, not from the quantitative point of view, if I may say so, but the qualitative point of view. The thing itself is so bad. Whether quantitatively it is exceedingly limited did not matter to me; a thing so bad is, as I said, itself a reversal of history. It is a qualitative matter, but the quantitative matter is also important; both are important. Now, Mr. Mohammed Ali made the other day a remark, which rather surprised me, that if we get this military aid from Kashmir, this will make it easier to solve the Kashmir problem.

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Hon. Members say, as they often say, withdraw this from the United Nations, or do this and that. Well, we are not going to do something which is against our assurances and our commitments. India has a certain reputation in the world. There is no good discussing now what was right or wrong five or six years ago. We have to consider the position as it is today. As I said earlier, we propose to honour our commitments, and stand by them to the extent that is possible, in the sense of the removal of the difficulties that have stood in the way.

Now I have taken a good deal of time of this House, but I must say something about what my friend Acharya Kripalani said in regard to the Kumbh Mela. I am not dealing with the Kumbh Mela as such, because, let us wait for the inquiry. But one thing I would like to say; the great Acharyaji referred to Government as inviting and encouraging and pushing people into the Mela, because we had special trains and the like. I do submit that this is not a correct appreciation of the situation. The Railways make arrangements, wherever large crowds are expected—we have to—and as a matter of fact, hundreds of thousands of people could not come on this occasion because there was no accommodation in the Railways. The hon. Member referred to people travelling on the roofs of carriages, it was true especially on the metre gauge section. It shows the pressure on the Railways was such that people simply went up and stood on the roofs of carriages. There was this pressure, and the railway had to make the best arrangements possible. All these arrangements had been made ten years ago, I forget now, at the last Kumbh Mela at Hardwar—I believe hundreds of special trains. 300 or 400 special trains, were run. One has to do that.

I wish to deal with another aspect of the matter. There was an accusation that Government rather wanted to exploit this Mela apparently for some party advantage. I was surprised to hear that. It is not my view nor is it the view of the Uttar Pradesh Government. If I may say so, so far as I am concerned. I am in agreement, at any rate, with my friend Shri Purshottama Das Tandon on what he said just now about this business of people going and imagining that their faith or the country's faith or anybody's faith' is governed by the planets, the sun or the moon, and they could wash away their sins in the Ganges, and that kind of thing. I do not wish to shock anybody's faith or to pain him, but perhaps many Members in this House know that I seldom let to go an opportunity to escape when I don't say something against astrologers and the like. I think they are a most undesirable crew. Further, they do a lot of harm to the country.

..... **XXX** **XXX** **XXX**³

One hon. Member referred to superstitions. Well, I agree with him. but I would add this: there are very few of us who are free from some kind of superstition or other. It is always the case of one's own orthodoxy and the other's heterodoxy; one's own superstition which is justified and the other's is sheer superstition! There are, of course, religious superstitions, but there are political superstitions and economic superstitions,—all kinds of superstitions. Let us fight all these superstitions, and, if I may say so, the only way to fight them really is to increase what I call the temper and the climate of science. And that is why the best thing that this Government has done. I think, is the establishment of those National Laboratories where scientific experiments are carried on.

But there is another aspect I would like to bring out here. I went to the Kumbh Mela, as I have been previously. Well, as the House perhaps knows, I was born and bred in Allahabad; well, more or less you might say, born and bred on the banks of the Ganga and the Yamuna, and the Ganga and the Yamuna are very dear to me as companions from my childhood. Whenever I have had the opportunity, I liked bathing in the Ganga. But I made it a point of never bathing there on a sacred occasion, so as not to mislead others. If I get a chance to go there— unfortunately I do not have many chances, and I do not mind it—on such occasions, I go, but on such occasions, I deliberately do not bath there lest I should be misunderstood as encouraging that.

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But the point I was going to put to the House was this: that the stars or the bathing in the Ganga do not affect me in the slightest, but I am very powerfully affected by this huge concourse of human beings, of Indians, wherever they are. I am affected by them, and I want to be in tune with them, to understand them, and I want to influence them in the best manner possible, therefore, I try to go there —not to the Kumbh Mela—if I have the chance to meet them I have gone to Melas previously, but not with the idea of merely condemning them. They are a very fine lot. They have their superstitions. If I can convince them of what I consider is wrong, I try to

convince them. But it doesn't do me much harm if they go and have a dip in the Ganga, and I do not see why I should waste my energies over it; there are many other things that perhaps I have to fight. Ultimately, one does this, I suppose, more positively in other ways. And here I must say all my sense of history comes up before me and when I think of the long course of years and centuries that these people have behaved in this way, well, I want to understand that—why that has happened, why that is happening, what force there is, apart from the superstitions, in that? There must be something else about it, because—to come back to what I said at an earlier stage—I want to be in tune with them, being myself what I am, not in tune with their superstitions but be in tune with them, because I am their fellow traveller, and I have to understand them.

That is by way of a personal explanation, if I may put it so, to the House. Sir, I have taken a good deal of the time of the House and the House has been good enough to listen to me patiently. I thank the House.

BACK NOTE

XIX. Reply on Motion of Thanks to President's Address, 22 February, 1954

1. SHRI S. S. MORE (Sholapur): Not in the least.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: ...and do not realise that it is ultimately the people of India who are functioning today.
SHRI S. S. MORE: No, Sir.
2. AN HON. MEMBER: It is a threat.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is a remark which is odd. It can only mean one or two things. It either means that with the help of the military aid, the military way will be easy of solution, or it means that with the help of that aid, a certain pressure can be exercised in order to solve the problem. It can mean nothing else. So, these things have to be considered carefully.
3. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS AND STATES (Dr. Katju): They continue to flourish.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, I hope they will not. I have no doubt about that.
4. ACHARYA KRIPALANI (Bhagalpur cum Purnea): But others do the opposite.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May be; of course, I cannot answer that.

STATEMENT REGARDING U.S. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

1 March, 1954

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I am grateful for this opportunity to make a statement in regard to a matter which is no doubt in the minds of most Members of this House as well as many people in the country. This relates to a recent letter which I received from the President of the United States of America, together with a copy of a statement which was issued by him. I received the letter on the 24th February, and both that letter and the statement, I believe, appeared in the public Press on the morning of the 26th February. Hon. Members have seen those and I do not propose to read them, but for facility of reference, I am placing copies of that letter and that statement, as well as a copy of my reply, on the Table of the House.

Letter from the President of the United States of America to the Prime Minister of India delivered on February 24, 1954.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister, I send you this personal message because I want you to know about my decision to extend military aid to Pakistan before it is public knowledge and also because I want you to know directly from me that this step does not in any way affect the friendship we feel for India. Quite the contrary we will continually strive to strengthen the warm and enduring friendship between our two countries.

Our two governments have agreed that our desires for peace are in accord. It has also been understood that if our interpretation of existing circumstances and our belief in how to achieve our goals differ, it is the right and duty of sovereign nations to make their own decisions. Having studied long and carefully the problem of opposing possible aggression in the Middle East, I believe that consultation between Pakistan and Turkey about security problems will serve the interests not only of Pakistan and Turkey, but also of the whole free world. Improvement in Pakistan's defensive capabilities will also serve these interests and it is for this reason that our aid will be given. This Government's views on this subject are elaborated in a public statement I will release, a copy of which Ambassador Allen will give you.

What we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India. And I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action, both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I believe the Pakistan-Turkey collaboration agreement which is being discussed is sound evidence of the defensive purposes which both countries have in mind.

I know that you and your Government are keenly aware of the need for economic progress as a prime requisite for stability and strength. This Government

has extended assistance to India in recognition of this fact, and I am recommending to Congress a continuation of substantial economic and technical aid for this reason. We also believe it in the interest of the free world that India have a strong military defense capability and have admired the effective way your Government has administered your military establishment. If your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration.

I regret that there has been such widespread and unfounded speculation on this subject. Now that the facts are known, I hope that the real import of our decision will be understood.

I am, my dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER"

Statement made by President Eisenhower

"On February 19, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention to study methods of achieving closer collaboration on various matters, including means designed towards strengthening peace and security. This Government welcomed this move and called it a constructive step towards better ensuring the security of the whole area of the Middle East. The Government of Pakistan has now asked the United States for grant military assistance.

I have said repeatedly that regional groupings to ensure security against aggression constitute the most effective means to assure survival and progress. No nation can stand alone today. My report to the Congress on June 30, 1953 stated that we should strengthen efforts towards regional, political, military and economic integration. I, therefore, under the authority granted by the Congress, am glad to comply with Pakistan's request, subject to the negotiation of the required Mutual Defence Assistance Program agreement. This Government has been gravely concerned over the weakness of the defensive capabilities in the Middle East. It was with the purpose of helping to increase the defence potential in this area that Congress in its last session appropriated funds to be used to assist those nations in the area which desired such assistance, which would pledge their willingness to promote international peace and security within the frame-work of the United Nations, and which would take effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace.

Let me make it clear that we shall be guided by the stated purposes and requirements of the mutual security legislation. These include specifically the provision that equipment, materials or services provided will be used solely to maintain the recipient country's internal security and for its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part. Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation. These undertakings afford adequate assurance to all nations, regardless of

their political orientation and whatever their international policies may be, that the arms the United States provides for the defence of the free world will in no way threaten their own security. I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with the Congress on further steps.

The United States earnestly desires that there be increased stability and strength in the Middle East, as it has desired this same thing in other parts of the free world. It believes that the aspirations of the peoples in this area for maintaining and developing their way of life and for realizing the social advances close to their hearts will be best served by strength to deter aggression and to reduce the fear of aggression. The United States is prepared to help in this endeavor, if its help is wanted."

My reply has not yet been published. It is a relatively brief reply and so I shall read it out to the House.

"Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for your personal message which your Ambassador in Delhi handed to me on February 24th. With this message was a copy of your statement in regard to the military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan. I appreciate the assurance you have given. You are, however, aware of the views of my Government and our people in regard to this matter. Those views and the policy which we have pursued, after the most careful thought, are based on our desire to help in the furtherance of peace and freedom. We shall continue to pursue that policy."

That is the reply. I should like to add a few more words in regard to this matter. In his letter, President Eisenhower, as the House knows, gave certain assurances, and stated what his objectives or motives were. I have at no time in this House challenged any individual's or any country's motives-I cannot go behind their motives. We have to consider facts as they are. So far as President Eisenhower is concerned, on my part I am convinced that certainly he bears no ill-will to India; he wishes well of India, and that he would not take any step to injure India. It is not a question of motives, but rather of certain results which inevitably follow certain actions, and it has seemed to us in regard to this matter of military aid to Pakistan, that the results were bound to be unfortunate. It is stated that the aid is merely meant to strengthen Pakistan so that it can defend itself against aggression, and also to ensure security and peace. It is not clear to me what kind of aggression and from what quarter it is feared. I am unable to see any danger of aggression on Pakistan from any quarter; but perhaps to throw light on this question, the Pakistan delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Ahmed Bokhari, only a day or two ago spoke in New York, and made it clear as to what his fears were. He said: "We want the guarantee that the two biggest countries in Asia will leave us alone." He referred to China and India. Now, it is not again clear to me how China is going to invade Pakistan,-whether it is going to come over the Karakoram Pass into Pakistan, or how it is going to get there. As for India, it not necessary for me to remind the House as to what our attitude has been. I may say a little about it later.

So far as ensuring security and peace are concerned, one need not go into any argument about it. It is a fact that since this aid has been announced there has been greater insecurity and greater tension. Whatever, as I said, the motives may be, the result, the fact, is there—that there has been in India, in Pakistan, an upsetting of things as they were and a sense of insecurity. In other countries in Asia, West and other, there has also been a sense of the situation becoming if I may say so, “fluid”, and a certain apprehension as to what the consequences might be.

Now, so far as India is concerned, the House will remember that for the last three years we have repeatedly offered a No-war Declaration to Pakistan, A No-War declaration is what is called in perhaps more precise language a Non-Aggression Pact. Now we have offered that repeatedly and Pakistan has been repeatedly rejecting that for whatever reason it may be. If there had been such a No-War declaration or Non-Aggression Pact, obviously that would have eased tension between the two countries and in surrounding areas and produced a greater feeling of security in both countries, it would have helped us to solve the problems that face us. Now it is in the context of this rejection of our proposal for a No-War declaration that we have to view this military aid from the United States to Pakistan. I venture to say that it is not easy to even imagine any aggression on Pakistan as things are, either from that great country China, or from India, regardless, I say, of motives about it. I am looking at the barest physical possibilities of the matter.

How then does this question of aggression arise and is made a pretext for this kind of military aid being given, from Pakistan's side? I am wholly unaware of any possible reason which I can understand. For my part, I would welcome the strengthening of Pakistan, economically, even militarily, in the normal sense, -if they build themselves up I have no complaint. But this is not a normal procedure. This is a very abnormal procedure, upsetting normality, and in so far as it upsets normality it is a step away from peace.

Now, the President of the United States has stated that if the aid given to Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression he will undertake to thwart such aggression. I have no doubt that the President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless, the United States have not thus far condemned it and we are asked not to press this point in the interests of peace! Aggression may take place again and be denied, as the previous aggression was denied till it could not be hidden. If conditions are created for such an aggression to take place it may well follow, in spite of the desire of the United States to prevent it. Later long arguments will be carried on as to whether it was aggression or not. The military aid given by the United States to Pakistan is likely to create the conditions which facilitate and encourage aggression.

The President of the United States has been good enough to suggest that he would consider sympathetically any request from us for military aid. In making this suggestion the President has done less than justice to us or to himself. If we object to

military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves.

As I have said repeatedly, this grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan. It is vitally necessary for India and Pakistan to solve these problems and to develop friendly and co-operative relations which their geographical position as neighbours as well as their long common history demand. These problems can only be solved by the two countries themselves and not by the intervention of others. It is, indeed, this intervention of other countries in the past that has come in the way of their solution. Recently a new and more friendly atmosphere had been created between India and Pakistan, and by direct consultations between the two Prime Ministers progress was being made towards the solution of these problems. That progress has now been checked and fresh difficulties have arisen.

The military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems which is likely to have more far-reaching results than the previous types of intervention.

At the present moment there is a considerable number of American Observers attached to the United Nations team on either side of the "cease fire" line in the Jammu and Kashmir State. These American Observers can no longer be treated by us as neutrals in this dispute, and hence their presence there appears to us to be improper.

I have referred previously to the wider aspect of this aid, aspects which may affect that whole of Asia. Many countries in Asia have recovered their freedom after long years of colonial subjection. They prize their freedom and any intervention which lessens their freedom is considered by us to be harmful and a step away from both freedom and peace.

Recently, on the 26th of January the Assistant Secretary of State in the United States, Mr. Walter S. Robertson, made a statement to the House Appropriations Sub-Committee of the Congress of the United States of America. Now, I have no official record of the statement. The statement was made on January 26th. It was released, I believe, on February 23rd or 24th. I have to rely on Press reports on which I have two, which are not identical though the meaning perhaps is much the same. One Press report states that he told the House Appropriations Sub-Committee of the Congress that the U.S.A. must dominate Asia for an indefinite period and pose a military threat against Communist China until it breaks up internally. Another report says that the US must hold a posture of strength in Asia for an indefinite period till those results follow. Whether it is a Posture of strength or clear domination, I do not know what the exact words were, the idea behind it appears to be much the same. This testimony, as I said, was made public about five days ago. It is known that India's policy in regard to the People's Government of China differs from that of the U.S.A. We have recognised this Government in China and have friendly relations with it. Our two policies, therefore,

in this respect are wholly opposed to each other. What is more important is that a responsible official of the US should say that it is their policy that the U.S.A. must dominate Asia for an indefinite period. Whatever the objective may be, the countries of Asia, and certainly India, do not accept this policy and do not propose to be dominated by any country for whatever purpose. It is in this wider context that we must view these recent developments and more especially the military aid to Pakistan.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has stated that by the receipt of this military aid, a momentous step forward has been taken towards the strengthening of the Muslim world and that Pakistan has now entered a glorious chapter in its history and is now cast for a significant role in world affairs. It is not for me to criticize what the Pakistan Prime Minister says, but I have endeavoured to understand how the Muslim world is going to be strengthened through arms supplied by a Foreign Power, and how any country is going to play a significant role in world affairs relying on military aid from another country.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has also stated that this military aid will help to solve the Kashmir problem, that is an indication of the way his mind works and how he thinks this military aid might be utilized. Military aid is only utilized in war or in a threat of war.

There is another aspect which I should like to mention. These separate pacts between countries take place, some of them in the nature of military alliances. It is for us and others to consider how far they are in consonance with the spirit of the U.N. Charter, even with the letter, I might say. But, I am not for the moment speaking in legal or juristic terms. The United Nations was formed for a particular purpose and the Charter lays down that purpose. I would like the House to consider this is not the time to discuss this matter-how far those purposes are being furthered by all these developments that we see in regard to countries linking up militarily against other countries, both sides often being represented in the United Nations.

Also it is becoming rather significant how discussions on particular vital matters affecting world peace are avoided in the United Nations General Assembly, and when something is discussed, previous decisions have been taken which almost appear to be imposed upon the United Nations in the General Assembly. That, I submit, is not the way either to work the United Nations to fulfil the purposes of the Charter or to remove the tensions of the world.

The world suffers today from an enormous amount of suspicion and fear. And we have to judge every matter from this point of view as to whether it adds to suspicion and fear or lessens them. Can there be any doubt that the recent step taken in regard to military aid being given to Pakistan is a step which adds to suspicions and fears and therefore the tensions of the world, instead of bringing about any feeling of security?

There is another small matter-not a small but relevant matter-relating to Kashmir. The House will remember its long history and how for the last two years among the questions being discussed has been the quantum of forces to be left in Kashmir with

a view to having afterwards a plebiscite; that is, a reduction of forces-sometimes it is called demilitarisation. There has thus far been no agreement on that issue. Now the whole issue has to be considered from an entirely different point of view when across the border, across the "cease-fire" line on the other side, large additional forces are being thrust from outside in Pakistan and put at the disposal of Pakistan. It does make a difference. I said some time back, that this military aid was changing the balance of things in India and Asia. I was not thinking so much of the relative military strength of Pakistan or India, although that of course is a relevant matter, but I was rather thinking of all these other upsets, to some of which I have drawn the attention of the House.

India has no intention of surrendering or bartering her freedom for any purpose or under any compulsion whatever.

In this grave situation that has arisen this House and the country will, I have no doubt, stand united. This is no Party matter, but a national issue, on which there can be no two opinions.

BACK NOTE

XX. Statement Regarding U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan,
01 March, 1954

NIL

STATEMENT ON KOREA

16 March, 1954

THE PRIME MINISTER, SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The statement laid on the Table of the House is rather a long one, and I do not propose to take up the time of the House by reading it through. It is a factual statement, and if I may say so, there is nothing new in it which hon. Members do not know and which has not appeared at various times in the Press. It is really a kind of continuation of the account of what our Forces had to do in Korea since I made a statement in this House in December last. Now, that chapter is practically close so far as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is concerned.

The only point remaining over for us is the fact that we have got 88 of those old prisoners of war here in Delhi with us, and we are holding them on behalf of the United Nations- that is, not the United Nations Command, but the United Nations Secretariat in New York. We have referred the matter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as to what we are to do with them.

These 88 persons are those who refused to be repatriated and at the same time refused to be handed over to their old detaining sides. Out of the 88, 2 are from the Southern Camp and 86 are from the Northern Camp. These are the persons who first elected to go to various neutral countries, and among the neutral countries named was India. They could not be sent to neutral countries unless the neutral countries accepted them and there were arrangements for them to be sent.

Some of them said at the moment that they wanted to go to the United States of America, but the United States were not a neutral country; so, they could not be sent there. These difficulties could not be got over, and we pointed this out to them before our Custodian Force came back. We said again that either we could send them back to their own homes or hand them over to the U.N. Command. A number of them said that they were prepared to be handed over to the U.N. Command, provided they gave an assurance and a guarantee that they would not be handed over to the South Korean Government or the Government of Formosa. The U.N. Command were not prepared to give this guarantee to them, and in fact said, "As soon as you come to us, we will release you, and you can go anywhere you like."

The result was that we had the choice of leaving them in the Camp and coming away, or bringing them with us. When these people learnt that we were on the point of leaving, they, - some of them, at any rate,-were much agitated that they might be

left behind, and some of them even threatened something in the nature of suicide. They said, "We won't be safe here if you go away; therefore, we might as well commit suicide." Maybe, it was an idle threat. Now, we could not very well leave them in the lurch, and so we brought them here with us, and here they are with us at the present moment.

We are in communication with the U.N. Headquarters in New York as to what to do with them. That, more or less, closes the chapter of our work in Korea in connection with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Custodian Force. I am sure that, as previously, this House would like me to express on its behalf our high appreciation of the work of our representatives in Korea.

BACK NOTE

XXI. Statement on Korea, 16 March, 1954

NIL

HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS

02 April, 1954

Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, the other day hon. Members desired me to make a statement in regard to the hydrogen bomb. I have also received two or perhaps three short notice questions on this subject. So I propose to make a statement which, I take it, will cover the short notice questions also.

..... XXX XXX XXX¹

I welcome this opportunity to state the position of the Government and, I feel sure, of the country, on the latest of all the dread weapons of war the Hydrogen Bomb, and to its known and unknown consequences and horrors.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we are told, possess this weapon and each of these countries has during the last two years effected test explosions unleashing impacts, which in every respect were far beyond that of any weapons of destruction known to man.

A further and more powerful explosion than the one on the 1st of March has been effected by the United States, and more are reported to have been scheduled to take place.

We know little more about the Hydrogen Bomb and its disastrous and horrible consequences than have appeared in the press or are otherwise matters of general knowledge or speculation. But even what we do know, and the very fact that the full facts of the effects of these explosions do not appear to be known or are ascertainable with any certainty even by scientists, point to certain conclusions. A new weapon of unprecedented power both in volume and intensity, with unascertained, and probably unascertainable range of destructive potential in respect to time and space, that is both as regards duration and extent of consequences, is being tested, unleashing its massive power, for use as a weapon of war. We know that its use threatens the existence of man and civilisation as we know it. We are told that there is no effective protection against the Hydrogen Bomb and that millions of people may be exterminated by a single explosion and that many more injured, and perhaps still many more condemned to slow death, or to live under the shadow of the fear of disease and death.

These are horrible prospects, and it affects us, nations and people everywhere, whether we are involved in wars or power blocs or not.

From diverse sides and parts of the world have come pronouncements which point to the dread features and ominous prospects of the Hydrogen Bomb era. I shall refer but to a few of them.

Some time ago, when the Hydrogen Bomb was first mentioned in public, Professor Albert Einstein said:

“The Hydrogen Bomb appears on the public horizon as a probable attainable goal, If successful radio active poisoning of the atmosphere, and hence an annihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of technical possibilities.”

This was said some time ago. That success appears now to have been achieved.

A U. S. Professor, Dr. Greenhead of the Cincinnati University, said:

“We are proceeding blindly in our atomic tests and sometimes we cannot predict the results of such blind moves.” He said that “the U. S. was able to make these bombs out of relatively plentiful substances. If these are used to create an explosive chain reaction, we are nearing the point where we suddenly have enough materials to destroy ourselves.”

Mr. Martin, the Defence and Scientific Adviser to the Government of Australia, is reported to have said after the explosion of the 1st of March:

“For the first time I am getting worried about the Hydrogen Bomb. I can say as an individual that the Hydrogen Bomb has brought things to a stage where a conference between the four World Powers in mankind’s own interests can no longer be postponed.”

He is reported to have added that the fission was greater than expected by the scientists and that the scientists were more worried than anyone else.

Mr. Lester Pearson, the External Affairs Minister of Canada, referred to the use of such weapons in war when he said recently that “a third World War accompanied by the possible devastation by new atomic and chemical weapons would destroy civilisation”.

The House will no doubt recall the recent statement of Mr. Malenkov, the Soviet Prime Minister, on this subject, the exact words of which I have not before me, but which said in effect that modern war with such weapons in use, would mean total destruction.

There can be little doubt about the deep and widespread concern in the world, particularly among people, about these weapons and their dreadful consequences. But concern is not enough. Fear and dread do not lead to constructive thought or effective courses of action. Panic is no remedy against disaster of any kind, present or potential.

Mankind has to awaken itself to the reality and face the situation with determination and assert itself to avert calamity.

The general position of this country in this matter has been repeatedly stated and placed beyond all doubt. It is up to us to pursue as best as we can the objective we seek.

We have maintained that nuclear (including Thermonuclear), chemical and biological (bacterial) knowledge and power should not be used to forge these weapons

of mass destruction. We have advocated the prohibition of such weapons, by common consent and immediately by agreements amongst those concerned, which latter is at present the only effective way to bring about their abandonment.

The House will no doubt recall the successive attempts made by us at the United Nations to secure the adoption of this view and approach at the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1953, as a result of amendments moved by our delegation to the Resolution on Disarmament, there were incorporated in the resolution that was adopted:

(1) An "affirmation" by the General Assembly of its "earnest desire for the elimination and prohibition of atomic, Hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of war and mass destruction and for the attainment of these ends through effective means".

(2) A provision for setting up of a subcommittee, consisting of the Powers principally involved, to sit in private, and at places of its choosing to implement the purposes of the Disarmament Commission.

The House is aware that this latter suggestion has lately engaged the attention of the Powers principally concerned, at Berlin and elsewhere and talks have taken place and, so far as we know, are continuing.

Time, however, appears to challenge us. Destruction threatens to catch us up, if not to overtake us, on its march to its sinister goal. We must seek to arrest it and avert the dire end it threatens.

Government propose to continue to give the closest and continuous consideration to such steps as it can take in appropriate places and contexts in pursuit of our approach and the common objective.

I have stated publicly as our view that these experiments, which may have served their one only useful purpose, namely, expose the nature of the horror and tragedy, even though but partly, should cease. I repeat that to be our considered position, and it is our hope that this view and the great concern it reflects, and which is world wide, will evoke adequate and timely responses.

Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial. In respect of the prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, which the General Assembly has affirmed as its nearest desire, the Government would consider, among steps to be taken now and forthwith, the following:

(1) Some sort of, what may be called, "Standstill Agreement" in respect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling, must await more substantial agreements amongst those principally concerned.

(2) Full publicity by those principally concerned in the production of these weapons and by the United Nations, of the extent of the destructive power and the known effects of these weapons and also adequate indication of the extent of the

unknown but probable effects. Informed world public opinion is in our view the most effective factor in bringing about the results we desire.

(3) Immediate (and continuing) private meetings of the sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission to consider the "Standstill" proposal, which I have just mentioned, pending decisions on prohibitions and controls etc.. to which the Disarmament Commission is asked by the General Assembly to address itself.

(4) Active steps by States and peoples of the world, who though not directly concerned with the production of these weapons, are very much concerned by the possible use of them also at present, by these experiments and their effects. They would, I venture to hope, express their concern and add their voices and influence, in as effective a manner as possible to arrest the progress of this destructive potential which menaces all alike.

The Government of India will use its best efforts in pursuit of these objectives.

I would conclude with an expression of the sympathy which this House and this country feels towards the victims of the recent explosions. Japanese fishermen and others, and to the people of Japan to whom it has brought much dread and concern by way of direct effects and by the fear of food contamination.

The open ocean appears no longer open, except in that those who sail on it for fishing or other legitimate purposes take the greater and unknown risks caused by these explosions. It is of great concern to us that Asia and her people appear to be always nearer these occurrences and experiments, and their fearsome consequences, actual and potential.

We do not yet know fully whether the continuing effects of these explosions are carried only by the medium of air and water or whether they subsist in other strata of nature and how long their effects persist, or whether they set up some sort of chain reactions at which some have already hinted.

We must endeavour with faith and hope to promote all efforts that seek to bring to a halt this drift to what appears to be the menace of total destruction.

BACK NOTE

XXII. Hydrogen Bomb Tests, 02 April, 1954

1. DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH (Shahabad South): The short notice questions have not been accepted?

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: The answer will cover all the points raised both in the motion for calling attention as also in the short notice questions.

STATEMENT REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH SETTLEMENTS IN INDIA

6 April, 1954

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I thank you for your kindness in this matter. Sir, this is a statement in regard to the developments in French possessions. I do not wish to take up too much of the time of the House in reading the whole of it because a large part of it is really a summary of the events that are known and are being mentioned just to make the story compact. I am prepared to lay it on the Table of the House or read, it or give a summary of it and lay it on the Table of the House.

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The House knows that on the 18th March, a number of resolutions were passed by the municipalities in Pondicherry demanding immediate merger with India. Some days later, similar resolutions were passed by the municipalities in Karaikal. The resolutions had the full support of the French Indian Councillors, who are popularly known as Ministers, and the President of the Representative Assembly.

These Municipalities represent roughly 90 per cent of the population of the French possessions and they called upon the Government of France to take urgent and necessary measures to give effect to the wishes of the people. They made it clear that the vast majority of the population, through their elected representatives and responsible Ministers, were supporting the popular demand. After this, there has been a great deal of repressive activity on the part of the Government and the Ministers functioning in some parts of Pondicherry. People were told to withdraw their support. Pressure was brought to bear on them. So far as we are concerned-we are naturally concerned in many ways-it has been with the effects of this repressive activity, and we drew the attention of the Government of France to these developments and again suggested to them what we had said before, that the obviously simple and proper course would be for them to agree to hand over the *de facto* Government of the territories retaining the *de jure* sovereignty to be discussed a little later, because that would involve constitutional changes both in India and in France and we can discuss them at a later stage and take such steps as were necessary. The *de facto* control should have been handed over anyhow, and after this obvious expression of the people's will at Pondicherry and Karaikal, there is no argument- even such arguments as had previously been advanced - on behalf of the Government of France. The Government of France did not respond favourably to our proposal and they repeated that there could be no transfer of French territory under the French Constitution without the consent of the people. So far as we are concerned, the consent of the people has been shown in very ample measure. Apart from this, of course, if hon. Members would look at an enlarged map of the Settlements-not a

small map-the whole thing appears like a jigsaw puzzle, with all kinds of odd bits here and there, Indian territory inside, French Indian territory there and French Indian territory here. From the administrative and political point of view, it is not defensible. Apart from this point of view, basically we cannot admit the right of small pockets of French territory anywhere in India. We cannot have a few villages here and a few villages there owing allegiance to foreign and distant Powers. Apart from that basic argument, the fact that here was a popular expression of will through the elected representatives seemed to have amply satisfied every provision even of the French Constitution. So, we have been suggesting that the *de facto* transfer should be made, and then, for the *de jure* transfer, if any steps have to be taken and procedures have to be gone through, they can be gone through. It should be remembered that it has been stated by the authorities in Pondicherry, etc., that certain subversive elements have not been behaving properly. The 'subversive elements' happen to be persons who were elected a little while ago as Ministers, Councillors and Mayors and they were responsible for the people a little while ago, but later because they expressed their opinion in a particular way, they were viewed as subversive elements. So far as the Government of India are concerned, they have pursued, and still hope to pursue, peaceful methods to secure a friendly settlement with the Government of France. Certain measure we have taken. One was to prevent French Indian police crossing Indian territory to go from one enclave to another. We had to take it for a variety of reasons. One was that we could not allow this trouble to spread in Indian territory. We could not allow people to cross Indian territory for the sake of repressing others. Apart from all this, we had put up certain barriers to stop smuggling etc. We have not stopped essential supplies, because we do not wish to bring any pressure to bear upon the general population. It is only in one case, that is, in the case of petrol, that we have, in the last few days, stopped its supply, because it was reported to us that in distributing this petrol there was a great deal of discrimination - that is, the so-called pro-merger people did not get petrol and those whom the Government there favoured got petrol. So, we stopped the supply of petrol. Otherwise, all essential supplies go.

And even in regard to stopping the French police from crossing the Indian territory, it is only the French police that have been stopped; the civilians have not been stopped. For normal purposes, even a civilian functionary of the French Indian Government can go.

On thing else. We have decided to introduce a permit system for people coming into Indian territory from that territory. We have to give a fortnight's notice for this, and this notice was given, I think, four or five days ago. During the last few days, the movement for merger has gained considerable ground in spite of the repressive measures of the Local Administration, and, as perhaps most hon. Members know, some of the separate enclaves have more or less declared their independence from the French Administration and are carrying on by themselves. I would like to make it perfectly clear that this entire movement is naturally spontaneous and, when it is natural for all of us to feel sympathy with it, there has been no question of our Government directly or indirectly interfering with it.

There was a case, the House will remember, when the French police came outside just across the French border into Indian territory and arrested one of the Mayors and two Indian citizens—young men —, which was a violation of Indian territory. We protested strongly and the two Indian citizens were released a day or two later. But, so far as I know, while we had demanded the release and return of the Mayor whom they had taken, so far the Mayor has not been released and certainly not returned. We had asked for the punishment of the policemen who had done this and that too has not been done. These are the major reasons why we had to stop the French police from coming into Indian territory.

We were asked by the French Government whether we intended taking possession of those enclaves where the people have taken possession, I mean, where for the moment the French Administration has ceased to exist, because people have seized the Local Administration in those few villages. We informed them that we have no intention of taking any unilateral action in this matter, but we could not allow the French police to use Indian territory against them. This would have serious repercussions in India, and therefore, the ban on the police going there must continue.

The Government of India are disturbed by reports which have reached them of acts of hooliganism against Indian citizens. There have been reports of attacks on the library attached to the Consulate-General and on the quarters occupied by Indian press correspondents in Pondicherry. The Government of India are making enquiries about this matter and they will take necessary action to safeguard their rights and interests.

It is clear from the developments that are taking place that the demand for immediate merger with India without a referendum has the general support of the people. The movement is completely spontaneous and is led by persons who until recently were responsible members of the Administration. Other political groups and leaders have also declared their support of this popular movement. Repression cannot kill a movement which is based on the natural desire of the people to form part of India. The people of the French possessions form an integral part of the great Indian family. Economically, culturally and in other ways, they have the closest links with India. A political system which keeps them separate from India and subject to foreign rule is wholly unacceptable to them and to the Government and people of India.

It is the hope of the Government of India that this system will be changed peacefully by means of a friendly settlement. It cannot, in any case, continue much longer, for the people have declared their firm intention to terminate it. The Government of India have, therefore, again requested the Government of France to consider the suggestion which they made in October 1952. They have stated the reasons which prevent them from accepting the proposal for a referendum. All important political groups have rejected this proposal on grounds of principle and also because conditions in the French possessions are such that no free referendum can be held. As the wishes of the people have been made known so clearly by the

elected representatives of almost 90 per cent of the population, a referendum is in any case unnecessary.

The Government of India have made it clear that the cultural and other rights of the people will be fully respected. They are not asking for the immediate transfer of the *de jure* sovereignty of France. Their suggestion is that a *de facto* transfer of the administration should take place immediately, while French sovereignty should continue until the constitutional issue has been settled. Both India and France will have to make necessary changes in their respective Constitutions. All this will take time, while the demand of the people is for immediate merger without a referendum. The Government of India are convinced that the suggestion which they have made will help to promote a settlement, which they greatly desire. They will gladly enter into negotiations with the Government of France on the basis suggested.

I have already informed the House of the developments that are taking place in the French possessions. On the 18th March, resolutions were passed demanding immediate merger with India by the eight municipalities of Pondicherry. Some days later, similar resolutions were passed by the six municipalities of Karaikal. The resolutions had the full support of the French Indian Councillors (who are popularly known as Ministers) and the President of the Representative Assembly.

The Municipalities which passed these resolutions comprise nearly 90 per cent of the population of the French possessions. They called upon the Government of France to take urgent and necessary measures to give effect to the wishes of the people. Telegrams were sent to the President of the French Republic, prominent members of the French Cabinet and the Presidents of the National Assembly, the Senate and the Assembly of the French Union. Copies of these telegrams were sent to me.

It is clear that the vast majority of the population, through their elected representatives and responsible Ministers, are supporting this popular demand. The demand is for immediate merger without a referendum, as the wishes of the people about merger with India are known. The Ministers and the elected representatives expected that the Government of France would consider their request sympathetically. Their expectation was, however, not realized, for the local authorities ignored the resolutions and adopted repressive measure against the popular movement.

Some threats were held out to the Ministers and others in order to make them retract their declarations. There were acts of hooliganism in Pondicherry and on the 20th March the local PTI correspondent was assaulted by lawless elements. Police parties were sent to various parts of Pondicherry and warnings were given to the people that they should keep aloof from the popular movement.

The Government of India expressed their concern about these repressive measures. A strong protest was lodged with the local authorities and they were informed that these acts of intimidation were bound to have serious repercussions in India. A similar representation was made by the Indian Ambassador in Paris to Government of France. The Government of France were reminded that a settlement of the question

of the future of the French possessions had been held up for many years by doubts which existed in their mind about the wishes of the people. These wishes had now been expressed in the most effective manner possible under the existing circumstances.

The Government of India had made a suggestion in October 1952 that a settlement might be reached on the basis of a direct transfer of the administration, leaving constitutional and other matters to be settled by negotiation. The *de jure* sovereignty of France would continue, pending further negotiations, while the administration would be in Indian hands. The Government of France were invited by the Ambassador to consider this suggestion and to take the opportunity afforded by the popular demand for merger to arrive at a friendly settlement.

The Government of France have not responded favourably to this suggestion. They have alleged that certain measures have been taken by the Government of India to prevent the people of the French possessions from enjoying a normal economic life. These measures, according to them, have the aim of exerting pressure on the people. The Government of France have also stated that no transfer of French territory is possible under the French Constitution without the consent of the people. They propose, therefore, to start immediate conversations about the conditions under which a referendum could be organized in the French possessions.

The Government of India regret that the suggestion they have made for a peaceful and friendly settlement of this question has not yet been accepted. They have made it clear, time and again, that the economic measures which they have adopted are designed solely to protect their legitimate interests. They are measures directed against smuggling and other undesirable activities which have been encouraged by the peculiar methods and policies of the local administration. There is no basis for the suggestion that pressure has been exerted on the people. Many essential supplies for the French possessions come from India and, with one exception, these supplies are being continued. The Government of India have also pointed out repeatedly that, under the conditions existing in the French possessions, a free referendum cannot in any case be held. These conditions have steadily deteriorated since 1951 when the neutral observers appointed by the Government of France gave expression to similar views.

In the last few days, the movement for merger has gained ground, in spite of the repressive measures of the local administration. The movement was launched on the 28 March since when processions are being taken out and meetings are being held almost daily in Karaikal and parts of Pondicherry. Some supporters of the merger movement have been arrested and others have been victims of violence from the police.

The movement has been conducted peacefully and in the western areas of Pondicherry, eg. Nettapakkam and parts of Bahour, the pro-merger parties appear to be in effect in power. According to newspaper reports, the local police has gone over to them and they have hoisted the Indian flag on public buildings and declared their wish to form part of India. They have again called upon the Government of France to

take immediate measures for the integration, without a referendum, of the French possessions with the Union of India.

In view of the repressive measures of the local administration, the Government of India have been obliged to take some steps to protect their interests. Some days ago, Indian territory was violated by the French police who seized two Indian nationals and the Mayor of one of the Pondicherry Communes who was seeking shelter in Indian territory. There were other acts of coercion and intimidation of Indian nationals living on the border. The Government of India lodged a strong protest about these incidents and demanded the immediate release and return to Indian territory of all the three persons who had been illegally seized. They also demanded the punishment of the French officials concerned and some assurances about the future. Their demands have not been met and they have been obliged to take various precautions to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. Among the measures which they have taken is a total ban on the passage of French police across Indian territory to any part of the French possessions.

The Government of India have no intention of assuming control unilaterally of any part of the French possessions. They cannot, however, allow the French police to use Indian territory for the purpose of suppressing a popular movement. This would have serious repercussions in India and the ban must, therefore, continue so long as the present tension prevails. This ban has been imposed in the interest, not only for Indian national, but also of the French police. The Government of India have no wish to interfere with the normal administration of the French possessions, much as they disapprove of some of the methods that are being used. The ban which they have imposed is, therefore, restricted to the police force. Other functionaries of the administration are not subject to this ban.

Another measure which the Government of India have been obliged to adopt is the ban on petrol supplies from India to the French possessions. Petrol and other essential supplies were being sent freely until the Government of India discovered that in the matter of sale of petrol some discrimination was practised by the local administration. Dealers had been given instructions to stop sale of petrol to the supporters of the merger movement. The Government of India cannot give facilities for export of articles to the French possessions if sale or distribution is restricted to supporters of the local administration. They have stopped supplies of petrol and they propose to apply this principle strictly in all cases.

The Government of India have also given notice to the local administration that they propose to apply the permit system to regulate traffic to and from Pondicherry and Karaikal with effect from the 19th April. They have been obliged to take this step, not only as a check on smuggling which has not been stopped in spite of the measure that they have taken, but also with a view to preventing undesirable elements from coming freely to India. Conditions in the French possessions will become more and more unsettled if repressive measures are continued and lawless elements are encouraged by the local administration. The Government of India consider it necessary,

in the conditions which are now developing, to control the entry of persons from Pondicherry and Karaikal into India. Ordinarily, single-journey visas will be given for visits to India, but the Consul-General will be empowered to give multi-journey visas in special cases. He will also have complete freedom to refuse visas at his discretion.

The Government of India are disturbed by reports which have reached them of acts of hooliganism against Indian citizens. There have been reports of attacks on the library attached to the Consulate-General and on the quarters occupied by Indian press correspondents in Pondicherry. The Government of India are making enquiries about this matter and they will take necessary action to safeguard their rights and interests.

It is clear from the developments that are taking place that the demand for immediate merger with India without a referendum has the general support of the people. The movement is completely spontaneous and is led by persons who until recently were responsible member of the Administration. Other political groups and leaders have also declared their support of this popular movement. Repression cannot kill a movement which is based on the natural desire of the people to form part of India. The people of the French possessions form an integral part of the great Indian family. Economically, culturally and in other ways, they have the closest links with India. A political system which keeps them separate from India and subject to foreign rule is wholly unacceptable to them and to the Government and people of India.

It is the hope of the Government of India that this system will be changed peacefully by means of a friendly settlement. It cannot in any case continue much longer for the people have declared their firm intention to terminate it. The Government of India have, therefore, again requested the Government of France to consider the suggestion which they made in October 1952. They have stated the reasons which prevent them from accepting the proposal for a referendum. All important political groups have rejected this proposal on grounds of principle and also because conditions in the French possessions are such that no free referendum can be held. As the wishes of the people have been made known so clearly by the elected representatives of almost 90 per cent of the population, a referendum is in any case unnecessary.

The Government of India have made it clear that the cultural and other rights of the people will be fully respected. They are not asking for the immediate transfer of the *de jure* sovereignty of France. Their suggestion is that a *de facto* transfer of the administration should take place immediately, while French sovereignty should continue until the constitutional issue has been settled. Both India and France will have to make necessary changes in their respective Constitutions. All this will take time, while the demand of the people is for immediate merger without a referendum. The Government of India are convinced that the suggestion which they have made will help to promote a settlement, which they greatly desire. They will gladly enter into negotiations with the Government of France on the basis suggested.

BACK NOTE

**XXIII. Statement Regarding Developments in French
Settlements in India, 6 April, 1954**

1. Mr. Speaker: It is better he gives a summary.

STATEMENT REGARDING INDO-CHINA

24 April, 1954

The House is aware that in February last France, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom agreed to convene a conference of themselves and the People's Republic of China, to which other interested States are also to be invited, to consider, respectively, the problem of Korea and Indo-China. This conference begins its sessions at Geneva next week.

We are not participants either in this conference or in the hostilities that rage in Indo-China. We are, however, interested in and deeply concerned about the problem of Indo-China and, more particularly, about the recent developments in respect of it. We are also concerned that the conference at Geneva should seek to resolve this question by negotiation and succeed in doing so, so that the shadow of war which has far long darkened our proximate regions and threatens to spread and grow darker still, be dispelled.

An appreciation of the basic realities of this problem, of the national and political sentiments involved, and of the background and the present situation there, both political and military, is essential to that kind of approach which alone might prove constructive and fruitful.

The conflict in Indo-China is, in its origin and essential character, a movement of resistance to colonialism and the attempts to deal with such resistance by the traditional methods of suppression and divide-and-rule.

Foreign intervention have made the issue more complex, but it nevertheless remains basically anti-colonial and nationalist in character. The recognition of this and the reconciliation of national sentiments for freedom and independence and safeguarding them against external pressures can alone form the basis of a settlement and of peace. The conflict itself, in spite of heavy weapons employed and the large-scale operations, remains even today a guerilla war in character with no fixed or stable fronts. The country is divided between the rival forces, but no well held frontiers demarcate their respective zone. Large pockets and slices of territory and populations, change allegiance to one side or the other from day to day or over-night. Battles are won and lost, places taken and retaken, but the war rages year after year with increasing ferocity. Millions of Indio-Chinese, combatants and others as well, irrespective of what side they are on, are killed and wounded or otherwise suffer and their country rendered desolate.

In Indo-China, the challenge to imperialism, as a large-scale movement, began in 1940 against the Japanese occupation. During the war against Japan, the United

States and allied troops were assisted by the Viet-Minh (founded in 1941) and by other nationalist and other groups, at the head of which was Ho-Chi Minh. The Viet-Minh proclamation of the time referred to the "defence of democratic principles by the United States, the USSR, Britain and China" and asked the Great Powers to "proclaim that after Japanese forces had been overthrown, the Indo-Chinese people will receive full autonomy".

After World War II, a provisional Government, of which five out of the fifteen members were communists and which was supported by moderate nationalists, Catholics and others, was established. Ho-Chi Minh was elected the President of the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam" which was proclaimed in September 1945 and was recognized by the then Government of China. On March 6th, 1946, France, which had now returned to Indo-China after the war, signed an agreement with Ho-Chi Minh, recognizing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "as a free State with its own Government, Parliament, Army and Finance and forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union". This arrangement, however, did not last long. Conflict between Ho-Chi Minh's Republic and the French Empire began in 1947 and has continued ever since. In June 1948, the French signed an agreement with Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam, and made him the head of Viet-Nam which they recognized as an Associate State within the French Union. Similar agreements were made by the French with the two other States of Indo-China, the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia.

At this stage, the conflict in Indo-China begins to assume its present and most ominous aspect of being a reflection of the conflicts between the two power blocs. Material aid and equipment given to France by the United States became available to the French for the war in Indo-China. The Viet-Minh, on the other hand, although still maintaining that the war was one against French colonialism, it is reported, received supplies from the People's Republic of China, whose Government continued the recognition accorded to the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam" (Viet-Minh) by its predecessor.

Intervention followed intervention and the ferocity of war increased. Negotiations became increasingly difficult and abortive. It is in this background that the developments of recent months have taken place.

The first of these developments is the decision of the Berlin Powers to have this problem considered by the Geneva Conference. We welcomed this conference and expressed our hope that it would lead to peace in Indo-China. We saw in it the decision to pursue the path of negotiation for a settlement. I ventured to make an appeal at the time for a cease-fire in Indo-China in a statement made in this House, which was unanimously welcomed by the House.

While the decision about the Geneva Conference was a welcome development, it was soon followed by others which caused us concern and forebodings. Among these were:

- (1) The repeated reference to instant and massive retaliation, to possible attacks on the Chinese mainland and statements about extending the scope and intensity of hostilities in Indo-China;
- (2) An invitation to the Western countries, to the ANZUS powers, and to some Asian States to join in united and collective action in South-East Asia. This has been preceded by statements, which came near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally, over the countries of South-East Asia.

There were thus indications of impending direct intervention in Indo-China and the internationalization of the war and its extension and intensification.

The Government of India deeply regret and are much concerned that a conference of such momentous character, obviously called together both feasible and necessary, should be preceded by a proclamation of what amounts to lack of faith in it, and of alternatives involving threats of sanctions. Negotiations are handicapped, they start ill and they make chequered progress if any at all, with duress, threats, slights and proclamations of lack of faith preceding them.

Another element which must again increase our misgivings, is the stepping up of the tempo of war and the accentuation of supplies in Indo-China. Accentuated supplies have obviously come to the aid of the Viet-Minh which, it is alleged, enables them to mount great offensives calculated to secure military victories to condition the forthcoming conference to their advantage. To the French Viet-Nam side, United States aid has been stepped up and assurances of further aid have been made.

To us in India, these developments are of grave concern and of grievous significance. Their implications impinge on the newly-won and cherished independence of Asian countries.

The maintenance of independence and sovereignty of Asian countries as well as the end of colonial and foreign rule is essential to the prosperity of Asian peoples as well as for the peace of the world.

We do not seek any special role in Asia nor do we champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. We only seek to keep for ourselves and the adherence of others, particularly our neighbours, to a peace area and to a policy of non-alignment and non-commitment to world tensions and wars. This, we believe, is essential to us for our own sake and can alone enable us to make our contribution to lowering world tensions, to furthering disarmament and to world peace.

The Present developments, however, cast a deep shadow on our hopes; they impinge on our basic policies and they seek to contain us in alignments.

Peace to us is not just a fervent hope; it is an emergent necessity.

Indo-China is an Asian country and a proximate area. Despite her heavy sacrifices, the conflict finds her enmeshed in intervention and the prospect of her freedom jeopardized. The crisis in respect of Indo-China therefore moves us deeply and calls from us our best thoughts and efforts to avert the trends of this conflict towards its extension and intensification, and to promote the trends that might lead to a settlement.

The Government of India feel convinced that despite all their differences of outlook, their deep-seated suspicions and their antagonistic claims, the great statesmen assembling at Geneva and their peoples have a common objective, the averting of the tide of war. In their earnest desire to assist to resolve some of the difficulties and deadlocks and to bring about a peaceful settlement, they venture to make the following suggestions:

- (1) A climate of peace and negotiation has to be promoted and the suspicion and the atmosphere of threats that prevail, sought to be dissipated. To this end, the Government of India appeal to all concerned, to desist from threats, and to the combatants to refrain from stepping up the tempo of war.
- (2) A cease-fire. To bring this about, the Government of India propose :
 - (a) that the item of a "cease-fire" be given priority on the Indo-China Conference agenda;
 - (b) a cease-fire groups consisting of the actual belligerents, *viz*, France and her three Associated States and Viet-Minh.
- (3) Independence. The conference should decide and proclaim that it is essential to the solution of the conflict that the complete independence of Indo-China, that is, the termination of French sovereignty, should be placed beyond all doubt by an unequivocal commitment by the Government of France.
- (4) Direct negotiations between the parties immediately and principally concerned should be initiated by the conference. Instead of seeking to hammer out settlements themselves, the conference should request the parties principally concerned to enter into direct negotiations and give them all assistance to this end. Such direct negotiations would assist in keeping the Indo-China question limited to the issues which concern and involve Indo-China directly. These parties would be the same as would constitute the cease-fire group.
- (5) Non-intervention. A solemn agreement on non-intervention denying aid, direct or indirect, with troops or war material to the combatants or for the purposes of war, to which the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and China shall be primary parties, should be brought about by the conference. The United Nations, to which the decision of the conference shall be reported, shall be requested to formulate a convention of non-intervention in Indo-China embodying the aforesaid agreement and including the provisions for its enforcement under United Nations auspices. Other States should be invited by the United Nations to adhere to this convention of non-intervention.

(6) The United Nations should be informed of the progress of the conference. Its good offices for purposes of conciliation under the appropriate Articles of the Charter, and not for invoking sanctions, should be sought.

The Government of India make these proposals in all humility and with the earnest desire and hope that they will engage the attention of the conference as a whole and each of the parties concerned. They consider the steps they have proposed to be both practicable and capable of immediate implementation.

The alternative is grim. It is not time for all of us, particularly those who today are at the helm of world affairs, on one side or the other, in the words of His Holiness the Pope, which I feel cannot be improved upon, to “perceive that peace cannot consist in an exasperating and costly relationship of mutual terror”?

BACK NOTE

XXIV. Statement Regarding Indo-China, 24 April, 1954

NIL

PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

10 May, 1954

I am glad of this discussion and grateful to Shri Meghnad Saha for having initiated it, though I feel that he has perhaps done less than justice to the work done so far by our Atomic Energy Commission.

Of course, it is quite possible and it may be perfectly justified to say that the work may have been, ought to have been bigger, vaster, speedier. That can always be said about any work that we undertake, but quite a large number of fairly competent critics, not very friendly critics either, from abroad have testified to the very considerable work done by our Atomic Energy Commission and have indicated that India has laid the basis for fairly rapid advance in the future.

Naturally, our pace and rate of work is determined by so many factors. Shri Meghnad Saha mentioned that the United States of America spend one thousand crores of, presumably, rupees a year on this, that the United Kingdom spends a hundred crores and other countries spend less. Well, it is perfectly true that our average rate of expenditure as exists is Rs. 1 crore. Now, it is possible, of course, to increase the sum and also increase the other thing, facilities for doing this work. That is a matter of right priorities and giving more importance to some aspects. For my part, I should like to increase very rapidly to the very full the geological and like surveys of India. Of course, we have got a geological survey but not that type of geological and mineral survey and other survey which would require hundreds and hundreds of people, competent people, to do it. I confess that I am not satisfied at the rate at which we do these things. Anyhow, I would submit that we have made progress even comparatively speaking—leaving for the moment some half a dozen big nations of the world who have far greater resources and who started much earlier than us. Right at the beginning, may I say that I welcome Dr. Saha's suggestion that specialists in this field, that selected scientists who are interested directly or even indirectly in this work, should meet together and gather at a conference or a symposium,—whatever you like to call it—to discuss this matter and to make suggestions as to how to make greater progress and what new lines to take up? I entirely agree with him that it is a very desirable step to take. But when Dr. Saha goes on to say that this meeting of scientists should take place to draft a reply to President Eisenhower, I was amazed—to draft a reply to the speech of President Eisenhower delivered before the United Nations, a speech which is worthy of our respect and careful attention. But for a number of scientists to sit down and draft a reply to President Eisenhower does appear to me somewhat astounding.

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I am not aware of any other Government having drafted a reply and sent it. President Eisenhower's speech was, if I may say so with all respect, a fine speech, with

generous sentiments and with a proposal which deserves our attention. But the proposal was a vague proposal; it is a vague indication of which way one should look; not exactly a specific proposal. If you want to know what proposals there are, go to the Disarmament Conference or to the Commission dealing with atomic energy matters. You can see there the proposals of the different countries and then you can consider them. Anyhow, I am glad of this discussion and I would like this discussion, as far as possible, to be separated from the purely political aspects. I know it is difficult to do that. Hon. Members opposite and those on this side talked about banning these weapons. Well, we feel that we should ban or control all these terrible weapons. But it is not quite clear to me how our sentiments in this matter are going to result in that ban, or how a strong speech in this House can result in banning them. Ultimately, sometime or other, they will have to be controlled, if not put an end to. Well, from a good deal of what we know of this world, if one is all the time talking about banning this, who is to bell the cat? It might have been possible if there had been no conflict or collision in this respect—each afraid of the other. Nobody is going to be controlled till he is quite certain that the other is controlled; and nobody is going to be certain till there is much more confidence in each other than there is at present. Each will think: 'oh, there is some public protestation; secretly, this will not be given effect to.' I am not going into that matter. As I said, it is obviously necessary to control these weapons. But how to control them? How to ban them? That is again another matter of great difficulty. It is all very well to say, control or ban them. Who is to ban them? Who is to control them? International law, as is well known, is rather a feeble instrument even yet. So, let us discuss this question apart from its political aspect although it is intimately tied up with it. One cannot dissociate it; nevertheless, let us consider it apart from politics.

Further, in this twentieth century in the last generation or two, we have come up against certain explorations of the remotest, frontiers of human knowledge and they are leading us to all manner of strange discoveries and strange consequences. Max Planck's quantum theory and later on, Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, changed the whole conception of the universe. Most people may not realise it even now though they changed the whole conception of the universe and the world. All other things followed. The atom bomb struck us because of the tremendous power to kill. Vast changes in human conception had taken place as my friend Mr. K.D. Malaviya suggested. This only came on the scene in 1939 when some German scientist did something, split the atom or whatever they say rather crudely. Soon after, the Americans did it. In America, it was in fact a migrant scientist who did it and in 1942 something else happened and a chain of reactions was established by Italian scientists. By August 1945, Hiroshima fell, as the result of the work from 1939 to 1945.

Since then, of course tremendous progress has been made in this and the world has been struck by it because it is a terrible thing. Now, therefore, the human mind and human efforts are unleashing tremendous powers without quite knowing how to control them. You will not control these by a mere demand to ban this or to ban that. Nobody can really control the human mind from going on unleashing new things;

they will go on doing that. How to approach this problem of control which is of vital consequence is one of the political problems of the day. Behind that lies some measure of lessening the tension in the world, some measure of confidence in each other by the great nations, some agreement to live and let live and not to try to destroy others, to allow each country to live its own life. Unless that approach is made, the only other approach is of conflict and if the idea of conflict is in the minds of nations, then the atom bomb will undoubtedly remain; it doesn't matter your going on talking about banning it or not.

Now, let us consider these possible issues. It is perfectly clear that atomic energy can be used for peaceful purposes, to the tremendous advantage of humanity. Probably, it may take some years, may be five years or may be ten years, but not too long, before it can be used more or less economically. I should like the House to remember one thing. The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like India, that is to say, in a country whose power resources are limited, than for a country like France, an industrially advanced country. Take the United States of America, which has already tremendous power resources in other ways. It is not so much for them to have an additional source of power like atomic energy. No doubt they can use it; it is not so important. It is important for a power-starved or a power-hungry country like India or like most of the other countries in Asia and Africa. I say that because it may be to the advantage of the countries who have adequate power resources to restrain and restrict the use of atomic energy because they do not want that power. It would be to the disadvantage of a country like India if that is restricted or stopped. It is a very important factor to remember from the point of view of this so-called international control. It is probably loose talk, this talk of control. Who is to control it internationally? Who are the international nations who are going to control it?" One may say, the United Nations. Obviously, there is no other organisation approaching the United Nations in its international scope. And yet, the House knows, the United Nations even now does not include in its scope even the big nations of the world. Some of the biggest are kept out of its scope. The United Nations can only control itself. It cannot control any nation which is not in it, which it refuses to admit and with which it would not have anything to do, so that the result will be that you control a great part of the world, but still there is a part of the world which is not controlled by it. That part, over which there is no control, makes all the mischief. You do not control it; it is not, in fact, recognised by you; you treat it as if it did not exist. It will go its own way and upset the apple-cart. Therefore, the question of international control becomes difficult. Reference has been made in "President Eisenhower's speech to this international control. We all agree with the proposition that if it can be so organised, there should be proper international control and proper use made of the stock of fissile materials, so that all countries can use them for research work or for proper purposes. Well and good. But how is this to be done? There the difficulty comes in, President Eisenhower refers to some agency of the United Nations. That organisation appears reasonable, but then, let us go back and see what the actual proposals are before us in regard the atomic energy of various

countries. These are the latest proposals, at the beginning of this year, of the United States:

“An international control agency shall be set up by the United Nations. It shall hereafter be an independent body outside the control of the Security Council and of the United Nations.” The United Nations is merely supposed to set it up and wash its hands away. It becomes an independent organisation. So it is a very important matter as to what an independent organisation is. This organisation will, of course, have an unlimited right of inspection. Agreed. “It shall have the right to maintain its own guards on the territory of any foreign State, licenced to engage in any of the processes of the production of or research in atomic energy.” It becomes a super-State atomic energy body, maintaining its own guards, armies or small armies, or whatever you like. Then again, “it shall own and control”—mark these words—“the raw materials mined, the plants in which the ore is processed, and all plants which deal with production of atomic energy wherever they may be situated in any country of the world.” This is a very far-reaching provision, namely, that all pure raw materials and our mines are owned and controlled by that independent body, which is even independent of the United Nations after it is created. It means tremendous power being concentrated in the hands of a select body. “It shall decide if, when and where and to what extent the various processes may be carried out and in which parts of the world atomic energy plants may be established”—and there are limitations also—“and it shall have authority to issue or withhold licences from countries, institutions or enterprises engaged in any activities relating to the production of atomic energy,” and so on.

I read to you some of them and there are one or two others also. This tremendous and vast power is being given to a body which is even independent of the United Nations, which has sponsored it or started it. Who will be in this body? That is an important factor. Either you make the body as big as the United Nations with all the countries represented, or it will be some relatively small body, inevitably with the Great Powers sitting in it, and lording over it, and I say with all respect to them that they will have a grip of all the atomic energy areas and raw materials in every country. Now, in a country like India is it a desirable prospect?

When hon. Members talk so much of international control, let us understand, without using vague phrases and language, what it means. There should be international control and inspection, but it is not such an easy matter as it seems. Certainly, we would be entitled to object to any kind of control which is not exercised to our advantage. We are prepared in this, as in any other matter, even to limit, in common with other countries, our independence of action for the common good of the world we are prepared to do that, provided we are assured that is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way, not dominated over by certain countries, however good their motives might be. These are the difficulties that arise in this matter.

In President Eisenhower’s speech these details are not gone into, but he says that what he calls “normal uranium” should be controlled. I could have understood

even control of fissile materials. But President Eisenhower refers to “normal uranium”. It is not clear what he means by “normal uranium”. Presumably he means uranium ores. So, again we get back to the raw materials. So that, there is this difficulty. We want international control of this; we want fair use of it for peaceful purposes. This is common ground, not a matter or argument. But when we come to how it is to be done, we immediately get into difficulties. I submit it would not be right to agree to any plan which hands over even our raw materials and mines, etc., to any external authority. I would again beg the House to remember this major fact that atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important to the underdeveloped countries of the world than to the developed ones. And, if the developed countries have all the powers they may well stop the use of atomic energy everywhere, including in their own countries, because they do not need it so much, and we suffer.

We welcome the entire approach of President Eisenhower in this matter. Since he delivered his speech this question has been discussed by representatives of other Great Powers chiefly concerned, and if they find out any suitable method for creating this international pool, we will be very happy—subject to what I have said, to share with, and give what we can to it.

Dr. Saha drew a rather dismal picture of our pitiable state in this matter. He referred to our coal supplies running out. Now, my own information, derived from our best geologists is contrary to what Dr. Saha said. I believe there is a dispute between Dr. Saha and our geologists, but with all my respect for him, I would take our geologists’ word in this matter. Dr. Saha is an eminent physicist, but our geologists are expected to know more about coal than Dr. Saha.

Here I may say what our geologists’ estimate of our coal reserve is:

Total reserves of coal in the Indian rock-formations, upto a depth of 2,000 feet— 60,000 million tons.

Total reserves of available coal, of all grades, which are considered workable by present methods—20,000 million tons.

Reserves of first grade coal, workable—5,000 million tons.

Reserves of coking coal suitable for metallurgical use— 1,750 to 2,000 million tons.

Present day annual consumption of coal in India, of all grades —35 million tons.

Annual consumption of metallurgical grade coal (coking coal used both for metallurgical and non-metallurgical purposes)—About 8 to 12 million tons.

Consumption of coking coal purely for metallurgical purposes —About 3 million tons.

As is well known we are wasting our best coal by using it in our railways, where it is not necessary. Attempts are being made in our railways not to use our best coal. Consumption of coking coal purely for metallurgical purposes is about 3 million tons, while our annual consumption of metallurgical grade coal both for metallurgical and non-metallurgical purposes is about 8 to 12 million tons. This is chiefly because

our railways and some of our factories use this high grade coal, because it is easily available. We should curb this down, because our best coal should not be wasted in this way, while other coal is available.

Recent experiments conducted in India by the Fuel Research Institute and private industrial concerns, like Tatas go to show that our second-grade coal is capable of improvement to first-grade by coal-washing and blending methods. Large scale trials for [I regret I do not wholly understand the meaning of the word which I am going to read] “beneficiation”— making it better, I suppose—of low-grade coal give promise that India’s Coal resources will prove adequate for all her present as well as future needs.

According to the above summary, assuming that correct methods of mining are employed and waste is eliminated, we have reserves of 2,000 million tons of high-grade and coking coal which should last (if the consumption were restricted to use in iron and steel and other metal manufacturing industries alone) for a period of about 650 years. But India is using coking coal today for ordinary furnace and railway purposes, for domestic fuel, and some industrial uses to the extent of about ten to twelve million tons per annum. At this rate the life of coking coal reserves will be reduced to 160 years only.

The position, however, is different in respect of non-coking coal of food and medium quality, the supply of which is such as would last for several hundred years, allowing the present rate of consumption plus a progressively increasing rate for future industrial expansion.

Of course, India’s resources in coal are much less than those of the United States or the U. S. S. R.

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Dr. Saha put a question, directly or indirectly, as to whether we have the necessary scientific personnel or requisite competence to set up a nuclear reactor. He mentioned that five years ago, we had stated that it would, be set up. He is perfectly justified in pointing out that it has not been set up. It is true there has been delay. It was delayed due to certain factors outside our control. We are setting it up. We have obviously to get some equipment from abroad. We have to get heavy water which we do not produce yet. It was a little difficult to get this heavy water but I believe things are in good shape about the starting of this moderate size reactor.

As for our scientific personnel, we cannot compare ourselves with the great countries but leaving out some of the big countries, we are supposed to be rather good in our scientific personnel even now. We can put up a reactor even if fissile materials are not available from the common pool as President Eisenhower has indicated. It is not that we are entirely depending upon some common pool. Even if some help may not be forthcoming, even if the fissile materials and the modulators do not become readily available, I think we can do it. We have sent several teams abroad and people are being trained both in India and abroad for this purpose. I think we are justified in assuming that this would produce results very soon.

The Atomic Energy Commission has also a small team which is gaining experience in the use of radioactive isotopes which will become available when the reactor starts functioning, for biological and other research and for medical treatment.

Now, the main purpose in putting up the reactor is to acquire the necessary technical experience which will help us later on to put up power plants for peaceful purposes. Therefore, some of the workers are engaged, in gaining experience in some of the technical processes like heat transfer which will be needed at some later stages. The reactor will also help us to produce some of the radioactive isotopes. At present radioactive isotopes are used in biological research for study of metabolism of various elements. For medical treatment radioactive isotopes and special radioactive iodine are used. These are much weaker in intensity of radiation and can be easily controlled. But they have a short life. Their effect disappears soon after. It is also used for metallurgical purposes, to follow the progress of certain reactions. All of these can be purchased from abroad even now for peaceful purposes, but they are so short-lived that even in the course of transit they lose some activity. It is obviously more advantageous to produce them here. We have got, of course, a major Division dealing with prospecting for ores and raw materials. Two new Divisions have been started, a Medical and Health Division which deals with the protection of workers against the effects of radiation and with research and associated problems, and a Biology Division which conducts investigations on the biological effects of radiation.

Now, hon. Members have mentioned something about our sending some part of the monazite sands or something else abroad. We have sent them abroad, a little of them. Some five or six years ago they were sent abroad without limit; anybody could come and take shiploads of them. We stopped that. I believe even now there is some theft going on occasionally from the coast. We try to stop that by posting guards and in other ways. But we have not considered the question of monazite as a money making proposition, although it is a money making thing. But we used it always to give it in exchange for something that we lack for atomic energy development. For naturally we lack things. Naturally, we want something which we can get easily from other countries. So that, we use it as a valuable exchange material. We are in some contact with some foreign Atomic Energy Commissions, notably France and England, chiefly these two countries. I think it first started with the French Atomic Energy Commission, and later England. I do not say intimate contact, but we do help each other. We have therefore supplied them. We have occasionally supplied some things to the United States of America, to some other countries too—I do not know at the present moment, I have not got the list here. But generally speaking, what we have supplied is relatively small in quantity. As a matter of fact we do not want to supply these sands as far as possible. We now supply the processed material. We have put up a factory in Travancore Cochin for processing that material, and it is much more advantageous for us to supply the processed material than the sands. At Trombay near Bombay we are also putting up a factory. A good deal of work is being done in these matters.

Dr. Meghnad Saha said that there should be no secrecy. I entirely agree with him and so far as we are concerned, we want no secrecy. Our difficulty has been that when we deal with another country, whether it is France or England, when they give us any process or any information, they insist on secrecy for their part and we have to agree because it is their custom. We have to take something from them; we cannot get it otherwise; we have to give that assurance. Therefore, we have to keep that assurance. Otherwise, so far as we are concerned, there is no secrecy. It is obvious that in this matter, we are in the first stages of atomic energy work and not so advanced as the Soviet Union or America or England. So, we have really nothing to hide so far as we are concerned.

Dr. Meghnad Saha suggested that our Atomic Energy Act came in the way and so it should be scrapped. We have no objection to scrapping it or what is more probably desirable, amending it if necessary. We may come to this House for amending the Act. Let us consider the matter right from the beginning. We are perfectly agreeable to consulting or having a conference of eminent scientists and discussing these matters with them. If they make any suggestions for the improvement of the Act or for the improvement of the work, we shall certainly accept and adopt them. Even now, as a matter of fact, within the compass of this Act, we are trying to improve and expand our work. I might mention that in some way we ourselves have felt that perhaps the Act is not quite adequate and slightly comes in the way occasionally. But, the difficulty is of adding to the legislation that will come up this session or the next session. Finally we decided not to trouble Parliament at this stage till we are forced to do it and to try to expand our work within the scope of the Act, if we can, to some extent. I can promise this House and Dr. Meghnad Saha that we shall gladly pay every respect and attention to all the suggestions that are made individually or jointly.

BACK NOTE

XXV. Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy, 10 May, 1954

1. SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA: I meant this: it is to advise our Government in drafting a reply.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It comes to the same thing. First of all, I do not quite see why even the Government of India should sit down to draft and send a reply to the speech delivered by the President of the United States to the United Nations.

2. SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA: May I interrupt? If our industrial power is increased ten times, its life time would be 650 divided by 10 which is 65 years. It is a very dismal prospect.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member is thinking of metallurgical coal. The other coal, even if the industrial capacity is increased tremendously, is enough to last for several hundred years.

STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

25 August, 1954

The House is aware that since it took into consideration the international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto on the 15th May last, events and developments of much significance have occurred. All these are, in a general way of concern and interest to us. Some of these events and developments are of more proximate concern to us. In some of them again, our sentiments and our historic circumstances are engaged; in others we are either involved or are concerned to avoid involvement; and in some we have accepted, as part of our international obligations and concern for peace, heavy burdens and onerous responsibilities.

It is not my intention to refer to all these matters or to deal with any of them at great length but to make a comparatively brief statement, setting out the Government's appreciation of and position in respect of some of these problems and developments.

The situation in respect of the Portuguese settlements in India, which has aroused much attention and concern both in the House and the country, is one which has continually engaged the study and active consideration of Government. Internally in the Portuguese settlements, the opposition and resistance to foreign and colonial rule has gathered momentum. This is an entirely Goan movement, popular and indigenous. It has been countered by the authorities by the time-honoured but discredited methods of colonial assertion, repression and authoritarian violence coupled with the denial of inherent rights of the people to their freedom and self-determination.

The position of the Government of India and indeed of the people of this country is well-known and hardly needs restatement. Goa and the Union of India form one country. As a result of foreign conquest, various parts of India came under colonial domination. Historical developments brought almost the entire country under British rule. But some small pockets of territory remained under the colonial rule of other foreign powers, chiefly because they were tolerated as such by the then British power. The movement for freedom in India was not confined to any part of the country, its objective was the freedom of the entire country from every kind of foreign domination. Inevitably the movement took shape in what was called British India and, ultimately, resulted in the withdrawal of the colonial power and the establishment of the Republic of India. That process of liberation cannot be completed till the remaining small pockets of foreign territory are also not freed from colonial control. The Government and the people of this country, therefore, fully sympathise with the aspirations of the Goan people to free themselves from alien rule and to be reunited with the motherland.

The policy that we have pursued has been, even as in India under British rule, one of non-violence and we have fashioned our approach and conduct accordingly. This adherence to non-violence means:

- (i) that we may not abandon or permit any derogation of our identification with the cause of our compatriots under Portuguese rule; and
- (ii) equally we may not adopt, advocate or deliberately bring about situations of violence.

We regard and base our position on the fact that the liberation movement is Goan and spontaneous, and that its real strength lies in this fact.

The Government of India, and I am confident the great majority of our people, have no intention of adopting any policy or methods which depart from these principles, which are the foundations on which our very nationhood rests and which are the historic and unique legacy of Gandhiji and the pioneers of our freedom.

Further, we may never forget that, in our approach and endeavours for our own freedom we were enjoined to eliminate fear. I want to say in all sincerity that the Government do not and will not function in this matter on a foundation of apprehensiveness and fear of probable consequences, of threats, from whatever quarter they may come, or condone, much less approve or support, methods of conduct based on fear. Such methods are opposed to our policy and deny the basic ideas of non-violence.

The Portuguese Government have indulged in reckless allegations and unrestrained abuse of us. Moved by the fear characteristic of those whose strength is based on force, they have sought to amass their military strength on their possessions in India to terrorise the people. They are well aware that they constitute no terror for us.

It is not, however, the intention of the Government of India to be provoked into thinking and acting in military terms. The Portuguese concentrations and ship movements may well be a violation of our national and international rights. We shall examine and consider these and take such legitimate measures as may be necessary. But we have no intention of following the Portuguese Government's example in this respect.

The Portuguese Government have, in their representations to us and to other countries, as well as in their crude propaganda, indulged in totally untrue and reckless allegations. The purpose of all this is to arouse opinion against us by painting us as aggressive militarists, anti Christian, particularly anti Catholic, and hypocritical expansionists. They want others to believe that we want to make Goa an Indian colony.

These allegations are repudiated by the Goan people in the Portuguese possessions themselves, despite the authoritarian regime there and the repression, the censorship and State-controlled propaganda. The Goan liberation movement, however, continues to grow and may well be measured by the increase in violence and recklessness of Portuguese allegations and propaganda. Goans, outside Goa, mainly in India and East Africa, have expressed themselves in favour of this movement. They demand the end of alien rule and the reunion of Goa with the motherland.

The Portuguese allegations about Indian hostility to Roman Catholics and the danger to Catholics, if Goa joined the Indian Union have been repudiated most

emphatically by the Roman Catholics of India and, more particularly, by their eminent leaders. The Catholics in India regard these Portuguese allegations not only as false but as a slur on themselves and their country. They point to the five billion Catholics in India, who have absolute religious freedom and enjoy the consideration and respect of the rest of their compatriots. They know that the guarantees of our Constitution are a reality. Recently, at a widely attended meeting of Goans in Bombay, composed of people of all shades of opinion, mostly non-sectarian and non-party, this feeling found emphatic expression and the falsity of Portuguese allegations was exposed.

I deeply regret that the Portuguese Government should have decided to arouse religious passions to serve their colonial ends. They have failed in this endeavour.

I would like to take this opportunity of stating once again some aspects of our basic approach in respect of Goa, when it becomes a part of the Indian Union:—

- (a) The freedom and rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India and which specifically refer to freedom of conscience, worship and practice of religion, will extend in full measure and in all their implications to these areas.
- (b) The special circumstances of cultural, social and lingual relations and the sense of a territorial group which history has created will be respected.
- (c) Laws and customs which are part of the social pattern of these areas and which are consistent with fundamental human rights and freedoms, will be respected and modifications will be sought only by negotiation and consent.
- (d) As we have done in the rest of India, full use will be made of the administrative, judicial and other services, confident that the return of freedom to and the unity of these areas with the motherland will enable adjustments to be made in harmony with progress and with the desires of the people.

The House knows that recently some Notes have been exchanged between the Portuguese Government and the Government of India. They have been placed on the table of the House. It will be evident from these Notes that the Government of India have stated their position with firmness, clarity and restraint and unprovoked by either the language or the content of the Portuguese Notes. The Government believe and are confident that the House will agree that this is and should be the way of behaviour of Governments. I shall refrain from detailed comments on the Notes exchanged except to say that, consistent with their policy of settling differences and resolving problems by conciliation and negotiation, the Government of India promptly accepted the very first offer of the Portuguese Government to cooperate with them on the issue of impartial observation. The Government of India have no objection to this and they have nothing to conceal. They have proposed that representatives of the two Governments should meet together at once and implement the principle on which they have agreed. The last Note of the Portuguese Government appears to raise some further doubts and difficulties, but the Government of India have intimated their firm desire to pursue conciliation and negotiation and urged the Portuguese Government to enable the conference to begin.

I would like to say on behalf of our country and Government that we have no animosity towards Portugal or her people. We believe the freedom of the Goans, now subject to Portugal, would be a gain for Portugal as well. We will continue to pursue, with patience and firmness, the path of conciliation and negotiation. Equally, we must declare that we would be false to our history and betray the cause of freedom itself if we did not state, without reserve, that our country and Government firmly and fully believe in the right of our compatriots in Goa to free themselves from alien rule and to be reunited with the rest of the motherland. This will serve the cause of friendship and understanding, even as freedom to India has led to friendly relations between the United Kingdom and India. We would therefore invite the Portuguese Government to cooperate in the peaceful consummation of these endeavours.

The position in respect of the French settlements happily affords at present a different and more hopeful picture. I believe we may reasonably feel that we are nearing the consummation of our hopes of a peaceful and lasting settlement, arrived at by conciliation and consent, honourable and satisfactory to all concerned. Exchanges of views and ideas between ourselves and the Government of France have been in progress for sometime and they are being pursued with goodwill on both sides. The Prime Minister of France has demonstrated to the world his patriotism and political boldness as well as his desire for peaceful settlements by negotiation. I have every hope that we shall before long witness the solution of this problem in the context of the full freedom of our people and of firmer friendship between India and France.

The present phase of this problem is, as I have said, hopeful, but it has not always been so. The exercise of patience and our firm desire to reach settlement by negotiation has justified itself. The House will perhaps allow me to say that this policy of acting with patience and prudence, in accordance with the principles we hold does justice to ourselves and also yields results.

From these two issues, geographically and politically proximate to us, I would now ask the House to turn to others, in which we are no less concerned and are perhaps more onerously involved and committed. I refer to the two Conferences held in Geneva in April to July of this year. Both these Conferences were concerned with the countries and peoples of Asia. Yet the principal participants in the Conference, with the significant exception of China, were non-Asian States. This corresponds in some measure to the reality of the modern world, a reality that represents territorial, racial and political imbalance. It also enables us to appreciate that we cannot consider, much less resolve, the important problems of the world today by regarding them as Asian or European, Eastern or Western, problems exclusively. Their solution, however, requires the recognition of the place of Asia in the modern world.

This was evident at Geneva in several ways. Firstly, there was the presence of China at both the Conferences, proclaiming by her presence there not only the inevitability of the recognition of facts, but of the purposefulness of such recognition.

Secondly, there was the fact that at the Conference on Indo-China, the deliberations of the South East Asia Prime Ministers at Colombo had an essential and

inescapable role in the Geneva deliberations, although none of these countries participated, at Geneva. The Colombo proposals on Indo-China were themselves, in large part, based on similar proposals submitted to this House on an earlier occasion and which, with certain modifications in formulation, found favour with my fellow Prime Ministers.

The Conference on Korea adjourned inconclusively, but it should be noted and affirmed that the Conference has not broken up. The problem of Korea has to be resolved in the interests of Asian and world stability and peace. It is not without significance that no party at Geneva was willing or ready to force the Conference to a catastrophic or even formal end. The great majority of the States represented wished and sought at least partial solutions. The proposals made there contain the elements of advance and a concern to find a settlement. They can be a kind of bridgehead from which a hopeful landing to the shores of a Korean settlement may, and indeed, should be planned or envisaged. The Geneva Conference should not be permitted to lapse. Endeavours to make progress towards peace in Korea should be continued.

At Geneva, the Indo-China Conference assumed the greater importance. The historic role of this Conference was that it was the alternative, or the deterrent, to what threatened to lead to World War III. This is the feature of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China that gives it a memorable place in history.

The mediatory role of the two Presidents of the Conference, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, and the dominant desire that pervaded Geneva despite all conflicts and deadlocks, was that there should be a settlement and the grim alternative must be averted.

Apart from the two Conference Presidents, the Chinese Prime Minister, whom we had the pleasure of welcoming in this country, distinguished himself as a constructive statesman. He also brought to the Conference the firsthand sense of the reality of the new Asia. His visit to India appears to have assisted him to understand the Asia outside of China and also to appreciate the evolving South East Asia pattern of collective peace.

Great as the role of others was, the main task and therefore the determining role rested with the principal belligerents—France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Direct negotiations between them first proposed in this House and later affirmed at Colombo, became an important feature in regard to some aspects. To the Prime Minister of France, M. Mendes—France, and the representatives of the Democratic Republic of VietNam our gratitude is due for the courage and vision with which they tackled this difficult problem. The three other Governments in Indo-China, represented at the Conference, namely, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, all intimately involved in the horrors of war, also made their contribution to the settlement. Indo-China has been a truly negotiated settlement where not any one of the belligerents but peace has been the victor.

The Armistice settlement rests on the agreement between the combatants, represented by the two High Commands. On them rests the responsibility of

maintaining it. But, from the beginning of the Conference, the role, functions, composition and the procedure of the neutral or impartial Supervisory Commissions bedevilled the deliberations, and stood deadlocked for a long time. The agreement reached on the functions as now set out and the composition of the Commissions with Canada, Poland and India proved the turning point. To India, a place on the Commissions was proposed by every participant and on every occasion. Finally, the Chairmanship of India became one of the necessities for a settlement.

India had not been a participant at the Conference. She had not sought a place on the Commissions. Indeed, we did not even disclose whether we would or would not accept responsibility. When this responsibility was offered to us, we could not refuse for our refusal would have meant imperilling the whole agreement. We have thus to shoulder this heavy and onerous responsibility.

We have been fortunate in our colleagues and in our relations with the parties in Indo-China. Hitherto all decisions in the Commissions have been unanimous. This itself represents goodwill and an earnest desire to work as a team. On the 1st August I inaugurated a Conference of the three Governments to establish the Commissions on the date fixed by the agreements. This Conference came to unanimous decisions and sent out in record time an advance party under Shri S. Dutt, Commonwealth Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs. Sri Dutt returned two days ago after all the three Commissions had been established. I feel sure that the House would wish to assure them of its goodwill and its earnest hope of their success.

It is a notable feature of the IndoChina settlement that it provides for the establishment of the independence of the three States—VietNam, Laos and Cambodia—and seeks to safeguard their sovereignty on the pledges of mutual respect of each other's integrity, freedom from interference in each other's internal affairs, and the undertaking not to enter into military alliances with other States. Thus, the IndoChina States bid fair to find a place in collective peace rather than in war blocs.

To the people of Indo-China, irrespective of their former antagonisms to one another and in all their grim travail, we send our sincere and warm wishes and hopes for peace, unity and prosperity. Asia has greater hopes of peace and stability as a result of the Indo-China settlement.

I have already mentioned the visit of Mr. Chou-En-Lai to Delhi. The welcome he received was spontaneous and proclaimed the urges of our people for understanding and peaceful relations. It was also an expression of a sense of Asianhood among our two peoples. This visit has brought greater understanding of each country to the other.

The joint communique issued by Mr. Chou-En-Lai and myself, as Prime Ministers of our respective countries, has attracted world attention. The five principles set out there flow from the collective peace approach. Our nearest neighbour Burma has also adhered to these five principles and other countries in South East Asia favour them. The understanding we have established is not aimed against any country or group of countries. We hope that it contains the nucleus of the pattern of collective peace,

the only alternative to war preparedness and the only substantial approach to real security.

Early next month a meeting is going to be held at Bagnio in the Philippines to consider proposals to form a South East Asia Collective Organisation. We have expressed our inability to participate in this meeting because it seems to us that it is likely to reverse the trend of conciliation released by the Indo-China settlement. Collective security, according to our belief, can only come by resolving world tensions and developing a pattern of collective peace. Anything that adds to those tensions takes us away from peace. We are apprehensive, therefore, that the proposed South East Asia Collective Organisation will in the present do more harm than any good that it may hope to do in the future.

It is the view and the hope of the Government of India that the present lowering of world tensions, following the Indo-China settlement and the expressed desire of nations for peace, should be followed up and utilised to further the means and prospects of world peace and of resolving present world tensions. The United Nations General Assembly, which meets next month, has before it this historic task. We trust that it will endeavour to resolve some of the stubborn conflicts of our world by the collective peace approach and not by relying on false hopes of peace and security based on fear and war.

BACK NOTE

XXVI. Statement on International Affairs, 25 August, 1954

NIL

THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE BILL

16 September, 1954

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, yesterday, speaking on this clause, Acharya Kripalani drew attention, I think, to the first part of this clause, namely, (a), and said that it would be unfortunate if by some occasional lapse all these results might follow. May I say that quite apart from the particular point that he raised, I entirely agree with his broad approach to this question? But the question here is not enumerating a number of things. The question that ultimately arises is the question that when two people find it impossible to get on together whatever the cause, what is to be done about it? I am prepared, if I may say so, to forgive not one lapse but many but I am not prepared to forgive the intolerable position of two persons who hate each other being tied up to each other. Therefore, I welcome this clause here. I welcome particularly the amendment that my colleague, Mr. Venkataraman, is moving to it in regard to divorce by mutual consent. That has been brought into the picture by the Rajya Sabha in another form. I think the form suggested in the amendment moved—I believe it is amendment No. 97 of Mr. Venkataraman and Mr. Raghu Ramaiah—is a much better way for various reasons. I entirely agree that in this matter the ultimate reason for divorce and a breakup is that two persons cannot continue to live together in peace and amity. At the same time, we must now not allow them in a fit of temper to come to a decision which affects their lives. Therefore, one should allow time for consideration, for reconciliation and all that. I, therefore, welcome this amendment which gives a year's time.

Also in another part of this Bill there is a clause, and I believe that there are two amendments, one by Acharya Kripalani and one by Mr. Venkataraman about this conciliation and attempt at reconciliation. I attach a great deal of importance to such attempts being made. I think the best course is to allow the court to make these attempts. The court may, take any move it likes. There is no reason why the court should not adopt the method suggested by Acharya Kripalani to do that. But to bind the court down by a rigid procedure in this matter where flexibility is important would not, I think bring about the results aimed at. The point is: we must have some kind of procedure and the court should be definitely directed to try to bring about that.

I suppose it is almost too late in the day for arguments to be advanced in regard to divorce and the desirability of allowing for divorce. Therefore, I shall not say much about it. We are dealing in these matters with something that is some kind of relationship which is extraordinarily delicate and difficult: often it may be very fine and often it may be the most horrible thing in existence. We talk about marriage and we, talk about divorce. I feel that in all these talks perhaps the subject that we have in our mind is—well, the sex relationship which is naturally a part of marriage. But surely marriage is something much more than sex relationship. Marriage is companionship; marriage is comradeship; marriage is helping each other, cooperation in the task and

all kinds of things. I am by no means minimising the sex part of it but I say that it is something bigger than this business of talking in terms of sex and sex alone, as if that marriage meant a sort of wallowing in the bed all the time? I do not understand. Some hon. Members spoke. One should marry; a widow should not marry. I do not understand this business, this kind of thing. It simply means that he is thinking in terms of sex and nothing else and I object to this approach to this question.

Perhaps all problems, all human problems, can be listed in terms of human relationships—all problems, I will say: personal, domestic, national and international: the relationship of the individual with the individual, the relationship of the individual with the group and the relationship of the group with the group. All these things come under those various headings. So this matter of certain relationship, in spite of many thousands of years and practice, has grown no easier. It is full of difficulty and in fact hard enough. Perhaps the difficulties as well as, perhaps, the successes become all the greater when the individual or the group becomes more sensitive and more advanced because you do not want either party to be subordinated intellectually, mentally, physically or in any way to be made a kind of just the reflection of the other and have no individuality of his or her own. Now, when you have highly developed human beings it requires much more of the spirit of accommodation, of understanding of adjustment and of tolerance—tolerance even of errors and faults for them to succeed in life. Of course if you treat them as merely two persons who occasionally or frequently indulge in the sex process and nothing more, then difficulties may be limited perhaps. But if you take a larger view—as you must—then the question becomes one not of enumeration, in this law or any other, when a person has committed this or that offence you have to provide something for the law's sake but ultimately it is a question of your finding a way to encourage happy marriage.

Many people seem to imagine that by bringing in divorce you break up the system of marriage. I am absolutely convinced that by bringing in divorce you make for happier marriages normally. I cannot speak of individual cases. People may use or may abuse anything that may be laid down or without the law they can do as they did.

We are often told that there is something against our basic conventions and ideas and Hindu society. It seems to me that almost anything can be said in that way because Hindu society is so wide so broad based and so various that you can say anything about it either historically or actuality today. While we talk about Hindu society are we talking about a few high caste people who are Hindu society or are we talking and thinking in terms of 250 or 300 million—whatever the figure may be of Hindus in this country. When we want to impress other people with numbers, we shout: we are 270 million Hindus in this country but when we come to brasstacks and when we talk about reforms, we think of a certain small group at the top. You cannot have it both ways: either this way or that way. Apart from that what is the conception? In order to get the conception, with all deference I say that you should not read some fixed, rigid enactments, commandments of Manu or anybody else. Of course even there you find a wide variety.

But you should rather look into the social life, as far as we can see it as evolved in our country in the past ages. We can see that in a variety of ways: probably, almost a better way than any, is to have some glimpses of the social life as they are found in our older books. Take our oldest drama. Take one of our oldest plays, the *Mrichchakatika*. Read it if you have not read it. See the tender humanities that are found in the play, There is no rigid Puritanism and punishment of a woman or a man but a human approach to these difficult problems of life. *Mrichchakatika* was probably written in the fifth century A.D., that is about 1,400 years ago or more. You may call it as a play slightly—not artificial—anyhow, I need not describe the play. The point is that the man who wrote it, to some extent, inevitably reflected the life in his day. If you read that play, you see a society which is highly cultured, highly developed. The individual is highly developed. The development of the individual is not in saying big things or broad things or shouting them out. You judge of an individual from the way he treats another individual. The test of an individual, is how he treats his neighbour, his wife, his son or anybody. How he behaves to another, how an individual functions in social relationship, that is the test of the individual. If you apply this test our people in those days were amazingly advanced and tolerant and generous in outlook.

I was talking about tests. There is another test. In primitive societies we had totems and taboos. I wish to say nothing against totems or taboos. But, normally speaking, totems and taboos are instances of primitiveness. The more a society grows, the less the totems, less the taboos. Because, you replace totems and taboos by selfrestraint. That is again a test of society's growth: selfrestraint, not the application of the rod of the policeman. I use this word: you may apply it in any way you like. But the principle is the same. In the international affairs you try to avoid war or something approaching war for the solution of problems. In the national sphere, you, try to settle problems peacefully. In the same way, in the domestic sphere, in the husband and wife sphere, cultured society avoids the rod of the policeman, of the law coming down and punishing you for everything. I do not think that we can do away with that in the international or national or other spheres. That is a different matter. But, the principle is the same. It is a sign of the culture of a society, of a nation, to do away with the approach of the use of violence. If that is so in other spheres, much more so is it necessary in this intimate, domestic sphere of the family. Whether it is husband and wife or father and child or parent and children, the rod is not supposed to be a good way of dealing with the situation. I use the word rod here, I include in it the law which oppresses which constrains, which restricts, which punishes one party as it does in the present conditions.

It is no doubt true that our laws, our customs—for the moment I am speaking of the upper strata—do fall heavily on the womenfolk. That is why we are introducing other pieces of legislation. This has nothing to do with the Hindu law. This is a voluntary permissive piece of legislation which people may accept or not. If they marry in this way, they accept certain consequences. I do not see how anybody can object to this kind of thing. Even though one may object, one has no reason to restrain other people, who do not object, in having their way. I do not understand it. But, I venture to say that there is something more than that. If you restrain others,

you bring in the primitive conceptions of totem and taboo. I am afraid all our people are not out of these primitive conceptions of totems and taboos. We still live a clan life and think in a clan way and many of our troubles are due to that fact. Therefore, I beg this House to consider this broader point of view.

First of all, this is a permissive piece of legislation, meant only for those who accept it, who want to abide by it and come under its fold. It is not right for anyone else, who does not approve of it, to prevent them from doing so. Secondly, on the merits, it is a right piece of legislation. I hope that the basis of this legislation will not only be confined to those few, but will spread and bring about a certain uniformity in our nation.

Most of all, I would beg to submit to this House one point. I am speaking here in regard to divorce. Divorce must not be looked upon as some thing which makes the custom of marriage fragile. I do not accept that if that is so. I say that marriage itself has become a cloak. It is not a real marriage of the minds or bodies or anything. It is just an enforced thing which has no value left in ethics, morality, if you compel and force people in this way. Certainly stop them from acting rashly. Give them time. Make attempts to bring about conciliation. If all that is no good, don't permit a state of affair which is, I think, the essence of evil, which breeds evil, which is bad for them, which is bad for the children, bad for everybody. I would particularly beg the House to consider that this clause about divorce by mutual consent, subject to time, subject to reconciliation, subject to all such, approaches, so that nothing may be done in a hurry, is a right clause, is a proper clause and that it will produce a happier adjustment, a better relationship between the parties than will be produced if one party thinks that he can misbehave as much as he likes and nothing will happen.

Again, it is another question. The House knows that customs have grown up under which different standards of morality are applied to men and women. I think, on the whole—I cannot speak for everybody—you will find women standing up for this right though some men may challenge it because men happen to be in a dominant position. Let us be clear about it. I hope they will not continue in that dominant position for all time. That is a different matter. You cannot maintain these different standards of morality. Therefore, the approach in this Bill is not to maintain these different standards, but to bring about a certain measure of equality in them. It is true that you cannot do this by law only. It is custom, it is education, it is basically the economic position of the individual. If the economic position is bad. It is bad and somebody else may exploit. That is a different matter.

Another approach has to be made about it. It cannot be allowed as an excuse if some people say that if you have divorce by mutual consent, the husband will exploit the wife, will kick her out and force her to give consent. It is not an impossibility. It is a possibility that may happen as many worse things often happen. I do not think it will happen if you give time. If the husband wants to behave in that way, the sooner the wife is rid of him. the better. I beg to support this clause and the amendment moved by Shri Venkataraman and Shri Raghuramaiah.

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BACK NOTE

XXVII. The Special Marriage Bill, 16 September, 1954

1. SHRI A. M. THOMAS: (Ernakulam): My reaction to the clause as adopted by the Rajya Sabha is not quite favourable. This point was brought to the notice of the Members of the Select Committee and they were not in favour of the adoption of a clause which allows divorce by mutual consent. Even the Members of the Select Committee who were in favour of the adoption of a clause which allows divorce by mutual consent wanted to have several safeguards to that clause. I will draw the attention of the House to page xi of the Report of the Joint Select Committee. Hon. Members Sucheta Kripalani, K. A. Damodara Menon and Rajendra Pratap Sinha write:

“The unpleasantness involved in a divorce suit has in no way been reduced under the new provisions of the present Bill. We, therefore, feel the provision of mutual consent as one of the grounds for divorce would have helped to eliminate the above mentioned difficulty. As a safeguard against hasty divorce action it may be provided that in such cases divorce proceedings shall be kept pending for one year thus giving an opportunity to the contending parties to reconsider their decision and withdraw the petition if they so desire.”

So that, even the minority of the Select Committee which was for adoption of a clause providing for mutual consent was not for unconditional acceptance of such a provision, and so there is much weight in the amendment that is moved by my friend Shri Venkataraman that divorce by mutual consent cannot in any way be adopted unconditionally.

Shri Venkataraman as well as some other Members who spoke on this clause stated that divorce by mutual consent obtains in some parts of our country. Shri Venkataraman pointedly referred to the statute law in Malabar. I wish to state that I also come from a State wherein there are provisions embodied in certain statutes mainly relating to people who follow the Marumakkattayam system of law, providing for divorce by mutual consent as per a registered document of dissolution. There are also provisions in these Acts allowing one of the parties to present a petition before the district or principal court of civil jurisdiction, praying that the marriage may be dissolved. Notice will be issued to the other party, and if the other party appears and within a period of six months the petition is not withdrawn, the court will pass a decree nisi to the effect that the marriage will be dissolved. But we have to understand when we adopt these provisions as they are, that conditions in that State are a little different from the conditions in other States.

SHRI R. VELAYUDHAN: (Quilon-Cum-Mavelikkara— Reserved—Sch. Castes): More progressive.

SHRI A. M. THOMAS: I believe that the adoption of an unconditional clause providing that marriage may be dissolved by mutual consent may adversely affect the interests of women, because women are likely to be prevail upon by men and it may not be difficult to obtain the consent of the women. But on Travancore-cochin, wherein. This provision for divorce by mutual consent exists, the inheritance is through the female, so that my humble submission is that there the women is in a dominant portion.

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

29 September, 1954

I beg to move:

“That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

I confess that while I am supposed to deal with this vast international scene, my mind at the present moment is gravely perturbed by the grievous news, to which you were pleased to make a reference sometime ago, about the railway disaster in Hyderabad.

That disaster, a domestic tragedy which we have to face, led me to think of the much vaster disaster that might engulf this world if by some misfortune we were led into the ways of war. Of course, there was no comparison between this disaster, big as it is, and the other terrible happenings that might take place all over the world if, unfortunately, the world was foolish enough to enter into war.

Now, it has become a custom for this House during every session to have a debate on foreign affairs. If I may venture to say so, it is a good custom and convention that we have developed, because, for the moment, it makes us think of the larger issues that confront the world and see our own problems in proper perspective. Naturally, we are most concerned with our own national problems. They affect us; we are thinking in terms of building up our country and most of our time is spent in considering them. That is as it should be. But even in order to gain a proper understanding of those problems of ours in the national sphere, we have to see them in this world context, in this context rather of a changing, disturbed, perplexed and, sometimes, tormented world. So I welcome these debates every session during this House. It so happens, however, that these debates often become rather a repetition of what was being said. Although facts, new facts, occur and the world changes and new situations arise, often the debate follows a set pattern.

Some hon. Members on the other side will, no doubt, repeat this time, as they have done before, why is India in the Commonwealth? There are some set phrases, set grooves of thought, set ideas which are not affected, whatever happens in the world. Well, I find it very difficult to deal with those closed minds which have learnt to repeat phrases without understanding them even. So, no doubt, that would be said with great force on the other side. Nothing will be said or considered as to what our being in the Commonwealth means, whether it has helped us in our larger policy of peace in the world or not, whether whatever broad policies we have pursued or we want other countries to pursue are helped by a certain action of ours, a certain step we take or not. Because, after all, we may talk about individual policies, we may talk about even important subjects like Goa or the French Settlements in India. They are important for us, of course. Nevertheless, even those subjects have to be seen in the particular

context of the world and of the policies we pursue in the world. If we lose sight of these broad policies, then we may be right, we may be wrong in the particular action we may take in a special matter. But it will be inter-related to the larger issues. The point I wish this House to consider is this, that today there is a great deal of inter-relation in all these matters which affect the world. We do not interfere or wish to interfere with what happens in Europe. And yet, one of the major issues before the world today is what happens to Germany and to German rearmament, one of the biggest issues which will affect the future of the world, not only of Europe but of Asia, of the world. We do not interfere with that, but we have to understand it. We have to have some views about it and we have to see things in the proper context, in the context of other things. Naturally, therefore, we have to consider this entire picture, although our sphere of action is limited, limited to some extent by geography, to some extent by our resources and by our capacity, because we do not wish to talk in a big way when we know we cannot act in a big way. Therefore, we try to keep our talk in line with our capacity for action. We talk, I hope, in a modest way, because the problems are big and it does not seem to me to talk otherwise, though, certainly I would, with all respect, suggest to other countries too, but so far as we are concerned, certainly I hope we consider these difficult and intricate problems in all modesty and all diffidence. They are intricate, and nothing is easier and nothing is more wrong than to oversimplify them and to describe the problems in the world by a slogan or a phrase. They are difficult problems for every country, whatever they may be.

A short while ago, a development took place, a big development took place, in the European scene when the Government of France refused to agree to certain terms of the European Defence Community. They refused to join it as they had been asked to. I am not going to consider that question; I do not consider myself entitled to go into that matter or express any opinion. That is for the Government of France and other Governments concerned to do. But what I wish to point out is this: that looking at the reality of the picture, the Government of France and the people of France had to face a terrible dilemma. What was the dilemma? Right or wrong, they are afraid. They are a brave people, a highly developed people, but certain fears surround them, fear, let us say, of this great colossus, the Soviet Union—whether it is justified or not is another matter. Another fear is of German rearmament. They have had experience of the armed might of Germany.

Now, what are we to do? I am merely pointing out, not the rights and wrongs of these questions, but how we are apt to simplify a problem and express our opinion as to what this country should do and that country should do, not realising the intricacy, the complexity of that problem as it faced that country, that Government or those people. So I endeavour to approach these problems with a certain humility and modesty and not be overeager to express my view or my Government's view about matters which are of no direct concern to us; indirectly, of course, they all concern us.

Recently, certain major developments have taken place, more especially in Asia. The House knows, of course, about the Geneva Conference resulting in certain agreements in regard to Indo-China.

The first thing to remember about the Geneva Conference is this, that it was a conference to deal with Asian affairs, Indo-China, Korea. In that conference, apart from the belligerents or parties directly concerned, no Asian country was present at the conference table, in regard to Indo-China. I am not complaining of that. I am merely pointing out the odd way in which things continue to be done. That is the conception that affairs of Asia are predominantly to be decided by other great countries whom we respect and honour. But, nevertheless, the fact is, this conception that the affairs of Asia could be decided or may be decided by other countries without much reference to Asia.

Now, you will see the reality of the picture. Because an artificial attempt was made or rather an attempt was made to deal with this question forgetting the reality of Asia and the countries of Asia, the reality crept into the picture. Although Asia was not present, although Asian countries, apart from the belligerents, were not present at Geneva, Asian opinion was always there for them to consider, Asian opinion, as represented by certain decisions or recommendations of the Colombo Conference, which, if I may remind this House, were largely based upon what was stated, what was suggested in this House early this year in regard to Indo-China. So, even in Geneva Asian opinion was there present—a shadow of it—and it had to be considered.

Now, Geneva ended with an agreement and the war that has been going on for 7½ years in Indo-China stopped. As we have often said, for the first time in many many years there was no national war in the world. A new atmosphere of concord, of relative peace was established in Indo-China. In Asia, tensions relaxed. Nobody was foolish enough to think that problems have been solved. Of course, no problem had been solved either in Indo-China, much less in Korea or elsewhere, but certain steps had been taken towards the solution of the problems, or, if you like, towards creating an atmosphere which would help in the solution of those problems. That was something and the whole world, I believe, every country in the world heaved a deep sigh of relief that at last we were going at least towards some kind of peace.

Recently, another conference was held in Manila in the Philippines. We had been invited to that conference also but we expressed our inability to attend or participate in any way. Now, why was that so, because normally it is our desire to participate in conferences of our neighbour countries or in other countries and to understand other people's viewpoints and to put forward our own? Why did we not participate in the Manila Conference? Apart from every other reason, big or small—I should, probably, refer to some of them soon—it is obvious that our participation in the Manila Conference would have meant our giving up our basic policy of nonalignment. That is patent. Surely, we are not going to give up that basic policy, which we have followed for so many years, merely to participate in that conference.

Secondly, our going there would obviously have affected our position in Indo-China as Chairman of the three Commissions there. We had gone there and we had been chosen by all parties for those responsible posts because we were thought to follow a certain policy. Now, if we change that policy and go behind that, our whole

position in Indo-China would have changed. That would have been a very improper thing to do. That relates only to India joining this conference or not.

I have often wondered what was the special urge, the special drive towards having this Manila Conference and this South East-Asia Treaty that emerged from it? What was the sudden fear that brought the countries together—there were some countries together. Was any aggression going to take place? Was the peace of South-East Asia or the Pacific threatened suddenly? Why was that particular time chosen, just after the Geneva Treaty? I have been unable to find the answer. Now, I understand that there are fears—I refer to the French fears on two sides—and their trying to balance which is the greater fear and how to deal with the situation. I can understand there are fears in Asian countries, in Australia, in New Zealand—may be in other countries round about—there are those fears. I do not deny them. It is no good denying the fact. But, how do we meet these fears, how do we get rid and how do we counter-act them all or deal with the situation, so as to create more security?

Now, I put it to the House, has this Manila Treaty relaxed tensions in South-East Asia or increased them?

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Has it taken South-East Asia or any other part of the world more towards peace and security or has it not? I confess, I neither see any lessening of tension nor any advance towards peace. In fact, the reverse. The good atmosphere that was created by the Geneva agreements has, to some extent, been vitiated. Now, that is not a good thing. Has the Manila Treaty created any bulwark for peace and security? The Treaty, itself, as a matter of fact, does not go very far. Those who were of a certain notion, I presume previously, have expressed their opinion, if you like, in a more corporate way. It does not add to the strength of those countries, even increase the strength for their strength as such was there; it may develop a little more. So, positively, it has little contribution to make. Negatively, it has definitely added to the tensions and fears of the situation.

I do not suggest and it would be unrealistic for me to suggest that any country in South-east Asia or India should just live in a sense of, shall I say, false security. Nothing is going to happen and let us sing the song of peace and nothing will happen. I realise that responsible governments and countries cannot merely behave in that manner. They have to take precautions for any eventuality, but, they should also, I suggest, fashion their policy so as to go in a certain direction and, if that is peace, in the direction of peace.

Now, another aspect of this SEATO or SEADO—Whatever it is called—is a curious thing. I can understand a number of countries coming together for their own defence and coming to some agreement and making an alliance. Now, this particular SEATO treaty, although the alliance or the agreement that emerges is not very strong so far as the military aspect is concerned, goes somewhat beyond those very countries. There is constant reference in that agreement or treaty to an area, an area not of the

countries concerned, but of course, to an area beyond those countries which are parties to that treaty; an area which those countries themselves can designate: "this is also in our area". That, I submit, is a dangerous extension of this idea. I am not for the moment challenging or criticising the motives of those countries which were parties to this Manila Treaty. I do not know what their motives were and I presume their motives were to get a measure of security and I do not challenge that; but, I do submit that they have set about it in the wrong way. Now, they have mentioned this 'area', an area which is partly determinate and partly indeterminate; because the countries concerned can expand that area, if they so agree unanimously saying "this is also in our area", and if anything happens in that area— that is, even outside those particular countries or the treaty powers are concerned—they can take such steps as they feel like taking.

Our hon. Members may remember the old days—they appear to be old days—when Great Powers had spheres of influence in Asia and elsewhere—of course, the countries of Asia were too weak to do anything. "The quarrel was between the Big Powers and they, therefore, sometimes, came to an agreement about dividing the countries in spheres of influence. It seems to me, this particular Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in this direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries; because, ultimately, it is the big and powerful countries that will decide and not the two or three weak and small Asian countries that may be allied to them.

Another fact I should like to mention is this: in this Treaty there is reference, of course, to aggression. One can understand that external aggression, but there is reference also to a fact or situation created within this area which might entitle them to intervene. Now, observe the words 'a fact or situation created in that area'. It is not external invasion. That is to say, some internal development in that area might entitle these countries to intervene. Does this not affect the whole conception of integrity, sovereignty and independence of the countries of this area? This SEATO Treaty, if you read it, a great part of it reads well. There are phrases about United Nations Charter, about their desire for peace, about their desire even to encourage self-government in colonial territories provided they are ready and competent to shoulder this heavy burden: all this is said and it reads well. But, I do feel—I have read it carefully—that the whole approach of this Manila Treaty is not only a wrong approach but a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian country. I repeat that I realise the motives may be quite good. I repeat that countries in Asia as well as outside have certain fears and those fears may have justification. But, I say, the method of approach of this Treaty is a wrong approach and it is an approach which may antagonize a great part of Asia. Are you going to have peace in this way and security by creating more conflicts, more antagonisms and making people think that instead of bringing security you bring insecurity into that region?

Again, we have ventured to talk about an area of peace and we have thought that, perhaps, one of the major areas of peace might be South-East Asia. Now, the Manila Treaty rather comes in the way of that area of peace. It takes up that very area

which might be an area of peace and almost converts it into an area of potential war. So, all these facts, I find disturbing.

Some years back there was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation created and when it first saw the light of day it was a defence organisation of certain countries associated in joint defence. I must say, at that time it seemed to me—well, I agree, not in any other matter—nothing but a justifiable reaction of certain countries who were afraid of certain developments to join together in defence. But, observe how this NATO developed. It developed geographically supposed to be the North Atlantic community, but it spread to the Mediterranean, to the coasts of Africa, Eastern Africa and to distant countries which have nothing to do with the Atlantic community. Internally too it began to extend itself. The various resolutions of the NATO powers, meeting from time to time, gradually extended its scope. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was first envisaged it was for defence, but gradually we find that it is supposed to cover the colonial possessions and all those powers also. How the maintenance and the continuation of the authority of those colonial powers over their dependent countries is a matter of defence of the North Atlantic community, is not quite clear to me. However, that idea extends itself and becomes a North Atlantic Treaty giving a protecting cover to the colonial domains of the powers concerned.

Recently, I hope this House will remember, a reference has been made by the Portuguese authorities that the North Atlantic Treaty covers Goa too in its wide scope. Now, we are not concerned and we are not bound down by any treaties to which we are not parties. We have stated that and I am not quite sure if the North Atlantic Powers, or most of them, are quite happy about this assertion by the Portuguese Government that Goa is also their concern. What I wish to point out is this: how these treaties meant for a particular purpose might be understood gradually to extend their scope and nature and ultimately become something much bigger and wider than what people imagined them to be. Now, if the North Atlantic Treaty has managed to extend its scope to Goa, I wonder whether the SouthEast Asia Treaty will extend too. It starts at our doorstep; where will it go to?

These treaties, especially the South-East Asia Treaty, take the shape of certain colonial Powers, of certain Powers not colonial in themselves but interested in colonialism and certain associated countries trying to decide or control the fate of this great area of South-East Asia. I think the world is too small now for any few countries, including the Asian countries to say that nobody else will interfere with us and that this area is our sole concern. I am perfectly prepared to admit that what happens in South-East Asia is also the concern of the rest of the world—not only of South-East Asia. But the rest of the world may be Europe or America or anybody and we have all to consult together; we cannot live in isolation. But I do submit that when decisions are made of vital significance excluding the views of the vital part of that very area, then there is something wrong in that procedure. I have said this about this South-East Asia Treaty Organisation because we have felt strongly about this. We have felt not that by itself this Treaty carries events far but the direction it takes is a dangerous direction; it is a

direction which may not be obvious at the present moment to everybody but I have no doubt that, unless something is done to it, it will become more and more harmful to the interests of peace in South-East Asia and the world at large.

Now, I have said that there are dangers. People say: eminent statesmen have said in defence of this Treaty how can we trust the communist countries? How can we trust China or Russia? Others have said: how can we trust the other countries? Well, I suppose in the final analysis, no country can trust another country; or, if I may put it differently, no country should rely 100 per cent, on trust alone. It has to think of possible developments, changes in views and policies, etc. Governments change in democratic countries; in other countries too other forces may come up. Therefore, it is not a question of my trusting any of these big or small countries; but it is a question of our following a policy which is not only right in itself but which makes it more and more difficult progressively for the other country to break trust. We need not live in a fairy world where nothing wrong happens. Wrong does happen. But we can create an environment wherein it becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to break away from the pledges given. Surely, that is not only good morality but good commonsense.

I submit that all these statesmen, by all these SEATO and other treaties, create an atmosphere, the reverse kind of atmosphere. It is not a question of trust but creating an atmosphere so that the countries and the parties concerned have to keep in step and if they go out of step they suffer for it. According to the SEATO, you threaten them that if you do this and that, we shall take strong action. Now, this business of carrying on diplomacy by threats has not proved very successful in the past and it is not likely to prove successful in the future because you are immediately brought up to this. If something happens either you live up to your threat with whatever the result is—war, etc.—or you simply pipe down and do nothing which is bad after talking too loudly. So, this whole approach of threats does not help; it hinders; it creates a wrong atmosphere: it creates actually an atmosphere when the other party need not live up to certain pledges given because you have broken them. Therefore, all this business—whether it is on the side of China or North Korea or North Vietnam, whatever it may be—has a certain result of putting fear in the other party and therefore, producing reactions of that type. And so also these alliances in this side.

The House will see how many countries in the world are getting more and more entangled in these alliances. There are a series of alliances of the Soviet Union, the People's Government of China, North Korea and some other countries. On the other side if I may mention some, there is of course the North Atlantic Treaty, then the ANZUS—Australia, New Zealand and the United States; and there is the United States Treaty with South Korea, with Formosa—they are secret treaties presumably—and then there is this South-East Asia Treaty—all these curious circles of alliances overlapping with some common factors. There is—it is not an alliance exactly—but there is the military friendship between the United States and Pakistan. Some of them are supposed to have common reservoirs and common pools. It is presumed that

great countries involved in these alliances are cautious, wise and restrained and that they will not act in a hurry. But some of those with whom they are associated are neither cautious nor wise and they are all the time—as we know in the Far East threatening— to War and all that. Now, as it is, one of these uncautious and unwise participants of these groups of alliances takes a rash step—it is quite conceivable in the world—and suppose one step leads to another and a big country which is roped in, though not liking that step, will be dragged in with the result that something happens. So all the circles of alliances are built one way or the other and because one big country is being dragged in, another big country is being dragged in. The whole approach that has been carried on for the last few years has been fundamentally—if I may say so with exceeding respect to those countries— not a system which produces peace or security. I do not mean to suggest that countries should just live within themselves in the hope that nothing will happen; I do not say that. Let all countries—if they want to—be as strong as they like; let them even have understandings—even some alliances. But this whole system as it is going is trying to envelope every part of the world.

Remember we have still got—I do not know what the developments might be—MEDO somewhere in the background. We may have sometime or the other some Far Eastern States Association. The whole conception is one which is no doubt meant to frighten the opposite party just as the conception on the side of the opposite party and the alliances are meant— may be—to frighten the other party. But, in effect, all this is producing such a tremendous entanglement that all clear thinking and clear action become more and more terrible. As I said, the evil deed of one country may drag in other countries. So, gradually, we are getting into a stranger realm, which reminds me of my early reading of *Alice in Wonderland* or even more so *Alice*, through the looking glass, getting all things upside down. We talk of peace and always prepare for war; we talk of security and take steps which inevitably bring insecurity; we talk of freedom and liberation and we come in the way of freedom and liberation of colonial territories. So, this trend seems to me to be unhappy. Again, I repeat that we must recognise the need to do something, not merely to wait till we are all swallowed by evil forces or other developments which we do not like. What can we do about it? I submit that we can do something about it and the way is to deal not amongst yourselves, because you are together, but to deal with the opposite parties. There are two parties, and if both the parties face each other today, keep apart and merely threaten each other and combine with their own groups against the other, then obviously it is no way. It is only when the two deal with each other, as they did to a certain extent in Geneva, that you settle the problem. I do not say that settles the problem finally, but there is no other way, because remember the basic thing today, that we have always to keep in mind is that in the opinion of every intelligent person in any part of the world, war has been ruled out as a method to attain a certain objective. War is no good today. War is too dangerous, because the first thing it does is to put an end to your objective itself and put an end to you. If you rule out war as

a method of solving problems, you must have some other way of solving them. It is no good taking steps which lead to war. Therefore, the only other step—I do not say it will solve the problem that way—is the way of peaceful negotiation and approach. It may take time, but it is better than war or even cold war. In Geneva, this was tried and it has led to certain satisfactory results. It did not go too far, nevertheless there are results. If these methods are adopted to the solution of the problems that face us in the world, you create a certain atmosphere, a better one, and you tie down the countries which may want to do mischief. They may still make mischief. If you think that communist countries are up to mischief, what is the best way of dealing with them? It is not by threatening them “unless you are prepared to go this way”. The best way is ultimately to talk to them, to talk to any opponent of yours, and if it is in the interests of both parties, some agreement will be arrived at. The House knows about the five principles which were included in the joint statement that we issued here when Prime Minister Chou En-lai came here. I do not think anyone present can possibly take exception to these five principles or any of them. What were they? They were recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty and independence, non-aggression, non-interference, mutual respect, etc. Can anyone take exception to that? And yet people have taken exception to it. On what grounds? Oh! they say “How can you believe that this will be acted upon?” Of course, if you cannot believe in anything, there is no fun in talking or writing and the only thing left is to live in isolation or to fight and subdue the other party—there is no other way. It is not a question of believing the other party’s word; it is a question of creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word, or if I may say so, where it finds it difficult to break its word. May be the other party breaks its word and it is likely to find itself in a much worse quandary. Those conditions are created by the joint statement that was made both in India and in Rangoon and if those five principles are repeated by the various countries of the world in their relations to each other, they do create an atmosphere. That does not mean that all the forces of aggression and interference and mischief in various countries have been ended. Of course not; they are there, but it does mean that you make it slightly more difficult for them to function and you encourage the other forces, and that is the way for human relationship whether of the individual or of the bigger groups.

I submit that here is a question of South-East Asia. Obviously, the countries round about, especially like China, are very much concerned. Obviously, the way to have security there is to deal with China and the various other countries there and not sit down there, get angry about something that might happen and then take action afterwards.

Take another thing. One of the basic things that emerged out of the Geneva settlement was that Laos and Cambodia were to be, what is now called, the South-East Asia pattern of countries—this phrase is gradually coming in—in other words, should be countries not aligned to any group, or to use a word which I do not like, ‘neutral’ countries. That was the basis of the agreement of Geneva, because on the one hand, the other Governments concerned, whether it was the French or whatever Governments

on this side, were very much concerned at the prospect of Laos and Cambodia being absorbed or interfered with in any way by China and on the other hand, China was very much concerned that Laos and Cambodia should not be made bases of action against China, whether it is atom bombing or any other bombing. What was the possible way out? Obviously, the only way out was that Laos and Cambodia should not allow themselves to be used by either party against the other; that is, in a sense, neutral and that was the basis of the Geneva agreement. There was something added to it which was objected to, but basically, the agreement was that Laos and Cambodia must be considered as neutral States, and neither party should use them against the other. I am not quite sure in my mind that this SEATO agreement does not to some extent, go against that basic approach of the Geneva conference, because they have brought Laos and Cambodia in that area, to which I referred. There are these difficulties that have arisen, and I wanted to put them to the House because I feel that in spite of the advance made in Indo-China peace, we live in very dangerous times. On the east coast of China, recently there has been fighting on a fairly big scale in the Island of Quemoy and actually the mainland of China has been shelled and bombarded. But nobody knows when a petty incident might not grow into a big thing. It is an odd thing to think of. The island of Quemoy is, I believe, only a few miles from the mainland, Quemoy is supposed to be essential, presumably, to the security of Formosa and the security of other countries. Presumably it has something to do with the security of China itself,—it is right there at its doorstep. So, this kind of thing is going on. That is why I say that any action of the Government of Formosa or the Government of South Korea might result in dragging in these Big Powers and these big circles of alliances may be all dragged in and war would result.

Now we may not be in the war. We have no intention to be pushed into any war and the only fighting we propose to do is if anybody threatens India. But let us be clear about it that if war occurs, it would be a terrible disaster for the whole world, including us, because the whole conception of war has changed.

Now the United Nations are meeting in New York. And the United Nations have, normally, a very big agenda; because nothing is ever taken out of its agenda, the agenda grows. But oddly enough the agenda seldom contains the major issues that concern the world. Whatever it may be, whether it is the Far East of Asia or Germany, these are not there. Naturally they govern people's minds there; they affect their decisions.

In regard to the United Nations, this House knows that we have stood for the People's Government of China being represented there. Recently the United Nations have passed a resolution that this matter will not be considered for a year or so I have long been convinced of the fact that a great part of our present day difficulties,—certainly in the Far East, but I would like to go farther and say in the world—is due to this extraordinary shutting of one's eyes to the fact of China. Here is a great country and it is totally immaterial whether you like it or dislike it. Here is a great country and the United Nations, or some countries of the United Nations, refuse to recognise that it is there. The result is that all kinds of conflicts arise. I am convinced in my mind that

there would have been no Korean War if the People's Government of China had been in the United Nations—it is only guess work—because people could have dealt with China across the table. It adds to the complexities and difficulties of the world problems.

Remember this: that it is not a question of the admission of China to the United Nations. China is one of the founder members of the United Nations. It is merely a question of who represents China. This fact is not adequately realised. It is not a question really of the Security Council, or anybody else deciding, as they have to decide, of new countries coming in. China is not a new country. It is a founder member of the United Nations. It is really a question, if you like, of credentials,—who represents China, a straight forward question. And it surprises me and amazes me, how this straight forward question has been twisted round about and made the cause of infinite troubles. There would be no settlement in the Far East, or South-East Asia till this major fact of the People's Government of China is recognised. I say one of the biggest factors towards ensuring security in South-East Asia and in the Far East is the recognition of China by those countries and China coming into the United Nations. There would be far greater assurance of security that way than through your South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, or the rest.

If China comes in, apart from the fact that you deal with China face to face at the United Nations and elsewhere, China assumes certain responsibilities in the United Nations. Today it is a very odd position. Sometimes the United Nations passes resolutions directing the People's Government of China to do this or that. The response from China is: "Well, you do not recognise us; we are not there; we are not a part of it; how can we recognise your directions?" which is an understandable response. Instead of adding to the responsibility and laying down ways of cooperation, you shut the door of cooperation and add to the irresponsible behaviour of nations in this way, and call it security. There is something fundamentally wrong about it. The result inevitably is that the influence of the United Nations lessens as it must. I do not want it to lessen, because, whatever it may be, it is one of our biggest hopes of peace in the world.

May I refer to one other matter? Among the causes of fear among the Asian countries or countries of South-East Asia, of this great country China, has been large Chinese populations in these countries. In some countries like Malaya, a very difficult problem arises. Now, all of us here, are I believe, in favour of Malayan independence. True, but remember this that the problem in Malaya is not an easy one. It is difficult, because oddly enough, in Malaya the people of Malaya are in a minority. That raises difficulties and confusion. Nobody is in a majority singly considered; the Chinese are in great numbers; the Indians may be 10 per cent, or 15 per cent, whatever it is. Now the indigenous people of Malaya are not at all keen on something happening which might give power to non-Malayans there. I am merely pointing out the difficulties which we have to understand. It is no good our thinking in terms of pure logic without facts. What I am saying is this. Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, Thailand, have large Chinese communities which rather frighten them. In the old days and up till now the Government of China did not recognise the right of any Chinese person

to divest himself of Chinese nationality and a very peculiar situation was created. Sometimes there was some kind of dual nationality. That also was a factor in making the position of the Chinese communities in all these South Asian countries very embarrassing to that country. They did not know, just as a vast number of foreigners would, and when the foreigners of a country are almost fifty per cent, it creates difficulties.

An interesting development is taking place, and reference has been made to it recently both by the Prime Minister of China, Mr. Chou En-lai and the Chairman of the Republic, Chairman Mao Tse Tung. The development is they say that they are going to consider Chinese communities living outside, well, not in the old way, but they will have to choose, those communities will have to choose either becoming nationals of the country they are living in, and if they do so then they are cut off completely from China, they have nothing to do with it, or retaining Chinese nationality and in that even they must not interfere in the internal affairs of the other country. That, I think, is a helpful move which will remove some of the difficulties and apprehensions in these South East Asia countries.

Let us take another matter. Let us be frank about it. Most of these countries are afraid, not of what Governments do officially, but what they might do *sub rosa* through the activities of the Communist Party in those countries. And the fact of the matter is one of the serious difficulties that have arisen in international affairs is that previously one country was against another; you knew where you were; there might be some people in your country, a handful who might sympathise with the other; two nations came into conflict. Now we have this new development that in national groups there are, what I might call if you like, international groups who oppose the national group and who psychologically, emotionally, intellectually if you like, are tied up with another nation's national group. That creates difficulties. In fact that is one of the essential difficulties of the situation. I am not discussing Communism, its theory and practice. I am merely pointing out the essential difficulty of the situation of all these countries. And if there was such a thing as the Communist Party in a country, that is a national Communist Party, that is a party which had nothing to do with another country, that is a different matter. It has got a certain policy, economic, political, whatever it is. It is one of various parties. The difficulty comes in because that party in your country is, as I said, intellectually, mentally and otherwise tied up with other groups in other countries. And the other country might well utilise that for its own advantage. That is the fear that comes to all these South-East Asia countries, whether it is Burma or Thailand or any other country; with the result, unfortunately, that problems, economic and other problems which could be considered by themselves get tied up with these extraneous issues, and different types of reactions are created. Therefore, I think that just as in the old days there was the Comintern, that international Communist organisation which was wound up some time during the last war, then later the Coming form which was, I suppose, something of the old type in different garb, I think that these organisations and the activities that flow from that idea have caused a good deal of apprehension and disturbance in various countries and nations. And now, as a reaction to this we have other forms of international interferences in national affairs

growing up in various countries, not in that ideological way, but in a practical, governmental, *sub rosa* way. It is extraordinary how this kind of thing is growing in most countries, not on one side but in every side.

So we have, if you want peace in the world to come to grips with this problem, not by threats, not by having these treaties of military alliance and the like, but by coming to grips and coming face to face. Because if once you recognise, as I believe it is recognised the world over, what I said, that war is no solution of this—the two major protagonists are too powerful to be dismissed one by the other—if you have no war, then you have to coexist, you have to understand, you have to restrain and you have to deal with each other. And the question of coexistence comes in. If you reject coexistence the alternative is war and mutual destruction.

Now I shall refer briefly—very briefly because I have taken up a lot of the time of the House—to certain other problems, notably Ceylon, Pondicherry and Goa.

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About Ceylon, hon. Members will be aware that in the course of another ten days or so the Prime Minister of Ceylon accompanied by some other Ministers is coming here to Delhi. The suggestion came from the Prime Minister of Ceylon that he wished to have talks with us, and naturally we said: you are welcome to come, we shall have these talks with you. I would not like to say much on this subject, except that I confess that I have been much distressed at developments in Ceylon and at the way the hopes that had been raised, of some satisfactory solution being found, well, have not been realised. And the question of a large number of persons who for all practical purposes are becoming Stateless, continues unsolved.

About the French Settlements, for the last two weeks or so, representatives of the French Government and representatives of the Government of India have been having consultations, discussions, and have made much progress in these consultations. They have been discussing all kinds of details too, apart from major issues. I hope that in the course of some days, or may be a week or two, these will be finalised and I hope that before the end of another month or so, we shall be able to take some formal steps. I should have liked to take the House into confidence more. But, it is a little difficult when we are discussing these matters with each other, to go into these details. But, I am happy that this difficult and intricate matter is being settled. Because however small in size Pondicherry and the rest of the places may be, big nations, proud nations are involved. There is the pride and interest of India involved in not having any foreign territories in India. There is the pride of France involved, not to do anything which makes that pride suffer. We do not want that to suffer. France is a great nation. Whatever we want to do, we want to do in friendship and cooperation with France, so that whatever action we decide upon should, instead of straining our relations, make them better. We have chosen this way and I am very happy that this way is likely to yield substantial results.

We tried to choose this way in regard to the Portuguese possessions also. But, unfortunately, it has led to no result and what the Portuguese Government has done,

in recent months especially, does not make the prospect hopeful so far as they are concerned. We are determined, however, to solve this problem by peaceful methods and we are convinced that we are going to solve this by peaceful methods.

Hon. Members have often expressed some, shall I say, dissatisfaction at our not encouraging Indian nationals who are not Goans, Indian non-Goan nationals, from entering these territories in large numbers. There is no, if I may say so, high principle involved in this that Indian nationals will not go there. The Indian nationals have every right to go there. It is not on high principle that we have done that, but for a variety of reasons. We did not think it desirable to encourage them, because, if we encouraged them, the aspect of Goans' struggle would be eclipsed, the aspect that it is essentially a struggle of Goans whether in Goa or outside, would be eclipsed. It would be said that non-Goan Indian nationals are doing it in spite of and against their wishes. We wish to make it clear to the world that it is Goans whether outside or inside Goa who want this association with India and to get out of Portuguese association. I think that gradually the world is beginning to realise that.

In Goa itself, of course, it is a hundred per cent, police state. There is no question of meeting or anybody expressing any opinion. Papers cannot go, opinions cannot go from outside and the slightest expression of opinion in the mildest way against the Portuguese Government means long-term imprisonment, exile and all that, whatever your position. Even so, inside Goa, so far as we know, quite considerable numbers of persons have been arrested for some kind of Satyagraha or otherwise. Outside Goa, in Bombay city, more especially, as the House must know, there is a large body of Goans, many of them occupying high positions in professions and in various occupations. It has been most encouraging how all these Goans, who are not, if I may remind the House, normally politically minded, who are not politicians, who have not taken part in any agitation, professors, doctors and other people, on this occasion, in the last month or more, have come out—many of them may I also say, persons who have received honours from the Portuguese Government in the past—and stood for this freedom of Goa and its association with India. So that, we are moving forward; perhaps not as fast as Members would like, but certainly and surely in a particular direction. There are also, of course, certain economic steps that we have taken.

One thing I should like to say. On another occasion, I said something about some talks or negotiations which the old Hyderabad authorities had with the Portuguese. I am afraid that a few sentences I used there have neither been well reported in the Press, nor bring out correctly what the facts were. I should like to state more precisely what the exact facts were. I did not state them that there was any official negotiation between the Portuguese Government and the old Hyderabad Government. This was sometime before Independence, in 1945 or 1946. About that time, through other intermediaries there were talks about some kind of joint control of the port and other facilities in Goa: not of the transfer of Goa as such. My whole point in making this reference was that the Portuguese were willing at that stage to discuss various matters

concerning the internal administration of the port and others even with the then State of Hyderabad in early 1946. I believe, at that time, the Government of India of the day, that is, before any of us were in the picture, were kept informed too by the Government of Hyderabad. It is nothing very secret and we have looked up our old files. Nothing much happened, it is true, because other developments took place in India and elsewhere. My whole point was that they were prepared to have some talks then. The line that they have taken up recently is practically that there were no talks of any kind about Goa.

The House will remember, there has been some correspondence. The Portuguese authorities asked for some international observers to go there. We agreed immediately. We said, let us talk as to what their functions should be and who they should be. In answer, they said, no. They wanted to lay down previously before they appointed. We have plenty of correspondence that has been published and the result is that that matter has ended. We are prepared. We said, come and talk to us. Observe, all that we have asked is, come and talk as to what the functions of the international observers should be and how they should be chosen. They refused to come even then. Because, the fact is, once they talk, they cannot very well adhere to the action they have taken, because it is absolutely unreasonable. Therefore, they refused. There is going to be, I take it, no observation of any kind. The deadlock continues. It does not exactly continue in that way because other things are happening which inevitably, will put an end to Portuguese administration in Goa.

BACK NOTE

XXVIII. Motion Regarding International Situation, 29 September 1954

1. SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS: No, no.
2. BABU RAMNARAYAN SINGH (Hazaribagh West): And Pakistan.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: And Pakistan? I have nothing to say about Pakistan except to say that I wish it well.

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

30 September, 1954

I am deeply grateful to the House for the generous terms in which nearly all the Members have spoken, and have referred to our broad policies in regard to international affairs. I am particularly grateful to the hon. Member opposite, Acharya Kripalani, for his overgenerous language in this respect. And, may I say that, in a larger measure, I accept many of his criticisms also. He referred not only to our successes but to our failures. I admit the failures, except that I would describe them somewhat differently. Failure has some finality about it. I would say: 'lack of success'; because we continue trying for success and I hope that we shall achieve success. But, I admit that completely we have not achieved success in regard to the many matters he mentioned—Kashmir, Pakistan, South Africa, Ceylon and Goa. He referred to one or two other points. For instance, he said that we were unable to stop the formation of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. Well, I do submit that we can hardly be accused of being unable to do that. All we can do is not to associate ourselves with it. We do not control the ways and activities of the nations of the world.

Now, perhaps, it would be as well if I dealt with some matters, which will not take much time, to begin with, and having disposed of them, then dealt with two or three questions which have attracted much attention in this House — Goa, for instance, more specially — and I should like to say something, again, about what is called the 'Commonwealth link': then finally, about our broad policy which covers all these matters.

I should like the House to remember that, if we have a broad policy, other smaller matters have to be integrated to that broad policy. Hon. Members may like one part of it and not like something else; but, I should like them to see the link between the two, the logical link, that if we do not follow up something here, that affects our doing something elsewhere.

Acharya Kripalani hinted at the fact that our policy in regard to Goa was perhaps influenced by what the United Kingdom said, the Commonwealth said or somebody else said. Prof. Mukerjee also said, in stronger language, much the same thing. Now, I am not dealing with the Commonwealth question at the present moment— I shall do so later—but what I am venturing to suggest is this: that, what we did in Goa— whether it was right or wrong is another matter—or what we are doing there, has nothing, to do with what the United Kingdom said or any other country said to us. It had not the slightest influence on us. In fact, if I may say so, the effect of it on us was a contrary effect; because one does not like to be told as to what is right or wrong in regard to one's policy, by another country. Also, I would add, that in regard to Goa, what we were told by some countries was not exactly what, perhaps, some Members imagine. No country told us to do this or not do that. They certainly expressed their concern about the situation and their hope that this will be settled amicably.

Now, I am free to confess that even the manner in which they expressed their concern in this matter did not seem to be the right approach or a proper approach. As the House knows, in our replies to them we made that perfectly clear. But, I can assure the House that those representations to us had not the least effect on our policy in regard to Goa—whether it is right or wrong we can judge. That policy was governed by our understanding of our broader policies and our trying to fit in Goa in the context: of those broader policies.

Here I may mention that I was myself grieved at a certain development that took place about four or five days ago on the Diu border, where the police there had to indulge in what is called "mild lathi charge on some volunteers who were endeavouring to enter the Portuguese territory in Diu. I do not blame the police for that, because the police got into a difficult situation when they were being stoned", by those volunteers. Of course—if I may say so in parenthesis—the so called 'satyagraha' takes a very curious turn in India. Nowadays everything is Satyagraha however violent however aggressive and however far removed from our own conception of Satyagraha it might be. Anyhow, the poor police were put in a somewhat difficult position when they were being stoned and, apparently, they indulged in some kind of a lathi charge which injured some people. But, that apart, I was grieved by that, because it is not the function of our police or our people to indulge in any kind of violence in this matter. Suppose we decide—as we did decide—that it is better for large groups or bands of Indian nationals not to go into Portuguese possessions in India; that we should discourage them; that may be a right or wrong policy, but, certainly, it does not mean that we should indulge in violence and give effect to that policy. We made that perfectly clear to the State Governments and to the police concerned.

I should like to refer to another matter. I am told—I was not here then—that an hon. Member objected to our having given recognition to the Pope on the ground that it was wrong to give recognition to any religious dignitary. Further, he added that the Pope has created so much trouble for us in regard to Goa. Of course, both those statements are completely wrong. We recognised the Pope not in his capacity as a religious head—that, of course, is there—but as a temporal head of an independent State. It is true that he is the temporal head; sovereign head of an independent State that follows from his other positions, status etc. It is not our recognising any religious head as such, though, of course he is the religious head of a very big, large and widespread community. Further, it is quite wrong to say, and I do repudiate it, that the Pope has given us any trouble in regard to Goa. In fact, the dignitaries of the Catholic Church in India—I am not talking and I cannot of course speak about every individual here,—but the religious leaders of the Catholic Church in India—publicly expressed themselves in favour of the movement of the Goans for merger with India.

In fact, the House will remember that "one of the main arguments advanced by the Prime Minister of Portugal in this respect was, that Goa was a Christian, and more particularly, a Roman Catholic sanctuary with remains of Francis Xavier, and that, somehow or other, if Goa became integrated with India, these remains and the place will be desecrated and all that; which was, of course, an absurd statement to make. It

showed either complete ignorance of the fact that five million Roman Catholics live in India and have every opportunity to live, practise their religion and such other activities as they might indulge in. They are equal citizens as anyone else. Also because reference was made to St. Xavier, perhaps many Members of the House will know that in Bombay City, St. Thomas is supposed to have existed and I believe St. Thomas Mount is there.

I am sorry I said Bombay, but I meant Madras, and nobody has yet complained about anything being done to the relics of St. Thomas there. So, the Catholics of India have very clearly shown and demonstrated that they are non-political people who are quiet, but even the non-political people have clearly demonstrated that they are in favour of the popular movement in Goa for merger with India.

Two days ago, day before yesterday, I met some leading Goans—and Catholics. I think, most of them were who came to me—who, I believe, call themselves the Goan Liberation Council. I was glad to meet them because they were a different type of persons from what one normally meets in political affairs, that is, they were not politicians, they were professors, professional men and others who had nothing to do with politics as such. I believe one or two of them have received decorations from the Pope and from the Portuguese Government too in the past, so that they were not political people, but because of the development of the situation in Goa, they were moved out of their normal non-political existence and they had formed themselves into a Council, or whatever it is, for this particular purpose, to help in this. That is a very significant thing. There is, of course, the Goan National Congress and there are various other organisations who have been working for the liberation of Goa for many years, but in a sense, it was more significant that these sage and sober people, who have nothing to do with all politics, also felt the urge of the times and came forward. Many of these are Catholics and it is very unfair, I think, for any Member of the House to say that the Catholic Church or the Head of the Catholic Church, that is, His Holiness the Pope, are, in any sense, coming in the way of this movement or encouraging the Portuguese Government in its conduct.

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One or two other matters I wish to say.

Mr. Asoka Mehta asked: Why was not Japan invited to the Colombo Conference?—I am sorry it is not Japan but Nepal—Why was not Nepal invited to the Colombo Conference? Mr. Asoka Mehta should know that we were neither the sponsors of this Conference nor those who issued the invitations. It was the Prime Minister of Ceylon who invited us and we went at his invitation, and he decided to invite the four countries that you know of and not others. He could very well have extended this invitation to others. Then Mr. Mehta quoted from a letter which he had received from Acharya Narendra Deva about the danger of the cry of 'Asia for Asians'. If I may say so, with all respect, I entirely agree with what Acharya Narendra Deva said in that letter and I do not wish that our people should associate themselves with any such cry. What we have said is something rather different. What we have said

is that other people should not interfere in Asia, which is a different thing, whether it is Europe or America or any other place, and that Asia should be left to develop according to her own wishes or genius. Asia, of course, is a huge territory and one may talk about it, of course, but to consider Asia as a big unit is to delude oneself. Asia is not only big but there is enormous variety in it. It may be, I believe it is true, that there are certain features which may be said to be similar and one of the major features is that a great part of Asia has suffered for a hundred or two hundred or more years under foreign domination, whether it is direct colonial domination, whether it is indirect, but Asia has been, during all these years, chiefly under European domination. That fact alone has given a certain commonness of outlook, the struggle against foreign domination, etc., and, therefore, as I have said previously, hon. Members or I or any Indian can perhaps understand the mind, let us say, of a Burman or an Indonesian or anyone else a little better just as an Indonesian can understand our mind a little better than perhaps a European or an American might do. That is because we have had common experiences, common sufferings and common struggles, and, therefore, we react more or less in a common way. Naturally we differ, our backgrounds differ to some extent, they are similar to some extent, and I do not think of this business of 'Asia for Asians', 'Europe for Europeans' and so on except in the sense that no country or no group of countries should be dominated over, should be interfered with by other. As a matter of fact, all this talk is rather out of date because in the modern world, today there can be no isolation of a country or even of a continent. We have to pull together, whether we like it or not; the world is too closely knit together to be thought of in terms of even national units or continental units. We overlap and everything happens together, but the very cry—you might even say that we respect so much and feel so much—that is, the very idea of nationalism itself is becoming somewhat out of date. It is true that it is not out of date again, if you compare it with something like, let us say, provincialism or communalism. It is not out of date because provincialism and communalism and the like are retrograde and reactionary, and nationalism is a shining beacon and an example for us to follow when compared to that, but nationalism itself becomes a narrowing force progressively in the modern world. All that is true. So, in effect, we have to be at the same time nationalistic and international just as in our country we are at the same time talking in terms of centuries; most past and present centuries are represented in this country at the same time. We are passing through this tremendous phase of transition. But let us not do anything which will narrow our vision or come in the way of our growth. But intense feeling of nationalism, as opposed to some idea of world internationalism, will be bad. Nationalism is good; nonetheless at the present age because there are forces which oppose unity; nationalism is a uniting force or liberating force and it continues to be a liberating force. It may become a narrowing force. We have to beware. The House knows that nationalism has sometimes a curious history; that is to say, the very nationalism that struggles for freedom has in the past, in some cases, denied freedom to other countries; it has become aggressive; it has even become imperialistic. All these things merge into one another and one has to be careful lest even a good custom does not bring harm to us or injure us.

I do not know if there is any other minor matter for me to deal with. Someone stated—I forget in what connection; perhaps Shri Asoka Mehta said—that Japan was ignored. It is not quite clear to me: who ignored Japan: how and when? We have had very friendly relations with Japan and we continue to have them. It is true that in the larger policies that we are pursuing, Japan is not wholly in line with us; that is perfectly true. In these larger policies that we pursue there are many countries in Asia— some outside Asia—that are friendly to us and they cooperate with us either in the United Nations or elsewhere. But in effect the two countries that are closest to us are Burma and Indonesia in South-East Asia area. The Arab countries are close to us and we are friendly with them but they are so tied up with their local problems that they tend to concentrate too much on them whether it is the Palestine problem or the like problem. But because of common interests and common backgrounds of many things. Burma, Indonesia and India have progressively functioned together and been drawn closer to each other. I welcome this development. Of course we welcome Ceylon too; Ceylon has also functioned with us since the Colombo Conference. To some extent we would like Pakistan and we would like every other country to do so but I mention two or three. In this context, it is perfectly true that Japan's policy has been somewhat different. We are not coming into conflict in any sense because we are functioning in different spheres but merely we are not wholly in line. What Japan's policy may be in future, I do not know because we must remember that Japan has gone through a terrible crisis—war and defeat—and subsequently all that has happened. They are a great people, hardworking people and they have built themselves up again. But which way Japan will go in the future, I do not know.

Now, there is another matter. Several hon. Members have referred to Tibet— 'the melancholy chapter or Tibet'. I really do not understand. I have given the most earnest thought to this matter. What did any hon. Member of this House expect us to do in regard to Tibet at any time? Did we fail or did we do a wrong thing? I am not going into that matter now but I would beg any hon. Member who has doubts about this question to just consider and try to find out what the background, the early history and the late history of Tibet and India and China have been what the history of the British in Tibet has been and what the relationship of Tibet with China or India has been. Where did we come into the picture unless we wanted to assume an aggressive role of interfering with other countries? Many things happen in the world which we do not like and which we would wish were rather different but we do not go like Don Quixote with a lance in hand against everything that we dislike; we put up with these things because we would, without making any difference, merely get into trouble. We have to see all these things in some larger context of policy.

Big things have happened in the world even since the last war. And among the big things has been the rise of a united China. Forget for a moment the broad policies it pursues— communist or near-communist or whatever it may be. The fact is—and it is a major fact of the middle of the 20th century—that China has become a Great Power—united, strong and great power. I do not mention that in the sense that because China is a Great Power. India must be afraid of China or submit to China or

follow the same policy in deference to China—not in the least. The fact of the matter is, with all respect to all countries of the world,—today or, looking into the future, even today of course—the two Great Powers striking across the world are the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Now, China has come into the picture with enormous potential strength not so much actual strength, that is, developed strength, because remember this, even now China is far less industrially developed than even India is. Let us not forget it—these facts. Much is being done in China which is praiseworthy and we can learn from them and we hope to learn from them but let us look at things in some perspective India is more industrially developed than China—India has got far more— let us say—communications, transport and so on which are also essential for development of China. China no doubt, will go ahead fast; I am not comparing or criticising but what I said was that this enormous country of China, which is a Great Power and which is powerful today, is potentially still more powerful. This is a country which inevitably becomes a Great Power. Leaving these three big countries. United States of America, the Soviet Union and China for the moment leaving them aside, look at the world. There are great countries, very advanced countries, highly cultured countries and all that. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong—wars and the like—the obvious fourth country in the world is India.

I am not speaking in the sense of any vain glory and all that but I am merely analysing the situation and given—much has to be given—the economic growth, given unity, given many factors, India, by virtue of her general talent, ability of her people, working capacity, geographical situation and all that, will rise. Countries like China and India, once they get rid of two things—foreign domination and internal disunity—inevitably become strong; there is nothing to stop them. They have got the capacity; the people of India or the people of China have got the ability and the capacity. The only thing that weakens is internal disunity or some kind of external domination. As soon as the external domination is removed from India, we go ahead. We may go faster; that is a different matter. But inevitably the force, regardless of the individuals or the Governments that may have to do anything with it, is at work. Ultimately, if the people have it in them, they go ahead. Even if Governments are stupid, they go ahead. Acharya Kripalani completely agrees with me. So here we have these great historical forces at work, historical transformations taking place. These great countries, after some hundreds of years of being submerged, are coming up. You have to realise that. Do not get mixed up and tied up with these rather superficial arguments, important as they might be, of communism and anti-communism. Communism is important as a force. You may like it or dislike it; you may like it half and dislike it half, as you like. But they somehow confuse the issue. Therefore it is far better to forget these for the moment in order to analyse the world situation. And the misfortune has been that in western countries, or in some of them, they are so obsessed with communism and anti-communism that they completely fail to see the forces or anything working in the world. We are not obsessed with that thought. We may like it or dislike it, but we are not obsessed with that thought of communism or

anti-communism; because we think of other things also, we think of ourselves we think of our own good, we think of how we should progress, etc. So other countries get rather irritated at us that we do not see the light as they see, that we are perverse or that we are blind, because they can only see one thing and nothing else. What to us appears a lopsided view on their part, to them it appears perversity on our part, whatever it may be. So there are these great historical forces. No doubt in time to come they will adjust themselves, something new will emerge.

Let us look back on history, let us look at European history a hundred years, or a hundred and fifty or a hundred and sixty years ago, at the time of the great French Revolution. The reaction on the Europe of the day was terrible. It was a kingly Europe. It was tremendous. They thought the end of the world had come. And even when Napoleon came with his counter-revolution and all that, Napoleon became the devil incarnate to all those people in Europe. And if you read the books written then, the newspapers written then, you see the passion there was behind these feelings. If one compared that with the present day and with the passions that are roused today, well, one somehow begins to look at things in a little more perspective. These passions come and go and the world adjusts itself. For hundreds and hundreds of 'years, as you know, Europe and Western Asia struggled over the crusades, Christianity versus Islam. Several hundred years these things lasted. Fortunately for our country we have had no major religious conflicts, at any rate except recently. Europe had these conflicts Thirty Years War, Hundred Years War. Each of them appeared then to put an end to civilization and everything. And there were these crusades which lasted hundreds of years. Well, things adjust themselves somehow, and oddly enough, certainly Christianity did not win in the crusades: nor, you might say, did Islam remain as it was. So that, you have to look at things in their perspective and not get overheated or overexcited over things that are happening today, and think of them as mighty crusades of communism on the one side or anti-communism on the other.

It is my conviction—I speak for India, but it may apply to other countries too—that we can only progress according to our own light and reason. We can and will no doubt profit by things we learn from other countries, forces, movements, ideas. But we must have our roots in the Indian soil. Keeping our roots in the Indian soil is important, but it is also important not to be just a root and nothing else. It is, because there is a tendency to be just a root. And one has to grow and put out branches and leaves and flowers. And in the world today, as I said a little while ago, it becomes difficult to be just even narrowly nationalist. So many things develop which are common for the world.

Now, about this talk of the Commonwealth and objection or disapproval of our continuing the Commonwealth link, some Members seem to imagine that thereby we are doing violence to the pledge we took on the banks of the Ravi in 1929-30, as 1929 turned into 1930, or subsequent Independence pledges. Well, I should like you to refer to those pledges and see what our condition is. I say we have kept to those pledges hundred per cent. That has nothing to do with the desirability of keeping the Commonwealth link. We may or may not keep it. Because when we talked there of

the fact that we were associated with the Commonwealth. It has helped. You may say that our being in the Commonwealth has been of some advantage to the United Kingdom. I agree. I do not say it is a one-sided affair. Nothing is one-sided. It has been of some advantage, if not actual physical advantage, advantage in terms of prestige and all that. May be so. My point is that in these international affairs, the fact that there was this thin tenuous link with the Commonwealth has helped the cause of world peace. Hon. Members must have noticed that the relations between the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom are growing a little more friendly than they have been. It is rather difficult for me to refer to private conversations. But many people—I am not talking of Indians or British people, non-British, non-Indian people—who were surprised at first at our continuing the Commonwealth link, have confessed that we were very wise in doing so, because it has helped in international affairs and also in our work for world peace. Therefore, I submit that the test is whether it is helpful or not. I say it does not hinder in the slightest degree.

Shri H. N. Mukerjee talked something about our Commander-in-Chief going to Camberley. Or you may refer to some economic contracts we may have with England. That has nothing to do with the Commonwealth link. We may or may not have those economic contracts. They are independent of the Commonwealth link. You may have economic contacts with America; there is no Commonwealth there; with France or with the Soviet Union. Nobody can stop us from doing that. So that, that has to be eliminated. You may dislike the economic contacts. Say so. But, do not connect that with the Commonwealth link, because it is independent of that. It is true that our Commander-in-Chief has gone in the last two or three years to Camberley to take part in certain military exercises there. We have sent some senior officers. It is also true that from time to time our little Navy puts out to sea and either goes to the Mediterranean or the eastern waters. South-East Asia, etc. In doing so, we encourage it to come in contact with the British Navy for some exercises. The Cruiser 'Delhi' cannot have exercises by itself. It cannot go round and round itself. It has to keep itself in exercise; it wants that.

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It so happens that, among the several things we have, the House knows very well, our Navy more particularly, has grown up after the pattern of the British Navy, they are British ships which we have got. We have been trained by them. Our methods of training are British. We may change them tomorrow. But, so long as we have those methods of training, etc., it is easier for us to fit in exercises on that basis, than independently of them. For a mere matter of convenience, we sent the Commander-in-Chief and two or three senior officers to take part in these exercises. We can send them, we will send them if invited, to the Soviet Union or China if the opportunity occurs, to take part in their exercises. I may tell you that we have invited to our exercises representatives of various countries, including the Soviet Union and China. Of course, our exercises are in a small way. We do not pretend to teach anything to the Soviet Union. It is not like that. So far as we are concerned, we treat these

countries on a level. It is true that our contacts, not because of the Commonwealth link, but because of historical factors, may be this or that are greater with the British. We can get greater advantages and facilities than with the rest. That is helpful to us.

Another thing in connection with the Commonwealth link is this. There are large numbers of Indians living in other countries. The question of Ceylon comes up; true. There are quite considerable numbers still living in various countries, Malaya, Fiji, Mauritius, and other territories. It is going to be a problem. It is going to be a bigger problem in the future. That is, their future is going to be a problem. In regard to Indians abroad, we have taken up a firm line regarding those Indians who are living in what may be called independent countries. We have said that we do not want them to remain apart from the people of those countries where they are living, and that they may associate themselves. It is perfectly open to them to become nationals of that country or remain our nationals. They may choose. They are welcome to be our nationals. If they remain our nationals, they cannot participate in the life of that country to the same extent, naturally. They cannot become voters there. If they become their nationals, culturally they are connected with us, but otherwise they are not. They are not our concern. The connection is cultural, not political. We have encouraged them to do that and in Africa etc. we have said repeatedly that we do not want Indians there in the slightest degree to exploit the people, to develop any vested interests which are against the people of the country and that they will get no protection from us as against the people of that country, *i.e.*, the Africans. But now, questions arise about Ceylon—difficult questions. In other places like Malaya and elsewhere, apart from the political and other questions there, the fact that there is the British link, the Commonwealth link, makes the situation of these millions of Indians in those countries somewhat easier in the sense that while retaining Indian nationality, if they so choose, they can get civil privileges there, which they cannot otherwise. The time has not come for them, they are not compelled to choose, to have this or that. They can have both, and we do not wish to put them in this dilemma of having to choose till the time comes. It will come some time or other. All these are minor considerations I admit. The major considerations are different. But I say even the major considerations point to the fact that we should continue this very loose association which does not come in our way and which helps us in many ways.

Now, hon. Members—some Members and some others outside, too—frequently criticise us, sometimes even my humble self: “Oh, you are saying this and that, criticising countries. Why do you not criticise or condemn Soviet imperialism?” Perhaps, hon. Members who care to read what I write or hear what I say will appreciate that I seldom criticise any country, whether it is in the West or in the East, a country as such;—I may sometimes pass a remark—deliberately I avoid doing so. I may say something about imperialism or colonialism, but I would try to avoid saying something about a specific country. Why is that? That does not mean I am hiding anything, but because I have found there is far too much of mutual recrimination, running down and passions roused, when you cannot consider a question calmly. Either you are out

to convince the other party or convince their friends about a certain position. For instance there are many things that have happened in Russia, in the Soviet Union, in the past especially, which have pained me exceedingly. I do not know all the facts. I cannot pass final judgment about any incident, and I am not competent to do that. But, broadly speaking, whatever information has reached me distressed me greatly. Well, I did not shout out from the housetops. There are many things which have occurred in other countries, in Western countries, which have distressed me. There are things which are occurring today in the continent of Africa, which I think are horrible in the extreme. And I restrain myself because I feel that if I went about just giving expression to what I feel all the time, well, it will be neither good for me, nor for others.

Somebody asked me in a television interview in London last year: "You are in the Commonwealth and you go about criticising the Commonwealth or Commonwealth countries. Do you think that is quite fair for a member of the Commonwealth?" He said: "Is it fair for you as the Prime Minister to do this?" So, I said: "I realise fully my responsibility as the Prime Minister, and I have exercised tremendous restraint on myself because of that and on the whole succeeded. If I had not been Prime Minister, I would be shouting from the housetops all the time." So it does not help, I feel. Somehow we have got, I think it is a bad thing, to suppress truth. But, if one shouts out unpalatable truths all the time, you do not convince or convert people, you merely create a feeling of greater conflict.

Now, before coming to the larger issues of the world, I shall say a word about Ceylon. I should not like to say much because the Prime Minister of Ceylon is coming here in about ten days time and it would not be fair or courteous to him for me to discuss these matters. But I would say this, that the so called agreement that we arrived at many months ago has not proved a success. There are various matters connected with it, but the principal question is about the fate of a considerable number of people of Indian descent—remember, people of Indian descent, not Indian nationals—who are in Ceylon. What is their future going to be? An hon. Member who is himself connected with this question very much mentioned something about the large numbers of Chinese who are in various countries of South-East Asia and elsewhere. It was a perfectly relevant observation. There are considerable numbers of Indians too in other countries. In fact, in discussing other questions with the Prime Minister of China, I pointed out to him the large number of Chinese in South-East Asia and a fairly considerable number, not quite so much, of Indians too; and I said to him that both because of the size of our respective countries—we are both big—and because our populations have overflowed into other countries, it is not difficult to understand that the other and smaller countries round about us are a little afraid of us—afraid of China or afraid of India, it depends upon where geography puts them. And he said that is perfectly true and we must do everything in our power to get rid of this fear in so far as we can.

Now, in regard to Ceylon unfortunately—or both fortunately and unfortunately—there is this fact that Ceylon is a relatively small island very near to

India, and because of this there is a fear,—which I think is completely unjustified,—a fear that India may overwhelm Ceylon and absorb it. I have repeatedly said that, so far as I know, nobody in India thinks that way. We want an independent Ceylon, a friendly Ceylon, a Ceylon with which we have the closest contact, a Ceylon which is nearer to us in every sense than any other country outside India culturally, historically linguistically, as you like, in a religious sense and all that. Why should we look with greedy eyes on Ceylon? We do not. But the fact remains, there is fear, and because there is this fear, I would beg this House, Members of this House, not at any time to say things which might add to that fear. He talked of economic sanctions and the like. I deprecate that kind of thing, although I have been deeply pained by many events in Ceylon, because I want this House and this country to look ahead. We are a country. I hope, and I believe, with a great future. Therefore, look at the future. Do not get lost in the present. Have some vision of that, and do not do things now which may come in the way of that future, whether it is Pakistan, or whether it is Ceylon, or whether it is any other country. Now, therefore, we have to treat and continue to deal with Ceylon in a friendly way, even though Ceylon's response might be unfriendly.

Now, coming to this Agreement, the question is about these large numbers of people who are now sometimes called Stateless; that is to say, they are not our nationals, and if the Ceylon Government does not make them their nationals, for the moment, they have no regular constitutional position of being attached to one State—of course, they are in Ceylon.

This raises legal, constitutional issues, as well as issues of social well-being and decency. In the past two or three decades, these questions have arisen in another context. When Hitler started his career as Chancellor in Germany, Members will remember that large numbers of people fled from Germany, and they became stateless, because no other State would father them, and Hitler, far from fathering them, was after their blood. So, this question of Stateless people became an important constitutional issue in Europe and elsewhere. Much has been written; in fact, books have been written on the subject. I do not mean to say that that question is at all comparable to this question. It is a question of people of Indian descent in Ceylon, but I am merely referring to a certain constitutional aspect, which is important. Normally speaking, people are not driven out of a country, even if they are the nationals of another country. They are not driven out; individuals may be sent out because they misbehave, but whole vast crowds, tens and twenties and hundreds and thousands of people are not sent out. It is almost unknown, excepting under these very abnormal conditions which prevailed under Hitler and the like.

So, this is the background. We shall gladly meet the Prime Minister and his colleagues, when they come here, and talk to them in a friendly way. At the same time, we hold certain views about these matters, and we shall put them before them.

Now, coming to this broad world, aspect that we have to face, I mentioned something about it yesterday in this House. I was talking about the Commonwealth link. Now, you will observe that our links at present with Burma and Indonesia are far

closer than the links with the Commonwealth countries. That does not come in the way. It is natural; it is a natural growth. And because of our Commonwealth link, we can serve many causes a little better than we might otherwise be able to do.

Anyhow, we have to face in the world a very difficult situation. I do not wish this House or anybody to feel overwhelmed by the difficulty of the situation, because as long as we have the perspective, we shall get over these difficulties, and the world will get over them. Undoubtedly, we are passing through a very big period of transition. The first thing in this situation is. As far as I can see to avoid war, and especially world war because if that war comes, it destroy everything that we or anyone else is working for. Therefore, our policy—and the policy of many other countries—becomes one of avoidance of this war, in so far as we can. I do not pretend to say that we can make much difference in the worlds but in so far as we can. we try to do that, and in trying to do that, we try to avoid that type of bitter controversy which has taken the place of the old style diplomacy now, the diplomacy of running down and cursing each other, because we think that it will not lead to any peaceful solution. It was from that point of view that we talked about an area of peace; and our neighbours, Indonesia and Burma also talked about an area of peace, and welcomed that approach.

But there are these great fears. How are we to get rid of this fear? How are we to get rid of the fear of this great colossus, the Soviet Union, overwhelming other countries, or the other colossus overwhelming some other country? Look at the world today. It is quite extraordinary. Each party accuses the other of encirclement or encircling. Some countries accuse the Soviet Union of activities, subversive activities and the like—there may be some truth in it. The Soviet Union accuses the United States of America of encircling it with bases all round—and there is truth in it. Look at the map. There are hundreds, literally hundreds, about two hundred, I believe, bases encircling the Soviet Union and China from the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean—and I do not quite know what is happening in the North Pole. Now, obviously, each is afraid of the other, afraid not in the narrow sense of the word, but afraid of the consequences that this might bring. How can we get rid of it?

Now, it is my submission that you do not get over these fears by these pacts and alliances against each other. Certainly I cannot suggest to any country to trust in good luck and do nothing at all to prepare itself—I cannot say that as a responsible person. But these pacts and alliances do not help. And even if they helped at an earlier stage, we have arrived at a stage when it does not help but hinders. It is perfectly clear today that if either party, either of these great colossuses, commits any major act of aggression anywhere in Asia or Europe or Africa or anywhere, that will lead to world war. It is not the pact that prevents that, it is the fear of world war that keeps the peace today. There is no doubt about it, that if there was aggression on either side, any major aggression, there would be world war. Therefore, there is no chance of major aggression today. The chance is that some petty thing might bring about this conflict. Now, we have to develop an atmosphere—the Geneva Conference

helped in developing that atmosphere; it was good. Now, the SEATO arrangement comes and in some degree, upsets that atmosphere. It is a bad thing in the sense—quite regardless of what they arranged—it does not add to their defensive strength; whatever it was, it was there; it merely led to this habit of dealing with the other party with threats. Of course, it is not a very polite habit;—apart from that, it is not practical, because the other party happens to be fairly strong too—it is not that you should frighten the other party. So, it is in this larger context that we felt it.

There is talk about this communism, anticommunism and the like. As an Indian and as an Asian, it is a matter not only of great surprise to me but of distress that the racial policies of some countries do not seem to excite much notice in Europe or America. There is the racial policy of the Union of South Africa which is, in no sense, different from the racial policy of Hitler, except that they have not gone to those extremes that Hitler went to. But the theory is the same: the practice may be different—somewhat milder. Or take other parts of Africa. We tolerate that. We talk about the bird's eyeview which is different from the view of those who are crawling on the earth. So also the view from different places of the earth's surface is different. If we look at the world from Delhi, our view is one. A person looking at it from Washington or Moscow—his view is different. The whole picture is different, not the same, and the perspective is different. Anyhow, this particular example that I gave of racialism running rampant in Africa and of the United Nations being unable to deal with it passing resolutions, is in our eyes, a very important thing and at least as important as all this business of communism and anticommunism— both of them.

Now, I have taken a lot of time and I have yet to deal with Goa in particular, because Acharya Kripalani was good enough to deal with this matter at some length. I shall endeavour to explain our policy which, in its basic approach might not change, I hope, but which certainly, in so far as the steps we take or do not take are concerned, may change at any time. Acharya Kripalani took exception to our not permitting Indian nationals from going there. He will be perfectly right in taking exception to it; if I state that as a principle, as a maxim, Indian nationals have every right to go there. But every right has to be exercised in the right way and at the right time. Hon. Members may have the right to walk along the road, but if they walk along the wrong side of the road, they get run down.

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My point is that I want to remove this misapprehension in anyone's mind that we think that it is not the right or sometimes even the duty of an Indian non-Goan national to go to Goa. It may well be. But we did think about it. I do not differentiate at all; and I even agreed with the hon. Member when he said that such a thing might be the right of an individual in any other country to join in Goa too. I agree, but all those rights have to be considered in the context of particular situations and events. They may create grave embarrassment and difficulties to them, to their country and to others. It was in this context that we considered this matter of Goa round about the 15th August. A tremendous propaganda was taking place, encouraged by people who

did not like our policies very much, a propaganda to indicate that the Goan people were in love with Portuguese rule they did not want a change, they were quite happy as they were: Goa was a peaceful idyllic spot where quiet and calm reigned while in India there was trouble all over, and in this peaceful and idyllic place where the people were completely happy and satisfied, hordes of Indians from outside were sweeping down and compelling, forcing and coercing them to accept their domination. That was the propaganda. Of course, hon. Members think it is absurd; it is absurd. But that was the propaganda believed in by numbers of people elsewhere. We had to meet that propaganda, we had to meet that position and to show what the real fact was. And the real fact was that the people of Goa themselves wanted their freedom and their association with India. How are we to show it? If we had allowed at that time large crowds of Indians to go, I have no doubt at all that the fact that the Goans wanted their freedom and were prepared to sacrifice themselves for it would never have emerged, as it is emerging today.

Another aspect I shall bring before the House which, I am sure, my friend, Acharya Kripalani, will appreciate. In the olden days, when we were carrying on our struggle for independence, we took up a particular line in regard to what were called the Indian States then. We did not come in the way of their freedom movements, but we discouraged people from outside functioning from outside in regard to them. What was the reason behind it? Not that we considered that there was any difference between the Indians in India and the Indians in an Indian State—there was never any question of difference. But we wanted the people of those States themselves to wake up, to organise themselves and not merely to rely on others. Whether it is satyagraha or whether it is anything else, outsiders can go and help, but a satyagraha completely based on outside help with no foundation or strength inside, that outside satyagraha is not a very potent weapon. Outsiders can help, but there must be strength inside. I am no professor of satyagraha as the Acharya is. I speak certainly with diffidence, but I am merely pointing out that even in regard to the Indian States, we assumed a certain attitude which gradually strengthened those Indians. We were associated with the Indian States as individuals; we associated ourselves as President of the All India States People's Conference and all that. But we did not encourage numbers of Congress people and others from outside to go and invade a State.

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I do not think it is quite right for the Acharya to say that we have left those people in the lurch—I do not think it is quite correct. We have not left them in the lurch. So far as the Government is concerned, it is openly, explicitly in favour of the merger of Goa with India. Our public organisations have expressed themselves in every way, and we have in regard to other matters—economic and others—taken steps too. But there is such a thing, as hon. Members,—especially the leaders of the revolutionary movements sitting opposite—will realise, as adventurism which is very different from adventure or adventurousness, and no responsible group or party should indulge merely in adventurism, because adventurism leads to reaction. It does not succeed. It leads to reaction and loss of morale. The success and the virtue of

satyagraha that some of us of the older generation were taught were very largely due to its discipline, largely due to our being pulled back even when we resented it; but at no time did we fail. Success might have been postponed a little. But at no time were we allowed to function in an adventurist way.

Now, lastly, the hon. Member Mr. Chatterjee—I was not here then—in my absence, among other things referred to me as a “fellow traveller”. Well, I have been a traveller not only in many countries, but in many avenues of thought and I have been proud to be a fellow traveller with all kinds of persons, many of whom, perhaps, might not be considered quite respectable by Mr. Chatterjee. It is rather embarrassing for me to talk about myself and I do not wish to do so. But I do believe that some things are good and some things are bad. Of course, there is a great deal in between to choose from. I do believe firmly and absolutely that evil means lead to evil ends, that bad means should never be adopted even to gain right ends. If you tell me that I do not always act up to that you may be justified, because we are weak persons having to deal with complex and difficult situations from day to day. But anyhow I firmly believe that means are important and bad means always produce bad results.

I believe also that hatred and violence are bad—intrinsically and absolutely bad—and it is largely because of this abundance of hatred and the spirit of violence in the world that we have come to this quadary. Violence today is represented by the atom and the hydrogen bombs. I do not think it is very helpful for me to criticise this country or that country because it indulges in hatred or violence, or because it does not care for the means. Many of my basic differences have been because of that. If you discuss economic policy with me, I may agree with you or you may disagree with me slightly. I do not mind considering with a completely open mind the communist, or the Marxian or any economic policy. It does not matter whether I agree or not; only, as I said, they must have roots in the Indian soil; they must be related to Indian conditions and the ideals we might have. If you align them to dubious means and dubious methods, then I dislike it. It is because of that chiefly that I have felt not only recently, but previously, very much out of tune with things that were happening, whether in India or outside.

One tries to function to the best of one’s ability, realising that the success of the objectives one seeks is seldom attainable, nevertheless, one tries to do one’s best.

BACK NOTE

XXIX. Motion regarding International Situation, 30 September, 1954

1. SHRI KOTTUKAPPALLY (Meenachi): As a Catholic, I endorse every word of yours.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Thank you.

2. BABU RAMNARAYAN SINGH (Hazaribagh—West): Partly.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Partly.

3. SHRI SADHAN GUPTA: What is the charm in the British Navy?

AN HON. MEMBER: What is the charm in the Soviet Navy?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The charm of the British Navy is this. If hon. Members want us to have exercises with different countries annually, that is not a practical proposition. One cannot do that. The hon. Member, if he knew anything about a Navy, would probably understand what I said. One cannot do this kind of thing. As a matter of fact, we have had exercises with the French Navy; we have had exercises with some other countries: I forget now where we have gone.

4. ACHARYA KRIPALANI: It is for the Government to send them in the right way.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is a different matter.

5. SHRI MAHAVIR TYAGI (The Minister of Defence Organisation): And the Acharya issued the circular.

SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE: He himself broke the ban.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: So this becomes a question not of high principle, but of organising and disciplining a movement, strengthening a movement and striking when the right time comes in the proper way. Let there be no mistake about it, that so far as Goa is concerned, we consider it a part of India, of course, inevitably, and on no account, whatever the pressure or whatever might happen, are we going to give up this claim or the right to work for it and to achieve it.

MOTION REGARDING ECONOMIC SITUATION

21 December, 1954

Mr. Chairman, Sir, speaking on my own behalf and on behalf of the Government, I should like to say that we have welcomed this debate. I hope that such debate, might take place from time to time in Parliament, not only because they are necessary but also because they are helpful to Government. They show, they demonstrate, the social awakening that has come all over the country. They are the signs of our moving more and more rapidly. I hope from the purely political plane to the social plane. I welcome, therefore, even the criticisms that have been made, though I must confess that some of the criticisms left me rather aghast, because they seemed to have no relation, so far as I am aware, with the facts.

An eminent Member on the other side, who used to be a great scientist, Prof. Meghnad Saha, but who drifted from the fields of science and has found no foothold elsewhere yet told us many things, most of which, I think, are completely wrong. I have seldom come across a less scientific approach to a problem than that of Prof. Meghnad Saha, in fact, a less factual approach. I can only express my deep regret that such an eminent scientist should have fallen into such evil ways of thinking.

I do not mind Prof. Saha, or any other hon. Member in this House, criticising our Government. We are no doubt open to criticism in many matters and we do not mind it. But I do mind, sir, criticisms which amount to criticisms of the Indian people. And if any man in this House or elsewhere blames or criticises what the Indian people have done in the last six years, I say it is not proper, certainly for any of us, I would say—even for any outsider to do it—much more so for any national of India to do it. Because, in spite of the grave and great problems that we have had to face, in spite of this Government's deficiencies—I admit it—in spite of the errors that we have made, the Indian people have done a fine job during the last six years. Let that be clear now. And I include in the Indian people almost every group—I do not include individuals—the vast numbers, the masses of the Indian people, the intellectuals, the peasants, the workers and others. They have done a fine job, of which I for one am proud and I am prepared to shout out my pride anywhere in the world.

Now, I find all this carping criticism partly as I said, I do not object to it, —is based, not, as it should be, if I may say so, with all respect, on a balanced view of the case. I can very well understand a criticism here, acceptance of a good thing there, but I cannot understand just criticism, just denunciation alone. Our friends opposite seem to have forgotten to appreciate anything, to say "Yes" to anything. That I say, whether it is on this side or that side of the House, is an unbalanced, unscientific, unfair, unhelpful attitude.

What are we after? All of us, whether we may sit here or not, are after doing something which is tremendous, changing the face of this ancient country, with its vast population, also, let us remember, tied up in many ways with ancient customs,

ancient habits, ancient economic systems. We want to break through many of these things. If you travel all over India you see an enormous variety of population— all kinds of people, various degrees of development, cultural, political, social, economic, call it what you like; disparities, sometimes vast disparities. We do not like it. Nobody in this House likes that. We want to put an end to disparities, inequalities. We want, naturally, to raise the standard of living, have a new structure of society and all that. It may be that we may differ, in regard to any particular item, the particular method of doing it. It may be that even in the final picture, there might be some difference of opinion, but I rather doubt if there is any great difference of opinion in regard to the final picture that most of us envisage. But anyhow we can only think out our plan of progress, whatever it is. On what I venture to say, a scientific assessment of the facts of the situation. We can hardly consider it in the manner of an academic debate.

Here is a terrific problem, not merely in numbers, but in the complexity of it. People talk about the public sector and the private sector. Does the House realise that the private sector, the biggest and the overwhelming private sector, is the private sector of the peasants in India, the small holder of land? That is the tremendous private sector in this country, not those odd factories and odd things that exist. Now we want to change all that. And remember this that there is a limit to the amount of compulsion that you can exercise, apart from the desirability of compulsion. You have, ultimately, in a vast society, to go by consent, not everybody's consent, but consent of the community as a whole. Apart from this ineluctable factor, so far as our country is concerned, we have followed a policy in our political field which was rather unique. In our political struggle, we by and large, adopted peaceful methods. In our economic approach there are conflicts there is no doubt about it. In the economic field there are classes. We want to do away with the classes. Our approach has been, by and large, trying to win over people. We put an end to the princely order in this country. We paid for it. But remember this that what we paid for it, however heavy, was very little, compared to the cost of conflict. Nowadays in the world, whether it is in the international sphere or the national sphere, people are always talking in terms of conflict. It is war or cold war, or conflict or class struggle. I admit class struggle; I admit it, but I do not want to aggravate it. I do not want to obsess my mind with it. I want to get rid of it as far as possible without aggravating that struggle, by other means. I do submit that the results of our political and other approaches have led to good things. They are good in many ways, and apart from reaching a person's goal or a particular goal and get going towards it, we create an atmosphere, a mentality of cooperation, or, at any rate, we do not have strains of bitterness and conflict pursuing us. We have taken examples from other countries, of big, social, political upheavals. We may have differing opinions about them, and we may like some part and do not like some other part, but it is not a Question of liking or not liking. They are great historical upheavals like a tempest, but it is no good my saying or any hon. Member saying that he does not want the cold wind or the tempest outside. But this is happening, and they become the conditioning factors in a country, and one conditions oneself to these factors. One makes mistakes and then recovers from that mistake.

I dislike comparing my country with others to our advantage or disadvantage, because I do not want or like to criticise other countries. I want to be friendly with them, because I like some things in them and I do not like some other things in them, but I venture to point out to this House that where those upheavals occur, they are products of history, violence and all that kind of things—defeat and civil war. They govern subsequent things. Now, one does not, in order to reach something, organise an upheaval deliberately and destruction. If it comes one's way it is a different matter and one has to face it. Now, some hon. Members seem to think that in order to make progress, we must destroy, we must increase the conflict, bitterness and then we shall have a cleaner slate to write upon. As I said, no country has ever had a cleaner slate to write upon not even after the biggest of revolutions. We cannot get rid of many factors which govern the situation and the growth of a people. But no one, as I am aware, would willingly destroy something which is worth while in order to build something which may be good in certain circumstances. Now, I am prepared to compare what has been done in India in the last few years with what was achieved in any other country. It may be that may not have achieved much. We may have achieved less; I am prepared to admit that. But at the present moment, behind that we must see this Peaceful cooperative method of approach. You may say that taking this peaceful cooperative method of approach we might have gone faster; we can go faster, and let us admit it, or let us start about it and increase our pace. But this House must be clear as to whether we accept that peaceful, cooperative and democratic method or whether we accept some other method. "When I use the word democracy, I know it can mean many things, but I am talking in terms of what is called parliamentary democracy. There are other methods which may equally be democratic but which are different. It is in that context that one has to see. Why do we have parliamentary democracy and the like? Because, presumably, we think that in the long run, that produces the best results. If we get to the conclusion that it does not produce best results, well, we change it, obviously because we want results. What results are we aiming at? National well being, human happiness of the millions and millions of our people. Let us not, for the moment, use terms which have a very specific connotation. We aim at human happiness in this country—national well being, national strength. How do we achieve it? We have got at the present moment, a country which is industrially not developed, although, remember that even so India is more industrially developed than any country in Asia, apart from Japan. I am out for the moment taking into consideration the Soviet part. But apart from these two exceptions, India has more industrially developed than any country, certainly more than China. What will happen in the future is a different matter. I am talking about the present. Nevertheless, we are an undeveloped country. Our standard of living is low. We have got to raise that, and in raising that we have got to find employment for all our people.

What are our objectives? Well, we may define them in many, ways, but perhaps one way which is more important than others is to find progressively fuller employment till we reach full employment by increased production and all that. You may also say

greater production, better distribution. All that we can say and all these things are part of the main objective. Essentially, the problem should be viewed. I hope, from the point of view of attaining fuller employment and greater production and better distribution.

Now, if that is our approach, how are we to do it in this very complicated situation that we are in, with an under-developed economy and with very little surplus to invest and all that? We cannot compare our problems with those of the industrialised West, because they have centuries, or at any rate, generations of growth. Even with Soviet Russia we cannot compare. We can learn from them in some matters. There, conditions were completely different—with war, civil war. I am prepared to compare India with Soviet Russia after seven years of freedom certainly, but not after 30 or 40 years of their freedom. The only country which is in a sense comparable is China, comparable in the sense that it has a vast population, tremendous unemployment, very low standards and under-development, and not industrialised. That is a comparable case. Therefore, possibly, it is conceivable that as they make their progress according to their ways, we may be able to learn something from them. But again, take the background of China; as they are today, after 40 years of civil war, international war, national war, till the country was absolutely at the rockbottom level. We had, fortunately or unfortunately—for ourselves fortunately, so far as I am concerned, and possibly hon. Members opposite may think. It is unfortunate a peaceful transfer of power in this country with a running machine. A running machine has its advantages and disadvantage; I prefer the advantages. The disadvantage may be that you are tied up with certain processes which take little time to change. The advantages are obvious: that you do not destroy and start from scratch, but we started at a higher level, as I said, compared to most countries in Asia. I dislike comparisons; they are odious: but nevertheless, I beg the House to consider the state of affairs, political, social or economic, in India today with those of any other country in Asia. Again, for the moment, I leave out China, because China deserves a separate treatment in regard to many matters. Although at present conditions in India are better, that is to say, industrial and general conditions, I think if the standards here are better than in China it does not mean that China may not make greater progress. That is a different matter. It is a different matter to compare all these countries of the West with those of the South and South-East Asia. Is there any comparison between the stability— political, economic and social—that we have achieved in this country and the progress we are making, with others? It may be slow, according to our thinking, but there is no doubt about the progress that we have made. There is no doubt at all about the impression that has been made in the wide world about India today.

It is an extraordinary thing that our critics largely come from, well, some of our own countrymen, or—it is an odd thing to put in the same level—or from certain very reactionary parties in the West who do not like India's progress. But I would beg this House to consider that let us have criticism galore, but let us always remember that in this matter if India is going to go ahead, it is not because the Government of India is very bright—that helps no doubt if it is so—but it is because the people of

India function. And it is not right for us always to be running down what the people of India are doing. We take up something in a big way. Take the Community Projects or the National Extension Service. I think it is one of the biggest things that any country has undertaken, and I think that—I won't say that it has succeeded hundred per cent—but it is succeeding in a very large measure. And it is an amazing thing how from the grass roots we are building up something, not imposing something from above as normally governments have done.

And what has been the reaction of many of our friends on the opposite benches? They not only run it down, they refuse to cooperate with it, it is not a governmental effort, it is a people's effort. They keep away, they keep others away; in fact they obstruct in the progress that might be made there. Is that, I would like to suggest to hon. Members, is that a proper way of dealing with these vast national questions? So I do submit that some difference might be made in the criticism of any Government policy or something, which should always be welcome to us, and the way this great country of ours and these great people of ours are functioning today and building up a New India. I have no doubt they are building it. I see all over the place and I have no doubt at all that the atmosphere, the air of India is invigorating and exhilarating today.

Professor Meghnad Saha said that all the figures that the Finance Minister has given were completely wrong, about the industrial and other progress that we have made. It is rather difficult for me in a short space of time to go into these detailed figures. Most of them, hon. Members know, have been given in the Planning Commission's progress report and other papers. But I really am surprised at Professor Saha challenging obviously right figures. He challenged the whole question of greater production.

The index of industrial production (in 1946 being 100) from 105 in 1950 rose to 117 in 1951, to 129 in 1952 and to 135 in 1953. In July this year it was 135. It is a big jump from 105 to 149. There has thus been an increase of over 33 per cent since 1950, it is a very good increase. Mr. Asoka Mehta said about its being lopsided. It may very well be lopsided. But let us remove the lopsidedness. Then again, it is also true, of course, that judging of these in terms of our needs and what we should do. It is not enough. We admit that. But the point is that there has been a marked increase in industrial production, whether it is output of cloth by 25 per cent or cement by 50 per cent; and Sindri has reached capacity production, and we are now on the verge of starting one or two more Sindries; electric energy, and so many other things. I agree, of course, there is no question of Government or anybody feeling complacent. The problem is terrific. All I can say is, not that we are complacent, but that (how shall I put it) that we are not frightened by this problem, we are going to face it and solve it, however difficult it may be. Not we; for the moment I am talking of all of us together and the country. Because the slightest weakening, the slightest element of complacency will come in our way, and we will have to work hard and think hard—think hard, I say. How do you solve it? You find these vast social problems in a country like India. We talk about classes, but something infinitely worse than classes exists in India: that is, castes, castes petrified. Can anybody deny, on this or that side, that it is a curse in this

country, this caste business which comes in the way, and is bound to come in the way of any kind of progress, political, social, economic? There it is. You have to deal with the situation. We have to fight that menace of caste which comes in our way. How are we to do this? Not by some resolution here. We are not going to change the caste structure of India by some resolution or by some law. We can help if we pass laws, about untouchability and all that; they are good, they help in bringing about a gradual change. My point is you cannot change this vast fabric of India, with its caste and other divisions, enormous divisions, provincialism and all that, by some magic wand.

Also, if you think on economic lines alone—you cannot, of course; but let us suppose we think on economic lines, the question of production, of balanced production, of employment how do we proceed about it? People argue about public sector and private sector, and it is important enough to argue it, talk about it, discuss it. But the question is not solved by either talking about public sector or private sector or both. After all, there must be so many factors in the problem and we have to make progress. There is something left, and unless you think of the consequences of one step and prepare for the second step from today, there will be bottlenecks and stoppages. Therefore it becomes necessary to think about these problems, not academically, but scientifically— not like Professor Saha, but scientifically, I say.

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It is essentially based on social statistics: not wishful thinking—except wishful thinking in the sense at the objective—but essentially based on social statistics; how we can gain something and how we can have a balanced economy, heavy industry, medium industry, light industry, cottage industry; how we can provide employment within the short space of time; and how we can generally raise the level of human happiness in the country and national strength.

It is quite possible, and I think Mr. Asoka Mehta was perfectly right in pointing out, that there has been lop-sided development. There has been. And, if I may say so, there has been lop-sided development in most other countries too, even in trying to plan.

Now, I think that this country—I am not comparing it with any other— but taking the background in this country as it is. all these separatist backgrounds, class and caste and all that, and provincialism, it has done, I think, a pretty good job of work, through its Planning Commission in making the people conscious of the problem. It is very important that people should generally become conscious of the intricacy of the problem and begin to think in terms of planning for India as a whole. They have done a very fine job. I am not referring to any individuals, but generally. We started planning as the House will remember three years or four years ago, with practically very little data. It is very difficult to plan without data. One can pass resolutions in Parliament and elsewhere as to what the objective is. Gradually, we have collected data. Gradually, we have made the States and the people in the States plan conscious. All the time, we had to face the terrific problem of food shortage in this country. We came to the conclusion rightly or wrongly that in the First Five Year

Plan, the most important thing was the agricultural front. Of course, we are carrying on the river valley schemes, we have put up the Sindri and Chittaranjan factories and all kinds of other things. But, essentially, we said that food shortage was a big problem and we concentrated on that. Opinions may differ as to whether we have done something about heavy industries or not. It is a matter of opinion. But, we did that because we felt that unless we have a strong basis in the food front our industrial efforts may, well, if not fail be begged or checked. Hon. Members who have studied the history of other countries, probably know that too much stress on heavy industries have produced difficult problems in those countries, the socialistic and the like countries. In fact, the cost paid for rapid industrialisation has been terrific in some countries. I doubt if any country deliberately would pay that cost it came their way; they paid it. I am certain that no country with any kind of parliamentary democracy can possibly pay it. Maybe, where we have dictatorship with an army behind it they may perhaps do it. Even there, I doubt it because, no dictator can go on too far without the consent of the people. You have to consider this. I am quite sure in my mind that real progress must ultimately depend on industrialisation. That industrialisation ultimately depends on heavy industries. Other things are good but heavy industries are more important. Of course, other things are important too: I am not saying of that. If we want even to preserve our national independence, and much more so if we want to raise our standard of living, heavy industries are essential. It is admitted. But, if I go in for heavy industries alone and not think of the other factors, it is quite possible that our problems may become much more difficult. It is quite possible that unemployment might grow. We have to face the problems which China has to face. Of course, we have many kinds of reports about China. There are good accounts and true accounts. There is terrific unemployment in China. Their leader says so. They are trying to face it; may be in a different way. The problem comes up before us. We want higher techniques. We cannot progress without higher techniques. The moment we think of higher techniques, we will cause unemployment. We do not want unemployment; we want more employment. We talk of rationalisation and the rest. These difficulties come up. One has to balance them. We have to see how we can go ahead on all fronts.

Shri Meghnad Saha has, fortunately, returned to the House. May I repeat something about his reference to our National Laboratories as having done nothing worthwhile in the industrial field?

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I am glad that Shri Meghnad Saha is of the opinion that the National Laboratories are worthwhile and that they have done good work.

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Well, Shri Meghnad Saha is neutral on that subject. Having had something to do with these National Laboratories and having met scores and scores of young scientists, men and women, who are working there, I can say that there is no finer set of young men and women in India than our young scientists. The other day, we had a small

conference on atomic energy. There were senior men present there. We heard their discourses with the respect that is always due to senior scientists. There were some young men present there too. If I may say so again with all respect to the seniors, the juniors outshone the seniors.

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The House may remember the saying in Urdu: 'The Teachers remained stagnant but pupils excelled'. I was talking about statistics. We are now engaged in trying to work out these problems as far as possible on a statistical basis. In this matter, naturally, we have asked for the help of our senior statisticians in the Statistical Institute. Such of the hon. Members as have seen the Statistical Institute in Calcutta will know what fine work they are doing and on a big scale. There are hundreds and hundreds of young people being trained there. In fact, it has become a centre of international training. There are, I think, men of 20 nationalities being trained there. Very eminent professors have come from abroad. At the present moment there are expert statisticians of world repute from a number of countries including America, England, France, Belgium, Norway, the Soviet Union, Japan, and may be one or two other countries. I am glad to say that there is peaceful coexistence among them. As I said, the problem is, we have set out for us to work out statistically as far as possible, how in 10 years' time—the Finance Minister yesterday said about unemployment being ended in 10 years—we can end unemployment and of course, increase production all round, how to do it in a balanced way and how much investment is necessary in heavy industries and cottage industries. It is obvious to us that we cannot do without any industries. We cannot do without cottage industries in a big way. It is not a question of conflict between them. All this has to be balanced in order to bring about this production. Of course, this requires very heavy investments. My point is this. I beg of the House and the country to consider these problems on this basis, excluding words and terms which provoke perhaps passions, excluding the slogan like approach, but in a practical way. We have got to do this and that. We have got to produce certain things. If we have got to produce certain things, we have got to have a factory or whatever it is, to produce them.

If we want a factory, we have got to make the machines for a factory in India, and look ahead as to what we want five years later. We want a plan for it today. It is Professor Saha or Shri Asoka Mehta who pointed out that we have been very slow about our steel production. I accept that indictment. We might have gone faster, certainly; but, anyhow, we have woken up to this fact some time back, and we intend to go as fast as we can. For the moment we have in view at least two additional plants and we are thinking also of a third. That is, we want to quadruple our steel production in the next few years. So, that, in these matters one can only approach them from this point of view of how we can bring about the greatest amount of production and the greatest employment, and the purchasing power etc., will flow from employment.

There is much discussion about the public sector and the private sector. I said the other day,—said it more than once—that I attach great importance to the public

sector and that the pattern of a society that we look forward to is a pattern which, broadly speaking, can only be described as a socialist pattern of society which is classless, casteless,—So far as the Congress is concerned, for a long time past it has laid down its objective as a casteless, classless society—which can only be attained obviously in a socialistic pattern. That is agreed. But, again, I would beg of you to think of the problem not, let us say, in this way that because socialism imagines or conceives of all nationalised industry, therefore you must have all nationalised industry;—I think that progressively as the socialist pattern grows, there is bound to be more and more nationalised industry—but what is important is not that there should be an attempt to nationalise everything, but the results of that. That is, what you are aiming at its production and employment if by taking any step you actually stop the production process from growing, the employment process from growing, then that does not lead you to that socialistic pattern, although that little step might be called socialistic. What one has to do is, in a country like India, where, being underdeveloped in many ways, money is lacking, where trained personnel is lacking, where experience is lacking, we have to take advantage of such experience, training, money etc., as we have got everywhere. We want to make this business of building up India, a tremendous cooperative enterprise of all the people, and try to avoid mere conflicts and try to avoid taking steps, which, by themselves may be agreeable, but which really have a chilling effect on this pattern. We want to go ahead in regard to production and employment. That is the vital thing. And in order to do that, we have to create an atmosphere and encourage the initiative for that purpose.

Now, in regard to the public and the private sector, it is obvious that with all the resources that we may have in the country in the hands of the State—they are limited—we cannot do all that we want to do at the present moment. We will try to do as much as we can, and perhaps we might do a good deal. But some people suggest: “You must prevent the private sector from functioning in regard to industries”. I think any such idea comes from confused thinking. I do not understand this business. I want a socialist society in India, but I am not going to get it by merely passing resolutions and slogans. I want India to move in that direction carrying a large number of people with it. I want to get of this framework of an acquisitive society.

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The point is, we have got this policy; whatever policy we lay down, we go ahead with it, but we always try to win over even those who suffer from that policy. One cannot win over everybody, but we will create an atmosphere of cooperation with us. I am too humble a person to talk big, but that at least is some little lesson we learnt from Gandhiji. He was a hard man in regard to the policies he considered vital, but he was always trying to win over even his opponent and his enemy—whether it was, politically, the Britisher, or whoever it was. Therefore, I submit that I would be glad if we made it perfectly clear what our objective is, what the socialist pattern of society means for us. But, having made that clear, let us not get lost in language, let us not think that we have done anything. It is far better to think in objective terms, than be

involved in this, that and the other. We want fuller employment. How are we to get it? We want industry. In order to get a socialist pattern of society, we have to break through, it is true, a certain crust of structure, call it an economic structure or a social structure. In the social structure, I would include caste and everything which inhibits progress, which comes in the way, which prevents the full growth, the full initiative being exercised by masses of people. I want to release that energy of the people. It is true that energy is released, may be, by a violent revolution, but then you pay for that revolution heavily, and it takes a generation or half a generation at least before you get over that, and there is a tremendous hiatus, and therefore, one has gradually to get out of that old crust. The old feudal crust was broken by the capitalist order when it came—the new capitalist order. We have to get out of this capitalist crust, and go in a socialist direction. As a matter of fact, all over the world this process is continuing, because of the nature of things. Some individuals might talk somewhere in a distant country about private enterprise and *laissez faire*, but nobody, practically nobody, believes in *laissez faire*. There is regulation and control all over the place in regard to, industry and imports and exports. The State everywhere, even in the more highly developed countries of the capitalist economy, function in a way which possibly a Socialist fifty years ago did not dream of. That has happened. But I am not saying that we should follow that slow course. I say let us go swifter and faster in that direction, definitely of a socialistic economy, but let us go in a balanced way. Let us get as much help as we can; and I do not see any harm at all, in fact I see a lot of good, in the private sector functioning.

I just reminded the House of a fact which perhaps it has not kept in mind, that our biggest private sector is the peasant, and the peasant, by the nature of things, is a conservative person, is far more conservative than the industrial worker or other. I am not going into the land problem now, but obviously by the abolition of the landlord system, we have not solved the land problem. Obviously, many other steps have to be taken. But here is this economy—of which whatever the percentage may be. I do not know, seventy, eighty or ninety per cent, or whatever it may be—which is an agrarian economy based on a private sector. What are you going to do with it? Well, we change it gradually.

The Finance Minister said something about rural credit and rural banking. I think that is a tremendous thing to release the energies of this vast countryside, if we do it rapidly and thoroughly. These are the things which you can discuss, and I am sure hon. Members of the Opposition could put forward many ideas which should be helpful. Merely to denounce it or repudiate it does not help at all.

Therefore, one has to think in terms of our objectives, keeping them ever in mind, the objectives being, I say,—to put it in that way, a socialised pattern of society. We want to attain that, the real objectives being human happiness of all our people. To put it in a more restricted way, we want full employment, and much greater production to raise our levels. To put it yet in a different way, we want to attain these things in a peaceful democratic way. We think that is the best way to attain them, because that prevents conflict, or lessens conflict; and therefore, ultimately, it is the speedier way, and it does not leave these trails of bitterness behind, which are very

harmful both to the State and to the individual. And within the State, we have to proceed as cooperatively as possible.

Now that might be good enough for any country, but for India, more especially, I think, it is even more necessary that we pursue that path, because of the great diversity of India, because, unfortunately, of the fissiparous tendencies, whether they are provincial, State, caste, communal, religious or whatever they are. We have got so many things to fight against in this country, and if we lose sight of this broad picture and merely but is in one direction, well, we might upset the whole applecart.

I now come to the public sector. From this larger point of view, it is obvious. In a country as undeveloped as we are, quite apart from the objectives, we cannot progress except by State initiative, except by enlarging the public sector, and except also by controlling the private sector in a measure, *i.e.*, the important points of the private sector. I cannot obviously go into the question where the line should be drawn. But the line will ever be a changing one because the public sector will be a growing one, and the point is that the strategic points must be controlled by the State. The strategic industries, and the strategic points in the private sector must be controlled by the State. Having said that, I should also like to say this. If I am right, Shri Asoka Mehta said something yesterday about the harassment or something caused to the private sector. I agree with him that we should control the private sector, the strategic points in the private sector. Having said that, if you leave something to the private sector, give them freedom to function within those strategic controls; it is absurd to ask them to function, denying them room to function there, denying them the initiative. We have them because presumably we think they will add to our common good in production. And if we deny them, in that sphere demarcated for them also, any initiative, then they are useless and helpless; it is better to take the whole thing then into the public sector.

If I may repeat, our policy must be, inevitably, one of raising production and increasing employment as rapidly as possible. In doing that, we can devise means. In doing that, it is essential that the public sector should grow as rapidly as possible. I think under circumstances in India today, it is quite necessary that the private sector should function under certain broad strategic controls, but otherwise with freedom, with initiative, etc., within those limits. But the controls are there, because we have to think of the public sector, and the private sector is part of the Plan, is a coordinated part of the Plan; this is where the strategic controls come in. That is to say, you have to think of the whole purpose, business of building up India as one largescale enterprise, cooperative enterprise, in which every group and every part of India shares. That is the only way I can conceive of it. There are people, naturally, in India, who are selfish, who are bad, who are corrupt, and who are everything—I do not say, everybody in India. But you have to create an atmosphere, so as to bring in as many people as possible to help in their own way. And we have to be wide awake all the time, so as to change our line of demarcation, for there is no limit to the public sector, and it can take anything it can. I do not wish to limit the public sector at all anywhere. Whatever we can, we take it. But our resources are limited, the State's resources are limited. It is

no good my preventing somebody else doing something which I cannot do myself; that is just folly, because thereby we lose something which might be done.

The Finance Minister calls this pragmatic approach. It is pragmatic in the sense that the pragmatic approach itself look in a certain direction, has certain objectives and definite ideas about it. But otherwise, it is based on an objective consideration of things as they are, and we can constantly vary any line to that extent.

Reference has been made to the Industrial Policy Statement of 1948. It is a broad statement. It does not go into any details, Shri Asoka Mehta referred to it as something moth-eaten. I really do not know what he meant by it, unless he said that he wants to go a little further. I think basically that statement is a very good statement. One can add to it. One can implement it. One can give more emphasis. But I see absolutely nothing in it which is wrong from our present point of view, and I think it is good indication of how we should proceed.

Maybe, in the course of the next few months, we shall have to consider the second Five Year Plan, and in that second Five Year Plan, It is obvious that we, shall have to lay much greater stress on industry. It is obvious that we shall have to lay much greater stress on the public sector of the industry in that Five Year Plan; also, the private sector, of course, will be there. I hope in fact that this House will have full opportunity to consider that even in its draft stages. The idea apparently is that a draft Plan should be prepared for discussion, *i.e.*, the draft second Five Year Plan, and after full discussion not only in Parliament but outside in the country, later, *i.e.*, after some months later, it should be finalised. That will be time for us to consider many of these details and lay down not only broad policies, but even more definite policies in regard to particular sectors.

BACK NOTE

XXX. Motion Regarding Economic Situation, 21 December, 1954

1. SHRI S. S. MORE (Sholapur): What is your science?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: My science, if I may say so.

2. SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA (Calcutta North-West): May I interrupt. I have not said anything like that.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Shri Asoka Mehta said so.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yesterday it was said.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: By Shri Asoka Mehta.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It does not matter really.

3. SHRI S. S. MORE: He has not said that.

SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA: I have not said that also.

4. SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA: May I interrupt? The particular junior scientist was my own student and I am very proud of that. The saying is:

Men seek victory everywhere but seek defeat from his own sons and students.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Of course, Shri Maghnad Saha is completely right.

5. SHRI S. S. MORE: Do you want the consent of the capitalists?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I might even seek the consent of Mr. More occasionally.

SHRI S. S. MORE: But Mr. More is not a capitalist.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is obvious there is no question of asking for people's consent, and especially we do not go and seek the consent of the landlords before we have land legislation. It is absurd. But, nevertheless, we have land legislation in a way so as not to throw the landlords to the wolves. That is, we try to fit them into our future structure. As a matter of fact, hon. Members might know that the landlords,

say of U. P., apart from a few, have been terribly hard hit by the land legislation; vast numbers, hundreds of thousands—I am not talking about small numbers —have been hit very hard indeed. Well, that is a consequence of a social change. One cannot help it, and many of them, realise it and accept it. We have not made them enemies. The other process is to make other people your enemies, call them enemies, and instead of getting some help from them, actually get obstruction from them. That I say is a wrong process either logically or from any point of view.

There is no question of our asking the permission of any capitalist or anything.

REPLY ON MOTION OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

25 February, 1955

Sir, for the last two days we have been discussing in this House the President's Address. Much has been said in praise and commendation of Government's policy and a little has been said in criticism thereof. Naturally, I am grateful for the bouquets that have been thrown at us, but I am equally grateful for the criticisms made, even though I do not agree with most of them.

I am a little afraid that this House in its enthusiasm might not perhaps imagine that we are doing more than we are doing. I am particularly referring to the international sphere, because some hon. Members in their speeches seemed to make out that India was playing a very important role, almost a dominating role, in regard to some world problems. Well, let us have a more correct perspective.

I believe that we have helped, occasionally, in regard to the solution of some problems, or the relaxation or lessening of tension and I think we should take due credit for that. But let us not go beyond that. After all a country's capacity to influence events is limited by various factors. As a matter of fact, if you look at the various factors you will find that India is lacking in most of those factors, and if we have been able to influence at all any events abroad, it has been due, not obviously, to any kind of military strength or financial power, but—if I may say so in all modesty—because we took a correct view of events and we understood them more correctly than others, because we were more in tune with the spirit of the age and therefore could understand those things, not because we had greater strength or power. We could not threaten anybody; nor did we want to. Therefore, I would beg the House to look at this in that perspective. I feel, after all, in so far as international policy is concerned, right or wrong, I hope, counts somewhere. But it is not the rightness of a proposition that is listened to but rather the person or the country who says so and the strength behind that country. Any international policy depends ultimately on the domestic state of affairs in that country; indeed international affairs and domestic policies have more or less to be in line; they cannot be isolated from one another and in the ultimate analysis it is the internal state of affairs of a country that enables it to speak with some strength, force and authority in the international sphere. I do not wish to indulge in invidious comparisons. But hon. Members can themselves look at India as our country is today and a number of other countries and decide for themselves how far India has not progressed in the last six or seven years more than most other countries. It is indeed due to this feeling that India is marching forward, India is a country which is firmly established and is dynamic—it is due to this idea that people in the rest of the world see India with a measure of respect.

Many hon. Members have complained that the President has not referred to this matter or that. I have often ventured to point out that the President's Address is

not a long list of everything we have done and everything that we want to do. It is not a review of all our departments and ministries. The President's Address by convention deals briefly with India's relations with other countries and with international affairs—that is, some important points in that respect—and deals briefly with the broad internal picture.

The hon. Member opposite said, at great length I believe, that the President should have spoken more about the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Why should the President speak at great length about the Army, the Navy and the Air Force? I do not understand it. It is not that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force are not important. Let us discuss them at the right time and at the right moment. Why should the President indulge in discussing the state of affairs in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force or for the matter of that, the Indian Administrative Service or any other service? I therefore, want this House to look at things in some perspective. We are always likely to lose ourselves in the trees forgetting the big forest that we are in. Perhaps many of the difficulties of the present day in regard to international affairs are due to the fact,—if I may say so with modesty— that people have lost perspective: or, in the alternative, they have not been aware of the big changes that have come about and are coming about all over the world. We live at the present time if I may say so, in an extraordinarily revolutionary age—revolutionary in the true sense of the word that everything is in a transition and is changing rapidly. Why so, is a different matter.

You may say: it is the culmination of the industrial revolution, the crisis of the industrial revolution, of which the present symbol might be considered to be the atomic bomb or hydrogen bomb because it is all the product of the industrial revolution, development of science and technology: all the other things that have happened in the world are the resultants of the industrial revolution that had begun 200 years or a little less, ago. We have arrived at this stage and the symbol of the age today is hydrogen bomb. We see it in terms of terrific destruction but it is something more than that; it is a symbol of enormous power that the world has got since the advent of the industrial revolution. We are having another revolution of even greater magnitude where power is being released. Whether that power will make humanity perish or survive is another matter. But there is this enormous power that has come into being. Unless one has some clear conception of this, one cannot judge the other problems because they are related to this.

Take another aspect of the world situation today: what is happening in Asia particularly and to a much lesser extent in Africa. In Africa there is a ferment. In Asia there is something much more than a ferment. Things have happened; revolutions have taken place. The whole face of things has changed and is changing. One of the dominant features of our age is the rise of Asia and it is totally immaterial whether people like it or dislike it: it is a fact. Unfortunately, people do not accept facts. Here is a fact as big and solid fact as any that you can imagine—the fact of the existence of the People's Government of China. But some countries do not recognise it. The United Nations calls the island of Formosa, China. It is an extraordinary state of

affairs; geography means nothing to the United Nations nor to other countries. How can any policy which is based on deliberate avoidance of such a fact be a correct policy? Apart from that, what I was trying to point out was this: here is this Asia in the process of a tremendous revolutionary change and transition. That change and transition may take different shapes and forms in different parts. But the major point is that it has got out of its ruts. And yet you will find great countries knowing very well that political changes are taking place but not being emotionally aware of these great changes and imagining that the old practices could be followed in the affairs and problem relating to Asia. I do not want to say or imply that Asia should, if I may say so, put herself against any other continent.

What I am trying to point out is that the first thing necessary in order to solve the problem is to understand the nature of the problem. If you do not understand the nature of the problem and if you do not know what the question is, how can you find an answer to that question? I do submit that enough attempt is not being made to understand that question. To understand, perhaps intellectually, it may be possible but not so to understand emotionally and psychologically and to have a feeling of what is happening in Asia and in Africa. It may not seem very dangerous from the point of view of foreign representatives. At present, what is happening in Africa is of the greatest interest and moment. Leave out ourselves—of course, we are there. It is of the greatest interest to any student of history and to any person who wants to see history in some perspective. And yet I am astonished at the way Africa is treated and is being treated still. What I want to say is: because, may be, of past habits, past practice or present interest—whatever it is— people are unable to view the situation as it is. We have to understand these vast new forces that have been let loose, geographical, if you like, because geography counts also; of course, political, economic, social and many other. These are functioning in the world, and in a sense you might for the moment consider the nuclear forces as the symbols of the age.

There are many consequences from this trying to understand the problem in this new context. One is, and I say so with all respect, that all our previous thinking may become out of date in the new context. All our thinking—and I say so to all our colleagues sitting here in this House, whether on my side or the opposite side—all our thinking may have become out of date in this nuclear age and in this age where politics and economics and everything has been affected. All the slogans that we have used in the past—there may have been some truth in them, and there may be still—but they do not exemplify the present age. We have to understand, therefore, the present situation afresh, whether in the international sphere or in our domestic sphere.

I should like to say just a few words in this context which is very important. I should like to say a few words about certain international aspects of problems we have to face and some casual remarks about our domestic policies. As the House knows, the most important question today internationally speaking, and the most dangerous one, is the situation that is being created in regard to Formosa and the offshore islands of China. The President has referred to it and he has stated that we recognise the People's Government of China, we recognise no other China, and that

Chinese claims are justified according to our thinking. Some hon. Members have criticised the statement. I should like them to consider some aspects of this question.

First of all, it is patent that we cannot recognise two Chinas. We can recognise only one. In fact it is nobody's case that there are two Chinas—at any rate no country's case. And we have deliberately recognised one China because that was the real China. Obviously, Formosa is not China.

The question arises as to why we should say, or the President should say, that Chinese claims appear to be justified—Chinese, whoever has China. I will not go into ancient history, because for hundreds and hundreds of years Formosa has been part of the Chinese State, except for a little less than half a century when the Japanese occupied it, and China always looked upon it as its own and claimed it; it was totally immaterial what government existed. This was the nationalist claim of China.

But apart from this, in Cairo, in Potsdam this was clearly stated that Formosa should go to China. It is true that China then was not governed by a Government which is predominantly Communist. Subsequently, under the Japanese surrender terms also this was stated. And—I speak from memory—in the San Francisco Treaty also some kind of reference was made to it. So that, at no time has there been any doubt cast on the fact that Formosa is part of the Chinese State. Now, what has happened in the last year or two or, if you like, three years to change that position? I am not aware of anything, unless one says one does not like the present Chinese State. That, logically or legally is no particular argument.

Therefore it follows logically—I can understand even a logical proposition being upset by war or by other settlements, they are not ruled out— but for a country which recognises the present Government of China it logically and inevitably follows that Formosa is part of that State. At the present moment it is in possession of Marshal Chiang Kai Shek supported by a Great Power. That is the fact as it exists today. What is to be done about it?

I do not propose to argue about that matter except to lay stress on this that whatever is done, one should try to negotiate a settlement peacefully. It may take a little time. Time spent is better than war which might extend and bring ruin to a large part of the world.

There is a curious division of opinion about these matters among some countries of the West. There is hardly any country which does not recognise that the offshore islands, notably Quemoy and Matsu, are obviously and definitely parts of China. They are a few miles, five miles or ten miles beyond the shore. And no country can tolerate an enemy sitting ten miles from their shore bombarding them all the time. It is an intolerable situation. Therefore it is almost generally recognised that those islands should immediately be evacuated and taken possession of by the government of the mainland. But that has not been done. I do not know if that will be done. I should have thought that was an additional step that should be taken in any event. Because, it has

absolutely no justification of any kind. After that, so far as Formosa and the Pescadores are concerned that matter can be taken up.

The difficulty—it is not in regard to Formosa alone but in regard to many world problems—is, I do believe, a certain hiatus between facts as they are today and the thinking.

I shall put to this House another aspect. One hears frequently about pacts and military alliances in Europe, in the Middle East, in South East Asia, elsewhere. There are in the world today two mighty Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. There are some other Great Powers today, the United Kingdom and may be one or two others; they are great in degrees. I can understand, although I would not approve of it, military alliances between Great Powers. There is some meaning. I do not understand military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a Power and a little pigmy of a country. It has no meaning in a military sense to me. It has absolutely no sense. In this nuclear age the only countries that count, from the nuclear war point of view are those great countries which are, unfortunately, in a position to use these bombs. But to attach small countries to themselves in alliance really simply means—and I say so with all respect to those countries—that they are becoming very much dependent on the other countries. They do not add to the defence, from the military value; it is little or nil. May be, it may be supposed to have some value from a psychological point of view. I wish to refrain from saying anything which might militate against anybody. But it applies to both groups, not to one group. First of all, in this nuclear age, to think of war itself is, I think, insanity. Because, any person who has thought about it, not every but many, many general whether in England or France or U.S.A. or the Soviet Union, have all said that war today is unthinkable, simply because a war is fought to achieve certain results, not to bring ruin on yourself. War, today, will bring ruin to every country involved, not only one. In this nuclear age, war is unthinkable. All the great countries appear to be clear about it and are absolutely certain that there is no country in the world which wants war. To talk about war mongers and the rest is completely wrong. There is nobody—individuals may be—no country that wants war. If that is so. what, is the value of this policy of military alliances and armaments. I do not understand it. It does not logically follow from the first. I am not criticising the past for the moment. I am trying to think in terms of today, after the development of thermo-nuclear bomb, the hydrogen bomb, because, it has changed the whole picture of fighting today. What might have been good a few years ago is no longer good today.

Remember this, the fact that one country has far more bombs and the other country has less is of no great relevance. It has some relevance, of course. I believe, in phrases like one country has more and the other less, the question is that the country that has less has reached the saturation point. That means that a situation is reached that the country that has less, although it has less, has enough to cause infinite damage to the other country. There is no defence against these things. You merely damage or ruin the other country. When you have arrived at the stage of saturation point, you have arrived at the stage of mutual extermination. Then the only

way out is to prevent, to avoid war. There is no other way. This talk about reduction of armaments etc. good as it is, does not help much. That is point No. 1.

Secondly, in this age of nuclear warfare, what does this business of having alliances and pacts mean? How does it help in a military sense psychologically, it may. Whatever military strength a country has, I suppose it possesses. I am not asking them to disband their armies or their air forces or whatever it is. They are there. The only effect of these pacts and alliances, appears to me to be to try to frighten, to hold a kind of threat. These threats are being thrown about on both sides of these powerful blocs: if this happens. We shall do this and destroy you; if this happens, we are ready; all this. Again, if I may say so, this business of threatening through military pacts has become rather obsolete in this nuclear age. If you threaten a power, a big one which has nuclear weapons, it is not likely to be frightened. If you threaten small countries, of course, small countries might possibly come under the threat—it is a possibility—and function through fear.

As things are today, we have reacted a certain, if you like, balance—it is a very unstable balance, but a certain balance—when any kind of major aggression is likely to lead to a world war. If you like, that itself is a factor that checks. Whether aggression takes place in a small country or big,—even if it is a small country—because it tends to upset that unstable balance, a war is likely to result. It is because of this that in the Geneva Conference, the House will remember, there was much argument about some of the Indo-China States or all of them. Either major party was afraid that if these States or some of them link up or are coerced into joining one group or the other, it will be to the disadvantage of the other. For instance, suppose countries like Laos and Cambodia were overwhelmed or drawn into the sphere of China, that frightened the other countries, big and small on the other side. On the other hand, if Laos and Cambodia became hostile to China and could be used as bases for attack on China, naturally China objected to it very strongly. What was the way out of the difficulty? Either you have war to decide who is the stronger one or you make Laos and Cambodia or all the Indo-China States more or less outside the sphere of influence, outside the alignments, outside the military pacts and alliances of the two groups, so that both could feel, at least to some extent, secure in the knowledge that these Indo-China States are not going to be used against them. There is no other way out. Because, if any party went more forward, there, the other party had to check it and there came conflict, there came war. So, wisely, at Geneva, they decided more or less, though not in clear language, but more or less that these Indo-China States should keep out of military pacts or alliances on either side: in other words, remain more or less neutralised: not quite, but more or less.

If you extend that argument, you will see that the only way to avoid conflicts is, first of all, to accept things more or less as they are; I do not say completely, because many things require change. But, broadly speaking, you must not think of changing them by war, because, war does not do what you want to do but it does something much worse, something quite different. Secondly, by enlarging the area of peace, of

countries which are not aligned to this group or that, which are friendly to both, and which do not intend joining in any war, you reduce the chances of war.

As the House knows, India has adopted a certain policy in this respect. We have followed this policy consistently during the last few years. I believe that that policy has been appreciated by many countries. Some countries of Asia, not because of us, but because of their own reasons, have followed a similar policy. Even other countries which have not followed it have begun to appreciate our policy. I should like to say this in regard to our policy. We are following it because we are convinced that it is the right policy and we would follow it even if there was no other country in the world that followed it, because, it is not a question, as some hon. Members seem to imagine, of balancing the things, joining this group or that or sitting on the hedge, but because it is a positive policy, it is the only policy which we think we should follow, and we hope others would follow. We follow that policy with conviction and faith. There is no doubt about that because there is conviction and faith in our mind. Also, because people have their conviction or their reasons for it, or because of the benefits of it not only in the present but in the possible future, they have begun to appreciate it more and more.

The House knows of some countries, some good friends in Asia like Burma, Indonesia, who have more or less been following the same policy in international affairs. Recently, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came here and he and I issued a statement in which reference was made to the *Panch Shil* five principles. That indicated how the idea is spreading. I can assure this House that even though many Governments may not publicly approve of it, people in many countries have been attracted to it and are constantly being more and more attracted to it.

In this world today there are many schools of thought and action, I cannot enumerate all of them, but I can mention a few. There is the school of strong action, as it calls itself. That, I suppose is a relic of the old days; when some small country misbehaved, a warship or a cruiser was sent down to frighten it into submission. Strong action is all right when a very big country shows a mailed fist to a very small country, but strong action does not go very far when the other country has also got a big fist. However, there is a school of strong action. Then there is a school which talks about negotiation through strength—a good thing. Of course, if you are weak, nobody will listen to you. But, as one develops one's strength to negotiate, unfortunately the other party also goes on developing its strength. So, more or less the balance remains where it was. In fact, sometimes it becomes worse, so that, that does not help very much.

Then there is the school of—what shall I call it—learned confusion which talks very learnedly about international affairs, discusses them, delivers speeches, writes articles, but never gets out of a confused state of mind. There is a fourth school, equally prominent, of ignorant confusion. So that, between all these various schools it is a little difficult to get to know where we are, what we are more especially when the problem relates to Asia, because most of the currents of thought today in international

affairs comes from Europe and America. They are great countries there, to be respected, but the greatness of a country does not necessarily endow it with greater understanding of some other country; and the fact that Asia has changed and is changing has not wholly been grasped by many people in other continents. Therefore, in thinking of Asia more especially, there is great confusion.

Now, probably—certainly in America and in some parts of Western Europe—the world seems to be divided into two mighty camps, the Communists and the anti-Communists, and they see these two great forces in conflict with each other, and they cannot understand—either party cannot understand—how any one can be foolish enough not to line up with them. Now, that itself shows how little understanding they have of the mind of Asia. Well, I will not presume to talk of Asia, although what I say applies to many countries in Asia, but Asia is a big continent with many ways of thinking and functioning.

To take India now, we have fairly clear ideas about our political structure, about our economic structure. We function here in this Parliament and in this country under a Constitution which may be described as that of a parliamentary democracy. We have accepted it. It has not been imposed upon us. We propose to continue it. We do not intend changing it. We intend to function on the economic plane, too, in our own way. I hope to say a few words about that aspect slightly later. We, with all respect to some hon. Members opposite have no intention to turn Communists. But, at the same time, we have no intention of being dragooned in any other direction. So that, simply we mean no ill to anybody. Every country has a right to choose its own path and go along it. We have chosen our path and we propose to go along it, and to vary it as and when we choose, not at somebody's dictates or pressure; and we are not afraid of any other country imposing its will upon us by military methods or any other methods. Anyhow, the only way is for us to build up our own strength, internal strength and other strength, which we intend doing. Meanwhile we want to be friendly with, other countries. So that, our thinking and our approach does not fit in with this great crusade of Communism or anticrusade of Communism or anti-Communism. And many people in those countries do not understand this, the cause of this. And yet many countries of Asia have inevitably to follow this policy, unless we are much too weak to stand on our own feet. Then it is a different matter. If a country is too weak to stand on its own feet, then it seeks shelter, then it seeks help because it cannot rely upon itself. But that is an unfortunate state of affairs. But there is this for us to consider that if we seek help, there is the help which countries take in friendship which we are willing to take of course, but there is the help which countries take because they are too weak to stand on their own feet. Well, that help does not help at all, it weakens. And hence, we have been careful in this matter to make it clear always that our policies cannot be affected and there must be no strings attached to any kind of help that we get, that we would rather struggle through ourselves without any help than to have our policies affected in any way by outside pressure.

I was mentioning just now the change in Asia which is taking many forms. Presently, in the course of about seven weeks there is going to be a conference at Bandung in Indonesia—an Asian-African conference it is called—to which a number of countries, independent countries of Asia and Africa, have been invited. So far as I know, every country that has been invited is likely to attend. I am not quite sure, all the answers have not come, but I think they will all attend. Now, what this conference is going to do exactly I cannot say. I cannot, it is not up to me or even to the sponsoring countries to draw up their agenda. It is the conference that will decide. But, I was a little surprised to learn that hon. Member, Mr. Asoka Mehta, said something about this conference drawing up a vast programme for the liberation of suppressed countries. Now, we are all for the liberation of suppressed countries. There is no doubt about that. But the idea of associating this conference with a programme of this type seems to me to misunderstand completely the purpose of this conference. Are we going to set up an agitation there? The House will remember this is an official level conference, Governments are represented. In fact, Prime Ministers are represented. And in the conference there are completely different ideologies and political and economic structures so to say, completely different. There are countries in this Conference, which are aligned to this great Power Bloc or the other Power Bloc, and there are countries like India and Burma and Indonesia and others, which are not aligned with any. So, here we meet this curious assortment of countries of Asia and Africa, with certainly much in common, and also much not in common. It is going to be an extraordinary meeting. And yet, the mere fact of our meeting is of the highest significance. It is the first time that such a meeting is taking place. It does represent rather unconsciously, subconsciously, Asia and Africa coming to the forefront. I do not know whether this idea was present in the mind of the original sponsor of this Conference wholly, but because the proposal was made at the right time, it fitted into the spirit of the times, and this Conference has thus got an importance of very high significance.

Obviously, a Conference of this type is hardly likely to discuss highly controversial issues as between the countries represented there. Also, if I may express my own opinion. I hope it does not function as if it was setting up a rival group to others. It is essentially an experiment, if I may use the word, in coexistence, essentially an experiment in countries of Asia and Africa,—some of which are inclined this way, and some the other way in regard to the Power Blocs—meeting together, meeting in a friendly way, and trying to find what common ground there is to cooperate in the economic field, the cultural field or even the political field. Therefore, this is a development, which is, from the point of view not only of Asia but of the world, of great importance.

The hon. Member Shrimati Renu Chakravartty gave me the honour of quoting at some length one of my own books about democracy. I have looked up the passage, and I could tell her that by and large I agree with what I wrote 22 years ago, although

I hope I have developed much since then. What I said—if I might repeat that—was that democracy, if it is confined to political democracy, and does not extend and does not become economic democracy at all, is not full democracy. And many people want to hide themselves under this cloak of political democracy, and prevent other kinds of progress. Broadly speaking, I said this. That is perfectly true. Now, something has happened in recent years, which is quite new and novel. Even in regard to political democracy, it is quite a recent event that adult suffrage has come to various countries of the West even; it is quite new. And therefore, the argument that a small restricted democracy was in favour of vested interests, while quite true, does not apply when there is adult suffrage in a country; it may apply to some extent, but not certainly to that extent.

The problem that we really have to face is whether the changes we want to make, changes in the economic domain, can be brought about by the democratic method peacefully or not. Normally speaking, if democracy is not functioning in the political plane properly, then there is no way out to bring about a change, except by some kind of pressure tactics or violence or revolution or violent revolution. But where there is this peaceful method available, and where there is adult suffrage, there the question of trying to change anything by violence is not only absurd, but wholly wrong, according to my thinking, because that means that a small number of people are trying to impose their will by means of violence on a much larger number, having failed to change their opinions by the normal method of reasoning or argument. That, certainly, is not democracy, political or economic or any. Therefore, the problem before us is to have democracy—we have it politically—and to extend it in the economic field.

I think it was the hon. Member Shri Asoka Mehta possibly, who asked the question about what I have meant when I was talking about socialist pattern of society; and another respected colleague of his, Acharya Narendra Dev has also asked this question in public. I think he is completely entitled to ask that question, though I do not know if he expects from me a kind of formal and specific and detailed answer. Frankly, I am not in a position to give that detailed answer. But if you want me to explain what we aim at, that is a different thing. We have called it a welfare state; certainly; I go a step further and say we aim at an egalitarian society.

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This is a serious matter. Even the system of production, distribution, everything has changed because of the tremendous development of technology. That does not put an end to any economic doctrine or any other doctrine, but it does point out new avenues of approach. I say, all our economic thinking has to be refashioned in the nuclear age—I come back to the hydrogen bomb—in terms of nuclear power. It is not that I wish to show any lack of respect to the great thinkers of the past: they were very great thinkers, and we must profit by what they have said already. But I do submit that to apply them wholesale in the present age is complete lack of thinking

and lack of judgment. Now, what we have to do and what we aim at is this—leave out the final picture, except that the final picture is important of course, for we must know where we are going to; but in the present, the most important thing becomes one of rapid production of wealth and increasing unemployment...

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I am sorry, lessening unemployment. Honourable friends opposite are satisfied by very little things. They have not got much to hand on to now.

It is obvious that by whatever process, whatever method you may adopt, you have to have increased production in the country and greater employment till you reach full employment. Let us forget various 'isms' and catch phrases, good as they may be. Let us, therefore, think out how we can do it, scientifically. Before you start thinking, you have to have the data, the statistics, for it. We talk about planning. I think it is good, of course. I think we may take credit for this, that in the course of the last three or four or five years, our country has become completely planning—conscious—which is a good thing. Now, planning itself cannot be done in the air, just wishful thinking; it has to be based on data, on statistics. When you plan, you make a picture of five years hence or ten years. Now, you have to find out what your production will be then, what your consumption per capita will be, this, that and the other—how much food people will eat, how much your standards go up, how much more cloth people will consume or more food or more sugar or more shoes or more anything. All that has to be calculated; all that has to be provided for. So that if somebody asks 'define your socialism', well, I may give a picture, a distant picture, I have in view where there is a happy society with everybody having opportunities and nobody domineering over another and so on and so forth. That is easy enough; but it does not help, except to have a picture of what you are aiming at. The point is that in the present circumstances, we have got to increase our wealth in this country. We have got to see that distribution is just and that unevenness in this country is removed, and that ultimately we have a society where equality prevails. I am afraid that type of society is not going to come in my lifetime; let us be frank about it.

Obviously, you cannot by magic change 360 million people in this country suddenly. In every country, in any country, it takes a long time to do it. But we can go fast and we can remove, at any rate, many of the ills and differences that exist today. The faster you go now, the more you go now, the faster you can go later.

So that the approach to these problems, having had a clear picture of what I consider the socialist pattern, should be by devising means for greater production and greater employment. Now, obviously if we think in terms of socialism, we must have ever more social control of the major means of production. There again, we are not thinking—I am speaking frankly—of land becoming the public sector. Land remains a private sector. We are thinking in terms of cooperation, a cooperative effort. But land remains there. That itself rules it out I do not know what percentage of the country's land will remain in the private sector, though strategic controls will be there for the public good.

Then again, in regard to many other forms of activities, the private sector will have full play, but undoubtedly, the public sector—socially owned, of course—will grow more and more important—it is very important today—and it will have a dominating position and it will, by and large, control the economy of the country. That process will continue. Now, I think there is no example in history where this experiment of this type has been made in any other country. We have seen in other countries that what has happened is this. Many countries in Western Europe, the industrialised countries, developed industrially, economically. They made good progress before political democracy advanced very much. We have got instances, on the other hand, of certain countries, say, the Soviet Union, where by various revolutionary processes they industrialised their country more or less rapidly in the course of thirty years or so; remember, not in five or seven years; but in the course of thirty years or so. Now, we have not got that process. Here the process through which the countries of Western Europe went is reversed. We have got political democracy of the highest order to begin with and now we have to build up our economy under that. Remember the process was the very reverse of what it was in Western Europe for 100 or 150 years. Therefore, we are facing this problem in a novel way and we want to gain economic progress and all that through these democratic, peaceful processes. I think we can do it; in fact, I am sure we can do it. I am sure not because of any theoretical argument, because there is no question of theory, but simply because I am sure of the Indian people; I am proud of them. Therefore, I think we can do it. Anyhow, it is a tremendous thing, and the only way for us is to approach this question pragmatically, keeping that picture in view, the approach, I mean, of going as fast as we can, always basing our thinking and our action on facts, statistics and science.

BACK NOTE

XXXI. Reply on Motion of Thanks to President's Address, 25 February, 1955

1. SHRI M. S. GURUPADASWAMY (Mysore): What is that?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, I cannot go into explaining words—it means a society where economic opportunity and the rest are equal among the people.

SHRI NAMBIAR (Mayuram): How to get it?

SHRI ALGU RAI SHASTRI (Azamgrah Distt.—East cum Ballia Distt.—West): Wait, and you will get it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: These are broad generalisations. Anybody can say them, but I say them because one has to keep some picture in view, and there is a grave danger of—as hon. Members opposite are sometimes inclined to do—imagining they have done brave deeds because they have shouted a slogan, or that they have changed society by reciting a few phrases, usually out of date phrases.

SHRI S. S. MORE: What are your steps?

MR. SPEAKER: Let him proceed.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Steps there can be; the first step is to think correctly and not be tied down to slogans. That is important.

SHRI S. S. MORE: Next step?

SHRI TYAGI (The Minister of Defence Organisation): Try the first.

2. SHRI K. K. BASU: Truth has come out.

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS

31 March, 1955

Perhaps, it might be helpful, if I said something in broad outline about the situation confronting us today, although the subjects before us deal with the Demands for Grants and, no doubt, the various cut motions, or some of them at least, are important in their respective spheres. After all, the whole Ministry of External Affairs is broadly responsible for our international relations, and international relations today play perhaps a more important role in the world, even in affecting domestic policy, than almost anything else.

We live from day to day in fear of something happening which might confront us with a grave situation of war or peace. It is true that I do not think there is any immediate danger of war or danger of war in the near future; nevertheless, I am sorry to say that the situation generally in the world has hardened; it has become more difficult of solution, and things are happening which might well lead not merely to a worsening of the situation but to catastrophic results. Perhaps when the history of these times is written in the future, two things will stand out. One is the coming of atomic energy and the other is the emergence of Asia. There are, of course, many other important things happening too, but I do think that these two matters are, in a historic sense, of high importance, more important than anything else. As the sign and symbol of the latter, that is, the emergence of Asia, we are having, as the House well knows, a conference at Bandung in Indonesia. In about two and a half weeks' time, a Conference which is styled the Asian-African Conference, to which all the free and independent nations of Asia and Africa have been invited. I do think that this Conference has something of historic importance about it. It is unique, of course; no such thing has ever happened before, and the fact that representatives, I believe, of 1400 million people meet there, even though they differ amongst themselves, is a matter of the utmost significance.

The House will remember that it had become a regular practice for the affairs of Asia to be determined by certain Great Powers in Europe or sometimes in America, and the fact that people in Asia might have any views about those subjects was not considered a matter of very great importance. It is true that some importance is attached to those views now, because they cannot be ignored; nevertheless, it seems to be the high privilege of countries outside Asia to carry the burden of Asia on their shoulders, and repeatedly things happen and decisions are made affecting Asia in which Asia has little say. But it is obvious that things have changed in Asia. Whether they have changed for the right or for the wrong may depend upon the opinions people hold; but they have changed, and changed greatly, and are changing, and this kind of other people deciding the fate of Asian countries is not approved of by the countries of Asia. I cannot presume to speak for other people, but I think I am correct in saying so. So this Asian-African Conference is a gathering, I think, of very

great importance. The mere fact of its meeting is important. What it does. I cannot say, because countries coming there have different policies, different outlooks, sometimes opposing policies, and I do not know that it will be very easy for them to evolve any common outlooks or approaches. Yet, it is clear that there is something in common between them, even though they might otherwise differ; otherwise, they would not have agreed to gather together in this way.

So that is an important factor which, I hope, the House will remember, the Conference that is coming. The Conference, of course, is not opposed to anybody, opposed to Europe or America or taking sides as Conference in the great conflict and tug-of-war that is going on in the world. It is merely a coming together of Asian and African countries. Now, what do the Asian and African countries exactly aim at? All of them? Well, they obviously aim at two things; peace and opportunity to progress. They are all anxious to do that. They are not interested in other people's quarrels or disputes. They want to get on. They want to make good themselves in their own countries just as we, in our country, want to make good. And, for that purpose, we want peace in the world. Therefore, there is this tremendous urge for peace which is present all over the world, I think in the countries of Asia and Africa more than perhaps even elsewhere; just as the urge to freedom too is present, I think, all over the world, but more so among those who were not free for long periods, who either recently achieved their freedom or have yet to achieve their freedom. Freedom for them is much more important than to those who have been used to freedom for a long time past. Therefore, there is this passionate desire for peace and opportunity for progress in these countries and that is a common bond.

As I said—I hope, I cannot say definitely—but I hope, the Conference will not line up with these Great Power blocs. It cannot, in the nature of things, because the countries, that are attending the Conference themselves hold different views on that matter. The House knows that it has become almost impossible to consider any matter logically and reasonably or by itself. Everything has to be considered, now, we are told, like this: whether it advances the communist cause or defeats it, whether it is communist or anti-communist. There is no way of dealing with the situation by some Powers and authorities unless you raise the conflict of communism or anti-communism. Now, this has made it difficult to understand any question, much less to solve it. The simple, rather naive view of the world is that you must belong to this bloc or that bloc. If you do not, well, you are either very foolish or you do not understand what is happening in the world or there is some mischief behind your attitude. This kind of approach would have been difficult enough at any time, but, when we live as we do now on the verge, on the threshold, of this atomic age, it is a dangerously simple way of looking at things. And, we might, because of the simple thinking—I mean the world—suddenly find ourselves lust on the brink of disaster.

We have endeavoured not to align ourselves with these Great Powers and I speak of them with all respect. I do not presume to tell them what is right or wrong, but, I must confess that I feel very diffident about expressing any opinion in regard to other countries—sometimes in regard to my own—I feel very diffident because

the problems we have to face are very difficult. There are new problems being brought out and if people try to solve them by some slogan or precedent of their own times, then, I am afraid, it may be completely wrong. Therefore, I speak with every diffidence about these matters. It passes my comprehension how any of the problems of today are going to be solved by the approaches that are being made today by the Great Powers. I cannot understand this.

There was one approach sometime ago, last year in Geneva, which was a logical approach. It was an approach directed towards the solution of the problem. It did lead at least to a temporary solution because those who met desired to reach a certain conclusion and because the problem was dealt with as such and not merely as the backwash of the great struggle between communist and anti-communist countries. Therefore it was solved. Having achieved a measure of success at Geneva the world has again drifted back to glaring at each other from a distance, countries glaring at each other from a distance and, it seems to me very extraordinary, laying great stress on all types of military alliances and pacts, in South East Asia, in Western Asia and elsewhere in the name of security and peace.

Now, this question might be argued in theory whether these pacts encourage security or peace, but we need not go into the theory of it because we have the actual facts before our eyes, as to what is happening. There was a situation in the Indo-China States after the Geneva Conference which was a hopeful and a favourable situation, a difficult one, but nevertheless a hopeful one. And, for some months it lasted, and the Commissions of which India has the honour to be Chairman functioned satisfactorily and harmoniously. Then comes out of the blue an attempt, as it was said, to secure security and peace in South East Asia through some kind of a military pact or alliance, the foundations of which were laid at Manila. It was not clear to me then how exactly peace was ensured or security assured by that pact. It is clear to me now that that Manila Treaty and the Bangkok Conference that followed have upset any ideas of peace in that area that previously existed or any ideas of security and the whole conception lying behind the Geneva Conference which was a conception, if I may use the word, of co-existence. The Indo-China States could not continue unless they recognised each other and unless the other Great Powers recognised their freedom and independence and came to an understanding not to interfere with their freedom and independence. It was on that basis that the Geneva Treaty was formed. What is the trouble with the world today? Not perhaps so much the aggressive intention of any country, though individual may have them, but the terrible fear of each country that the other has aggressive intentions. And in order to prevent the other from being the aggressor you become the aggressor yourself. It is a most extraordinary situation and that was the position in regard to the Indo-China States because each of the major countries was afraid lest the others take advantage of the Indo-China States against it. And the only solution was that both Powers should agree to leave the Indo-China States by themselves and alone by and large and not to try to line them up with their own group because the moment one group tried to increase its influence or its pressure, or brought the areas under its own sphere of influence as it has been

euphemistically called in the past, immediately the other power got going to introduce itself and the conflict began again, call it a cold war or call it what you like.

Unfortunately, that rather happy phase in Indo-China did not last long. I do not say it has all broken up. But the situation is much more difficult today. Quite apart from that, the House will judge of the curious situation when they read only in this morning's papers that there is civil war in South Vietnam. It was an extraordinary state of affairs in Laos. The outcome of the Geneva Agreement is interpreted in various ways and the Geneva Agreement, I must say, was drafted in such a hurry that it can be interpreted in various ways. And so, I am talking about the Geneva Agreement in regard to Laos, not the whole Agreement. Difficulties are arising. I do not want to go into details about these matters, but I am merely pointing out that all these difficulties arise. I do not wish to say whose fault it is but we have a certain responsibility in trying to resolve those difficulties. To point out or to name people at fault does not help in resolving a difficulty, but what I want this House to bear in mind is this, that because of certain developments in the Far East, in South-West Asia, the whole atmosphere has changed there, that is, it has hardened the fear of war or for one person gaining an advantage over another or for one country over another, it mentioned the Manila Treaty and the subsequent Bangkok Conference. Then there is this very dangerous situation in the China Sea between Formosa and the mainland of China. So far as we are concerned, obviously we can only have one broad approach to this problem, which flows from our recognition of the People's Government of China. I am not going into that repeatedly, but there is something; it may be that there are other countries that do not agree with us—some countries there are, we think. Nobody, of course, says that there is separate State like Formosa because Formosa claims to be China just as China claims Formosa to be a part. But there has been a general, wide agreement of one obvious fact, and that is that the Islands of Matsu and Quemoy, which are four or five miles off the mainland are definitely part of the mainland, and an enemy force there is a constant irritation and constant danger. Countries which are not friendly to the People's Government of China have recognised that fact at least, and yet the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu continues by other forces, and it is stated that if the Chinese People's Government attacks them, then the whole force of the mighty Power will be engaged in defending them because it is said that they might involve the security of the Great Power. That is a very extraordinary approach—I say so with all respect. It is certain as anything can be certain that these Islands will go to the mainland of China by logic, by reason, by anything, unless you have great wars—and nobody knows the consequences of those wars. Therefore, what are you planning for—the great war to happen? You are just going against every canon of logic and reason and practical good sense. I do not understand this, because things are judged or measured by yardsticks which I cannot follow. I read articles about my humble self in the foreign press I see something: "Now he is inclined towards this, towards that and so on". Nobody seems to imagine that I am an Indian inclined towards India and nobody else—as if I was inclined towards America, Russia or China. I want to be friendly with them. Why should I be inclined towards them? I am happy

enough now and let me be left in peace to work for my country, for the destinies of my country. But I am interested in the peace of the world because that obviously is of high importance to my country as to every other country and so I cannot keep out of it. We have absolutely no intention to throw ourselves into war even if the whole world is at war; we are not at war. It is quite clear—there will be no doubt about it—that we will not go to war. but if there is war all over the world, we cannot escape the consequences of that war and we cannot be looking on the whole world going to rack and ruin. It will affect us. Hon. Members might perhaps remember a saying by Professor Einstein—it is attributed to him— that after the next war, wars would be fought by bows and arrows, that is, the consequences of the next war would be such that only bows and arrows would be left, and that is the stage of civilisation which is represented by bows and arrows. That is the opinion of a very great scientist and of those who are talking about, at least so far modern weapons are concerned.

Let us, therefore, take a realistic view of the situation and not talk about peace vaguely and do everything which encourages an atmosphere of fear and war. It is an extraordinary thing and I have no doubt that except for some maniacs nobody wants war in the world, and yet inevitably we indulge in activities which take the world to war. You may sit down and say that this country is at fault or that statesman is at fault, but that does not do much good. We are all, to some extent, at fault perhaps. I mentioned South East Asia. Now take the Middle East. Again, there is a passion for having little military alliances and pacts. All kinds of people rush about and talk to each other, and out comes the statement about military alliance between this country and that country. How that military affiance changes the world situation or the situation in that particular area in the slightest, either in the military sense or in the political sense, I have not been able to understand. I shall correct myself: it does change it. for it changes it for the worse.

Take the Middle-Eastern pacts—I am very sorry to criticise today other countries because they are free to do what they like—and some months back recently, there was news of a certain military alliance between two countries of the so called Middle East or Western Asia. They are perfectly welcome to do that. I happened to pass just about that time through Egypt and spent two or three days in Cairo, and I was asked by the Press there about my reactions. I said expressively and clearly that I thought that these military pacts, far from being helpful, did a lot of harm; far from bringing any security or assurance of peace, they actually help the other way. Take the effect of this very Middle East pact, to which we find a reference in this morning's newspaper, that a Great Power has adhered to attack itself to it. The first result has been the weakening and also the breaking up of the Arab League, which has brought the Arab countries together for cooperative effort. The second effect is that there is great bitterness. Egypt, for instance, is greatly opposed to this. In Syria, about that time, there was actually a change of Government because of this pact. Syria today is very much opposed to these pacts. Saudi Arabia opposes this; there is Yemen and there may be others apart from these, who are opposed to this, so that the Middle East has been split up into hostile camps because that pact was made.

Also look at it from the point of view of those very persons that have brought about this pact. Does It serve their own interests—leave out the interests of somebody else—to break up the homogeneity of the Middle East and create discord and trouble there? There was a mention the other day about the Yugoslav Government in which they said they viewed with grave concern the development of the situation in the Middle East because of these pacts, because of the pressure that was being exercised on the Government of Syria and other Governments to join the pact, which those Governments have resisted and I hope they will resist, because far too much is being done today under pressure and under threats and under other: methods of coercion. So that, if hon. Members will see this broad picture of what is happening in South-East Asia, the Far East and Western Asia, they will find it is not a happy picture. It is a picture full of discord and conflict and pulling in different directions. On the one side one sees Asia resurgent, Asia awake, Asia as if undoubtedly coming out, waking up and stretching out her limbs. It may take some time for her to grow to her stature, undoubtedly growing and troubled with all the difficulties of growth. On the other hand all these attempts, in the name of helping Asia, in the name of preserving peace in Asia, at promoting discord and conflict are made. Obviously we cannot view this with great satisfaction.

In fact, many of the important problems, except one or two, of the world today somehow affect Asia. A very big problem does not affect us, that is of Germany. There again, I cannot speak much about Germany. Nor do I wish to except to remind the House that it is one of the biggest problems in the world today, what happens in Germany with which is involved not only the unity of the two Germanies, but also the question of rearmament of Germany and all that. Now decisions have been made about the rearmament of Germany. There is at present a Disarmament Conference sitting somewhere and considering proposals which we hope will come into effect. I do not know what the results of it will be. At the sametime, major policies are based on the rearmament of some powers which at present are not heavily armed. This does not seem to me very logical.

What exactly are we aiming at? Repeatedly we hear talk about the Big Four or the Big Five—I do not know how many are big or how many are small—the Big Four or the Big Three meeting and talking things. Sometimes we are told that there will be an informal meeting without an agenda. For the last two years and a half we have been hearing this. Yet, insuperable difficulties come in the way of their meeting. If one person agrees, somebody else holds him back and does not permit him; if both agree a third person disagrees. So, the situation goes from bad to worse and people are not even brave enough to face each other and have a talk with each other. Because, they want to create a situation previous to the talks, which, according to them, is what is called a situation of strength. “Let us negotiate through strength”: that is the formula, forgetting of course that the other power is also strengthening itself at the same time. So, by the time you have produced a situation of strength, the other might have produced a situation of greater strength. So, they do not know where they are.

Again, when you deal with atom bombs and hydrogen bombs, this question of some greater strength or not has little effect. It has little meaning because you have arrived at a stage—so we are told—where even if one Power does it, and the other Power is relatively weaker, the effect on both is going to be much the same. That is what is called the state of saturation in regard to atom bombs, or hydrogen bombs. So, even if one is much bigger than the other with a greater number of bombs, may be more powerful bombs, in the ultimate effect both going to suffer terribly. In fact, the world is going to suffer. That is why I said because of all this that the situation in the world, far from being a promising one, is definitely a depressing one. I do not mean to say that a sudden catastrophe is coming, because countries are so afraid of it that they wish to avoid it. Nevertheless, things move in that direction and great statesmen talk too lightly sometimes of what they will do if something happens, how they will throw in their full weight of atom bombs and all that, if something happens.

Now in this broad world situation, what exactly are we to do? Are we to enter into these manoeuvrings and power conflicts and pacts here and there? I want this House to consider it from the lowest, opportunist point of view—forget for the moment any idealism, although idealism is very necessary—in fact, more necessary than at any other time. But from the lowest, opportunist, practical point of view, what are we to do about it? Are we going into this mad house also, behaving like lunatics like others? Simply because a person has got a hydrogen bomb, it does not mean that his mind has also become as powerful as the hydrogen bomb. The misfortune today is that we have got atomic energy which is a mighty power. It does depict the advance of humanity and its control over nature and nature's powers—tremendous things. But it is very doubtful how far the human mind has progressed to control them. And one comes ultimately at any rate, when thinking about this, to some kind of a conclusion that atomic energy cannot be met by atomic energy. That is to say, to put it differently the force of violence cannot be outmanoeuvred by force of violence. We have arrived at a stage where the force is so tremendous that it will overwhelm us. Both the person against whom it is used and the user of it. And unless we have some other methods of countering it or controlling it, we are likely to be overwhelmed.

What are the other methods? People go about signing documents: ban atomic weapons, atom bombs; don't manufacture them. I have also sometimes talked about this. But the more I think of it the more am I convinced that it is completely futile now to talk about this business of banning this and that. It has no meaning to me now, or very little meaning. The time is going to come presently when the hydrogen bomb might be made with some ease even by a small country—with gross exaggeration a scientist told me that it might be made in somebody's backgarden. It may be an exaggeration. But it shows where things are going. So, what is going to happen to the world when hydrogen bombs are made anywhere? How are we going to meet this menace to the world, unless you can control it by some entirely different standards—call them moral, call them spiritual, call them what you like—I am not using the word in a narrow sense—call them civilised. Because after all humanity has come to a certain stage of civilisation which has taught it restraint and behaviour and all that. We

are forgetting all that restraint and behaviour. The events of the last two wars have brutalised humanity. We are now standing at the verge of destiny: whether humanity is to revert to some phase of well being brutish beasts, or advance towards the stage of civilisation. It is a matter of culture and civilisation; it is a matter of standards, of values that we have, and it seems to me—and I say that with all humility—that what Gandhiji put before us and the world perhaps has as even more significance today in the world as it is, than it had previously. I see no other way out except for countries and nations to adopt Gandhiji's gospel, though not thought, but any how to realise that force is no remedy, that war is not only no remedy but is an ultimate evil today, and that violence is no good and does not pay—apart from its moral values.

Now, the House knows about what are called the Panchsheel, the five principles. Some people have criticised them. Some people have said—the Prime Minister of a country said—all this is some kind of 'communist trick'. Well, the fact of the matter is that these principles—what we call Panchsheel—are a challenge to the world and we want the answer of every country in the world as to what they think about them. Let every country say that it is agreed with it. I want them to have the courage to say so because I do say that every country, if it is honest to itself and if it is honest to its desire to peace, must accept them; there is no way out.

What are they? The recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect, equality, etc. Am I going to be told by any country that this is disagreeable? If they are for aggression let them say so; similarly, let them say if they are for internal interference in other countries' affairs—much of it is taking place, I know but nobody recognises that; nobody admits that rather—I do say that the Panch Shila are a challenge of Asia to the rest of the world. And each country will have to give a straight answer to this question and I do hope that the question would be put in all its straightness and boldness by the Asian-African Conference. Let each country search its mind and answer whether it stands for non-aggression and non-interference.

The charge is made—rightly, I say, sometimes—about communist interference in other countries. Non-communist countries also interfere in other countries obviously. How are we getting over this? The present military approach is to get more and more powerful to squash the other party so that it may not do it. In doing so, of course, you squash the world and yourself. It is not exactly the brilliant way of approach to the solution of the problem.

Now, the Panchsheel says: Well, both of you or all of you refrain from interference internally or externally in a straight way. It may be that someone agreeing to it does not keep his word; it can always happen, whether you have a treaty or an alliance or a pledge. But anyhow, it is a firm basis for an agreement. If some country agreeing to it does not keep up its word, naturally it gets into hot water much more than otherwise. So that, this principle of Panchsheel—or call it coexistence, if you like it in a particular sense—you have to admit. Either you admit co-existence in the modern world or you admit conflict and co-destruction. That is the alternative to it.

The Asian-African Conference is, if I may say so, a rather strikingly remarkable example of co-existence. Countries come there with different outlooks and differing approaches. Some of them have been allied in military alliances. But, still they come there and discuss matters in a different context—in the context of co-existence.

Now again there is a good deal of talk about communism and anti-communism. Both are important—I do not deny that, but what about some little and odd things happening in the continent of Africa? What about things that are happening in the new colonial territories? What about that tragedy—that human tragedy—that is continually taking place in the Dominion of South Africa—hundreds and thousands of people lifted up bodily from their homes and taken away somewhere else? Why do we not hear the champions of freedom talk about this? They are silent: they simply pass it over. But they should realise that people in Asia and Africa, though they may not shout very much about it, feel it; sometimes they feel it more than communism and anti-communism. It is a human problem for us—this racialism—this human problem may become a very dangerous problem. This problem of racialism and racial separation may become more dangerous than any other problem that the world has to face. I should like the countries of Europe, America, Asia and Africa to realise that and not to imagine that we are putting up with these things that are happening in Africa whether on the colonial plane or on the racial plane. They hurt us. Simply because we cannot do anything effective, and we do not want to cheapen ourselves by mere shouting, we remain quiet. But the thing has gone deep down into our minds and hearts. We feel it strongly. When we talk so lightly about other matters some of which are more important, it simply means that our standards are very different—what we consider important and what we consider less important.

I have referred to some of these matters briefly; I want to refer to some of our immediate problems—there is Goa; there is Ceylon. About Ceylon. I do not wish to go into these arguments because—whether it is Pakistan or whether it is Ceylon—these are neighbour countries and I think it is a bad thing for us to say words which hurt and which create more difficulties in the solution of the problem, to issue threats and the like.

The other day, in another connection; some hon. Members talked loosely about taking military action against Pakistan because of what is happening in East Bengal. All I can say is that those hon. Members who said so are—I say so with all respect—totally lacking in wisdom. I would even go further and say—common intelligence. It is not with a view to criticise anything that I want to say that.

In Ceylon we have been, I think, cooperating and patient. We go some way out to understand and to meet the difficulties of the Ceylon Government and the Ceylon people. But I must confess to a feeling of frustration that what we are aiming at is not realised. Just take some simple figures. I am giving you figures of the registration of people of Indian descent as Ceylon citizens. That is the main problem. Otherwise, these people become stateless. They are not Indian citizens unless by another process they are registered as Indian nationals. They are neither here nor there; they remain there because they cannot be thrown into the sea. We had agreed to register them—

those people who are anxious to register themselves and who fulfilled our calculations according to our Constitution—as our citizens. And naturally, we pressed the Ceylon Government to go ahead with its registration too so that gradually this process might exhaust these people of Indian descent there. We hoped of course that a very large number would be registered as Ceylon citizens because they are really and in fact residents of Ceylon. Their fathers were born there and they live there. For nine months from December 1953 to September, 1954, the total number of persons registered in Ceylon was 7,505. The number of persons whose applications were rejected was 45,236. The proportion of registrations to rejections is very small, 7,500 to 45 thousand in nine months. Now, we come to the four months since September, last, that is October, 1954 to January, 1955. The total number of persons registered was twenty one and the total number of persons whose applications were rejected was 36,260. It is obvious that while previously not many were registered and a large number were rejected, now we have arrived at a stage when hardly any person is accepted: thirty six thousand rejections in four months and twentyone registered, which comes to about five and a quarter a month.

So far as our registration of Indian citizens goes, we have proceeded normally. I will give the figures. The number of applicants from January to December, 1954 was 8,000, and the number registered was 5,600. As a matter of fact there were non rejections. The rest are under scrutiny. So, thousands have been accepted. We have been going fairly fast.

At the last meeting of the Prime Ministers of India and Ceylon it was further decided that the Ceylon Government should prepare a list of all the people of Indian descent in Ceylon, in order to know—quite apart from deciding the final question whether they are Ceylon citizens or not,—to know who are there, because of their constant complaint that illegal immigrants came in; so let us know who are there. Because very often it so happened that a person who has been resident there for a long time was called an illegal resident. That list too has not yet been prepared.

Nevertheless, as I said to this House, and I would appeal to the House that in this matter and even in regard to the Pakistan matter our approach must continue to be a cooperative and friendly one, not giving up the principles we stand for.

I referred to Goa. The other day, hon. Members must have seen that some satyagrahis, so-called satyagrahis who went there, I think, on the 26th January, and who to my knowledge have not been accused of any violence or any kind of offence other than going there, which of course is a technical offence—I cannot complain if they are punished; if any person commits satyagraha he must not complain and nobody should complain on his behalf that he is punished; that is the inevitable consequence of satyagraha; otherwise it is not satyagraha; it is something else—I would not have objected if they were punished, but when those persons or some of them are sentenced to twentyeight years of penal servitude it does shake one up. Some of them were sentenced to varying degrees of imprisonment, some were sentenced to twentyeight years and to deportation to Portugal—not Portugal but perhaps to some of their penal colonies. That again, trying deliberately to use mild

language, I call barbarous. It is really extraordinary that any Government anywhere should behave in this way; much more so a Government which because of our patience and goodwill is allowed to remain in the corner of India. Remember this, and I want them to remember, I want the Government of Portugal to realise that they are there because we are patient and men of goodwill; not because we cannot deal with the situation but because we think ahead, we see the world situation as it is. We do not wish to do something, even in a small way, indulging in violence etc. which may have bigger repercussions and all that. We are prepared to wait a little, because inevitably the end must be the one that we aim at. Our objective must be realised. It is inconceivable and impossible, and I do not care what other Powers in the world support Portugal, it is impossible for Portugal to imagine that they can remain in Goa.

I referred to other powers. There has not been much talk of this lately. But some time back some countries, on the basis of the N.A.T.O. alliance, mentioned Goa to us. They mentioned it in rather soft language, but they mentioned it. And immediately—apart from the fact that they had no business to mention it to us; if they had any business they ought to have gone and said something at Lisbon—another fact came out, and that is the wide tentacles of the N.A.T.O. alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was made for defensive purposes of the North Atlantic countries. One of the tentacles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation crossed these continents and seas and came to this continent of Asia, and to India—came a long way. Secondly, it came in order to defend a colonial territory in India. That did not do much good to the prestige of N.A.T.O. It showed that behind its other, perhaps, laudable objects there were some which were not so laudable and could be used for very wrong purposes.

I referred to Quemoy and Matsu. And almost every country, barring one or two, agrees that the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu are a part of the mainland of China. Goa is not an island; Goa is the mainland of India; it is not even separated by a few miles of sea as Quemoy and Matsu are and yet these arguments are advanced, and this barbarous behaviour is indulged in.

In regard to Pakistan the House knows that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was to have come here in the 28th of this month. But then we decided to postpone this meeting for a variety of reasons—we were much too rushed and all that—and we are meeting now, after this Asian-African Conference, on the 14th May, in New Delhi. I have no doubt at all that the leader of Pakistan, and more specially the Governor-General of Pakistan, are very anxious to settle Indo-Pakistan problems. I am anxious, and I am sure that this House is anxious, that there should be no interference in the way of settling these problems in a friendly way. I have still less doubt about the general goodwill among the people of Pakistan and India towards each other. We have had some evidence of this recently, rather remarkable evidence, that whatever the people at the top may say or do, there is this basic goodwill among the people. Our people went to Pakistan and they came here. Both these are very desirable things very helpful. Yet it is true that the problems we have to face have not become easier by the passage of time. All kinds of things have happened in the course of these seven or

eight years since Pakistan came into existence. And it is very very difficult to unwrite history. We shall consider them. But we have to consider them in a realistic way, not ignoring what has happened. Among those big problems there is the problem of evacuee property, canal waters. So far as canal waters are concerned, we have been dealing with the World Bank for two years now or more. We have now arrived at a certain stage. It has been a slow, slow process. But, anyhow, we have made some progress. I think today or yesterday a joint mission arrived here, consisting of representatives of Engineers of the World Bank, of Engineers of Pakistan and of course, our own Engineers, who are going to visit various places in India in the Indus basin, and various places in Pakistan in the Indus basin and formulate plans more or less on the basis of the World Bank's recommendation which we had accepted and which Pakistan also had accepted. Anyhow, we are moving there although the movement has been remarkably slow. In regard to evacuee property, there has not been much movement. My colleague the Minister of Rehabilitation is going to Pakistan in four or five days time at their invitation to discuss these matters again.

There is a very big question, Kashmir. Perhaps,—why “perhaps”? —certainly, that is the most difficult of all these problems as between India and Pakistan,—I say problems between India and Pakistan, certainly. But, we must always remember that Kashmir is not a thing to be bandied about between India and Pakistan. It has a soul of its own; it has an individuality of its own. We cannot, certainly much less can Pakistan, play with it as if it were something in the political game between the two countries. Nothing can be done without the goodwill of the people of Kashmir. I am not going into that.

But, I might say this. The House will be glad to know, if it does not know it already, that in recent months, there has been a very considerable, in fact a rather remarkable progress in Kashmir. Economically and otherwise, I doubt if Kashmir has been so prosperous—it is a relative term! I do not say it is prosperous; it is relatively prosperous—for many many long years as it is today. In regard to food, in regard to other things, in regard to many schemes that have been undertaken, they are just on the verge of yielding fruit. There is the Sind Valley Electric Works which will be extraordinarily useful in the whole valley of Kashmir, apart from lighting, for industrial and other purposes. The old power works at Mohra, constructed 40 or 50 years ago, are on the point of collapse. Then, we are starting the great project, the Banihal tunnel. The great work has started. It is really the numerous small projects that are bringing about a new atmosphere in the whole of the Jammu and Kashmir State. So that, the conditions are more satisfactory there either from the political or the economic point of view than they have been for a long time. I do not say that everything is 100 per cent, satisfactory. But, things are on the way.

The other day, I think, two Members of this House have sent me questions. I shall probably answer them in due course. The questions were about certain statements that the Prime Minister of Kashmir made the other day in his Assembly. I was asked if Sheikh Abdullah had communicated with me in regard to that statement. The statement as reported was that the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Bakshi Ghulam

Mohammed had in his possession correspondence, etc., which would throw light on many things that happened 1½ years ago, but he could not publish them because I or the Government of India came in his way. I do not remember his words; but, by and large, this is what he has said. On this I received a telegram from Sheikh Abdullah saying that he had seen the statement and that he would like publication of these papers or documents and he hoped that the Government of India would not come in the way.

All this, of course, relates to what happened about a year and a half or 2 years or 2½ years ago. I would say straight off that so far as the Government of India is concerned, so far as I am concerned, I do not wish to come in the way of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir in regard to this matter. I tried to refresh my memory, I may add that the report of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's speech in the papers, although broadly speaking, is this, it is not a correct report. Some sentences in between have been left out. However, broadly speaking, it is that. As I do not wish to come in the way of the discretion of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, they have to decide this. I have not got all these papers with me. I do not know what they are. I have some. My own correspondence with Sheikh Abdullah. I have got. Shri Rafi Ahmed Kidwai had some, as also Shri A. P. Jain and Maulana Azad: some correspondence and others. But, apart from correspondence, there were numerous talks. It is difficult to produce those talks. The correspondence itself relates to these talks. They are not there. It is difficult to form a picture of these events right from 1952 onwards and throughout 1953.

There is another aspect of this question which naturally concerns me and concerns the House. We are for, I hope all of us, friendly ways of settling problems and not adding to bitterness. How far the publication of the letters or reports of conversations 1½ or 2 years ago, charges and countercharges, will help in producing that atmosphere which leads to a friendly settlement or come in the way of it, it is for the House to judge. Therefore, anyhow, I have left it to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. I have not got all the papers. I have told them that I do not wish to come in the way. They may consider and publish if there are any.

One thing I should like to say, Hon. Members may remember, that on the 10th August, year before last, 1953, I made a statement here. That was one day or two days after Sheikh Abdullah's arrest. Then, I made a much longer statement a month later, I think on the 17th of September. I was reading the statement of the 17th September. There was much in it that, if I wanted to deal with this matter, I will repeat again. I would refer the hon. Members who are interested in the matter to this statement because I dealt with the situation that had then arisen at some length, Naturally, even then I tried to avoid saying anything which would worsen the situation. In regard to one matter which I find is still raised often, charges are brought. These charges were brought recently again in the Kashmir Assembly about all kinds of horrible happenings in the valley of Kashmir after Sheikh Abdullah's arrest: that 1500 people were killed or massacred and all that. At that very time these charges were made. I took it upon myself to have a very full enquiry made, not through the Government of Kashmir,

but through entirely our own people, intelligence people and others, completely independent. I have no doubt in my mind that the enquiry we made—it may not have been hundred per cent accurate, but it was 98 per cent accurate or very nearly so, I cannot say—has by and large resulted in confirming the figures which the Kashmir Government had published, and I think our figures and their figures were out by four or five. I pointed this out to the very persons who were making these tremendous charges of 1500 people killed and massacred. And it was a detailed report of each place, each village, containing the names etc. and everything in fact. I said, here is this report. Well, they had nothing to say. Now, a year afterwards, they again raise the same thing. I think that is highly improper, if they know—they ought to know—that the charges they make are false completely, *i.e.*, going on repeating them.

In the course of the next few days we are having a number of eminent visitors from abroad. They will be the Prime Minister of Egypt the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Afghanistan; after that, we will have the Prime Minister of Sudan. Even earlier, that is in the next week or ten days, we are probably having—I am not quite certain—a deputation from the Government of South Vietnam the Foreign Minister of Vietnam; I am not sure if recent happenings might not interfere with that visit. And a little later, we shall have a deputation from North Vietnam, the democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Foreign Minister—all in the next eight or ten days. The House knows that prince of Cambodia came herewith the Prime Minister of Cambodia and others.

All this puts additional burdens on us, responsibilities on us, and we can only discharge them with a thorough understanding and goodwill of this House.

BACK NOTE

XXXII. Demands for Grants, 31 March, 1955

NIL

CONSTITUTION (FOURTH AMENDMENT) BILL

11 April, 1955

I beg to move:

“That the Bill further to amend the Constitution of India, as reported by the Joint Committee, be taken into consideration.”

The House will remember that when this matter came up on the previous motion to appoint a Joint Committee, we had a fairly full and, if I may say so, a very profitable discussion in this House. As a result of that discussion, the House agreed to send this Bill to a Joint Committee and, if I remember aright, the House agreed by a rather unusually big majority— in fact, only 8 or 9 persons disagreed in all this House. When this matter went up to the other House also, in connection with the appointment of the Joint Committee—it went up there with our recommendation—that other House, if I may say so, went a step further and unanimously agreed to send it to the Joint Committee. I mention these facts to show what an astonishing, almost unanimity of opinion there has been in Parliament over this matter, and quite rightly so, if I may say so with all respect.

One would imagine, sometimes reading or hearing some criticisms made outside this House, that this was a measure over which opinion was rent in twain, that it was a highly controversial measure which proposed something to be done which was very extraordinary. And, yet, when one comes to see actually what has happened in this House or the other House, one finds that those persons who were most intimately connected with this matter in the sense that they are considering it directly, Members of this House, Members of the other House, those who have listened to arguments for and against, have, by and large, nearly all of them, come to one broad conclusion in favour of this amendment of the Constitution. This should be remembered because an attempt is made—outside this House, of course, outside Parliament—to create an impression contrary to this.

Now, this Bill went up to the Joint Committee and I am not, I think, saying anything that may be considered secret when I say that the proceedings of the Joint Committee were quite remarkable for their, shall I say, cooperative approach to this problem for their understanding approach and for their near-unanimous approach to this problem. In fact, the Bill as it has emerged from the Joint Committee might almost be considered— because, naturally, every Member of the Joint Committee has the right to say what he has to say or may say— but, it may almost be considered to represent the opinion, the views of almost every Member of the Joint Committee, which consisted of people of various parties and various views. I merely mention this to place the House in possession of the background. Now, after the report of the Joint Committee was prepared and passed in this cooperative manner by almost every Member of the Joint Committee, some Minutes of Dissent have been received. They are three, I think,—one by Mr. Chatterjee, one by Mr. Jaipal Singh and one by

Mrs. Chakravartty and others. So far as the Minute of Dissent of Shri Jaipal Singh is concerned, I would only say that I am sure that if Shri Jaipal Singh had taken the trouble of attending any single meeting of the Joint Committee, he might have been convinced otherwise. Because he did not attend a single meeting and he was not there at all...

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I am sorry I made a wrong statement, but when presiding over it, I did not remember seeing him there—perhaps he was at the first meeting. So, we might presume that Shri Jaipal Singh had erred in ignorance in presenting his Minute of Dissent. If he had discussed the matter with us. He might have been convinced to the contrary.

Then there is the Minute of Dissent of Shrimati Chakravartty and two other hon. Members. I think that anyone who reads it will probably come to the conclusion that this is what might be called a formal Minute of Dissent, without much faith or belief in it. They have to say something. The one thing that they say at the beginning of that Minute of Dissent is that they felt that they have been returned to this House on a programme of acquisition without compensation. That may be so, but that certainly is not the basis of this Bill or the policy of Government. Therefore, there is no question of our considering that matter in connection with this Bill or otherwise.

Now, we come to the major and the longest Minute of Dissent of the hon. Member, Shri Chatterjee, in which he has quoted from high legal authorities, apart from the fact that he is himself a high legal authority. Now, exactly what is this Bill? What is the attempt to amend this Constitution? It is odd that words are thrown about confiscation of property, of expropriation when actually what the Constitution or the amended Constitution, if you amend it, says is that there will be no such thing except by law and except on payment of compensation. Remember that. The quantum of compensation is to be determined by the legislature. Now, there are so many quotations given by Shri Chatterjee about due process of law—for instance he says:

“A distinguished American Judge observed a great desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way.....”

Well, I say, this is the constitutional way, and what is proposed is the definite, legal and constitutional way of doing it and we are varying or amending the Constitution in the constitutional way. I do not quite understand this throwing about of words, about expropriation and confiscation and doing things apart from the law. Remember this that the sole major change is to make clear one thing which I submitted on the last occasion, was clear to us at the time this Constitution was framed. That is to say, according to the Constitution as put forward before the Constituent Assembly and as it emerged from the Constituent Assembly, the quantum of compensation or the principles governing compensation would be decided by the legislature. This was made perfectly clear. Now, it is obvious that those who framed the Constitution failed in giving expression to their wishes accurately and precisely and thereby the Supreme Court and some other Courts have interpreted it in a different way. The Supreme

Court is the final authority for interpreting the Constitution. All I can say is that the Constitution was not worded as precisely as the framers of the Constitution intended. What the framers of the Constitution intended is there for anyone to see. All that has been done now is to make that wording more precise and more in accordance with what the framers of the Constitution at that time meant and openly said. That is the only thing. So, I do not understand this measure of excitement and agitation in people's minds—not in this House, but elsewhere—about this matter.

May I say straight off that I think, with all respect, that the Joint Committee has certainly improved the Bill from what it was previously? Naturally, I accept this Report and their recommendations completely. Of course, there might be one or two minor changes that we might agree to—we have one or two minor changes in view—but apart from that, I think that it would be a pity to amend this as it has emerged from the Joint Committee's consideration of it. It has emerged, as the House will see, in a much simpler form. It is shorter and simple than before and that itself is desirable. Because of a change made—I am sorry I forget the numbers—to article 31(2)

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This slight change makes the point clear and as a consequence of that change, it was not necessary to add in the next clause, the third clause, a long list of matters. We have shortened that. That is practically all that has been done.

What exactly is our approach to this basic question? Shri Chatterjee has written at length and has begun by referring to the makers of the Indian Constitution having deliberately conferred certain Fundamental Rights. I was one of those humble individuals who had something to do with the making of the Constitution; there are others sitting here who had recorded their views in their speeches then. I do submit that those makers of the Constitution were perfectly clear as to what they meant and I do submit that what we are putting before the House in this Joint Committee's Report is precisely and exactly what they said at that time, so far as 31(2) is concerned. There is nothing new about it and there is nothing very terrible about it. The whole Constitution is based on the proposition that it must proceed by law and secondly, that compensation should be paid, except in certain specified cases of a small number. Generally speaking, compensation must be paid, but in regard to the determination of what the compensation should be, it is left to the legislature. To repeat what I said four or five years ago, if anything is done by the legislature which is considered a fraud on the Constitution, it is a different matter—then the Courts may come in—but otherwise it should not be open to the Courts to challenge the decision of the legislature on this point. It is a simple issue. Where does expropriation or the rest come in? I really do not understand it. The view in regard to property which Shri Chatterjee has put forward in his Minute of Dissent and in which he is supported by some high legal authorities, is one with which I cannot agree. It may be that, as Shri Chatterjee says quoting a great political thinker, "men will sooner forget the death of their relatives than the confiscation of their property". We rather not encourage such men in this country. It is a monstrous thing that property should be made a God, above human beings. To put it this way, that whatever a man may do,—he may even

commit murder—it is nothing, but property is a God and must be worshipped—well, this Government is not prepared to accept that view of property at all.

Repeatedly, Shri N. C. Chatterjee refers to the use of the phrase “the sanctity of private property”, as though there was something divine or semidivine about it. It is a right —property. The possession of property is a thing which we recognise, which we protect, and it is defined here how compensation is to be given if a man is deprived of it. There it is. But to talk in these terms, if I may say so, of sanctity, divinity etc. being attached to property is very much out of date. It has no relation, not only to present days but to present day facts. I am not referring to what may be called socialistic or communistic countries, but to countries which are presumed to be capitalistic and the like. The whole conception, the whole approach is changing. If Shri Chatterjee quotes something from the judges of the middle of the 19th century, that may have been the way of thinking then. It is not so now. The whole idea and approach to this question is changing. These questions do not arise in this particular amendment to the Constitution.

Again, Shri Chatterjee quotes — rather, he quotes someone who quotes an eminent English jurist as having said that “the public good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of private property”. I would like the House to consider these words: “Public good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of private property”. That is what I call an astounding and amazing statement— that the highest public good is the protection of private property, more than everything else. I do submit that not only we should not agree to it but we should reject it summarily and absolutely—such a statement— whoever might have made it.

Shri Chatterjee goes on to say that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. I agree completely. Who is doing so? Is this arbitrary deprivation of property? Firstly, the law does not do it. Secondly, the law lays down rules and regulations on the principles of compensation. Where does arbitrariness come in? I mention this because quite unnecessarily people do not see what is being done and I regret even some people who write in newspapers do not see exactly what is being done and they write about things without understanding the purport of them. They talk loosely and use these words: expropriation, confiscation, arbitrary action. There is nothing of the kind any where.

Then, Shri Chatterjee has referred to the United States Constitution in this respect. Now, the United States Constitution is a great document, but I do not think it is quite appropriate to compare it with our Constitution or to compare our Constitution with it or to say that our Constitution is based on it. Of course, we have taken a good many things from it and many more things from the Constitution of the United Kingdom. But, nevertheless, our Constitution is neither the Constitution of the United Kingdom, much less of the United States. The whole basis of the United States Constitution dates back to some time of the 18th century. It is not obviously a very recent document. It represents the idea of the fathers of the American Constitution and the American nation at that time and they produced a very fine

document, but for us to consider it in another country, in India, in the middle of the 20th century is hardly a reasonable proposition.

So, I should like Parliament to remember these basic things. Here is something that is being proposed which in effect is clarifying, elucidating, the Constitution and bringing it completely in line with what the makers of the Constitution intended. Unfortunately, they did not do so in clear enough language, and therefore the courts have interpreted it differently. So, firstly, it is a matter of elucidation. Secondly, it is wrong to say that we are suggesting any arbitrary action, any confiscatory action or any expropriatory action. In fact, the Constitution has said that there should be compensation by law. But it is true that the quantum of compensation will be determined by the legislature. I cannot say offhand what in a particular case the legislature might do. But, by and large, if you have to govern this country democratically, you have to trust the legislature not only in this but in a hundred other matters of far greater moment. This legislature might decide on some far-reaching change affecting, well, the question of war and peace—a tremendous thing. Surely the Supreme Court will not decide that. It may decide technical questions in other ways which directly or indirectly will even affect property, planning, and all kinds of things may be done which will have a powerful effect on our social structure and economic structure and everything. But it is the legislature's will in such matters that is bound to prevail. There is no way out of it. To single out this question of the compensation to be given to property and to take it out of the purview of the legislature in the sense of somebody else revising the legislature's decision seems to me a basically wrong approach, unless of course you think that property is something semidivine and that the protection of private property is to the largest good of the nation which obviously hardly any one today can say.

I venture to place before this House this simple amendment which, I am glad to say, is an improvement in the Select Committee, and it is simpler and clearer. I should imagine that there is really not much room for argument left. After all, it is a simple provision.

Now, I do not know how one has to deal with the fears and apprehensions. There is no remedy for fear except the absence of fear. Today, in the larger context of the world, nations are afraid and because they are afraid they often say and do the wrong things, afraid of each other, and things get worse. I do not know what we shall do about it in the international sphere. It is true perhaps that some people in this country, may be some outside, have got all manner of apprehensions. Also sometimes it is said that "well, it is all right in the present Parliament but what about other Parliaments?" "It may be all right in the present Government". In fact, Shri Chatterjee himself has hinted darkly at the picture of the time when this Government may be no more. I am glad that Shri Chatterjee appreciates the virtues and values of this Government. Now, at any time, for us to think of a distant future, a distant time as to what may happen is not a very useful or profitable occupation at any time, much less so at the moment when it has become a truism to say that the world is in a state of great transitional stage. All those kinds of things may happen. Even if we manage to

escape big wars, other enormous changes have happened and may happen,— technological changes which are changing the structure of society, as it happened when the industrial revolution came and when it changed the whole relationship of human beings. The whole thing changes, everything. The idea of property changes with the coming of the technological revolution. It is changing. Now, these enormous technological changes are taking place and their pace becomes hotter and hotter— atomic energy and the atom bomb. I am not thinking in terms of war now, for the moment. But atomic energy is releasing enormous forces which are bound to change and which are changing human life.

In this tremendous age, to think in a static way and to imagine that property has exactly the same place in human life as it used to, means that you have stopped thinking at all. So, these apprehensions and fears appear to me completely unjustified. There is nothing to be apprehensive about in this world. Far bigger and far greater things and disasters might suddenly confront the world and in this context for somebody to be afraid of some mill or plant or factory being acquired, seems to me to be a thing completely out of proportion. So far as this Government is concerned, so far as I am concerned, my mind is perfectly clear on this subject. Mind you, I have no respect for property. I have no respect for property at all except perhaps some personal belongings. I respect the other person's respect for property occasionally; that is a different matter. But I am speaking—the House will forgive me—in a personal sense; I have no property sense. It seems a burden to me to carry the property; it is a nuisance. In life's journey one should be lightly laden; one cannot be tied down to a patch of land or building or something else. May be, I cannot quite appreciate this tremendous attachment to property—the property sense. But, while not appreciating I realise and recognise it is there. But, anyhow, I think the proposition that some hon. Members on the other side advanced about acquisition or confiscation without compensation seems to me a basically wrong proposition from the point of view of the public good—not from love of property or anything like that. It is basically a wrong proposition. In a particular case if a person misbehaves that is a different matter. I am talking in the broad sense: I do not want anything to be acquired except— normally speaking—on payment of just compensation.

I need not refer to any foreign capital here. I am always surprised to hear this proposal being put forward repeatedly: confiscate or expropriate foreign capital. Anything which is more unthinkable, unthought of and unrealistic—I cannot imagine; it has no relation to reality—this kind of thing—quite apart from what we may do within our country. Because no country—I say and I repeat—whether it is socialist or communist or any other country that may arise, except in a thunder of war or revolution which is a different matter—things happen there not because of law or decision but because of forces which are at motion—no country does that to a foreign country. I am quite certain that the Soviet Union will never do it in regard to any foreign capital that may be there: it will never do it because it affects one's relations— international relations. No country wants to break its international relations or its credit in the world by doing this kind of thing in order to save some money—a few

crores or a few millions. It is an unthinkable proposition; it is not done in international society except as I said during huge commotions when nobody knows what may be done. In Soviet Russia—leaving the revolution aside—the Soviet Union has had dealing with other countries and it has developed a reputation of always honouring its word—financial word. Sometimes, other countries had not done so in Europe but the Soviet Union has. It is very careful about preserving that reputation. Let us not talk about this matter of trying to get rid of it by suddenly expropriating foreign capital or anything; that is not worth it. We are not such a poor country as to go about indulging in these tactics and losing the goodwill and the credit of the world and may be, having a feeling of wrong doing in our minds and hearts.

Even in regard to our own country, when we consider any large scheme involving may be land, or may be anything, wider considerations come in. We deal with the zamindari system, we deal with other schemes relating to land. Sometimes, this is referred to as a scheme of social engineering and all that. One can understand that: it becomes quite impossible to deal with the situation in the normal way of land acquisition or actual property. We cannot do that; we cannot acquire the whole land in that way. It is not possible. Therefore, one has to go in graded ways; one has to find out something of your capacity to pay. And then it is graded. That is, if you acquire the property, as we had done in the zamindari cases, the relatively poor zamindar gets full compensation—hundred per cent. The other person may get about 80 per cent, the third 70 and the fourth 60. As you go up this grading is perfectly justified. Even Mr. Chatterjee agrees to that...

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There is no trouble there. But take the other cases. Let us see to the industrial ventures: other things—banks, this, that and the other. We are acquiring the Imperial Bank; we have decided and so far as I know we are paying pretty full compensation in whatever form it may be. I am not going into morals or into the practical aspect of it: it is not worthwhile. It does not pay. It injures one not to do so. You save a little money here and there. It will be completely wrong in the case of what may be called the small owners not to give them full compensation. Small owners—I am talking about them. I am surprised that Mrs. Chakravartty in her note— I do not know whether it is she or Mr. Chatterjee; ...I am sorry to mix up the two—has thrown a hint that we are out to harm the small owner. I do submit that it is practically an unfair charge. Nobody can do it; how can we—this Parliament and this Government? Because the power is given to the legislature. Can one conceive this Parliament or even any other legislature to go out to harm the small owner? Even the petty self-interest of the average Member will shout out against it, if nothing else.

Take the big owners. I am talking about industrial property—plants and the like. My approach to industrial plants and the like is that the Government should never acquire anything—any old plant—unless for the purpose of planning or for the purpose of holding some strategic point, we have to acquire it. Why do I say that? I have said that previously too, perhaps in a different context. Because whatever we

are—we are an underdeveloped country, industrially speaking; we want to industrialise the country; we want hundreds of factories to go up—should I not use all the available resources at my hand to put up new factories—State factories—instead of acquiring old—may be worn out—plants of somebody else? I just do not understand it.

I am not going to acquire anything unless it comes in the way of my planning. That is a different matter. But the idea which is sometimes put forward by some hon. Members opposite that a kind of a general scheme of nationalisation would bring about great advance in the matter of equalisation, socialisation and all that is I think not correct. It will not. It is always bound to be by some drastic steps of equalisation. Whether you succeed or not is another matter. That drastic equalisation in that way simply means equalisation of the lowest stage of poverty. That is not good enough. We want to raise our country's standard and yet to bring about this equalisation and try to go towards an egalitarian society. The whole idea of nationalisation, of this plant and that, does not come into my picture at all except that when our planning requires some measure, that is to say to take possession of a strategic point which comes in the way, the State should control it. Otherwise the State should go ahead and build up the State plants. The public sector becomes bigger and more and more important and there is more and more production, letting the private sector advance at all times. But if the public sector is nibbling and eating into the private sector, there is no total advance, even though there might be some advantage from the social point of view, because you are losing your resources, shifting one factory from the private to the public sector. Unless that is desired and required by overwhelming reasons. I would not do it.

The House will forgive me. I am often talking about atomic energy and the likes. Because I wish people to realise how the whole basis of our future industrial living patterns may be affected. I have no doubt that just in the same manner as it was affected with the advent of steam and later electric power, we are having something like atomic power in the next ten, fifteen or twenty years which again may make a vast difference to the running of all our factories and other things. Well and good. This is another reason why I should not go about wasting national resources in mere acquisition of property when I can build other plants and other things.

Therefore, these questions do not come up. And if we have to acquire property I think we should pay just and equitable compensation. I am talking about individual properties. Normally there may be a number of rich men interested—there are here and there—but many of these properties, big properties, are limited liability companies with a large number of small shareholders. We do not wish to deprive them. So that, all this apprehension and fear is completely misplaced, and it ignores not only existing conditions in India but the probable future line of advance.

It is true that inevitably if we have our way—when I say “we” I am not talking about myself nor even of the Government, but of this Parliament and I think of the overwhelming opinion of this Parliament and of the people—we go towards a socialist pattern of society. Inevitably it means building up the public sector. The private sector remains. The private sector always remains, I say. Because the private sector

includes—as I reminded the House, it includes—cottage industry, so many things. That itself is a huge chunk of the activity in this country. And it may include some big industries too. I do not know twenty years later what will happen. But the dominating feature will be the public sector. And the planning will be for the public and private sector. The private sector will have to function within the ambit of that plan too.

In all these approaches we talk about, many words we use, good words, socialist pattern of society; we talk about industrialisation, removing unemployment, higher standards—all good things. May I put it somewhat differently, that the thing that is really necessary is somehow to activate and dynamise the base of the Indian social structure? I want you to appreciate this phase. The approach from the top has to be made. The top has to function. But there has been too much thinking of activating from the top all the time, that is activating the top layers of society. It has to be activated, and it activates other layers. But you do not solve the problem unless you activate this base of Indian society, which means millions and millions of villagers, millions of workers and small earners, unemployed people on the land; this is the base of Indian society. If you merely grapple with it from the top, what happens? By that you gradually draw away people from that bottom into the middle layers, which is a good thing. You activate them, and gradually this domain increases, of people who are being activated. But the base, fundamentally the tremendous base of Indian population is not affected. Therefore, while you do this from the top, which we have to do, you have to think in terms of affecting that vast base. Once you activate and make it dynamic to some extent, the progress of India would be rapid. Going from the top all the time, progress would be there, but not rapid. If I may, with all respect, refer to Gandhiji, his view always was to activate the lowest strata. What way you should do it, we need not go into that now. The bottom, the base of Indian society, that is the real thing. The view of many of our leading people, able people, interested in industry and others, is that it somehow starts from activating the top and seeping down to the bottom. I am not criticising this, but I think that the emphasis and the outlook has to change. It has to be from the top, of course; we have to do it; but we have somehow to activate this base. And in activating this base one may have to take numerous social steps of all kinds. To approximate this and so as not to have the big gap between the top and the bottom, all these things have to be done. So that, that is the basic approach, not the approach of acquiring or depriving somebody of his property and seizing it, and thinking you are doing good to the people because you are not paying compensation. I am entirely opposed to that.

So, I would plead with this House that this particular amendment of the Constitution removes a slight obstacle that had come in our way, clears the path for us, as far as we can see at the present moment, to go ahead with these vast schemes of planning, etc. that we shall have to undertake, and is one which is eminently suited not only for this House and the Parliament to accept but also for the people to accept.

BACK NOTE

XXXIII. Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill, 11 April, 1955

1. SHRI JAIPAL SINGH (Ranchi West— Reserved-Sch. Tribes): May I contradict the Mover of the Motion and say that I was present at some of the sessions?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What?

MR. SPEAKER: He says he was present there on some occasions.

2. THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (Shri T. T. Krishnamachari): Article 31(2).

3. SHRI N.C. CHATTERJEE (Hooghly): I object to the word 'even'.

STATEMENT REGARDING ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE HELD AT BANDUNG

30 April, 1955

The House will be interested to have some account from me of the recent Asian-African Conference held at Bandung. Much has appeared, in the public press about it. This is not always accurate. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Conference and embodying the unanimous decisions of the Conference has also been published. It is being issued as a Government paper.

At the meeting of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia and India at Bogor in December last, it was decided to convene such a Conference under the joint sponsorship of the five Prime Ministers. The main purposes of the Conference were set out as follows:

“To promote goodwill and cooperation;

To consider social, economic and cultural problems and the problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples; and

Finally to view the position of Asia and Africa in the world today and the contribution they could make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.”

The Prime Ministers further agreed that the Conference should be composed of all the independent and near-independent nations of the continents of Asia and Africa. In the implementation of this principle, with minor variations, they decided to invite the representatives of twenty-five countries who together with themselves, thirty in all, could compose the Conference. The invitations thus extended were on a geographical and not on an ideological or racial basis. It is not only insignificant, but impressive, that all but one responded to the invitation of the sponsors and were represented at the Conference, in most cases by Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers, and in others by their senior statesmen.

Arrangements for the Conference were entrusted to a joint Secretariat composed of the five sponsoring nations. The main burden of organisation, however, including accommodation and the provision of all facilities to the visitors, fell upon the Indonesian Government. I am happy to pay a wholehearted tribute to the Government and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia for the excellent arrangements that had been made and the enormous amount of labour and attention which they devoted to their task. Their achievements in this regard have in no small measure contributed to the success of the Conference itself.

The Asian-African Conference was opened on the 18th April by the distinguished President of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. Ahmed Sukarno. The President's opening address to the Conference gave not only an inspiring and courageous lead to the delegates present, but proclaimed to the world the spirit of resurgent Asia. To us in

India, President Sukarno's address is a further reminder of the close ties of our two countries; and of our joint endeavours in the cause of Asian freedom.

I think we may all profit by the concluding words of his speech which is well worth recalling. He said:

“Let us not be bitter about the past, but let us keep our eye firmly on the future. Let us remember that no blessing of God is so sweet as life and liberty. Let us remember that the stature of all mankind is diminished so long as nations or parts of nations are still unfree. Let us remember that the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of poverty, the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for too long stunted the development of humanity's majority.

And let us remember, sisters and brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians, and Africans must be united.”

Introductory speeches made in the plenary session by a number of delegations revealed the diversities as well as the outlooks that prevailed, and thus, to an extent, projected both the common purposes of and the difficult tasks before the Conference. The rest of the work of the Conference except for its last session, was conducted in committees, in private sessions, as being more calculated to further the purposes of the Conference and to accomplish them with expedition.

It was part of the decisions at Bogor that the Conference should set out its own agenda. This was not an evasion of responsibilities by the sponsors but a course deliberately adopted, by them to make the Conference the master of its own tasks and procedures.

Accordingly, the Conference settled its agenda on the lines of the main purpose set out at Bogor. The Conference also decided that their final decision should set out the consensus of their views.

Economic and cultural issues were referred to separate committees and their reports were finally adopted by the committee of the whole Conference. This committee also dealt with the remainder of the agenda including the main political issues. The House will be familiar, from the final communique of the Conference which has been laid on the Table of the House, with the proceedings of these committees and the recommendations made. It is, however, relevant to draw attention to their main characteristics. These recommendations wisely avoided any provision for setting up additional machinery of inter-nation co-operation, but, on the other hand, sought to rely on existing inter-national machinery in part and, for the rest, on such decisions as individual Governments may, by contact and negotiation, find it possible to make. I respectfully submit to the House that in dealings between sovereign Governments, this is both the wise and practical step to adopt. It is important further to note that all delegations without exception realised the importance of both economic and cultural relations. The decisions represent the breakaway from the generally accepted belief and practice that Asia, in matters of technical aid, financial or cultural cooperation and exchange of experience, must rely exclusively on the non-Asian world. Detailed

recommendations apart, the reports of these committees, which became the decision of the Conference, proclaim the reaching out of Asian countries to each other and their determination to profit by each other's experience on the basis of mutual cooperation.

In the economic field, the subjects dealt with include technical assistance, early establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; appointment of liaison officers by participating countries; stabilisation of commodity trade and prices through bilateral and multilateral arrangements; increased processing of raw materials, study of shipping and transport problems; establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies; development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest.

In the cultural field, the Conference similarly dealt with a wide range of subjects, recognising that the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural cooperation. The links that bound the Asian and African countries together in earlier ages had been sundered in their more recent history of foreign conquest and annexation. The new Asia would seek to revive the old ties and build newer and better forms of relationship. While the Asian renaissance has legitimately and naturally played an important part in the thinking of the delegates, it is important that they remembered and recorded, in accordance with the age-old traditions of tolerance and universality, that the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context of world cooperation.

As a practical step, the Conference decided that the endeavours of their respective countries in the field of cultural cooperation should be directed toward their knowledge of each other's country, mutual cultural exchanges and the exchange of information and that the best results would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements, each country taking action on its own in the best ways open to it.

The work of the committee of the whole Conference was devoted to problems mainly grouped under the headings of human rights and self-determination; problems of dependent peoples and the promotion of world peace and cooperation. Under each head were grouped a large number of specific problems. In the consideration of human rights and self-determination, specific problems, such as racial discrimination and segregation, were considered. Special consideration was given to the Union of South Africa and the position of people of Indian and Pakistan origin in that country as well as to the problem of Palestine in its relation to world peace, human rights and the plight of the refugees.

The problem of dependent peoples or colonialism was the subject which at once created both pronounced agreement and disagreement. In the condemnation of colonialism in its well-understood sense, namely, the rule of one people by another, with its attendant evils, the conference was at one. It affirmed its support to those still struggling to attain their independence and called upon the powers concerned to grant them independence. Special attention was paid to the problems of Morocco,

Tunisia and Algeria as well as West Irian. Aden, which is a British Protectorate and is in a different category, also came in for consideration.

There was, however, another and different view in the Conference which sought to bring under colonialism and to include in these above affirmations the alleged conditions in some countries which are sovereign nations—some of these are members of the United Nations and all of them are independent in terms of international law and practice. They have diplomatic relations with ourselves and other countries of the world including the Big Powers. It appeared to us that irrespective of whatever views may be held in regard to the conditions prevailing in these countries or of relationships that may exist between the Soviet Union and them, they could in no way be called colonies nor could their alleged problems come under the classification of colonialism. To so include them in any general statement on behalf of the Conference could be accomplished only by the acceptance by a great number of participants of the Conference, including ourselves, of the political views and attitudes which are not theirs. It is no injustice to anyone concerned to say that this controversy reflects a projection of the cold war affiliations into the arena of the Asian-African Conference. While these countries concerned did and indeed had a right to hold their own views and position on this as on any other matter, such views could not become part of any formulation on behalf of the Conference. It was, however, entirely to the good that these conflicting views were aired and much to the credit of the Conference that after patient and persistent endeavour, a formulation which did not do violence to the firmly held opinions of all concerned, was forthcoming. This is one of those matters of which it may be said that one of the purposes of the Conference, namely, to recognise diversities but to find unity, stands vindicated.

Asia and Africa also spoke with unanimity against the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. The Conference called for their total prohibition, and for the establishment and maintenance of such prohibition by efficient international control. It also called for the suspension of experiments with such weapons. The concern of Asian and African countries about the armaments race and the imperative necessity of disarmament also found expression.

The most important decision of the Conference is the "Declaration on World Peace and Cooperation. The nations assembled set out the principles which should govern their relations between each other and indeed that of the world as a whole. These are capable of universal application and historic in their significance. We in India have in recent months sought to formulate the principles which should govern our relations with other countries and often spoken of them as the five principles. In the Bandung Declaration we find that the full embodiment of these five principles and the addition to them of elaborations which reinforce these principles. We have reason to feel happy that this Conference, representative of more than half the population of the world, has declared its adherence to the tenets that should guide their conduct and govern the relations of the nations of the world if world peace and cooperation are to be achieved.

The House will remember that when the five principles, or the Panch Shila as we have called them, emerged, they attracted much attention as well as some opposition from different parts of the world. We have maintained that they contain the essence of the principles of relationship which would promote world peace and cooperation. We have not sought to point to them as though they were divine commandments or as though there was a particular sanctity about either the number or about their formulation. The essence of them is the substance, and this has been embodied in the Bandung Declaration. Some alternatives had been proposed and some of these even formulated contradictory positions. The final declaration embodies no contradictions. The Government of India is in total agreement with the principles set out in the Bandung Declaration and will honour them. They contain nothing that is against the interests of our country or the established principles of our foreign policy.

The Declaration includes a clause which has reference to collective defence. The House knows that we are opposed to military pacts and I have repeatedly stated that these pacts based upon the idea of Balance of Power and "Negotiation from strength" and the grouping of nations into rival camps are not, in our view, a contribution to peace. We maintain that view. The Bandung Declaration, however, relates to self-defence in terms of the Charter of the United Nations. The provisions of the Charter (Article 51) make it clear that the inherent right of self-defence, individual or collective, is: "if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". This is quoted from the Charter. I also invite a reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter where the conditions about regional arrangements are set out in detail. It has been stated in the Bandung Declaration in express terms that these rights of collective defence should be in accordance with the Charter. We have not only no objection to this formulation, but we welcome it. We have subscribed to collective defence for the purposes defined in the Charter. It will also be noted that the Bandung Declaration further finds place for two specific safeguards in relation to this matter, namely, that there should be no external pressures on nations and that collective defence arrangements should not be used to serve the particular interests of the Big Powers. We are also happy that the Declaration begins with a statement of adherence to human rights and therefore to the fundamental values of civilisation. If the Conference made no other decision than the formulation of the principles of the Bandung Declaration, it would have been a signal achievement.

So much for the actual work and achievements within the Conference itself. But any estimate of this historic week at Bandung would be incomplete and its picture would be inadequate if we did not take into account the many contacts established, the relations that have emerged, the prejudices that have been removed and the friendships that have been formed. More particularly, reference should be made to the conversations and, happily, some constructive results arising from private talks. Such results have been achieved in regard to some of the difficulties that had arisen in relation to the implementation of the Geneva decisions in Indo-China. Direct meetings of the parties concerned and the good offices of others, including ourselves, have

been able to help to resolve these difficulties and create greater understanding and friendship. This is the position in regard to Cambodia, Laos and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We regret, however, that we have not been able to make progress in this regard in respect of South Vietnam. This must await time and further endeavour.

The House is aware that the Prime Minister of China made, while he was at Bandung, a public statement announcing his readiness to enter into direct negotiations with the United States to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Formosa area. We have known for some time that China was willing to enter into direct talks, and other parties concerned have also not been unaware of it. The announcement itself does not therefore represent a new attitude on the part of China, but the fact that this has been publicly stated at a gathering of the Asian and African nations represents a further and wholesome development. If this is availed of by all concerned, it can lead to an approach towards peaceful settlement.

I had several conversations with Premier Chou-En-lai. Some of these related to Formosa. At my request Shri Krishna Menon also explored certain aspects of this question with the Prime Minister of China. In the last few months we have also gained some impressions on the reactions and the attitude in Washington, London and Ottawa in regard to the Formosan question. We cannot speak for other Governments and can only form our own impressions and act according to our judgment of them. We have increasingly felt that efforts to bridge the gulf are imperative in view of the gravity of the crises and the grim alternative that faces us if there are to be no negotiations. We feel and hope that patient and persistent endeavour may produce results or at least show the way to them. We have the privilege and advantage of being friendly to both sides in this dispute. We entertain no prejudices and do not feel ourselves barred in respect of any approach that will lead to peace. We propose, therefore, to avail ourselves of such opportunities as are open to us to help to resolve this grave crisis. In order to continue the Bandung talks, Premier Chou Enlai has invited Shri V. K. Krishna Menon to go to Peking, I have gladly agreed to this.

The Bandung Conference has been a historic event. If it only met, the meeting itself would have been a great achievement, as it would have represented the emergence of a new Asia and Africa, of new nations who are on the march towards the fulfilment of their independence and of their sense of their role in the world. Bandung proclaimed the political emergence in world affairs of over half the world's population. It presented no unfriendly challenge or hostility to anyone but proclaimed a new and rich contribution. Happily that contribution is not by way of threat or force or the creation of new Power Blocs. Bandung proclaimed to the world the capacity of the new nations of Asia and Africa for practical idealism, for we conducted our business in a short time and reached agreements of practical value, not quite usual with international conferences. We did not permit our sense of unity or our success to drive us into isolation and egocentricity. Each major decision of the Conference happily refers to the United Nations and to world problems and ideals. We believe that from Bandung our great organisation, the United Nations, has derived strength. This means in turn

that Asia and Africa must play an increasing role in the conduct and the destiny of the world organisation.

The Bandung Conference attracted world attention. In the beginning it invited ridicule and perhaps hostility. This turned to curiosity, expectation and, I am happy to say, later to a measure of goodwill and friendship. In the observations I submitted in the final plenary session of the Conference, I ventured to ask the Conference to send its good wishes to our neighbours in Australia and New Zealand with whom we have nothing but the most fraternal feelings, as indeed to the rest of the world. I feel that this is the message of the Asian and African Conference and also the real spirit of our newly liberated nations towards the older and well established countries and peoples. To those still dependent, but are struggling for freedom, Bandung presented hope to sustain them in their courageous fight and in their struggles for freedom and justice.

While the achievements and the significance of the meeting at Bandung have been great and epochmaking, it would be a misreading of history to regard Bandung as though it was an isolated occurrence and not part of a great movement of human history. It is this latter that is the more correct and historic view to take.

Finally, I would ask this House not only to think of the success and achievements of the Conference, but of the great tasks and responsibilities which come to us as a result of our participation in this Conference. The Government of India are confident that in the discharge of these responsibilities, our country and our people will not be wanting. Thus we will take another step in the fulfilment of our historic destiny.

BACK NOTE

XXXIV. Statement Regarding Asian-African Conference held
at Bandung, 30 April, 1955

NIL

HINDU MARRIAGE BILL

5 May, 1955

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, during the last few days I have not spoken at the various stages of this Bill. But I have taken a deep interest in these discussions and followed them. As, perhaps, the House knows, I have been deeply interested not only in this Bill, but in certain matters connected therewith, and it is a matter of great gratification to me that we have arrived at this stage now, the third reading stage of this Bill and I have every hope that this House will finalise it in the course of the next few hours.

I approve of this Bill, of course. It is not merely what is incorporated in this Bill but rather something more than that which this Bill represents. It appeals to me greatly, I think it is highly important in the context of our national development. We talk about Five Year Plans, of economic progress, industrialisation, political freedom and all that. They are all highly important. But I have no doubt in my mind that the real progress of the country means progress not only on the political plane, not only on the economic plane, but also on the social plane. They have to be integrated, all these, when the great nation goes forward.

We work peacefully in this country and we have brought about a great political change. That is, from being a dependent country we have become an independent country, by and large, through peaceful methods. We are pursuing that peaceful way to bring about changes. But let it not be forgotten that the changes—political or other—that are being brought about are, well, in a sense revolutionary in their context, although they might be brought about largely cooperatively.

Now, I welcome this particular measure because I think it is of the highest importance that we should take up the social challenge. On a previous occasion, speaking, I think, on not this Bill, but on a similar measure—the Special Marriage Bill—I ventured to say something about my reading. I speak, of course, before experts with some fear of trepidation, but I ventured to say what my conception of Hindu Law had been in the past.

Hindu Law had never been rigid; Hindu law had a certain dynamic element in it: indeed that was its strength, because any law that is rigid and is not dynamic is inevitably static and does not change with the changing times. Hindu Law has that dynamic changing quality. It is not a law of the Statute Book which is changed when you change it. It encouraged all kinds of customs to grow up. When they grew up it acknowledged them. In fact, even today in India there are so many varieties of Hindu Law—in the South, in the North, in the East,—that it is very difficult to say that this is the one and the only Hindu Law. You see the variety all over. Then again, everyone knows that a great majority of Hindus, apart from the few topmost castes, are governed by all kinds of customs. Would anyone here venture to say that they are not Hindus and drive them out of the Hindu fold? Surely not. Therefore, the essential quality of

the Hindu Law in the old times was this dynamic quality, not changing by the decree or statute, but allowing changes to creep in, so that they might be in the fitness of the changing conditions of society.

Now I venture to ask: can any law, whether it is social or economic, be equally applicable where society has changed completely? Let us take India, broadly speaking, a thousand or two thousand years ago. The population of India in those days was one hundredth of what the population today is and India was a community of a large number of villages and some small towns. Now surely modern conditions are entirely different. In the cities of Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras industries are growing and new social relations, are growing up. Can any one say that while all these changes are taking place—tremendous changes—in our social setup, certain things must remain unchanged? The result is that they will not fit in; the result is very bad one—that while you appear to hold on to something, that something which has gone, or is in the process of going, cracks up, because it does not fit in with the changed conditions.

This Bill has taken a few days in discussion here, but behind it lies years and years of investigation,—I forget how long. First, there was Sir B. N. Rau's Committee which functioned for a number of years. Here in this Parliament this matter has come up for the last three and a half years. Before this Parliament came up, in fact, Bills were repeatedly moved. Proceeding this was the tremendous investigation by the B. N. Rau Committee. No subject, I take it, has been so much before the public, has been discussed so much and opportunities given for its consideration by the public as this particular subject in its various aspects,—the question of the reform of the Hindu Law in regard to personal relationships. Now that was right because it was important. After all, politics are important, economics are important, very important, but in the final analysis human relations are the most important.

This morning a fact came to my notice, that in the small State of Saurashtra, one of our smallest States, one, if I may say so, of our advanced States in many ways, socially speaking, there is on an average one suicide a day among the women because of mal-adjustments in human relationships. The figure was 375 in a year: 375 in a population of 40 lakhs, men, women and children. You can calculate the promotion it works out in that State. These are regular authentic figures which the Chief Minister of that State gave me. This shows the mal-adjustment and the difficulties that more especially the women have to face. I have no doubt that such similar statistics may be collected from other parts of India. One has to face that situation.

I had the privilege of listening to the speech of the hon. Member opposite, Shri N. C. Chatterjee. The more I listened to it, the more confused I got and surprised. He dealt at great length with what is a sacrament and what is a *samskara* and other things. He is quite welcome: let it be a sacrament. It concerns us and let us get at what is a sacrament exactly. What does it mean? A sacrament, I take it, is something which has religious significance, a religious ceremony. A Hindu marriage is a religious ceremony, undoubtedly. Nobody doubts that. It has a religious significance. But, does it mean that it is a sacrament to tie up people who bite, who hate each other, who make life hell for each other? Is that a sacrament or a *samskara*—I do not understand.

Obviously, that is not the question, I admit. I would go a step further. I think all human relationships should have an element of sacrament in them. More so, the intimate relationship of husband and wife, apart from other relationships, should have an element of sacrament in it. There is something rather fine in human relationships provided they are good relationships. Otherwise, that relationship is the reverse of fine. It is awful. If they cannot fit into each other, if they are compelled to carry on together, they begin to hate each other and their life is bitter. The whole foundations of their existence are bitter. Surely that is not a sacrament.

He quoted, he referred to Manu and Yagnyavalkya, very great men in our history, who have shaped India's destiny. We admire them. They are among the heroes of our history. But, is it right for Shri N. C. Chatterjee or any one to throw Manu and Yagnyavalkya at me and say what they would have done in the present conditions of India?

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The point is, it is very unfair for Manu or Yagnyavalkya or anybody else to be brought in as a witness as to what should be done in the present conditions of India. The conditions are completely and absolutely different. I admit that there should be, and there are, undoubtedly, certain principles of human life which, normally speaking, do not change and should not change. There are certain bases of human life. But, in adapting them in legislation and other things, you have to consider the conditions as they are and not as they were 1000 or 2000 years ago.

Then, again,—I speak subject to correction by Shri N. C. Chatterjee,—he referred to some learned professor of a Hindu University who has produced a pamphlet. I happened to see the pamphlet. It does not bear his name; I do not know his name. Because he has drawn my attention to it, I looked into that pamphlet. I was surprised that any person, learned or unlearned, should have produced that. What is that pamphlet? That pamphlet is based chiefly on a certain report in America known as the Kinsey Report. It is based on showing how the conditions in the United States of America are. First of all, for a professor, learned or unlearned, to go about issuing pamphlets, condemning other people and customs of other countries, is not a good thing. It is not good for him to do or for any one of us. If it is a scientific study, well and good. The scientists can do it. To make that a parallel and say, "See how horrible the conditions in America are, if you pass this Bill, you will have the same conditions," is not only *non sequitor* in logic, but it is a bad way of approach. Very few of us who are present here, I would venture to say, none of us, is competent to give any real opinion, worthwhile opinion, about the conditions in America or England or Russia or anywhere. We read about them in the newspapers; may be we read books about them. We do not know the context, we do not know the historical development, we do not know the facts and a hundred other factors. The major thing that is affecting human relationships in the world today is the growth of industrialisation. It has nothing to do with the law of marriage or divorce and the rest of it. It is the growth of industrialisation, the industrial economy of the countries, vast numbers of people living in huge industrial centres, resulting in all kinds of neurosis and other things. That can be studied in a

scientific manner or otherwise. To apply that parallel to India and say that if this Bill is passed, all kinds of looseness, laxity and licentiousness will prevail, is narrow and unworthy of a professor, learned or unlearned.

Apart from this, I should like in this context, with all respect, to say something about a habit that some of us have, everybody has —to condemn other people, other countries their customs, their religion whatever it may be, their economic principles or anything and take pride in the fact that we are superior. That is a very bad way. I would not call that in the wider context a civilised approach. It is a narrow approach and an uncivilised approach to these matters. The right approach is, watch them, learn from them, be warned by what you see there, certainly, avoid the things that you think are wrong, accept the things that, you think are right, do not shout about things in other countries, especially with regard to the people, instead of condemning them, rather think of our own failings so that we may improve them. That is the right approach to strengthen ourselves.

In this context, with your permission, I should like to quote an ancient passage which, I hope, represents the real spirit of Indian culture, the real spirit of that old *sanskriti*, that is talked about by people who, sometimes, do not themselves exhibit it. I am going to quote from the famous Rock Edict of Asoka, 2300 years ago, Rock Edict No. XII.

“The beloved of the Gods does not value either gifts or reverential offerings so much as that of an increase of the spiritual strength of the followers of all religions.

This increase of spiritual strength is of many forms.

But the one root is the guarding of one’s speech so as to avoid the extoling of one’s own religion to the decrying of the religion of another, or speaking lightly of it without occasion or relevance.

As proper occasions arise, persons of other religions should also be honoured suitably. Acting in this manner, one certainly exalts one’s own religionist and also helps persons of other religions. Acting in a contrary manner, one injures one’s own religion and also does disservice to the religions of others.

One who reverences one’s own religion and disparages that of another from devotion to one’s own religion and to glorify it over all other religions does injure one’s own religion more certainly.

It is verily concord of all religions that is meritorious as persons of other ways of thinking may thereby hear the Dharma and serve its cause.”

Now, the word “religion” is used. I take it the word in the original was “dharma”, which has, of course, a wider significance, and it applies not only to the question of decrying or praising religions, but ways of life, ways of people and others in the wider context, and I wish that this inscription of Asoka which has been carved out in some of the rocks should be multiplied and be made available, visible, to vast numbers of our people, because I do believe that represents the essence of the soul of the old Indian approach which has made India strong, which has given strength to Indian

culture in the past, and to the extent it survives today, it gives us strength today. Now, we see something entirely opposed to this—this kind of running down others, condemning others, ex-tolling oneself that we are good, our country is good, or as groups of individuals we are good. Well, goodness shows itself, it does not require ex-tolling by the persons concerned with that particular matter.

And so, in this matter I would submit—in this and connected matters— that we should always avoid running down other countries. Of course, in the course of discussion when questions come up, we have to deal with their policies and that is all right, but never run down a people or their customs or their ways. We do not know how they have grown, how they have been conditioned by past ages. How to compare the people, let us say, of Central Africa, to the people of Europe or Asia? We have had a different conditioning. How can we compare them? We may like something that they do, dislike something that they do, and there the matter ends. And we should accept this great variety that exists in the world. Even in this little world of India there is tremendous variety. The more I wander about, the more I am surprised and amazed and pleased by seeing this great variety of India. India cannot go ahead, cannot progress, unless it accepts this variety in all its richness and at the same time builds up unity. If we try to impose our own conception of things, our own ways of life, our own way of eating, dressing, standing, sitting, whatever it may be, on somebody else who has a different way, well, then not only do we crack up the structure of a united India, but we are imposing ourselves on others. Let us impose ourselves by argument of course, by goodwill. Let them accept. But never impose forcibly, because the moment we do that, it is a bad approach, especially when it affects their present life etc.

Therefore, I am glad that in this Bill, custom etc., has been excluded. It will be wrong to go and interfere with custom. Again, if I may refer to this again, the fact is that, 80 per cent, or whatever the percentage of the Hindus, actually at the present moment enjoy divorce in some form or other— if that is so—do you want the elect to remain the elect, cut off from the rest looking down upon them, a few higher castes considering themselves the real descendents of Manu and Yagnyavalkya and that others are outside the pale? That is not the way of democracy, nor is it the way of building up a unified society in India. Even looking at it from the narrowest viewpoint of Hinduism, is it good for Hinduism to look at this point in this way?

Now, we are often told, reminded, of the high ideals of Indian womanhood, Sita and Savitri. Well, everyone here, I take it, admires those ideals and thinks of Sita and Savitri and other heroines of India with reverence and respect and affection. Sita and Savitri are mentioned as ideals of womanhood for the women. I do not seem to remember men being reminded of Ramachandra and Satyavan, to behave like them. It is only the women who have to behave like Sita and Savitri, the men may behave as they like. No example is put forward before them. I do not know if Indian men are supposed to be perfect, incapable of any further effort or further improvement, but it is bad that this can be so. It cannot remain so, you cannot have it so under modern conditions— either modern democratic conditions or any conditions of modern life. You simply cannot have it. You cannot have a democracy, of course, if you cut off a

large chunk of humanity, fifty per cent, or thereabouts of the people, and put them in a separate class apart in regard to social privileges and the like. They are bound to rebel, and rightly rebel against that.

Some people, I believe, some hon. Members spoke with disdain of what they consider certain traces, certain developments in what might be called the social life of upper class Hindus, upper class Indian women. Well, I am not a great admirer of certain types of development which we see in Delhi City, in New Delhi, and the like, but what does that lead to? Because we do not like certain developments, let us try to improve them, let us try to change them. That is a different matter. But what exactly does that argument lead to? Does it lead to this that you should create or perpetuate or petrify conditions which themselves are leading to these cracks and breakups in Hindu society because we find nothing to fit in there?

Then again, it is said: "It is all very well. We are in favour of it, but it is not good enough unless you create economic conditions for the women." That is an argument which may be considered valid logically, but, when applied to these things, it simply means: "Do not do this and you start the other. You have not done the first, you are doing the second." So, the real, basic approach is that nothing need be done. It is quite absurd. You have to make some beginning somewhere. Of course, I entirely agree that the basic thing is economic condition, equality of economic opportunity. To some extent, I hope another Bill which is following will do it. Let us go forward still in that line, but to stop a good Act because it does not completely meet the demands of the situation is never to do anything at all.

The House will remember how it tried at first—that was not in this Parliament, but in the previous Parliament—how the then Government brought forward what they called the Hindu Code Bill, a huge document of hundreds of hundreds of pages. We considered it in various ways, introduced it in the House, referred it to committees. It was so big that we could never get through it. In fact, we never started properly with it, and it was patent that if we went through it, it might take a few years—all committee sittings and all that clause by clause consideration could not be done. Therefore, it was decided to split it up into several compartments and deal with each separately. This is the first part of it. The second I hope will be dealt with and sent to the Select Committee later. This is the only way to deal with human life. You cannot take every aspect, the condition of Indian women, all together, and improve it some way. Apart from the complication, the difficulty involved is that, simply the time element comes in, and you rub up so many other groups and things and they object and say it is not practicable at all. Therefore, you have to take one by one. We take this here now, and I hope we shall take something else next.

I referred to Indian women and I said that I am no admirer of certain tendencies which are visible. They are not visible in Indian women only, they are visible elsewhere too, but I would beg of you again not to fall into the trap of appearing to criticise other countries or other women or other people in other countries about whom we know very little. We may have gone, some of us may have gone abroad, spent two or

three weeks or months abroad, and formed some opinions. Is that the way you would like a foreigner to come to India and form an opinion of Indian society? You would not. When he comes here for two months and writes a book, you object highly because he has picked out some things which he dislikes and runs you down. He does not know the background of it. As I have often said, the man goes to Banaras, from Western Europe or America and all that. Now, if I go to Banaras, there are many things that I do not like in Banaras. The streets are not clean and this and that—there are many things. But Banaras evokes in me a thousand pictures of India's history, of Buddha preaching in Sarnath and a hundred other things happening, the whole seat of India's culture and development and this and that. I am filled with India's past history when I go to Banaras. When some tourist comes from abroad he sees the filth and dirt of Banaras lanes. They are both true, if he says that the Banaras lanes are not clean, the streets of Banaras are filthy, unclean and the like. But it is something deeper than that. But we who go abroad then fall into the same trap. We see some filth—social and otherwise—and think that that is the basis of society there. Do you think that the civilisation of the west or your civilisation or the civilisation of any country has been built on these weak foundations, immoral foundations, low foundations? Do you think that any civilisation, any culture, can be built up on that loose basis? Obviously not. They may have been colonial powers—they have been colonial powers. They may have dominated over us—they have done so. They have done injury to us. But the fact is that they have built a great civilisation in the last 200 or 300 or 400 years, and you must find out the good and take the good from them. After all, we have got to build ourselves on our own soil, basically on our own ideas, but keeping the windows of our mind open to the ideas, to the winds, that come from other countries, accepting them, because the moment we close ourselves up, that moment we become static. Whether we close ourselves up by law, by dogma, by religious dogma or any other kind of closure, it is preventing the growth of the spirit of man, and it is bad, for the individual, for the group and for the country. And it has been the greatness, I think, of the basic Hindu approach of life that it was not rigid. Whether in philosophy or anything else, as everybody knows, we have a way of civilisation or a way of orthodoxy completely opposed to each other. We accept them; it is a good thing. There is a spirit of tolerance; a man may be an atheist and still not cease to be a Hindu. May be it is not religion in the ordinary sense of the word. But in regard to certain social practices, rigidity comes in. Rigidity comes in when you say you must not eat with so and so, you must not touch so and so. That rigidity is a thing which has weakened and brought many disasters on Hindu society. Now, we have to break that rigidity. I am glad we have broken, and we are continuing to break, the rigidity in regard to untouchability. I hope we shall break the rigidity due to these caste divisions. Now, in that context, it becomes important that you should break this rigid statute law or interpretation of law by judges which has brought about rigidity in regard to human relations in Hindu society. It is because of that that I welcome this, because it breaks that rigidity. As anybody who has read this Bill can see, the conditions provided for divorce etc. are not easy. They are pretty difficult. For any one to say that this is

something which will let loose licentiousness all over India is fantastic. There is no basis in fact for that.

So far as I am concerned, I do not propose to say anything about women in other countries. They are good or bad, as the case may be. About the social fabric of other countries, I am not competent to judge. Though I may be a little more competent perhaps, because of the opportunities I have had of travel abroad, than many Members here, yet I am not competent to judge. But I can say with considerable confidence, expressing my own faith, that the womanhood of India is something of which I am proud. I am proud of their beauty, grace, charm, shyness, modesty, intelligence and their spirit of sacrifice and I think if anybody can truly represent the spirit of India, it can be truly represented by the women of India and not by the men. So, it is, and I may tell you that even now in the modern age, some women of India—not many—go out of India, may be on some official or unofficial work, in commissions and the like. Every time that a woman has been sent, she has done well, not only done well, but produced a fine impression of the womanhood of India.

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But I do say that not every man who has represented us abroad has always brought too much credit on us, but every woman who has gone has whether it is in commissions, committees etc. It is true that fewer women have gone abroad; so it is difficult to take out averages. But still I have the greatest admiration—I am not talking about the ancient ideal of Indian womanhood, which I certainly admire in the old context—for the women of India today. I have faith in them; I think they have solid foundations of character and the rest, and I am not afraid to allow them to grow, to allow them freedom to grow, because I am convinced that no amount of legal constraint can prevent society from going in a certain direction today. And if you put too much legal constraint, the result is that it does not bend; it breaks, the structure breaks. I mentioned a simple case, of Saurashtra. There are many cases given in B.N. Rau's Report, and I think if you go into this matter, you will find that the position of Indian women, more especially of the upper classes is parlous today; it is bad legally, economically and socially speaking. Therefore, I welcome this Bill, because it is a first good attempt to improve that condition and to shake off that rigid structure.

BACK NOTE

XXXV. Hindu Marriage Bill, 5 May, 1955

1. SHRI N.C. CHATTERJEE: I am sorry the Prime Minister was not here; Shri Pataskar threw them on me and I only reciprocated rightly.

2. SHRI H.V. KAMATH: Question, question.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am glad the hon. Member has questioned it in this House. By questioning this he has tried to show, shall I say, how life is odd and curious and something ludicrous.

SHRI H.V. KAMATH: We can't hear you. Please speak up.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I find every aspect of life even in this House...

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER: The hon. Member is a bachelor.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Perhaps that has caused certain misfits.

SHRI H.V. KAMATH: How about widower sir?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, when I speak about women, I am not saying that every women in India is ideal. That should be an absurd thing to say.

SHRI H.V. KAMATH: That's all right.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am grateful for his acquiscene.

SITUATION IN GOA

25 July, 1955

I beg to leave, Sir, to make a statement in regard to the situation in Goa.

This House and all our countrymen are deeply interested in the problem of the Portuguese enclaves in India. Because of this and the importance of the problem, I have from time to time kept this House informed of developments there and of the policy that Government was pursuing. On the 4th of May last, in a statement in the Lok Sabha, I expressed our concern at some recent developments in Goa which indicated a deepening of the crisis there. During the past two months, there have been further grave developments which have caused anxiety and aroused intense feeling throughout India as well as in Goa.

I should like to remind the House that the struggle of the Goans for freedom and for integration with the Union of India is not a new development. It dates back a considerable time. More particularly, in 1946, the prospect of India becoming independent soon naturally brought hope to the Goans, and they made an attempt to free themselves. This attempt failed. Ever since then, there has been a continuing agitation in Goa, and many Goan patriots have suffered because of this. Eminent citizens have been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment or deported. Even an expression of opinion in favour of integration with India or a verbal protest has led to imprisonment, loss of civil rights and sometimes deportation. There is a complete absence of civil rights in Goa and the normal methods of constitutional agitation are forbidden and suppressed. Nevertheless, the movement for Goan freedom from Portuguese rule has continued. The Portuguese Government has often stated that there is no political movement inside Goa. This is a manifestly wrong statement.

About a year ago, the agitation in Goa became more vigorous and demonstrative. This led to greater repression by the Portuguese authorities. A new turn was given to the movement then by Goans within Goa as well as outside performing some form of satyagraha. This was largely continued in Goans though, occasionally, non-Goans also participated.

Government was anxious that this problem should be settled peacefully and if possible by negotiations with the Portuguese Government. This was the policy Government had adopted both in regard to the French settlements and the Portuguese settlements in India. As the House knows, this policy met with success in regard to the French settlements and an agreement was arrived at with the French Government. In regard to Goa, however, the Portuguese Government have consistently refused to have negotiations or even to discuss this matter. On some occasions, the Government of India's notes addressed to the Portuguese Government have not been accepted by them. Nevertheless, it was the firm policy of Government to pursue peaceful methods only.

When satyagraha started within Goa as well as outside, Government had to give careful thought to this new development. In regard to satyagraha inside Goa, the Government of India naturally had no concern. Regarding the entry of satyagrahis into the Portuguese territories, the Government of India's attitude has been to discourage non-Goans from participating in the satyagraha. They also do not look with favour on any mass entry of satyagrahis. In August 1954, a serious situation had arisen but any crisis was avoided because of this policy of Government and the cooperation that people generally gave to it.

Satyagraha, however, has continued ever since then from time to time. On the 18th May, a group of peaceful satyagrahis under the leadership of Shri Goary entered Goa. The Portuguese authorities opened fire on these peaceful men, injuring four of them and later severely beating and manhandling them. Shri Goray and the injured satyagrahis were kept in police custody while the others were pushed out into Indian territory.

Since the 18th May, twelve more groups of peaceful satyagrahis have entered the territory of Goa. These satyagrahis have been treated with considerable brutality. They have been assaulted and beaten till some of them have lost consciousness. It is reported that some of these persons were trampled upon after they had fallen down.

One of the injured satyagrahis, Shri Amir Chand Gupta, was put back into Indian territory in an unconscious state and succumbed to his injuries. Many others were admitted into hospital, suffering from compound fractures and other serious injuries. Another group of satyagrahis led by Shri Jagannath Rao Joshi, on the 25th June, was also fired upon, resulting in injuring two satyagrahis.

It is reported that another person Shri Maparia, Gaon, who was not a satyagrahi, also met his death because of the severe beating he had received.

Since May last, about eight hundred satyagrahis have entered Goa in different groups and at different times. Of these, nine have been detained and the others have been thrust back into Indian territory often after a beating. Among those detained are Shri N. C. Goray, Shri S. P. Limaye and a Member of this House, Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri.

Some of these in custody have been brought for trial before a local military tribunal. Up till now, so far as our information goes, 122 Goans, most of whom are resident in Goa itself, have been sentenced to terms of rigorous imprisonment ranging from one to twenty-eight years. They have been denied the status of political prisoners and are being treated as common criminals. Thirteen Indians have also been sentenced to terms of imprisonment of eight to nine years.

According to our information, the satyagraha conducted chiefly by Goans as well as some Indians, has been completely peaceful. But some violent acts have been reported as having occurred inside Goa. The Portuguese authorities have stated that these violent activities have been carried out by Indians and by armed personnel from India. This is completely untrue. The satyagrahis have no connection with this and no armed personnel of India has crossed the border. These petty acts of violence are

apparently done by some odd individuals within Goa itself as a result of desperation following the repressive policy of the Portuguese Government.

The Portuguese Government have repeatedly stated, firstly, that there is no movement inside Goa and, secondly, that such as there is not indigenous and is organized and is initiated in India. While it is true that in recent months some Indians have participated in the satyagraha, the movement has been essentially a Goan movement. This is borne out by the fact that in the course of last year about 2500 Goans have been arrested and subjected to great physical and mental suffering. Even now, about 450 Goans are still in custody.

The Portuguese Government in their propaganda in Goa and abroad, have laid repeated stress on the religious and cultural aspect of the problem. Their claim is that Goa is a part of Portugal, a claim which is manifestly absurd.

According to Portuguese official statistics published in 1951, out of a total population of 6,38,000 in the Portuguese enclaves, all but 1,438 persons are of purely Indian origin. These are hardly distinguishable in language, customs and manners from their brethren across the border. Sixty-one per cent of the population profess the Hindu faith and about thirty-seven per cent are Christian Catholics. There are also some Muslims. Only a small percentage of the total population can read and write Portuguese, while the common languages are Marathi, Konkani and Gujarati.

No religious or cultural question arises in Goa. It is well-known that there are many millions of Christians who are nationals of India, most of them being Catholics. It has also been repeatedly stated by Government that the religion, customs and languages of the people of Goa will be respected and protected.

The Government of India had opened a Legation in Lisbon in the hope that this might help in bringing about direct negotiations with the Portuguese Government over the question of Goa. But, on the continued refusal of the Portuguese Government even to discuss this question, the Government of India felt that there was no advantage in keeping the Mission which had ceased to be of practical utility. The Government, therefore, withdrew their representative from Lisbon in July, 1953 and closed their Legation there. Even so, the Government of India hoped that if it might be possible to achieve a negotiated settlement by peaceful means and they took no steps for the closure of the Portuguese Legation in Delhi, which has continued to function here. A proposal was made last year for representatives of the two Governments to meet together without any prior commitments. Even this was rejected by the Portuguese Government. In view of this as well as because of recent developments, the Government of India have come to the conclusion that the continued functioning of the Portuguese Legation in Delhi, in existing circumstances, serves no useful purpose. They have accordingly decided to ask for the closure of this Legation. A note to this effect was personally given this morning by the Foreign Secretary to the Portuguese *Charge d'Affaires*. The closure of the Legation will take effect from the 8th August, 1955.

As will be evident, the Government of India have exercised the utmost patience and restraint in dealing with the situation in Goa, in spite of the strong and natural

feelings of the people of India and Goa. In accordance with their general policy, they will continue to seek a peaceful settlement and will welcome negotiations with the Portuguese Government. No one who knows anything about the past history of Goa and India, the geographical and cultural affinities, and the wishes of the people of Goa and India, can doubt that Goa is an integral part of India and must inevitably become a part of the Indian Union, while preserving its cultural and other interests in accordance with the wishes of the people there. The Government of India hope that, in spite of all that has happened, the Portuguese Government will reconsider their policy and will make a friendly response to their proposal for a negotiated settlement.

The Government of India are firmly convinced that only peaceful methods should be followed and they do not approve of any action which would encourage a resort to violence.

There is one other matter, Sir, which I should like to mention. It really is not directly connected with the statement I have made. In this morning's newspapers Members no doubt have seen a news item to the effect that certain railway services to Goa have been suspended. That is a result of an entirely different course of events. What has happened and the position there is that in regard to the railway service, the Indian Railways run the services within Goa under a contract with a British Railway which apparently deals with it on behalf of the Portuguese Government. Now, there are two ways of running this railway. There are shuttles - Indian trains - that go to the border and shuttle trains on the other side of the border which serve the other side. In addition to this, there were through-trains going. Now, it was discovered by our railway people, about two months ago or more, that in that small space between the two shuttle services some obstructions had been placed which might be in the nature of mines. The railway engineers reported this: this was on either side of the Sanvordam railway station. This matter was reported to the Portuguese authorities.

Also another odd thing happened. The permanent way staff of the railway who normally attend to the maintenance of the track were asked by the Portuguese military authorities not to attend to these tracks on this place in between. So, this matter was brought to the notice of the Portuguese authorities and they were asked to remove this interference or give an assurance that there was no danger to traffic passing over this section of the railway in Goa. Intimation was also sent to the British Railway which is supposed to be in charge of this. No reply was received within the time stated. This through-railway service has been stopped, because it passes through that little area which was supposed to be dangerous, but the shuttle services on both sides continue. That is, the Indian Railway system still runs a shuttle on the other side, and of course, on this side. It became incumbent to stop the through-services going over that part of the Goan territory which was supposed to be mined as it was dangerous to passengers and others.

BACK NOTE

XXXVI. Situation in Goa, 25 July, 1955

NIL

STATEMENT ON GOA

18 August, 1955

Before I make a brief statement about certain developments in the North East Frontier Agency, with your permission, I should like to give some later figures in regard to Goa, i.e., in further correction of the figures I gave yesterday. These relate to the occurrences that took place on 15th August.

Yesterday I mentioned that 15 persons were known to be dead and 20 were still missing: others had returned, many being injured. Later information states that of these missing 20, 10 more have returned. There are 10 still not fully accounted for. But it is our information that 7 out of these 10 were shot down and are dead - this was on the 15th. Thus, the figure of deaths may now be presumed to be 22. There are 3 persons missing now. Of these, one, we know, is detained by the Portuguese Government. About 2, we do not know whether they are detained or where they are. The total figure of injured is 225, of whom about 38 are said to have serious injuries.

BACK NOTE

XXXVII. Statement on Goa, 18 August, 1955

NIL

STATEMENT REGARDING NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY

18 August, 1955

May I now read the statement about the North East Frontier Agency?

A number of questions have been asked in the Lok Sabha recently about the situation in the Tuensang division of the North East Frontier Agency. During the last few months, there have been sporadic outbreaks of violence by certain elements on the borders of the Naga Hills district and the south of Tuensang division. These consisted of ambushes in which some Assam Rifles men as well as a number of tribal interpreters and other villagers were killed, some school buildings, houses and some villages were burnt, and medical supplies were looted. Government thereupon sent two companies of the Shillong Brigade in May this year for garrison duty at Tuensang to relieve Assam Rifles for rounding up the violent elements. Troops were used only for garrison duties and not for operations.

Some days ago, we received further information about some of these Nagas who were indulging in violence and arson. They had adopted hit and run tactics. The Political Officer of the Tuensang Division, who is himself a Naga, reported the presence of organized armed gangs, totaling a few hundred in this area. These gangs possessed fire-arms and some automatic weapons. The Political Officer had received numerous complaints from many villages to the effect that they had been terrorised by these gangs. He suggested to the NEFA administration that these sporadic outbreaks of violence must be promptly and effectively put down. He, therefore, asked for military aid to the civil power. This recommendation was considered by the Governor and his advisers, and they were unanimously of opinion that it should be accepted. Government have, therefore, agreed to send a battalion of the army to the Southern sector of the Tuensang Frontier Division. This will act in close consultation with the local civil authorities and will be withdrawn as soon as these violent elements have been rounded up. This step was considered necessary in view of the evidence of murder, extortion, arson and terrorisation of certain villages so that this trouble may not be allowed to grow and should be fully controlled at the outset. The army has been directed not to use undue force.

Government, are, at the same time, carrying out their programme of developing the tribal areas for the benefit of the tribal people. There is no change in our policy of non-interference with their social customs and tribal structure. It has been found by experience that the most effective way of dealing with these areas which have been recently brought under administrative control, has been to introduce community schemes, with suitable variations to suit the people there. These schemes have already become popular wherever they have been introduced and have diverted the minds of

the people to constructive and beneficent activities. Most of the educated elements and the masses of the tribal people are cooperating with Government. Even some of their leaders who had encouraged previously these violent activities, have now denounced violence and promised support to Government in curbing and controlling the violent elements who have been terrorizing the population for some months past.

The casualties thus far suffered on our side have been :

Killed : Five Assam Rifles, two interpreters, two wood cutters, one porter and twelve villagers.

Injured: Three Assam Rifles, two porters and five villagers.

Among the hostile elements, the exact casualties are not known but, so far as is known, there have been fourteen killed and twelve injured.

The loss of property thus far due to arson and looting by these hostile elements has been sixty houses and twenty-five granaries, one office building and godown, and two schools burnt. Medical stores and one dispensary looted. Eight culverts damaged.

The hostile elements have collected ransom from the villagers, amounting, so far as is known, to Rs. 2,700/-.

The troops that are being sent to the Tuensang Division will be in position on the 19th August.

BACK NOTE

**XXXVIII. Statement Regarding North East Frontier Agency,
18 August, 1955**

NIL

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

17 September, 1955

I beg to move:

"That the present international situation and policy of Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration."

Nearly six months ago, I spoke in this House on foreign affairs. That was, I think, in connection with the Demands for Grants. At that time I drew attention to the state of international affairs and I pointed out that the prospect was a very gloomy one. The situation had hardened and there was danger of catastrophe of world war or something leading to it and a general pall of fear. The guns were all loaded and fingers were on the triggers. I am happy to say that the situation now has improved greatly during these six months. The guns are still loaded, but the fingers are not on the triggers. I do not wish to paint too rosy a picture of the world which is today, because there are numerous dark spots and danger zones. Nevertheless, I think it is correct to say that there has been an improvement in the atmosphere all round; and for the first time people all over the world have a sense of relief, the sense that war is not inevitable or is not coming, in fact, that it can well be avoided. I think that the biggest thing that has gradually evolved in people's minds all over the world has been, if I may use the word, futility of war, that war does not—modern war at least does not—solve any major problem and that therefore all problems, however difficult and intricate they might be, should be approached peacefully and an attempt should be made to solve them by negotiated settlement. Now, that may seem a simple thing to say and yet I think it is of high significance that more and more people have thought and spoken in these terms. I am not referring to the people of India, because we have always said something like that; but countries, great and powerful countries, which have placed their reliance considerably on their military might, today speak in different terms. That I think is a fact of a very great importance, because it may well be that this heralds an entirely new approach all over the world. Again I repeat that I do not wish to appear to be too optimistic, because there are danger spots all over and there are still many people who believe, perhaps they have said so, in war, like methods to solve them. But, an evergrowing number of people in all countries look towards peaceful methods and have turned away from those people who think in terms of war.

Soon after I spoke last time in this House six months ago, there took place the Bandung Conference. That was, as everyone knows, a very significant event not only in the history of Asia, but in world affairs, and I think it led to many other developments. In the Bandung Conference the 30 nations assembled there produced a document signed and accepted by all of them in favour of peaceful methods, and of course, against colonialism and racialism. That was, I submit, a remarkable achievement, considering that the nations represented at the Bandung Conference differed in their

outlooks greatly, in their policies greatly. Yet, they found a common ground in regard to these basic approaches. It was a significant example of people trying to find common ground. In spite of differences, of peaceful coexistence.

Thereafter, many things happened. I am not going to detail them. But, round about that time, before and after, there was the Austrian Peace Treaty which removed one troublesome question from the long list of problems which Europe normally nourishes. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia ended a rather longstanding dispute. There was a new approach to disarmament. There was the invitation then which has taken effect now by the Soviet Union Chancellor Adenauer, and a number of other factors. Above all, there was the Four Power, Conference in Geneva: the four Great Powers. That Conference did not produce any blueprint, did not produce and resolutions, etc. Nevertheless, without doing anything different, it made a tremendous difference to the whole aspect of things in the world. All the four eminent representatives there, no doubt deserve credit but I would like to mention more specially in this connection the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. The world looked with some surprise and great gratification at the melting away to some extent of the high walls and barriers that had existed between these countries.

Subsequently, quite recently, two or three events have taken place. One was the conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Geneva, which turned the world's mind towards these peaceful uses, because, the average person has only thought of the atomic energy as something destructive and catastrophic. Now, it appears that it could be used for the advancement of humanity and the choice before the world thus became clearer still as to whether they are going the way of war and infinite destruction or the way of peace and almost, if not infinite, tremendous advancement of humanity.

Then, there has been the recent visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow resulting in some kind of Agreement. The Agreement does not go far. We must not expect suddenly all problems to be resolved. The problem of Germany is very far from solution. I would not like to say when it would be solved satisfactorily to all parties.

But, the fact to remember is that that problem is removed from the arena of possible conflict to the conference table. That itself is a tremendous gain. Therefore, this agreement between the Soviet Union and Chancellor Adenauer, although it does not go far, is nevertheless a gain for the lessening of tension and for the peaceful solution of problems.

Again, for some weeks past in Geneva the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's Government of China have been meeting and discussing a relatively small matter, that is, the return of their civilians to their respective countries, and it was announced sometime ago, a few days ago, that an agreement had been reached in regard to this matter. As I said, it does not go very far. The major questions affecting China and the United States, remain. The whole far eastern problem remains. The future of Korea is still among the undecided questions. Formosa or Taiwan, or

even those little islands, Quemoy and Matsu, about which there has for long been a general consensus of opinion that they should, whatever other matters might be decided, go to the mainland—even that problem remains. And yet the House should remember that there has been some kind of a sea change over it all. We have not heard for a long time now of a major conflict in the China sea. Whether there has been any official agreement or not—and there has been none—the fact is that people move away from this idea of settling things by military measures, and have greater hopes of a peaceful settlement.

Now, all these changes have taken place which point to this one direction—the growth in people’s minds of an aversion to war, or, if you like the fear of war, and a desire to settle problems peacefully. Now, it is true, I suppose, that this change in people’s mind is partly at least due to the fact that they realise the tremendous potentialities for destruction of the new nuclear weapons, the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb and all its progeny. That is a major fact. And yet, I think, it is not that fact alone, but rather, well, if I may say so with all respect, a return to wisdom and goodwill, a reaction from these long years of war and cold war and the people getting tired of them because they led nowhere at all they realised,—it has solved no problem, it only kept them at a high pitch of effort, excitement, anger and hatred— a turning away from that in the direction of “Well, let us try to settle these problems in some other way, even though they might take some time”.

Where does India come into this picture? It would be an exaggeration to say that India has made a major difference to world policy. We must not exaggerate our role, but it is a fact that India has on significant occasions made a difference and that difference has led to certain consequences.

During the last several years India has been called upon to undertake international duties in Korea, in Indo-China and elsewhere. And now, as the House knows, there is a proposal that India should undertake some responsibilities in regard to the Chinese civilians or nationals in the United States of America. India has, I think it may be said without undue exaggeration played a significant role in times of difficulty. It was not often enough a public role—and we did not, and we do not, desire to publicise it—but a gentle role of friendly approach to the parties concerned, which has sometimes helped in bringing the others nearer to one another. We have never sought to be, and we have never acted as, mediators. Let us be quite clear about it. And we have no desire to act as such. The word ‘mediator’ is often branded about. Therefore, I wish to make it perfectly clear. There is no question of mediation between great countries. All we have suggested and sought to bring about is that those countries should face each other, talk to each other and decide their problems themselves. It is not for us or for others to come in and advise them what to do. But we can sometimes remove obstacles which have arisen during the last few years.

Now, India’s contribution to this new situation may perhaps be put in one word or two, *Panch Shila*, or rather the ideas underlying it. And the House will notice that ever since these ideas of peaceful coexistence— there is nothing new about those

ideas, but nevertheless it was a new application of an old idea, an application to a particular context—were initially mentioned and promulgated, they have not only spread in the world and influenced more and more countries, but they have acquired progressively a greater depth, and a greater meaning too. That is, from being perhaps a word used rather loosely, it has begun to acquire a specific meaning and significance in world affairs.

I think we may take some credit for helping this process of spreading this conception of a peaceful settlement, and above all, of non-interference, of the recognition of each country to carve out its own destiny without interfering with others. That is an important conception. Again, there is nothing new about it. No great truths may be new, but the fact remains that that required emphasis, because there has been in the past a tendency for great countries to interfere with others, to bring pressure to bear upon them, to want them to line up with them; and I suppose, that is a natural result of bigness and smallness; and it has taken place not recently but throughout history.

Now, this stress being laid on non-interference of any kind—and it has been defined, the House will remember, as political, economic, ideological etc.—is an important factor in considering the situation today. The fact that it will not be wholly acted upon here and there is really of little relevance. You make a law, and it is no good people saying that somebody made us obey that law, and commit a crime. The law is the law which gradually influences the whole structure of living in that country, even though some people may not obey it.

I need not say that those who do not believe in it gradually come within its scope.

So that it is this basic conception which counts. And what does that conception mean, again? It means that there may be different ways of progress, possibly somewhat different outlooks on the objectives aimed at; but, broadly, they may be the same. If I may use another type of analogy, truth is not confined to one country or one people; it has far too many aspects for anyone to presume that he knows it all, and each country and each people, if they are true to themselves, have to find out their path themselves, through trial and error, through suffering and experience. Only then do they grow. If they merely copy others or attempt to copy, the result is likely to be that they do not grow, and even though the copy may be completely good, perfectly good, it is something imposed upon them or something undertaken by them without that normal growth of the mind which really makes it an organic part of themselves.

We have had in the past thirty years or so the development of this country under a great leader, Mahatma Gandhi. Now, quite apart from what he did or did not do, it was an organic development of this country, something which fitted in with the spirit and thinking of India, and yet which was not isolated from the modern world, which fitted in or tried to fit in with the modern world too. No doubt, this process of adaptation will go on. But it is something which grows out of the mind and spirit of

India, effected by learning many things from outside, as it must be; because, if we are isolated, as we were for hundreds of years, we fall back. If we are submerged by others, then we have no roots left. So that this idea of *Panch Shila*, apart from the various aspects of it, lays down this very important truth, that each people must ultimately fend for themselves. I am not thinking in terms, of military fending, but in terms of striving intellectually, morally, spiritually, opening out all their windows to ideas from others, learning from the experience of others, but, nevertheless, doing it themselves; and those other countries should look upon this process of each other with sympathy and friendly understanding without any interference or imposition.

So India has played this some little role, and during these past few years the general policy laid down on behalf of India, and which we have sought to follow to the best of our ability, has been progressively recognised in other countries. It may not have been accepted by all, certainly not; some have disagreed with some parts of it or the whole even. But progressively, there has been a belief in the integrity of the policy of India, that is, it was a sincere policy based on a definite outlook and there was no illwill in it for any other country. It was based essentially on goodwill and fellowship with other countries. That, I think, has been progressively recognised.

The House knows that only a short while ago I undertook a somewhat extended tour of some countries, notably the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and also Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Rome, England and Egypt. Rather incidentally, on my way back, I even saw for a brief while a small corner of Western Germany, Dusseldorf. Wherever I went I had the most extraordinarily cordial welcome or welcomes which, naturally, moved me greatly. But I realised then, as no doubt the House realises, that that welcome had little personal significance; it was a demonstration of appreciation of India's basic policy and a demonstration in favour of peace. It is extraordinary how the people of every country that I visited were not only intellectually inclined towards this but emotionally inclined towards this idea of peace. And those countries, the House will remember, were not of one type. They were of various types and kinds and backgrounds. Nevertheless, this was a common factor. So I took that welcome to be a tribute paid to our country and the policy that we have pursued.

Soon we are going to have, in the course of these next few months, a number of eminent statesmen and leaders from other countries. Only the other day we had with us the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt whom we welcomed cordially, because we have the most friendly relations with Egypt. In two or three days' time we are going to have the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Laos visiting Delhi. And in the course of the next few months we shall have the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union; and, I hope, accompanying him will be some of his chief colleagues also. Apart from that, among our distinguished guests during this winter season are going to be the Emperor of Ethiopia, the King of Saudi Arabia, the Shah of Iran, the Vice President of Indonesia, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy and Australia and the Vice Chancellor of Germany. We shall welcome all these eminent dignitaries representing different view points with equal warmth and show. I hope, that India has a large heart and a friendly approach for everyone.

Now, I just referred to a new responsibility which we are likely to undertake, that is in regard to the recent agreement arrived at in Geneva between the Ambassadors of the United States and the People's Republic of China. The matter has not been completely finalised yet but, I hope that in the course of a few days it would be finalised. In this matter, it was the Peoples' Government of China that proposed India's name to represent them or to undertake this duty on their behalf in the United States of America, just as the United States, I believe, suggested the name of the United Kingdom to undertake that responsibility for their nationals in China. The proposal of the Chinese Government naming India was accepted by the United States of America and thus we were approached to undertake this work by both parties. In the circumstances, we had to agree to this and we have expressed to the Peoples' Government of China and to the United States that if this responsibility has to be undertaken we shall endeavour to discharge it. We are not quite sure about the details of it yet as the matter, as I said, has not been finalised yet.

Now, I mentioned many cheering developments in the world situation. But, there continue to be many dark spots. In the North of Africa, Morocco and Algeria, recent developments, in some ways, have been terrible; and, I have no doubt that all who have heard of them in India have naturally been greatly moved by them. I do not wish to say much about that because efforts are being made to find some solution and I earnestly hope that those efforts will succeed. But, I will say this, that what is happening in these countries in North Africa has not only deeply moved people in the whole of Asia and Africa and I hope elsewhere too—because it is not merely a matter of some law and constitution but what happens to millions of human beings struggling for freedom. Well, what has happened, unfortunately of tragedy, has happened and all we can hope is that this is the end of this tragedy and that some way out to freedom for these countries will soon be found.

At the other end of the continent of Africa, there is the Union of South Africa which stands out today in the world as the unabashed champion of everything that I would submit not only the United Nations Charter but civilised humanity everywhere should abhor. They consider that they are the champions today—and there is no secrecy about it, no veil, no subterfuge—of racialism and the master race, something which the Charter of the United Nations expressly forbids, something against which the last Great War was fought. But, here is this extraordinary instance of a Government continuing a policy which, I believe, every thinking and every civilised person in the world must deplore.

In the heart of Africa there is much trouble, much movement, much ferment because one of the outstanding features of the modern age is this awakening of Africa. With that, all of us in this country have the deepest sympathy. Africa has had a history of greater tragedy and suffering than any country or any continent, not today, I mean, but for hundreds of years ever since the slave trade had carried so many of them to the West. I earnestly hope that the peoples of Africa will find freedom.

One of the bright spots in Africa is the Gold Coast and Nigeria and I hope that before very long we shall welcome these countries to full freedom.

In Indo-China there have been the three International Commissions functioning and all three have Indians as Chairmen. We have been faced with problems from day to day—difficult problems—and we continue to be faced by them. But I must congratulate the Commissions and, more particularly, the Chairmen of these Commissions for the great tact and ability with which they have handled these problems.

Now may I come nearer home to problems which perhaps occupy our minds, more than these world problems? But it is right, I think, that even in regard to our internal problems, we should see them in proper perspective, I mean, in the larger picture of the world; otherwise, we shall see it out of perspective and not form a right judgment of them. Therefore, it is important that we should always keep this larger picture of world affairs before us. It is often said that external policy is a projection of internal policy, or sometimes to some extent external policy affects internal policy. They both affect each other. And the proper policy is one in which both are related and both help each other. In the same way, any policy that we pursue in the wide world has to fit in with our internal policy, broadly speaking. I do not mean to say that in every detail it has to fit in, but there are certain domains. But there must be the same broad mental approach; otherwise, both the policies fail. In the same way, any internal policy that we pursue must also be in keeping with those broad policies. But it is not so much a question of internal or external policy but the basic approach basic, mental, intellectual, moral approach to life and its problems, national or international.

Among the problems which affect us especially in India at present are the Goa problem, Pakistan and Ceylon. I do not wish to say much about Pakistan except that, however difficult the problems may be, we have always sought in the past and we shall continue to seek in the future a peaceful solution of them. In regard to Ceylon I have stated in this House that the situation there is not a happy one; indeed it is very unsatisfactory. But we still hope that we shall be able to find some way out which will be honourable to India, to Ceylon and most of all to the people concerned—the nine hundred thousand or so people of Indian descent.

Now I come to Goa. There is apparently a feeling, and even news papers in India and abroad have given expression to it—that there has been some marked or sudden change in our Government's policy in regard to Goa. Further, it has been thought by some people, more particularly I think by some foreign observers that we have made this change because of foreign opinion or foreign reactions. Now, naturally we follow and we are interested in foreign reactions not only about this matter but about every other matter. We want to be wide awake and know what the world is doing and what the world is thinking. We are not isolated. We do not wish to wall ourselves in.

But I should like to make it clear that whatever decisions we have arrived at have been completely internal decisions in our attempt to follow the policy which we

consider right. Nothing that has happened or is being said in foreign countries has in the slightest affected or brought about the decisions we have made.

Secondly, I would venture to point out to this House that there has been no reversal of the policy and that we have consistently followed the same policy throughout and more especially in the course of the last little more than a year ever since certain developments took place. It is true that there has been sometimes a varying emphasis; it is true that at some periods there was a certain laxity in enforcing that policy.

What are the basic elements of our policy in regard to Goa? First, there must be peaceful methods—let us be clear about that. It obviously is essential unless we give up the whole roots of all our policies and our behaviour. Now, therefore, any person who thinks that the methods employed in regard to Goa must be other than peaceful—it is open to him to have that opinion but there is nothing that I can debate with him or argue with him because we rule out non-peaceful methods completely.

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The hon. lady Member opposite says: what about Patna? I entirely agree with her; I think peaceful methods were not adopted by a large number of people in Patna including the students, and including of course the police. I think it is about time that the people of this country and all parties decided that it is not desirable or in the interest of our country to indulge in non-peaceful and indisciplined methods of action.

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If the police is wrong, the police must be punished. Nobody defends the wrong actions of the police. There is no defence of the wrong action of the police or anybody or any official. But if I may say so—I was going to say so a little later—one of the elements in our thinking has been not only what happened in Goa but what happened subsequently in the city of Bombay and elsewhere; the indiscipline, the methods other than peaceful that come into evidence because—I am not blaming anybody—they exhibited a certain atmosphere in the country which was the very reverse and the opposite of the peaceful atmosphere which is so necessary for any peaceful movement of satyagraha etc. One cannot have it both ways. If one thinks that methods like military methods, or police action as they are called—are necessary or desirable, well, one has them. If on the other hand one feels that peaceful methods are essential than one tries to have them. But to mix them up is to fall between two policies, two chairs, and to be nowhere.

There are, perhaps, some in this House—not too many, but certainly some—whose experience may go back during the last 35 years or so in India's history. When the national movement in India was pursuing, under a great leadership, peaceful methods, whenever we slipped—and we slipped sometimes—the movement was stopped utterly and absolutely, because it was felt by our leader that we must be true to our principle and to our policy and that nothing is going to be achieved by indiscipline

and by people diverting themselves from that basic policy either through excitement or anger, or, even if you like, some Justified resentment. Whatever it was, one cannot carry on a movement at any time, big or small, unless one is clear about one's policy and unless that policy is followed and some other policy is not included in that policy.

The word "satyagraha" has been used in this connection. I am not the originator of satyagraha nor do I presume to be an authorised commentator as to what it is. But, some of us at any rate have functioned at least for 35 years in a way and in a domain where satyagraha has been ever present. So, we have learnt through trial and error some experience about it. Anyhow, so far satyagraha is concerned it is no business of the Government. A Government does not start satyagraha. The most that a Government can do is not to come in the way of satyagraha, not to prohibit satyagraha because it is not against their law or their general policy. That is the most a Government can do. It is for other people, people other than Government to do it if it is not contrary to the law of the country or to the general policy pursued. Therefore, as a Government, of course, we do not discuss satyagraha. In some other capacity we might or some people might, consider it.

Now, I would like the House to remember what the basic policy was in the course of the last year and a quarter; that is to say, ever since satyagraha or some kind of satyagraha was talked about. Repeated emphasis was laid, of course, always on peaceful methods. Secondly, emphasis was laid that there should be no mass entry into Goa, or, no mass satyagraha in the form of mass entry. Thirdly, that it should be predominantly the business of Goans. It was about an year ago that was said, and repeatedly said. Later, gradually, what happened was that a number, to begin with relatively a small number, of Indians, non-Goan Indians, participated in the small groups that went in there. The groups were small and the Indians were relatively few. It is true we may be criticised for allowing this thing to continue. There was no vital principle involved. It may be asked "Why didn't you deny the right of Indians to do it"? It is not that I say that Indians have no right to do it. I am not for the moment talking about satyagraha—Indians have every right to work for the freedom of Goa or, for the matter of that, for the freedom of the North Pole if they want to. Why should I put a ban? But it can come in the way of my policy and therefore I can stop it, but mentally, I do not wish to deny the right, but if it comes in the way of policy or if it is likely to create consequences which are undesirable, then I come in the way or the Government comes in the way; because we thought that the participation of Indians in the so called satyagraha in any large numbers would produce wrong results, we expressed an opinion against it. When one or two Indians go in, it is not a matter of great significance—it may be, of course—but it was doubtful and so we had to make that point perfectly clear later. Gradually, early in August, or earlier still—on the 18th July,— the number of Indians increased somewhat. I want to be quite frank to this House that early in August, that is, let us say, a week before or a few days before the 15th August, we were in some doubt as to what, if any, action we should take, because we saw developments taking place which were, not in keeping with the policy we had laid down. The policy throughout, even at the end of July, was that there

should be no mass entry and pre-dominance was on Goans and not Indians, though there was no strict, rigid barrier between individual Indians going there or not going there. We were much concerned about these developments. We know that large numbers of enthusiastic countrymen and countrywomen of ours were going there in a spirit of self-sacrifice and desiring to help in the freedom of Goa. Whatever our policy or their policy might be, even though their policies might differ, there was no question of our not appreciating the individual motives of those people who went there—or most of them—and that is why on the morning of the 15th August, when I was speaking from the ramparts of the Red Fort here, I said that my mind and heart were full of thoughts for those people on the Goa border. My mind was full of what happened and what might happen to our brave people doing an act, facing a danger. Whether I agree or disagree, my mind and heart will go out to brave men facing danger for a cause. But I was concerned about the consequences then, and we may perhaps be justifiably criticised that “Why do you allow matters to go thus far on the 15th August”? The criticism might be justifiable. I quite frankly say that my mind was not clear how, having gone that far, to suddenly ask those people who had collected or were collecting in larger numbers against our conscience in regard to the mass entry, etc., not to do so. So, what took place in Goa on August 15 happened. Later, all of us had to give a great deal of intense thought to this position, and as a result of that very careful and anxious consideration, we came to the conclusion that we must lay stress on our basic policies in regard to Goa, again the old policy, but in addition, in the present context, certainly not to allow any doubt about that policy. As I said, it may be justifiably said against us that we were not quite clear, not about the basic policy but about certain developments, certain minor aspects of that policy and therefore, the people generally might have not been clear in their minds as to our policy. That charge might be brought against us perhaps and I think there will be some slight justification for it, though the basic policies have been completely clear for the last year and a quarter. Anyhow we felt that now it was not right or fair to the public or to ourselves or to anyone who was thinking in terms of going to Goa that we should leave the slightest doubt in our minds; and in the present context we therefore came to the conclusion that no satyagraha, even individual sayagraha, should be permitted. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that—I am not speaking on grounds of principle but about the sheer practical aspect of it—after a big-scale effort was made on the 15th August, going back immediately to individual efforts, efforts of odd individuals, has no particular meaning. It is lost; the signflcance of it, moral or physical, is rather lost. Hon. Members may have read in the newspapers how the Portuguese have started describing some people as “violent satyagrahis”. I do not know anything about them. I believe there are some small groups, or some small group in Goa itself, which have indulged in acts of sabotage like damaging a small bridge or something like that.

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I just said that reports in the Press have appeared, and I have no doubt those particular reports are correct, that the Portuguese say that “violent satyagrahis have

done this and that". What I was venturing to point out was this. There are a number of people, not satyagrahis—people who do not claim to be satyagrahis at any time—belonging to some small or big groups who have committed small acts of sabotage. These little attempts of odd individual satyagrahis, although completely different from that, tend to get mixed up with that other thing, or even if we cannot tell the Portuguese mix it up. I was just pointing out the practical aspects; but it is not this practical aspect that I am venturing today to lay stress in this House, but on the basic aspects of this problem. I am asked, "what is the alternative to this kind of satyagraha?" In answer to that, I can also ask my questioner, "what exactly you seek to achieve by the particular methods that you may suggest?" Obviously, problems of this kind do not yield themselves to some sudden and magic remedy. But, as the House knows, we have taken a large number of measures, economic, financial and other, which I have no doubt are effective to a considerable extent; and their effectiveness grows with other measures that we may take. These are the normal ways of approaching this problem. Remember that in our considering this, we are ruling out what is called military or police action. We have ruled it out. Then we are considering what other steps we should take. I have no doubt in my mind that the steps we take as well as the general development of the situation must necessarily and in the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese. I cannot fix a date. I do not think any person in this wide world can fix a date for the solution of any of the world's problems. Whether these problems are of Europe or of Germany or of other parts of Europe, of the Far East, of Indo-China or Africa or any other part, no date can be fixed. But, the main thing is that the policies pursued should be on right lines. I do believe that right conduct must necessarily lead to right results just as wrong conduct leads to evil results. I have no doubt in my mind about that. I do not think that when we are acting in the international sphere, we can apply some other test.

In Goa, we have a remarkable picture of the 16th century facing the 20th century, of a decadent colonialism facing a resurgent Asia, of a free and independent India being affronted and insulted by the Portuguese authorities of in fact, Portugal functioning in a way which, apparently, to any thinking person, is so amazing in its incongruity in the modern world that one is a little taken aback. It is not the normal opposition of a normal argument or action.

We have watched, may be other Members may have watched—with interest the reactions of foreign countries to what is happening in Goa. Goa is not only a symbol, small as it is; it was and it has become even more so a symbol of decadent colonialism trying to hold on. It is something more. It has become an acid test by which we can judge of the policies of other countries. Does any country actively support or encourage Portuguese intransigence in Goa? If so, we know, broadly speaking, where that country stands in world affairs. Or, are there any countries that, without positively and actively encouraging, passively support or acquiesce in this position? We know how those countries stand. Or, lastly do those other countries realise that Portuguese domination in Goa cannot and must not continue, not only for normal reasons and causes, but because it has become an affront to civilised humanity, more especially after the

brutal behaviour, the brutal and uncivilised behaviour of the Portuguese authorities there. I submit, therefore, to this House that the policy Government have laid down in regard to Goa is not only a sound policy, but, if I say so, it is the only policy. Minor variations may take place from time to time, but the major roots of that policy must hold good, unless we ought to uproot everything that we have done inside the country or outside and our national and international policies and seek some new path which we have no intention of doing. And I submit that this policy which fits in with this larger world policy as well as our national outlook is a policy which will yield results too. It is not merely an idealistic policy, but a practical policy. I trust, therefore, that any doubts about this matter would be removed from the minds of not only Members here but those outside and they will realise that we have consistently followed a policy through this last year. Certainly to some extent it now appears to me, we created some doubts and misunderstanding about it recently, and we allowed the situation to drift a little, and you may blame us for that, but the moment we saw what this was leading to, that it was taking us in a wrong direction, we had to pull ourselves up, and no Government which realised that could refrain, unless it lacked courage, from stopping this evil drift. I think we have shown—the country and the Government—courage in this matter to ourselves and to the world. That does not mean—and I should like this to be clearly understood by people outside India, here it is not necessary—the slightest slackening by our Government in regard to this question of Goa. All that has happened in recent months has made this question important. It may not be a terribly important question because it is inevitable—all the world knows and I am quite certain that people in Portugal know that it is quite inevitable—that Goa has to come to India, that they will have to leave India and that Goa then necessarily has to associate itself with the Indian Union. But the first thing is the liberation of Goa. If in the normal course this took a little time, it did not matter much. There are many problems which take time. As the House knows, there are bits of Portuguese dominated territory in China, in Indonesia, little bits—Macao, this and that, they continue to be as such, the People's Government of China does not get terribly excited because Macao is Portuguese. Macao will go to them; there is no doubt about it; everybody knows. But they do not get excited. They are not weak in their military strength. It is a small matter for them if they choose to take it, but they do not choose to take it because of their larger policies. There is a bit of Portuguese territory elsewhere too. So, it would not matter normally if a matter takes a little more time or not, but the course of events has made Goa a more important and a more vital issue and to some extent over this issue the iron has entered our souls, the country, and therefore, one has to deal with this matter with all the wisdom and strength that we possess and not allow it to lapse, not allow it to become a static question, and I hope that people in other countries will realise that.

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BACK NOTE

XXXIX. Motion regarding International Situation, 17 September 1955

1. SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY (Basirhat): What about Patna?
2. SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY: What about the police?
3. SHRI K. K. BASU (Diamond Harbour): Is there any independent source to verify what the Portuguese said about the satyagrahis?
4. MR. SPEAKER: Motion moved:

“That the present international situation and policy of Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

Now, there are certain substitute motions. Hon. Members who wish to move them may do so.

SHRI RAGHURAMAIAH (Tenali): I beg to move:

That for the original motion, the following be substituted:

“This House having considered international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto approves the foreign policy pursued by the Government, which has led especially to the acceptance by many countries of the principles of Panch Shila and to the easing of the international tension, thus promoting the cause of world peace.”

CITIZENSHIP BILL

5 December, 1955

I wish to deal with only one aspect of this Bill on which some comments and criticisms have been made. The other aspects will be dealt with by my colleague, the Deputy Minister. This aspect is in regard to the references in this Bill to Commonwealth citizenship. They are in clause 2(l) (c), clause 5(l) (e), clauses 11 and 12 and the First Schedule.

I do not wish to discuss at any length the whole question of the Commonwealth relationship though I should refer to it briefly. I should like to refer, first of all, to certain statements made in the minute of dissent of some hon. Members to the effect that there are, because of this relationship, obligations on us which are irksome, repugnant and derogatory. I do not think that is a correct statement. I speak now not theoretically, but from the practice of the last few years. I should like the hon. Members who have put in this minute of dissent to point out anything which has been irksome, derogatory or repugnant, anything that has limited in the slightest our independent sovereign status or freedom of action, internal or external. I submit that there has been no such thing, and that in fact, we have exercised, because of it, a certain greater freedom of action in regard to external matters than we might perhaps have done.

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I am not aware of that I think, if the hon. Member will read that, he will see it is not quite so. But, what the British Nationality Act may or may not say is totally immaterial. It is what we say that counts.

This House knows and the country knows that in regard to our internal and external policies we have functioned exactly as this House and the Government wanted to. The Commonwealth relationship does not come in the way in the slightest. We have often differed from the policies and practice of the other Commonwealth countries. We have discussed with them and differed. Only recently, if I may say so—and this matter, no doubt, will have larger consequences—there was the pact which is called the Baghdad Pact, which, we think, is a most unfortunate and deplorable action of the countries who have joined it: deplorable not from our point of view, but from the point of view of peace and security. Though such action is taken, it has not affected our policy. On the other hand, I do think that our association in the Commonwealth has been of great help to the larger cause of peace and cooperation. I have no doubt that it has been so. I do not wish to take the time of the House in detailing this. But, this is the clear conclusion that I have come to.

We would like to extend that area of cooperation to other countries too. We do; if I may say so, I would mention Burma. With Burma our relations are of the closest, closer than with many Commonwealth countries. But, the fact remains that Burma is not in the Commonwealth. We develop these close relations with other countries. It is

asked: Why is not Burma mentioned here? For the simple reason that the clause of reciprocity is there. It is not a question of our deciding; but the other country has also to decide and various other difficulties in regard to the laws of Burma. There are some laws which do not fit in with ours. Questions are raised in this House in regard to them. So that, I should like this House, first of all, to keep in mind that by this Commonwealth relationship, there has been nothing which has come in our way, in the way of our dignity, prestige or freedom of action.

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I am perfectly prepared to discuss this with the Government of Burma. The hon. Member will realise that in this matter it is not we that might perhaps dislike any such approach. But, it may be embarrassing to the other Government. We do not wish to embarrass the other Government. We on our part are perfectly willing. We cannot say anything in this matter, because, we are a country with a large population which tends to expand. Burma is a country with a relatively limited population. For obvious reasons, they do not like to have a large population there in their country coming in. It is entirely for them to consider: not for us. I would be very glad indeed to consider this matter in connection with Burma.

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I hope that we are gradually working up to a stage when there will be world citizenship. That is a different matter. Meanwhile, we have to have citizenship laws.

In the course of the development of our Constitution, we had, the House will remember, a period before we became a Republic when we were called a Dominion. Of course, we had long decided to change that status and become an independent Republic. It took two or three years for us to frame our Constitution. Then we became an independent, sovereign Republic owing allegiance to no other authority, even nominally. This question of the Republic coming into the Commonwealth was a new conception, completely new conception from the point of view of the Commonwealth, because the Commonwealth till then was based on some kind of allegiance to the sovereign of the United Kingdom. Whether it could be fitted in or not nobody knew at that time, and so far as we were concerned, we rather doubted. We did not know how it could be fitted in, but we certainly desired for a number of reasons of vital import to continue our association. We thought that would be good for ourselves and for world peace. This was discussed at some length in the years 1948 and 1949 between us and the British Government and the other Commonwealth Governments, ultimately in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. It was their suggestion then, and their desire, that there should be some kind of notional, nominal link of this kind merely to.

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There was no commitment etc., but certainly there was this measure of agreement. We told them we would like, we were prepared at the right time to include in our

Nationality Bill some kind of clause or reference, some enabling clause, so that, on the basis of reciprocity, we could give the same treatment which we got in the other country. It is not a common thing for all Commonwealth countries. It depends on the reciprocal arrangement we have with that other Commonwealth country. In regard to the United Kingdom, the privileges that Indian nationals have are very great. In fact, they are almost one hundred per cent. In regard to other countries they are more limited; we give them limited privileges. In regard to South Africa, far from any reciprocity or privileges, there is, if I may use the word, hostility between the two countries. So that, it is entirely an enabling clause, entirely something which is in our power to give or not to give. I am presently going to propose a small amendment which I think the House will probably approve in regard to this particular matter in reference to South Africa.

I can very well understand the natural sentiment and desire of the House not to put in or include the name of the Union of South Africa in such a Bill. But I would submit that our including the Union of South Africa is not at all to our discredit. What do we say? We are merely enumerating certain countries which for the present are in the Commonwealth, and we are saying that "we will give you such privileges if you behave." We do not give them anything. It is a challenge to them to do so. Today, no South African can come to India. Leave out everything else and the question of Commonwealth citizenship, they cannot enter India, because no South African, according to the rules we have framed at present, can enter India. No South African goods can come to India. We are completely cut off from each other from that point of view. Only by a special permit can a South African come here, and they have been very rarely issued, for some humanitarian work. I think it is not quite fitting for us to cut out the name of South Africa from the Schedule. We give nothing. We have everything in our power. It simply means that we are prepared always to open the door for any proper compromise if the others behave. That has been our policy in regard to every matter, that we are always ready, not to give up our policy or any basic principle, but to treat with the other party, negotiate a settlement, however hostile it might be for the present. That applies to large world questions too. They are very big questions. If each country is hostile to the other and they take up an attitude of refusing to deal with each other, then there is no solution left except conflict. So that, I submit from the practical point of view, the theoretical or again of following the general policy we pursue, we should never finally close the door.

So far as this Bill is concerned, it is true, and I myself share that sentiment, it slightly hurts me even to mention South Africa in this connection. I accept that. Nevertheless, I think for wider reasons it would not be right for us to delete one country.

Then, the whole Commonwealth conception has been obviously a changing one, and it took a tremendous leap in a particular direction of change when an

independent Republic owing no allegiance to any outside authority was associated with this Commonwealth.

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There are two or three factors which I should like the House to bear in mind. The first thing is that there are a large number, many millions, of Indians abroad, abroad in what are called the British colonies today, and which I hope will cease to be British colonies and will develop themselves to freedom. There is no doubt that our Commonwealth connection helps us and helps them, helps us in dealing with them. Otherwise, all these millions of Indians would have to choose; they would either become absolute aliens in the country where they are living, or they have to give up completely their connection with India. Of course, when a country becomes independent like Ceylon, like Burma, naturally they have to choose, but forcing them to choose before they are independent puts them into a very embarrassing and false position. I do not think it is right that we should place these millions of our fellow countrymen in that position.

Then also, look at it as this Commonwealth might develop. I hope that in the course of the next year, the coming year, there will be in addition to the Commonwealth, the addition of Gold Coast. That will be a good thing when it comes off and I do hope it will come off and we are looking forward to it greatly. The addition of the Gold Coast again changes the entire character of this association of nations. Here is a full blooded African nation for the first time being associated in this way. So, it is changing. If I may say so, the European character of it changes, and as it is, there are free Asian and African nations coming together, and I hope that subsequent steps may bring in perhaps Singapore and Malaya. So, the whole things is a changing one. And from the world point of view, from the racial point of view, it is a good thing for these changes to take place. It may be that some members of the Commonwealth, notably the Union of South Africa may utterly dislike this change; it is very likely, because it goes against their basic policy. Well, they have to face their difficulty as to what they do in the circumstances, and not we. And I should like to place the burden of choice on them, whether they are so disapproved of these developments as not to tolerate them, and themselves retire into their own shells, if I may say so, cut off from the rest of the world. Why should I help them in the process? Why should I not have the widest sphere of influence, widest sphere of cooperation?

Therefore, I submit that from these wider points of view, it is desirable for us, more specially at the present day when these big questions arise, to have this Commonwealth link and association and thereby help in these larger causes of peace and solution of problems, world problems, apart from our own problems—they have helped undoubtedly. India can be influenced by other countries, but it should be remembered that India also can influence other countries, and has done so remarkably in the past few years.

I would therefore beg this House to accept this broad pattern which I again say does not give the slightest privilege or special position to any country except on a basis of reciprocity. It is an enabling thing; that is, if the other party suggests, it is for us to determine. There is one amendment, however, which I would like to suggest for the approval of the House. If you will refer to clause 2 (c) of the Bill, you will find:

“ ‘citizenship or nationality law’ in relation to a country specified in the First Schedule means an enactment of the legislature of that country which, at the request of the Government of that country, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, have declared to be an enactment making provision for the citizenship or nationality of that country;”.

This is an enabling clause. But I would like to add to this the following:

“Provided that in respect of the Union of South Africa, no such notification shall be issued except with the approval of both Houses of Parliament.”

That is first of all an indication of the special way we look at the Union of South Africa in this connection. Secondly, we want in this matter to bring every step to both Houses of Parliament and not leave it to Government. I submit that if this proviso is added, some part at least of the sentiment we feel in this matter is met, and the broad advantages of the position are also maintained.

There is one small matter also which I might mention. In the First Schedule, some names are mentioned; their order should be changed; one or two names are not quite correct. That is a small matter.

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BACK NOTE

XL. Citizenship Bill, 5 December, 1955

1. SHRI M. S. GURUPADASWAMY: (Mysore): May I know whether the hon. Prime Minister is aware that in the British Nationality Act we are considered as British subjects?

2. SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE: (Calcutta NorthEast): Could not we make a gesture to Burma for reciprocal rights of citizenship as far as our Citizenship law is concerned at present?

Shri Kamath: Nepal also?

3. SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY (Basirhat): But does South Africa like our giving them reciprocity? We are extending the citizenship rights to South Africa.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We are not.

SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY: Because that is a part of the Commonwealth.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I beg your pardon. We are not. All that you can say is that we are prepared to offer reciprocal rights to any country provided they behave. That is all

SHRI KAMATH: Any country outside the Commonwealth also?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is a separate matter. We will have to change the whole texture of our citizenship if we include every country in the world.

SHRI N. C. CHATTERJEE (Hooghly): If the hon. Prime Minister is correct when he says that we are not giving any reciprocal rights with regard to the Union of South Africa, why does he not agree to the deletion of the Union of South Africa from the First Schedule?

4. SHRI KAMATH: Sentiment?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Not sentimental. There is no sentiment about it, but it is the other way. It is a notion which enables us to hold together, to meet etc., and after much thought the only way discovered was that the British Government should introduce some clause in their Rationality Bill to enable this association on the basis of reciprocity.

SHRI S. S. MORE (Sholapur): Does the British Crown constitute a notional link?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I go on, Sir?

MR. SPEAKER: Yes.

5. SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE (Guna): The Queen of England is the head of the Commonwealth, and that is the notional link.

SHRI KAMATH: Symbolic.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, that is a symbolic link. I am told that Pakistan is going to become a Republic.

6. SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE: May I ask a question? We have a repealing clause in this Bill, namely clause 19, where we say that the British Nationality Acts from 1013 to 1940 are repealed.

Why do we repeal these Acts and omit any reference to the British Nationality Act of 1948 which itself repeals these Acts, except on the supposition that certain British Acts and especially the British Nationality Act of 1948 is operable in India? It may not be part of our statute law but it operates in our country.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: How does it operate except in the measure that we do something in line with it? How can you say that it operates? We have been guided by it in framing our law. You may say that if you like. We have been guided by it in taking some action. But that law does not operate here obviously. How can that law directly operate here? It cannot

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE: I just want to understand. We specifically say that we are repealing certain British Acts. We go out of our way to do so, because it is not our business presumably to say that their Acts do not operate. But in regard to certain British Acts we say they do not operate. And there is another British Act which itself has repealed those British Acts which we say we are repealing. Therefore, my contention is that the British Nationality Act of 1948 which is specifically omitted from our repealing clause continues to operate as a law in our country.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I confess this is a matter too deep for me. Some lawyer would have to answer that.

MR. SPEAKER: That is what I was going to say. This matter is one of a drafting nature, really speaking, and one for legal experts. It may therefore better be left to be answered by the hon. Minister of Home Affairs.

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE: We took advantage of the Prime Minister's presence.

MR. SPEAKER: The Prime Minister lays down the policy and general principles and does not sit for drafting.

SHRI KAMATH: By your leave, may I put another small question? The Prime Minister can answer that.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I just say this? I am told that according to a provision in our Constitution, the British Acts before 1947, that is, before the changeover of Government, continue to apply. That is the real reason. The 1948 Act does not apply, because it came after the changeover of Government here.

SHRI GADGIL (Poona Central): That was made clear last time.

SHRI KAMATH: May I remind the hon. Prime Minister that the First Schedule lists at least one country which is outside the Commonwealth, that is, the Republic of Ireland? If that can be so, what is the bar to including some other countries outside the Commonwealth?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is true that Ireland is outside the Commonwealth. But being outside the Commonwealth, it has continued, I believe to be considered in a special way by the Commonwealth. Naturally, so far as we are

concerned, we all very gladly welcome that special way. They have these economic and other relations; and we merely welcome it; we must.

SHRI KAMATH: What about other countries outside the Commonwealth, which are just like Ireland?

MR. SPEAKER: These questions can be raised later on. Let us proceed with the discussion now.

SHRI GIDWANI (Thana): I have only to refer to the clause dealing with the persons who migrate from Pakistan. I am opposed to the registration clause. Any person who comes to India from Pakistan must automatically be considered as citizen of India by descent and not by registration. Registration involves a lot of expenses.

As Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava put it the other day, it means that so much of money will have to be spent.

MOTION REGARDING REPORTS OF STATE REORGANISATION COMMISSION

21 December, 1955

Sir, this is the seventh day, I believe, of this debate and, as you have just informed us, 70 persons have previously spoken. So, I am the 71st in this long succession. I have been hesitating as to whether I should take up the time of this House in this Marathon race not because I am not only not interested in this question but I was doubtful if I could throw much light on it. I might straight off say that I am not greatly interested as to where a particular State boundary is, and I find it very difficult to get passionate or excited about it. Naturally, I have my preferences, but it does not have much difference to me whether any internal boundary of a State is drawn here or there. What is infinitely more important is what happens on either side of the boundary, what happens within the State and more especially in those great areas, which inevitably are few. Look at that from the linguistic point of view, multilingual or bilingual—as there are bound to be a large number of areas— what happens to people inside a particular State who may either linguistically or in any other sense form what might be called a minority. That seems to me a far more important proposition than where you draw the line. Because, if you once lay down those basic principles correctly, and act up to them, then the vast number of problems that arise and difficulties and legitimate grievances would inevitably disappear.

Now, for a moment, I may as well say to the House that I am not speaking particularly in my capacity as Prime Minister or on behalf of Government and I am not going to make any epoch-making pronouncement. We, in Government, have been Considering this Report and the other matters that flow from it for the last many weeks and we shall continue to consider them till we come up to this House in some form of placing the recommendations for this House to consider. And, it will not be proper for me or for any other member of Government to express himself in any tone of finality about any matter. But, I may give expression to my own inclinations in regard to the recommendations of the Report or the other suggestions that have been made.

One thing I should like to say is that I have regretted very greatly certain criticisms that have been made in the Press, in some newspapers—I do not know how far any hon. Member indulged in such criticisms—criticisms of the Commission. One can criticise their recommendations; of course, that is a different matter; but criticisms of the Commission and sometimes very strong criticisms about their unfairness and all that, I think, that is a very unfair approach and it is a kind of approach which is bound to make such work now or hereafter much more difficult. We choose eminent men; they take a great deal of trouble and tell us what they think about the problem. You may or may not agree with it but to attack, in a sense, their

bona fides or fairness, if I may say so, apart from its wrong approach, does indicate, to my mind, that your case is very weak. It is the old story of abusing the attorney on the other side.

May I also suggest for the consideration of this House that while Members here represent their constituencies, of course, they do something more. They are not only Members of this or that particular area of India, but each Member of Parliament is a Member of India and represents India, and at no time can we afford to forget this basic fact that India is more than the little corner of India that we represent. We know, all of us, that we have to face certain forces which may be called separatist, that is to say—I am not using the word in any bad sense—it nevertheless means that people's attention is being diverted more to local problems, parochial. State, Provincial and forgetting the larger problems of India. There should be really no conflict between the two but it is a question of the method in our thinking, in our minds, in considering our problems. There is the word in the English language 'parochial'. That is, a person thinks of his parish or village while he forgets the larger considerations; while he thinks too much of even of a State as big or important he forgets these larger considerations.

Now, it has been my good fortune and privilege to travel about India a great deal and often to go abroad. Perhaps, I have had that good fortune more than most Members of this House. The result is that I am constantly compelled to think in larger terms, not only in national terms but even in international terms and see this picture of India in that context. Perhaps, that is helpful in giving a truer perspective of events. I travel about India and I see this moving drama of India and I feel excited and inspired by it. I see many things that I do not, of course like; but the major thing is this tremendous drama that is India today moving as if by the dictates of some predestined fate and destiny towards its goal. It is a tremendous thing and we see that not only in India. I would submit to this House we see it even more if we go abroad and see this country of India in the south of Asia, from some distance, see it in proper perspective. I would beg the House to consider that there are many people in the wide world who also are beginning to feel the sense of drama and adventure about what is happening in India. Now that is the perspective. And they say also how we have got over great problems and great difficulties. It is true that we have even greater problems ahead, but in the measure in which we have succeeded in the past, that is the measure with which they judge of our strength to succeed in the future. That perspective, I submit, has some importance. We may argue as to the boundary of Bihar or Bengal or Orissa or some State or other—and I have no doubt that the argument on the question is an important one and I do not say it should be brushed aside—but the word 'important' also is a relative word. There may be other things which may be more important, and one must not lose oneself in passionate excitement as to where the boundary of a State should be, provided, as I said, we have this fuller conception of India and provided we have, by Constitution, convention or otherwise, the fullest guarantees that whether a person lives on this side of the border of a State or the other, he will have the fullest rights and opportunities of progress according to

his own way. In this sense I tried to approach this matter, and I felt that perhaps this larger outlook was sometimes lost sight of. We talked about linguistic provinces and some people said that this principle of linguism should be extended more and more; some people criticised my colleague, the Home Minister, because he did not quite make that the final test. May I say quite briefly and precisely that I dislike that principle absolutely 100 per cent as it has tended to go?

Now I want to make it perfectly clear that that does not mean that I dislike language being a very important matter in our administration or education or culture, because I do think that the language of the people is a vital matter for their development, whether it is education, administration or any other matter. But I do distinguish between the two things, this passion for putting yourself in a linguistic area and putting up a wall all round and calling it the border of your State and developing the language to the fullest extent, because I do not think that the people can really grow except through the language; I accept that completely, but it does not follow in my mind that in order to make them grow and their language, you must put a barrier between them and others, that you must put a wall all round and call that this is this language area or that. For a State, broadly speaking, there are language areas in India; of course, you cannot ignore them and there is no need to; they are welcome as they are; they represent the development of history through the ages. But considering them as something opposed to the others and putting a hard and fast line between the two areas is, I think, carrying it too far. As a matter of fact, it just does not matter where you draw your line. If you judge it from the purely linguistic point of view, you go against the wishes of some—may be many. There are invariably bilingual areas, and if they are not today bilingual areas, are you going to prevent people from going from one State to another? Are you going to step, contrary to the dictates of our Constitution, the movement of population, the movement of workers or of other people from one State to another? You cannot. Therefore, whatever fixed line you may even draw, if that movement is free, people will go, will be attracted by one side or other, and again change the linguistic composition of that State or the border area. Are we going to sit down every few years or ten years and say, “Now the ratio of this particular tehsil or taluk has changed and, therefore, it should be taken out of this State and put into another”. It is quite impossible if you think in that way. Therefore, you must realise that while there are clearly marked linguistic areas of great languages, there are also almost always between two areas bilingual areas, from the language point of view and sometimes even trilingual areas. And wherever you may draw your line, you do justice to one group and injustice to another. What is our difficulty in these problems is raised in this Report and there are many difficulties. By looking at it purely from the language point of view, the difficulty is that there is good reason, good logic and good argument for every case, on both sides of the case. That is the difficulty. If there is logic only on one side, we decide it easily; but there is logic on both sides and the two logics conflict. There is argument on both sides. You may balance the two and say that this argument is stronger than that; by and large, the case of one side is somewhat better, but the fact is that the case of the other side is pretty

good too. Are you to measure merely in a balance—maps and census figures have become the fashion now—how many individuals are supposed to speak in this or that language? Because there is a slight majority in this case, this kind of a thing may be all right. It might be done sometimes, but it leads us ultimately to all kinds of fantastic conclusions. Therefore, I submit that we must consider this matter separating the question of language in the sense that we must be clear that the language has to be developed, more especially all the great languages of India which are mentioned in the Constitution—but I would go a step further—and even those that are not mentioned in the Constitution like those in the North-East Frontier Area and elsewhere ought to be developed; secondly, that the development of one language should not be and cannot be at the expense of the other. It is a strange notion that the development of one language comes in the way of another language in India. I am absolutely convinced that the development of any one of the great languages of India helps the development of the other languages of India. It is my privilege, however unworthy I might be, of being the President of the Sahitya Akadami, started a year or two ago where we deal with all the languages of India and try to encourage them; the more we discuss these matters, the more we see that every encouragement, development and growth of the language results in the other Indian languages also getting some advantage of growing. And we of course are trying to have translations of one from the other and so on. I would go a step further and say that the knowledge of a foreign language helps the growth of an Indian language. If we are cut off from foreign languages, we are cut off from the ideas that come in those foreign languages—with not only the ideas but the technology which is part of modern life. Therefore, let us not think of excluding a language. I do not for instance understand—I may be quite frank—the way some people are afraid of Urdu language. I am proud to speak Urdu and I hope to continue to speak Urdu. I just do not understand why in any State in India people should consider Urdu as a foreign language or something which invades into their own domain. I just do not understand it. Urdu is a language mentioned in our Constitution, is it intended to live in the upper atmosphere or stratosphere without coming down to the earth? I just do not understand it. It is this narrowmindedness that I object to.

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It is no good. People go into arguments in regard to philology, in regard to other things. Take the Punjabi language. We heard learned arguments about the origin of Punjabi and Gurmukhi script and how far it is connected with Hindi and how far it is independent of Hindi; whether it has descended from Sanskrit etc., as if it was of the slightest significance, to what source it belongs. What matters is what people do today. Let scholars go into the past of Gurmukhi, Hindi or anything. What is done today? If people in Punjab or elsewhere are accustomed, or if they wish to have, to use or to speak a certain language and to use a certain script, I want to give them every freedom, every opportunity and every encouragement to do that. Because, as a matter of fact, speaking from the strictly narrowest, practical and opportunist point of view, the more you try to suppress it the more opposition there is, and the more,

if I may say, it survives the suppression. Everybody knows that in regard to language there are intimate, rather passionate ideas connected with it in people's minds—something very intimate. I can understand the passion with regard to any language—Hindi or any other. But the person who feels passionately about a language must also remember that the other fellow also feels passionately about it. That is the difficulty. Therefore, the safest and the only course is to give every freedom and opportunity to all of them. Let them develop in the natural course of events. They will adapt themselves; they will affect each other and influence each other and grow more and more important, if they have the capacity or remain less developed. It is not for any person or for me to go about and say that any language—let us say, the Gurmukhi language—is an undeveloped language. It may be. It does not matter. We should try to develop it then and allow the natural forces to increase the importance and the use of these languages. Any attempt to decry or deny a language is bad not only from that language's point of view but from the point of view of other languages and those who use the other languages. It is the only correct policy both from the point of view of good policy and even if you look from the narrower points of view.

I am dealing with this question of language because it has somehow come to be associated with this question of States reorganisation. I repeat, if I may, that I attach the greatest importance to the language but I refuse to associate it necessarily with a State. Inevitably of course, in India as it is, there are bound to be States where one language is predominant. If that is so, let it be so; we encourage that. But there are also bound to be areas where there are two languages; as I have said, we should encourage both of them. We should make it perfectly clear that the dominant language of that State should not try to push out or suppress or ignore in any way the other language of the State. If we are clear about that, then the language issue does not arise.

Other issues may arise—economic and others. With language of course other aspects, cultural aspects which are connected with them may arise. Then the two should be treated on the same basis. That is to say, every culture, every manifestation of culture should be encouraged. Culture is not an exclusive thing. The more inclusive you are, the more cultured you are. The more barriers you put up, the more uncultured you are. That is the definition of culture. Therefore, culturally too, we should encourage every aspect of culture. It as the world develops and changes, something falls out, let it fall out. But if you try to push it down or push it back, then you are probably not likely to succeed and in fact it brings in conflict which injures your own culture possibly.

Thinking as I do in this matter, I personally welcome the idea of bilingual or multilingual areas. For my part, I would infinitely prefer living and my children being brought up in bilingual and trilingual areas than in a unilingual area. Because of that, I think I would gain wider understanding of India and of the world and a wider culture—not a narrow culture, however big that narrow culture may be.

The House will forgive me, if I mention a rather personal thing. This is in relation to my daughter. When I had to face the problem of her education—

unfortunately, I was a bad father and I was not with her for years and years—my attempt was this; when she was a little girl I sent her to a school—not in U.P. as I wanted her, as a child, to pick up some of India's languages— in Poona; I sent her to ya Gujarat! school in Poona because I wanted her to know the Marathi language and the Gujarati language and their influence. I sent her subsequently to Shantiniketan because I wanted her to understand the Bengali background—not only the language but the cultural background. Whether I succeeded or she succeeded or not—that is another matter. My point is that ray outlook was such. I should like her to go down south and learn Tamil or Telugu dt Malayalam. But of course life is not long enough to go to every State.

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The hon. Member hat put a question: what it the percentage of people who can learn other languages? Well, if I may say so, I imagine that the percentage is very very large. I will tell you what I mean by it. You and I may have some difficulty in picking up another language because we proceed by' grammar and all that. But you take persons—pick them out from the Delhi bazaar and put them in an environment of another language. You will find in three months they will talk that language which you will not know. I know and I can tell you another instance. In our foreign missions, our Secretaries and others are supposed to learn the language of that country. They do try to learn in a scientific way. Before they know anything of that language, some of the lower staff who have to work there pick up the language and talk in it. So, it is not merely a question of learning a language correctly but being in a position to understand it and thereby entering into the life of other people; that is important. There is nothing so difficult as trying to understand another people unless you can speak to them directly without an interpreter. Interpreter is a great nuisance.

Therefore, I would say that the first question for us and the most important question in this entire Report is the last portion—the last chapters in which they mention certain safeguards. Whether they are enough or not is another matter. Add to them if you want. But the point is that there should be clear safeguards laid down, possibly in the Constitution, otherwise, by some other way, so that a fair deal could be given to every language everywhere in this country. There should be no argument about that. We should not say: we are in a majority and therefore our language should prevail. Every language has equal right to prevail even if it is a minority language in the country; of course there have to be some good numbers. You cannot have it for every small group. I understand that the Bombay Corporation has schools in fourteen languages; because Bombay is a great city with all kinds of language groups there.

Secondly, if I may venture to lay down a rule, in very matter it is the primary responsibility of the majority to satisfy the minority. The majority by virtue of its being a majority naturally has strength to have its way; it requires no protection. It is a bad custom, a most undesirable custom to give statutory protection to minorities; it is not good. Sometimes it is right that you should do that to give an encouragement, let us say to backward classes, but it is not a good thing. Therefore, by its being in the

stronger position it is the duty and responsibility of the majority community, whether it is linguistic, whether it is religious, whether it is caste—whatever it may be—to pay particular attention to what the minority there wants, to win it over. It is strong enough to crush it if other forces do not protect it. Therefore, I am always personally in favour, wherever such a question arises, of the minority there, whether it is a linguistic minority or a religious minority.

Talking about religion in the broad sense of the word, obviously in India the votaries of the Hindu religion outnumber others tremendously. Nobody is going to push them from their position; they are strong enough. Therefore, it is their responsibility, and special responsibility that people following other religions in India, which may be called minority religions, have the fullest freedom, have the fullest liberty and a feeling of satisfaction that they have their full play. If that particular principle is applied then I think most of these troubles and grievances would disappear.

About a month ago I think, or less, at that tremendous legion—meeting in Calcutta which was a kind of public reception to the Soviet leaders who were here—much has been said about Panch Shila; as the House knows everybody talks about Panch Shila—I ventured to say that this Panch Shila was no new idea to the Indian mind—maybe, to other minds also it is not new—and that, in fact, it was inherent in Indian thinking, in Indian culture, because Panch Shila ultimately is the message of tolerance. And, I quoted at that mighty meeting—I do not know whether it was very proper on that occasion or not—Ashoka's edicts and said: "This is the basis of Indian culture and Panch Shila flows from it". Naturally it is not an imposed thing on us. We may misbehave as we sometimes do—that is a different matter—but the basic Indian thought is that, and it has continued for these long ages.

Now, we thought of this Panch Shila and peaceful co-existence in the wide world, warring world, and we have gained a measure, a considerable measure of respect and attention because of that. Why have we done so? Well, partly, I would submit, because our thinking has been correct and based on some principles which are not so opportunist, and partly also because our thinking has been correctly laid down have not been very divergent from the action we have taken; that is, there has been an approximation in the ideals we have laid in regard to foreign policy and the action we have taken. I do not say they absolutely co-incide, but there has been an approximation, and whenever thought and action fit in strength follows. It is the conflict between one's so-called ideals and one's action that leads to bad results and to frustration in the individual, or the group, or the nation. Where a nation is fortunate, or a group, or an individual, to be able to act according to his own ideals, well, then it achieves results. It is in our struggle for independence and freedom that we were fortunate in being able, largely, to combine our ideals with our day-to-day activities as well as give strength to us as individuals and as a nation.

Therefore, we have succeeded in this measure in our foreign policy, and may I as an interlude just mention two matters not only because they are relevant, but because we have been criticised with regard to them in foreign countries? The two

questions are Goa and Kashmir. We are criticised by some people that, we who talk loudly about peace and loudly about anti-colonialism and all that—well, it is said by our critics—follow a different policy in Kashmir and Goa. Now, I think that possibly when history comes to be written Kashmir and Goa will be the brightest examples of our tolerance, of our patience and the way we have suppressed our anger and resentment at many things in order to follow that broad idealistic policy that we have laid down.

Now, I was saying that what I am concerned with is not so much the boundaries here and there. I am concerned with two things: first the principles; that is the principle of life wherever you may live, on whichever side, and, secondly, the manner of approach to this problem; that is to say: how do we discuss these matters, how do we decide them, how do we accept the decisions made. That is vital. That is more important than what you decide. A person is judged more by that. Anybody can decide things according to his own wishes, but when a group meets, of varying opinions, how do they decide? There is the method of democracy, of discussion, of argument, of persuasion and ultimate decision and acceptance of that decision even though it goes against our gain and our opinion. That is the democratic method; or else, simply the bigger lathi or the bigger bomb prevails and that is not the democratic method. Whether you consider this matter in problems of atomic bombs or street demonstrations the question is the same. That is to say, I am not objecting to demonstrations, but I am objecting to the violent part of it, the violence of it. There are democratic ways of demonstration too. I am objecting to the violence coming in these matters and that violence is, in quality, the same perhaps. Then there is violence of atomic bombs. At any rate the violence of the atomic bomb has a tremendous course, tremendous destruction, but it does not poison your personal thinking so much which smaller violences do. When you begin to hate your neighbour you cannot pull on with your neighbour. That is a more dangerous thing from the point of view of degradation of the individual. That hatred seeps in, the hatred of your neighbour and it is bad enough. Of course, to hate a country or a whole nation is bad but somehow that spreads out. That hatred is not good, but the hatred of an individual, group or a community, the hatred of a Hindu for a Muslim or the hatred of a Muslim for a Hindu or a Sikh, that type of thing is much worse. It poisons your daily life. So, I submit what is more important is the method of decision. Do we believe in peaceful democratic methods or means or not? That is the test question in this matter, because we feel passionately. Let us admit that many of us feel very strongly about our point of view on this matter and no doubt they have reasons for feeling strongly. I do not object to that but we must be strong enough, in spite of our feeling strongly to realise that it is far more important that this question should be discussed calmly, deliberately and peacefully, and whatever decisions are arrived at by the final authority—and the final authority of course is this Parliament—must be accepted, because there is no absolute finality about any decision. But also, at the same time, nobody wants the whole question to be brought up and discussed again and again frequently. If one can do it calmly or objectively, one can do it, so, we need not think that we are tied down to a particular decision for ever. At the same time, we should accept it and work it

with all goodwill. Therefore, the basic question is one of approach, of goodwill. It really does not matter what the decision is.

Now, the two or three most important questions appear to be, let us say, the questions in regard to the State of Bombay or Punjab or any other. Now, what do we aim at? What can we aim at? Obviously to me, speaking for myself, I do not care two pins as to what happens to them provided that the people of Punjab or the people of Bombay have goodwill for each other. That is the basic thing. It does not matter how you divide or sub-divide one State or two States or three or four States. That is a matter which we could consider on administrative, economic, and linguistic and other grounds. But the basic thing is that after having done that, do you create goodwill and cooperation amongst the people who live there, because, if you do not, it does not matter how much you justify the decisions made by census figures and arguments and maps. If you do not create that goodwill, you fail completely, because we have to live and work together.

We have in India, as I ventured to say a little earlier, a moving sight. What is happening in India? We—this Parliament and the people of India—are working hard to weave this pattern of India's destiny, with its variegated, many coloured facets and many languages and yet, it is under one Government that we are weaving gradually at present. Now, if, instead of weaving it, we take the scissors and the knife and start tearing it and make holes in it, that is bad. What is the pattern you give? Therefore, the basic thing is the goodwill that accompanies a decision and we should remember it.

Some hon. Members here may well remember that I delivered quite a number of speeches in Hyderabad opposing tooth and nail, if I may use the word, the disintegration of the State of Hyderabad. That was my view. I would still like the State of Hyderabad not to be disintegrated, but circumstances have been too strong for me. I accept them. I cannot force the people of Hyderabad or the other people to come in a particular line because I think they should do so. I accept the decision and I adjust myself to the change that Hyderabad be disintegrated. If it is going to be disintegrated, the Commission has suggested that the Telangana area, the remaining part of Hyderabad State, should remain for five years and then it may be decided. We have no particular objection, but logically speaking, considering everything, it seems to me unwise to allow this matter to be left to argument. Let it be taken up now and let us be done with it.

When I read this Report first rather hurriedly, I may assure this House—because some people seem to doubt it—that I had seen not a single line of the Report before it was officially handed to me, and I knew very, very little about what it contained before I got it. So, I read it as something almost new. Because of that, many parts of it and many proposals that it contained were new to me. I had absolutely no notion what they are going to suggest about Bombay, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and about any other place. I had no notion at all. The thing which for the moment rather surprised me somewhat was the proposal about Madhya Pradesh for the simple reason that it was quite novel to me. I have not thought of it in those terms at all. I said so in

the broadcast—not criticised—but I said that some parts of the Report came as a surprise to me. They did; but I thought about it; we discussed it amongst ourselves. The more we discussed, the more we talked, I became more and more convinced that it was the right proposal. I had no preconceptions and prejudices about this or that. So, the House will notice how my mental approach to all these problems was— to keep an open mind and try to understand the various aspects of it and in particular to arrive at a decision which is an agreeable one and which creates goodwill as far as possible. Because of this, apart from official approaches to this problem, we have met literally hundreds and hundreds of persons in group of five, ten or twenty, who were coming from almost every State of India and putting forward their viewpoints. We have listened to them and we have discussed it with them, because we want the greatest measure of agreement and cordiality about this and because we attach more importance to a decision having that goodwill, even though it might be logically not a good decision for logic is a very feeble and unworthy substitute of goodwill. I would rather have goodwill than logic and cooperation. We have proceeded that way. How far it will succeed wholly in creating that goodwill I do not know. But I am quite positive that, however much the Government may or may not succeed, this House can succeed if it wants to create that and give that lead to the country in deciding these things rightly or wrongly but with goodwill, and accepting the decisions made. Then, if something is wrong about the decisions, we can consider them quietly later on.

Now, take two of the major problems—the question of Bombay and Punjab.

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With the greatest respect for our friends in Bihar and Bengal and Orissa, I would say that nothing is more unimportant than their problem. I am really astonished at the amount of heat, about these three or four States, which has been imported. We can consider it and decide it. But what does it matter if a patch of Bihar goes this way and a patch of Bengal or Orissa goes the other way? I cannot get excited about it provided always that they get fair treatment. That is the vital and important point.

About Bombay, which undoubtedly is one of our major difficulties, I think there are arguments advanced on the part of Maharashtrians, on the part of others in Bombay, and I have no doubt at all that the arguments advanced about the Maharashtrians have great force. But, unfortunately, I see the force in the other arguments too. Obviously, nobody can say that it is a one sided affair. Then, how does one deal with it? Hon. Members know that the Congress Working Committee, after considerable discussion, suggested three States, but speaking for myself I hate them and believe that the recommendation made by the States Reorganisation Commission was the best in the circumstances. But, I do not wish to compel others to accept it, because the Maharashtrians, Gujaratis and others are the people who have to reside there. Who am I to push my opinion own their throats, more especially the Maharashtrians who played such a vital part in India's history and who have to play such a vital part in the future of India? But I do think that was a fair and equitable

decision which would have promoted co-operative working and which could, if necessary later, have been added to or amended. There is nothing to prevent it; I still think that it will be the best thing. I do not know if the time is past for considering that matter afresh by the people most affected by it.

Take Punjab. People talk about unilingual and bilingual States. I have already laid stress on the importance I attach to language; and, in relation to Punjab, I would lay stress on the importance I attach to the Punjabi language. I attach importance to it; because, apart from the very important fact of a large number of the Sikhs or all the Sikhs wanting it—that is the major factor good enough for me; it does not come against me—I do not know why the Hindiknowing people should object. I say that a language should not be considered something exclusive or excluding others; we must be inclusive in our thinking. But, apart from that, the minor modulations of a language represent the growth of a particular specific culture in a group. The folk songs of Punjab are an immensely important part of the Punjabi culture. It does not matter to me for the moment how many books on technology exist in the Punjabi language in the Gurmukhi script. If they do not exist, it is a great drawback from the national point of view. Either that drawback will be made good, or it will suffer and it will not advance with us in the future. But I do wish to give every encouragement to the Punjabi language, not at the expense of Hindi. There is no question of expense of Hindi; Hindi is strong enough, wide enough and powerful enough in every way to go ahead. They should cooperate with each other. This whole outlook of one language trying to push out the other is a wrong outlook. So, I have laid stress on this linguistic point. If you look at the Punjab from the linguistic point of view, from the point of view of numerous proposals made, you will find that there is no proposal conceivable which makes the Punjab completely unilingual, that is to say, unilingual in the sense the entire thing being based on Punjabi in Gurmukhi script. So far as the speaking part is concerned, it might well be said that nearly all Punjabis speak Punjabi, whatever they may say. In fact, even Hindi or Urdu is half Punjabi, so that, if you look at it from the communal point of view, it is a bad attempt. It does not matter how much you may divide Punjab, but the Hindus and Sikhs are intermixed completely. You may, by adjustments make one 45 per cent and the other 55 per cent, the one 30 per cent, and the other 70 per cent and so on. But, you do not change the basic fact that both are completely mixed up in each village. And, therefore, the only way for Punjab to exist and prosper, rather, even to exist, is for both to pull together. There is no other way. Of course, the Punjabis are people with very great virtues; but among their great virtues, the virtue of pulling together has not been known. Perhaps it may be due to their greater vitality. They are very vital people. Even today Punjab is probably the most prosperous of our States from the common people's point of view. Nowhere in India do people drink more milk and lassi than in the Punjab. They have a future before them of great advance; with Bhakra Nangal and other schemes, that is a tremendous future and it surprises me that they should waste their great energies when they have all this work before them. Again I would say, if, as they are, the Hindus in the Punjab are in a majority—I am not for a moment talking about the shape

BACK NOTE

XLI. Motion Regarding Reports of States Reorganisation Commission, 21 December 1955

1. SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA: Tell your colleagues, please.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I consider the hon. Member opposite also my colleague.

2. SHRI MEGHNAD SAHA (Calcutta North West): May I interrupt? What is the percentage of people who have the capacity to learn more than one language? Ninety per cent, of the people have no capacity for learning a second language and you must legislate for those ninety per cent of people.

MR. SPEAKER: Let there be no argument in between.

3. AN HON. MEMBER: Bihar also.

4. SHRI KAMATH (Hoshangabad): A common High Court.

5. SHRI KAMATH: Dakshin, Purva, etc.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Something like that. I would submit that for the consideration of this House.

SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA: On a point of information, while I listened, as the House did, with very deep respect and interest to the speech of our beloved Prime Minister, my colleague on that other side, I should like with equally, deep humility to ask whether it is in order from any Member of the Cabinet, especially the Prime Minister who announced the appointment of the State Reorganization Commission, to speak on the principles of linguistic States, the very principles on which the commission was constituted?

REPLY ON MOTION OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

23 February, 1956

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, it has often been my privilege to address this hon. Lok Sabha and I have gladly availed myself of the opportunity. But, I confess that at the present moment I am rather performing a duty—and with little joy in it.

We have discussed for the last four days the President's Address to the joint session of both Houses of Parliament. That Address was referred to by the hon. Member, Shri Chatterjee, as a third class report by an Under Secretary. The hon. Member, with his great knowledge of affairs and of the English language, no doubt is entitled to judge all these matters, and it is for us to listen to his advice. But, it does seem to me, if I may state it—or rather, under state it—an odd way and perhaps not a proper way to refer to the President's Address in this way. Other hon. Members complained that the Address did not deal with this or that matter. Shri Asoka Mehta and I think Sardar Hukam Singh said that it gave too much space to foreign affairs and too little to other matters. Others said that it did not refer to Kenya or some other places.

I ventured on some previous occasions to submit to the Lok Sabha as to what the Government thought the President's Address was supposed to be. We are following parliamentary procedure and to some extent—not that we are bound by it, but to some extent—we have derived this procedure from the British Parliament and from the King's Address there. I do not mean that we should adhere to that, but normally speaking, the Head of the State does not, except in America and countries with a like Constitution where the Head of the State delivers "Message to the Nation" or some such name, give a long review of foreign and internal politics and an expression of his opinion on it.

The Head of the American State is the Head of the American Government also; he occupies a special position. Now, the Head of our State is not the Head of the Government, and he occupies a different position. He is analogous to constitutional Heads of State and in his Address to Parliament, according to our thinking, there are two matters which should be dealt with principally. One is reference to foreign affairs and the other is reference to the legislation that is going to be taken up by Parliament. Naturally, he may refer to other matters too. Therefore, that is the normal approach of the President to his Address, it is not normally right that the President should enter much into controversial matters, although he is supposed to express, broadly speaking, the viewpoints of the Government of the day. Therefore, if we keep this in mind, the President's Address has to deal with foreign affairs, because it is an Address not only meant for the Parliament, not only for the country, but for other countries also. It does so briefly and broadly refers to certain incidents. Whether the reference to foreign affairs, is a little longer or shorter depends upon what has happened in the

realm of foreign affairs of importance during the past year or so. Therefore, I would beg the Lok Sabha to remember this when considering the President's Address.

It is right—it is true—that in this debate that we have had during the last four days, not too much has been said about foreign affairs; a little has been said about economic policy; but, mostly the debate has been an inquisition and an indictment on the question of States reorganisation. That is right because that is an important and vital issue which has affected all of us. Nevertheless, so far as the President's Address is concerned, we can hardly expect him to go into details even about a vital issue which affects us internally; he can broadly refer to it. I shall deal, naturally, with the circumstances that have arisen in regard to the States reorganisation, but before I do so, I would like fairly briefly to refer to some other matters which have been raised in the debate. I do not wish to say much about foreign affairs or about economic policy in spite of their great importance, because I take it that so far as the economic policy and the second Five Year Plan are concerned, they will come up before this House and this House will have full opportunity to discuss those matters. But I would beg this House to remember all the same that whatever happens in this country, including the important occurrences in regard to the reorganisation of States, has to be viewed in a certain context and not isolated from everything else.

It is to be viewed in the context of these great happenings in the country or in the world, whether they are good or bad. After all, the reorganisation of States, however much it may please us or displease us, is a thing of this year or the next year. The other things continue. The other things are more vital and are going to have a more lasting impression on our future. We live today—if we look at the world—in perhaps an odd and strange period of the earth's history. There is this drama—almost at every step, in every country—of an everchanging situation going on; that drama often leading to tragic happenings and almost always hovering over the brink of disaster. That is the particular background of the world in which we live.

In our own country, we face tremendous problems—economic problems, social problems and the like—problems to which references has been made, of unemployment, poverty etc. We try to face them realising that there is no magic way of suddenly solving all these problems or untying all the knots, but that it will take us time and mean hard work to do so. That again leads us to the Second Five Year Plan and all the rest of it. But, looking at India's foreign policy, India's connection with international affairs, looking at India's attempts at improving her economic lot under the First Five Year Plan or the new draft Second Five Year Plan, somethings, I venture to submit, may be borne in mind. It may be that some of us may take an unduly partial view about our own accomplishments. That is a human failing. It may be that some others may take an unduly critical view of these accomplishments. But, I think I may state it without the least exaggeration that the last few years in India, looked at as a whole, are considered in the world, I am not for the moment excepting any country in the world, as a story of success and considerable achievement. Whether those countries which have considered them lie in what is called the western world of America or England or Western Europe or whether they lie in Eastern Europe and the Soviet

regions or in Asia, Western Asia or Eastern Asia or Africa or South America, from everywhere comes the cry that India has made remarkable success. Hon. Members opposite have far greater opportunities of judging it than the people in America or England or Russia; I admit it, of course, because they live in the midst of these things. But, I think this fact need not be completely ignored.

The hon. Member Acharya Kripalani mentioned,—I am quoting, I believe—that our brilliant foreign policy had not succeeded in stopping these military pact being made. He is completely right. Our foreign policy has not succeeded in many ways in setting right the evils of the world, just as our internal policy has not succeeded in putting right all the evils of India. That is perfectly true, because nobody can claim that. The point is whether we are aiming right and whether in aiming right, the experience that we have gathered shows that we are achieving something here and there, something little, not big. I do submit that in this complicated maze of international affairs, where there is so much of bitterness and hatred, or even clash of arms, we have been a soothing influence an influence that has sometimes helped a little in improving the situation or in taking a step towards peace or in avoiding a step towards war. That is all the claim. Nothing more. If we have done that little bit, it is something. Anyhow, no one, even the great countries of the world, who have great power for good or ill, has succeeded in solving the problems of the world. It is no solution of the problem for me to say or for the hon. Members opposite to deliver a harangue as to the evils of other countries and the problems that exist elsewhere. It is no good my saying, I am very virtuous and saying that other countries have erred or are erring, and are misbehaving. We are all mixed up in virtue or lack of virtue that we possess of all countries. So, I should like this House, even when we are excited and distressed by these conditions that have arisen in this country about the reorganisation of States, to look at this broad picture of the world and what we have done, what we stand for and the direction we are aiming at.

The hon. Member opposite, I think Shri U. M. Trivedi, made some fun and belittled the visit to this country of various Heads of States and distinguished statesmen. I do not mind what any hon. Member says about us or our Government. But, I do not think it is quite becoming for any of us to speak in that way about distinguished people who come from abroad as our honoured guests.

It has been during the last year an extraordinary sight, an experience in this country for us to be honoured by the visit of so many distinguished Heads of States, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and other distinguished men from all parts of the world. That is no small matter. It is not because of our Government or because we issued invitations to them that they came. It is essentially because in this larger picture of the world, India begins to count. India's opinion counts because India makes a difference sometimes whether it is in the United Nations or elsewhere in the consideration of world problems. Because India makes a difference and because India's opinion is valued, important people, distinguished people who themselves play an important part in the world affairs, have thought it worth while to come and have a look at this country which is changing, which is progressing, which is already playing

an important part and which is likely to play a still more important part in the future. That is the broad context. That does not mean in the slightest that we, as a Government, have not made mistakes, have not failed here and there, and that there are not any problems in India and abroad with which we have been unable to come to grips, or where our wishes have exceeded our achievements. That is so. And hon. Members may be right to draw attention to these problems and to criticise them, but in criticising them that criticism will have value if it has a little balance, if it keeps this broad picture in view and not merely, simply recites some old slogan which has been heard often enough like some, if I may use the word with all respect, bigoted religious fanatic reciting an old mantra without understanding it, which has no meaning today. Our Government does not claim to succeed always, or not to err. It errs often enough. But I do claim that we want to do our utmost and that we want to be judged by our success and failures. And certainly the failures should be pointed out, but when some hon. Members offer criticisms which have little relation to facts or to this broad context of world affairs that I have ventured to place before this House, then those criticisms do not have much value.

Shri Mukerjee in the flush of his oratory says many things which I am quite sure he does not mean. In fact, some hon. Members opposite who have bitterly criticised us even in regard to the States Reorganisation Report have privately come to me and spoken in a different way, that is to say—I am not criticising anybody—recognising the difficulties of the situation and discussing the matter—not this kind of lopsided attack with head down and without thinking of what the facts etc., are. Shri Mukerjee did not particularly like the reference to Malaya or the Gold Coast in the President's Address, and he said: what about Kenya? Well, I should say that what is happening in the Gold Coast is one of the most promising features in the African situation today. What is happening in the Gold Coast is not something that you and I could perhaps fashion out of our heads and put down that this is the right thing. The world does not function that way. I say in the context of Africa what is happening in the Gold Coast is something not only of hope for the Gold Coast but for the whole of Africa. What will happen ultimately I do not know, but we should welcome these things in this distracted and distressing world wherever a good step is taken.

In Malaya I am not quite sure because we have not the full details of what is likely to happen there, but at any rate, there is a ray of light, something that is pulling this terrible tangle from out of the mire.

About Goa, I can say nothing more than what I have said previously. There is no difference of opinion between any hon. Member here and the Government broadly speaking, on Goa. The difference does come in perhaps here and there as to the line of action to be adopted in regard to Goa. Now, it is clear that any line of action adopted in regard to Goa or any other matter which is international has to be judged not from the point of view of some local affray, but from various international aspects. One hon. Member—I forget who, Shri Syamandan Sahaya, I think—said something about this, that the application of the doctrine of *Ahimsa* to our foreign relations does not succeed at any rate in regard to our border problems. Well, I am not aware of our Government having ever said that they adopted the doctrine of *Ahimsa* to our activities.

They may respect it, they may honour that doctrine, but as a Government it is patent that we do not adopt and do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doctrine of *Ahimsa*. If we did, we would not keep an Army or a Navy or an Air Force. But it is quite a different matter not being able to adopt it in the circumstances or today, nevertheless not going to the other extreme of shaking about a sword or a lathi or whatever weapon you may have in your hand and threatening everybody and delivering a number of harangues and all that. Not only is that rather childish and rather foolish in the context of affairs today, but remember when you talk about violence, violence is only useful if it is superior violence. Inferior violence may make a fool of yourself. Violence has to be judged today in the ultimate context of the most violent things, that is, the hydrogen bomb, the atomic bomb. I do not say that every country has got it, but that is the final acme of violence today. Violence has arrived at a stage in the world today when it will either end in destroying the world, or in, well, I won't say putting an end to itself, but putting an end, at any rate, in men's minds to the age of violence. We are at the last edge of the age of violence. We may topple over into the dark pit, or we may keep back and see that violence is no longer a remedy for the world's ills. That is the broad picture. That has nothing to do with the doctrine of *Ahimsa*. It is a broad practical realisation of things as they are today. When heads of States which have the greatest methods of violence and weapons of violence at their disposal, and who have no inhibitions about violence or *Ahimsa*, have come to the conclusion that modern war with all the new weapons, must be ruled out practically speaking, something has happened in the world. It may be that everybody does not fully realise the implications of it, but something has happened, that is, violence essentially and basically is being ruled out for the solution of the world's problems. It may be that before it is completely ruled out, eruptions may occur, all kinds of things may occur. That is a different matter.

Now, if big violence means that, then you have to look at little violences in that context, more especially when the small violences are on the international sphere, because you immediately impinge on the big violence and it cannot be considered separately as something that we can indulge in whenever we feel like it. We have to consider the far reaching consequences of this.

I should like the House to note that I am not basing my argument on any high moral basis, although I would be right in even putting it on that basis. I would be right in saying that it is improper for us to say one thing to the wide world and act in a different way, to suggest and encourage in the world a policy of peaceful settlement of disputes and ourselves to settle a dispute that we have and in which we are right, — that is admitted— by way of violence and armed might and military measures. It does not fit in with what we say; we simply do not succeed in this or that; we fall between two stools. So, that is the broad background.

Now, may I say one or two things about Ceylon? An hon. Member referred to Ceylon and Burma and other places where he said Indians are being kicked out. He is partly right, though not wholly so; when he brought in Burma and all those places, I do not think he is right or fair. But it is true that people of Indian descent in Ceylon

as well as others who are Indian nationals, who have gone there, have not had, and are not having a square deal.

I do not wish to go into this question except to say that here it is. How do we settle problems with Ceylon? Surely, the only way to settle problems with Ceylon is in a friendly way, and we shall continue to follow that. There is no other way. And I should like hon. Members to tell me it any other way except delivering a brave speech, that is no way in international affairs. For instance, my hon. friend the Finance Minister, when he deals with foreign countries, when he is worried about foreign exchange while buying things, cannot pay in his own currency; he has to pay in somebody else's, he has to pay in some other coin for effecting that deal.

I shall just inform the Lok Sabha of one very small development on our side in regard to Ceylon. There was two years ago, or thereabouts, a kind of an agreement signed between the Prime Minister of Ceylon and our Government—I signed it—about certain procedures to be adopted, certain steps to be taken, which we thought would help towards the solution of this problem there.

Ever since then or soon after, there was a controversy between the two respective Governments as to the interpretation of that document. Well, we have written long letters to each other; and I wrote another long letter, about two or three weeks—may be a month ago—to the Prime Minister of Ceylon. In this letter, apart from the other points I raised, I suggested to the Prime Minister of Ceylon that 'if the interpretation of that document is an issue between us, for my part and for my Government's part, I shall gladly agree to refer the interpretation of this document to any eminent authority agreeable to you and me; I shall accept that interpretation, whatever it is; let us at least find out some way of ending a dispute about interpretation..' I shall accept that interpretation. The person to interpret must be chosen by me and by him, that is, by the two Governments. Whether he is a foreigner, or whatever country he belongs to is immaterial; whoever he is, whether he is a high mature judicial officer or not is immaterial. Here is a document of three pages, let him interpret it, and we shall accept his interpretation.

We have not had any reply to that. I have had an acknowledgement of the letter, but no reply. Meanwhile, as you perhaps know, Ceylon is going to have general elections. So, perhaps, that will delay any further development.

I referred just now to the great, moving and rather tragic drama of the world. It is an exciting drama all that is happening. One sees the headlines on the newspapers, but behind them lie all kinds of things happening in different countries, our country or any other countries.

Only recently, hon. Members must have read of the proceedings in Moscow of the Communist Congress there, where it would appear that considerable changes in outlook and approach have been announced. Now, it is not for me to interpret the significance of those changes. But I do think that it is an important matter not only for the Soviet Union but for other countries in the world at large to understand these great changes that are taking place there, which are, if I may use the word, taking the

Soviet Union more and more towards some kind of normalcy, which is to be welcomed in every way.

The point is that even great revolutionary countries who have passed through very tragic experiences, and who have lived on a pitch of effort and excitement become normal, vary their policies, change their outlooks. I wish in this respect their example was followed by others also, who sometimes look up to them.

Now, may I refer briefly to the States Reorganisation Commission business, which has been discussed here during the last four days, and may I say that distressed as I have been about much that has happened—and it has caused me much unhappiness and produced in me a sense of failure, which I do not often have—nevertheless, what has worried me and distressed me is not so much the actual occurrences or the actual things that have happened, bad as they are, but rather this growth and recrudescence of a spirit of violence all over the country, or in various parts of it, this attempt to settle problems by violent methods? That is, I think, something very bad for this country, regardless of the merits of any cause, because once you enter that region of trying to settle any problem by violent methods, then you go towards, something that is perilously near to civil war.

Our country with all its faults, all the Government's faults and failings, has shown to the world a certain stability, a certain peace, a certain measure of progress—may be, it is not as fast as you like—and through that established that reputation which it is proud to hold today; and all that is based on certain fundamental characteristics. If we enter into the region of violent explosions, because we dislike this thing or that, well, then, we lose not only that reputation—reputations do not matter much—but something much more important than that.

Are we going to enter into that and become that type of country where every month or two, we hear about some kind of violent revolution trying to upset the government? That is not democracy, of course; that is something, which is the very reverse of democracy. But apart from that—we need not for the moment apply any technical definition of democracy—I do submit that that is a complete denial of any idea of measured or ordered progress. I can understand an attitude, and I believe that some people hold that attitude, that nothing can be achieved by these slow democratic or parliamentary methods, nothing can be achieved by peaceful methods, nothing can be achieved, in fact, step by step; we must break everything and produce some kind of a clean slate. It may be, to begin with, an anarchic condition. Let us have that clean slate and then we shall have an opportunity to build. I do not agree with that, of course. But I can understand that; then the other thing follows. Let us encourage what is called sometimes a militant attitude, whether it is in the workers or the students or anybody. Even now poor little children of 6, 7 or 8 are exploited for this. I think it is a matter for the Lok Sabha to consider very carefully. Where all this is leading us to, quite apart from the States Reorganisation Report.

There are always in great cities and elsewhere anti-social elements, *goondas* and the like. One can deal with them if society generally disapproves of them, as it does. But, when society or certain respectable sections of society approve of violent methods,

then the *goonda* and the disruptive element can immediately have the chance of their lifetime. They come and they are bound to come in. What is happening today? It is a cycle. Some matter is disliked or disapproved of by some group. They say, we will demonstrate, we will have a hartal and we shall take out a procession. If shops do not close, they are forcibly closed. There may be some violence. If trams or buses are functioning, they are burnt. If an order is passed that there should be no procession, that order is broken. The result is conflicts. Police are there and police fire. Some people are hit; some people die and others are wounded. Then, there is an outcry against police action and a demand for an enquiry. This is the cycle. The police might have misbehaved or not; I am not mentioning any particular place; but this is the cycle of events—a deliberate challenge on the violent level usually accompanied by violence, burning, arson molestation of people, attacks on people who do not fall into line, burning of trams, buses etc., looting of shops and defiance of other laws like section 144 and the like and then a conflict, with the police firing; unfortunate tragic deaths, sometimes of possibly innocent people, sometimes of even small children who might be roundabout and then, naturally, a reaction against that and condemnation of the Government for resorting to these things; they have exceeded the limits of legitimate action and the demand for an enquiry into police misbehaviour. What are exactly the limits of legitimate action of the police or for the Army functioning? It is rather difficult to say. Obviously, they can be exceeded. When you are dealing with a limited affair somewhere it is rather easy to understand what are the limits. When you are dealing with conditions of uproar all over a great city like Calcutta, or Bombay or Madras, then it is a bit difficult to judge these things. Either you allow those anarchical conditions, loot, arson etc., to gain the upper hand or you do not. If they gain the upper hand, then, of course, the whole city becomes at the mercy of the hooligan element. Mind you, when such things happen, the decent elements even in the crowd are pushed out; it is the hooligan elements that take the lead. The decent elements only have given them an opportunity to take the lead. They always take the lead, and—it may be expected rightly—some political elements who believe in this kind of thing. Either you allow that kind of thing to gain the upper hand; if they do gain the upper hand, it is then hooligan raj there and Government ceases to function. Or, Government has necessarily to take steps to stop this at any cost because the cost of not stopping it is too terrible and too great for citizens as well as for everything. Surely, no government can afford to do it.

I think Prof. Hiren Mukerjee referred to a speech of mine which I delivered in Amritsar in which there was something about the challenge of the streets to be met in the streets. I was laying stress on this very point. I was venturing to lay before the Lok Sabha that if people go in for violence in the streets that violence has to be met in the streets and has to be stopped. I cannot understand how even Prof. Hiren Mukerjee could object to my statement.

In this connection, may I also correct him? He referred, I think—I had not the good fortune to be present here but I have read his speech fully in the transcript as well as other speeches delivered by hon. Members—he referred to my having called

the Akali procession in Amritsar as a *tamasha*. It is not correct; it is completely incorrect. What I said—speaking from memory, of course—was, referring to large gatherings including the Congress, I said, these are difficult questions which we have to consider seriously and decide not by having big *tamashas* and delivering long speeches. I was referring to the critical questions we were considering....

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Yes; including the Congress? all big gatherings.

I stated, we must look at these questions not in a demonstrative spirit, *tamasha* spirit but a spirit of critical, humble approach to the problem and decide it in this way and not in a slogan like way. It is not the way to consider problems.

So, I would beg the House to remember this that, I think, the major question today before India, internally speaking, is this question of what is going to be our policy in regard to this growing violence. I am not afraid of the violence of the *hooligan*, but this spirit of violence. The other day or two days ago, on the occasion of the funeral procession in Lucknow of Narendra Deva, a person beloved of all, a policeman was blinded and others were badly injured. Why should this happen? Here is a funeral procession and it should be an occasion for solemnity. There people threw stones and pushed about a poor policeman lost an eye completely, apart from some police officers being rather badly injured by stones. This is what I cannot understand.

What is happening elsewhere? We talk about the split personality of India; we speak unctuously about non-violence and about these methods and all that and about our culture and *sanskriti* and in our daily behaviour we are coming down to a level which is not a civilised level at all.

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What I would venture in all humility and respect to place before the Lok Sabha is the dangerous trends that are developing in this country. I am not easily upset by any occurrence however bad it may be—one survives these things—but something has happened in this country which, I believe, is poisoning the whole community, poisoning in this sense in two ways. One is of course the spirit of violence. The other is poisoning against each other which is equally bad. And I have no doubt that this will go sooner or later. But we have to work actively to that and not encourage it. Therefore, I would again submit that an act which may be quite legitimate in a certain set of circumstances may become dangerous and objectionable in another set of circumstances. A *hartal* which may be legitimate as an expression of opinion in a certain set of circumstances may in another set of circumstances be dangerous and harmful. And I say that at the present moment with these big tensions and bitterness prevailing in various parts of India, it is not patriotic, it is not wise, it is not reasonable to do anything which may even by the fault of the Government lead to violence because there are some steps in which the possibility of violence is inherent whoever

starts it—may be a policeman’s fault or somebody else’s fault—but one should be wary.

May I say a few words about the States reorganisation business? Slightly less than two months ago we discussed this matter in this Lok Sabha. At that time there was a very full debate, and I ventured to give expression to my own approach to that question then. I will just repeat it. It is true that as I have watched these developments in the various parts of the country, I have been troubled not by this occurrence or that, but by the atmosphere that was being gradually created in the country— not created all on a sudden but because there was something in our hearts which came out because of the circumstances. I have been troubled by that and the main problem before me has been— not any particular problem that is dealt with separately, but— how to meet this particular challenge—this challenge of violence and bitterness that was spreading. How can we possibly check this? How can we possibly soothe it? At any rate we should not encourage it in any way. This is how I have tried to approach it.

Some hon. Members have referred, rather caustically, to some kind of a dictatorial approach of four men of the Congress Committee laying down this and that. What is exactly the procedure we followed? I referred to it on the last occasion, and to the multiplicity of these problems and the fact that the problem usually was not one between the Government and a certain group or a certain State. The problems were between two. So far as the Government is concerned they had their views, no doubt, about them but it was not important for them which way a certain border lay. What they wanted obviously was—the Government or most of us wanted—a settlement which was agreeable to the largest number of people.

I will give you a straight example. Yesterday, Shri N. C. Chatterjee said “My Chief Minister is giving 500 square miles away”. With all respect, I ask : what does that indicate? How is he thinking of giving 500 square miles away? To whom is he giving them away? The SRC Report had made some recommendations and Dr. Roy had apparently magnanimously given that away.

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Take this issue of Bengal and Bihar. Here the State of Bihar and the State of Bengal are thinking in terms of the same patch of territory or several patches. It is not a dispute of the Government of India. So far as Congress is concerned, the Congress of West Bengal is pulling one way and the Bihar Congress the other way. Presumably it is the case with other parties too. All parties or most parties, therefore, could hardly function uniformly. The provincial pull was greater; the State pull was greater in their minds than any other pull. Now, one can understand that. There is no harm in the State pull being there but it is harmful—it is very harmful—if the State pull is so strong that it leads to violence in speeches and words and deeds and then to this kind of violent demonstrations.

Take the case of Orissa. According to the SRC Report, no change has been made in Orissa—this way or that way. Orissa had claims on West Bengal, Bihar,

but over a thousand persons, not of the Congress only but of all groups and parties. Many hon. Members here in the Opposition and others, we have met them, and discussed this matter with them separately, because as I said, it was not a party matter. It was a matter in which we are seeking some kind of broad agreement in so far as it is possible.

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Reference was made to the proposal of a union of Bengal and Bihar. I can assure this House that at no time did it strike me or occur to me or to anybody. The first time this matter came up was as a result of a terrible shock to us, and others too, by the occurrences in Bombay, not the actual occurrences only, but we felt, with the occurrences in Orrisa and Bombay, where we are going to. It was a shock, and we felt that in this linguistic direction we will be quite lost and will continue to break each other's heads if once we give vent to the terrible bitterness and anger. So, the desire to stop this trend and make people think in a different direction came.

In this particular matter, I do not know and I cannot even say exactly who started this idea, not I. It was not to my knowledge. Anyhow it so happened that Dr. Roy and Shri Krishna Sinha and some of their colleagues were here, and they discussed it. I did not start it. Then they did not immediately do anything. They went back to their respective headquarters and then came back five or six days later, having discussed it and seen their colleagues, and it was only then that they formally broached it to us. Our answer was, "If you are willing, we are very happy". We did not take any single step about it. There was no kind of imposition. It was they who did it. Then they issued a statement. That was the second time when they came here. Obviously, a thing like this can only take place with the goodwill of all the persons concerned. There can be no impositions of these things. But what is the test?

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You see the whole object of the talk about the linguistic provinces. I think Shri N. C. Chatterjee has told us about the Congress decisions and all that. Now, Shri Chatterjee is not perhaps well acquainted with the development of the Congress outlook on this subject. Undoubtedly, in the 1920's, we were strongly in favour of it. We were strongly in favour of the work being done in the language of the area, to enable the people of the place to take their part. In so far as that point is concerned, that is, the importance of the language in doing the work is concerned, we hold to that thing. But do not mix up the two things, namely, the importance and the development of the language and these boundaries. The two are not synonymous. Later on, if you will see the resolutions of the last three or four years, the Congress resolutions, and in fact the resolutions before the appointment of this Commission and the resolutions just after it, you will find that all of them have stated quite clearly that language is an important factor but that there are other factors which are equally important, the other factors being economic, geographical and economic development.

Finally, the most important factor, the overriding factor, is the unity of India. That is what the Congress has been saying all along. Now, seeing all this happening since the publication of this Report, naturally, and; even more than previously, our thoughts went towards laying a greater stress on the unifying factors and other things. That is a relatively recent development,, since we have been discussing the Five' Year Plan and the rest, and recently we have been thinking more and more in economic and developmental terms.

Take Bengal and Bihar. The area between Bengal and Bihar is the richest industrial area of India, and no doubt in a few years' time it will grow to be the most heavily industrialised area. Now, we could not do things in a huff and do something there in a hurry. So. for developmental reasons, it was of very great advantage to Bihar and Bengal to work that area jointly.

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However, I am merely pointing out that there were valid reasons for that. It is not just some kind of sentimental approach to the problem. So, in the first place, we said: "Go ahead". Everywhere you will find that this economic approach has to be considered' now much more than previously, always making sure that the language approach is there, not as a boundary but for the purposes of doing the work in that language so that the cultural aspect of the language could always be encouraged. Occasionally it may be that two languages overlap. Suppose Bengal and Bihar form a union. Nothing happens to the Bengali language or to the work done in Bengali. Nothing happens to the Hindi language in Bihar. They function, in their respective areas as they did, but in regard to developmental matters it will be a great help. Apart from that, personally, it is very desirable that we should have the multilingual areas, where people automatically get to know more than one language. It does help. This kind of absolutely linguistic barriers does create a certain narrowness in approach.

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I think I should just mention one thing which should be borne in mind by all of us, namely, the trend towards violence disturbs everybody, whatever be the merits of it. The most important thing now is to calm and soothe the people to get rid of this bitterness as much as possible. These are the two basic things. I do not know how some people have been saying, and Mr. Chatterjee also told me, that in my broadcast about the States reorganisation I have used the words "irrevocable decisions" and all that. I was quite surprised. I have looked through my broadcast and it is not there. I do not know wherefrom Mr. Chatterjee got it. There is nothing irrevocable. There is nothing final in this sense that if we have a democratic structure of society and a democratic Government, we can sit down and consider any matter at any time. The point is that we must have the atmosphere to do it. You cannot do it by people beating and quarrelling with each other. We must calm down. It is obvious, as Mr. Asoka Mehta said, that no decision about Bombay which is a decision which is looked upon by a large section of the people as an imposition of one or the other is a happy

decision. It may be an unfortunate decision, an inevitable decision, but it is not a happy decision. If the Gujaratis feel or the Maharashtrians feel imposed upon, it is not a happy decision. They have to live together as well as others in Bombay. Now unfortunately a situation has been created which makes it difficult for a cool approach to the problem. Let us cool down and become normal and then realise the fact that there is no question of one group dominating over another. I do not know, but some people say that some capitalists in Bombay wanted this to be done and that not to be done. I really do not understand it. But, for my part, I can say that in the whole of the conversation, I did not meet a single capitalist from Bombay. I know they presented a memorandum which I saw. but this is quite absurd. You can take it from me—you know it well enough—that the capitalists in Bombay or elsewhere would probably be able to function in any condition. I do not think there will be any difficulty about that. It is not that a handful of capitalists wanted this or that. But, it is a fact that today there is tremendous bitterness of feeling. Our function should be to lessen it and then we can move together and do it. There have been two types of proposals. One is about plebiscites. I cannot say that plebiscite should be ruled out in every case. I think in some cases it may be desirable. But it is a dangerous thing to say that you must apply the principle of plebiscite to all these areas, because it will produce all kinds of difficulties. In some cases it may be desirable. But we will have to think of these things not in an atmosphere of violence and extreme ill will and bitterness and almost compulsion of the people to do this or that. That is the difficulty. There has been this proposal made about the judicial enquiry in regard to Bombay. My general reaction is that whenever there is trouble, there should be an enquiry. But I must say that my mind is rather confused when I think of an enquiry into the Bombay occurrences. It would be a tremendous enquiry which will last for ages. But apart from that, is it not obvious that this kind of enquiry will raise passions to the utmost? Every party will seek to cast the blame on the other and the result will be, that instead of that process of healing and soothing, —bitterness, charges and countercharges. That, I think, will be terrible. Therefore, I do not see how it can serve any good purpose in that way.

I feel I have exceeded my time-limit: I am grateful to the House for its indulgence.

BACK NOTE

XLII. Reply on Motion of thanks to President's address, 23 February 1956

1. SHRI KAMATH: Including the Congress!
2. SHRI S. S. MORE (Sholapur): Is this applicable to Chief Ministers also speaking about nonviolence and practising violence?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is applicable to everybody, including Shri More and me. We are all split personalities in that respect. But here I am venturing to place before the Lok Sabha this very dangerous development of associating any kind of dislike or anything, any kind of protest or anything with a violent demonstration or a demonstration which is inevitably likely to lead to violence. That is what is happening. I do not know what is going to happen. The other day in Madras at some places an organisation sponsored *hartals* and demonstration—an organisation which is openly committed to disruption of India, the separation of Tamil Nadu from India and being an independent State. They raised various slogans and cries and anyhow there was trouble. Tomorrow, I believe some kind of a *hartal* is being organised in Calcutta and I have no doubt you will see the whole cycle—the cycle I have just mentioned.

SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY (Basirhat): How was it peaceful on the 21st January? Not a word had been said about it; not a word had been said on the huge and tremendous success of the peaceful *hartal* on the 21st January. You are talking about violence.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I did not mean to imply that people behave always at all times badly.

SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY: Did you try to find out why they were behaving badly?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is clear to Shrimati Charkravartty, who no doubt knows a great deal more of Calcutta hartals and the like, and probably knows what is going to happen there tomorrow.

SHRIMATI RENO CHAKRAVARTTY: Merger is responsible for it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Anyhow there has been an open declaration...

SHRI H. N. MUKERJEE (Calcutta NorthEast) : When your Home Minister says in Amritsar that the merger shall go through—that was what the papers reported—would you object to the people of Calcutta having a *hartal* to demonstrate their resentment against that?

AN HON. MEMBER: Illegal *hartal*.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I will come to this merger business later. But these peaceful *hartal*/sponsors have announced, as stated in the public press today, that they would defy section 144 and every order that is passed. I do not call that a peaceful approach.

AN HON. MEMBER: Illegal *hartal*.

It is true that this Parliament has to consider this question squarely and fairly. Are we going to encourage or promote this kind of spirit of violence and constant violent activity by *hartals* and agitations to continue?

Some Hon. Members: No, no.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Is there any way out?

SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE: Are we going to allow the police to fire?

SHRI SYAMNANDAN SAHAYA (Muzaffarpur Central) : Yes, if necessary.

SHRI SADHAN GUPTA (Calcutta SouthEast) : Check your violence.....

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I should like hon. Members opposite, who seem to consider it as a kind of personal reference by me, to cite to me any example in the capitalist or communist world where such things are allowed, in any country, where this kind of activity is indulged in. I am not aware of any country.

SHRI KAMATH: There is no section 144 in England at all.

SHRI A. K. GOPALAN: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he will kindly enquire into one thing? I am only saying this because the Prime Minister just now said it should be stopped. Will he kindly enquire whether the Finance Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Shri Biyani had made an open speech in Akola in which he said that goondaism will be met by *goondaism* and that he will send *goondas* from Nagpur?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: If anybody, including a Minister, has made such a speech, he has said something very wrong, very foolish and very objectionable.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: May I suggest that all this arises from the fact that Congress people think that you are speaking to the Opposition while you are speaking to them also?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The hon. Member who just interrupted is completely right. And I was not referring to any particular group, although it is true that there is this difference, not among the Congress and others, but certainly some

groups even in theory do not object to violence, much less in practice. In fact, they think that violence is the only way to lead to the goal which they may aim at.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: They are reciprocated.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: As Acharya Kripalani just got up, may I tell him that I was pained and surprised to learn from him that some C.I.D. officials had been dogging his footsteps because I can assure him that if he will be good enough to give me some information, I would be glad to enquire into it.

An Hon. Member: That is a privilege to some.

SHRI NAMBIAR (Mayuram): For every one of us.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There might perhaps be some difference between some hon. Members opposite.

Shri Nambiar rose—

3. SHRI K. K. BASU (Diamond Harbour) : On what grounds?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That was not the point. My point is this. Here was a conflict in the opinions of the State of West Bengal and the State of Bihar—not with the Government of India, not with the Congress or anybody because you will remember in this matter what the SRC had done. It is not—at least by and large, it has not been—a party matter. Parties have been split on this. I mean to say that in one party, there were two opinions. They may pass a resolution by a majority but the point is that there have been several opinions in the parties themselves. Possibly—I cannot say definitely—the Communist Party may or may not have had, but they have adopted the opinion that there should be not only linguistic division, but a linguistic division of every village.

An Hon. Member: Not of every village. By villages.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is so. They want to carry the process of disruption to its extreme limits.

They want to carry this process to its extreme limit—to carry this linguistic warfare to every village.

SHRI SADHAN GUPTA: No. It is incorrect.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have no doubt that hon. Members opposite had the best of motives. I am only pointing out the natural consequence of what they stated or what they presumably still state. I say that the natural consequence of their policy was absolute disruption of India—every village. I do not doubt their intelligence

and therefore, I presume they realise what the natural consequence of this policy, they aim at, was.

SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY: It is the border disputes you are talking about. You are misrepresenting what we have stated. There are disputes on no other issues.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I know, obviously.

4. SHRI K. K. BASU: The Pradesh Chief Minister accuse each other.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That was what I am venturing to point out myself. That is what we have to deal with now.

5. SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE: They have not come to an agreement. It is a tragedy.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I entirely agree that Shri Trivedi has not come to an agreement. We are talking about the others.

SHRI V. G. DESHPANDE: I am saying that the majority in the Assembly in Madhya Bharat has not agreed, and the reports provided to us say that they have not agreed. But because there were no incidents, you say that they have agreed.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I venture to say that even though this was their strong view, and the Assembly said no, yet, they agreed in the larger interests of the country. There is no doubt they have agreed, because they are working together and fashioning and working out the union. They have not gone out into the streets to fight.

6. SHRI S. S. MORE: May I know, apart from the Congress, what parties were consulted in regard to Maharashtra?

7. SHRI K. K. BASU: The test of the people.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What is the test of the people, and why?

8. SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY: The Central Government owns those resources.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We have enough experience, in the last five years, of small matters being delayed because of two Governments having to deal with matters and pulling in two different directions.

9. ACHARYA KRIPALANI: In what direction is the mind of the Government working? We want to know how the Government's mind is working in this matter.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not quite understand Acharya Kripalani's question. I have been trying to explain not only the direction of the Government's mind but the decisions. The Acharya knows what decisions have been taken.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: I do not know.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: They have been published in the public Press.

SHRI K. K. BASU: They have been changing.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Not at all. All decisions have been taken. There is no question of change. Of course, some decisions have not been taken. About Punjab, I think that by agreement we shall arrive at some suitable solution. One or two minor things remain; other decisions have been taken. About this question of Bengal and Bihar.

SHRI K. K. BASU: It is an imposition.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There is no question of imposition. The proposal was made and we welcomed that proposal. Naturally, it is subject to its acceptance by the concerned people. We cannot impose it upon them, but we welcome that proposal.

SHRI KAMATH: Parliament should accept it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Ultimately it will come before Parliament. Naturally, what the Government has got to do now is to frame a Bill which will ultimately be placed before Parliament. But before that, it should be sent to the State Assemblies concerned for their consideration and their reactions. Then Parliament decides.

SHRI K. K. BASU: In the case of Bengal, the S.R.C. recommendation was different. Has this decision now been arrived by the high command or...

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The proposal, is for the union of the two States, presumably with language regions, regional councils etc. I cannot go into these details here.

I am sorry I have taken so much time, but yet I have said nothing about Bombay, about which I wish to say something, not much. It is quite wrong for any of us to go about censuring any community or group about it. That is a wrong approach completely. There is no doubt that what has happened in Bombay is disgraceful. There is no doubt about it.

SHRI S. S. MORE: Even firing.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: About that probably I and Mr. More will differ. I was not there to see how much firing took place. But I say that for what happened in Bombay, in any other country the Army and tanks would have been used. I am quite sure about it. If in any country such arson had taken place, the Army and tanks would have come into the stage.

SHRI KAMATH: Not in democratic countries.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: ... but, in Bombay, only police force was used. Bombay has been a tragedy for all of us. It does not help much blaming anybody.

LEAKAGE OF BUDGET PROPOSALS

12 March, 1956

Two or three days ago I informed the House that some progress had been made in regard to the investigations into the budget leakage and I promised to make a further statement today. As a result of the investigations carried out by the Central Intelligence Bureau and the Bombay and Delhi Police, it is now known exactly how the leakage occurred. We also know a great deal about the distribution of this information in Bombay and other places.

It has been established that the leakage occurred from the Government Press situated in Rashtrapati Bhawan where the budget papers had been given for printing. Copies of the draft which has been sent for printing had been passed without authority to certain persons two of whom have already been arrested. The person who passed this information has also been arrested. Investigation is still proceeding to find out if any other persons had been guilty of this leakage or use of secret Government documents and could be proceeded against. As the case against the three arrested persons will soon be put before the court and further investigations are proceeding it would not be advisable for me to give at this stage further detailed information which is in the Government's possession. Meanwhile I can assure the House that everything possible will be done to punish those who have been guilty of this offence. In view of this, leakage Government are giving consideration to the improvement of procedure in this regard in order to prevent such occurrences in future.

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So far as proceeding in the court is concerned that will take place very soon. They will not wait for the completion of the investigation. The investigation, in a sense, may go on. Whenever any additional information comes before us it will help. I do not know what the hon. Member means, because we have naturally to proceed in court and we are going to proceed in court.

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I do not understand, Sir, how a Committee of the House is to be associated with the police investigations. The question of leakage is being enquired into by the police and the Intelligence Department. The question of privilege is perhaps a slightly different type of thing. How the two things can be mixed up I do not know.

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So far as this particular matter is concerned the police investigations will continue in the sense that not even those cases may be complete against some people. We may get information about other people. In that sense it will continue. Otherwise, the case is fairly good especially, as far as we can see, against those who have been arrested. That is one thing.

I also informed the House and the Speaker immediately that we were going into this matter. I knew nothing about the adjournment motion. It was when I came here at 11 o'clock that I was given this notice of the adjournment motion and I made the brief statement which I did.

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May I just complete the information? Shri Morarji Desai, the Chief Minister of Bombay, gave that paper which was being circulated in Bombay, at 4-30 P.M. to Shri M.C. Shah, the Minister, Shri Shah knew nothing about the budget. He had not seen the papers.

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He has not seen it. He said, "I do not know whether it is correct or not". He said "I shall immediately try to find out". He left Mr. Desai, in the course of his talking, at five minutes to 5 o'clock.

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He left straight for the airport, and then came here by the evening plane, and he communicated it the next morning. He arrived late at night that day, and informed the Finance Minister about it the next morning. As I have said, the Finance Minister immediately instituted an inquiry. He did not quite know what was for him to say to the Home Minister about the thing that had taken place. It might have been done, but it could not have been helpful till he gave a fuller picture, by taking the steps necessary. He immediately had an enquiry made in the Finance Ministry as to who dealt with all these matters, and then reported it to the Home Ministry.

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The Government is entirely in your hands and the hands of the House in this matter. I am not able to understand what the question is - the question put by Dr. Lanka Sundaram. It is not quite clear to me what the issue is, - namely, the issue of privilege which the hon. Member has raised. I would like to know about it, in order to be clear what is the issue that has been placed before you for your decision. I am sorry I was not present here on that occasion.

BACK NOTE

XLIII. Leakage of Budget Proposals, 12 March, 1956

1. DR. LANKA SUNDARAM (Visakhapatnam): May I know how long the Prime Minister thinks the Government will take to complete the investigation?
2. DR. LANKA SUNDARAM: I put the question for the specific reason that the question of privilege of the whole House is involved. I would like to know whether a Committee of the House will be associated with the investigation? Actually, that was my question.
3. SHRI KAMATH (Hoshangabad): May I remind you, Sir, that you yourself held over this matter for some time and deferred your ruling on the subject. Now that the Prime Minister has made a fairly full report- not, perhaps the final report-on this matter, it may be that later on the plea might be taken that the whole matter is *sub judice* if it goes to court, and Parliament's jurisdiction may be ousted on account of that. Therefore, at this early stage I submit that this matter be taken up by the Privilege Committee at once, and I would earnestly appeal to you to give your ruling on this matter today or, latest, tomorrow.

SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTHY (Basirhat): Sir, I would like to point out one other matter. After the leakage had occurred it had been brought to the notice of the Finance Minister round about the 29th February, if I remember the date correctly, and even after the Budget was placed before the House no mention was made...

MR. SPEAKER: Order, order. I have understood the hon. Member's point. That is another matter. The only point is this. From the statement as I understand, so far as the hon. Prime Minister is concerned and the Home Ministry is concerned, there is sufficient material here for a case to be launched. So, unless new materials are available, in which case further steps will be taken, so far as this House is concerned there is sufficient material. I shall consider this matter as to what further steps have to be taken so far as the privilege of the House is concerned. It is with respect to that I have been asked to give a ruling the other day. I have reserved it. I shall look into all these matters and inform the House.

THE MINISTER OF FINANCE (SHRI C. D. DESHMUKH): I want to contradict the statement that the information reached me on the 29th, if that is what the hon. Member said just now. I would say that that is not correct because I stated the other day that the information reached me the next morning at nine o'clock.

MR. SPEAKER: Order, order. I am not allowing any further discussion. So far as these matters are concerned-as to when the hon. Minister was informed, he made a statement the other day during which he had an opportunity to say that he himself did not get the information on the very day and that it was only later on-all the material is before the House. The Hon. Prime Minister and Leader of the House said

that he will make a formal report to the House. Now, what further steps have to be taken so far as the House is concerned, I will consider.

4. SHRI NAMBIAR (Mayuram): On the 30th.
5. SHRI C.D. DESHMUKH: 4.30pm
6. SHRI KAMATH: He did not inform you that day?
7. SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTHY: The adjournment motion was there that day.
8. SHRI S.S. MORE (Sholapur) rose-

MR. SPEAKER: Order, order. We have already discussed this matter the other day. Another day also-the second day also-the matter was brought up before the House. I then said that in view of the statement made by the hon. Leader of the House that he would make a full report to this House regarding the matter, prosecution, etc., we could wait. He has made a statement today. Apart from the cases that may be launched in the court for prosecuting the persons concerned, the persons who are guilty, etc., the question of privilege of the House also came up before me and before the House. I said that I would look into the matter. Of course, budget leakage is a matter which has to be taken notice of by the House-what are the steps that have to be taken, etc. In accordance with the previous practice and precedents, I shall look into the matter and see what more is necessary. Let there be no more discussion.

SHRI KAMATH: On a point of enlightenment, Sir, when there are such serious things happening, is it not obligatory for the Finance Minister or any other Minister-when things happen like that in his Ministry- to communicate the same at once to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet?

9. SHRI C.D. DESHMUKH: Not the budget speech.
10. SHRI KAMATH: He did not phone at all.
11. SHRI S.S. MORE: When did Shri Morarji Deasi get that particular document?
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: He got it just before well, I do not know.
SHRI C.D. DESHMUKH: He got it about two or three hours before.

DR. LANKA SUNDARAM: The information given by the Prime Minister is almost identical with the information given by the Finance Minister earlier. There is no disposition on the part of any Member in this House to Impede Government investigation nor to interfere with the process of law. But the thing which I would like the Chair to clinch is this, and that is the question of privilege of the whole House which arises from these things. It must be brought up now. Otherwise, it will drag on possibly for months and years.

STATEMENT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

20 March, 1956

Mr. Speaker, Sir, during the past few months, as the House is aware, we have had the pleasure and privilege of welcoming to India many eminent visitors from abroad. These visitors came from many lands, as messengers of goodwill from nations with widely differing cultures and systems of thought and organisation. To all of them we extended a warm and cordial welcome in that spirit of friendliness towards all, which distinguishes our foreign policy, as indeed it does the traditions of our country and our people. I had long and detailed conversations with all of them, both on the major problems of the world, in their many aspects, and on matters of mutual interest to the particular country concerned and ourselves. I should like to take this opportunity of saying how valuable have been these talks and how much I have profited by them. It was, of course, not to be expected that, as a result of these talks, there would be sudden changes in the foreign policy of our country or of any of the other countries concerned. Foreign policies are not made and changed in that way. All the same, these talks at a personal level, held in a frank and informal atmosphere, have enabled us, and I hope our visitors too, to appreciate better each other's point of view. They have helped us to obtain a better understanding of the minds of those who in their respective countries, are directly concerned with the formulation and direction of policy. Where we have been unable to agree, we have agreed to differ.

It is not possible for me to cover all the ground of these talks or to refer, in this statement, to the many problems that afflict the world and are a matter of concern to us. Perhaps, at a later stage, I might refer in this House to some of these international problems. For the present, I should like to mention some important matters which were recently discussed by us with our distinguished visitors.

Of these visitors, the three recent ones have been Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State of the USA, and M. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France. We welcomed them as representatives of three leading countries in the world, and with each of them I discussed the international situation and also how best tension could be relaxed and peace, which is the objective of all countries, could best be promoted.

The occasion which brought these statesmen to this region of the world was the meeting of the SEATO Council in Karachi. To our great surprise, the Council at this meeting thought it fit, at the instance of one of its members, to discuss the question of Kashmir and include a declaration on this question in its final communique. In doing so, the Council confirmed our worst apprehensions about the organisation which it represent. The declared purpose of the South East Asia Treaty is to increase the defensive strength of the parties to the Treaty against aggression from outside

and against internal subversion. How the question of Kashmir could come within the scope of the SEATO Council is not clear to us. Its reference to Kashmir could only mean that a military alliance is backing one country, namely, Pakistan, in its disputes with India. For any organisation to function in this way to the detriment of a country, which is friendly to the individual countries comprised in the organisation, would, at any time be considered an impropriety. In the present case, however, there is a further aspect. We have noted with regret that three other Commonwealth countries have associated themselves with the offending declaration. We have communicated our protest to all the countries concerned at the unusual procedure adopted by the Council.

I had talks with Mr. Dulles about the US military aid to Pakistan. I told him how this aid has been causing us serious concern. The atmosphere in Pakistan seems to be one of threats and menaces towards India. India continues to be the subject of bitter attack in sections of the Pakistan Press, and bellicose statements appear from time to time even from responsible leaders. More recently, there has been a recrudescence of border incidents which have, by their frequency and dispersion over a wide area, assumed a special significance. Substance is thus lent to the growing belief in this country that whatever the object of the United States in giving military aid to Pakistan, in Pakistan itself the resulting acquisition of military strength has been generally welcomed not because it will increase Pakistan's defensive capacity against a potential aggressor, but because they hope thereby to be able to settle disputes with India from what is called a position of strength.

We in India wish Pakistan well. She has just declared herself a Republic, and we offer her our best wishes at the threshold of a new chapter in her history. We are sending one of our Ministers as a special envoy to Karachi to convey our felicitations in person. It is not our intention to enter upon any arms race with Pakistan or with any other country, even if we could afford such a competition. Our energies and our resources are completely absorbed and will continue to be absorbed for many years to come in our Five Year Plans, and none of us would wish to divert any part of our limited resources to further expenditure on arms, nevertheless, those responsible for the destiny of India have to take note of certain facts. I can only express our regret and disappointment that at a time when we in Asia should be bending our energies to the task of development, a new factor making for tension and instability should have been introduced by this arms aid. I have explained our views on this point clearly to Mr. Dulles and I hope he now has a better appreciation of our feelings.

Recent developments serve once again to focus attention on military pacts. These pacts, instead of dwindling in numbers, seems to be on the increase, and are being strengthened and enlarged, irrespective of previous commitments and declarations. This is the history of all pacts, more especially of the South East Asia Defence Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. The former came into existence at a time when, after many years of warfare, there was peace in South-East Asia. Tensions were relaxed and people looked forward to a return to normality. There was no possibility of

aggression in the foreseeable future. Yet, at this moment of relief and the beginnings of hope, this Pact came into existence and resulted immediately in increasing tension. The more recent Baghdad Pact has already brought disruption, insecurity and discontent in Western Asia. Thus, the very objective for which these pacts were made is being defeated. It has been our firm conviction that these two treaties and similar military pacts and alliances do not add to the intrinsic defensive strength of the regions in the interest of which they are supposed to have been devised.

Talks on disarmament in the face of military pacts by either bloc and further preparations for war are inconsistent and a mockery of avowed purposes. There is always time to revise policies even if the Great Powers are involved in them, if the revision is in the common good and in the interests of peace. It is not by military alliances and the matching of strength with strength that tensions can be lowered and peace and stability reestablished where conflict now prevails. We hold, and with each new experience are further confirmed in our conviction, that in the adherence to and the practice of the Five Principles, now widely known as the Panch Shila alone lies the promise of a new era of international peace and stability.

The coming of atomic energy and the dread weapons that it has let loose on the world, has made all previous thinking not only in regard to military matters but also other matters, out of date. Thinking people and the leaders of nations have, as a consequence, ruled out war. In this new situation, there is no logic in clinging to the idea of a cold war. We have stated repeatedly that nuclear weapons must be banned and that atomic energy must be used for the benefit of humanity and not be controlled by the Great Powers. If war is to be ruled out, then cold war becomes illogical and harmful. It can only keep up the atmosphere of hatred and fear, and the everpresent danger of being converted into a nuclear war.

I had discussions also on Goa with Mr. Secretary Dulles. As the House is aware, the joint statement issued by him and Mr. Cunha, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, some weeks ago, caused a deep feeling of resentment throughout India. We took this matter up immediately with the United States Government and explained to them how, in the context of the present situation in Goa, the association of the U.S. Secretary of State with a statement of that kind could only have one effect, that being to give encouragement to Portugal in pursuing a policy which represents the worst type of colonialism. I told the House then that we would place our correspondence on this subject with the U.S. Government on the Table of the House. I am doing so today [See Appendix V, annexure No. 26] and hon. Members will have an opportunity of seeing our notes and the reply of the United States.

Mr. Dulles, in his talks with me, assured me that, in subscribing to the joint statement, the U.S. was not supporting Portugal as against India. We do not, of course, doubt this statement, but the position nevertheless is that the joint communique is being interpreted, especially by Portuguese authorities, as if it supported their claims. We have made our position clear to the U.S. Government, and I want to repeat here that in no circumstance will we tolerate the continuance of the last remnants of

Portuguese colonialism on Indian soil. We have been patient, and we shall continue to be patient.

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But there will be no compromise on this issue. I still hope that friendly countries will impress on Portugal the unwisdom of following a policy of sixteenth century colonialism in the second half of the twentieth century.

With all the three Ministers I have had detailed discussions about the situation in Western Asia. All are agreed that this situation is an explosive one. I do not presume to give advice about any quick solution of this difficult problem. At the same time, I have no doubt in my mind that a solution can only emerge from a gradual relaxation of tension. Here again, the Baghdad Pact is partly responsible for a good deal of the present trouble which now plagues West Asia. It has rent as under Arab unity and has thereby made the solution of a problem already difficult, still more difficult and complicated.

I discussed the situation in Indo-China with the three Foreign Ministers, particularly with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, who is a co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. When, in response to the invitation of the Geneva Powers, India accepted the Chairmanship of the three International Commissions in Indo-China, we did so in the hope that at long last peace would return permanently to this troubled region in South East Asia which is so close to us and with which we have so many old and historic ties. It appears now that the time schedule for elections as a preliminary to the unification of the two parts of Vietnam, which was envisaged in the final declaration at Geneva, is unlikely to be fulfilled. We are compelled, therefore, to review the situation in so far as it concerns us. We have no intention of trying to escape from a position of responsibility, or to take a step which would hamper a peaceful settlement. We have, therefore, suggested to the two co-Chairmen that they should review the position and decide on the steps that should be taken to secure compliance with the Geneva Agreement. I have reason to hope that the two co-Chairmen will meet and discuss the present situation.

The discussions with the three Foreign Ministers also covered the present situation in East Asia, particularly in relation to the two coastal Islands of Quemoy and Matsu as well as Taiwan. I explained to them once more how in our view the basic cause of the trouble in East Asia is the non-recognition of a patent fact. That fact is the emergence of a new China, unified as never before in its history, strong powerful and conscious of its rights and dignity. I do not think that, so long as the Chinese People's Republic is not admitted to the United Nations, the situation in East Asia will return to normal. In particular, I expressed the view that China will never feel secure so long as Quemoy and Matsu remain in the occupation of hostile forces. The essential first step would be the withdrawal of those forces from these Islands so that they can become part of the mainland. The Taiwan issue will still remain but I believe that if the coastal Islands were to return to China, the problem of Taiwan could be handled a little more easily.

In this context we have been watching with interest the course of the talks at Geneva between the Ambassadors of the United States of America and China. Both sides are broadly agreed that they should settle disputes between them through peaceful negotiation. The main difficulty now is that of applying this principle to the particular case of Taiwan. We hope that a satisfactory formula in regard to this also will be found, thereby paving the way for a discussion of other outstanding matters, including a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries.

I should like to refer in particular to the talk I had with M. Pineau about North Africa. We in India appreciate and welcome the steps taken by France to restore sovereignty to Morocco and Tunisia. The difficult problem of Algeria still remains. I was glad to find that M. Pineau takes a realistic view of the situation. The problem there is complicated by the existence of about one and a quarter million persons of European descent, who have been settled there for some generations. The House will not expect me to go into further details of these discussions. I hope that the problem of Algeria will also be solved to the mutual satisfaction of the French and the Algerian people.

Shortly before M. Pineau reached Delhi, we received from the French Government a draft of the treaty for the *de jure* transfer of sovereignty over the former French establishments in India. We do not foresee any difficulty about agreement on this draft and I hope that the *de jure* transfer of sovereignty will not be long delayed.

If peace is to be aimed at, disarmament is essential. As with every other difficult question, perhaps it is easier to proceed step by step. A subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations has been meeting in London and there is already a large measure of agreement on this subject. Unfortunately, however, the growing tensions in the world do not create an atmosphere in favour of disarmament and yet the urgency of disarmament grows in proportion to the invention and accumulation of weapons of ever-increasing destructive potential. We believe in the unconditional prohibition of the production, use and experimentation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and, as a step to that end, the suspension of experimental explosions and an armaments truce.

I should like to take this opportunity of drawing the attention of the House to a very important event in recent weeks. I refer to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which met recently in Moscow. There can be no doubt that this Congress has adopted a new line and a new policy. This new line, both in political thinking and in practical policy, appears to be based upon a more realistic appreciation of the present world situation and represents a significant process of adaptation and adjustment. According to our principles, we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, just as we do not welcome any interference of others in our country. But any important development in any country which appears to be a step towards the creation of condition favourable to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence, is important for us as well as others. It is for this reason that we feel that the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Union are likely to have far-reaching effects. I hope that this development will lead to a further relaxation of tension in the world.

I should like to make some brief reference to a speech delivered by the Prime Minister of Pakistan yesterday in his Parliament. Normally, I would wait for a fuller and a more authoritative version before commenting on the speech. But, as I am speaking here today, I think I should say something about it.

I have read the brief report of this speech with sorrow and surprise. Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali has spoken in anger and has made some statements which are manifestly incorrect. He says that India was carrying on a campaign of fear and hatred and had created an atmosphere of hatred against Pakistan. It is easy to compare the press of India with the press of Pakistan and the statements made by responsible persons in India with those made in Pakistan.

There have been for long the most virulent attacks in Pakistan on India and frequent appeals for jehad. Has any responsible person or newspaper in India talked of war or indeed talked of hatred? We have even now an unceasing flow of migrants from East Pakistan to India. That is a great burden on us and a matter for serious concern. We have naturally drawn attention to this and to the reasons which compel people to leave their hearths and homes and lands and seek refuge in another country.

Mr. Mohammad Ali has referred to the recent border incidents and has said that they had been created by India and that in every single instance, aggression had come from the Indian side. It is a little difficult for me to deal with statements which have little connection with truth. I can give long lists of these incidents and I can give the facts behind them, in so far as we know, and any impartial authority can judge. I shall only mention one wellknown incident here because, in that case, an impartial authority did enquire and judge and give its decision. That was the Nekowal incident on the Jammu border. The United Nations Observers enquired into this and stated clearly where the fault lay. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan had assured as publicly that he would abide by the decision of the U. N. Observers and punish those who were guilty. We still await the carrying out of this assurance. We have written repeatedly with no effect.

Mr. Mohammad Ali has said that he wrote to me and made certain proposals and that he had received no reply from me. This is correct. But his message reached me night before last. We have had just one day to consider it. We hope to send an answer soon. In his message, Mr. Mohammad Ali has referred to a decision arrived at a meeting of the Joint Steering Committee on the 11th and 12th March 1955 for the demarcation of the Indo-Pakistan border and apparently accuses India of delay in giving effect to this decision. This decision was further considered at a meeting of our Home Minister with the Pakistan Home Minister in May 1955 and they arrived at an agreement, referred to as the Pant-Mirza Agreement. The Pakistan Government took no action for the ratification of this agreement till the end of December 1955, and then suggested certain amendments to the agreement, which in effect, largely modified it. However, I welcome the Prime Minister's proposal for the demarcation of the Indo-Pakistan border and we are prepared to take this up immediately.

Mr. Mohammad Ali has suggested in his speech that India and Pakistan should declare that they would never go to war with each other. I welcome this proposal.

Everyone knows that we have been suggesting a nowar declaration by both India and Pakistan for some years now. Our proposal, however, was not accepted by the Pakistan Government. I am glad that Mr. Mohammad Ali now looks with favour on this proposal and we shall gladly pursue this matter further.

There can be no greater folly than conflict between India and Pakistan. We have endeavoured to create friendly feelings between the two countries and I believe that, in spite of many unfortunate occurrences, there is today a large measure of friendship between the people of India and the people of Pakistan. It is not by military methods or threats of war or of talking to each other from the so-called positions of strength that we shall come nearer. In this world of the atom bomb, both India and Pakistan are weak. But we can develop strength in other ways, strength in friendship, in cooperation and in raising the standards of our people. I offer, in all goodwill and earnestness, the Panch Shila to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and I have every faith that if we base our dealings with one another on those Five Principles, the nightmare of fear and suspicion will fade away.

BACK NOTE

XLIV. Statement on Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1956

1. SHRI V.G. DESHPANDE: Why?

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS

21 March, 1956

My colleague, the hon. Minister of Defence will, no doubt, deal with the broad issues raised in this debate and with the criticisms and suggestions made. I have intervened to draw the attention of the House to certain broad and basic principles of the line of defence and more especially, the problems that we have to face.

I have noticed in the course of the debate today, a certain anxiety, a certain concern about recent events, amounting almost to an apprehension, a fear lest India might be attacked by our neighbouring country and we might not be ready for it. The number of recent border incidents and more especially the fact that a great foreign country is giving military aid has led, no doubt, to this apprehension. It is perfectly true that the situation today in regard to the defence of India has been very much affected by this factor of military aid coming in from a great country and we have to view this situation; therefore, in this new light.

The hon. Member who spoke just before me asked us to give the latest equipment, best training and all that. What exactly does that mean? In nothing, I think, has there been such a rapid, such a great improvement in technology as in defence or in attack in war equipment. Of course, the latest example of that—the final example—is nuclear weapons, atomic bomb or hydrogen bomb. That is the final culmination of this process up till now. If you judge from that, it simply means this, that no country in the world, practically speaking, excepting the two great powers, adequately defended, because only they have enough of these nuclear weapons. One or two others have a little, but comparatively less, and others have not got it at all. How, then, does one judge of this adequacy of defence of a country?

Obviously, if some power which has nuclear weapons at its disposal chose to attack India fully, from the purely military point of view, we have little defence. It may be that from other points of view, we may yet be able to meet this menace of the atomic bomb, because a people that has vitality, that has strength and unity and people that will not surrender whatever happens can never be defeated. I have often said, therefore, that the real answer to the atomic bomb lies in other spheres. I mention this because in the final analysis what counts is not your soldier or your military weapon, but the spirit of unity of the people, the will of the people to survive in spite of every difficulty and every menace, and it is well that we should remember that when we are considering other problems, whether it is States reorganisation or any other problem. When we quarrel about petty matters, when some of us come into conflict with some others, it is well to remember some of these basic propositions, to remember the kind of world we are living in today. It is a dangerous world. It is a world full of menace. It is a world which may well trip us up and push us down if we are not careful, if we are not vigilant, if we are not as prepared as we can well be. That is the background.

If I am confident about India, that confidence depends more on the spirit and unity of our people than on other factors. If that is weak, for me it just does not matter how many tanks you may put in somewhere, or how many aircraft. But, let us consider this matter from another point of view.

As I said, technology has developed so rapidly that if, unfortunately, there is a great war in the future, probably every book that has been written in the past about warfare, every weapon that was used during the last war and previously would be out of date. Judged from that point of view, we in India and nearly all the countries of the world excepting very, very few are completely out of date and there is no help for it in the present. We may gradually go forward. What is the equation of defence? In what lies the strength of a people for defence? Well, one thinks immediately about defence forces, army, navy, air force. Perfectly right. They are the spear points of defence. They have to bear the brunt of any attack. How do they exist?—the Army and Navy. What are they based on? The more technical you get, as armies and navies and air forces are getting, the base is the industrial and technological development of the country. You may import a machine or an aircraft or some other highly technical weapon and you may even teach somebody to use it, but that is a very superficial type of defence because you have not got the technological background for it. If spare parts go wrong, your whole machine is useless. If you cannot get it, if somebody from whom you bought it refuses to supply a part of it, it becomes useless, so that in spite of your independence you become dependent on others, and very greatly so, and that is what is happening today. From that point of view probably there are very few countries in the wide world that are really independent—that is to say from the point of view of being able to stand on their own feet against the military strength of others or from the point of view of technological advance. Therefore, apart from the Army, Navy, etc., that you may have, you want an industrial and technological background in the country. Next comes, to support all this, the economy of the country. Because if the country's economy is not sound if the country, in fact, is not a relatively prosperous country so far its economy and people are concerned. It is a weak country. I can give many example to this House of countries which for the moment may have a good army as an army but it really is a superficial strength that they have because the army depends on outside factors, outside machines, outside economy, outside help, and therefore essentially it is a dependent country from that point of view, though it may be called independent. Then lastly, or fourthly, you depend on the spirit of the people. So, the equation of defence is your defence forces plus your industrial and technological background—I am not talking of equipment produced from abroad but the background which produces the equipment; thirdly, the economy of the country, and fourthly the spirit of the people.

Looking at the countries of the world, there are only two at the present moment which may be termed to be, from the military point of view, absolutely in the front rank. There are many other countries in between. Where do we come into the picture? Here we are relatively backward technologically and industrially, and yet, except for one country, except for Japan, probably more industrialised at the present moment

than any country in Asia. I am leaving out the Soviet territories, and even in regard to China which is making great progress, I think it may well be said that at the present moment we are somewhat in advance in some ways, not in all ways, industrially considered. Certainly not in a military way. They have a huge army. We have a relatively small army. But I am talking about industrial development, not of other matters. We are, therefore, of the so-called underdeveloped countries, relatively more advanced in some matters. Take atomic energy. Probably we are in the first half a dozen countries of the world or somewhere near that—I do not exactly know ; it is difficult to say. We are certainly leaving out the first three or four. We are in the next rank. These things are basic for laying the foundation of future strength and growth.

An hon. Member, I am told, said here: "What is the good of your Five Year Plans? You must concentrate on defence." That is a grave statement to make. But the Five Year Plan is the defence plan of the country. What else is it? Because, defence does not consist of people going about marching up and down the road with guns and other weapons. Defence consists today in a country which is industrially prepared for defence, which can produce the goods, the equipment. Otherwise, you simply depend upon other countries, buy some goods which goods become totally useless to you if some little bit, a little spare part is lacking and you cannot get it.

Therefore, the right approach to defence is—well, one obvious approach, of course, is friendly relations with other countries, to avoid having unfriendly relations which might lead to conflict. And therefore, some hon. Members in, this House, not many, who talk in rather aggressive terms of neighbouring countries and want to take brave action sword in hand, serve no cause—certainly not the cause of this country apart from any larger cause of the world. It is one thing for us to be perfectly prepared, or prepared in so far as we can be for defence if somebody attacks, because, whatever our policy may be, however peaceful our policy may be, no one can take—no responsible Government can take—the risk of an emergency arising which it cannot face. That is true. But any kind of blustering attitude is neither becoming to a dignified nation, nor is it safe, nor is it appreciated by anybody in the world. It is a sign of weakness, not strength. Therefore, we must cultivate friendly relations, and we must cultivate and spread the feeling that no subject, no quarrel, is big enough for war to be required to settle it, or, to put it differently, that war today is and ought to be out of the question. Of course, by our saying it, we do not make war out of the question, because the other party may not look that way.

But what I mean is that all these national questions are rather tied up with international issues. If internationally it becomes more and more difficult for war to take place, well, the national question is affected by it. That is the broad approach. And it is our broad approach, therefore, in foreign policy or in defence policy—and the two are intimately allied—to have friendly relations with every country.

Then, we come to the second item, and that is that the real strength of the country develops by industrial development, by the capacity to make, if you like, weapons of war, whether it is for the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. That means

general industrial development. And you cannot develop just a particular isolated industry without a background of industrial development. You cannot say, well, we shall have, let us say, a factory producing tanks without any other industrial development of the country, or a factory producing aircraft, because you require a large background of technically trained people. It is only then that, that can take place. Therefore, our immediate object should be, both from the point of view of economic development and that of defence, to build up industry, and to build up heavy industry, which produces machines.

Now, it does not matter how keen you are, and how hard you work. That takes time. It may be, and the criticism may be justified, if you like that we ought to have started thinking in these terms even earlier. But the point is here we are today, and we are trying to think in these terms of building up heavy industry, iron and steel, machine-making, plant, or exploiting and producing oil.

Take this business of oil. Most of your machines will simply become completely useless without oil to run them. If oil is stopped, if we have not got enough oil in this country, well, there you are, you put your big machines, and tie them up, because there is nothing to move them about.

These are the factors. People seem to consider that defence is just training a man to walk up and down in a step with a gun in his hand. That is a very out-of-date conception of it.

Now, we come up against a grave difficulty. Let us admit for the moment that we are proceeding along right lines—we may speed up the process— those right lines being the industrialisation of the country, which is good from the economic point of view as well as from the defence. But industrialisation takes some time.

All the time, we have to think of two aspects. One is that the speed of industrialisation means a burden that we have to carry, the people have to carry, all of us. How far can we carry the burden? Either we slow down the speed or we increase the burden. That is one aspect of the problem which applies to all our Five Year Plans and the rest.

The other aspect is that it is all very well that you are going along the right lines you may be ready for this, let us say, ten years later. But what happens in between the ten years? You may be knocked down in the course of the ten years. And all your saying that 'We are not ready for an attack' will not prevent an enemy from attacking you, and waiting till you are ready for it. That is obvious. That is the difficult problem that every country has to face, to balance immediate danger with considerations of better security later on.

If you think too much in terms of immediate danger and concentrate on that, the result is that you are never getting strong enough tomorrow and the day after, because your resources are being spent not in productive ways, not in the growth of real strength, but in temporary strength which you borrow from others, which you buy from others. You get a machine from outside, or something. You get it, you use it, it does give you some temporary assurance, although it is not very great. But as I

told you, if some part goes wrong, or somebody fails to supply you, there again you are helpless. That is the real difficulty.

And this difficulty has become even more real for us because of these recent developments, more especially the military aid that has come in fairly considerable quantity to our neighbour country. I do not myself think that there is any marked likelihood of war. In fact, I would very much doubt if any such war is at all likely to take place. And I am trying to think objectively, not merely because I wish it so, because one has to take a realistic view of these matters. Nevertheless, having said so, one cannot ignore the possibility of some emergency arising. And we are put in a very great difficulty. And I want to take the House into confidence.

The difficulty is this, that if we lay too much stress on present-day assurance, which ultimately means the purchase of big machines of various types from abroad in adequate quantity, well, we undermine the economic progress that we envisage. It is a terrible problem for us to face, and for this House to face.

It is quite easy for some hon. Member to say, push away your Five Year Plan and do this. But that is almost a counsel of despair. We cannot sell tomorrow and the day after, because of our fears of today. At the same time, we have to provide for today. That is the problem. I do not pretend to give an answer to this problem here in this House, because it is not a problem I do not mind which arises today at this minute; the problem is there, in its broad context, which we shall have to face from day to day, month to month. It has been thrust upon us. To a slight extent, the problem is always there with every country. But the problem has been thrust upon us rather forcibly and rather urgently by these developments of pacts and military aid and the rest.

I do not wish the House to think that we are unduly anxious about this problem, but naturally we are a little anxious, and we certainly are not complacent about it. I think we would be anxious undoubtedly, if we did not have the feeling of the spirit of the country, the unity of the country, and the assurance that, whatever our petty views might be in many fields, over these large questions there can be no difference, and we all have to pull together.

So this, in the final analysis, is the major problem: how far to ensure safety today we are to sacrifice and delay tomorrow's developments? This House will be considering sometime later during this session the Second Five Year Plan. In considering that, it will have to bear in mind this particular problem because if the advice of some hon. Members is adopted in regard to our defence, we shall have to throw overboard the Second Five Year Plan, if not completely, a good bit of it. So it is not such an easy matter for us to decide in this way, seeing only one part of the picture and not the other.

It is largely for these reasons and if they apply to our country, presumably they apply to other countries also that we have deprecated this business of military pacts and alliances and military aid being given. We would welcome civil aid for development of the country, which really strengthens the country ultimately much more than the other and which has no other implications to other countries concerned. But the way

things have developed in Asia and elsewhere has been rather unfortunate and has brought this atmosphere of tension and fear in the train.

I have endeavoured to be perfectly frank to the House because this problem is troubling us, and it is not a problem to be dealt with in a small way here and there; it is a problem which extends itself not to a few days and few months but it goes on. We will have to face it from day to day, for the next year and the year after that. We hope that whatever decisions we arrive at from time to time we shall naturally communicate to this House, because other matters will be affected by those decisions; whether it is the Five Year Plan, whether it is some other scheme of development, they might well be affected. Therefore, we cannot proceed in this business without the fullest understanding, sympathy and support of the House.

BACK NOTE

XLV. Demands for Grants, 21 March 1956

NIL

DEMANDS FOR GRANTS

29 March, 1956

Mr. Speaker, I have often had the privilege of addressing this House in regard to international affairs. I am afraid I repeat myself on these occasions because I do feel that certain aspects of the changing world today are so important that they should always be borne in mind. So, the House will forgive me if, on this occasion also. I say something which, perhaps, I have said before.

Some little time ago, I made a statement in this House in regard to certain very important matters—more especially, the conversations we had with some eminent statesmen who came here. I shall not of course repeat that but I shall have to refer to some of those important matters again.

Acharya Kripalani was good enough to say that our foreign policy was right in principle—the broad objectives and possibly even certain broad achievements—but that we tended to go wrong in regard to details, in regard to tactics to be employed. Other hon. Members opposite criticised it in various ways also.

Now, it is perfectly true that we in our foreign policy or in any other policy have not had a run of success everywhere, that we have met with difficulties and are likely to meet with many more difficulties, that we have faced lack of success in many of our important problems and it may be that if some wise step had been taken previously in regard to some particular problem it would have led to better results. It is so easy to be wise after the event. Nevertheless, I would like the House to remember that all these so called problems—small problems—are not isolated ones; they are intimately connected with some of the basic problems of the world today. You can hardly separate any problem from these basic conflicts of the world today. Therefore, even a small problem tends to become a big one in its consequence. And to imagine that you can settle any small problem, or one which affects us particularly, without reference to the other aspects, the world aspects is to make a mistake.

Now again, if I may draw the attention of the House to certain very remarkable and basic changes that have taken place and are taking place in the world, and which I believe are changing or will change the whole context of thinking and action in the world in various spheres of activity—you may make your approach as you like; you may call it the development of technology to an extreme degree leading ultimately to the invention and use of the atomic bomb or the hydrogen bomb—I am referring to the hydrogen bomb as an aspect of the development of technology and not as something that will kill and devastate vast numbers of people—it is this development of technology in industrial civilisation which has reached this level of tremendous power which may inflict infinite disaster on humanity and which may also do enormous good. The mere release of this power—and humanity will use it more and more for good or ill—is a new feature in the world today which upsets all previous thinking. It

upsets military thinking. All the textbooks on war that have been written thus far are out of date because of these new factors. That, I think most people recognise. But, perhaps, they do not recognise that it upsets political thinking, or should upset it if we can get out of our grooves, and it upsets economic thinking and all the isms to which we have been attached in the past. We have had a great deal of truth in them, a good measure, but they are out of date. I do venture to say that this tremendous increase in the power available to humanity today has made our previous thinking militarily, politically and economically out of date to some extent and unless we adapt ourselves to this new age which is dawning upon us we shall be left behind and not be able to take advantage of these new conditions or protect ourselves from the new dangers. That is an important basic fact that has to be kept in mind.

Now, one of the results of this new development is that violence and the methods of violence have become so tremendously powerful that, practically speaking, they have become useless and it is an extraordinary thing to say—they have overreached themselves that is, if they go on further they are not useless but they destroy.

Take the question of war and disarmament. People have discussed disarmament for years and years past, honest people desiring to put an end to war etc. or at least to lessen the chances of war. But they have never come to an agreement. Why? Because, essentially some party or other thought that war would pay, that war would lead to victory or they have a fair chance of victory and they are not prepared to give up their fair chance of victory in order to achieve certain objectives that they had. Therefore they would not agree to disarmament.

Now for the first time, I would say, in the world's history, it is gradually dawning on people that war does not lead to victory and will not lead to victory in the modern context—I am talking of course of big scale war. Therefore, for the first time I imagine, the question of disarmament is being considered or will be considered in much more realistic terms than at any time previously because of this realisation logically. Of course, war is completely ruled out by any reasonable or logical approach because it cannot yield any of the results aimed at and it is bound to—even with the limited knowledge at our disposal in regard to the effects of the use of hydrogen bomb—lead to almost universal disaster. Mind you, there are certain uncertain factors about which we do not know yet but which may even mean something worse. Now, therefore, logically one comes to the conclusion that war should be completely ruled out.

But hon. Members know well enough that life is not completely governed by logic. There are passions and hatreds, fears and apprehensions which come in the way. And so today, even more so than before, we feel the position that logic, reason and good sense tell us the path we should follow and the fears, apprehensions and hatreds tend to push us—not us or our country, I mean the world—in a different direction. Nevertheless, one cannot ultimately ignore reality and the reality is typified by that symbol of the age today, the atom bomb or the hydrogen bomb and the great energy behind it, the tremendous power behind it, the power for destruction in war or otherwise.

This is an important factor which I sometimes, I fear, repeat very much because it is the governing factor of the age today and it is governing it not only in human hands for use political and, I would again repeat, in the economic domain. In fact, all economic thinking has been affected by the tremendous increase in technology, the tremendous advance in technology, the tremendous capacity to produce wealth, or goods, or necessary articles.

Two or three generations back, possibly, nobody could even think of this abundance of goods for everybody—the possibility of it. A hundred years or so ago any economist thought in terms of scarcity. Then came the period when people gradually began to think in terms of some abundance. But the wildest hopes of individuals and prophets have been exceeded by the power of modern technology and modern science to produce wealth and also to produce not only wealth but very-very powerful weapons. But it is all in the same line of technological development. Whether you call it happiness on one side or misery and destruction on the other, it is power which they produced and put in human hands for use.

Now, this is the background and in this background any reasonable or logical approach must, therefore, necessarily be away from war and conflict of the violent type. One does not deny that there are many conflicts, social conflicts and the like, in society between nations and the rest. But the solution of those conflicts, big or small, by methods of violence is undesirable. In the big way they are not solved; there have been destruction to both; but in the small way, relatively small way, it is dangerous to apply that method because that might lead you to the bigger conflict so that, what has been said by the prophets and sages in the past, that violence and hatreds etc., are bad morally, has become today the extremely practical method of considering these matters.

Morality apart, from the strictly opportunist and the narrowest point of view today, violence is a folly, in a big way or a small way. Naturally, violence will continue in a small way. Man will hate another man in anger. That is a different matter. The point is basically that the high moral outlook of the great men of the past today has become the practical consequence of the developments of the modern age. This is the background.

If it is so, then this business of cold war and anything that leads to cold war also completely lacks sense. It has no meaning, because cold war is only a step to prepare the atmosphere for a hot war. Cold war means the development of hatred and the spirit of violence and the preparation for war violence all the time. It is folly to spend all your energy to do something which you want to avoid doing. It has no meaning. Again, you may do it because of fears and the like. There is always that conflict in peoples mind. But, it is a wrong policy fundamentally. Logically there can be no dispute about that.

The policy we have followed in this country with more or less success—I do not claim any wonderful success for it; but I do claim, with all respect that it looks in the right direction—tries to work in the right direction. It may make mistakes, it has made mistakes in minor matters, or for the matter of that, in some major matters. But,

it does lay emphasis on the right things—call them what you like—on the right means. Because of that, it has evoked a certain wide response in peoples mind all over the world. I am not for the moment referring to the Governments; certainly, Governments also. We say that we are friendly to all countries. Naturally, the degree of our co-operation with countries differs, because it is a twoway traffic. You cannot co-operate one way. But, our offer of friendship is always there, I hope, with every country, even those who might at present be hostile to us or with whom we may have some problems or conflicts.

Sometimes people, rather with some disdain, refer to our neutralism. I do not think we are neutral. I hope we are not neutral about any vital matter. But, this business of talking about neutrality itself denotes a state of mind which can only think in terms of war. Neutrality is a word which applies to war and belligerency. It is the opposite of belligerency. People have developed a state of affairs in the world where you cannot get out of the war mentality. You talk about belligerency and neutrality. In terms of no war or peaceful conditions, the use of the word 'neutral' is completely out of place. It has no meaning. Why it is used is this. They can only conceive of two basic attitudes in the world today, represented, by and large, by the two great groups of nations which are supposed to be more or less opposed to each other and you are supposed to fall in line with this or that. You have no business to try to find a place for yourself in thought or action. This kind of thing is essentially authoritarian thinking whether it is done by this side or that side. It is also essentially military thinking of war and lining up here or there. I cannot understand how any reasonable person, whatever his views may be—he may differ from me—should confine his thinking to this military approach to this question. That is one of the misfortunes of the age. The fears and apprehensions which the people have felt have made them think more and more in this confined soldier's way. A soldier is an excellent person. You give him a particular job: do this, fight and defeat the enemy. He tries his best to do it whether he succeeds or not. But, obviously, in politics, and more so, in human life, if you start always making that soldier's approach you will get into difficulties. The world has got into these difficulties because military thinking, military phraseology and methods have been introduced into our political activities. While on this question of neutrality, I would like again to lay stress on this, that a person who considers our political or other activities neutral, in that sense, has completely failed to understand them. I would advise him to try to make another effort to understand them. I would advise him to try to make an effort to get out of his narrow shell of thinking which does not represent the whole of the world. It is desirable for the world that people should think differently from each other and then come together and cooperate. I wanted to lay stress on this background phenomenon.

Today, broadly speaking, if you want to know what the basic world problems are at the present moment, one, of course, is the basic problem, which has led to numerous of shoots, the problem of atomic energy coming into the field. I would connect that with the problem of disarmament which is of exceeding importance. I believe, for the reasons I have stated, that there is a little more hopeful chance of

something being achieved in regard to disarmament. Why? Because of this progressive realisation that it does not profit anybody not to do so; in fact, it is harmful. But, I cannot say definitely, of course.

Then, take, for the present, a very explosive region of the world, the western Asia, conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries, the region of the Baghdad pact and the like. Here again, in a sense, the problems, important as they are, are not world problems. But, obviously, they are so interrelated with world problems that some kind of upset or explosion there will affect the world and one does not know exactly what might happen. The fact of the matter is that in the 19th century, a certain not very happy equilibrium was established in the world by the dominance of certain European powers practically all over the world. That continued till the beginning of the First World War. The First World War upset that equilibrium in many ways,—political, economic. Some empires vanished. The period between the two World Wars intervened, a troubled period, a difficult one. Always an attempt has been made to find some equilibrium and it has been a failure. The Second World War came and upset the old 19th century balances still more. Ever since then, the world has been grouping about to find some equilibrium. Meanwhile, apart from the emergence of these great giants, America and the Soviet Union, in terms of material power, this atomic energy comes in—another upsetting factor.

Now, the countries which enjoyed the privileged position in that 19th century setup, many of them, have lost their position—at least that particular position. It is not easy for them to adjust themselves to the new thinking, the new balances in the world, the new balances—apart from the giants coming up—and the new renaissance in Asia and Asian countries becoming independent in their different ways, whether it is India or China or Indonesia or Burma or other countries. The old balances go on being changed and Governments, and very wise Governments cannot easily keep pace with those practical developments. Of course, the most remarkable fact about this lack of recognition of changes is the fact that some great countries still seem to lack awareness, proper awareness, that a great country like China is there. Of course they know it. Nevertheless they seem to lack something, or, otherwise, their policy would be different.

But it is not merely a question of China. It is really a question of the outlook on all Asian problems or African problems and the idea that, as previously they have to be settled by the great powers, whom we all respect, hardly taking into consideration what the countries of Asia might feel about it. There has been a slight change, and the countries of Asia are sometimes asked about it, or, may be that they have been even allowed to sit in the corner of the council chamber. But the fundamental fact, this basic conception, still remains—that it is the duty, the responsibility and obligation of these great countries of the western world to carry the burden of the world, of Asia and Africa; like weary Titans they face all these problems and carry this burden of Asia when progressive Asia does not want them to carry that burden.

So, this kind of difficulty is there, and facts and events have gone on, bringing about enormous changes and yet, the mind of man cannot keep pace, and it keeps in

the old ruts. I am not blaming anybody outside, but we ourselves, all of us, are equally guilty of this. We go on using the same clichés, the same slogans which bear no meaning today; but we go on repeating them. Some of our friends opposite—Shri H. N. Mukherjee—cannot forget the Commonwealth and our being in the Commonwealth. He thinks probably that is the root of evil. Well, I have often spoken on this subject. We are in the Commonwealth, I think, because it is good for us and good for the causes which we wish to support and because it does not come in our way at all, in the policies that we pursue, and it is—and might be helpful. We are in the Commonwealth because we welcome every kind of association with other countries, provided it does not come in the way of our policies. We have other associations with other countries, in Asia and Europe, which are as close and sometimes closer than our association with the countries of the Commonwealth—our neighbouring countries of Burma, Indonesia or some European countries like Yugoslavia or others. We have very close relations with them in every way. They are not labelled by something. Remember this: every type of alliance, whatever it may be, is restrictive. It may be helpful, but it is restrictive. I welcome this type of Commonwealth connection, because it is not an alliance, because there is no restrictive feature in it, and because one can go one's way. I would like this type of association—not in the Commonwealth, I mean—but this type of free association to take place all over the world, in other countries. It is far better than that alliance type, and of course, it is infinitely better than the military alliance which is always, inevitably, a challenge to some other country and comes in the way of our friendship with other countries. Therefore, I would beg this House to consider that this has nothing to do with our liking a country or disliking it. In the Commonwealth there are some countries which are, or rather, with whom our relations are not very friendly at present. There is Pakistan. I want friendly relations with Pakistan and it is inevitable that sometime or the other, we have to have them.

Take another country which does not really concern us very much. There is South Africa. Our relations with South Africa are nil. It does not affect us. It does not affect our being in the Commonwealth or not being in it, except that in a temper one might do this or that. It is not a good thing for an individual, much less for a nation, to go about functioning in a temper.

Now, it may be perhaps thought—I am not quite sure—that it might be embarrassing for us to function with South Africa, to function in the United Nations and walk out of the United Nations, because South Africa is there or because Portugal is there. It may be embarrassing. On the other hand, it might also be that our being there might not be terribly welcomed by the other parties and they might find it very embarrassing in the pursuit of their policies. Any how, my submission is that any kind of contact that we have with another country, whatever that country, is a good thing provided it does not come in the way and restrict our progress in any direction in which we wish to go forward.

I think that the Commonwealth connection is definitely helpful in some wider causes we have at heart including the cause of peace. Tomorrow, six months later or

nine months later—I do not know—some other countries may come into the Commonwealth, some African countries like Gold Coast, and Nigeria a little later. It will be an occasion of some historical significance, I think, when a purely African country like Gold Coast attains independence and functions with equality among other independent and relatively important countries. We want to encourage that tendency. May be that our presence there does encourage it, the various developments in Africa. It is true—and hon. Members have reminded me— why this is happening in the Commonwealth or in Africa or somewhere else. They ask, “What are you going to do about it”? Obviously we cannot do much or perhaps anything at all in regard to many things. It does not do good for a Government or as an individual for me to go about denouncing all the things that we dislike. Then all my life would be spent in denouncing things that I dislike! So there are so many things that one does not like to say or do in this world. One has to put up with them till the time comes when you can say or do things which can be useful. Therefore, I submit that at any time it would be bad for us to follow a policy of just hitting out verbally or otherwise, more especially in the present day. With all these new forces at work, new ideas new powers, it has become necessary to seek as many friendly contacts as possible to spread the area of friendship and to lessen the area of conflict. Our policy is directed to that end. Naturally in regard to those problems that we have, our own problems, we have to deal with them to the best of our ability. Naturally also, it is not possible always to fit in practice with theory. Sometimes one has to adapt these things in the best possible way, in the best way open to one, but the theory, the objective and the method should always be kept clearly in mind and one should not just allow the theory to be kept as something to be used, let us say, for public purposes, to delude people and go in the opposite direction.

Now, that are our immediate problems? I was talking about the international problems and I mentioned Western Asia, Israel, Egypt and disarmament, the Baghdad Pact. There is, of course, SEATO. And then there is the question of China and Indo-China, and the most important world problem of all, the economic growth of the parts of the world that are under-developed. It is of vital importance.

Just a word about the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. I spoke about it the other day. It is clear that if the analysis that I have ventured to place before the House is at all correct, then any approach by military pacts, any approach like that of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO is a wrong approach, is a dangerous approach, is a harmful approach. It creates, it sets in motion all the wrong tendencies and prevents the right tendencies from developing. I may be wrong in my premises, but if my premises are correct, it inevitably follows that this is so, and it is a matter of little consequence to me whether you suspect any country of dishonesty or lack of *bonafides*. You may consider its policy to be hypocritical. You should take every factor into consideration. But if you adopt the right policy, having regard to certain world factors, the question of a particular country functioning not with complete honesty does not make too much difference. The point is you should be honest in your policy, and if you are honest and straightforward, you may be tripped, of course, you may make a mistake, but

fundamentally you will not fall into error. SEATO and Baghdad Pacts, apart from their being, I think, basically in the wrong direction affect us intimately and in a sense tend to encircle us from two or three directions. And also, as the House knows, certainly the Baghdad Pact has, in fact, created in Western Asia far greater tension and conflict than ever before. It has certainly put one country against another country, the countries that were friendly to each other. Now, how anyone can say that this has brought security and stability to Western Asia I do not know.

Hon. Members know, talking about the Baghdad Pact, or for the matter of that SEATO too, that it is said to be the Northern or middle tier of defence, and presumably it is meant for defence against aggression if it takes place from the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee which country will commit aggression, which will not. Every great country and every powerful country tends to expand and tends to be somewhat aggressive. It is very, very difficult for a giant not to function sometimes as a giant. One can guard oneself as much as possible. One can create an atmosphere so that the giant will function mildly or not aggressively and all that, but it is inherent in a giant's strength that he should somehow try to use that strength if he does not like something, whichever giant of the world you might apply that to in whatever way. But, surely nobody here imagines that, let us say, the Pakistan Government entered this Pact because they expected some imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union. It is obviously not so. And if we read the Pakistan newspapers or read the statements made by responsible people in Pakistan, they make it perfectly clear they have done so because of India, because either—if you like, you may put it this way—they are rather apprehensive of India, or because they want to develop strength and, as the phrase now goes speak with strength; Whatever it is, they have joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO essentially because of their hostility to India. I am sorry because I do not feel hostility towards them and I cannot conceive of a war with Pakistan without the utmost dismay, but there it is. My point is that people enter into these pacts, countries enter into them, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, and I can mention others too in various parts of the world, with different motives. I am quite sure that the other members of the Baghdad Pact have no hostility to India. Obviously they have not entered into the Baghdad Pact because of their feeling against India, as I am equally sure that India was the motive thought of Pakistan when it entered this Pact— India as well as perhaps some others— so that these different motives come in. I am prepared to accept completely the assurance given to me by the leaders of the United States of America. I am quite sure they did not mean ill. They did not think even probably of India in this connection. Their minds were elsewhere, on the northern, western and middle tiers of defence. But the effect is the same, and the effect is you get tied up, you get interlocked. Countries get interlocked with each other, each pulling in different directions and in a crisis you are pulled away in a direction you never thought of going.

Look at the series of alliances and military pacts in this whole region of South-East and Eastern Asia. It is almost as bad. I must say as these big, international trusts and combines. We do not quite know who is pulling where. Things are happening but

nobody appears to be responsible. The danger of it, apart from the essential danger of any pact, is any odd member of one of these pacts can set in motion something which would gradually pull in not only the members of that pact, but some other interrelated pact of which they are common members, and so the whole thing goes into a turmoil. So, naturally both for larger reasons and for narrow reasons of self interest, we took exception, and we do take exception to the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. We think—I may repeat—that they push the world in a wrong direction. They do not recognise that new factors are working. Instead of taking advantage of these new factors which go towards disarmament and lessening of tension and towards peace, they deliberately check them and encourage the other factors which increase hatred and fear and apprehension and come in the way of disarmament. I do not understand how any person can equate military pacts and alliances with the approach to disarmament.

Now, if I may say so, there are two types of alliances and treaties. Personally I would rather have none of them, of any type, but I can understand an alliance or some kind of a treaty between countries which have been or are opposed to each other. Broadly speaking, this type of agreement is referred to often as the Locarno agreement, because at Locarno, in the late twenties, the victorious Allies, England, France, America etc., came to terms with their old enemy Germany, enemy of the First World War. Now, there was some meaning in that, because that meant the coming together of those who had been hostile, and therefore it released tension. I happened to be at the time in Geneva I think it was in 1926, when Germany was welcomed for the first time into the League of Nations. The future, of course, was hidden, the Second World War and all that. Anyhow, there was the Locarno treaty, and Germany came in. There was much embracing between the German delegates and the French delegates on that occasion in the League of Nations hall.

I say that that type of agreement has some meaning. It takes you somewhere, and mind you, it gives you an assurance, it gives each country an assurance that if any member of that group breaks the law or breaks the treaty, the others would come down upon it. That is an equal assurance to every member. But in regard to the other type of treaty, that is, if a group of allies representing one side binds itself together against the other, then obviously the first effect of it is to create a reaction, which leads the other group of allies to bind itself together in another hostile group. So, it leads to hostile groups. It does not bring us peace or security at all. It is not for me to say whether it is not justified; it may be justified in some cases in self protection, but normally speaking, it seems to me that it will lead us away from the creation of that feeling of security etc.

There is one larger thing which I should like to refer to, namely, this question of the economic growth of the underdeveloped parts of the world, which is intimately connected with political conditions, intimately connected with the question of giving aid or not, political pressures exercised, military pressures exercised, and which has almost been considered not purely from the economic angle but from the political angle also.

It is obvious that if this imbalance continues between the very rich countries and the poor, apart from being a source of misery and unhappiness, it will be continuously a source of trouble and conflict, and might lead to conflicts, so that it has to be remedied even from the point of view of the richer countries. Now, there is nothing wrong about the richer countries, from their own point of view or from any other, helping to remove it, giving aid to the development of those countries. But it may be that some element of wrong comes in the manner of doing it; it produces wrong results.

In this connection, I should like to refer to a proposal with which India has been associated for some time, a proposal before the United Nations; and it is still being discussed; in fact, I think, in about six weeks' time there is a meeting in New York to discuss it further. This is known in the modern way of capital letters as SUNFED, SUNFED meaning Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. You will notice perhaps that the word 'Special' was put in there; if 'S' was not there, then it became 'UNFED', which was very unfortunate. So, 'S' was put in to avoid this.

In the last three or four years, our representatives in the United Nations have been persuading us, the idea being that help to the more undeveloped nations should come through international agencies, and not so much by bilateral arrangements which tend to have political consequences. We have met with enormous difficulties. The great Powers; whoever they might be, do not like this way of doing things. They like to distribute largess to the poor and needy, and have not only the mental satisfaction of having done good but also that of knowing that the other knows that they have done good to it, and may be, getting something in exchange.

We have arrived at a stage now; even now, it has not been decided, but at last we have arrived at a stage where various countries, all the other countries, have been asked to give their reactions to this proposal and these reports are going to be considered in about six weeks' time in New York.

I mention this because I attach a good deal of importance to this proposal for SUNFED, because it will bring about gradually and completely, I hope, a different relationship between the giver and the taker, which will be advantageous to both, certainly to the taker, but also to the giver, because then it is done impersonally through international organisations, and there is not this giving of largess by one country to another, and sometimes with political strings attached.

Coming to our own major problems I am not referring to the world problems now of course, there are problems with Pakistan Kashmir, this tremendous exodus which is coming from East Bengal etc. There are the two other old problems, the canal waters and evacuees. There is this question of border troubles. Then, apart from this, there are the other problems. There is the problem of South Africa, of course; it is always there, the problem of people of Indian descent in South Africa. There is the question of Goa. There is the question of Ceylon. I am not going into these in any detail; hon. Members know them pretty well.

I wish to say something about some issues with Pakistan.

We are also entangled it is not our problem, but we are entangled in the Indo-China problems, because of our cochairmanship of the international commission there. More specially, difficulties have arisen in South Vietnam, because the present Government in South Viet Nam refuse to recognise, refuse to accept their responsibilities flowing from the Geneva agreement on the ground that they did not sign the agreement. True, they did not sign it, but they are a successor government to the French, and the French signed it. They have accepted all the advantages of that agreement, and they still continue to enjoy the advantages of that agreement, but till now, they have not accepted the obligations. Well, that puts us in a very difficult position, because we are in Indo-China or in Viet Nam because of the Geneva agreement. If the Geneva agreement is not accepted, then we have no place there, and we have simply to pack up and come back. It is an easy thing for us to pack up and come back, but we know that if the international commission is ended, it is likely to lead to trouble; the conflict will again be there. And we do not wish nor does anybody else wish that we should walk out in this way. Even the South Vietnam Government are very anxious that we should remain there, and yet thus far they have not made it very easy for us to remain, because of their non-recognition of their obligations. Naturally, I spoke about this matter at some length to the three distinguished statesmen who came here, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who with Mr. Molotov is co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Pineau. Of course I do not know how things will develop. But there have been some hopeful signs recently that the South Vietnam Government might accept the obligations flowing from the Geneva Agreement and thus make it easier for us to function.

Meanwhile, another difficulty has arisen, which has nothing to do with that, which is not directly our concern. Cambodia, which has practically gone out of the ken of the International Commission not entirely but practically ; there are only some minor matters to be dealt with has been asserting with some force that it will not adhere to any power bloc, and it wants friendly relations with other countries. Perhaps, as a result of this, it is not in too happy a position with some of its neighbours, South Vietnam on the one side and Thailand on the other. Whatever the reason may be, there is a kind of closure of the borders there, and partly some kind of economic blockade.

I should come now to some of our problems with Pakistan. The facts are well known I am referring for the moment to this exodus. I really do not know what I could say at this stage profitably to the House. My colleagues, the Minister of Law and Minority Affairs and the Minister of Rehabilitation, have stated the facts before this House in some detail. It is clear that this continuing major migration is something of tremendous significance. Apart from the great burden on us, it is a matter of tremendous significance, and in the ultimate analysis, it is not merely a matter of casting a huge burden on us but, I believe, of harming Pakistan greatly too. Do not imagine that this kind of migration is ultimately good for the country from which it comes. I have no doubt that the past migration from East Bengal has hit East Pakistan hard. The quality of it has gone down. Naturally, when trained people, skilled people,

go out, the quality suffers. It is not numbers that count; it is quality that matters. And a good deal of quality has come out of East Pakistan.

If you go back to history, you will see that one of the reasons of the advance of England towards industrialisation was the fact that religious wars drove out very prosperous weavers from France and that part of Europe to England, and those people then became the persons through whom gradually industrialisation, inventions and the like developed. So it is a very very shortsighted policy for those in Pakistan to imagine that seizing hold of this house, this property and this job here and there and driving out people who have played an important part in the economic life of the country I am leaving out the political aspect would be good for them.

I think it was Shri Gadgil who made a suggestion it has been made before about asking them for land. You may, of course, ask but one doesn't ask for things which patently are going to be refused and for which one has no means of getting by other ways. Ultimately, no country gives up land. Why should they? If they are prepared to give up land, they could very well settle the people on that land. It is not that. It is a question of dealing with this matter in other ways, so far as one can.

Undoubtedly, a situation has arisen, I believe, when the leaders of Pakistan themselves realise the extreme gravity of what was an absolutely complete and total denial of what we said. Having done that, they brought in all kinds of other issues; they talked about genocide, not in Kashmir but in Delhi, Punjab and all over; they talked about Junagadh and some other States in Kathiawar.

In fact, the greater part of the memoranda was dealing not with the Kashmir issue, which they slurred over and about which they said they had nothing to do with, but with other matters. It will be interesting for the House to remember that they said to the Security Council, "You must consider and decide all these questions genocide, Junagadh, etc., and they must be decided together with Kashmir simultaneously. I am repeating all this to show the mental attitude of Pakistan, first the complete denial of everything, and only a little later they had to admit these things which they had denied, and then trying to divert the mind of the Security Council to complete the other problems which we have not mentioned and which did not arise in that connection. I must confess that I was very much taken aback by this tissue of lies that have been put forward by the Pakistan representative before the Security Council. Naturally, we tried to answer that in terms of fact; we produced pictures and what, not. It is interesting for this House to know that lately, in the last year or so, there have been quite a number of statements from prominent people in Pakistan, in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, giving details of how they organised this raid from Pakistan, not only details but demands made by one party in the North West Frontier Province on the other for the amount spent in organising it and trying to recover it. Also, only recently, there was a statement by one of the leading officers of a case admitting it. I am merely pointing out how Pakistan was basing its case in the Security Council; it is something which can only be described as completely false and they had to admit it as false later. When the U. N. Commission came here, then it became quite impossible for Pakistan to say that their forces were not there because

the U.N. Commission would see them there. It was then that they admitted that their forces were there. They said it subsequently, not originally. They might have mentioned it in the U.N. debate which was taking place only a little before; they did not do so. It was, only under compulsion, when they were going to be found out completely, that they admitted it. In the U.N. Resolution, I think, on the 13th August 1948, it was stated—

“The Commission recognise that as the presence of troops in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation, since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State.”

This was the Commission’s recommendation. Please observe the language ; it is mildly put. “As the presence of troops in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State”—it is a mild way or saying that they had told a lie in the Security Council there and they found the troops here—a material change in the situation as it was represented. Privately the Commission people told us that of course all this was falsely stated, it was complete aggression, but they added, “We have come here to settle the matter peacefully and if we go about publicly condemning everybody, it will become difficult to settle it”. So, they tried to avoid giving expression clearly on their decision on aggression, which they admitted and which, in fact, indirectly they stated too.

The point now to remember is that because of this admission of aggression, the first thing they required was for Pakistan to withdraw its armed forces from the area of the State occupied by it. That was the first thing. There was a great deal of talk about plebiscite and a good deal of talk as to what India should and should not do. But throughout this period, the first demand of the United Nations has been in every respect the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from that area occupied by them. Other factors came later. We were asked later to withdraw the bulk of our forces, that is, on Pakistan withdrawing from that area, we were asked, to relieve tension, to withdraw the bulk of our forces, but retain our army in the State in order to give it protection. The right of our army to be there was recognised, but it was stated that since Pakistan is withdrawing completely from Jammu and Kashmir State, India also can reduce her forces as that would tend to bring about a better atmosphere. It is agreed, but the point I wish the House to remember is that the first essential should be the withdrawal of Pakistan armed forces from that area of the State which they had occupied. Today, 8½ years after that, those armed forces are still there. All this talk of plebiscite and other things is completely beside the point. In fact, those questions only arose when Pakistan had taken a certain step, that is, withdrawal of armed forces. And Pakistan is out of court till it performed its primary duty by getting out of that part of the Jammu State on which it committed aggression. This is a major fact to be remembered. Many attempts were made during these years—discussions etc.—to deal with the conditions laid down in the U.N. Resolution; I am not going into all that detail. I have

mentioned one essential thing. There were many other conditions—prerequisites—to plebiscite. Well, many attempts were made. They did not yield results. I am not going into detail as to whose fault it was. The fact is that they did not yield results. It has been found that the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State could not remain continually in a state of suspended animation in regard to Kashmir; something has to be done. Years have passed and then certain steps were taken by the Jammu and Kashmir Government with the concurrence of the Government of India, to elect, to convene a Constituent Assembly. That was done. We stated even then that actually the Constituent Assembly was free to decide any constitution it liked but we made it clear that we continued to be bound by our international commitments.

More years passed and while on the one hand Pakistan continued to occupy a part of the State on which they had committed aggression, the Constituent Assembly proceeded to draw up the Constitution of the State and passed very important measures of land reforms; great development works were undertaken and the people of the State, except those under the forcible occupation of Pakistan, made progress. Jammu and Kashmir experienced more prosperity under their own Government than they had at any time previously in living memory or before. A very simple test of this is the number of visitors who had gone to Kashmir last year. An unprecedented number of 50,000 went there; at no time, even during the war, had such members gone there.

Eight or nine years have passed and these major changes took place and the Kashmir people were settled. I cannot speak with authority about the other side and the changes that have taken place there. The Governor-General of Pakistan—I mean, now the President—and others repeatedly talk about the abject slavery of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State under their present regime. I really do not know why they should talk in this irresponsible manner. Jammu and Kashmir State is not a closed book on the subject. 50,000 tourists went there and if there is one thing which is very established, it is this that the State has never been so prosperous before.

It is not for me to say what the state of people on the other side of the ceasefire line is. But I notice that there is a continuous attempt by people on that side to come over to this side to share in the prosperity.

Well, all this was happening and we were discussing various ways with the Prime Minister of Pakistan and a new development took place. This was the promise of military aid from the USA to Pakistan—a promise which was subsequently fulfilled. This created not only a new military situation but a new political situation; and the procedure thus far followed by us became out of date and had to be viewed a fresh. That situation has become progressively worse because of the flow of this military aid to Pakistan and the conclusion of SEATO and the Baghdad Pacts. In our discussing or considering this question of Kashmir with Pakistan representatives and others, apart from legal and constitutional issues, we have this practical aspect of it in mind; that is, we wanted to promote the happiness and freedom of the people of Kashmir and we wanted to avoid any step being taken which would be disruptive, which would upset

things which had settled down and which might lead to migration of people this way or that way and which further, if that happened, would again lead to conflict with Pakistan which we wanted to avoid; because, while we were desirous of settling this Kashmir problem with Pakistan, there was no settlement of the Kashmir problem if that itself—the manner of settling itself—would lead to conflict with Pakistan. So, this is an important consideration; because, as things settle down, any step which might have been logical some years back becomes more and more difficult; it means uprooting of things that have become fixed—legally, constitutionally and practically.

We pointed this out last time when the Prime Minister of Pakistan came here. I pointed this out: "You can talk to me; you have talked for the last five or six years about these preconditions laid down previously in the UN Resolution. We have not come to an agreement. The departure of the Pakistan armed forces itself has not taken place. I am prepared to talk to you, if you like, on the subject but it is not very likely that, when we have failed for the last five or six years, we are likely to come to a rapid agreement, more especially when new factors have come". They came in a little later—these factors, military aid, etc., which have changed the situation completely and all our previous discussions had to be abandoned because the basis of discussion has changed—the military aspect, apart from the political aspect. I said: 'You must recognise facts as they are. It is no good proceeding on the basis of old things ignoring the existing facts'.

Meanwhile, another thing was happening. Constitutional developments have taken place both in our Constitution and that of the Jammu and Kashmir State. As perhaps hon. Members will remember; we have in our Constitution laid down that we could not agree to any change in regard to the Jammu and Kashmir State without the concurrence of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly. That is the constitutional position. I pointed this out to the distinguished representatives from Pakistan who came here.

I will mention it; it is not directly concerned with us but it did somewhat concern the people of Kashmir indirectly. It was a development in West Pakistan—that is, the creation of one unit in West Pakistan. Now, as a consequence of all these factors, I have made it quite clear to the Pakistan representatives that while I am prepared to discuss any aspect of this question, if they want to be realistic, they must accept the changes and they must take into consideration all that had happened during these seven or eight years and not talk in terms of eight or nine years ago. Well, they did not quite accept that position and there the matter ended.

Now, the only alternative, I said, was a continuing deadlock in our talks. I had offered sometime back a nowar declaration to the Pakistan Government: that, under no circumstances, would India and Pakistan go to war for the settlement of any dispute. There was considerable correspondence. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, who was then the Prime Minister, did not agree to that because he said: 'Before you make that declaration, you must settle the questions at issue or you must agree to their being settled—inevitably settled or automatically settled, rather—by some process like arbitration, etc.'. I pointed out to him that I would very gladly settle these questions

but they had already made various attempts and they could not succeed. I thought that by a nowar declaration a new atmosphere would be created which would help us in settling them. I said, let us consider advance in both lines. Further I said, when you talk to me to bind myself down to a strict schedule the question of dispute arises. When a dispute arises it is referred for conciliation for one month, may be two months, one month more for mediation, or two months and then arbitration. Within 4 or 5 months it is over. I said, I am not aware of any country having committed itself to arbitration about any problem, political or other, that might be raised in the future. I said I am not aware of this because when we fix our sovereignty it fixes matters of high State policies which can only be considered by the countries concerned. There are many other questions which can be settled otherwise. So, to ask us to commit ourselves in the future in this way was not a wise or feasible approach. There the matter ended.

Now, the present Prime Minister of Pakistan has again mentioned this matter and I gladly welcome his proposal. But it is clear that we must not tie us in a nowar declaration with all kinds of conditions etc. Then you get the same vicious circle, you must settle first and then make a nowar declaration, if you settle everything then it is not necessary to have a nowar declaration and this business of trying to commit us to arbitration.

I want to be quite frank with this House and with the Pakistan Government. Having had 9 years of this Kashmir affairs in changing phases and this problem affecting certainly the people of Jammu and Kashmir State, affecting India in a variety of ways, affecting our Constitution and our sovereignty, affecting our vital interests, am I to be expected to agree to some outside authority becoming an arbitrator in this matter?

I cannot understand. No country can agree to this kind of disposal of vital issues. But I do think that since we both agreed,—both Pakistan authorities and we,—that on no account should we go to war at each other, that we should settle our problems peacefully, they may not be settled for some time. It is better to have a problem pending than to go to war for it. Therefore, it would be a very desirable thing, a helpful thing, to have a no-war declaration.

One thing more. The Pakistan President said with great force that in all these border incidents, in every one of them, India was guilty. Well, any number of incidents have occurred. I cannot discuss each one of them, and it may be that even if I have one case they may have another in regard to it. But at least in regard to 10 incidents on the Jammu border the United Nations Observers stated that Pakistan was the aggressor. So I take their word for it. But again I would repeat what I said here in my statement the other day, about the Nekewal incident. The Nekewal incident stands out in a stark manner not because 12 persons were killed—that is bad enough—but in the way it has been dealt with by the Pakistan Government. Now, the present President of the Pakistan Republic was in Delhi when we received the report of the U.N. Observers in regard to this incident. It was handed over to him and to the then Prime Minister. They assured us, and in fact the Prime Minister stated in public, that they would deal

with and punish those who were found guilty by the U.N. Observers. This is not our opinion which might be challenged by Pakistan. This was the opinion of the U.N. Observers after an enquiry. Anyhow, they had themselves said that they would carry out the job and punish the guilty. I am astonished that an year or more has passed and nothing has been done. I am still further astonished that statements should be made that we are the aggressors in all these incidents.

I am afraid I have taken a great deal of the time of the House, but I did wish to refer to the Kashmir matter in some details and to bring out some basic facts. I hope that the Pakistan Government and the people will consider these basic facts and realise that we mean no ill to them—to Pakistan. It will be absurd for us to mean any ill to them because our prosperity is connected with their prosperity. We want to be friends with them. We want to settle all our problems in a friendly way and I am sure we can settle them if our approach is a friend's approach.

BACK NOTE

XLVI. Demands for Grants, 29 March 1956

NIL

STATEMENT ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF GOVERNMENT

30 April, 1956

Sir, I beg leave to place before the House a Resolution of the Government of India in regard to industrial policy. I understand that copies of this Resolution will be available to the Members of the House through the Lok Sabha Secretariat.

The Government of India set out in their resolution dated the 6th April 1948, the policy which they proposed to pursue in the industrial field. The Resolution emphasized the importance to the economy of securing a continuous increase in production and its equitable distribution, and pointed out that the State must play a progressively active role in the development of industries. It laid down that besides arms and ammunition, atomic energy and railway transport, which would be the monopoly of the Central Government, the State would be exclusively responsible for the establishment of new undertakings in six basic industries - except where, in the national interest, the State itself found it necessary to secure the cooperation of private enterprise. The rest of the industrial field was left open to private enterprise though it was made clear that the State would also progressively participate in this field.

2. Eight years have passed since this declaration on industrial policy. These eight years have witnessed many important changes and developments in India. The Constitution of India has been enacted, guaranteeing certain Fundamental Rights and enunciating Directive Principles of State Policy. Planning has proceeded on an organized basis, and the first Five Year Plan has recently been completed. Parliament has accepted the socialist pattern of society as the objective of social and economic policy. These important developments necessitate a fresh statement of industrial policy, more particularly as the Second Five Year Plan will soon be placed before the country. This policy must be governed by the principles laid down in the Constitution, the objective of socialism, and the experience gained during these years.

3. The Constitution of India, in its preamble has declared that it aims at securing for all its citizens -

“JUSTICE, Social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation.”

In its Directive Principles of State Policy, it is stated that—

“The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice-social, economic and political - shall inform all the institutions of the national life”.

Further that -

“The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing —

- (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;
- (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common goal;
- (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;
- (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;
- (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength;
- (f) that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.”

4. These basic and general principles were given a more precise direction when Parliament accepted in December 1954, the socialist pattern of society as the objective of social and economic policy. Industrial policy, as other policies, must therefore, be governed by these principles and directions.

5. In order to realise this objective, it is essential to accelerate the rate of economic growth and to speed up industrialization and, in particular, to develop heavy industries and machine making industries, to expand the public sector, and to build up a large and growing cooperative sector. These provide the economic foundations for increasing opportunities for gainful employment and improving living standards and working conditions for the mass of the people. Equally, it is urgent, to reduce disparities in income and wealth which exist today, to prevent private monopolies and the concentration of economic power in different fields in the hands of small numbers of individuals. Accordingly, the State will progressively assume a predominant and direct responsibility for setting up new industrial undertakings and for developing transport facilities. It will also undertake State trading on an increasing scale. At the same time, as an agency for planned national development, in the context of the country's expanding economy, the private sector will have the opportunity to develop and expand. The principle of cooperation should be applied wherever possible and a steadily increasing proportion of the activities of the private sector developed along cooperative lines.

6. The adoption of the socialist pattern of society as the national objective, as well as the need for planned and rapid development, require that all industries of basic and strategic importance, or in the nature of public utility services, should be in the

public sector. Other industries which are essential and require investment on a scale which only the State, in present circumstances, could provide, have also to be in the public sector. The State has therefore to assume direct responsibility for the future development of industries over a wider area. Nevertheless, there are limiting factors which make it necessary at this stage for the State to define the field in which it will undertake sole responsibility for further development, and to make a selection of industries in the development of which it will play a dominant role. After considering all aspects of the problem, in consultation with the Planning Commission, the Government of India have decided to classify industries into three categories, having regard to the part which the State would play in each of them. These categories will inevitably overlap to some extent and too great a rigidity might defeat the purpose in view. But the basic principles and objectives have always to be kept in view and the general directions hereafter referred to followed. It should also be remembered that it is always open to the State to undertake any type of industrial production.

7. In the first category will be industries the future development of which will be the exclusive responsibility of the State. The second category will consist of industries, which will be progressively State-owned and in which the State will take the initiative in establishing new undertakings, but in which private enterprise will also be expected to supplement the effort of the State. The third category will include all the remaining industries, and their future development will, in general, be left to the initiative and enterprise of the private sector.

8. Industries in the first category have been listed in Schedule A of this Resolution. All new units in these industries, save where their establishment in the private sector has already been approved will be set up only by the State. This does not preclude the expansion of the existing privately owned units, or the possibility of the State securing the cooperation of private enterprise in the establishment of new units when the national interests so require, Railways and air transport, arms and ammunition and atomic energy will, however, be developed as Central Government monopolies. Whenever cooperation with private enterprise is necessary, the State will ensure, either through majority participation in the capital or otherwise, that it has the requisite powers to guide the policy and control the operations of the undertakings.

9. Industries in the second category will be those listed in Schedule B. With a view to accelerating their future development, the State will increasingly establish new undertakings in these industries. At the same time private enterprise will also have the opportunity to develop in this field, either on its own or with State participation.

10. All the remaining industries will fall in the third category, and it is expected that their development will be undertaken ordinarily through the initiative and enterprise of the private sector, though it will be open to the State to start any industry even in this category. It will be the policy of the State to facilitate and encourage the development of these industries in the private sector, in accordance with the programmes formulated in successive Five Year Plans, by ensuring the development of transport, power and other services, and by appropriate fiscal and

other measures. The State will continue to foster institutions to provide financial aid to these industries, and special assistance will be given to enterprises organized on cooperative lines for industrial and agricultural purposes. In suitable cases, the State may also grant financial assistance to the private sector. Such assistance, especially when the amount involved is substantial, will preferably be in the form of participation in equity capital, though it may also be in part in the form of debenture capital.

11. Industrial undertakings in the private sector have necessarily to fit into the framework of the social and economic policy of the State and will be subject to control and regulation in terms of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and other relevant legislation. The Government of India, however, recognize that it would, in general, be desirable to allow such undertakings to develop with as much freedom as possible, consistent with the targets and objectives of the national plan. When there exist in the same industry both privately and publicly owned units, it would continue to be the policy of the State to give fair and non-discriminatory treatment to both of them.

12. The division of industries into separate categories does not imply that they are being placed in water-tight compartments. Inevitably, there will not only be an area of overlapping but also a great deal of dovetailing between industries in the private and the public sectors. It will be open to the State to start any industry not included in Schedule A and Schedule B when the needs of planning so require or there are other important reasons for it. In appropriate cases, privately owned units may be permitted to produce an item falling within Schedule A for meeting their own requirements or as by-products. There will be ordinarily no bar to small privately owned units undertaking production, such as the making of launches and other light-craft, generation of power for local needs and small scale mining. Further, heavy industries in the public sector may obtain some of their requirements of lighter components from the private sector, while the private sector in turn would rely for many of its needs on the public sector. The same principle would apply with even greater force to the relationship between large scale and small scale industries.

13. The Government of India would, in this context, stress the role of cottage and village and small scale industries in the development of the national economy. In relation to some of the problems that need urgent solutions, they offer some distinct advantages. They provide immediate large scale employment; they offer a method of insuring a more equitable distribution of the national income and facilitate an effective mobilization of resources of capital and skill which might otherwise remain un-utilised. Some of the problems that un-planned urbanisation tends to create will be avoided by the establishment of small centres of industrial production all over the country.

14. The State has been following a policy of supporting cottage and village and small scale industries by restricting the volume of production in the large scale sector, by differential taxation, or by direct subsidies. While such measures will continue to be taken, whenever necessary, the aim of the State policy will be to ensure that the decentralised sector acquires sufficient vitality to be self-supporting and its development

is integrated with that of large scale industry. The State will, therefore, concentrate on measures designed to improve the competitive strength of the small scale producer. For this it is essential that the technique of production should be constantly improved and modernised, the pace of transformation being regulated so as to avoid, as far as possible, technological unemployment. Lack of technical and financial assistance, of suitable working accommodation and inadequacy of facilities for repairs and maintenance are among the serious handicaps of small scale producers. A start has been made with the establishment of industrial estates and rural community workshops to make good these deficiencies. The extension of rural electrification and the availability of power at prices which the workers can afford will also be of considerable help. Many of the activities relating to small scale production will be greatly helped by the organization of industrial cooperatives. Such cooperatives should be encouraged in every way and the State should give constant attention to the development of cottage and village and small scale industry.

15. In order that industrialisation may benefit the economy of the country as a whole, it is important that disparities in levels of development between different regions should be progressively reduced. The lack of industries in different parts of the country is very often determined by factors such as the availability the necessary raw materials or other natural resources. A concentration of industries in certain areas has also been due to the ready availability of power, water supply and transport facilities which have been developed there. It is one of the aims of national planning to ensure that these facilities are steadily made available to areas which are at present lagging behind industrially or where there is greater need for providing opportunities for employment, provided the location is otherwise suitable. Only by securing a balanced and coordinated development of the industrial and the agricultural economy in each region, can the entire country attain higher standards of living.

16. This programme of industrial development will make large demands on the country's resources of technical and managerial personnel. To meet these rapidly growing needs for the expansion of the public sector and for the development of village and small scale industries, proper managerial and technical cadres in the public services are being established. Steps are also being taken to meet shortages at supervisory levels, to organise apprenticeship schemes of training on a large scale both in public and in private enterprises, and to extend training facilities in business management in universities and other institutions.

17. It is necessary that proper amenities and incentives should be provided for all those engaged in industry. The living and working condition of workers should be improved and their standard of efficiency raised. The maintenance of industrial peace is one of the prime requisites of industrial progress. In a socialist democracy labour is a partner in the common task of development and should participate in it with enthusiasm. Some laws governing industrial relations have been enacted and a broad common approach has developed with the governing recognition of the obligations of both management and labour. There should be joint consultation and workers and

technicians should, wherever possible, be associated progressively in management. Enterprises in the public sector have to set an example in this respect.

18. With the growing participation of the State in industry and trade, the manner in which these activities should be conducted and managed assumes considerable importance. Speedy decisions and a willingness to assume responsibility are essential if these enterprises are to succeed. For this, wherever possible, there should be decentralisation of authority and their management should be along business lines. It is to be expected that public enterprises will augment the revenues of the State and provide resources for further development in fresh fields. But such enterprises may sometimes incur losses. Public enterprises have to be judged by their total results and in their working they should have the largest possible measure of freedom.

19. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 dealt with a number of other subjects which have since been covered by suitable legislation or by authoritative statements of policy. The division of responsibility between the Central Government and the State Governments in regard to industries has been set out in the (Development and Regulation) Act. The Prime Minister, in his statement in Parliament on the 6th April 1949, has enunciated the policy of the State in regard to foreign capital. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with these subjects in this resolution.

20. The Government of India trust that this restatement of their Industrial Policy will receive the support of all sections of the people and promote the rapid industrialisation of the country.

SCHEDULE A

1. Arms and ammunition and allied items of defence equipment.
2. Atomic energy.
3. Iron and steel.
4. Heavy castings and forgings of iron and steel.
5. Heavy plant and machinery required for iron and steel production, for mining, for machine tool manufacture and for such other basic industries as may be specified by the Central Government.
6. Heavy electrical plant including large hydraulic and steam turbines.
7. Coal and lignite.
8. Mineral oils.
9. Mining of iron ore, managanese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold and diamond.
10. Mining and processing of copper, lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum and wolf-ram:
11. Minerals specified in the Schedule to the Atomic Energy (Control of Production and Use) Order, 1953.

12. Aircraft.
13. Air transport.
14. Railway transport.
15. Shipbuilding.
16. Telephones and telephone cables, telegraph and wireless apparatus (excluding radio receiving sets).
17. Generation and distribution of electricity.

SCHEDULE B

1. All other minerals except "minor minerals" as defined in Section 3 of the Minerals Concession Rules, 1949.
2. Aluminium and other non-ferrous metals not included in Schedule 'A'.
3. Machine tools.
4. Ferro alloys and tool steels.
5. Basic and intermediate products required by chemical industries such as the manufacture of drugs, dyestuffs and plastics.
6. Antibiotics and other essential drugs.
7. Fertilizers.
8. Synthetic rubber.
9. Carbonisation of coal.
10. Chemical pulp.
11. Road transport.
12. Sea transport.

....XXX.... XXX.... XXX¹....

I have not read out the schedules, because we are distributing all these papers to every hon. Member, and he can consider it more carefully then.

....XXX.... XXX.... XXX²....

I have already stated that the resolution that I have just read out is immediately available to all Members of the House. As for the previous statements, there are two mentioned here, the industrial policy resolution of 1948 and the statement I made in April 1949 about foreign capital. I suppose the Lok Sabha Secretariat could make them available to Members.

BACK NOTE

XLVII. Statement on Industrial policy of Government, 30 April, 1956

1. SHRI SADHAN GUPTA (Calcutta South East): May I make a suggestion?
2. SHRI SADHAN GUPTA: Since we are shortly to have a debate on planning, and this policy statement is obviously going to loom large in the debate, and since it will also have to be considered in the light of the previous statement on industrial policy and the previous statement on foreign capital, may I suggest that all these statements may be circulated to us, because many of us were not here in 1948 or 1949, and we do not have the advantage of having these copies ready with us?

SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN

15 May, 1956

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I have the honour to present to Parliament and lay on the Table of the House a copy of the Report of the Planning Commission on Second Five Year Plan [Placed in Library See No. S-177/56]

This is rather a bulky volume. It is divided up into two parts, the second part dealing with details of the schemes and the first part dealing largely with broad approaches, policies and various other problems, industrial, agricultural, etc., that arise. A Draft Outline of this was circulated some time ago and after considering the criticisms that have been received, this is for the moment finalised. I believe now cyclostyled summaries of this will be placed in the hands of the Members and a full copy would also be available in the Notice Office. Printed copies of the summary will also be issued very soon. It is proposed to issue soon translations in the various Indian languages of the full book, it may take a little time as also summaries of it in the various languages.

A Hindi version of the Draft Outline is being circulated today. I regret it is slightly out of date - that is obvious. As it gives many of the facts contained in this and it is ready, we are circulating it. But, the other Hindi edition and others will be ready before very long. It is proposed also to issue pamphlets on individual aspects of the Plan, and separate sections will be printed separately for those who are interested in each part. It is proposed to issue soon a report on the development programme for 1956 and 1957 and a volume on the development schemes in the Second Five Year Plan. A new edition of the book called Building of New India is also being issued.

I understand that it has been decided by the Business Advisory Committee and approved by the House that four Committees should be formed of Members of the House to consider the subjects divided into four groups, and that these Committees are going to begin functioning from today. That is, I understand the Chairmen of these Committees are meeting today the Minister of Planning to decide on their procedure and course of action. I believe that the debate on this should begin on the 23rd of this month in this House.

Now, Sir, many Members present here may remember that it was almost exactly three and a half years ago that I presented to this House the Planning Commission's report on the First Five Year Plan. It was in effect presented after the First Five Year Plan had been functioning a year and a half. This time, we have improved somewhat on that and we are presenting this report only five weeks after the Plan started functioning from the 1st of April. Of course, this business of the Plan's functioning does not start on a particular date. Planning, and even more so, implementation of a Plan is a continuous process. It goes on; it does not stop on a particular date. But, for purposes of calculation, targets, financial arrangements, etc., we have to give this time table.

Hon. Members, in looking through this report, will see that stress has been laid on what I might call flexibility. That is, while the Plan is there for the House to consider, and when approved, for the country to act upon, it is not a rigid Five Year Plan. It is proposed to consider it from time to time and, in effect, to have annual plans varied here and there as experience dictates and as conditions necessitate. So that, while we have a Five Year Plan, it is going to be considered annually and where necessary revised. Also, although a Five Year Plan is in one sense rather a long period and we have to divide it up into annual plans, in another sense, it is too short a period for planning. We have to consider what is called perspective planning, that is consider a picture of 15 years or 20 years and keep that in view in drawing up these Five Year Plans, because many of the things that we undertake take several years. Apart from that, unless we have some kind of a picture of a social structure that we are aiming at, that we are going to, it will be difficult for each step to be conditioned, to be directed towards that end. We must have that picture. That picture, of course, need not be a rigid one or a kind of a steel frame. But, broadly speaking, it does become necessary for us to have this perspective planning.

I do not propose at this stage to take the time of the House; but I think that perhaps it may be helpful if I read some parts of the Introduction of this report. This gives briefly the stages through which it has passed and the general outlook that has governed that.

“The Plan was considered in draft by the National Development Council which passed the following Resolution on the 2nd May, 1956:

HAVING considered the Draft Second Five Year Plan,

THE National Development Council places on record its general approval and acceptance of the objectives, priorities and programmes embodied in the Plan; and

REPLYING on the enthusiasm and support of the people;

AFFIRMS the common determination of the Central Government and the Governments of all the States of the Union of India to carry out the Plan, and improve upon the targets set out in it; and

CALLS upon all the citizens of India to work wholeheartedly for the full and timely realisation of the tasks, targets and aims of the Second Five Year Plan.”

The beginning and the end of a Five Year Plan are vital dates in the nation's history. Each Five Year Plan is both an assessment of the past and a call for the future. It seeks to translate into practical action the aspirations and ideals of the millions in the country and gives to each of us the opportunity of service in the common cause of eliminating poverty and raising standards of living.

The First Five Year Plan ended in March, 1956. Its approach and outlook are part of our common thinking. It has laid the foundations for achieving the socialist pattern of society - a social and economic order based upon the values of freedom

and democracy, without caste, class and privilege, in which there will be a substantial rise in production and the employment and largest measure of social justice attainable.

Work on the Second Five Year Plan about two has been in progress for years. In April 1954, the Planning State Commission requested State Governments to arrange for the preparation of district and village plans, especially in relation to agricultural production, rural industries and co-operation. The preparation of such plans was undertaken as it was felt that in sectors which bear closely on the welfare of large numbers of people local planning is an essential means for securing the maximum public participation and voluntary effort. While plans for districts and villages and for national extension and community project areas have to be fitted within the framework of State plans which, in turn, take cognizance of plans prepared from the point of view of the economy of the country as a whole, the district is still the pivot of the whole structure of planning. At this point plans from different sectors come intimately into the life of the people.

The study of wider aspects of national planning also commenced during 1954. Towards the end of the year the assistance of the Indian Statistical Institute was obtained for the study of technical and statistical problems relating to national planning, and a number of working papers were prepared at the Institute. In March, 1955, the results of these and other studies were brought together in Professor P. C. Mahalanobi's 'Draft Recommendations for the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan' (referred to as the 'plan-frame') and in a 'Tentative Framework' for the Second Five Year Plan which was prepared by the Economic Divisions of the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission. These documents were considered in April 1955 by the Planning Commission's Panel of Economists, which drew up a 'Memorandum on Basic Considerations Relating to the Plan-Frame'. Members of the Panel also prepared a number of studies on individual aspects.

The 'plan-frame' and the other documents mentioned above were considered by the National Development Council early in May 1955. The National Development Council generally agreed with the basic approach of the draft 'plan-frame' and 'tentative framework' and with the policy considerations relating to it which were put forward in Memorandum of the Panel of Economists. The Council also agreed that the Second Five Year Plan should be drawn up so as to be capable of leading to an increase in national income of about 25 per cent over a period of five years and of providing employment opportunities to 10 to 12 million persons. Further, the Council directed that the Second Five Year Plan should be drawn up so as to give concrete expression to policy decisions relating to the socialist pattern of society.

Between July and December 1955, the Planning Commission held discussions with Central Ministries and with State Governments.

Then it goes on to say:

"During January 1956, a Draft Memorandum embodying the proposals which emerged from these discussions was considered by the National Development Council and the Consultative Committee of the Members of Parliament. In the

light of these discussions and other comments, a Draft Outline was published in February 1956 for general information and for eliciting comments and suggestions. Suggestions received on the Draft Outline were taken into consideration in the preparation of the Draft Second Five Year Plan.

In the course of the past year certain considerations have impressed themselves upon the minds of those concerned with the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan.

A Plan for a period of five years has to be viewed in the social and economic perspective of a longer period. It has to be worked in a flexible manner so that, through annual plans, adjustments are effected in the light of economic and financial trends, increase of production in agriculture and industry, and progress in different sectors of the Plan. Close coordination has to be arranged in related fields of industry, transport minerals and power, so that the expenditure incurred on each group of connected projects yields the maximum return. As the National Development Council recognised, to offset inflationary period pressure associated with a period of rapid development, it is imperative that the targets of agriculture production proposed in the Plan should be further improved upon. At each stage adequate supplies of food and cloth and of essential consumer goods will have to be provided at reasonable prices and a careful watch on the working of the national economy maintained.

Our Second Five Year Plan seeks to rebuild rural India, to lay the foundations of industrial progress, and to secure to the greatest extent feasible opportunities for weaker and under-privileged sections of our people and the balanced development of all parts of the country. For a country whose economic development was long retarded these are difficult tasks but, given the effort and the sacrifice, they are well within our capacity to achieve.

The Plan which is now presented to Government for submission to Parliament is a result of the labours of large number of persons in the Central Government, in the States at various levels and leaders of thought and opinion in every part of the country. In its preparation men and women in all walks of life have given generously of their time and experience. The enthusiasm and the widespread participation which have gone into the making of the Second Five Year Plan are the best augury for its fulfillment.”

BACK NOTE

XLVIII. Second Five Year Plan, 15 May, 1956

NIL

RESOLUTION REGARDING SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN

23 May, 1956

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, some days ago, I had the honour of presenting to the House the report of the Planning Commission on the Second Five Year Plan. I presume that many Members have read or at any rate partially read this, report since then.

I have now the honour to move the following Resolution:

“This House records its general approval of the principles, objectives and programmes of development contained in the Second Five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission.”

It has been agreed informally that this debate on this very important subject should continue in the next session, because we are anxious that the House should be given the fullest opportunity of expressing its views on this report on the Second Five Year Plan. It is also generally agreed that on this occasion, during the next two or three days, whatever the period might be, attention may be more specially paid to the general principles, to the approach, etc., as contained in the first eight chapters of this report. Therefore, this debate will not end during this session, but will probably continue at the beginning of the next session of the Lok Sabha.

Those hon. Members who have read this report will probably not find it very light reading. A report of this type can hardly be termed light reading although I believe there are many parts of it which are exciting reading. Few of us can say that we agree with every single word in this report, with every single proposal. A report of this type is the product of a great deal of labour of a great many persons, not only Members of the Planning Commission, but the vast number of other people who have been consulted, experts of our own country and from foreign countries, various groups, representatives of various interests and professions. In fact, it is the product of the joint labour and thinking of a very large number of people in this country. As with all joint products, there is an attempt to meet various view points. It may be that somebody may say this is not exactly what I thought about this matter. That is natural. Nevertheless, I would venture to say that this report represents a certain unity of approach. In any event, I hope that this House will view this, report as a whole and from the point of view of this unity of approach, objectives, methods and principles underlying it and not so much in regard to certain detailed programmes and the rest. It is open, of course, to any hon. Member to criticise or to make suggestions about any part of the report whether it relates to principles or to details. But I submit that the important thing is to get hold of the main principles. I propose, therefore, to deal with certain broad principles only.

What does this report mean? It may be light reading for some. It may be heavy reading for others. But, the subject which concerns this report is obviously not only of the highest importance but something that produces in me very great excitement.

It is an exciting subject because it deals with the future of 360 millions of people, and, to some extent, that future will affect the future of other countries and even of the rest of the world. Therefore, it becomes an enthralling and exciting subject. We read the history of India. We have a long history with many ups and downs. Now, we are concerned with the writing of our history. Now, we are concerned with the shaping of the future of India. Surely, there could be fewer more exciting subjects than this. It is, therefore, with a sense of the burden of history upon me, upon us, upon this House, that I face this problem. It is also with a great sense of humility, because, however great, however competent we may consider ourselves, we are small in relation to this mighty theme, that is, the building up of India, taking this country and its millions of people forward during the next five years.

Five years, I say. That five years is only some kind of a period that we fix for our convenience, because there are no periods in the march of a nation. It is a continuous march. We must really think in terms of even larger periods, one, two, three, four Five Year Plans. This is the second. Nobody thinks that at the end of the second Plan, we shall have been at the end of our journey. There is no end of a journey when a nation is marching. Nevertheless, leaving out the final ends, even such ends as we envisage, the objective that we have, the objective of a socialist pattern of society, we are not going to achieve at the end of the First Five Year Plan or the second. It may require three, four Five Year Plan periods before we can say with some confidence that we have very largely achieved it. Therefore, we must keep this larger perspective in view. In planning, especially, we are apt perhaps sometimes to forget the larger perspective and lose ourselves in details, lose ourselves in some particular aspect of it which is of importance and yet which may very well come in the way of the larger perspective that we have. The question arises—important question of regional development. Now, we are all agreed that there should be an even development all over India, even regional development. We are all agreed that the disparities, not only as between individuals in regard to income, but in regard to the various areas in India should be removed, that there should be equality of growth and opportunity all over India. That it true. But, If we start applying that principle regardless of the other objectives and perspective, you may spoil the whole Plan. We may not have very much to give to any region. Therefore, in looking at the Five Year Plan, we have to think really of several Five Year Plans. That is why it is becoming more and more important, in addition to the period we are dealing with, to have a longer perspective in view.

Now, this Five Year Plan necessarily deals with, broadly speaking, what might be called material objectives. They are very important, because, it is on the basis of certain material achievements that you build other achievements. It deals, to some extent, no doubt, with culture and like matters. Nevertheless, it confines itself chiefly to material advances. That does not mean that we in this House attach no importance to other aspects of human life. Indeed, all the material advances that we may achieve may perhaps be worth nothing at all and may avail us little if we forget the other aspects of human life, moral, spiritual and other aspects. I mention this merely because

we have always to keep that in view unless somebody should say, here is your Five Year Plan and you talk only about material advances and not about other matters. It is not because we do not attach value to these other matters, but because we have to deal with these in a certain compass. The others have to be kept in view. It is right at any time that we should keep in mind these moral and spiritual values. Perhaps it is even more appropriate on this occasion today when we are on the eve of the celebration of a very great anniversary of a very great man, a great son of India, that we should remember those moral and spiritual values, which ultimately give content to the life of an individual as to that of a nation.

Now, coming to this particular report, the first thing I should like this House to consider for a few seconds, and the report speaks perhaps a little about it is the present day world. We stand or we sit as the case may be, in this middle of the twentieth century, and this middle of the twentieth century has brought about tremendous changes all over the world. These changes are due to many factors. There have been wars, great wars, revolutions and the like. Anyhow, the world has greatly changed, and what is more important, is continually and greatly changing. The pace, the tempo of change is tremendous. Any such plan that we make like this Five Year Plan is subject always to the great changes, political, economic, technological and the like, that we are having.

I shall not refer to the political changes, but the principal thing, the most revolutionary thing, in the wide world, that we have seen is the technological change that has come about, and which has really in the last few generations changed the world. Now, everybody knows that. But there is one aspect of this vast technological change which perhaps is not always present to our minds.

All of us who think of these problems or any problems probably have some kind of ideology, some kind of philosophy of life. We may not be philosophers, but without some kind of philosophical or ideological approach we would have no yardstick to measure things by and yet, one aspect stares us, namely that the ideologies and the philosophies of life that we adhere to somehow do not fit in with this middle of the twentieth century, whatever they were. It may be, of course, that though facts change and circumstances become different, we still hold to the lines of thinking that we previously had, because the human mind is a singularly conservative thing, and it does not easily change. It is a remarkable thing that today when almost every single ideological approach which had a great deal of truth in it—and many of them—does not quite fit in with the present day, we ignore what is happening in the present day, and still hold on to some, if I may venture to say so, rather out-of-date philosophical or ideological approach. Take something; take the question of war. Many people say that because of various developments in the world, war has become, or ought to become out of the question, because war does not achieve the thing you aim at. War was useful—whether it is good or bad—if it helped you to realise your objective. When it does not do that, when in fact it does something that is the reverse of that, then no person, however inclined he might be, is likely to indulge in the war.

I should like to extend that parallel a little further. If a war, atomic or other, is now something that can only be considered excessively foolish, the cold war becomes more and more equally absurd; it exists; it goes on, but really, analysed in the circumstances of today, it has little meaning. It only makes matters worse; it does not help us to solve any problem.

If it did, I can understand it. And I am not talking in terms of the merit of this or that, the problem, but I am saying that a certain method of approach has become out of date, whether it is so called shooting or atomic war or the cold war.

I gave those examples in order to state the second fact that the other approaches—apart from war—the other economic approaches, even the other ideological approaches, which are very useful and which have a great deal of truth, just do not fit in today with circumstances as they are.

The major fact of the last many years or few years, and the major fact of today, is the stupendous advance of technology. Everything flows from it, whether it is in a sense the atomic bomb or the tremendous colossal growth in production and everything, which is greater than was envisaged by any person previously, and because it was not envisaged previously, it is wrong for us to ask somebody who had not envisaged it, to give us an answer to today's problems.

So, here is this patent fact of this tremendous growth of technology, the tremendous growth of the productive apparatus of society, the tremendous power that human beings possess and are likely to possess, atomic power, energy etc. These things are not quantitative changes, but they bring about qualitative changes in society. And the previous theories we had in regard to them, therefore, have to be considered from this qualitative changed point of view. I do not mean to say that we should upset everything that we thought previously, but that we have to shape it and vary it to fit in with these changes.

Of course, in India, where we have not been very powerfully affected by the technological process, but only slightly, we have read about it, and we have no real sensation of these tremendous technological revolution, it is a little more difficult for us to appreciate this great revolution. But it is the basic fact, and when we talk of planning, more so, when we talk of anything else, we have to think in technological terms, because it is this growth of science and technology that has enabled man to produce wealth which nobody could ever dream of. It is that which has made other countries wealthy and prosperous, and it is only through the growth of this technological process that we shall grow and become a prosperous and wealthy nation; there is no other way. Of course, there are many other things to be done too. But I want to lay stress on this. This is basic.

Now, if you look at the picture of India—and that would apply to many other countries under the colonial rule—ten years ago or twelve years ago, or leaving out the last few years, in the previous two decades, you will find a static, even a stagnant society. Yes, some big cities grew up, Calcutta, Bombay and other cities grew up. But taking the country as a whole, it was a static and stagnant society, where instead of making progress,

either we remained where we were or sometimes we even went backwards. Take even the small figures. In spite of this big war that happened, where moneys appeared to flow about a great deal, and some people no doubt made large sums of money, the fact is that even in the post war years, we saw that the general condition of the country had gone down slowly. It was stagnant. It did not profit by all that.

I should like to mention a few figures. Take, for instance, this postwar period. In 1948–49, the national income was Rs. 8,650 crores, and the per capita income Rs. 246.9. In the next year, the national income was Rs. 8,820 crores and the per capita income Rs. 248.6. In the next year, that is 1950, that is, just before the First Five Year Plan, the national income was Rs. 8,850 crores, and per capita income Rs. 240—that is it has even slightly come down from Rs. 248. You see the national income more or less the same, very slightly creeping up, and the per capita income remaining the same or going down. Meanwhile, of course, the population grows, and went on growing.

Now, this was the state of affairs for quite a lengthy period before the First Five Year Plan started functioning—for several decades. At the end of the First Five Year Plan we have—remember, at the beginning the figure of national income was Rs. 8,850 crores—a national income of Rs. 10,800 crores. Nothing very remarkable, but nevertheless significant. The per capita income has gone up from Rs. 246 to Rs. 281 at the end of the First Five Year Plan period.

As I said, there have been far greater increases in other countries; the pace of increase has been greater. Nevertheless, the First Five Year Plan made a significant change in that nature of our static and stagnant economy. It broke that barrier of poverty and of being underdeveloped, which curses a poor country, out of which it can hardly grow, because poverty breeds poverty; poverty does not lead to anything; it is a horrible thing. If we have to get out of that, we have to break that barrier which holds us down. The First Five Year Plan—I do not say it has broken down the entire barrier—made the first effective breach in that barrier in regard to national income and in regard to per capita income.

Now, in the Second Plan, we have to make a bigger breach. In other countries, it so happens, of course, that the old rule prevails, unto those that have got, more shall be given, and from those that have not got, perhaps even, what they have got might be taken away. So the poor countries remain poor and the rich countries become richer and richer and richer, more surpluses, more investment, more production. So it goes on. If you compare the rate of progress of some countries, it may be 6 per cent per annum, 5 per cent, 6 per cent, or even 10 per cent, or 11 per cent or more from reports that we see.

For us, now we have aimed at 5 per cent in this Plan, and 5 per cent. is going to be a hard job for us to achieve. We will have to work very hard, because we started at such a low level, with such low surpluses. India is almost at the lowest rung of the income ladder. Even China, I believe, is a little higher. Take even Russia at the time of the Revolution; it was much higher than India is today—leave out what the Revolution

has done to Russia. So we have to start with that main difficulty; we have to start at a low level.

Now, the First Five Year Plan has, I think, made a significant breach in this barrier which prevents a poor country from going ahead. I should just like to read to you something that is in the Report, how we envisage, how the Planning Commission thinks of, the future. Naturally, it is a guess work, an estimate; nevertheless, it is not purely guess work; it is based on such thinking and satisfies as we possess, I have just told you that at the end of the First Five Year Plan period, the national income is Rs. 10,800 crores. Now at the end of the Second Plan period, we expect it to reach Rs. 13,480 crores; so also the per capita income to go up from Rs. 281 to Rs. 331. For the Third Plan period, we envisage national income to go up to Rs. 17,260 crores and per capita income to Rs. 396. For the Fourth Plan—that will take us to 1971—the national income is expected to go up to Rs. 21,680 crores and per capita income, to Rs. 466. Finally, at the end of the Fifth Plan— up to 1976—the national income is expected to be Rs. 27,270 crores and per capita income Rs. 546. This is during the next 20 year period. This is some kind of a rough estimate of what we think the progress of India might be.

Now, as I said, this depends on so many factors that are more or less uncertain. This whole idea of the Planning Commission may be upset to our advantage by new developments in science and technology. The Planning Commission cannot tell us merely what scientific and technological developments will come about. Therefore, we may go faster ahead. On the other hand, if by some misfortune, we cannot, well, work as hard, as we hope the country will, we may not achieve our target.

Here I might say that we have often repeated that this Plan is a flexible Plan. What does that mean? It does not mean that it is just a vague Plan for us to change about and throw about, if we cannot achieve this, we put a lower target or extend the period by another year or two. It does not mean that. Naturally if by force majeure or something it becomes absolutely impossible for us to do something; there it is. But I do not mean by its being flexible that these targets that we have laid down are loose targets. We want to achieve them; we are going to try to achieve them, and sometimes we shall go ahead.

I may tell the House that even after the preparation of this Report there was a change. While it was being considered by the National Development Council, just previous to printing it, it refused to accept one of the main targets that we had laid down, something of vast importance to us, the target for production of foodgrains. The National Development Council refused to accept the target laid down. It thought it was too low a target. It directed that it must be raised, not raised by a little or double or treble. The figure that is given in the book, I believe, is 15 per cent additional food production for the next five years. The National Development Council, I am very glad to say, said that this was totally inadequate and we must try to achieve 40 per cent, or at least 35 to 40 per cent. It is a tremendous change from 15 to 40 per cent. Were we just engaged in wishful thinking or what? I do not think it is wishful thinking. I think it is

possible that we can reach 40 per cent, achieve nearly 40 per cent, increase, and if not 40 per cent, something like 35 per cent. Anyway, it is far more than 15 per cent.

So the House will see that even as the Report is prepared, and even as we here in Parliament are considering it, our minds go further. We think afresh, we think more and more, we want to vary it here and there, change it for the better, I hope, always. In that sense, it is flexible. We shall consider it every year, the targets etc., and if we think it right, vary them.

During the next session, I hope to present to this House a Report of the Annual Plan, because we are now going to have annual plans. I hope to place a Report of the Annual Plan of the first year of the Second Five Year Plan before this House probably during the next session. So every year, a Report of the Annual Plan will be placed here which may give a more precise indication of the targets for that year.

Now, we have said that our objective is a socialist pattern of society. I do not propose to define precisely what socialism in this context means, because they wish to avoid any doctrinaire thinking, any rigid thinking, because even in my life I have seen the world change so much, and I have seen so many other changes that I do not want to confine my mind to any rigid dogma. But broadly speaking, what do we mean when we say "socialist pattern of life"? Surely we mean a society in which there is social cohesion without classes, equality of opportunities and the possibilities for everyone to live a good life. Obviously this cannot be attained unless we produce the wherewithal to have these standards and lead that good life. So, we have to lay great stress on equality, on the removal of disparities, and it has to be remembered always that socialism is not the spreading out of poverty. The essential thing is that there must be wealth and production. There is a good deal of talk about ceilings, and it is a talk with which naturally one tends to agree because you want to remove disparities. But one has always to remember that the primary function of a growing society is to produce more wealth; otherwise it will grow, and you will have nothing to distribute. If in the process of your fixation of ceilings or in any other process or methods of producing some kind of equality which is so necessary and at which we are aiming you stop this process of growth and wealth accumulation, then you fail in your objective. Therefore, whether it is in industry or in agriculture, the one and the primary test is whether in your process you are going in for the wealth of the country, for increasing the production of the country or not. If not, you become stagnant in that field or your progress is much more limited, that is to say, that in order to reach equality, in order to reach, as I hope you will some time or other, an automatic ceiling . with everybody having equal opportunities, the road to it is not by some artificial fixation but by a hundred paths which gradually bring that about. Certainly the result will be the same, but an artificial attempt at it may prevent it from reaching it and meanwhile reduce the rate of your progress and your growth. Remember this that while we plan, while we work, we grow in population also. It is estimated—I believe I gave the House just now the estimated figure of our national income in the next 20 years—that in the next 20 years the population of India will be round about 500 millions. Please remember the rate of our population growth is not

very great; it is far smaller than in many countries in Europe and elsewhere. It is not that the rate is very big, but when a big population grows, naturally the result is that it becomes large, 70 millions more or some such thing. Therefore, always there is the question of population pressure, and all that you produce has to be produced not only for those who are today but for those who are added on to us by the millions. Therefore, the rate of our economic development will depend obviously on the growth of the population, the proportion of investment or the proportion of the current income of the country devoted to capital formation and the return by way of additional production from the undertaking. Obviously, the most important factor is the amount that you invest in relation to the national income. That percentage is always a small percentage in underdeveloped countries. It is a big percentage in a country which is fully industrialised and developed. Yet, we have to increase it, we have to look at this problem in a balanced way so that the development in the different fields keeps pace and does not become lopsided development. We have to keep these longrange perspectives in view.

It is obvious that one of the major problems we have to face is that of unemployment. It is a terrific problem, a human problem, which we cannot ignore whatever else we may do. Yet in looking at it, it has to be remembered that merely giving some kind of occupation to a large number of persons does not ultimately increase employment or lessen unemployment. We delude ourselves if we think so. Hon. Member of this House made a remark one day, not in the House, I believe, but outside, and said something like this: How would it be, to give employment to a large number of people, if the railways were abolished? Probably there will be some kind of handcarts, many people will be pushing the handcarts and some no doubt will be sitting in them? That is a completely wrong approach to this problem. Employment comes by newer and more effective means of wealth production, and you cannot get that. The whole experience and history of the past for the last 200 years shows that by the growth of technological methods. It is true that you cannot merely think of technological growth that just for the moment it leads to human misery. That is a different matter, provided for that. Do not imagine that minus technological progress, we are going to deal with the problem of unemployment. You cannot. Every country which boasts of full employment today is a country which is technologically advanced. Every country which is not technologically advanced has unemployment or under employment.

Therefore, if India is to advance, India must advance in science and technology, and India must use the latest techniques, always keeping in view, no doubt, that in doing so, the intervening period, which always occurs, must not cause unhappiness or misery. We have to provide for that even at the cost of progress because that is no progress which brings sufferings and misery in its train. But the fact is that our poverty is due to our backwardness in science and technology and by the measure that we remedy that backwardness, we create not only wealth but also employment.

Now we have been planning more or less methodically for the last seven years or so, that is, about two years before the First Plan came on. As we have tried to plan, we have, if I may say so with all respect, grown a little more expert in planning—not

much but a little. Naturally we are getting more educated in this process. We have had the advantage of discussing these matters with real experts in India and elsewhere, realising that the problems will have to be solved by us, not by the experts elsewhere or from here. But the experts throw light on different aspects of the problems and make us think, and they point out many mistakes that we make or might make.

So, gradually, through painful processes of thought we have proceeded along this path of planning. And I have no doubt that we should continue this and learn more and more, and often make mistakes, nevertheless growing progressively a little more expert at this business of planning. Because, we want to arrive at a stage when we can assess accurately, or more or less accurately, what the next stage is going to be and to provide for it and to visualize our problems in advance, to take appropriate action before events force our hands. That is, after all, the object of planning. And people who do not believe in planning —progressively they are fewer in the world— people who believe in what is called free enterprise, even they are gradually realising the limitations of free enterprise. Of course, in a country like India, situated as we are, there is, or there can be, no question of free enterprise in that, sense. We just could not make any progress if we do that; it is not for me to advise any other country in different circumstances, it is for them to decide; but circumstanced as we are, I am quite certain that an unplanned approach according to what is called free enterprise would not make us progress at all, or, if it makes us progress, it will be a lopsided progress. Of course, we can put up factories here and there, there may be monopolies created, riches here and greater poverty there. That is not what India aims at. Even so the total wealth production of the country will not be as much as through planned effort. That is a patent thing requiring no proof. The essence of planning is the best way to utilise your resources in men and money and everything; and the essence of free enterprise is to leave these things more or less to chance. Well, if chance is a more satisfactory way of dealing with the problems of life than carefully thought out methods, I do not quite know why there should be planning or anything at all. It means trusting to luck or it is only a different way of putting, I suppose, the old idea of *kismet* or fate. That, of course, is no good.

Therefore, all over the world the idea of planning is becoming more appreciated. But what is certainly appreciated by almost everybody is this, that for an under developed country planning is essential. In a developed country it may not be so necessary, you can perhaps do without it, you may have wealth and you may be able to do it by other ways; but there is no other way but planning in an under developed country like ours. And when I say planning I mean planning, not in the limited sense of priorities and the rest, but having the full picture and almost every human activity that you indulge in, because each affects the other.

Now, again, we plan for India. India is part of a region. South Asia or a good part of Asia which is more or less undeveloped. As a matter of fact, even the progress and development of India necessitates the development of other countries round about India. I do not mean to say that we cannot develop without those countries developing, or that we should interfere in other countries. That is not my point. My point is that

it is to our interests that other countries develop also. It is a completely wrong idea and an exploded notion that if other Countries develop, it comes in your way. That is applied only in a colonial pattern of society where you want to buy cheap raw materials from a country under your influence and impose your goods in a protected market. That does not apply to free countries. So it is to our interest that other countries in Asia and Africa also develop. Of course, politically it has been to our interest, but I venture to say economically it is to our interest. We cannot, unfortunately, help them much, because our resources are limited. But the House knows that even with our limited resources we have done what little we could to help our neighbour countries or other countries in Asia and Africa.

Now, I just mentioned to the House that we intend raising the target of our agricultural production. This is not only because we want more food, an adequate supply of food in this country, but because we want more food even for export. Let that be understood. We talk about our resources and, as in the Plan, there is a big gap. How are we to cover that gap? It is a big gap, and for the moment there is no obvious way of covering it. One may well criticise us by saying that we have indulged in some pious hopes in leaving the plan as it is, with that big gap. Well, there are so many uncertainties about human life and planning in a great country. For my part I do not think that it is very difficult—it is difficult—but I do not think it is beyond our capacity to fill that gap and go beyond that.

Now, one of the chief things is foreign exchange. How are we to get foreign exchange? Well, the normal way to get foreign exchange is to export goods. We cannot live in expectation of the bounties of others. If somebody helps us; we welcome it thankfully, but we do not plan merely in the expectation of others being bountiful. Therefore, it becomes essential for us to export, whether it is foodgrains or industrial products or machines or whatever we may have. And we have to think more and more in terms of exporting, so as to import what we want. Otherwise there is no other way out of it. I believe that if we pay enough attention to this export business, we can go much further than has thus far been envisaged.

The other day my colleague, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, laid stress on this necessity of export. I wish this House to realise that, and I wish it to realise also that if we are going to export in a big way, we shall have to import also. One cannot have a one-sided affair; one has to balance these things. Otherwise, one cannot simply send out things without getting something in exchange.

And let it not be thought that it is going to be a burden on us, because that would ultimately increase—apart from getting us foreign exchange—it will increase our wealth producing capacity in this country. Therefore, we should certainly think in terms of more and more exports and build up markets, and build them up more and more in terms of State trading, so that we could profit by it more for purposes of future expansion.

Now, agricultural production has a very special importance. First of all, there can be no real stable industrial economy in this country without a stable agricultural

basis. We thought of that in the First Five Year Plan, and we paid considerable attention to agricultural production and we made more progress than we had expected. In fact, that gave us confidence for the future. Nevertheless, we have to do a great deal more. And when I said that we intend to have another forty per cent, increase, that is a great deal. And we can do that, because our agricultural production today is almost the lowest in the world. And we have shown in parts of India that we can increase it by a hundred fold. It is true that it is difficult to treat the whole of India on the basis of a model farm, but nevertheless, if we can increase it a hundred or hundred and fifty fold, now we want to increase it by 40 or 50 per cent on an average and no doubt we can do it if we can apply enough thought and energy to it, that again I think is one of the things that should be made the special work of our community schemes. Our community projects and national extension service schemes do cover already about 130 villages in India and they will cover about 50,000 more every year, may be more. As the House knows very well, these community schemes of India are something rather unique in the way they have functioned. They are something that have grown out of the soil of India. We have learned from others certainly, but they have grown out of the soil of India and therefore they are peculiarly adapted to India. I do not believe in imitating or copying other countries regardless of conditions in India. Therefore, something which grows in India, may be learning from others, is far more effective than something foreign which we impose on the soil of India. These community projects and national extension service schemes have, I think, created a revolutionary atmosphere in our countryside wherever they have gone. I use the word 'revolutionary' in the true sense of the word and not in the bogus sense. That is, it has changed the thinking and the activities of the people there. It is pulling them out of the rut of passivity and stagnation in which our villages live.

Thus far, these community projects and others have aimed at, what might be called 'amenities' like roads, tanks, wells, school buildings and so on and so forth. Perhaps it was right, because we have to create that atmosphere. People should see that what they do, produces results. Still, some attention was paid to food production and in all the community project areas the percentage of increase in food production there is from 20 to 25 per cent, in the last three years, which is really considerable. And this, when they were not paying very special attention to it; they were paying some attention but they were paying more attention to other matters.

Now we want them to pay special attention to food production and to the growth of small scale and cottage industries. That means two things, production industrially and agriculturally. I have no doubt that in those areas certainly our agricultural production should increase rapidly, and reach at least the 40 per cent, mark that we propose to lay down for the next five years.

Therefore, this question of food production may also be viewed from the point of view of the gap in this Plan. If we increase our food production by 40 per cent, your gap is filled or more or less filled, not the foreign exchange, that is export of food. We may export food if we had enough of it even today. Therefore, at this revolves round production, how much we can produce in our country.

Now I shall refer to one or two matters they are very important but I cannot possibly deal with all the important things in this report. They are questions of administration and organisation, more particularly the matter of management of public enterprises, because the public sector is growing and will grow. Here, may I say, that while I am for the public sector growing, I do not understand, or, at any rate, I do not appreciate, the condemnation of the private sector. The whole philosophy lying behind this Plan is to take advantage of every possible way of growth and not by doing something which fits in some doctrinaire theory and imagine we have grown because we have satisfied some textbook maxim of a hundred years ago. We talk about nationalisation as if nationalisation was some kind of a magic remedy to every ill. I believe that the means of production will be owned by the nation: I believe that ultimately all the principal means of production will be owned by the nation, but I just do not see why I should do something today which fixes my progress, my increasing production, simply to satisfy some theoretical urge. I have no doubt that at the present stage in India the private sector has a very important task to fulfil provided always that it works within the confines laid down, provided always that it does not lead to the creation of monopolies and the other evils that the accumulation of wealth gives rise to. I think we have enough power in our laws, in our rules, etc., to keep the private sector in check. We are not afraid of nationalising anything. The House knows that even during the last few months we have taken some big steps. Only just a little while ago, the House was dealing with the Bill concerning insurance. These are all big mighty steps that we have taken and we are not afraid of taking them, but we do not propose to take any such step merely to nationalise, unless we think it is profitable to the nation. On the other hand, we will much rather build up national industries, new ones, rather than pay compensation to all and sometimes rather decrepit industries in order to take charge of them. Why should we, in this growing age, in the changing technology and changing techniques, take possession of any old technique? I must rather have the latest technique and have new factories or new plants and not an old plant unless that old plant happens to serve some strategic purpose, which is a different matter; and in that case I do it because I want to hold the strategic points in our economy. Therefore, I should like the House to appreciate that the philosophy behind this report is, the public sector and the private sector are made to cooperate within the terms and limitations of this Plan.

Therefore, while the public sector obviously will grow and even now it has growth both absolutely and relatively the private sector is not something unimportant; it will play an important role and no doubt gradually; ultimately it will fade away.

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Quite so; that is what I said. The public sector will control and should control all the strategic points in our economy. The private sector, as we have stated in the industrial policy resolution, will be given a fairly wide field subject to the limitations, etc., which are there, and it is for us, from time to time, to decide how to deal with that sector in the future.

But the point is that the field for advance is so vast. We are an under developed country. The field for industrialisation is so vast. It is occupied by nobody. Let us advance; let the public sector advance. Why should we spend time and energy over acquiring some old factory and an old plant? I do not just understand it. We are thinking in terms of big things.

Now, let us take oil. Oil, every one knows, is of vast importance in the world today. A country that does not have its own oil, does not produce its own oil, is in a weak position, apart from losing money and apart from the amount of money that goes out in foreign exchange in respect of oil which is terrific. From the point of view of defence, the absence of oil is a fatal weakness. We want to develop it. The House knows that we have proposed to do it and we are doing it in fact. I cannot guarantee how much oil we will have to refine in India. All I can say is that the prospects appear to be favourable. If the prospects are favourable in ten places, and if in seven or eight of them we get nothing and if we get something out of the two or three, those two or three will bring us enough returns to cover all the failures and much more. Therefore, the prospects are favourable. We have to spend money on these things. It is not a particularly easy matter to find more money. But, we have to spend it because it is of vital importance. There may be other matters which are important from the point of view, not only of developing our basic industries, but also from the point of view of certain essential commodities. Of course, the machine making industry is of basic importance. Out of it everything else comes. It is quite essential that we should develop the machine making industry as early as possible. It takes time. We are considering how far we can go, how fast we can go in establishing big chemical plants and drug making plants, all in the public sector. These are all things of advance. I want this House to realise how this vast, unexplored, at least unoccupied field lies there for the public sector to advance, and the public sector is advancing. We do not mind if the private sector advances also, provided that in regard to the major basic things, in the strategic things the public sector holds the field.

There has been some criticism and even in the National Development Council, one solitary voice was raised criticising this Plan because, it was said that it was unfair to certain regions, because some railway had not been built in some part of the country, or some factory had not been put up in some other part. This morning, in answering questions in the other House, this question was raised too and I could not answer that in answer to a question. But, I should like to say this. First of all, it is admitted that there should be every attempt to make every region, every part of India develop equally in so far as it can, and that we should remove the disparities that exist in India. There are some tremendous disparities. Some of our provinces, I would not name them, are very very poor. They do not deserve poverty. In the British days, other parts were developed. Great cities grew up, not so much as industrial centres, but as ports for exports to go and other reasons. We want to remove these disparities. We cannot do it suddenly. It takes time. If in the process of trying to remove that disparity suddenly, we really do something which is uneconomic, then, we are merely adding to our burden. There are some plants which can only be started in particular

environments. We cannot have an iron and steel plant except where there is iron ore or coal. There is no help for that. We cannot have something else unless some other raw material is present, or unless transport facilities are there. These have to be considered. In regard to most of our major plants, we have appointed committees consisting of our own experts and sometimes foreign experts. They have gone about visiting 20 or 30 places and they have recommended some places. We have tried our utmost to allot that plant to an area where there are perhaps fewer industries. But, by and large, we have been unable to ignore the other factors which will make that plant an economic proposition for that area. If we put it in a wrong place, the plant cannot be an economic proposition. We cannot put it up there. This has to be considered. Ultimately some friends complained, you have put it up in one State and not put it up in another State. Their complaint is justified in the sense that we have to develop that State. We cannot just help it. We cannot help putting up a plant in a place where it will be most successful, because success comes in production. If it is not successful, the public sector is criticised, and otherwise, for, we create a wrong psychology.

Now, referring to the public sector, the question often comes up in this House for discussion, criticisms of the public sector, something wrong that happened—and many wrong things happen naturally in big undertakings. Another question comes up: How can Parliament control the public sector? Well, one can very well understand the desirability and even the necessity of proper controls, of checks and controls over these vast undertakings where hundreds of crores of rupees are spent. But there is one other aspect of this question which I should like to lay before the House.

The way a government functions is not exactly the way that normally businesses and enterprises function. A government rightly has all kinds of checks, as it deals with public money, and perhaps, normally speaking, it has time to apply those checks. But when one deals with a plant and an enterprise, where quick decisions are necessary, which may make a difference of large sums of money, which may be a difference between success and failure, the way a government functions is not a suitable way for it. And I have no doubt that the normal governmental functioning applied to a public enterprise of this kind will ensure the failure of that public enterprise, because of the delays, because of the other limitations of working.

Therefore, we have to evolve a system for working public enterprises, where on the one hand there are adequate checks and protections that is inevitable and on the other there is enough freedom given to that enterprise to work quickly without delay. Ultimately judge it by the results. You cannot judge a government by the results; you cannot judge in that sense I mean financially because it is a very mixed affair. Therefore, in government, you have to be careful about the pennies, because if you are not careful about the pennies, the pounds and the rupees and what not will go wrong.

But in judging a big enterprise, you have to judge by the final results. Suppose a mistake is made. Today, a thing may be a mistake. Today, a step is taken which causes loss. Somebody in Parliament will raise the question, 'who took that step? Why was there loss of lakhs of rupees' or whatever it is. Well, the executive in that plant will

never take a step afterwards. He will say, I will be hauled up before Parliament, so that there will be no spirit of enterprise left there, no experimentation, and he will work cautiously.

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But the other persons also will be afraid of the same thing.

It is interesting to see countries where there are public enterprises and everything is a public enterprise, and there they have arrived at this conclusion that you must give freedom to the man, to the executive, in charge. Tremendous freedom is given there. Of course, if there is a major loss, if the whole thing goes to pieces, then the man-in-charge will suffer no doubt. But the point is he is given responsibility.

Every person who has advised us, whether it is an American like Prof. Galbraith, or a great Russian leader like Mr. Mikoyan, has told us, do not interfere with your enterprises, give them responsibility, give your executive responsibility, do not interfere, Mr. Mikoyan came to me you know they are putting up the steel plant, it is only at the initial stage yet, but in discussing it and said, "You do not mind my saying this. But if you do not trust your executive, do not give him much fuller responsibility, the work will be delayed, and will suffer," He said, "we have come to the conclusion after considerable experience that we must trust our executives and allow them to go ahead." Of course, there are checks and all that, but checks come afterwards checks and audit and all that. But the chief man there must be able to do what we want to do quickly.

If we are to go in for public enterprises in future in a big way, we must realise this fact. We cannot sit down every day and control public enterprises from Parliament. It cannot be done. Sometimes it may be useful; you save some money, but you will lose a great deal of money and the thing will not function rapidly at all, and it will develop a kind of static atmosphere, which is worse for a growing industry.

I am afraid what I have said has been somewhat disjointed, drawing attention to some aspects of this Plan. But again, I would remind the House that this book may be good reading or rather dull reading, but the subject of the book is not a dull one; it is an exciting one; it is a vast one, for it means the future of India.

BACK NOTE

XLIX. Resolution Regarding Second Five Year Plan, 23 May, 1956

1. SHRIMATI RENU CHAKRAVARTTY (Basirhat): Will the philosophy be that the public sector will control all the strategic heights?
2. SHRI VELAYUDHAN (Quilon cum Mave-likkara—Reserved—Sch. Castes): Change the personnel.

STATES REORGANIZATION BILL

30 July, 1956

Mr. Speaker, Sir, a week ago today, I returned to Delhi after visiting many countries and great cities in the West, and meeting many leading personalities there. I tried to understand the great movements that were taking place there, the thoughts in the minds of people there and the changes that had taken place. Even more so, I tried to understand what reflection there was of India in the minds of the people that I met in Europe.

I was interested in that naturally, because even as I watched something of the stuff of history being made in Europe, I wanted to know how far the history we might be making here was reflected in the minds of people in Europe. I found they were greatly interested, indeed sometimes more than interested, in what was happening in India, because they felt that something very significant was happening here something that would not only change India, but would affect other countries and other continents. And I thought then of the work that we do here in India, the great problems that face us, and the tremendous responsibility of this Parliament of India. This Parliament of India indeed has this responsibility of making the history of India.

That was one thought that struck me. Another thought that struck me as I travelled from country to country was of how the old frontiers had gradually meant less and less. Within an hour or two, I travelled from the capital of a great country to the capital of another great country. There were problems, certainly many problems and many conflicts, but this idea of national frontiers became less and less important somehow in the modern scheme of things.

I mention this because here we are considering with considerable heat and passion not the frontiers of nations but the borders inside the nation between two States or provinces. If the frontiers of nation become relatively less important than they were, and if in the course of a few years, they may almost be ignored for many matters, how much less important are these problems of State boundaries which we are considering? I do not wish to minimize to their importance, but I do wish this House to consider this question in proper perspective. We are apt to lose that perspective in the heat of debate or otherwise. I know that this question which we are considering, and this Bill and its provisions, have moved people strongly, deeply and that even now there is a great deal of feeling about them. I do not suppose that the most ideal solutions, whatever they might have been, could possibly have been pleasing to everybody.

So far as I am concerned indeed, I might say, so far as Government here is concerned it is of no great significance to us what part of India goes into this State boundary or that. Yes, certainly we must consider what is more desirable from various points of view. But in the ultimate analysis, it does not make much difference where

one little part is from the Government point of view. From the individual's point of view or the State's point of view, it has certain importance; I do not deny that.

Therefore, the Government of India approached this question, if I may use word, more or less objectively and without any particular desire to impose this decision or that. We have been told that we did not go through the proper procedure of consultation and decision etc. But I think any person who knows what has happened in the last six, seven or eight months in this country, will also know that the amount of consultation and discussion about this matter that we have had is without parallel. In fact, many people say and perhaps, rightly that we over did this: it would have been much simpler if we had not tried to consult hundreds of thousands of persons in this process and thereby perhaps added to the confusion. However, it is a fact that this question has roused people. But I wish this House to realise this, and first of all look at this picture in proper perspective, lest we forget that perspective and get lost in the passions of the moment. Secondly, to realise that however important these questions of borders might be, they are, after all, administrative divisions inside the country. Thirdly, whatever we may decide today, surely nobody prevents us afterwards, subsequently, from making any variation.

I realise that nobody wants to decide things and change them everyday. That is a different matter. But nothing is final in the sense that it cannot be changed in the future.

Now, our difficulty has been that we have tried too much perhaps to balance respective viewpoints, to try to find a common way, to find as large a measure of agreement as possible. And naturally, in doing so, we have often succeeded in displeasing many people. Yet I would beg of you to remember that in this very very complicated business which affected the whole of India, by far the greater part of India has accepted, broadly speaking, the proposals that are made. True, very important questions remain; among them perhaps the one that has been talked about most is the question of Bombay and Maharashtra.

Now, I have felt I say so with respect that perhaps the approach to these questions has been too much marred by strong language and by direct or indirect reproaches, and, if I may use the word, by running down this group or that group this community or that, not only in regard to Bombay, but in regard to other places too whether it's Bengal, Bihar or other places. I would beg this House to consider whether it helps in the slightest the consideration of, these problems by running down any province, any community, in any part of the country, by considering one part more capable, more courageous, more independent or more nationalistic whatever it may be. We are all here as Members chosen by some constituency or other in India. Naturally, we are interested in that constituency. But I submit that we are here as something else also. I am not here merely as Member for the eastern part of Allahabad district. I consider myself the Member for India here, and I do submit that every Member of Parliament is a Member for India. We are not members of some local municipality or district to consider the particular interests of that area only and forget the rest of India. We have to consider every question, I hope to the best of our ability, in relation to the whole country. I am

not Prime Minister of Allahabad district. I am Prime Minister of India by grace of this House, and I have to think or try to think in terms of India. I may make a mistake. Of course, I make mistakes; all of us make mistakes. But I do submit that when we begin to challenge each other's *bono fides*, then any discussion and any consideration of any problem on merits becomes a little difficult.

Let us consider these problems from this larger point of view, realising that even if some decision which we dislike is made it does not make a terrible lot of difference, realising that if the mistake is made, it is a mistake in a narrow sphere and it can be corrected later, because the greatest possible mistakes and the greatest possible error in this is having a wrong mind and a wrong approach to this problem and creating an atmosphere of conflict which is so vital to the development of any big thing in India. That is the basic approach.

Some hon. Members may well say, 'It is all very well; your intentions may be very good, but where have you landed us with your good intentions?' It is perfectly true that we have landed ourselves in a bit of mess. I admit it and I admit my responsibility for it because, naturally, as Prime Minister and otherwise, also, I am at least partly responsible for it. Do not wish to run away from it. It sometimes happens that in trying to avoid one difficulty one lands in another. But there it is.

I do not wish to go into the past history of all these 8 months' debate and consideration; but we have arrived at a certain stage now and we have to look at the picture as it is. Many things could have been done, large bilingual States and many other things might have been done; they might be done later too, I do not rule that out. But, what exactly can we do at the present moment so as to promote and preserve and help to bring about this larger atmosphere of cooperative endeavour? In a decision which we take the decision may please somebody or displease somebody; it may be a right or wrong decision the main thing to consider is what is the final result of it in terms of goodwill or ill-will. That is the main thing.

On several occasions, in regard to this very matter of Bombay and Maharashtra, we varied previous decisions. Each time we varied it I am talking about the earlier stages we landed in a fresh difficulty. We did it at the suggestion of somebody, some respected colleague of ours and then, they themselves wanted something else. Ultimately we landed ourselves in this difficulty that any attempt to change it probably resulted in a worse situation than the first one.

Hon. Member, Shri Deshmukh said, he preferred a City State formula to the present state of affairs. So did we and that was our first decision. And, the hon. Member will remember that on one occasion, he told us not only on his behalf but responsibility and authoritatively on behalf of others too that we should adopt the City State formula. We adopted it although we had come to some other conclusion because we were anxious and eager to please. But not 48 hours had passed when we were told. No; go back upon that; we won't approve that. We want back upon it end so we shifted about in our anxiety to arrive at some decision which carried the largest measure of agreement and consent.

The hon. Member referred to what he called two crucial decisions which were taken without consultation. I am in a difficulty about this matter because I am really, totally and absolutely unable to follow him. I do not know where he gets his facts from. I consulted my papers, my Cabinet records and everything. There are two decisions I leave out for the moment the statement that I made in Bombay. The first decision was taken, I am say, absolutely and repeatedly with the consultation of everybody and my colleagues in the whole Cabinet. I have no doubt about it. Finally, I say leave out the intermediate stages this Bill itself was placed before the Cabinet. The Bill, after all contains it and it was the Cabinet that adopted it before it came to this House. That is the usual procedure. I do not understand how anyone can say without forgetting all these that this decision was adopted without consultation. There was more consultation than on any other subject that I have had since I have been Prime Minister.

The other matter is a small matter; what mistakes I might have made or anything said about me. Shri Deshmukh was kind enough and good enough to say that he did not refer to me when he said that there was a certain animus. I thank him for that statement, but it is a small matter after all as to what I am and what I may be. But, it is a much bigger matter as to what our method of Government is, what the procedure we follow in our Cabinet and the Government of India and in this Parliament and elsewhere. It is no small thing. Are we following wrong procedures; are we overriding everybody and just imposing some individual will, mine or a small committee's will over this Parliament, over the Government over the country?

That is a vital matter. It is more vital than, I say, this whole States Reorganisation Bill. If we go wrong, how are we to function? It is charge the hon. Member has made; it is a very serious charge. It is not easy to reply to it and to justify my own conduct. But I do submit that he has done little justice to his colleagues in the Cabinet and even less justice to himself when he made that charge. He has functioned in this Cabinet for 6 years or more and he has been a valued and respected member and colleague of ours. Now, he makes this charge against his colleagues after 6 years of functioning, together, a charge however much I may be guilty of or deserve, and I do submit it is a very very unfair charge on all my responsible colleagues in the Cabinet.

However, there was this question of the statement that I made at Bombay. Now, what is the crucial decision and the statement that I made in Bombay? Repeatedly I had said at Amritsar Congress and at various other places that statement had been made repeatedly that Bombay will be given an opportunity to decide by some democratic process what it should do and where it should go to. For my part, I would be exceedingly happy if Bombay went to Maharashtra. I have absolutely no reason against it and I shall be completely and absolutely frank in this House that I think there are many valid arguments, good arguments for Bombay going to Maharashtra. But I also say that other valid arguments are also to be considered on the other side. In this difficulty we thought, many of us thought, that the best way was to allow Bombay to decide. It may have been done even now. But, as I pointed out, the

conditions have been such that so much passion has been aroused that it was not yet the right time to decide that Let things cool down. I have repeatedly said, "Let normality prevail and then let it be decided by them". I do not naturally mean that you will have a plebiscite or referendum and all that; but, if there is a good atmosphere, I have no doubt that it would be far simpler to settle this matter without any such cumbrous procedure. I was hoping for that and I still hope for that. In Bombay at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee, I was not to my thinking making any great decision or announcement on a very big thing. I was merely stating what I had stated repeatedly my view and I am something; after all, I am the Prime Minister of India. And a Prime Minister is a Minister and he can lay down the policy of the Government it may be repealed or it may be anything. I know something about democratic procedure; I know something about party procedure: I know something as to what the Prime Minister's duties are and in the Constitution we have and in the Constitution that Britain has the Prime Minister is a linchpin of Government. To say that the Prime Minister cannot make a statement is a monstrous statement itself. I entirely fail to understand where the hon. Member has got his acquaintance of democracy and what under the present Constitution of India and England the Prime Minister is and what he can do and what he cannot do. I am something more than the Prime Minister: we are something more; we are the children of the Indian Revolution. And although we may be toned down here and although we may forget much that we did before, we still have something of the revolutionary fire in us.

I venture to say that many of us know a little more about the Indian people, about those poor people, about those peasants than some other who talk about peasants. We have spent a good deal of our lives with those peasants and poor people, and it does not be save any person to talk of money bags, in the sense of referring to our party or to our Government.

I made that statement in Bombay, a simple statement, if I may say so, to give an assurance that this was not a final thing; a statement which said, "Let peace be restored first and then this matter may be decided calmly" I do not mind which way it is decided. I am perfectly prepared to plead the cause of Maharashtra with others 'Animus' is a big word. I have no disinclination to Maharashtra, but 'animus' it a big word. I do attach much importance to this question being solved in a calm manner so as not to leave any headache behind.

I do not entirely agree with all that Shri Patil said; I agree with much but I do not agree with something that he said. But I say that the main thing is that if you do something with Bombay this way or that way and as a result give headache to that party, the Maharashtra, it will do little good to Maharashtra to get that headache. By all means, let it get it in a friendly way, in a cooperative way, and it will be good for Maharashtra, it will be good for Bombay, and good for the country. That was the trouble I had in the way to do these things.

I do venture to submit not in this matter only but in almost every matter in an individual's life or in a national life, that the older I grow, the more I feel that what is more important is the manner things are done than the things themselves. Means are

more important than ends. More and more I feel that. All our troubles in this business has been not that the ones were not good but the means employed somehow tarnished the ends, made difficulties and actually came in the way of achievement of those ends. That has been the difficulty. I am not blaming anybody. If I am to blame, I am quite prepared to blame myself. It is not a question of blaming anybody, but I believe it is a fact that if you employ the wrong methods and gain something, that end is perverted. Other considerations come in, passions come into play. Because of this difficulty I wanted this question to be considered in a calmer atmosphere. The more I thought, the more I felt it was good to postpone this particular decision for some time I say five years, but I am not making any rigid limit. That, oddly enough—what is called the crucial decision was, apart from being a repetition of what I said, an indication that our minds are not closed on this, an indication that this is not a finality that is coming in, but that the matter is left open for the future and whenever opportunity arises, it can be done. It was, to my humble thinking, a hand spread out to Maharashtra instead of against them, and, if I may say so, I do not know if it is quite proper for me to say so the day before I made that statement in the All India Congress Committee, I had the privilege of meeting quite a number of leading gentlemen from Maharashtra I do not say they all represented Maharashtra, but some did and we talked about these matters. I told them my difficulties and said “This Bill is there, what can we do about it?” I said that we can see that this matter is not closed, but is opened after a period. Then they said, “Can you not make your statement in the All India Congress Committee?” I said “Certainly” and I made that statement.

It is not conveying any firm decision of Government as such or that the Cabinet and the Government have decided it. I made a statement I know that when a Prime Minister makes a statement, it is an important thing, it is not a casual thing. That statement itself, if you examine it was “the door being left open” and that there is no finality about it, it can be varied, it could have been varied slightly here or there, if you accept what the Bill contains, because it refers to my talk in Bombay about the Bill, which was, of course. Government’s decision, etc. In order to lessen the shock of the Bill to those who do not like it. I found a way by which this can be varied or changed a little. It is really to lessen the shock of the Bill that I did so rather than to come in the way of Maharashtra.

Some people talked about a big bilingual State, and for my part obviously I welcome it. I do not mind if Bombay is a City State. I do not mind if any chunk of territory were to go from one side of the other. May be I do not have a sense of provincialism in me. I can consider economic reasons, geographical reasons. Geography is important, of course. Of course, geography of little patches become less important in this age of vast travel etc. But the one thing that is really important, I feel, is this. Stress has been laid on this in the Report of the Commission—how linguistic minorities are to be treated because it just does not matter you put your boundaries, between this and that, but they are bound to be overlapping. You can put people speaking in one language in a closed house, in a closed province. But there are bilingual areas, may be trilingual areas, whatever the percentage may be. How are you to treat them?

The House will remember that in the Commission's Report, there is a special reference in the concluding chapter to certain measures, certain protections, certain precautions, certain assurances, certain statutory provisions so as to give them protection—protection to the linguistic minorities. Now I am anxious that this should be done, and done in the form of words. At any rate this charge has some truth and I do believe that a language is not given protection or a group representing a certain language is not given protection when it happens to be in a minority or almost equal, whatever it is. That difficulty and that complaint must be removed altogether from India and removed in a way not merely by some pious protestations but by some active and precise instructions to that effect. One cannot get rid of all the evils of this world, but anyhow one should go as far as possible to prevent this happening. If this can be done, then the linguistic complaint goes or ought to go from every part of India. If I may say so, this fact, I am told, is in the Constitution, but nonetheless I do not think everybody realises it.

I do think that all the fourteen languages mentioned in our Constitution are our national languages not Hindi only, but all the fourteen languages. Hindi, not because of any linguistic superiority, but because it is spread over a larger area and for various reasons and facility and the rest we have said, should be an all India language; it should become an all India language gradually and after a certain period for official purposes. But all are national languages. We want to encourage them. And, I am convinced that the encouragement of one language in India leads to the encouragement of others. The outlook that we can encourage one language by crushing other is completely wrong from any point of view—literary, or linguistic point of view. In this matter, for instance, I feel that any kind of application, letter or petition of any kind can be presented to courts: it can be done in any of the fourteen languages of India and no court will reject it. It may be, of course, that the court may be unable to deal with it if it is totally unaware of it because no court can keep fourteen translators. That does not matter. It is a matter of convenience. But, a court in Delhi has to accept an application put in Malayalam or Tamil or Telugu or Kannada. Let them get it translated. May be, it will delay matters. But it is none of your business to say that you cannot get it. It is one of our national languages.

If that is so about every language in India, it may be so especially in regard to the actual languages represented in a certain area. There should be no difficulty. Certainly those languages should be given that official position in that area, in applications and others. After all Government issues notices and others so that they may be understood. That notices is not merely to encourage or discourage a language. It should be issued in the language of that area, regardless, I say, of whether it is sixty or forty per cent whatever the percentage, provided of course there are sufficient number of people to be approached in that way.

I just mentioned about the frontier. We are, as the House knows, facing tremendous technological changes. We have got this marriage of science and technology and industry and that is producing enormous changes in the world. If you think of those changes, the problem that we face such problems as in this particular

Bill becomes quite extraordinarily insignificant. Of course they have importance. I do not mean to deny it. I would beg of you to consider it in this particular context and consider the way the country is changing we are changing, what our future is going to be. I am intensely interested in the future of India; so are the Members of this House. We work for it. We may pause but India will continue. We have laid the foundation of that future today. About our future, one thing is quite certain. It is not going to be a repetition of the past. The world is changing too rapidly and it is of the utmost importance that, in building that future, we should develop this all India outlook. The provincial outlook is not going to pay either the province much less India. We cannot have it. I may come from U.P., my ancestors might have come from Kashmir, but, I consider myself an Indian. I feel that I have inherited every great deed and great tradition of India from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. Sometimes, there are comparisons in this House that the people of this province are brave, that the others are not so brave and that the others are businessmen and these people are saudagars and so on. All this thinking which we find is unfortunately the reflex of the caste system—a bane and curse to this country which should be dealt with as such. We are too much immersed in these things. Which province is 'there in India, which State is there in India, which has not got a proud tradition of its own? Go to the south—the Tamils; there is a great language and there are great traditions—military and the rest. Go to Andhra—famous Andhra empires. Go to the Malayalees, go to the Kannadigas—the Vijayanagar empire. Whether you go north or 'south' or east or west, each area, each part of India has got great traditions, great stories of' the past, best culture — even military glory they have in store.

I inherit all that legacy. Do you think that I can confine myself to the story of Allahabad, although it is an ancient city, because I was born at Allahabad! I claim to have a right to the glory of Andhra, or Tamil Nadu or Maharashtra or Gujarat or any part.

Maharashtra—everybody knows the vital part it has played in India's history, military way, scholarly way, literary way, in learning and in so many ways and lastly in the struggle for freedom. The Maharashtrians or Gujarat is or the Tamilians do not require protection. They are big enough. But the people who do require protection are our border people.

My hon. friend, Shri Jaipal Singh, suddenly gets excited when the word 'tribal' is mentioned.

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He may not get excited but I do get excited. Because, I think that we forget our responsibility, the trust that is reposed upon us by these people who do require every help and protection not in the sense of imposing ourselves upon them but in the sense of always stretching out our hand of friendship and fellowship, to let them lead their own lives.

We have got a little trouble in the Nagaland, Naga Hills. I have said before—I say here—that I admire the Nagas. I like the Nagas. I think they are among the finest

I really do not understand what this has got to do the widows being deprived of their houses with the States Reorganisation Bill. Does he suspect that this is going to happen in some parts of India Maharashtra, Bombay, Gujarat or anywhere? I just do not quite follow, nor do I follow what this argument had to do with the socialist pattern of society. It seems to me that many of these difficulties and many of these confusions are due to certain fixed wrong assumptions. When you get a wrong assumption in your mind then all things flow from it which have no bearing on the subject. What has socialist pattern of society got to do with this? It is said that this Bombay decision is meant to placate some people in Bombay. Will I cannot look into the hearts of the rich or other people, but I can tell you and honestly that it never struck me that this decision has anything to do "with that with which other people aim that to be. And I do not see how their riches are going to be protected by this decision or otherwise, to put it in the other way, how their riches axe going to be spoiled if Bombay goes to Maharashtra. I do not quite understand. I think they are capable of looking after themselves even if they are in Maharashtra and equally otherwise. It does not make the slightest difference to them. It may be, of course, that Government's policy is such as affects them; that is a different matter; but whether they are in Maharashtra, Gujarat or Bombay, it makes no difference to the position. So I submit that these questions should be considered apart from these extraneous matters.

Now, I am very reluctant to indulge well, in quoting poetry as my hon. friend did; but since he said so much about this may I also quote it is a fairly well known couplet:

*"Hum aah bhi karte hain to ho jaate hain badnaam,
Wah katl bhi karte hain to charcha nahin hota."*

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I hope the hon. Member does not want me to be a little precise about it, but if he is referring to.....

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Tribal languages, I can tell him that our present policy is to encourage them in every way, both educationally and linguistically, in notifications etc.

BACK NOTE

L. States Reorganization Bill, 30 July 1956

1. SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: I do not get excited.
2. SHRI S. S. MORE: Has poetry any barriers?
3. SHRI GADGIL (Poona-Central) : This is what has happened in Bombay. We have been defamed like this. Just inquire what has happened in Bombay. If we carry out some enquiries, we come to know that what O'dwyer did in Amritsar was nothing in comparison to what happened in Bombay.

SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: Sir, there might be a very serious misunderstanding if I were not to ask the leader of the House for a little bit of clarification about something—I welcome the assurance; how strong that assurance is yet to be seen when the Bill progresses—in regard to linguistic minorities. He specifically mentioned 14 languages as being the national languages. Are they the national languages; that is to say, are the linguistic safeguards to be restricted only to these 14 languages, or will they be applicable to languages outside these 14 languages? That is really a very important issue.

4. SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: Tribal Language.

STATEMENT ON COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE AND HIS VISIT ABROAD

31 July, 1956

A number of questions which refer to the recent meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and my visit abroad have been submitted to you, Sir, and you have been pleased to suggest that I make a brief statement on these matters to the House.

The conference and conversations on which I was engaged, cover a wide range of topics of common interest and of world affairs, and were largely in the way of exchange of views and clarification of positions. Where possible, we also tried to seek and find similarities of views and approach to such problems. As a rule, such exchanges of views are not about specific problems that may be subsisting as between the participants in such conferences or talks.

Conferences of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or other Ministers, take place at intervals, at times and places arranged by consultation among Commonwealth States.

At the recent meeting of Prime Ministers in London, the Prime Ministers exchanged views on matters of common interest to all of them, more particularly problems relating current developments in international affairs. The Communique issued at the end of the Conference has been published in the Press and is laid on the Table of House. [See Appendix III, annexure No. 63].

The House will note that the communique states that the common understanding reached by the Prime Ministers will form a valuable background which will assist each Government in the formulation and pursuit of its national policies.

This truly sets out the character of the discussions and their general purpose. These conferences are forums for exchange and understanding, whether it be of agreements or differences. They enrich the experience of the participants and serve to inform them of both similarities and divergences of views, but they do not seek to condition, much less formulate, national decisions. These latter are matters within the exclusive competence of each country, its Government and Parliament.

I might, however, draw the attention of the House to some of these common understandings. The direction of policies to the promotion of peace, the importance of the search for a comprehensive Disarmament Agreement, the determination to strive for progressive improvement in the standards of life of their peoples, the recognition of parliamentary government as a common heritage, the respect for the aspirations of people to freedom and self-government, the furtherance of their own economic development and of rendering assistance to and cooperation with other countries in their development, are among those initially set out in the communique.

Personal contacts and exchange of views, resulted in our reaching a helpful, reasonable and realistic appreciation of the developments in the Soviet Union in their different aspects. These developments were regarded as, "Significant" and were

welcomed. It was recognised that the improvement in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the other Great Powers would help to remove the fear of war and further peace. There was also the common appreciation of the significance of Asia in the world of today, and of the situation in the Middle East and Far East. There was the recognition that a peaceful settlement of the problem of the Formosa area was imperative to stability and to removing the dangers of conflict which would frustrate the hopes of peace. I would also invite reference to the paragraph which refers to part played by certain Commonwealth countries in seeking to maintain peace in Indo-China.

Ceylon's intention to become a Republic and her desire to remain in the Commonwealth was agreed to which we, in this country, welcome most heartily.

It is not the practice, nor would it be helpful, to discuss at these conferences problems of direct concern to two or more Commonwealth States. A Commonwealth Conference does not seek to arbitrate, much less decide by Resolutions or votes, the solution to such problems. Nonetheless, the occasion of their being in the same capital at these gatherings presents opportunities to Prime Ministers, if they so wish, to have talks with one another. Such talks, whether it be of groups of countries who have certain common problems, e.g., Defence arrangements, etc., are, however, not part of the Conference proceedings.

The Conference has been a useful one. The general approach to world problems has been realistic and constructive. It is my belief that the common understandings as set out in the communique will make some useful impact not only on the thinking and approach of the participating countries, but also on other countries and nations. I would add that these Commonwealth Conferences with their diverse composition and the divergences of outlooks and backgrounds and yet displaying a capacity for tolerance and, for reaching common understandings, are a good thing for the world, beset as it is by the sectional outlook and much intolerance-ideological, racial and other. The date and venue of the next meeting of this conference was not considered.

My visit to the German Federal Republic impressed me greatly. This nation, or part of it, after the most crushing defeat and destruction in war, and and stricken prior to that by the crushing of the human spirit and values under the Nazis, has resurrected itself. It is truly remarkable that West Germany is today a highly successful industrial nation. She has rebuilt much of the ravages of war. The capacity for hard work and the inventiveness of these people is impressive.

The problem of German unity remains. It is the main and understandable obsession of the German people, of the West and the East. In my talks with the Chancellor Adenauer I expressed my understanding of, and sympathy with, the desire of the German people for the peaceful achievement of their unity which would be facilitated by a lessening of tensions and which would contribute to the improvement of both the European and the World situation.

The German Federal Republic expressed its implicit faith in the economic future of India and its desire for cooperation in the technical, scientific and cultural spheres, which I reciprocated. The Federal Government offered to establish, in

cooperation with the Government of India, a technological institute in some part of this country, and a large number of students have been offered scholarships for technical studies in West Germany. I gratefully accepted these offers.

The Chancellor and I issued a joint communique at the end of my visit, a copy of which is laid on the Table of the House [See Appendix III, annexure No. 64]. This communique reaffirms the faith of our two countries in democracy and individual freedom and that the approach to each other and other countries should be that of friendly and peacefully co-operation, respect for national independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of others. The basic aims of preserving and strengthening peace were emphasised. Two days after the date of our communique, the Chancellor issued a statement, in the course of which he said: "We reject energetically every war and share in regard to this the view point of the Indian Prime Minister, which he has laid down five political basic principles".

My brief stay in Paris enabled me to meet French leaders, including the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. We did not issue a communique, but I am able to tell the House that these talks have helped to further the relations between our two countries and for mutual appreciation of our problems and outlooks.

At Brioni in Yugoslavia, where I went to pay a call on Marshal Tito, opportunity for joint talks with him and President Nasser occur. President Nasser was paying an official visit to Yugoslavia and my arrival there coincided with the last days of his stay with President Tito.

Our tripartite talks there were again on matters of common interest and World affairs. A communique issued by the three of us as Heads of our Governments is placed on the Table of the House [See Appendix III, annexure No. 65]. We expressed our common understandings on the growing desire for peaceful and active co-existence, on the division of the World today into blocs based on fears, the imperative need for progressive disarmament, and the immediate suspension of nuclear explosions. We declared our common belief that the cooperation of the People's Republic of China was imperative for the solution of problems relating to the Far East, and also expressed our Support towards finding a just and peaceful solution of the problems of Algeria and the cessation of violent conflicts there.

The House will notice that in this communique the ten principles of the Bandung Conference have been reiterated.

On my way back home I halted at Cairo and also visited Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. I had previously been to Damascus, the capital of Syria. I had the opportunity to talk with the Presidents and Prime Ministers and others in Syria and Lebanon. We have much in common with these countries of West Asia, who like ourselves have recently established their national freedom and sovereignty.

At Cairo, President Nasser and his Ministers and I had further opportunities of talks, more particularly on our common problems in Asia and developments in the Middle East, such as the Baghdad Pact, as also on colonial problems. These discussions did not relate to the Suez Canal or any aspect of Anglo-Egyptian relations. The recent

decision of the Egyptian Government in regard to the Suez Canal first came to my knowledge from the reports in the Press after my return to Delhi.

I had a happy and brief stay in Ireland with which country we have much in common in respect of the background of our struggle for our national freedoms.

Sir, I was out of India for a full month during which, despite a crowded programme of receptions, visits, conversations and conferences, India, a modest sense of pride in her, in our own endeavours and our achievements in the creation of the New India, as well as an overwhelming although invigorating sense of the tasks ahead, has always been with me.

The friendly and enthusiastic reception which my daughter and I and our party received not only from Governments and at official gatherings but also from peoples everywhere was a constant reminder to me of the tasks ahead of us and of the vast and deep expectations that this country of ours, in the short period of her freedom, has aroused in the peoples of the World. It is a happy feeling to be aware of this, it is even more an overwhelming one. The enthusiasm of peoples, their desire for understanding and friendship, their responses to our approach to the problem of peace and cooperation, the prevailing recognition of a resurgent Asia—all this was exhilarating. It helped me to realise more and more how shrunken the world has become and how much nations and peoples really must belong to each other.

The onward march of history has brought continents together: and yet the sharp struggles and conflicts divide them. The overwhelming weight of deadly weapons and the menace of atomic destruction have rendered peaceful co-existence the only way of survival in the immediate future. This was borne in on me by my talks with people and Governments during my travels, and I have come to realise that this is our imperative need today. For this, we need goodwill and tolerance as between nations. We can make our best contribution by our example and by our persistent endeavours to promote peace and cooperation.

BACK NOTE

- LI. Statement on Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference
and his Visit Abroad, 31 July, 1956

NIL

STATEMENT REGARDING SUEZ CANAL ISSUE

8 August, 1956

On the 26th of July, President Nasser announced in a speech at Alexandria that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company had been effected. The control of the offices of the company at Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and Cairo was taken over by the Egyptian Government following the promulgation of the nationalisation law by Presidential decree.

The assets and obligations of the company were taken over by the State. The law provides for compensation to shareholders at the market value of shares as on the day preceding nationalisation. Such compensation is to be paid after the State has taken delivery of all the assets and properties of the company.

The management of the Suez Canal raffle service was entrusted to an independent authority, with an independent budget and all powers, without being subject to Government rules and regulations.

The funds and assets of the nationalised company were frozen. The new authority was under obligation to retain the existing personnel who, in turn, were not to relinquish their posts without permission. The decree also provides for enforcement of the law and penalties attaching to breaches thereof.

The announcement has had world-wide repercussions. A grave crisis which, if not resolved peacefully, can lead to conflict, the extent and effect of which it is not easy to assess, has developed. In this crisis, the foremost consideration must be to strive for a calmer atmosphere and a rational outlook. When passions dominate, the real issues recede into the background, or, are viewed or presented so as to emphasise the differences between the disputants and to rouse or feed the passions already engendered.

It is not easy for anyone, much less for the disputants, to escape this tragic involvement, and even for others, total objectivity is not possible. In a crisis of this kind we deal not merely with the issue in dispute, but we witness the upsurge and conflict of mighty forces.

So, we have to deal with the problem as it confronts us or be overwhelmed by it. It is appropriate, therefore, to glance at the facts and the history of this problem.

The Suez Canal Company, which is nationalised by Egypt, controls the operation and the equipment, and holds the concession of the Suez Canal. The Canal itself is in Egypt and an integral part of Egypt. The sovereignty of Egypt is thus beyond question. This is recognised both in the Charter given to the Company in 1856 by the Viceroy of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire as well as in subsequent agreements and until as late as 1954. The original Charter of 1858 which set out the terms of the canal concession

provided that the Canal "shall always remain open as a neutral passage to every merchant ship crossing from one sea to another without any distinction, exclusion, or preference of persons or nationalities....."

The Convention of Constantinople of 1888 reiterates that the Canal shall always remain free and open.

The position in regard to the sovereignty of Egypt on the one hand and the character of the international waterway is well set out in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, negotiated by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt.

The House would be interested in the formulations in this Agreement, which is a very recent Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, two of the main parties in the present crisis:

Article 8 reads: "The two contracting Governments recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October 1888".

The sovereignty of Egypt on the one hand and the character of the waterway as one "of international importance" is recognised in a solemn agreement by Egypt and the United Kingdom and they both have also expressed their determination to uphold the Convention of 1888.

The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian Company and, in Egypt's view, subject to the laws of the country. The shares are held, except for a small portion, by foreign Governments or nationals. The British Government hold 44 per cent of the shares. There are 32 Directors on the Board: 9 British, 16 French, 5 Egyptian, 1 American and 1 Dutch.

The concession of the Suez Canal Company would have expired in 1968, and the Egyptian Government, the present and previous ones, have publicly declared that the concession would not be renewed. The assets and obligations would then have reverted to Egypt under the Agreement of 1856.

The present decision of the Egyptian Government therefore would appear to ante-date the taking over by them of the Company. No question of expropriation has arisen since the shareholders are to be compensated at market value. Even if there remain any outstanding differences in this matter, they do not call for developments which lead to an international crisis.

The Egyptian Government have also reiterated that they will honour all their obligations arising from international agreements, and in their reaffirmation have referred both to the Convention of 1888 and to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.

The French and the United Kingdom Governments reacted to the Egyptian announcement quickly, sharply and with vehemence. Hon. Members of the House have seen Press reports of military and naval movements ordered by the United

Kingdom and France, and some military measures in Egypt. These have received much publicity and have aggravated the situation. All this has influenced public opinion not only in Egypt but over the Arab world. In Asia as a whole, with its colonial memories, great resentment has been aroused.

I have no desire to add to the passions aroused, but I would fail in my duty to this House and the country and even to all the parties involved in this crisis, and not least of all to Britain and France, if I do not say that threats to settle this dispute, or to enforce their views in this matter by display or use of force, is a wrong way. It does not belong to this age and it is not dictated by reason. It fails to take account of the world as it is today and the Asia of today. If this were all, we could perhaps possess ourselves in patience and reflect that the mood will pass.

But it would be unrealistic and imprudent not to express our deep concern at these developments and point to their ominous implications. We deeply regret these reactions and the measures reported to be taken in consequence, and we express the hope that they will cease and the parties will enter into negotiations and seek peaceful settlements.

We also much regret that, steps that have led up to this crisis, there has been no exercise by one side or the other of their respective or common initiative to inform or consult one another.

We have great respect and regard for the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt and for our friendly relations with her. The Egyptian nationalisation decision was precipitated by the Aswan Dam decision of the United States Government in which the United Kingdom Government later joined. More than the decision, the way it was done, hurt Egypt's pride and self-respect and disregarded a people's sentiments.

The suddenness of the nationalisation decision and the manner in which it has been implemented may have contributed to the violent reactions. But the terms of the nationalisation itself under the laws of Egypt are within the province of that Government.

As I informed the House some days ago, the Suez Canal issue was not discussed between President Nasser and myself when we met recently. The consideration of it and the concerned decision must have been made later. The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have held urgent and prolonged consultations and their views are set out in a joint communique which hon. Members must have seen in the Press reports.

This communique recognise the sovereign rights of Egypt, but appears to limit these sovereign rights to nationalise only assets, which in the words of the communique are "not impressed with an international interest". If this was the point at variance, the violence of the reactions and the war like gestures - I would still hope they are not war-preparations-were unnecessary and have been grievous in their results.

The three powers also agreed that a conference of the parties to the Convention of 1888 and other nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal should be held on the 16th of August 1956 in London in which they agreed to participate. The United

Kingdom has in pursuance of this decision extended an invitation to 23 countries which are:

Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the U.S.A, and the U.S.S.R.

The Government of India received an invitation from the United Kingdom on the 3rd of August to a conference in London "on the Suez Canal question". Prior to this, the United Kingdom Government kept the Government of India informed of developments.

Aware as they are of the extreme gravity of the situation that has developed and of the circumstances that obtain, the Government have given anxious and careful consideration to all aspects of this question, including the reply to the invitation. The Government have also been in contact with interested countries, including Egypt.

It has always been quite clear to the Government that they could not participate in any conference which bound its participants beforehand as to the conclusions to be reached. The Government would equally decline participation in any arrangements for war preparations or sanctions or any step which challenged the sovereign rights of Egypt. They have also been concerned at the exclusion from the list of invitees of various countries who should be included in the categories of signatories to the Convention of 1888 or of principal users.

Without seeking to make invidious distinctions, I would like to say to the House that the exclusion of Burma is to us a particularly regrettable omission. Yugoslavia, by virtue of being a succession State in respect of the Convention of 1888 and a maritime power should also have found a place among the invitees. The Government of India, therefore, do not subscribe to the appropriateness of the list of invitees.

They have sought clarifications from the United Kingdom Government and feel assured that their participation in the conference does not in any way imply that they are restricted to or bound by the approach and the principles set out in the joint communique. They recognise that Egypt could not and would not participate in a conference on the Suez Canal to which she is merely an invitee and in respect of which there have been no consultations with her.

The Government of India had to take a decision in the situation as it confronted them. India is not a disinterested party. She is a principle user of this waterway, and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the disputes, not to speak of worse development, in regard to it.

Even more, India is passionately interested in averting a conflict. She is in friendly relations with Egypt, and associated with her in the acceptance of the Bandung Declarations and the "Five Principles". India has also good and close relations with the principal Western countries involved.

Both these relations are held in great esteem by us, as this House and all the world knows. The considerations and the criteria on which the Government had to base their decision, and not an easy one, is how best they could serve the cause of averting conflict and obtaining a peaceful settlement before it is too late. The House will appreciate the gravity of the situation as the Government have done. The settlement of this problem, on the basis of the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt, and by agreement amongst all concerned, and the abandonment of postures of threats and violence, and of unilateral action by either party, are therefore of the utmost concern to India.

The Government therefore obtained the necessary assurances from the United Kingdom and made their own position quite clear. They have satisfied themselves that their participation in the London Conference will not injure the interests or the sovereign rights and dignity of Egypt. With the sense of grave responsibility that rests on them, the Government have decided to accept the invitation and to send representatives to the Conference.

They have kept in close contact with Indonesia and Ceylon and with others who broadly, have a similar approach and attitude to that of India on this question.

The Government are well aware that this conference can reach no final decisions; for that requires the agreement of Egypt.

Sir, the House, I am aware, shares the grave concern of the Government in this matter. In all humility, I ask it to share with them the hope that the participation of India will assist in the endeavours for a peaceful settlement.

BACK NOTE

LII. Statement Regarding Suez Canal Issue, 8 August, 1956

NIL

MOTION REGARDING SITUATION IN NAGA HILLS

23 August, 1956

Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, I have welcomed this debate in this House on the situation in the Naga Hills; not that that situation from a military point of view is a very grave one but because it is essentially the kind of problem in which the House and Parliament should take interest.

Now, it has been repeated many times that this should be treated as a human problem; some hon. Members have said: as a political problem and not as a military problem. Well, if we had treated it as a military problem only, probably, the results should have been quite different. It is because we have not treated it as a purely military problem, it is because we have issued all kinds of instructions, restrictions, limitations and inhibitions to our Army and to the others not to treat it as a military problem that from the military point of view progress is not being as fast as it should have been. I believe that if we had treated it in a military way and did not succeed in winning the goodwill and cooperation of the Nagas, we would have failed utterly. There can, and there should be no thought that you can deal with a problem like this, or that you should deal with it, in the sense of merely by force of arms suppressing the people. That is not our attitude.

I should like this House to remember that they should look at this in the larger context of our general policy in these areas, not only in the Naga Hills but in the NEFA area and roundabout areas. Many of these areas, for the first time, were brought under some kind of administration during the last six, seven or eight years. Vast areas have been brought under some kind of administration. I do submit to this House that they will probably not find a parallel of this kind of administrative system spreading out so peacefully and with very few incidents. Why was that so because we have issued strict injunctions and directions, saying that we have to win over the people and that we have to seek their cooperation. We have to build, whatever we do, on their goodwill. There have been incidents, but very, very few.

There has been one major incident which, the House might remember, was a little over three years ago. In Auchinmore, in the NEFA area, in October, 1953, an officer of ours, with a number of troops, was going there, not to shoot or kill but for normal patrol work and inspection work. They were suddenly attacked, roost unsuspectingly. The poor person was making a cup of tea in his camp, and the others were putting up tents. What was the result? 70 persons were killed 40 porters and 30 army personnel. It is a large number. This kind of thing naturally and normally produces strong reactions in a Government. But I doubt if any Government in the wide world would have dealt with the situation in the way we did. I must say that when we first heard of this incident, it made us rather angry. It made our army, naturally, a little angry. It was not just fighting, but it was sheer coldblooded murder people

coming and suddenly surrounding peaceful people who were sitting down, and killing them in large numbers. Yet, immediately, we recovered from the first shock and surprise and anger, and naturally we took steps to send our forces there. But we told our forces that they must realise who those people are. It is no good going about killing them and burning their villages. Some hon. Member suggested that the normal thing in British times was to go and burn the villages. Of course, bombing does not kill anybody there because they are not living in concentrated quarters. So, it was said that you can simply burn their villages. But we said, 'No.' The place was very much interior and it was very difficult to reach the areas. It was not plain. We refrained from doing that. We took enormous trouble and after weeks of trail, some of our forces got there. It took us months and months to deal with the situation. We did deal with it and we dealt with it essentially in a peaceful way and ultimately we captured the people who were supposed to be guilty, but we handed them over to the tribal councils to judge.

I mentioned this incident of nearly three years ago to show how we have approached these matters. This particular incident has nothing to do with the Nagas as such. I am merely saying that we issue instructions to the forces, to the civilian officers and to our army, to deal with the situation in a peaceful way.

Last year, there was some trouble in the Tuensang area which is largely a Kaga area. Now, it is all very well for the hon. Members Shri K. K. Basu and Shri Kamath to say, "You must deal with it in a human way. Why do you send the army?" But then, what exactly is to be done when other people start killing? Do we send them messages of goodwill, or do we try to stop the killing? We got messages from the population of that area, asking for help. We got messages from the villagers and we got messages from the Government employees, teachers and others, saying "Protect us". What are we to do? Should we not give them protection? This happened in the Tuensang area. We had to send some of our forces with some rifles and the rest, quietly, without much fuss. Of course, it was easy enough to treat or deal with it differently, by military action or by the army. But we proceeded rather slowly, because we had the object of winning them over and not merely crushing them. Of course, we had to shoot some because they shot at us, but that is a different matter. So, the Tuensang problem was solved within a few months without too much fuss.

Now, when fighting was taking place in the Tuensang area, the Naga Hills were relatively quiet. That is, there was no major incident or acts of violence. There might have been some smaller incidents. At that time, Phizo had come to see the Governor and the Chief Minister of Assam. Actually, he issued statements, more or less mentioning his adherence to non-violence. But we found that while he said so and actually issued notices, he was actually organising for violence, at the same time. There is no doubt about it. It is absolutely true. He was encouraging the people and telling them that "I am doing this. It is a trick, just to give you greater chance to go ahead. Let us play this game here, and you carry on your activities there". This was the kind of thing they practised.

Now, I should like the hon. Members to have some idea of who the Nagas are. I should first like to say that the Nagas, correctly speaking, are not what might be called a tribe or one group of tribes closely tied to each other. I do not know when the word "Naga" came to be used. I have an idea that it is a British word, that is, in the British times, that word was used. It may or may not be correct I am not sure. But their tribes are named differently Acama, Ao and Angami. These are the names of major tribes. They do not call each other as Nagas. This is a word which you and I may use or the Britishers used. Perhaps, it was used rather in some kind of derision, because Naga means naked. It is quite likely that the Britishers used that word. But the biggest tribes are the Acama, Ao and Angami. If you go to this area, you will find that there is no common language, a common Naga language. Every few miles, over half a dozen villages, the language changes, or the dialect changes. You can hardly meet with one common language over a distant place, except in a broken kind of way.

Among the Nagas, of course there were, or there used to be, some tribes which might be called the dominant tribes, who are, militarily, stronger or tougher than others. The tribes which dominated the others received some tributes from the other tribes. So, there is a certain element of domination over the other tribes. There were some stronger tribes who claimed tributes, in the past, and if they did not get tributes, they took stronger action and stronger measures against the other tribes and forced them to pay tribute. This has been the position there. Then, our administration spread through in those areas.

Some figures about the Nagas might interest the hon. Members. I shall of course use the word "Naga" as a generic term, because we are using this word in the records. The population at present all over the areas not the Naga area alone is a little over half a million. In the Naga Hills District, it is a little over two lakhs. In the Tuensang frontier division also, the population is slightly over two lakhs. In the Tirap frontier division, it is 50,000 and in the Manipur State, it is 80,000. So, the total is a little over 500,000, which is spread out. In the Naga Hills itself, it is a little over two lakhs.

Now, I confess that I heard about Nagas as such about 20 or 25 years ago, and I was rather attracted by what I had heard. Then came the case of that lady to which reference was made by Mr. Kamath Rani Guidallo who, parenthetically, after suffering a long period of imprisonment was released many years ago; and, I am glad to say that proper arrangements were made for her to live in the house built for her she built it herself and we gave her help and we made as much reparation as we could for the misdeeds of the previous Government. Although I became interested, I did not know much about the Nagas then.

Mr. Jaipal Singh mentioned the sending of those people to see me. Ever since then I have come into contact with them on a number of occasions. Mr. Phizo and a number of his colleagues met me here; they met me twice. There was one occasion to which reference has been made by Mr. Keishing; he said something about an incident at Kohima, where, according to him, the Nagas came and were prevented from giving

me an address, and therefore they became angry and walked away. The facts are not quite that. The facts are, I went to Kohima; to begin with, it was not a normal visit to Kohima. The Prime Minister of Burma had come over; flying across the frontier, he met me at Manipur, I think, and we were going to Burma a day or two later. I thought I might utilise that opportunity to go to Kohima. We went to Kohima and we relaxed. I suggested to the authorities there that some kind of a welcome might be given to the Burmese Prime Minister. He was our guest and the people gathered to say a few words. So, it was not a normal occasion on which I go there. What I found later was that the Nagas there wanted to read out an address to me. The Deputy Commissioner told them, "You can hand it over to the Prime Minister afterwards; I cannot allow your reading it out to him at a meeting when the Prime Minister of Burma and others had come", so that, it is not correct to say that I refused to take the address. As a matter of fact, at Kohima on a previous occasion, a year before or so, I had actually met the Naga leader—Mr. Phizo was not there—discussed the matter with them and taken a long document from them just a year before. So, it is not true to say that I refused or even the Deputy Commissioner came in the way of the address being given to me. But, he did come in the way of that being read at the meeting. I did not know it at that time; I knew only later. Then, when U Nu and I arrived at the meeting place, these Nagas who were present, about a hundred or may be a thousand, got up and walked away. I was very distressed at this, not because of me, but here I had taken the Prime Minister of Burma, an honoured guest of ours, and for him to be treated so discourteously hurt me very much.

Now, much has been said. Mr. Basu talked about the atrocities of the military and Mr. Kamath about Cypriots and Kenyans. I do not know what justification they have for using this language; or, it was merely a phrase they are used to without much significance, I do not know. Then, Mr. Keishing referred to the burning at villages and shooting down of people. Obviously, in military operations and the rest, I cannot get up here and say that everything that is being done was as if we were sitting in a drawing room and that everything that was done can be justified completely. Sometimes mistakes are made. Sometimes apart from mistakes, wrong things are done by individuals. That is a different matter. I do submit that mistakes have been made and one of the most regrettable mistakes which distressed us exceedingly has been in connection with the killing of Dr. Haralu. Apart from this, his sons, as the hon. Member said, are important officers of ours—assistant political officers here— and his daughter is serving with me in the External Affairs Ministry. It came to me as a tremendous shock when I came back—I was not here then—and we took immediate action in regard to it. We are taking action; in fact, courts of enquiry etc. are carrying on the processes. Military processes, I believe, are fairly thorough, but they take a long time. Undoubtedly, we should punish those who are guilty.

I am not saying that wrong things are not being done there by individuals or groups, whether by civil authorities or by the military. But, I do wish to remove this impression that our army or anybody else there is just playing fast and loose with lives and with burning of villages and the rest. Apart from our instructions which are

very strict, the General Officers-Commanding and others have been constantly issuing instructions. Now, it is true that many villages have been burnt there. Our information is that a far greater part of the burning is done by the Naga hostiles. They themselves do it; that is our difficulty. Mr. Jaipal Singh talks about more and more regiments or battalions to be sent there. It is true, but why do we send them? Principally, it is in order to protect the people who are being attacked. It is easy to attack; a group of 10, 20 or 30 persons can go about and attack any village. But it is very difficult to send a garrison to every village. So, it is attempts of protection more than anything that has led to our sending troops in the Naga Hills as well as in the places adjoining them. So, I do submit that slight errors have been committed; most regrettable mistakes have been made. But, the general conduct of our forces there has been certainly better than any other similar operation that I know. I do believe that Mr. Keishing is misled by reports he may receive, if I may say so, from Mr. Phizo's publicity department, because I get them too and they are the most fantastic tales one can imagine; completely it has no relation to truth at all. These things are not sent to him only, but sometimes, not frequently, they are sent abroad to foreign newspapers in America and elsewhere.

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I said that Mr. Keishing must have been affected by news emanating from Phizo's publicity department. I got the news too and many other Members get it.

..... XXX XXX XXX²

I do submit there are three types of burnings. Firstly, the Naga hostiles deliberately burn, because, after all, the tribes look at it from their point of view. They cannot, and any such group cannot, subsist for long unless they get help from the villages, unless they get food, money, etc. from the villages, if not out of loyalty, at least out of something imposed by fear. The result is they go about collecting money and food.

Now in the Tuensang Division there are at least one hundred defence societies of local people, Nagas and others, formed for the protection of villages from hostile Nagas and when the hostile Nagas come local people fight them. We have given some arms to those local people. So also—I do not know the number—to some extent in the Naga Hills it becomes rather a civil conflict between Nagas and Nagas and our information is that sometimes villages are burnt in this process. The figure of Mr. Rishang Keishing may be correct, but I say that most of these villages have been burnt by the Naga hostiles themselves. Another way of burning is— after all they have only thatched roofs—when any kind of firing takes place between our forces and Naga forces, the firing itself sets fire to the villages. May be our firing sets fire to them. I believe that there were cases in the early days or some months back when, suspecting that some villages had been occupied by these hostiles our armed forces either directly burned them or their firing burnt them. But that has been completely stopped, so far as our instructions are concerned. Where there is firing of this kind it is very easy for thatched villages to catch fire. As my hon. colleague reminds me the

Nagas fight, apart from guns, with arrows with burning heads. This is a thing which particularly sets fire to thatched roofs.

I do not for a moment say that there have not been mistakes made by the civil or the military, errors committed, regrettable errors committed; but both our approach to this problem and to a large extent in the carrying out of our directions by the army authorities have been rather remarkable for patience that is shown in the face of considerable provocation. I say provocation. Now any hon. Member can realise that it is very irritating to be sniped at, to get an arrow or gun shot suddenly while you are going along a road or passing through anywhere. Now it would be an easy enough problem to deal with armed forces, but the problem is of sniping, not everywhere, but at many places. This kind of thing is irritating. It makes an average soldier or civilian rather angry. Nevertheless, our instructions are: exercise patience, because we want to win over these people.

Even now in an increasing measure we are utilising the cooperation of the Nagas. Quite apart from Naga officials and others, there are some Naga people in our Assam Rifles, some Naga regiments in our army. I do not mean to say they have all been crowded up there; they are in various places. But our definite instructions are that they must seek the cooperation of the Nagas in every way and seek to make it clear to the hostiles and others that we have inevitably to meet them. We have to meet a person tiring a gun at us with a gun.

I do not understand what Mr. Basu and Mr. Kamath meant when they suggested to us that we should treat it as a human problem—yes certainly—and withdraw our army. I really am astonished that any person should make that suggestion, which means handing over large numbers of people there who have relied upon us for their protection, just, well, for their liquidation.

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That will be an astonishing thing for anybody to do, whatever be the consequences. That obviously cannot be done.

So that, I submit that the broad approach that we have followed is very much on the lines of what several hon. Members have suggested: Apart from mistakes made here and there, we propose to continue to follow that approach.

The hon. Member—I think it was Mr. Rishang Keishing—referred to the agreement which was made by the Naga National Council with Sir Asnar Hydari and Mr. Bardoloi. Now I do not accept his statement that that agreement has not been honoured. I do not accept that He repeatedly said that it has been dishonoured. That agreement came up before the Constituent Assembly, or rather before the Special Committee of the Constituent Assembly. I was not in it. The whole of the Sixth Schedule attached to the Constitution was largely drawn up keeping that in view. It may be that the Sixth Schedule as a whole was not an exact reproduction of the agreement. I was not in that committee. I cannot speak with authority as to what happened there. But the whole object was to give autonomy to those areas and to allow them, or to help them to live according to their own ways.

Now it may be that one may say that the Sixth Schedule as it ultimately emerged did not go far enough, or was not satisfactory enough I can understand that argument. Let us then consider the Sixth Schedule; let us amend it; or let us do what we like with it. It is up to Parliament to do whatever it likes.

Throughout this period this question has been raised. It has been raised off and on in the last eight or nine years. It is not something sudden that has happened now. As I said, on three occasions I met Mr. Phizo and at least once or maybe twice I have met other Naga leaders, that is to say the colleagues of Mr. Phizo. At least four times, or maybe five times, I have discussed this matter with them and pointed out to them that we are always prepared to consider any constructive proposal for amendment to the provision regarding these areas, but it is no good talking to me about independence. Certainly I have laid stress on that. It is no good talking to me about that. I consider it quite a fantastic idea for that little corner between China and Burma and India—a part of it is in Burma—being called an independent State.

Later it is true that when they wanted to see me certain conditions were attached. One of them was that I am not prepared to discuss independence. This was condition No. 1. The second was: you must give up violence. This was before this major violence and other things, when petty acts of violence were taking place. As a rule, I am prepared to meet anybody: does not matter whether we agree or whether we disagree. But I was told that after each interview that I had, the people went back and stated in those areas that they were going on the road to independence, because they met the Prime Minister. They go over the heads of the local government and local officials and generally try to strengthen their position there by reference to the interview they had with me. Their decision with regard to independence certainly came in my way. If they exploit interviews like that with me, should I encourage them? Even then I told them: I should be glad to meet you provided you make it clear that you do not demand independence. That is the position after I had met them four or five times in various places in various ways. Otherwise, there will be no difficulty in meeting them.

In fact, apart from me, the Governor—and the Governor of Assam, as you know, is our Special Agent, Government of India's Agent in regard to N.E.F.A. and the problems of N.E.F.A. and the problems of Naga Hills, although different, nevertheless, have a certain similarity and so the Governor has been taking great interest in these matters—often met the Naga leaders. He had a meeting with Phizo. The Chief Minister, last year, met him too, more than once I think. So, there has been every attempt on our part to meet them or to try to explain to them or to win them over from violence and all that. I do not mean to say that the Assam Government's policy or our Government's policy or every step that we took was absolutely correct or happy. We made mistakes, naturally. These petty mistakes do occur. But the whole objective before us was to win their minds and hearts and not to terrify them or frighten them. It is true, as some hon. Member has said sometime back about this policy— what is called Assamisation—perhaps it has been injudiciously pursued. But these are relatively minor things in this picture and the whole object was to deal with them directly, to establish conditions there which would lead to their progress and would allow them to lead their own lives without interference.

The one thing I was most anxious about was the establishment of basic schools there by their own people chiefly. As a matter of fact, a number of Naga boys had gone to Sabarmati to spend some years there and they go back as basic school teachers. We wanted them to establish schools there because I thought it would help them.

The second thing was the community projects. I thought these two things were more suited to that place and the Nagas themselves can work them with a little help from outside. Then there are the major schemes, of course, like communications, schools etc. So, this has been our approach.

I have not referred to the military aspect. There is not very much to refer in it. But I will just say this. Our instructions to our military continue to be what I have just stated— that they must treat it as a human problem; and military cannot deal with a political problem. That is for us and we are prepared to deal with it and we do consider it as a political problem and a human problem, much less a military problem.

Then, some hon. Members referred to general amnesty. Yes, certainly there is the amnesty. There is a proclamation of amnesty. I do not understand this demand for general amnesty which some hon. Member has made. I do not know what he means by saying this should occur simultaneously as if when there is a general amnesty automatically and spontaneously everybody surrenders.

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Right at the beginning I have said that when amnesty was proclaimed there were some exceptions, exceptions I believe for persons who had committed murder or something, I have forgotten the phraseology: there were some exceptions.....

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Heinous offences or something. There is still that proposal for amnesty for whoever surrenders. Although the period expires from time to time, we extend it. In fact, there it is. So, there is no difficulty about it. We are not out to punish any individual or any group there. We want them to settle down because it is no pleasure for us to have to deal with this problem and certainly it is no pleasure to see the great majority of the people living there lead abnormal lives, for naturally they are afraid on the one side of Naga hostiles coming and making them pay up or otherwise extorting things from them and afraid on the other side of fighting that takes place roundabout or some accidents happening or their villages burning—all kinds of things happen and nobody likes this kind of thing. The sooner it is ended, the better.

Does any hon. Member expect Government to invite the leaders of the Naga National Council and treat them as the leaders of, well, a different State and have a treaty with them. What exactly is the meaning of that, I do not understand. We are prepared to talk to anybody but not about independence; that is the sole qualification. If they want to come, they can come. But if they do something in the wrong way, instead of discouraging them, should we encourage them? That is what we found in the past and that is our difficulty.

It is not a question of prestige. The Government of India's prestige does not come in dealing with the poor countrymen of ours. The Government of India is too big a thing for its prestige to suffer in these small ways.

There is the question of our not taking a step which is misunderstood, misinterpreted and which is criticised by our own colleagues among the Nagas, all those who are cooperating with us. Surely, the House will not expect us to betray all those Nagas who, in spite of difficulties, have cooperated with our officials and our civilians, who have looked to us for help and protection. We wish in the future more and more to bring in this element of cooperation with the Nagas there.

Now, with regard to the political aspect, an hon. Member said that Tuensang Division of the Naga Hill District should be made into a separate political entity. I think he added Tirap frontier track too. These are political problems which we can very well consider. But we cannot consider them in this particular context because that will require a change in our Constitution, amendment etc. If necessary, we shall change the Constitution and I have no doubt that the House will agree to change it provided the right conditions exist and in this matter, naturally, we have to consult the Assam Government.

We cannot simply brush it aside because the main thing is the wellbeing of the people who live there. It does not matter whether you have one unit or two units. They should have a feeling that they can lead their own lives and they should have autonomy and they should be proud of being citizens of India.

Now, Mr. Jaipal Singh talked about diarchy, division of authority between the civilians and the military there. I do not know how far the present arrangements there have come in the way of efficient work. It was our desire not to go too far with the army. That led us to send our army in aid of the civilian power. It was easy enough to declare martial law or hand over the whole area to the military, but always we are thinking of not treating this as a purely military problem, the point that has been so much emphasised by hon. Members. So, we sent them in aid of the civil power. That is the present position. But, in effect, of course, the civil power functions in a very narrow way there; maybe in some centres it does, but in a very limited way. Naturally when the armed forces are functioning in the way they do and hostile elements are functioning, the civil power's activities are rather limited, but what the hon. Member Shri Jaipal Singh said is a matter worthy of consideration and we shall certainly consider it I gather from my colleague the Home Minister that the chief function of the civil authorities there is really relief and rehabilitation. In fact, even the Army of course is doing that, and here I would say that the record of the Army and the civil authorities in regard to the building up of villages and giving relief is fairly creditable. It is an increasingly formidable record of help that they are giving.

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BACK NOTE

LIII. Motion Regarding Situation in Naga Hills, 23 August 1956

1. SHRI RISHANG KEISHING: I want to submit to the Prime Minister that I never received anything from Mr. Phizo regarding the figures which I have given. I hope normal situation will be restored and the Government, as it is a democratic Government.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: He did not say that you were receiving it.

SHRI RISHANG KEISHING: He said that I might have received reports from Phizo's publicity department.

2. SHRI RISHANG KEISHING: The figures are unchallengeable.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Which figures?

SHRI RISHANG KEISHING: Figures regarding the burning of the villages.

3. SHRI ALGU RAI SHASTRI (Azamgarh Distt—East cum Ballia Distt.—West): That will be very callous.

4. SHRI K. K. BASU: We made the offer by saying.

SHRI KAMATH: We simultaneously appeal to the Government and to the rebels.

SHRI K. K. BASU: We should appeal to them.

5. PANDIT G. B. PANT (The Minister of Home Affairs): Heinous offence.

6. SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: The armed forces could do any job a hundred times better than the civil administration, whether it is rehabilitation, building villages or houses or whatever it is. They are much better and more competent to deal with the situation.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That may be so. Is the hon. Member referring to this relief and rehabilitation or everything?

SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: I am referring to everything in the light that the Naga situation is under discussion, not the whole of India. Anything I say relates to the Naga situation.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am inclined, if I may say so, to agree with the hon. Member that any kind of work of this type is likely to be handled much more efficiently by the Army than by the civil authority.

SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: Hear. hear.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have no doubt in my mind.

SHRI S. S. MORE: But will they do it in a human manner?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: They will do it and they will do it in a humane manner too. I have no doubt about that and if I may say so, I was surprised to find that even in the field of the law the Court Martials of the Army are much more thorough than some of our civil courts.

SHRI S. S. MORE: Have we suspended the Criminal Procedure Code everywhere?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: My colleague Dr. Katju, who is an eminent lawyer apart from being Defence Minister, tells me that he is surprised to find the high Quality of the law in the Army.

SHRI S. S. MORE: Now he has ceased to be a lawyer.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have no doubt about that particular piece of work but—there is a big "but" about it—in the short run that is good, in the long run that is not good. In the long run giving these activities to the Army produces certain results which may not be good, but that is not the fault of the Army.

One thing more. A proposal was made to send a parliamentary commission there.

SHRI JAIPAL SINGH: With Shri More as the leader.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I must confess I do not quite understand what a parliamentary commission is going to do and where it is going to go. Wherever the commission goes, we will have to send a battalion, round it to protect it, but I hope later a time may come when hon. Members of Parliament may be able to visit these areas.

MOTION REGARDING DR. APPLEBY'S REPORT ON RE-EXAMINATION OF INDIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

10 September, 1956

It was not the intention of the Government to have this matter debated during this session. It is not because it does not consider it very important—it does—but, before the discussion, we wanted a full examination of the various aspects, by the various Ministries and other departments of the Government and the Cabinet of the various suggestions made. Frankly, we are in the middle of the examination and if I am asked to state anything about it, I will be very brief and I will say that I have come here to listen to hon. Members and learn from them rather than to say anything myself. I would be very glad if these questions are discussed, but, obviously, I cannot guarantee what will happen in the next session. But, I would like it.

Unfortunately, listening to the hon. Mover's speech on this motion, I was hardly conscious about Dr. Appleby's report; I was more conscious of the Auditor-General: I refer to that part of Dr. Appleby's report in which he deals with certain important things. It was an important part, no doubt, but one small part, which he dealt with. I wish he dealt with the Other parts of the report, which, I think, are more important and vital, the parts which parliament should be interested in, where he discusses Parliament control and he criticises parliamentary interference. These are the points which Parliament, no doubt, should consider and discuss. The other matters are, relatively, of small importance. We can consider them certainly, but the main things are those and, if I may say so, any person introducing this subject should have, I submit, said something about the context of things in which this report was made. I would refer the hon. Members to the first page—I am too modest to quote it here, modest on the part of the Government. Administration—where he speaks in highly eulogistic terms of the Government's activities and the brilliant conception of the First and the Second Five Year Plans and so on and so forth. Then, he goes on to criticise.

If I may draw the attention of the hon. Members, I think in the second page, top, he mentions this. This was, this part, was not a document to be published at all. It was entirely a private document which he gave me and the then Finance Minister for our consideration. He told us that it was not for publication but he also told that if we wanted to publish it he had no objection but it had not been written from the point of view of publication. He has used the language deliberately because it is a private document and the language used is strong to shake things up. I think we should welcome it from that point of view, and not whether we agree or disagree. We always require taking it up so that we may build our minds and thought about various matters. We look upon it from that point of view and I am examining it fully. I should welcome as much discussion in these various aspects as possible, in this session or the next session, but I cannot just guarantee, Sir, the time for it.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, as I indicated at the beginning at this discussion, it is not my intention to go into this matter of the recommendations, suggestions and criticisms made in the Appleby Report at this stage, chiefly because we want to consider them very carefully in Government and then come up to Parliament for information or for guidance.

May I say right at the beginning that we should welcome very much discussions among MPs on this subject? Shri Matthen suggested some kind of Committee of Secretaries and the like. I do not quite know what he meant. The Secretaries are, of course, considering it. They are always considering these things that are referred to them, and they will, no doubt, send up their recommendations. But what seems to be a better procedure is that, if there is time, we might have those informal meetings with a number of Members of Parliament which we had for the Planning Commission. We may have that type of meeting, subject to one thing, if I may submit—not having the necessity of every word being placed or recorded for future use. That, I think, is a little waste of time and energy. But to meet and discuss these various matters informally would be undoubtedly helpful from the point of view of the Government. I cannot guarantee this—I do not quite know what work we may have in the next session — but we hope to do that.

Now, I find that the way this Report has been looked at is as if it was an attack on this or that privilege of ours or rule of ours, and we are on the defensive. The House will notice that Government in various departments of Government, the Ministry of Finance and others, are criticised in very strong language, though we do not object, my colleague does not object. We want as stout a criticism as is possible. Not that we agree with it. If we agree, well and good; if we do not agree, we do not agree. But we welcome criticism, and we have, therefore, welcomed this criticism, this time and the last occasion that Dr. Appleby came here.

Dr. Appleby, there can be no doubt, is a person of very considerable experience in administrative procedures, structures etc. not only in the United States, but certainly in nearly all the countries of Europe and many elsewhere. He has been for long considered one of the major experts in administrative matters. That does not mean what he says about India must be right or good—it is neither here nor there. But he is a person who is entitled to express his opinion, and his opinion has to be considered carefully.

It so happened that he came here about three or four years ago on the first occasion, and the report he issued then was placed before the House much later, and sent to State Governments. And as a matter of fact, we profited greatly by that report, and some improvements were made in our internal procedures here in the Finance Ministry and in other Ministries because of the consideration that we gave to that report. I think that the O. and M. Division — the Organisation and Methods Division— was, more or less, started because of those discussions on the Appleby report, and that is doing really good work. As a matter of fact, changes have been introduced from time to time, because it is not a question of one major 'yes' or 'no' about it. This whole thing runs through the whole gamut of administration, and these changes have

been introduced, and are being introduced from day to day, and I believe, to our advantage.

Then he came for a second time about two years back, and he made certain comments I forget if he presented a major report or not; I have no recollection.

On this occasion he came again, for the third time, although he is a fairly busy man; he has been for some time what might be called the Finance Minister of the New York State. We do not call him Finance Minister there, but that is his function in the New York State. He deals with the finances, which are pretty big, of the New York State. All that does not qualify him to be a final judge in regard to our matters. But it does show a degree of competence and experience. He is a person on the eve of retirement; he has finished, more or less, his life's work, and he gave a good deal about administrative procedure, financial procedure and other procedures, and we have welcomed his visit here and profited greatly by it.

The whole trend of his criticism has been how we can meet the needs of today in India; that is a new State dealing with not only social and other matters, but trying to deal with them at a rapid pace, a State which is industrialising itself, which is trying to grow, and in all sectors of our economy. How to do it? He has pointed out throughout that we cannot do this satisfactorily in the framework of the then existing administration, the one which we inherited from the British. He has paid tribute to the persons and the House will remember that he said that the level of administration in India, the quality of the administration was as high as he found almost in any country in the world. Even from the administrative point of view and the point of view of the purity of administration in spite of the fact that there was corruption here and there even so, he said that India came in the top dozen or so of the countries of the world. Having said that he said that the system that we have it was a good enough system for the previous type of State is not fast moving; it is slow and there are too many checks and counterchecks with the result that delays occur. That was his first criticism.

When he came a second time he expressed his surprise and satisfaction that things had moved much faster than he thought they could have moved under the system partly because of certain minor changes that had been made and partly, according to him, because people had worked very hard, that is, the administrative apparatus. On this occasion again, the House will see that he began by saying that while they have proceeded as well because they have over worked themselves and one cannot expect them always to be over working themselves in order to have a stable and fast progressive system you must change it in this way and that way. Any how, the whole criticism of Dr. Appleby is that this machine should move faster. It is obvious that he has a background. Although he has a world background, it is chiefly an American background and now he is partial to the American background. I remember I showed Dr. Appleby's Report to a very eminent Englishman, an English Professor, who obviously had an English background. He came, perhaps, from Shri Hiren Mukerjee's University, the Oxford University and he did not like Dr. Appleby's American background at all.

Well it does not matter, as a matter of fact, what Dr. Appleby says of what the other man from Oxford said. They are both very interesting and very helpful because they are looking at the question from various points of view. What are we interested in? We are not interested in retaining a particular framework, administrative framework or throwing it away; but we are interested in getting the job done as quickly and rapidly and as well as possible. We are interested in getting our Five Year Plans go ahead and accomplish them both efficiently and speedily with purity in our administration. These we are interested in. Therefore, we welcome all suggestions, from any quarter they might come, and examine them with our own experience, the experience of Parliament and others and try to improve on that system.

Nobody can say that our administrative apparatus is just as perfect nothing is perfect. At the same time it is admitted, and I think it should be admitted that our administrative apparatus, framed as it was originally for different purposes, has adapted itself to the change in India much more than might be expected. I might say everybody has adapted himself satisfactorily and the machinery has adapted itself a good part of it has adapted itself very well today. But, it is not merely a question of adaptation but something much more.

This House sometimes criticises and maybe rightly criticises the growth in all government offices, of people employed by Government or of Ministers or Deputy Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries and the like. But the fact is that the work we have to deal with has grown in geometric proportion not in arithmetic. It is astonishing how work has grown. We may deal with it adequately or not; it is not for me to judge. But there is no doubt about the growth of work. It has to be recognised and it is not a sort of doubling or trebling. The only way to judge of it is 50 times or 100 times than it was previously. It goes into that region. Now, this puts a tremendous burden on everybody. Work grows; people are lacking; trained people are lacking. Obviously, the type of work we have to do more and more requires trained personnel. We want trained technicians; trained scientists, trained engineers, trained administrative officers and so on and so forth. We are constantly facing this difficulty.

One of our big problems today is this question of manpower. How to train our manpower adequately and utilise it immediately, not in the present haphazard way people go through colleges and universities and then knock about having no work to do because they do not fit in with the kind of work required. We have to train for a great deal of work and nobody should knock about no trained person. There is no doubt that we shall be training these men in much larger quantities than now. Not only that; we have to compete with others.

I am told that in the Soviet Union they are producing 75,000 engineers a year. We may not produce 75,000, but we may be able to 5,000 or 10,000, I do not know. We should have to. I think the figure will go up. In the Soviet Union, to give another figure, I was just reading today that there are 250,000 science teachers there; just science teachers 250,000. That shows the importance of science and

technology and other things. The whole trend of administration is changing; the whole trend of modern life is changing and our administrative system will have to adapt itself to it. It cannot go on much as it has done in the past.

Two countries which are hardly alike but in some way are very much opposed to each other, the United States of America and the Soviet Union have one thing or many things in common. And, among them is this thing that they have a certain vitality and a certain adaptability, a certain knowledge of the changing world today and they are adapting themselves, they are trying to adapt themselves, scientifically, industrially and technologically and the rest. All other countries are behind them, if I may say so. Therefore, You will find that the average man from America and the average man from the Soviet Union offers the same criticisms on India. It is interesting to remember that the American comes and dislikes all these checks and balances. He wants to go ahead. He says, 'what is this'. We should have checks and balances. Every Government must. But what he says is, You have too many. The average man in the Soviet Union we do not have the average man from the Soviet Union, we usually have the special man from the Soviet Union but he offers exactly the same criticism to us 'We cannot get work done. Your checks and balances and references and this and that, why don't you give them to a General Manager to go ahead, as we have done in the Soviet Union, it is no good working in theory. Theoretically, Parliament is supreme. Of course, Parliament must remain supreme. We must have the democratic structure. We must follow the fundamental basis of our Constitution. Nobody challenges that. We must have our checks; we must have the AuditorGeneral; we must fix this and that. All right. But we have to deal with the practical problem and not the theoretical problem of dealing with the Constitution, so that it may lead to results. In that way we welcome criticisms. We have received many criticisms.

My friend here is dealing with the building of the Steel plants and he is constantly being pushed by the Soviet people that this thing should be done quickly; delegate responsibility, this and that; we have to go ahead, we cannot wait for others. It is odd that the same type of criticism comes from the Soviet Union and from the United States, although they have entirely different structures.

May I, in this connection, say and also draw the particular attention of my friend and colleague, Shri Mukerjee to a certain thing? He has been constantly talking about bureaucrats that this sort of bureaucratic machinery crushes the spirit of man and all that. Well, I do not know what he would call the men governing the Soviet Union at the present moment. I say it is the essence of bureaucracy. And, I say the more socialists we get in this country, the more will bureaucracy grow. That is the inevitable result of socialism. It is obvious. Maybe, it should be a better type of bureaucracy; that is a different matter. It is bureaucracy and you must have bureaucracy in this complicated state of affairs whether it is India or America or the Soviet Union.

In America, they have a little less than they used to have they used to have a good deal of what is called "The Spoils System". That is, when a new administration comes, they push out almost up to the postmaster in a local village. I do not know

whether they do so still, but they used to. Everybody changes and in comes the new party man. In the Soviet system, I do not know the exact details of it, but sometimes, lots of people change suddenly.

But, the point is that you cannot escape bureaucracy. Improve it, if you like and we must. But, it is bureaucracy and in the old days we thought of bureaucracy in terms of the Indian Civil Service and some other Service. That idea has of course changed. The Indian Civil Service, as it was, is gradually fading out; a few people are left. Other people are coming and the Indian Administrative Service is bred up and conditioned in a somewhat new atmosphere. But, apart from that, naturally, a new invasion is taking place in this so called bureaucracy and that is the invasion of the technical man engineer, technologist, etc. He is coming in large numbers and he will come in evergrowing numbers in our whole apparatus. You have to rely on these people; you have to train them more and more. The time may come when you will be using them, not in thousands but in if I may use the word millions, not even in hundreds of thousands. And your Government will be progressively more and more bureaucratic in that sense. Then of course there will be hundred ways and many more ways of controls and others.

Now, again, our work becomes so complicated and so various. The work of Parliament becomes very very difficult and it becomes difficult for the Parliament to keep pace with it. If it cannot keep pace with it and yet has to control it, it has to pick and choose the strategic points; it has to see, what are the important points which you must hold and check and not waste our time in relatively smaller and more trivial matters. Otherwise, important matters slip away and attention is drawn to the trivial matters.

If the hon. Members recollect the history of the growth of parliamentary system in England, they will see that the Parliament of the 19th century in the UK was something completely different from what it is today. Apart from the fact that it was not a very democratic Parliament I mean to say that franchise was very limited and all that, but apart from that, that Parliament had leisure... The private member had plenty of time. It was a private Member's Parliament. Government hardly brought in anything, any important social measure. Sometimes it did of course, but they were a few and far between. And the Private Member had full charge.

Gradually, the work of Parliament and of the Government in Parliament has grown so much that the poor private Member in the British Parliament, as in other Parliaments, gets pushed out, simply through lack of time. And the most vital and important things are decided by Parliament by a real decision on the principle and then it refers it to some other body. Take an instance. It was divided absolutely. There were two main parties in the 19th century and the early 20th century Parliaments. There were two parties, for and against, free trade. The old Liberal and the Conservative Parties were divided on vital matters. Yet later, when protection came in, somewhat upsetting the hundred year old policy of the British, it is astonishing: the principle being accepted and the Board of Trade being told to draw up lists, duties, etc. Parliament

hardly found time to consider; they had no time. They just decided: we have protection. Having decided that, the Board of Trade officials did the rest.

So, by the compulsion of events, Parliament cannot deal with these matters because there is so much. When you have not two corporations but hundred State corporations in India, it is competent for Parliament but it will never have the time to look into each one of them, even if it wanted to. It has the power and if it chooses, at any time, to do anything, it will do it. But, you have to evolve other methods, therefore, whereby there should be adequate checks and at the same time, full initiative given for progress to go ahead.

These are really problems, not created by the Appleby Report. These are problems which are created by the facts of today, by the facts of life and we have to face them; we have to consider them carefully and discuss them and, step by step, change our administrative system or whatever it is, financial system, as we gain experience and as we see changes are necessary.

Shri Gadgil said that he wanted Government proposals. Certainly, I hope, in the next session, to put forward Government's ideas on the subject. But, all these are not one consolidated proposals. They are so many things and they are continuously, gradually changing; change after change comes.

For instance, during the last year or two, we have been progressively delegating authority; we have accepted that broad principle. We are going perhaps a little more slowly than we ought to. The Finance Ministry, which has been complained against greatly, not only by Dr. Appleby, but very often by the other Ministries of the Government of India too is delegating its authority and introducing, what is called, internal financial advisers. That is, instead of referring every matter to the Finance Ministry, one of its advisers sits with the Ministry in question and we pass on things; it avoids delay. Only in very important matters, need it go to the Ministry. We are going along these times. Maybe, we are not going fast enough.

In regard to the delegation of authority to our autonomous corporations and others also, we feel it should be done, always keeping checks and controls as far as possible. So that it is not a question of yes or no to anything; it is a question of examining it and making gradually such changes which appear to us desirable and which do not involve any risk, any grave financial risks and the rest. That is how we are proceeding in this matter and we shall proceed. I shall, from time to time, place before the House the steps that we are taking. In fact, in answer to many questions, we have been telling them about these various matters and, as I said, in the course of the next session. I hope that we shall be able to arrange an informal discussion among as many Members of Parliament as they wish. It is not a question of selecting them. As many as are interested and wish shall discuss this matter. We shall discuss the various points that the Appleby Report raises and, in fact, other points too, in regard to the administrative system and the other like points.

But, if I may again mention it, one should not feel irritated because of the strong language that Dr. Appleby has used. If I were quite sure that we were going to put it

before Parliament, he would have used different language. But, we wanted our Government people senior officials to be shaken up. He told me that in fact he even offered to change his language, if it is going to be published, but I said: leave it as it is. That is good enough. So it is not that but let us think rather, of the great problem that we and every country has to face. It is a problem which, I have no doubt I know it is a fact the United Kingdom has to face today; not the same type of problem as we have, but not so different either. After all, in a sense our civil services were somewhat modelled after the United Kingdom pattern. They had the same difficulties as we have had. It may be that they have greater experience and their country is small whatever it is, but they have their problems. I know it is a fact that the Soviet Union is constantly struggling with this problem of how much authority to delegate and how much not to delegate. I know they impressed upon me, when I was in the Soviet Union they also impressed upon us when they came here that we made a great mistake in not delegating authority, and they are delegating much more authority now simply because they found that the rapidly moving machine of their's was checked and stopped repeatedly because they did not delegate. Of course, they have a close supervision. Every Government has but you cannot help the complicated and big administration not to delegate authority. And I would remind this House, when it talks about the Government by Joint Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, that is exactly the type of Government that both the United States and the Soviet Union have got today.

BACK NOTE

**LIV. Motion Regarding Dr. Appleby's report on re-examination
of India's Administrative System, 10 September, 1956**

NIL

STATEMENT REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

16 November, 1956

Mr. Speaker, Sir, on 13th of September 1956, the last day of the last session of the Lok Sabha, I made a statement in the House about the developments relating to the Suez Canal issue. Previous to that, on the 8th August, I had given to the House an account of the developments, which followed the action of the Egyptian Government in nationalising the Suez Canal Company.

Over two months have passed since my last statement on this subject in the Lok Sabha, and much has happened, which has been reported in the public press and must be within the knowledge of hon. Members. The matter was taken up by the Security Council, and there was broad approval of certain basic principles which should govern any agreement in regard to the Suez Canal. It was proposed that the chief parties to the dispute, namely, Egypt, the United Kingdom and France, should meet soon after to discuss this subject further on the basis of those principles.

That meeting did not take place. Instead, on the 29th October, Israel launched a sudden and premeditated attack on Egypt, and large concentrations of Israeli troops made deep penetrations into Egyptian territory. The next day, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to the effect that if they did not stop fighting and withdraw their forces to ten miles on either side of the Suez Canal, British and French forces would intervene to stop the fighting. The ultimatum expired on the morning the 31st October and, soon after, British and French forces commenced aerial bombardment of airfields and military objectives in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. This was followed a few days later, by landings of airborne troops near Port Said and heavy fighting there.

As the House knows, India had viewed with grave apprehension the policy of the U.K. and French Governments after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. In particular, the massing of troops and aircraft for the purpose of military operations in Egypt appeared to us to be a reversion to past colonial methods and an attempt to coerce Egypt by show of armed might. Indeed, it was stated by responsible statesmen in the United Kingdom and France that the regime in Egypt must be changed and, in particular, the Head of the State and of the Government of Egypt should be removed. We had hoped, however, that after the Security Council resolution, more peaceful methods would be adopted to solve this dispute. The starting of military operations against Egypt by the United Kingdom and France and more particularly, the bombing of parts of Cairo city and other parts of Egypt came, therefore, as a profound shock not only to people in India but also to large numbers of people in other countries including the United Kingdom. This appeared to be a flagrant case of aggression by two strong powers against a weaker country with the purpose of enforcing their will, even to the extent of changing the Government of that country. This led to widespread

world reactions against the Anglo- French action, and as the Security Council proved ineffective because of the exercise of the veto by the United Kingdom and France, the U.N. General Assembly, at an emergency session, expressed its disapproval of this action and demanded the stoppage of military operations in Egypt and the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, France and the United Kingdom, from Egyptian territory. An uneasy armistice followed, and it was declared on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Israel that they would withdraw their armed forces, though this was made subject to certain conditions.

These developments gave some hope that peaceful methods would henceforth be employed and I ventured to say a few days ago that the situation had slightly improved. Today I am by no means sure that this improvement has taken place. There are numerous tendencies which may well lead, unless checked, to a rapid deterioration of the situation and a reversion to warfare. If unfortunately military operations begin again, it is possible that they might extend over a much wider area and might even develop into a major war.

Two days ago, the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and India issued a joint statement which has already been placed on the Table of the House. That statement gives expression to the views of these Prime Ministers to the recent happenings in Egypt and in Hungary and points out the danger of war inherent in the present grave international situation.

In spite of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, sporadic fighting continued and there has been no attempt at withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory. It would appear indeed that these forces have established themselves firmly on Egyptian territory and have no present intention of leaving it. If these foreign forces continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the situation is, likely to deteriorate rapidly and bring the danger of fresh military operations nearer.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France, though apparently accepting the United Nations Resolution, have laid down certain conditions which are not consistent with that resolution. The Prime Minister of Israel has continued to insist that he will not evacuate Gaza. If the foreign forces are not wholly removed from Egyptian territory, this will amount to a clear violation of the United Nations Resolution.

Meanwhile, India has agreed to send a contingent of her armed forces for the United Nations International Force and this contingent is expected to leave India by air today. This United Nations Force will not be concerned with the Suez Canal issue as such, which can only be considered separately after peace has been fully established and all foreign forces removed. The main task of the international force is said to be to ensure that Israel remains within the demarcation lines set by the old Armistice Agreement.

The accounts that have appeared in the newspapers have not indicated that the fighting in and around Port Said was severe. We have received some accounts of this fighting and these show that the casualties, chiefly among Egyptian civilians were very

heavy, running into many thousands. Conditions in Port Said have been distressing in the extreme. We are taking immediate steps to send a large stock of medicines by special aircraft to Egypt for purposes of relief.

The story of the past three and a half months, ever since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company is full of tragic drama, and events have happened which I would have thought could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find it a little difficult to deal with this record of unabashed aggression and deception. The explanations that have been given from time to time, contradict one another and exhibit an approach which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and African countries and to world peace itself. It has brought misery and disaster, hatred and ill-will, with no gain whatever, and, in addition, we live now under the threat of possible world war.

During all the controversies since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Egypt has conducted herself with a large measure of propriety and forbearance. Without the least justification, Egypt was attacked not only by Israel but also by the United Kingdom and France. Whether there was any previous consultation between the aggressor countries, I do not know. But it is obvious that their plans fitted in, and the Anglo-French attack helped Israel's aggression and was itself helped by it. Egypt, the victim of Israeli aggression, was attacked immediately after by the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France. It was only the widespread indignation of peoples not only in Asia and Africa but also in Europe and America and the action taken by the United Nations that put some check on this aggression. But it appears to me that the ceasefire having taken place, there is a tendency to complacency and to allow matters to drift. Indeed, there has even been some attempt made to minimise and justify this utterly unprovoked and brutal attack on Egypt. Attention has been diverted to some extent to the grave and distressing occurrences in Hungary.

Even as we were distressed by events in Egypt, we viewed with grave concern and distress events in Hungary. It is possible that what happened in one of these countries produced its reactions in the other, and both created a very serious international situation. But it is well to remember that though both deserve serious attention, the nature of each differed from the other. Neither can be held to justify the other.

We are concerned with an attack on freedom anywhere in the world. We are concerned also with strong nations dominating, by armed force, weaker countries. In regard to Hungary, the situation was obscure for some days, and it was only gradually that the story of the tragic events that have taken place there, became known. From the very beginning, we made it clear that, in our opinion, the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their own future according to their own wishes and that foreign forces should be withdrawn. That has been and is our basic view in regard to Hungary. This has been repeated in the joint statement of the four Prime Ministers.

There was a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly in regard to Hungary, sponsored by Pakistan, Cuba, Italy, Peru and Ireland, against which we voted, and as some criticism has been made in regard to our vote on this resolution,

I should like to remove any misunderstanding that may have arisen. The resolution was, in our opinion, improperly worded. But the most Objectionable part of it demanded that, elections should be held in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations. We took strong exception to this because we felt this was contrary to the Charter and would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign State. Any acceptance of intervention of this type and foreign supervised elections seemed to us to set a bad precedent which might be utilised in future for intervention in other countries. The resolution was voted paragraph by paragraph. We abstained from voting on all the other parts of the resolution. In regard to the paragraph about elections under the United Nations supervision, we voted against it. When the whole resolution including this paragraph was put to the vote, we also voted against it because of that particular paragraph to which we objected strongly.

....XXX.... XXX.... XXX¹....

The hon. Member would hold his soul in patience. He will get every kind of information which he desires, and much more too.

....XXX.... XXX.... XXX²....

This voting on this particular resolution was entirely in consonance with our general policy and instructions. It seemed to us that this resolution, apart from the basic objections we had to a part of it, would not prove helpful to Hungary at all. We were trying to get the Soviet forces withdrawn from Hungary. What was proposed in the resolution would come in the way of that withdrawal and an attempt thereafter to intervene with armed force would have led to a major conflict. It might well have led to Hungary perishing in the flames of war. The people of Hungary had already passed through a terrible ordeal and it was the duty of other countries to rescue them from further warfare and destruction and, at the same time, to create conditions which would enable them to recover their free and separate individuality and have the government of their choice.

We are arranging to send relief to Hungary as early as possible.

The tragic dramas that have been enacted almost before our eyes, have demonstrated the inherent dangers of a recourse to arms to settle any problem. The Israeli and Anglo-French attack on Egypt has not only brought infinite suffering to the people of Egypt, but has let loose evil forces which are driving the world towards destruction. The recourse to force and the armed intervention in Hungary have not only cost the lives of many brave men and women, but have also checked a progress towards greater freedom which we had welcomed.

The world appears now to be in the grip of the fevered psychology of war, and I am reminded of the months preceding the last great war. I am convinced that it is not by war and violence that these problems will be settled or freedom established. I am convinced that colonialism, whatever new look it may put on, can revert to its old brutal self, and the only remedy is for it to give place to freedom.

The world stands facing great danger, and it may be that the little wars we have had, are only a first round and bigger conflicts lie ahead. In particular, the ambitions of strong nations imperil weaker countries. The only hope lies in the United Nations, representing the world community, succeeding in putting an end to the law of force and substituting for it a more civilised method of dealing with problems. Today, the choice lies between the hydrogen bomb and the Panchsheel.

BACK NOTE

LV. Statement Regarding International Situation, 16 November, 1956

1. SHRI KAMNATH (Hoshangabad): Under instructions?
2. SHRI KAMNATH: I am prepared for the worst.

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

19 November, 1956

Mr. Speaker, Sir, three days ago, on the 16th of November, I made a statement in this House on the international situation with special reference to Egypt and Hungary. In initiating this debate, it was not my intention to say much at this stage, but rather to reserve my remarks to the end of the debate when hon. Members have expressed their views. I feel, however, that it might be desirable for me to bring before the House some later developments in regard to these matters.

I beg to move:

“That the present, international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

I need not point out to this House how important this debate is. It is important because the issues before the world today are of high importance and deal with questions of war and peace and the suppression of freedom and issues that affect us too directly as well as indirectly. What we say in this House is not merely listened to by our Members here, but has a much wider audience in this country and even abroad. Therefore, I feel rather burdened with this occasion and I wish to use language which, I hope, will not in any way come in the way of such peaceful developments towards peaceful settlement as might be taking place. Three days ago, I mentioned that the situation was a very grave one and although there appeared to be some elements of progress in it, nevertheless, it continued very grave and was viewed by us with concern. That position remains as it was although there are some elements which may be considered to be helpful. But, basically, the situation is a very grave one. I hope, hon. Members also, in considering these matters which are before us and the world, will do so calmly and objectively and, if I may use the word with respect, with some caution so that their words and our words may not lead to greater tension, and might put perhaps some difficulties in the way of what we seek to achieve.

Now, we read our newspapers daily and everyday there are all kinds of reports and allegations, and naturally, we react to them. And yet it is not particularly easy for us to find out what is true and what is not true and what is perhaps exaggerated. We hear of Anglo-French troops landing somewhere in Israel. I believe this is contradicted. We hear reports of Soviet aircraft going to Syria. This is contradicted and it is said that except for some aircraft that went long before the crisis as a result of purchase by the Syrian Government, there has been no despatch of aircraft there. We hear so many other reports of this kind which either are directly contradicted or are not substantiated. In these cases, there is a very great difficulty for a responsible body like us or for the United Nations to proceed on the basis of unconfirmed reports and it might very well not only create complications but come in the way of giving a correct lead if those events happen to be not true, on which the reports were supposed to be based.

Only recently, we have had reports of deportation of people from Hungary, specially young men, deportation, it is said, by Soviet authorities. Now, the Hungarian Government has denied in the United Nations. So has the Soviet Government. I believe even today a resolution has been placed before the General Assembly on this subject based on the newspaper reports which are denied by apparently the two Governments which are most concerned and which should know. Now, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for any one to come to a conclusion without further information or further enquiry into the matter. In fact, I believe it was stated in the General Assembly on behalf of the Hungarian Government that they not only categorically deny this but that they have taken steps to allow some representatives of the workers, young men etc., to go themselves, to sit at the various points of exit from Hungary, to see if anything was being done there or anybody was sent away. Now, it is quite conceivable it is only a guess that these young men or workers were being sent to see things for themselves, and it might have been thought that they were being deported. I do not know, I am merely pointing out the difficulty of getting a correct picture.

Now, in regard to Egypt, as the House knows we in India have been intimately associated with events during the last few months. To begin with, even our relations with Egypt are intimate, and we are in constant touch with what happens there. Ever since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, we were in very intimate touch, so that whatever happened did not come to us without any foreknowledge of the events preceding it. That is, we were in a position, we were in a much better position to judge that situation. It was an open situation at that time. Later things have happened in Egypt which are rather confusing, say, the state of affairs at Port Said etc., but the broad facts were clear to us and therefore we ventured to express a very clear and definite opinion about it.

In regard to Hungary, there was a difficulty that the broad facts were not clear to us, and also the occurrences in Hungary took place at a moment when suddenly the international situation became very much worse and we had to be a little surer and clearer as to what had actually happened and what the present position was. Therefore, we were a little cautious in expressing our opinion in regard to facts. We were not cautious about expressing our opinion in regard to the general principles that should govern conditions there. As the House knows, right from the very beginning we made it perfectly clear that in regard to Hungary or in regard to Egypt or anywhere else, any kind of suppression by violently elements of the freedom of the people was an outrage on liberty. I said that and I made it perfectly clear that firstly foreign forces should be removed both from Egypt and Hungary although the two cases are not parallel, the facts are different, but this fact was there; secondly that the people of Hungary should be allowed, should be given the opportunity to determine their future.

I believe even now facilities are not being given both in Hungary and in parts of Egypt occupied by foreign forces like Port Said, like the other parts occupied by the Israeli Army, to outsiders to go there. On the last occasion I said in this House that from the reports we had received, conditions in Port Said were very bad and that

casualties were heavy. The statement I made was cautious. The reports which we had received were much worse than what I had said, but because I did not wish to proceed on those reports without further confirmation, I moderated my language in describing it. The fact is that even, up to now, so far as I know, nobody is allowed to go into Port Said. The reports that came to us previously were partly from refugees and we do not usually attach very great importance to a statement of excited refugees not that they deliberately misrepresent, but they are emotionally wound up and they tend not to give a correct appraisal of events. The reports that came to us about the events in Port Said were the reports of some foreign journalists who had gone to Port Said at the peril of their lives and who had made these statements in foreign papers in Europe, Even so, we hesitated to accept them because they were so bad that we thought they should be confirmed. In fact, we have been suggesting in the case of Egypt, as in the case of Hungary, that it is desirable from every point of view even from the point of view of the occupying forces, that impartial observers, preferably sent by the United Nations, should go look at the things there and report. I earnestly trust that the Governments or the authorities concerned in both places' will permit this to be done, otherwise all kinds of wild reports are circulated and believed in.

We have been, receiving fairly full accounts; dispatches from our Embassies abroad, our Missions abroad. Almost daily we get these reports from New York, from Washington, from London, from Moscow, from Belgrade, from Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Berne and some other places, from Vienna and Budapest also, because we have had one of our young officers in Budapest throughout this period. It was true that he could not communicate with us easily and his telegrams usually reach us now about six days' late because they have had to go to Vienna presumably by road and then they are dispatched from Vienna. Gradually the picture of events has taken some clear shape. All this daily information that we get not only from our Missions but by the courtesy of other Governments more especially I am grateful to the information we have received from the Governments of the United States, of Canada, of the Soviet Union, of Yugoslavia and some other Governments too, all these despatches have resulted in such an abundance of information which is often contradictory, which contradict each other. I will say it gives a picture which is a very confused picture, but it is true, I think, that one can make a fair appraisal of these Events. Now, may I just say without mentioning our representatives abroad, that I should like to express my appreciation of the work done by our Ambassador in Cairo which has been of a high order.

So far as the situation in Egypt is concerned, the House knows that the first contingent of our forces has already gone there. Others will follow. I want to make it perfectly clear on what conditions we sent these forces to join the United Nations' forces. First of all, we made it clear that it was only if the Government of Egypt agreed, only then we would send them, secondly they were not to be considered in any sense as a continuing force continuing the activities of the Anglo-French forces which was entirely a separate thing, thirdly that the Anglo-French forces should be withdrawn, fourthly that the United Nations force should function to protect the old

Armistice line between Israel and Egypt, and finally that it should be a temporary affair. We are not prepared to agree to our force or any force remaining there indefinitely. It was on these conditions, which were accepted, I believe, that these forces were sent there. I repeat this because, unfortunately, statements are sometimes made about this United Nations International Force which are not in consonance with the decision of the United Nations or, I believe, with the agreements arrived at by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with Egyptian Government.

Then, the first question that arises in Egypt at the present moment in regard to the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly is that of the withdrawal or the Anglo-French and the Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. This is a dangerous issue because if there is any attempt to create delay and certainly if there is any attempt not to withdraw, there is likely to be a resumption of hostilities which, I think, will be on bigger scales than earlier.

It is stated—and I believe on fairly good authority—that there has been some days ago, perhaps, some addition to these forces. One does not know when sometimes forces are exchanged, some are withdrawn and some are sent and so one cannot say. But, anyhow, it is a vital matter that Anglo-French and Israeli forces should withdraw from the area they have occupied because without that nothing else can be got going and so long as they remain, there will be constant fear of hostilities being resumed.

I have already mentioned about Port Said which requires immediate attention and which can only be done properly by observers being allowed to go there and report. The House may know that we are sending—I think tomorrow—a very large aircraft, in size about 3 Dakotas, of medical supplies and relief goods which are being taken both to Egypt and to Hungary.

In Hungary, as I said, the conditions, especially the rather detailed developments, were for some time not at all clear to us. I am not quite sure if they are completely clear even now; but, I think the broad facts are clear enough. There is little doubt that the kind of nationalist uprising which took place there after demonstrations etc. developed, after coming into conflict with the Soviet forces there. The Soviet Forces were withdrawn from Budapest and a statement was issued on the 30th October, embodying the Soviet policy in regard to these countries, which stated that they would withdraw their forces after consulting the Warsaw Powers and so on and so forth.

It is a fact, I think, that they were withdrawn. But, very soon after, other events occurred in Budapest—and this matter is not quite clear—I think not in Budapest but in Hungary and within 3 or 4 days the Soviet forces returned and in far greater mechanised power. There were big conflicts in Budapest which were ultimately suppressed by the Soviet Armed Forces. Some people say that even while the Soviet Forces were withdrawing from Budapest roundabout the 29th or 30th, actually the Soviet Army had come across the frontier and that this was not—if I may use that word—a *bona fide* withdrawal at all others think that something happened in the course of those two or three days which made the Soviet Government change its

policy, because we must remember that before any Government does that, more especially the Soviet Government or the Soviet Government or any major power, all these separate questions are weighed presumably in the light of other international developments and with the possibility of a bigger flareup. That is always in their mind. Anyhow, the fact remains that the Soviet Forces came back and there was a major conflict in which a fairly large number of Hungarians suffered as they fought very bravely. And, it is possible that the Hungarian Army itself was on the side of the Hungarian people and in the initial stages the Soviets also suffered fairly considerably, though, naturally, in lesser numbers. It is not, at the present moment, of any great importance that we should know the details of this. The major fact stands out that the majority of the people of Hungary wanted a change, political, economic or whatever the changes were, and actually rose in insurrection after demonstrations etc. to achieve it but ultimately they were suppressed.

I think it is true that there were some elements on the side of the Hungarians which might be called by a word which is rather misused sometimes, 'Fascist' elements. I think it is true that outsiders also came in because the border forces were not functioning and I think it is also true that arms came from outside to some extent. All that is true. But, while all that is true, this is not the major fact. The major fact is that the people of Hungary, a very large part of them, claimed freedom from outside control or interference, objected to the Soviet Forces coming, wanted them to withdraw and wanted some internal changes in their Government. That is a basic fact which nobody can deny.

Another rather implicit feature of the situation, perhaps, more significant than even the fighting that the Hungarian people indulged. It is the fact that when fighting stopped—It stopped some days ago, I think they are not fighting now—certainly in Budapest not in Hungary—in spite of all this, there was rather an extraordinary demonstration of passive resistance. That is, the people of Budapest refused to go back to work, refused to take part in other normal activities at a time when the city was suffering very greatly by the stoppage of work during the period of armed conflict. In spite of all that resistance, to forces by fighting, this resistance of people in a peaceful passive way seemed to be, so far as I am concerned, more significant of the wishes of their country than an armed revolt which might be aroused by some groups here and there.

I wonder how many of the hon. Members present here have in mind the past history of Hungary. It is a rather tragic history with frequent attempts to attain freedom, frequently suppressed. During the regime of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, there were such attempts. We know well, nearly 40 years ago, when we in this country first had this picture of non-cooperation put before us by Mahatma Gandhi what we were told; and we really read about the kinds of non-cooperation or something like it in other countries. Among those countries, more especially it was in Hungary, where somewhere in the middle of the 19th century, a movement of passive non-cooperation, passive resistance arose under the leadership, I think, " of O'Dver, which achieved some objectives too, though not completely. But then, 5 weeks before the First

World War was over, just after the October Revolution, as it is called or soon after, I do not exactly remember the dates, but anyhow, in 1918, there was an upheaval in Hungary; Austro-Hungary was breaking up; the German armies had been there and they, were withdrawing and there was an upheaval more or less on the lines of the upheaval in Russia at the time. The leader of that was one Belakuhn, an associate of Lenin and he established the Republic of Hungary. That was a time of intervention by other foreign countries in the affairs of the Soviet Union after the Revolution.

The Rumanian Army marched into Hungary then, and suppressed this new Republic of Hungary and suppressed it, so far as I can remember, in an exceedingly ruthless manner. In fact, it was not merely a suppression of the Republic, but widespread loot of Hungary by these armies. As a result of that the Republic of course, ceased to be and a regime was established under Admiral Horthy, a kind of feudal regime; hon. Members may perhaps remember that Hungary has been in the 19th and 20th centuries one of the most feudal countries in Europe, with very large landholders, with very outdated aristocracy. There was conflict between the various groups. Anyhow, Admiral Horthy's regime was there. I had a glimpse in 1918 when I happened to be in Budapest. It was not a very satisfying spectacle; then came the big war. I merely mention these just to bring to the mind of the House this tragic history of Hungary, and there are many names connected with Hungary which are famous in the fight for freedom of peoples. Anyhow there is little doubt that the present movement in Hungary was a popular one; it was a movement with the great masses of the people behind it, with the workers, with the young people in it; maybe, of course, a number of people against it, I cannot speak about all of them and this, I think, has, as I said, become even more patent by this passive resistance of the people inspite of the heavy army's strength being opposed to them.

So far as we are concerned, we entirely agree with what has been stated in the joint statement issued by the four Prime Ministers a few days ago. Apart from this, there is this aspect, if I may say so. The first thing, I think, is that qualified observers could go, whether it is Port Said, whether it is other parts of Egypt which are occupied by foreign forces or whether it is Budapest or some parts of Hungary, they should go and their mere visiting there will not, only bring out facts, but will open a window there, which the world can look in, and find out what has happened and what is happening.

Now, behind all these, there are all kinds of other forces at work and other dangers. We want naturally foreign forces to be withdrawn from Egypt as well as Hungary. Of course this question does not arise in Egypt, because there is a Government there, but in Hungary, it does arise. The House knows that during the last year or two, there had been certain currents and motions in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, itself, which have to some extent liberalized the functioning of the regimes there, which in Poland went perhaps farther than in other places, and the same ferment existed in all countries, and the fact Which has always to be borne in mind, not only by us but by other Countries was that if anything is done which comes in the way of this internal and organic process of change, which may well have

the opposite effect to that intended, there it becomes tied up with the larger issues of war and peace. What do we see behind these issues? In the final analysis—fear, fear of the Western Powers, of the armed might of the Soviet Union, fear of the Soviet Union, not only of the armed might, even more so, of the possible armed might of re-armed Germany. All over Eastern Europe, whether it is Poland or Hungary or Czechoslovakia and those countries which have suffered from invasion repeatedly from the German side, there is this fear of an armed Germany; there may be fear from the Soviet Union; it may be a balancing of fears, but there is that fear and because of the fear of the Western countries against the armed might of the Soviet Union, there came into existence the N.A.T.O. and much later, also the other pacts and military alliances like S.E.A.T.O. the Baghdad Pact and the like. Then came into existence as a counterblast the Warsaw Treaty, each pretending to be an association for peaceful defence against attack, each having, the effect really of frightening the other party and making it more apprehensive of danger and, therefore, helping in this race of armaments.

Because of this background, when situation arose in Egypt, that is to say, about 3 weeks ago, when the Anglo-French bombing of Cairo etc. took place, immediately there was a danger of this spreading. The Hungarian situation arose and the two taken together definitely, greatly added to this danger. Now, hon. Members will see—I speak with respect and with deference—it is not my intention in my present speech to go about condemning countries—not that their acts are not worthy of condemnation, but the fact is that because of these two, the situation in Egypt and the situation in Hungary, every attempt is made by one party to lay stress on what has happened in the other place so as to hide its own misdemeanour. There was the Anglo-French action in Egypt and there was a world outcry against it in the United Nations. Then came Hungary. Bad enough. But immediately it was made use of to hide what is happening in Egypt. The struggle in Hungary was the basic thing so as to somehow cover up the misdeeds in Egypt. Now on both sides this is happening.

Now, I do not mean for an instant to say that we are nobler or higher or purer than other countries. But we happen to be in a position which perhaps, to some extent, helps us not to get so frightfully excited about one side or the other and, therefore, we can view these events a little more objectively, perhaps.

Now, so far as recent developments are concerned, the House will know that only yesterday Premier Bulganin issued an appeal, I received a letter from him containing some proposals for a conference to consider the world situation and more especially disarmament. The various proposals have been examined and there is no doubt that disarmament is of high importance, more especially in this context. This question as to whether there is a conference or not and whether this question of “disarmament will be considered will really be decided by the Big Powers. We haven’t got a big army to disarm. Anyhow, in this context, it is the three or four Big Powers that really count. They have to decide this, if we can be of any help in this business, naturally our services will be there.

whether it is sooner or later, the Hungarian people, who have demonstrated so vividly their desire for having freedom, desire for having a separate identity and not being overshadowed by any other country, are bound to triumph. I have no doubt in my mind about that. Of course, I cannot say what intervening difficulties may come because of this world situation which is very very complicated.

But apart from that, we must realise that all these events have powerfully affected the prestige of the Soviet "Union in such matters not only in the many countries which are supposed "to be uncommitted countries but more in countries and governments which "believe in that country, European countries including, if I may say so, the people of the Soviet Union itself. That is a much more precious commodity—the respect that a country, its Government and its policy has— than anything else, financial or any that you may lose. We see today, therefore, powerful trends, I believe in every country whether it is the Soviet Union or England or the countries of Europe or America and certainly in Asian and African countries, trying to understand what has happened, trying to find out what they should do and in a state of considerable confusion. Even the clarity of those people who were intimately tied up with one particular policy, with one particular, if I may use the word, bloc of countries is not so quite clear in their minds as to whether that policy was the correct one. In the Soviet Union it was some time back that I said, two or three years back, that certain new trends displayed themselves and affected the life and activities of the Soviet Union and later the East European countries. But we have seen that the progress made was too slow in the East European countries and they wanted it to be more rapid, and this created a difficulty for the Soviet Union, thinking as they do, with the result of this conflict. Whether this conflict will lead to a greater liberalisation on the part of the Soviet Union or the reverse I cannot say. I would have been clear in my mind but for this complicated international situation. But apart from the immediate future, as I just said, I have no doubt that forces have been set in motion in all these countries among the rulers and among the common people—in all these countries including the Soviet Union or Western European countries or elsewhere—which make people think on somewhat different lines. They say, I believe, that they have been going along wrong lines. All the system of pacts and alliances, where has it led them? Not to peace or security, but to trouble. What is the position now of the Baghdad Pact. You may talk about the Baghdad Pact, but everybody knows that the Baghdad Pact is dead and it has absolutely no life left in it. What the SEATO alliance is doing I do not know, but we have not heard of it for a long time—it may be in a dormant condition. The Warsaw Treaty—we see the effect of it and the reaction to it in the East European countries. It may continue, that is, in form; it has lost its contents.

Regarding the NATO we have seen the differences between the powers included in the NATO. It has ceased to be, if it was so earlier, a kind of spiritual crusade. Both were in a sense spiritual crusades against each other. Both have lost that spirit of crusade. They have only become some paper arrangements behind which certainly are the armed forces which lack on either side their quality or the spirit which perhaps gave them some meaning previously.

So we have arrived at a stage when violence has interfered and the use of armed forces by the big countries, while apparently it has achieved something, has really showed its inability to deal with the situation. It is the weakness which has come out in the present day world.

But the fact remains that in people's minds violence has been shown up and 'this ferment is bound to continue working, I earnestly hope that as a result of all these we may survive this crisis and then take further steps towards disarmament, towards putting an end to all these military alliances which have proved so worthless and, in fact, proved so dangerous and try to fashion some new line of approach.

We have often been told, we know, that technology has greatly advanced, and technology has got us the atom bomb and hydrogen bomb which after all is the result of technological progress. When we reach higher levels of technique, the higher levels demand a higher level of international cooperation; they demand really a higher level of social organisation; they demand a higher level of international cooperation. You cannot have an advanced technology and an outofdate society and an outofdate system of international relations.

The difficulty is that while technology has gone up to hydrogen bomb, our international relations are still very backward and have not caught up to that. So long as they do not catch up, all these frictions will continue. In our aspect of this question we have "these ideas which people, often people of great merit and integrity, have pursued in crusading way—communism or other 'isms'. There is no doubt that the appeal of communism affected large numbers of young men, not today, but 38 or 39 years ago, and it has continued to do that in varying degrees. All kinds of organisations were formed—Comin form, Comintern and so on and so forth. Even though communism gradually became somewhat more, if I may use the word, respectable in people's eyes in the sense that communist governments functioned as other governments, nevertheless it had that aspect of some kind of religion often spread by intervention. Whether it was armed intervention or other intervention depended on circumstances. Gradually that has become less and less, but it is there.

The whole basis not of the internal economic system which is apparent—you may agree with me or not—but of the international implications of the internal economic system of the country is such as to create apprehensions about intervention in other countries. And we have seen, in fact, instances, but the most recent instance is the fact that undoubtedly the Government in Hungary was not a free Government, was an imposed Government, and that the people of Hungary were not satisfied. Ever since the last war, ten years have passed and more than ten years have passed, and if in the course of ten years in Hungary the people could not be converted to that particular theory, it shows a certain failure which is far greater, which seems to me the failure of the military coup. It indicates that all of us, whether, we are communists or non-communists or anti-communists, have to think afresh. We talk about violence. The question of Egypt has come up and the question of Hungary has come up. For the moment it has put aside other questions. Whether it is Africa or parts of Asia, essentially there is no difference, except that one gets used to evil. A new evil creates a sudden reaction, while the old evil we get used to. Therefore we have to view this

matter from this point of view that whether the evil is a new one or an old one, if it is based on violence, if it is based on the suppression of a country and a people by armed forces, then it is a bad thing and it has to be removed, liquidated, because so long as it is not done, it will create trouble and friction and possibly lead to war.

Therefore, apart from the outward features of the present crisis, there is this crisis of conscience, a spiritual crisis almost in peoples' minds. I hope that mere strong reactions to events will not smother this spiritual crisis, this attempt to find a better way of international cooperation. That way, I would submit, it has been shown cannot be based on", or cannot have any stability if it is based on armed forces being used to suppress' people, wherever they may be and however they may exist. If that fact is accepted, let us have full freedom, whether it is a communist society or an anti-communist society. If violence is once taken away and the ways of violence and the ways of suppression, then everything; all these theories, have a free field. They can be experimented upon and we shall learn by the experience of others, adopt such things as we like and not adopt things that we do not like and progress in this way.

There is one thing more before I finish. I have in view a certain controversy that has arisen in regard to India's voting in the United Nations on a resolution on Hungary. We circulated through the Lok Sabha Secretariat to hon. Members two speeches relating to Hungary delivered by our representative, Shri Krishna Menon on the 8th and 9th November. We got them day before yesterday.

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I am sorry. Anyhow, we got them day before yesterday and it was yesterday that I said that copies had to be made. A reading of these speeches will give a better idea than any quotation I can give.

I have today got further details of the voting in those days. I would have gladly circulated it, but I got the telegram only this morning. That resolution consists of nine paragraphs. I think some of you have got it. The first five paragraphs are what are called the "preamble"; the next four are called "operative". Now the voting on the resolution was on each separate paragraph. I do not know whether hon. Members want the exact figures, or what India did.

Preamble 1: India abstained. There were sixteen abstentions and: India abstained.
Preamble 2: India abstained.

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I will read out more or less it is the same, with slight variations.

In regard to the first part of the Preamble the abstentions were Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia. With slight variations this continued, the abstentions in the Preamble.

Preamble 3: As in Preamble 2; India abstained.

Preamble 4: India abstained with that Group.

Preamble 5: India abstained with the big Group.

Now we come to the operative part in which there are four paragraphs.

Operative 1: India abstained.

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There were four resolutions on Hungary. India voted in favour of one and abstained from some. We must read it in the context. When India abstained she stood for withdrawal, but I am for "the moment giving facts regarding the context and the way it was put.

The operative part is—

"Calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to withdraw its forces from Hungary without any further delay."

That is one.

The second is—

"Considers that free elections should be held in Hungary under U.N. auspices as soon as law and order have been restored to enable the people of Hungary to determine for themselves the form of government they wish to establish in their country;"

Here separate voting took place on the phrase "under United Nations auspices". In this voting, India voted against. So also, apart from the other countries mentioned previously, Ceylon and Yugoslavia. They voted against this phrase "under United Nations auspices". This was the only thing that India voted against in the whole resolution—the phrase "under "United Nations auspices".

In the remainder of paragraph 2 India abstained and in paragraphs three and four also she abstained. When finally the resolution was put as a whole with the phrase "under United Nations auspices". India voted against. That is the factual position.

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BACK NOTE

LVI. Motion regarding International Situation, 19 November, 1956

1. SHRI KAMATH (Hoshangabad): A welcome change.
2. ACHARYA KRIPALANI (Bhagalpur cum Purnia): We have got them here just now.
3. SHRI KAMATH (Hoshangabad): May I request the Prime Minister to tell us in each case how the Arab-Asian Group reacted and voted.
4. ACHARYA KRIPALANI: May we respectfully request the Prime Minister to read but the operative part.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The whole resolution?

MR. SPEAKER: Copies of the resolution have been circulated. Hon. Members may kindly look into the resolution.

Some Hon. Members: We have not got copies.

DR. LANKA SUNDARAM (Visakhapatnam): Only the two speeches of Shri Krishna Menon were circulated.

SHRI KAMATH: In view of the Prime Minister's categorical statement now, and also I believe on Friday, that the Government stands for and has supported the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Hungary, may I ask whether this abstention from voting on paragraph I of the operative part of the Resolution, is consistent with Government's stand?

5. ACHARYA KRIPALANI: We also voted against?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: At what time?

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: Who else voted against the whole resolution?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Apart from a number of countries associated with the Soviets, Yugoslavia, India, Poland Rumania, the Soviet Union, etc., about eleven of them.

SHRI KAMATH: Asian-African Group abstained?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is all I have to say. I beg to move my motion.

SHRI ASOKA MEHTA (Bhandara): We are grateful to the Prime Minister for the information he has given. We would also like to be enlightened why we abstained on some of these clauses.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have said that. It is because we did not like the whole context.

SHRI ASOKA MEHTA: I would like to know—let us take paragraph by paragraph.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Two or three resolutions were put out that day and we did not like the whole object and the context. These are broad directions; for instance, if there is a resolution, you have to see the context. You have to rely on the judgment at the time. One does not have much time to consider these matters.

SHRI KAMATH: May I request that copies of India's amendments...

MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Members will reserve their comments; they will have an opportunity to speak.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I suggest that the hon. Members may read speeches of Shri Krishna Menon, the Speeches that have been circulated because they deal with the points that have been raised.

SHRI KAMATH: I suggest that copies of India's amendments to this resolution may be furnished to us now or tomorrow. India moved some amendments but they are not available either in the Parliament library or in the Ministry.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not sure whether we moved any amendment to this resolution; there were amendments to the other resolutions; I am not sure whether they relate to this particular resolution and I have no further information on the subject.

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

20 November, 1956

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I am grateful to the House for the many kind words said about our policy and, in particular, the attitude taken up by Government in the course of the last few weeks.

When I spoke on my motion, to begin with, I pointed out and laid some stress on the gravity of the situation, gravity not merely because it was a question of war and peace but because many deeper issues were involved, and I appealed to the House to view them in that context.

Sometimes, if I may say so with respect, some hon. Members spoke with some levity as if this was a matter for making fun. Some spoke, as they often do, in some kind of an old world picturesque manner which had no relation to the facts of today. I was reminded: let us have first things first. I say, yes, first things first. But my difficulty is that many hon. Members never have the first things first before them, but they take the 9th, the 10th, the 50th and the 100th. They never get out of that out of thought in which they had remained. Shri Kamath talked vaguely of their going to establish a brave new world of democratic socialism. I wish them all good fortune in doing so. What has happened recently? A country, which prided itself on its democracy, like England has blown democracy to bits. A country like France, which had a big socialist party, supports this invasion of Egypt, apart from supporting what is happening in Algeria. Where is socialism and socialist party, I should like to know.

So far as communism is concerned, quite apart from the military adventure which it has indulged in, as I ventured to say, previously, it has done something which has uprooted even the deep faith of many communists, so that you see this uprooting of convictions and a grave crisis of the mind of the people who think of course, people who repeat old platitudes and so on that it is impossible to get anything across to them. Here is a deep crisis of the mind everywhere, apart from the deep crisis of the physical world which may lead to war.

We are told by hon. Members like Shri Asoka Mehta, what have you done in Algeria, what have you done in Cyprus, what have you done in Israel previously, as if the Government of India is a kind of boss for the whole of the world, orders it about and tells it, do this and do that or, as if, alternatively, the Government of India is a kind of debating society like the hon. Member's party which sits down, passes resolutions and then goes to bed with no responsibility left about it. We are a responsible Government, responsible to the country and responsible to the Parliament. We have to talk in a responsible way about a deep crisis. And the first thing to do is to avoid war and not talk bravely of democracy, of communism, of freedom or anything, because all those things fall if war is there. If war is there, there is no democracy left, there is no freedom left, there is nothing worth while left. That is the main thing.

Hon. Members say, why don't you go and do this? That is because we judge everything, first of all whether it is going to ease the situation or create a more difficult situation and lead to war. That is the first thing we see. That does not mean giving up any principle. But one does not shout out principles from house tops whether the occasion is appropriate or not. One does not bring in all the ills of the world simply because one does not like them.

There are in India itself a hundred ills. We know them and we are criticised for that and we also talk about them. But we cannot remedy them suddenly. We have to go through a certain process and work hard before we can gradually, step by step, remedy them. If we cannot do that in our own country, how much less can we do it in the whole world?

Apart from this political and military crisis that we see, if we look at the world, we see that is a platitude if I may say so a period of heavy transition from an old world to the new. Whether it leads to the new world or not, I do not know, but it is obvious whether it is political, economic, scientific, atom bomb that this is a period of tremendous transition and it is about time that our mind moved a little with this period and thought about it. Here is the old civilisation changing. I am not talking about the ancient civilisation, but what I mean by old civilisation now, is the present day civilisation which is changing economically, politically, culturally, for good or for bad. But it is changing.

Take, for instance, what is called a country with the most entrenched capitalism the United States of America. Everyone knows that thing; the United States today is capitalistic. But the capitalism in the United States is vastly different from what it was 50 years ago. It is getting more and more socialist. It is approaching in a certain direction, because the whole tendency in the world is in a particular direction. It is no good saying I do not like it. I may not like some things in Russia or England. But we have to look at these things objectively without sitting down in this block or this group. First of all, try to draw lessons from them for our own sake. What are we to do in our own country?

Secondly, wherever we have to function in international organisations, we have to function gently, politely, and in a friendly way, and to press our viewpoints, and not condemning this country or that country. We have sometimes to express an opinion which is tantamount to condemnation and we cannot help it. But the point is, if I may put it so, the old and the new are under conflict. There is something that is emerging in every country. We find perhaps, in a sense, the most advanced type of this thing in the technological world, in the United States. In the Soviet Union it is rather different but, nevertheless, each represents a particular type. We find them in some kind, and not only in some kind but with a great deal of ideological difficulty of war and conflict, and yet, we see both of them represent a new society, perhaps the other country representing it more. It may be good for us or bad for us. If anyone of you have gone to the Soviet Union, you will find this new civilisation growing up there. There is plenty of evil, there and yet this new civilisation is growing up and trying to break its shackles.

The interesting and fascinating part of it is that it was gradually breaking its shackles. It may not succeed and something else might come. But am I either strong enough or foolish enough to go about condemning America, Russia, England, because I do not like something and I consider myself an acme of perfection in democracy and socialism and every other quality that a country or individual could possess?

Sometimes people accuse us and say, "Oh, you are trying to be very superior, or trying to be, as the phrase goes, 'holier than thou'". We know very well our imperfections and the imperfections are greater than those of other countries. Let us not be afraid of them, because, if we do not realise this fact, we never grow and we shall never grow. The other countries are spiritually greater than us in many ways, and we may be so in some ways too. But we do not like this idea, if I may say so with all respect, of our sitting complacently and then thinking that we are spiritually greater even though materially we are not, and we may be poor. But, if we really grow spiritually, material things do not matter. It is because that we are not spiritually great, in the real sense of the word, that we look in others something which we condemn or criticise.

We sometimes venture to express our opinion. Well, we express our opinion, and why? For two reasons: firstly, we think that it is the right of every country, as of every individual, to express its opinion, and out of the welter of ideas truth sometimes emerges. Secondly, we are so placed and that is a virtue which we possess that we are not consumed with hatred of this country or that country, and if a country is consumed with hatred and fear, then its mind is clogged. I cannot think straight. I say with all respect that in the United States, there is no clear thinking about Russia just as there is no clear thinking in Russia about the United States, because the minds of both are clogged with indignation, with fear of the other and hatred of the other. The result is, naturally, all thinking is clogged. I do not say it is permanently clogged, but I am talking about a temporary phase. I have not a shadow of doubt that if they come to know each other more it does not matter whether they agree or not and they probably will not agree about many things hatred and misconceptions will go and they will realise one thing more than anything else, namely, that the other country, whatever it is, however wrong it may be in its opinion, is a living entity, a growing entity, has something new and worthwhile that has to be studied and has something to be learnt from. That is the important thing. That is why we have always sought to encourage contacts and mutual understanding.

Now, so far as we are concerned in India, we have had this advantage, and so have other countries too or at least some of them. That is, we can approach other countries in a friendly way. Whether we agree with them or not is a matter which is secondary. Because we can approach them in a friendly way and in a receptive way, we can profit by that contact and approach. We can profit by understanding them. At any rate, we remove the barriers of prejudice in so far as we can.

The greatest danger which the world is suffering from is this cold war business. It is because the cold war creates a bigger mental barrier than the iron curtain or brick wall or any prison. It creates barriers of the mind which refuses to understand

the other person's position which divides the world into devils and angels that we are the angels and the others are devils. We can take it that we have something angelic in us, something divine in us, but also that we have a good deal of the satan in us. Whether we are a country or individual, the whole point is that we should stress and try out the good in ourselves and take the good from others and thereby suppress the evil aspects.

Now, I claim this is a virtue for us, for our country, for this Parliament and for our people. We are not obsessed by fear. We are not obsessed by hatred of any country. We are not obsessed even with the dislike of any other country. You may dislike here and there but not any country. Therefore, our minds are a little more receptive than those of others whether it is Communist, anti-Communist or non-Communist or Socialist. I do think that is a virtue in us and it is in the good democratic tradition. When that goes, then it is bad for the world. When it goes completely, then there is war, and war means, as everybody knows, truth becomes a casualty. The first casualty of war is truth. If the first casualty of war is truth, apart from other casualties that follow the cold war also brings these casualties of truth, not adequately perhaps because the barriers are not so rigid and there is some kind of communication it encloses one's mind in a shell of prejudice. That is why wars and the cold war of the last few years, have been bad for the world, bad for humanity, apart from the damage that they have done. The cold war has resulted in these blocks of nations and fears, and a race of armaments and the like and all these treaties. We say, "Do not have any military alliance or pact". We honestly mean that, and yet, when I say that, I know the fear in the other party's mind.

Nobody likes spending vast sums of money on arms where they can better spend it. But why do they do it? It is because they are afraid that if they do not do it, something worse might happen. I do not think it will happen, but that is another matter. Why was NATO started? It was because of the fear of Russia. Why were the SEATO and Baghdad Pact started? It was again because of the fear of Russia or China. I think and I believe most of the Members of this House think that that way was the worst possible way of meeting that particular fear or apprehension; I think events have proved it. It is absolutely the reverse of it. Why was the Warsaw Treaty made? It was because of the fear of NATO and the fear of Baghdad Pact. So, there is action and reaction.

I believe the Russian leaders have said, "we shall withdraw every soldier from Eastern Europe; Poland, Hungary, Romania and other countries if the foreign soldiers from Germany are withdrawn". You may laugh at that, but there is something in it. It is because they are afraid, just as America is afraid; and, I have no doubt that ultimately all these soldiers will be withdrawn. I will give you an instance. I was reading today the full text of the recent joint statement issued by the Prime Minister of Poland and the Prime Minister and other leaders of the Soviet Union when they went, to Warsaw. I will read it out to you, because it deals with this matter; not that it represents my opinion, but it shows the mind of the Poles:

"Both parties (the Polish Government and the Soviet Government) discussed the questions connected with the temporary presence of the Soviet army units

on Polish territory. The parties have stated that so far no agreed decisions had been reached which might give the European States sufficient guarantees against the revival of German militarism. The continuous questioning by the revanchist forces of the correctness of the existing boundaries between the European States and in the first place the established and existing western boundary of Poland also is an essential factor impeding the normalisation of relations in Europe.

Both parties reached the conclusion that this state of affairs as well as the present international situation warrant the temporary presence of Soviet army units on the territory of Poland, which is also connected with the necessity of the presence of Soviet troops in Germany in conformity with the international treaties and agreements."

Now, that may be an excuse, but it does represent a fear. I wonder how many hon. Members remember that the present Polish boundary, the western boundary, has never been accepted by Germany. They challenged and said, "we will take back the territory". I offer no opinion on the merits of this question; but, at the back of these problems, the fact which I mentioned on the last occasion can never be forgotten that twice within my memory, and possibly more than twice in other people's memory, the German armies have desolated Eastern Europe and other parts of Europe too. Germany is a great country, great in the arts of peace and very great in the arts of war; it turns easily to the arts of war. It is great in science and all over Eastern Europe, there is a memory of German invasion. Therefore, one of the dominating thoughts in the mind of everybody in Eastern Europe, whatever country it may be, is, "let us not have another German invasion; let us protect ourselves from it". I believe personally that the German people as a whole at least a majority of them have no such idea, but the fact is that anything that leads to German militarism is frightening to them; and, as it is, it becomes for the western powers a question of taking no risk. Why did they start NATO? It was because they wanted to take no risk about the Russian power. They say and other parties say, "we will not take any risk". When it became a question of survival, then the five principles and platitudes do not go far enough; it is a life and death struggle. A cold war is exactly the production of that.

Look at this problem today. We have arrived at a sudden international crisis, if I may say so. The crisis, of course, has been brewing all over the place in a sense more especially from what followed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the crisis brewed and the House will remember that the Anglo-French forces were sent to Malta and Cyprus soon after nationalisation. They were not moved for some time; they were sent by aircraft carriers, ships of war and others, creating a greater crisis than actually existed and frightening people that a world war was coming. This was the development taking place on one side. On the other side, there was the other development, internal ferments taking place in Poland and Hungary and to some extent in other countries of Eastern Europe too. In Poland they gradually resolved themselves peacefully. The movement was identical. In fact, the movement in a sense was given the start in Soviet Russia itself by loosening certain restrictions and shackles that they had in Poland. In

Hungary it did not happen that way and I venture to think that it is quite possible I cannot be certain of it, nor can anyone be that this warfare in Hungary resulting in the suppression by the Russian troops would probably have taken a very very different turn if there had been no invasion of Egypt. That thing suddenly let loose all kinds of evil forces, fear and others. First of all, it brought matters to a head. There may be an international war and if there is an international war, well, we are going to take no risks about it.

Secondly, the example of countries like England and France with their high reputation as a democratic world doing something now in the middle of this 20th century released the bonds of law and order and international relations that normally exist to some extent not to a full extent and it became easier for other countries to do likewise, especially when fear was attached to it. What is that fear? I am trying to understand and analyse it. If something happened in Hungary, it made Hungary a hostile power to Russia. Then the hostile frontier comes up to the Soviet Union. Then this may have affected Romania and Bulgaria and upset things; and, in addition to German militarism, this, that and anything may happen. You may say and I may agree with you that all this was not quite justified. But, if I may say something else, I was discussing these matters once with a great Russian leader and I ventured with all respect to point out to him that the kind of speeches they delivered were not very helpful towards international understanding and they sometimes infuriated the people. He said, "You are quite right; we sometimes do these things. But remember that for the last 30 or 40 years, we have been in a state of siege and we have developed all the complexes of the people who live in a state of seige. We react quickly to the danger and fear of something. We think this is too great a risk. We have got into that habit and we sometimes say many things and regret afterwards". There is this psychology.

Today it may well be said that no country wants war and yet each country is afraid of the other and prepares for war.

Acharya Kripalani said something which surprised me, which I thought was not all justified. He was talking about the voting on the Resolution. He said that Yugoslavia voted as they did because they are in fear and terror of Russia. I do not think that anything can be more unjustified than that remark. Yugoslavia, like the other countries, does not go about like Don Quixote with lance in hand, perhaps like some friends of our Socialist Party do, tilting against wind mills, announcing their principles to the world. They have to understand the world as it is. They do not just announce to the world that the world is bad and it ought to be better and go into meditation. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia, for the last so many years, has stood up against the Soviet Union at great risk, tremendous risk, and stood up by its principles. Lately, in the course of a year or two, some of the barriers between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have been removed: removed chiefly by the Soviet Union, not by Yugoslavia except that Yugoslavia agreed to the removal. The initiative came from the Soviet Union. The initiative came from the Soviet Union because of the inner ferment and changes that are taking place in the Soviet Union itself, not because of fear of

Yugoslavia but because of this ferment. They have been removed and Yugoslavia's influence in that part of the world has been very considerable. What happened in Yugoslavia has affected naturally Poland, Hungary and other countries. It has affected to some extent Russia itself. It has affected other countries. Yugoslavia has been playing a role of helping and encouraging these movements, two types of movements you may say. One is towards liberalisation or democratisation in their own sense, not perhaps in your own sense, and secondly that each country should be completely independent and not within the influence or dominion of any country or compulsion of any country. They can develop. The Yugoslavs are socialists, communists, not communists exactly as the Russians are. They have their own view of communism. They say, each country must develop socialism in its own way which, I think, is a perfectly legitimate way of looking at it. Anyhow, I shall venture to say that they have resisted throughout and not given up their own policy and their own attitude either through fear or any other impulse emanating from Russia. To say that they were afraid and gave their vote in this manner, seems to me quite an extraordinary thing. I mention this specially because I believe that the Praja Socialist Party has had a high opinion of Yugoslavia and its policy. Some of their leaders have gone to Yugoslavia.

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I am very glad to hear that. They have gone there, they have conferred with them and representatives from Yugoslavia had come to their conventions, congresses and conferences. I might say that in the last two or three years, some of us in the Government of India and the Government of India itself have come into fairly close contact with Yugoslavia on the personal level, on the governmental level and Yugoslavia has become a country with which we exchange our appraisals of the situation more frequently than any other country. We attach great value to this in regard to Europe. That is because Yugoslavia, first of all, is geographically so situated as to be in intimate touch with the developments in Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe. Secondly, historically, linguistically it has been intimately connected with them. The history of the last 30 years has seen both the closest union of Yugoslavia leaders with the leaders of Russia and other countries in Europe and also their parting company with each other and the subsequent coming together again. The result is, the leaders of Yugoslavia, more especially, the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, are in a better position to make appraisal of the situation. You may or may not agree; that is a different matter. But, it comes from persons of great ability and great experience. Because, experience is not a question of high principles sitting here, but of knowing and trying to get what is at the back of the mind of the other party. So, we value them very much. I am free to confess that we have, to some extent, been guided by their appraisal of the European situation. So far as Asia is concerned, we presume to know a little more than they do and perhaps sometimes they are guided by our appraisal in regard to Asian situations. In regard to the European situation, we certainly attach value to what they say.

I was reading this morning a report of a speech that President Tito delivered, I think, on the 11th of November at Pula. It is a long speech. But, the Yugoslavian

Government have been good enough to send the twenty page speech to me by telegram, which reached us yesterday. I was reading it. It is his analysis of the situation in Hungary, in Egypt, in Europe, in the world. The analysis that he has made is special to him. I mean to say that I have not seen any other analysis which would fit in with any other conclusion though analysis may be part of the same. It is true that the objectives before him are not exactly the objectives that any country may have or we may have. That is a different matter. What I submit is, here is a person who has been working for the last few years in his own quiet way for this process of democratisation in the Eastern European countries, changes in Russia, etc., and has played an important part in it. He knows the leaders of those countries thoroughly. He can talk their language, not having interpreters in between. His appraisal is therefore helpful. I am not going to read the 20 pages of the appraisal except to say that in many points it seems to be very correct though in some I find it a little difficult to agree with him. One thing I would read out to you, the remarks that he has made about the present Hungarian Government. I say that because, to my amazement, an hon. Member on this side of the House, in his excitement, talked about Mr. Kadar as a quisling, imposter, as a puppet and what not, and wanted him to be thrown out of the window or some such thing.

I do, if I may say so, with all respect, a little more responsible thinking and responsible talk in this House. I am sorry that such utterly ridiculous statements can be made by any Member of this House even though he may be a Member of my Party. Mr. Kadar I do not know, I am prepared to say does not perhaps command the allegiance of the majority of the Hungarian people. That is a different matter. But, to run down an individual whose whole life and career has been one of fighting and struggling for freedom, who has been sent to prison by the Communist Government in Hungary for a number of years and kept there, that is to say, by the previous Government or the Stalinite Government, if I may call it, and kept in prison for years and who has come out now and who was a member of Mr. Nagy's Government, a senior Member—just to call him a Quisling and all that really does seem to me to go to an extreme limit of irresponsible thinking and speaking.

Other Members said: "Do not recognise this Government." I do not quite understand how those hon. Members think about these problems. Recognition and non-recognition. We have recognised Hungary as an independent country. If some hon. Member tells me it was not independent, not wholly independent, I might be prepared to agree. But I would add there are very few countries in the world which are wholly independent and whose leading strings are not in somebody else's hands. They may be independent countries, in the United Nations they may vote this way or that way, but I doubt very much if their voting is hundred per cent free voting. Quite a large number of countries would fall into that category of lacking complete independence.

I am just reading a paragraph from President Tito's long speech. After the analysis, he said:

“We must help today the Kadar Government. Comrades, I have gone a little away from the matter of which I have spoken. I wanted to tell you that viewing the current developments in Hungary from the perspective of socialism or counter revolution, we must defend Kadar’s present Government. We must help it because it is in a very difficult situation

I will not read more. The point is that the situations that a country or the world has to deal with, are not black and white, are not simple. Very often in the world or in our individual life or our national policies one has to choose what is called the lesser evil. One might take a particular step in order to avoid a catastrophe, in order to avoid a war.

Some hon. Members seem to think here that everything that has happened in Hungary was dead clear and there was no doubt and we can deliver a fine speech about it. I can tell them that during these last twenty days or so,—because this crisis we might say arose in its present form with the ultimatum to Egypt by the United Kingdom and France round about the 31st October—during these days or the first fortnight certainly, my Ministry of External Affairs here worked: till the small hours, of the morning because we were in a difficulty what to do, what to say, what to reply, getting all kinds of messages from our own people, from other countries, leaders of other countries, at midnight, at one O’Clock at night, having to answer it immediately, sometimes trying to telephone to other continents. It was a difficult situation. A situation is not resolved by the enunciation of a maxim. One has to take a step to improve and a step that will avoid worsening the situation. And the first thing we had all the time in our mind was that we must avoid a war, we must do everything in so far as we can to avoid a war because if there is a war everything goes to rack and ruin: if there is not, one can repair the damage, one can gradually begin thinking on straight lines and do something. And to some extent that has been the fate of many of our diplomatic representatives elsewhere.

Hon. Member Shri Shiva Rao complained that we did not give the House enough information, that we should issue memoranda to Members from time to time. I should be very happy to give as much information as we can from time to time, but I do not quite understand what he meant. If Parliament is sitting, naturally if anything important occurs, it is my business to come to Parliament and state it, and no memorandum is necessary. If not, I can otherwise do it. But in these 2½ weeks—Parliament met on the 14th, from two weeks practically before that—with an everchanging situation, with facts not quite clear and our trying to get those facts, it was not an easy matter to issue a memorandum, lest we say a wrong thing or the right thing at the wrong time. Remember this: right may be right, but right said at the wrong time may create wrong. It is a very difficult thing, in these matters what to say, when to say and how to say it.

Then again, Acharya Kripalani said that our diplomatic representatives ought to have sensed that this was going to happen. Well, if they could do so, I would have been very happy, but how we should expect our young men to sense future happenings like this when, as far as I know, hardly anybody in the wide world knew of them, is

more than I can understand. It is a fact that in so far as the Israeli invasion of Egypt took place, there were some rumblings three or four days before. The House may remember that almost exactly one month before the Israeli invasion of Egypt, Mr. Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, declared that he was not in favour of a preventive war and he was not going to have a preventive war—just a month before he attacked Egypt in a big way. It is an extraordinary way for a Prime Minister to give that kind of assurance and break it within a month.

There were some rumblings in the sense that one felt it and presumably because—naturally, the resources of England and America are far greater than ours—President Eisenhower issued some kind of an appeal, a vague appeal, asking Israel and others to restrain themselves. There was some talk of people being ready for evacuation. We read that in the newspapers just a little before. Then came the Israeli invasion.

So far as the Anglo-French ultimatum was concerned, so far as I know, no country in the world including all the Commonwealth countries, including America which is a very close ally of England and France, knew anything about it till just before the ultimatum. I got a message just about simultaneously with the ultimatum, late at night. I got it late at night when the ultimatum was to expire at 8 o'clock the next morning I got it at midnight or thereabouts.

We need not go into this question which Acharya Kripalani and other people have repeatedly referred to. namely why were we not consulted. Nobody was consulted, even the United States which is of such great importance to the military and other policies of the United Kingdom, and there is naturally very considerable resentment in the minds of some—if not all, most Members of the Commonwealth—that in a matter of this kind they were not consulted. However, the point is it did come like a bolt from the blue, and no diplomatic representative, however experienced he might be, unless he dealt in some astrological methods, could possibly sense this.

Two or three months ago I met our Ambassador in Egypt while coming back from my visit to Saudi Arabia and Syria. He came to Beirut. I found him rather ill from sheer hard work. In fact, to my great dismay, as he and I were walking in a corridor in Beirut, he suddenly collapsed, fainted. It was astounding. We took him up, put him in bed and he gradually revived. Just so much overwork. I told him: "Please rest a little here in Beirut for at least seven or eight days." The day after when I came here, we got the news of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and immediately after this, news of British ships of war moving about. Poor man, he had to hurry back to Cairo. He went to Cairo and worked hard again all the time, because there 'was work in Cairo then, very hard work during these two or three months. When he was thoroughly worn out, we gave him a little leave and we thought that now, after the Security Council had decided the six principles on which the Suez Canal question will be settled, the danger of war was over. Most people thought so and actually a date was fixed or suggested by Mr. Hammerskjold, the Secretary-General of U.N. for the meeting of representatives of Egypt, England and France and may be some others. Curiously enough that date did not come up and on the day which Mr. Hammerskjold had suggested for the meeting, that very day the British ultimatum, the Anglo-French

ultimatum came. I think it was the 29th, if I am not wrong. And so, this poor man, our Ambassador in Egypt had just come away for a little rest, on casual leave, when on the second or third day of his arrival these things happened. He telephoned to me from Hyderabad and said, 'I must go immediately'. I said, "Yes; go back". How was he to go back? All the Airlines to Cairo had stopped. Then he said, 'I will go to Damascus'. The Demascus line was stopped. He said, 'I will go to Istambul and work my way through. He says, 'From here I go to Rome and go there'. He comes back from Rome. From there he goes to Libya and from Libya to Cairo. The roads are being blocked there and nobody can go there. He comes back to Rome and then goes to Khartoum and from Khartoum by road and river he finds his way to Cairo. This was the process of his going back.

Then, about the High Commissioner in London. Because of some quietening of the situation some leave was asked on grounds of health and she came here. Immediately these things came. The next day she telephoned to me here and said, ' I am ready to go back'.

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She was in Allahabad. She telephoned to Delhi. She said, 'I am ready to go back immediately!'. I asked her to come here first and then she went two or three days later. She could have gone two or three days earlier but there was trouble about her health and she went as early as she could.

One word about our representative in Hungary, about our Ambassador in Hungary. He is Shri K. P. S. Menon who is also our Ambassador in Moscow. He normally lives in Moscow but pays his visit there. That applies to several countries like Poland because we have not got men to put up Embassies everywhere. Because of this ferment in Hungary going on for some time, we had decided to send a more junior official to be stationed there to report to the Ambassador or his First Secretary. This young man arrived there, I think, about two weeks before this outbreak in Hungary. He has been there throughout. He has done good work. He is a very young man who has just arrived in a new country. But he has done good work. We have asked our Ambassador Shri K. P. S. Menon; who is also our Ambassador in Hungary to move there immediately and report.

A good deal has been said, either directly or indirectly, hinting at the fact that there has been some difference of opinion between the Government of India here and our Delegation to the United Nations. I should like to make it perfectly clear that there is complete unison of thinking and action in the Government of India and our representatives. First of all, before they go, we have long talks and we discuss the matter. Secondly we are, so far as one can be, in constant communication. One cannot do so always, naturally, because emergency sessions are held there constantly. Suddenly, at midnight resolutions are put forward and suddenly passed because of the emergency. Even today when we were sitting listening to the speeches here, I was summoned by telephone from New York telling me what was happening today. I may tell the House what is happening today. It is just as it was happening previously. Here is a resolution

Unfortunately, with all respect to my elders and others, this has gone into wrong hands. There is interference in such matters, especially Hungary, by such associations like the Association for Cultural Freedom, Democratic Research Service and so on.

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I am referring to the Democratic Research Service. I am referring to some organisation going by the rather pompous name of the Society for Cultural Freedom. I do not know what democracy and culture is there about the organisation. They are merely, political organisations; just like they have political organisations for this and for that, they have for culture and mainly and only for the promotion of Communism. So in spite of high-sounding names, these rival organisations have sprung up, normally with their headquarters in Bombay, closely associated with the Praja Socialist Party, doing propaganda for democracy and freedom in this peculiar way. So that is the difficulty.

Here are two very vital issues affecting the world, and instead of those issues being considered on their merits, each one of them is considered more from two points of view. One is the point of view of the Cultural Freedom Society; the other is just to run down our Government as a convenient handle to do so. It is unfortunate. Because of this the resolutions that are brought in the United Nations, not all of them but some of them, are brought largely with a political intent, that is, to down some parties, may be to down the people who are agitating in Hungary, to down the people in Egypt. Speeches are delivered from that point of view so as to divert public attention from one matter to another.

In the first week of November world attention was concentrated on Egypt, and as the House knows, there was a tremendous reaction all over the world against the Anglo-French and Israeli aggression in Egypt. Just then the Hungarian question came to the front. That it had been there and it deserved close attention undoubtedly and caused great concern I agree, but the way it was taken up again was that it was viewed almost with the relief that it happened in Hungary so that attention might be diverted from Egypt to Hungary, and in this picture the poor people of Hungary played little part. I am not speaking of those people; I am talking of those who look at it from this angle about the future of those people. They are thinking of the Hungarian question as a pawn in the chessboard of international politics, just as others who are thinking of the Egyptian question as a pawn in the chessboard of international politics. It becomes very easy to be swept away especially in the passion and excitement of the moment. It is the business of a delegation not to be swept away by this. It is the business of a delegation to check these things. So it is not a question of phraseology of a paragraph or a sub-paragraph, but the whole context of it, how it is produced and when it is produced. One hon. Member, I forget who he was, mentioned something about the tuning of it and the country who produced it. With all respect, none of the important countries put forward this resolution. They may vote for it afterwards, but they did not sponsor it. Why did they not sponsor it? They did not think it was a responsible resolution at the moment. Naturally when it came to voting, they thought they had

better vote for it. It all comes in this way. All this tremendous propaganda against India is raised in other countries and to some extent in India. India voted this, India voted that etc. It is obvious that the whole thing had a political motive and objective behind it, to run down India, because India had taken a strong line in the United Nations about various matters. That is the clear objective. Most people of course did not know all the facts, and one cannot blame them for the reaction they have. But I say that the objective of all this was to try to put the Indian Delegation and the Government of India in the wrong in this matter, and may be many people in India were affected by that barrage of propaganda.

I do beg of the House to consider this with regard to all the accounts or what is said. That is why. I took the unusual step of circulating the two speeches which Shri Krishna Menon delivered on the Hungarian question because the speech clarifies our attitude fully, and I want the House to read them and judge thereby. Therefore, I wish to repeat, to remove any misapprehension, that in this particular matter of the resolution, in regard to the speeches— naturally the speeches were not vetted by me before, but reading it subsequently—it does represent our view-point and that vote was a perfectly correct vote. If a similar situation arises, We shall again vote in the same way I wish to make it perfectly clear because our attitude to Hungary or Egypt will be judged. But we are not going to be dragged into a wrong formulation of the policy by a resolution which, according to us, is not properly phrased. It may be that a particular bit of it by itself may be right. If I may refer to hon. Member, Shri Kamath's amendment to this particular resolution which I have moved, part of that amendment may seem to be innocuous I am not going to accept any part of it, that is certain because, as Shri Kamath has frankly said, it comes with a different objective. He is opposed to our policy and he is perfectly justified in putting forward that. But, of course, I am perfectly justified in resisting that, even though a bit of it here and there may by itself sound good. I cannot take a bit here and a bit there.

May I refer to one matter which several Members have brought up the question of Israel and demanded from us the policy we followed in regard to Israel? We have made no secret of our policy or the reasons for that policy in the past. We recognised Israel some little time after it had entered the United Nations and had been recognised by a large number of countries. We recognise it because it was our policy to recognise any country that was an independent functioning country represented in the United Nations. We recognised it. We recognised a country which we had not long recognised for other reasons, like Spain, entirely for other reasons, but we came to that conclusion, whether we had disagreed in the past or at present with Spanish policy, and we are glad that we have recognised it and we have now representation from Spain here. Having done so, it is true that a logical consequence of that was to exchange diplomatic mission, subject, of course, to our having the personnel. But we were trying at that time throughout. I am talking about the last two or three years mainly to help in some way or other in lessening the gap between the Arab countries and Israel; not that we wanted to push ourselves in, but we thought perhaps we might be able to help. We tried that and we came to the conclusion that in view of the

existing passions, if we exchanged diplomatic personnel with Israel, our task would become difficult. There is no logic in it. It is a question of seeing the existing situation and deciding how best you can serve your objective in view. I told the Egyptian people and others about this, but I must say that progressively I have been surprised at the aggressive tendencies of Israel. There has been plenty of aggression on the other side and wild speeches made also. But if hon. Members will look at the record kept by the U.N. observers who have been sitting on the Armistice Line there, they will find that the number of aggressions from the side of Israel there have been aggressions on both sides have exceeded those from Egypt.

Finally, this last action of Israel has amazed me. It is the most foolish gamble that any country can play, quite apart from the morals of it, which are wrong. I am completely at sea at the present moment. Even, some months ago, I had some hopes that some kind of a settlement might emerge. But, at the present moment, my mind is completely blank in regard to a settlement between Egypt and other Arab countries and Israel. Such tremendous passions have been raised that a very great deal of time should elapse before the people could forget what had happened.

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This question has come up in a different context on many occasions and I have warmly defended that connection for a variety of reasons. It is perfectly true that, because of this Anglo-French attack on Egypt, this question had to be thought about afresh. It was a new and important factor and as some hon. Members have said, a veteran statesman of ours had been writing and speaking on this subject. So also others. Well, we have given thought to it and I spoke about it the other day, in Calcutta.

First of all, it is up to us to decide, when we so choose, when there is adequate reason for us to do so, as to whether we should leave the Commonwealth. I do not think, considering everything, that it is desirable for us, because of this particular happening, to leave the Commonwealth. I want a dissociated not that it need necessarily be dissociated consideration; I do not think it is right for us to act in such a way. Why do we take any action? To achieve certain results. The only possible result I see here is to exhibit our strong feelings in this matter. That is the result and that is something which may be worthwhile just to show. I do not think that we have been lacking in the expression of views about recent events in Egypt. We expressed them very strongly and nobody doubts them anyway. Therefore, to do that, merely to express again our views about it is not worthwhile.

Again, we have to consider it from both the point of view of the immediate problems and from a longer view point. The immediate problem is, again, how we can prevent the situation from deteriorating towards war I mean the world situation. We feel that any such action would not tend to help in improving the situation but would rather make it worse. That is one important consideration.

In another context too, we feel that, subject of course to there being, no war and presuming that the world somewhat settles down, we think that it is desirable that

should continue this Commonwealth connection. We think it is helpful; it can help peace; it has helped peace. That does not mean that a Member should remind me: how do you keep the peace immediately? We do not of course know but I say that you could not have done it otherwise either. We have to weigh so many problems that have come up and, more especially, in this growing complex world situation we do think that it would be wrong for us, merely to show our irritation and anger at certain things that have happened, to cut off this Commonwealth connection. We feel that it is good for us and, if I may say so with all respect, good for England too to have this connection. I know at least some of the other Commonwealth countries, whose opinion and whose friendship we value, would also very much like us to continue there. But, of course we live in a fluid state of affairs and I do not know how the international situation will develop; it depends upon that too.

There were many things said and I am sorry if I missed any points made in the debate. But, I would refer to one thing. Acharya Kripalani said something about the statement issued by some Members of our U.N.O. delegation. As far as I remember, all the Members who issued it, are Members of Parliament, very well known to hon. Members here. It is not for me to give them a testimonial. But, I will say this that, some days ago, they informed me—I did not know that they were bringing out a statement—that they were surprised at all this outcry going on about India's vote, they said: "We have done it in this spirit. We have heard the speeches and that was their opinion and they informed was the only line we can take". That me so. Then, ultimately, they decided to issue this statement which they have every right to do. Naturally, one does not expect the official members of the delegation to issue statements in favour of Governments action. But, I would like I hope the House will not think that I am doing this merely for the sake of formality—to express my high appreciation of the work of our delegation, more especially, of the Leader of the delegation. We have reached nearly a stage where there is this inner and deeper crisis which we have to resolve not because we are in any way better than any other countries, but simply because we are friendly to other countries and we have been put in a position where we can help a little.

In the course of the next few weeks, I am going to the United States, chiefly to meet President Eisenhower. I am greatly looking forward to this visit not only because the United States is a great and powerful country but because also President Eisenhower is a great man who has exercised his influence and has undoubtedly been, I believe, instrumental in the maintenance of world peace on every critical occasion. I am sure that meeting him will be a profit to me.

Here again, in about ten days or less than ten days, the Prime Minister of China, Mr. ChouEnLai, the leader of a great nation, our neighbour, a very important person and a very able person, is coming here. This itself rather lights up the way we function in the international sphere. We meet in a frankly and friendly way the great leader of the United States. We meet frankly and in a friendly way a very prominent leader of the new China. And in a sense, may be to a slight extent, we do become a link between people who have parted and who do not otherwise meet. That is a service we

can perform, not again, because of our being better than anybody else but simply because circumstances and our policy have placed us in that position.

The House knows how we have regretted greatly during the last many years the exclusion and worked for the inclusion of China in the United Nations. We have done so not only because we thought it the right thing to do but because not doing so seemed to us very harmful to the world, more harmful to the world than to China herself and, progressively, the longer China is kept out the harm to the rest of the world is greater than to China herself. The other day we put this matter forward again in the United Nations and some other resolution was passed, I believe, although some kind of a controversy has arisen over it whether it was regularly passed or not by sufficient number of votes. But we may do that in the United Nations regularly and people may think that we are just doing it formally, as a matter of course. But it is something infinitely more than that. We consider this matter to be of the utmost significance for world peace. We consider it utterly and absolutely wrong to go on keeping China outside the United Nations. We consider it injurious to the United Nations and to the other countries. For my part I am convinced that if China had been there many of the troubles of the Far East might not have taken place. And if China is not there, may be, other conflicts may continue to rise up. I do wish to lay stress on this.

I believe there are three amendments to this resolution. I have referred already to Shri Kamath's amendment. Then there are two amendments, by Shri V. G. Deshpande, which I think do not require any words of mine, a reading of them will convince every person that they have to be dropped like hot bricks. Then there is another substitute motion which is merely a commendation of our policy. I am too modest to say anything about it.

BACK NOTE

LVII. Motion Regarding International Situation, 20 November, 1956

1. ACHARYA KRIPALANI: My high opinion is not less because of this.
2. SHRI KAMATH: She did not come to Delhi?
3. SHRI KAMATH: On the 9th.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Take that resolution, the whole context of it.
4. ACHARYA KRIPALANI: Let us talk about both.
5. SHRI KAMATH: Let us sit down and do it.
6. SHRI KAMATH: Are you thinking of Bulgarian?
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am not referring to Bulgarian;
7. SHRI CHATTOPADHYAYA (Vijayawada): Could we know the reasons why, at this juncture, in spite of all that has happened to take us away from these Commonwealth, we still continue to be in the Commonwealth? The Prime Minister has not spoken about it.
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Thank you for reminding me.
The hon. Member reminded me of the Commonwealth connection.

REPLY ON MOTION OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

21 March, 1957

Mr. Speaker, Sir, President's Address which this House has been discussing deals with a period of about one year. But, perhaps, in a sense, we are discussing this address that is before us as covering even a longer period, *i.e.* the period of the life of this present Parliament, this being the last occasion when this Parliament will consider such an address, so that, a longer perspective is opened out to us, and perhaps even a longer period than five years, *i.e.* the period since we became independent.

It is right that hon. Members should scrutinise, criticise or condemn if they like, any particular aspect of our domestic or international policy or any event happening now or anything. But, at the same time, perhaps it is more important that we should have an overall view of this period to see how the main forces at work have been functioning shaping this country's destiny, whether in the political field, the economic or the social. It has been the high purpose and destiny of this House to lay the foundation and to start this new chapter in India's history to build democracy on a firm basis, to work and to labour for the advancement of the Indian people towards what we call socialism, anyhow to increase their standards of living in the near future as much as we can and step by step go toward the ideal we have placed before us. So, I would appeal on this occasion for this larger view to be taken, not because I want the smaller view to be put aside, but still even a small part of a picture is understood more if we have this broad and perspective view of the larger picture.

It is not my intention to go through the history of the last 10 years or five years at this stage of the debate. Merely I wish to draw the attention of the House to this larger view. We are apt often to lose ourselves; in the trees We forget the wood. In doing so, again, and in considering our policy domestic or external. It is perhaps profitable to look round the world and see what has happened elsewhere, how the world has shaped itself during this tremendous period of history since the last war ended, what has happened not only in the world at large, but in individual countries, what has happened in Asia, which, since the war, has shown a tremendous vitality and a tremendous ferment, what has happened in our neighbouring countries or the other countries of Asia. Because, then perhaps, we will have a better yard measure to see what we have achieved or we have failed to achieve.

It is easy, and perhaps right, for all of us to be impatient, to want to go faster, to be impatient of the many evils that surround us, to be impatient of the inertia, to be impatient of inefficiency and all that. It is right that we should be impatient all the time. We should never be complacent And yet, to balance that impatience, one should see this larger picture and see what has happened in other countries round about, Because, by and large similar problems are faced by other countries; not entirely;

each country has its own problems, its roots and its objectives. But, the world becomes more and more knit together and has to face the same problems and the same diseases overwhelming the world.

I put this thought before hon. Members of this House because, speaking with all modesty, and looking at this broad picture, I do feel that the achievements of this Parliament during the last five years, and the preceding Parliament too, that is, during the last ten years, the achievements of India and the people of India have been not only very considerable, but rather striking. I do not, for an instant, forget the lack of achievement during this period. But, I think it would not be right for us to lay stress on the lack of achievement or to lay stress only on the achievement. One must see both sides of the picture. Looking at both sides of the picture, I think it may be said with justice that we have advanced on the political plane, on the economic plane and on the social plane. Because, I do believe that a country today cannot really go far unless it advances on all these fronts together.

Most of us here, whether on the other side of the House or on this side of the House, were engaged for long years in the struggle for India's freedom. We were engaged in the Indian revolution and it was, as the world recognises, a major revolution even though it was a peaceful one. Even though it took another shape and its methods were different, we were engaged in a revolution. A certain political aspect of it having been concluded, we did not, I am glad to say, imagine that the work of the revolution had ended. We always thought, of the revolution extending to the economic and the social sphere. Maybe our approaches were different; maybe our line of thinking did not agree. Broadly speaking, we did all agree and I believe we did carry on this old political revolution to the economic and social field. Most of us, not all, were conditioned by these past events as the country was conditioned. When we pledged ourselves to our present tasks, however lacking in worth we might be, we had this basis of a revolutionary or semi-revolutionary background in the country. I am saying this merely to point out something that the people seem to forget—people not so much in India perhaps but people outside,—that we in this country are still the children of revolution. We have been conditioned by it largely. We may forget it; we may become weak and falter or slip. That is another matter. There is some difference between a country which has gained its freedom by some revolutionary process, peaceful or not, and a country which has by chance, you might say, attained a certain objective, because the revolutionary process conditions the people; their character, their ability to resist, to go ahead, their capacity for sacrifice and all that. It is true that after every outburst of revolution, one has so often seen that very revolution sometimes eating up the people who made the revolution, sometimes going back upon it, action and reaction. Anyhow, these are major conditioning factors. We have gone through that. When other countries judge us let them remember this that we are children of the Indian revolution and not merely persons who, by some automatic occurrence, gained freedom and who can be dealt with in a casual way as other countries sometimes are dealt with, because they gained their Independence if I may say so, rather accidentally and as a result of India's struggle for Independence.

There is this major difference which governs not only the past, but the present and the future for which we work. Because, we want changes. We work hard for them. Our attention, by and large, is concentrated on the economic and social changes that we want, on the growth and building up of a new India. Everything else is secondary to us. Everything else really comes in so far as it affects the primary purpose of ours. We cannot cut ourselves off from the innumerable foreign developments because they have a most intimate connection with what we do. We cannot be isolated. Nevertheless, our main object is to carry on this process of building India socially and economically as rapidly and as quickly as possible, knowing full well that this requires hard work, labour, sacrifice and time. It cannot be done by a stroke of the wand.

It would be interesting to look at other countries with whom we are friends and to whom we wish well. We started building democracy. We aimed at socialism, we aimed at higher standards. We aimed at a welfare State. How far have we succeeded in preserving the democratic structure and yet gone on ahead fairly fast, not so fast as some hon. Members think was desirable, nevertheless as fast as any country that I know of, in the circumstances? Look at even the countries that claim to be democratic how many of them have even the trappings of democracy, leave out the inner content of it. They are not many in the world. Certainly not many in Asia; they are very limited in number. Our neighbour with whom we have tried to be friends in spite of it, Pakistan, finds it very difficult to carry on with any democratic process.

Only this morning's news is that the whole Constitution of West Pakistan has been suspended by the President It has been suspended under Section 193 and there is not Constitution functioning in the whole of West Pakistan. It is the rule under Section 193. Now, sympathise; I am not criticising it. I sympathise with the people of Pakistan and the Government of West Pakistan. I am merely pointing out the difficulties they have experienced in maintaining even the trappings of democracy. I am not going into the inner content which is a much more difficult thing to have.

Two years ago, or was it three years ago, there was a great election in East Pakistan with a very big majority of one party and then within two or three months of the election, the Constitution was suspended. That may have been justified or not it is not for me to say. I am merely pointing out how difficult it has been for this neighbour country of ours to function in a democratic way, even in a most elementary sense. Indeed, it is stated there that they want what is called a controlled democracy, whatever that might be, something different from normal democracy. Look at other countries round about good countries, good people, struggling against flossiparous and disruptive tendencies, struggling inside the country; various groups wasting their energies in fighting each other; and some countries receiving, a good deal of foreign aid—military and other—but in spite of that aid not shall I say finding roots in democracy in free government. We talk about the free world. How many countries which presume to belong to the free world have the trappings of democracy or freedom in them? We all see this, and if you look at India, in spite of all these failings, I do submit that the democratic process has worked—not worked perfectly, because there is no perfection

in this world, but worked nevertheless with remarkable success, and at the same time the progress on economic and social lines has been very considerable. I am not for the moment going into the amount of progress that we have achieved. The House knows and the House can have different opinions, but I do submit that any comparison made, that any consideration of India, should, not only bear India in mind, but these major forces at work in the world and how they have functioned in various countries which have had to face more or less similar problems. That comparison is, I feel a revealing one in so far as our achievements both in democracy and in economic and social achievements are concerned. I add 'social' specially because it is no easy matter for a country like India to advance far in the social field by the democratic process. The laws that this Parliament approved of in regard to Hindu Law Reform were I think among the more remarkable things that this House has done, remarkable in the sense that a subject like that touches people intimately. It brings out all the inertia of a people who have lived long in an inert stage, socially speaking in an inert condition. It is difficult to get over that inertia.

People talk here about opposition and the like. The real opposition in India is not the opposition of hon. Members sitting opposite; that, of course, is there, but it is the opposition of all kinds of disruptive tendencies, flssiparous tendencies, inertia reaction, which in a great country like this is there, which we have to fight—all of us. So that, I would beg this House to have this broad picture of these last ten years, to see what we have achieved and also what we have failed to achieve, because we must learn, we must always be prepared to learn by our own experience, errors of omission or commission.

Now, in this picture foreign affairs plays a considerable part, though not the most important part. It was understood that it would be better to deal with the foreign affairs aspect during a later debate. I shall not say much about it, but some hon. Members referred to it at some length and I should like, therefore to say a few words and to correct a few misapprehensions which have arisen.

One of the major points for consideration and for discussion has been the question of Kashmir. I do not wish to say much. We have said enough about it and so far as the Government is concerned, it has stated its policy with clarity.

An Hon. Member—I think Shrimati Renu Chakravartty—referred in this connection to Lord Mountbatten, and I think her words were something to the effect that he had delayed or that he had come in the way of sending our forces to Kashmir when this trouble arose. May I inform her and this House that that is not a true statement? I speak, naturally, with personal experience of those difficult days.

Lord Mountbatten, as I have said elsewhere, far from delaying,—he didn't—functioned completely as a constitutional Governor-General. In matters of defence and other matters we often sought his advice because he was a very experienced man. In fact, I may say something which is not perhaps wholly relevant. In the days of Partition trouble here, that is immediately after the Partition, when we had to face, and Pakistan had to face on the other side a fantastic situation and a horrible situation,

Lord Mountbatten's experience was very helpful to us. We had formed a Committee, a kind of Superior Staff, which met every morning some Ministers of the Cabinet, some of the heads of Departments, some of the Heads of the Army, the Police etc. and it met every morning as if it was conducting a kind of military operation all over India, with maps and charts and everything—what the situation was— the internal situation, Pakistan situation, with regard to that problem huge convoys coming, of hundreds of thousands on foot, etc. It was an amazing situation. We could not deal with it in the normal way of Government and so we dealt with it in a way a war is conducted—with a rapidity of decisions and action—and we found that Lord Mountbatten with, his experience was of extraordinary help during those very, very difficult days and things went through which may have taken weeks and months. Every morning we met for two or three hours and every person had to report after twenty-four hours that the thing had been done. Somebody was made responsible. So, it is quite incorrect to say that Lord Mountbatten delayed. In fact, there was no delay. It was quite extraordinary, in fact it is quite a feat which our Air Force which was in a very incipient stage then could be legitimately proud. I think 48 hours elapsed since our knowledge of the first trouble in Kashmir, the first invasion of Kashmir. We were much upset by it, we did not know what to do. We tried to get some information. We sent some people there and they came back. Ultimately on the evening of the second day we had to come to a decision as to what to do. We sat in our Defence Committee for several hours because it was a very difficult decision, difficult from many points of view including the practical point of view because it is extremely difficult for us to reach there, and at 6 p.m. that day—I forget the exact date, whether it is the 24th, 25th or 26th October but round about that in 1947—we came to the decision that we must take every risk to save Kashmir from falling into the hands of those raiders who had killed and massacred and looted and committed rapine. We decided at 6 p.m. as I said. Before that we had no intimation of this. An entirely and absolutely false charge is made on the Pakistan side that this kind of thing had been long prepared. We had not enough aircraft, we had to stop our civil air line planes coming that evening commandeer them, and in the morning we just managed to raise about 250 or 260 men to send by these civil airline planes, and these people reached the air field of Srinagar, the *kutcha* air field, when the raiders were within seven or eight miles of it. It may be if they had reached three or four hours later, the air field would have been in the possession of the raiders. So, it was a remarkable feat. Having decided late in the evening, at 5 O'clock in the morning these people went off. There was no question of delay. The moment we came to a decision there was no delay, and the decision was taken as rapidly as possible, as far as I remember within 48 hours of our first knowledge of any trouble in Kashmir, that is invasion. I shall not say anything about Kashmir.

We have made it clear that the basic issues in regard to Kashmir are accession and aggression and everything has to be considered on that basis. These are the basic facts, nevertheless it is a very important thing what happens to Kashmir, apart from law, apart from Constitution important as they are, because we are concerned not

only with Jammu and Kashmir State as a part of India, as a constituent unit State of India, but apart from that we are concerned with the welfare of the people of Kashmir, of that State. Any impartial observer, any observer partial or impartial I say, who goes and looks at the State and sees how the people are there and has a look, if he has a chance, at the people on the other side of the ceasefire line, will realise the enormous difference between the two. I have been convinced that any upset of this would bring, apart from other major consequences, ruin to the people of Kashmir. That becomes a major factor too. It would bring many other major consequences too, but we see what has happened to the people on the other side of the cease fire line; we see what is happening in regard to the functioning of Government etc., in the whole of Pakistan. Governments come and go rapidly, the democratic process goes and all that.

Then there is talk of our having in Kashmir done something against the decision of the Security Council. May I deal first with the criticism made very often that we were wrong in taking this matter to the Security Council? Whether we were right or wrong I do not think it does much good referring to it again and again ten years afterwards. If that is the sole argument, it does not help us in the present stage. But I do not think we were wrong because the alternative at that time for us was war with Pakistan. Well, deliberately we did not want war with Pakistan if we could avoid it and we did this. Apart from that, it is not a question of our going or not going. Others can go there too. So long as we belong to the United Nations we have to function as a member of the United Nations. So long as we believe in the processes of the Charter of the United Nations, we have to function that way. We cannot say that when it affects us we shall ignore the United Nations and when it affects somebody else we will believe in the United Nations. Surely that is not a legitimate position or consistent position to take up.

And we went there. Why did we go there? We did not ask, the United Nations to decide or accession etc. That was a fact that had been done, we did not want anybody's authority to tell us accession is there or not. We went there to ask the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to withdraw, to take away its forces from Indian Union territory. That was the main object.

Now we are told, sometimes we are criticised that we have done something, we have ignored the resolutions of the Security Council, that we have violated them—I must confess that after the deepest study I do not know what this means, and I have asked people to tell me, and nobody has been able to point it out more particularly the last resolution of, I think, the 24th January which was passed apparently under some misapprehension, though why any one should misapprehend the situation I do not know—it was adequately explained to them by our representative. There was some misapprehension that something was going to happen on the 26th January. Nothing was going to happen except the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State.

Much is made about what is called the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir State. I do not know what the word “annexation” means. Anyhow, if it means accession, Jammu and Kashmir State had acceded to us 9½ years earlier. You cannot annex

something that is already with you. But there is another important aspect of it. Nobody talks, I would not say nobody, but the people who accuse us seem to ignore completely the fact that nearly half of Jammu and Kashmir State territory has been practically annexed by Pakistan. Whatever rights or wrongs there may be in regard to India being there—we think we are completely right— nobody has even remotely suggested that Pakistan has the slightest right to be there, under what right it is there. It is patent it has no right and yet for nine years it has been occupying that territory.

So, our position in regard to these matters is quite clear, but it being clear, in regard to the wider approach to various problems, world problems, we have always put forward the peaceful approach, the approach of peaceful settlement. We cannot adopt a different approach in Kashmir or, if I may say so, in Goa without violating that major approach of ours. Well, that has been both our strength and our weakness. I admit that. But, in the final analysis, one cannot ride two horses or follow two contradictory policies. We had to do that. Of course, if we are attacked, it is a different matter. Some friends have thought this is a weakness of our policy; it was weakness only that we insisted on following a policy of peace, always thinking not of the immediate moment but of the future also, because we have to come to live in peace with our neighbours and with the world.

But, look at the broader picture of the world. In this world, we live on the verge of disaster with atomic and nuclear weapons constantly being produced, experimental explosions taking place and suddenly crisis arising which bring the world to the verge of war. No one can forget this major fact. And remember one thing also, if I may venture to say so, that for the first time in the world's history we are faced by a new possibility and a new contingency. There have been wars in the past, there have been disasters in the past, terrible disasters, they occurred either in one part of the world or another, a great part of the world, but even where they occurred something survived: some civilisation, some culture, some history, the accumulation of human experience survived. And after the war was over, it grew again from that thing that has survived.

Today, we have to face a contingency that all history and all human experience might be wiped off leaving nothing behind to survive. Now, that is the first time that such a contingency has arisen. And this has arisen because of these terrible weapons of mass destruction, and weapons of mass destruction which not only destroy outwardly and suddenly, but which are something infinitely worse, gradually destroying our bones your marrow, and everything, due to radiation going in. It is not immediately obvious. It may take weeks, it may take months, it may take years, that is the major thing that you have to face today. And all your problems, and all the hard work that you put in solving your problems, and all the conflicts that you may have of ideologies and everything pales into insignificance before this major fact that if somehow we go on over this brink, then all history and all past experience of humanity might be wiped off.

I repeat this, and I seek the indulgence of the House to do so because I myself feel that people do not realise it. They talk about the atomic bomb as a joke, and they talk about nuclear weapons and all that, and radiation. They do not realise the extreme

danger that faces the world. And I confess that the prospect depresses me, because ultimately this danger can only be held back by the character of human beings and nothing else by the peaceful approach, by the compassionate approach. You may make terms with each other, but if you are full of hatred and violence, I have not a shade of doubt that this danger will break out and submerge everybody.

Therefore, I think that the approach; the cold war approach, if I may say so, is an exceedingly bad approach. I say so with all respect. And I am not moralising. Who am I to tell anybody else? I do not think that we in India are in any sense better than other people in other countries. I do not boost up my own people. I like my people, I love my people, because I, am one of them, but I do not boost them up and say they are better more spiritual, more moral. I do not believe that. Every country has a spirituality, a morality. Every country has its periods of growth and decay. I do value what India has, I think it is something wonderful. Maybe, I am partial to India; maybe, all of us are partial to our country. But let us not forget this, let us not assume a superior pose about it.

I say this with all humility that this business of cold war which is based essentially on violence and hatred—the essence of it was hatreds headed against the other party—is a thing which is bad and is a thing, which, if it is not controlled, will lead to all manner of disaster.

Take again this fact. As a result of this cold war, armaments go on and go on; experimental explosions of nuclear weapons take place. The other day, there was an explosion. I think, somewhere in the Soviet Union. Soon, there is going to be an explosion in the Christmas Islands in the Pacific. We have received pathetic complaints from organisations and people in Japan about these explosions. They have had experience of them. And they dread a repetition of that experience. But what can we do about it? But it does seem to me tragic, a tragic circumstance, that these experimental explosions should take place, when even according to scientific advice, each explosion adds to the vitiation, making the atmosphere more vitiated and more dangerous. Nobody can say to what extent that poison spreads from each explosion. But every scientist knows that poison is there. Some people say that the poison is not so great as to kill you or to affect you very much, it is only in a small quantity but others say it may affect you a little more. Nobody knows, because we are on the verge of the unknown. And suppose there is doubt about it. Even apart from certainty, suppose there is doubt about it. Then, certainly there is one aspect that it may be very dangerous to the human race. In view of that, that experiments should still be carried seems to be tragic in the extreme.

Why is this done? We come back to the cold war. We come back to this policy of believing in arms and latest armaments, in military alliances and the like. The other day, someone said, speaking about S.E.A.T.O.—I hope I am correct I think it was something to this effect that S.E.A.T.O. will preserve peace in South-East Asia for a thousand years.

But, whether it is a thousand years or a hundred years, that meant, I suppose, the continuation of cold war for a thousand years, or whatever the period may be. With all that, it also reminded me of something rather unpleasant. Hitler had said that Nazism would last a thousand years, the Nazi regime in Germany.

So, this whole approach of cold war and military alliances, if persisted in sometime or other, I suppose, will lead to that final catastrophe. Now, I do not venture to offer advice. Who am I to offer advice to any country? I know that many things that we would like to do in this country we cannot do, for fear of having our country weak and unprotected. We dare not take that risk, and if I dare not take that risk, I cannot ask other countries to take that risk, obviously. At the same time, it is equally obvious that this race in armament and this continuation of cold war is an even greater risk than anything else.

I would very respectfully suggest to the great countries who have to shoulder these heavy responsibilities that the time has come—the time is always there, in fact—for some kind, of a step in another direction to be taken. I realise that you cannot suddenly reverse big policies; you cannot, as I said, take steps which make you face risks which you are not prepared to face. But even if the step be small, it should be in the right direction, and no step should be taken which adds to this cold war business.

I think—I have often said so—some people do not like our criticising these pacts. So far as we are concerned, whether it is the Warsaw Pact or S.E.A.T.O. or the Baghdad Pact, they are all, I think, dangerous things in the modern world which add to hatred, fear and apprehension. Somehow each one thinks that because of the other, he has to keep going, just as many countries say that they will stop nuclear explosions provided everybody else stops them. Everybody says so and nobody stops, and so they go on.

We have seen recently how the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O were dragged in regard to the Kashmir issue. You see how one affects another and how a wrong step leads to innumerable other wrong steps. The other day the Prime Minister of Pakistan, describing the Baghdad Pact, used rather striking language— I would not dare to do so. He said zero plus zero plus zero plus zero equals zero. His point was that unless some powerful country like the United Kingdom or the United States was in the Baghdad Pact with its big defence apparatus, all the other members of it, from the point of view of armament, were relatively zero. That means that there is another aspect to it. When a country considering itself zero attaches itself to some figure, it is the figure that counts, not the zero; obviously, it is the other figure that must count because the zero does not count. So not only policy but everything is determined by the other factor, not by this.

Whether it is Kashmir or whether it is some other country, recent events have shown us that one cannot build a country which has no roots in its own past. You cannot ultimately impose anything on a country; it may grow into it. You cannot impose anything and you cannot uproot a country from its nationalist roots. We saw in Central Europe some months back in the case of Hungary how ten or eleven years' attempt did not succeed in imposing something, and the nationalism of Hungary was strong and tried to resist. There are many other factors; I am merely pointing out the major factor, that it was an extraordinary example of how strong nationalism is in a country, for it has deep roots. Nationalism may become socialist, may become communist, may become anything—that is a different matter—as, I believe, in some countries it has. But it cannot be imposed; anything cannot be imposed upon it, and

a country which has not got these nationalist roots in its past life and culture and all that will be a rootless country.

Now I venture to point out that this theory—or call it what you like—the twonation theory, which was advanced in India some years before independence and about which reference; is still made in our neighbour country, is a theory which makes a country rootless. It ignores the real life of the country, the roots of a country in its past, and tries to impose something without those roots, with the result that difficulties come in. We can see these things in recent history. And if I may, in all humility, say to the people and to the leaders of Pakistan, I have sympathised with them in their difficulties; but their major difficulty has been their having uprooted themselves from their own past—I am not talking about India— and tried to develop something in the air on the basis of the twonation theory. The result is that they cannot get a grip and they have to rely more and more on external force and external aid, because they think in terms of transplanting religion to nationalism and to statehood. That is a medieval conception. In the old, medieval days, it might have succeeded because communications were not there, because many things happened which cannot happen today. But the conception of joining statehood to a religion is so out of place that no amount of repetition of it can make it real; it is unreal, and it becomes still more unreal when it is sought to be applied to, let us say, Kashmir. It is fantastic. It is not there the two nation theory in Kashmir. Our friends, some in Pakistan and more so in some other countries, always talk about it to us.

So we see in this Kashmir issue not only the basic facts to which I have referred but a basic conflict between the modern age and medievalism, a basic conflict between progress and reaction, a basic conflict between the welfare of the people of Kashmir and their ruination. Something back, the Prime Minister of Pakistan himself said that he did not believe in the two nation theory. I was glad to read that because I hoped that from that other things would flow. I still hope that might happen, but, unfortunately, it is not apparently easy even for him to give this new direction. Perhaps gradually it may come. Meanwhile, it is this two nation theory, again, which has led, in the final analysis, to this tremendous and alarming exodus continuing from East Pakistan. If that theory is there, whether there is exodus or not, there can never be really contentment and satisfaction among those who, inevitably, become some kind of an inferior race.

The House will forgive me if I have not dealt with the various criticisms which have been made in the course of the debate. We deal with them from time to time; we shall, no doubt, deal with them in the future. I would only just like to correct one or two statements that were made. I think more than one hon. Member opposite referred to large sums of money paid by industrialists to the Congress Party; and enormous sums were mentioned, Rs. 25 lakhs, Rs. 50 lakhs and crores. I really do not know where these large sums are. I know certainly that contributions have been made by industrial leaders and others to a political party with a wide platform and we accepted contributions; we have done that. But I can assure this House that the figures mentioned are completely unknown to me.

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BACK NOTE

LVIII. Reply on Motion of Thanks to President's Address, 21 March 1957

1. SHRI K. K. BASU (Diamond Harbour): What are the figures?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know; it is not just one chest But rest assured I do not know because it is not a sort of one chest in which it is kept. But I can tell you that I am quite sure with the knowledge of what has happened in India that the Congress, considering the number of seats. It has fought has spent less money per seat than other parties. We have spent it over all seats.

SHRI KAMATH (Hoshangabad): Tatas have paid Rs. 15 or Rs. 20 lakhs, haven't they?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am giving the House my information; I may be wrong. But remember this that every industrialist who has contributed to any party funds—his company funds—must show that money in his accounts.

SHRI KAMATH: Exactly. That is how we came to know.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU:—apart from individual private contributions. But that has to be shown; that cannot be hidden. I honestly tell the House that I really do not know. I would have told the House if I had known, I had some broad idea of it because from time to time I had information of it. It is nowhere known; how these large sums.

SHRI KAMATH: May I ask in all humility whether the Prime Minister knows that the Tatas have contributed Rs. 20 lakhs and that is known. It is not secret.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is not secret. You mentioned the Tatas. I am saying that all these matters are not secret they will come out in their accounts and there is no secret. But I say I would be very happy at a later stage if some procedure is adopted— speaking for myself when all party funds are made public.

SHRI KAMATH: We accept it.

SHRI K. K. BASU: We all accept it.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know on whose behalf Shri Kamath is accepting it.

SHRI KAMATH: I accept it on behalf of the P.S.P. just as you do on behalf of the Congress but of the P.SP. I can give that assurance.

SHRI GADRIL (Poona Central): Why not accept your defeat gracefully?

SHRI KAMATH: Let the Prime Minister speak.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There is another very small matter. Hon. Member Shri Sadhan Gupta referred. I am told—I saw his speech which was reported in the Press—that a British gentleman with a recommendation from Lady Mountbatten

undertook a trip into the Naga Hills. It was said he was recommended by the Prime Minister and so on and so forth.

DR. RAMA RAO: Our paper has published the contradiction.

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: In spite of the contradiction the statement was made. May I state when I saw this, I knew nothing about it and I made enquiries. Although my name was mentioned I did not know anything about the entry of anybody into the Naga Hills. I got the information. My information was confirmed that nobody has gone to the Naga Hills or has gone across the inner line and poor Lady Mountbatten has had nothing to do with this matter.

AN HON. MEMBER: Why poor?

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: But I say this. Some years back there was a case which has nothing to do with the Naga Hills, nothing to do with the inner line and nothing to do with the Mountbattens. There was a case of some botanists coming here and going to some parts of Assam and their general behaviour was not considered satisfactory by us and we told them so. It may be that, that incident of some years ago has got mixed up with the Naga Hills, inner line and all that. It is quite independent. There have been several odd cases of foreigners coming and sometimes being asked by us to leave rather rapidly.

I must apologize to the House for speaking rather about broad and general subjects in a broad and general way and not trying to reply to the individual criticisms that hon. Members made. But I thought that on this occasion when this Parliament was considering the President's Address for the last time we might have this larger perspective and so I have spoken in this way.

MOTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

25 March, 1957

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I beg to move:

“That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.”

In the course of the last few days, when we were discussing the President's Address, many references were made to foreign affairs and, I also, in the course of my remarks, replied to many questions put. In a sense, therefore, we have partly covered the ground of international affairs in that previous debate.

It is now, I think, about four months since we had a debate on international affairs in this House. It was to the end of November last, I believe, when we had that debate, that we were confronted by a very serious situation which had arisen in the middle eastern region, in Egypt, because of a military invasion of Egypt. Also, in Central Europe a serious situation had been created in Hungary. On that occasion, in November, I ventured to deal with these two matters. Many things have happened during these four months and considerable progress has been made in some matters, but I do not think I would be justified in saying that the general atmosphere in the world can be viewed with any optimism, indeed there are many factors in it which are very disturbing.

So far as the situation in Egypt, in the Suez Canal and round about is concerned, we have had the privilege of being in consultations with the Egyptian Government on the one side, and in the United Nations with others intimately connected with these matters, and we have tried to serve, in so far as we could; the cause of peaceful settlement, a settlement which would not only guard the rights of nations or sovereignty of nations concerned, but also be fair to the interests of the international community.

I am not in a position to say anything very much about what is happening in Egypt, now except that, I think, there are indications that a satisfactory solution may be arrived at in regard to the Suez Canal, the working or the functioning of the Suez Canal. Probably, in the course of a few days, a few weeks or a week or two, the Canal, will be open to traffic. Now, the House will remember that much of the trouble of the last five or six months arose in connection with the Suez Canal and, therefore, if it is settled satisfactorily as to how it should work to the advantage of the international community and safeguarding the sovereign rights of Egypt, that will be a great gain.

I do not say that, that will solve the problems of the Middle East. But, certainly, that will go a considerable way in easing tensions there. There are difficulties, as the House knows, in regard to Gaza in regard to the Gulf of Aquaba and, generally, in regard to conditions in the Middle East. But, I suppose, you cannot expect them to be solved altogether; one has to go slowly step by step.

Possibly, looking at the world picture as it is today, the Middle Eastern region might be said to be the most difficult and potentially explosive region. In spite of the progress made towards a possible settlement of the Suez Canal issue and other matters, in spite of the fact that the invading forces were withdrawn from Egyptian territory, this area and the Middle East still continues to be a very difficult area. I do not mean to say that the area is difficult, inherently difficult, but it becomes a difficult area because of, I may say so with all respect, certain conflicts extraneous to the Middle East which are projected there.

Unfortunately, in a great part of the world real trouble arises partly from some local difficulties, partly from some distant difficulty which is reflected there in that particular part of the world. This House knows very well our general views about military pacts, which are called 'defensive' but, which inevitably have a certain offensive or aggressive look to others. The moment one has a defensive pact aimed at certain other countries, the result is something more than 'defensive', and we have therefore ventured to say, and repeat again and again, that these pacts, whoever may make them, do not tend to preserve peace, or further the cause of peace, or assure security.

Indeed, one of the obvious things that anyone can see, that has happened in the last few months in this Middle Eastern region or Western Asia, has been the disturbing factor of these pacts. If I may refer to another place, Central Europe and Hungary, it is the pacts that came into the way; so that we have had enough evidence that these military pacts by one group of nations, presumably against another group of nations, do not help the cause of peace or security.

Unfortunately, however, the pacts continue, and are even added on to. Only recently we have heard a great deal about the SEATO Pact, about the Baghdad Pact. These two affect us, India, naturally much more intimately and directly than any other pacts. The NATO alliance or the Warsaw Pact we can view distantly on grounds of certain principles and the approach we make to questions of world policy, but the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO, as everyone knows, have a direct effect upon India and, naturally, we have viewed them with suspicion and dislike.

In considering this question of military pacts, I am not, and I do not wish the House to consider that I am trying to run them down, and to be presumptuous enough to criticise the policies of foreign countries in the past, or to a large extent in the present. It may be that at one time something was necessary. What I am venturing to suggest is that in the present context of events, these pacts do not help the cause of peace. In fact, they have the contrary effect and this has been borne in upon us lately with greater force than ever. But we saw how these pacts, notably the Baghdad Pact, and to some extent, the SEATO arrangements also were utilised against us in connection with the Kashmir issue.

Now, presumably, the Kashmir issue has nothing to do with the Baghdad Pact or any other pact, but it was dragged into this picture and the members of these pacts functioned, well, as members of those pacts in regard to a particular issue which had nothing to do with it. Thus, we see how these pacts which were meant presumably for

some other purpose are used for different purposes and create, therefore, greater difficulties. And thus, because of these pacts, cold war comes and impinges upon the borders and frontiers of India. That is a matter of concern to us. We do not want the cold war anywhere, much lessen the borders of India. I am quite convinced that the cold war approach is an approach which will continue to worsen international understandings for a certain basic reason, and that is, if the international situation is bedevilled today by fear, by suspicion, by dislike and hatred even, then you do not get over all these by the cold war. The cold war creates all these things or continues them. Some other approach has to be made, as I ventured to say.

I cannot say that in this country or any other, we can give up, abandon, our defensive apparatus or do something which will involve us in grave risks. No country can do that. Nobody suggests to any country that they should be prepared to take risks and hope that all will be well. But there is something in between these two policies. One is of just taking risks and hoping for the best. The other is taking no risks and yet working in the direction of peace.

Take even one of the major issues of today. What is going to happen to hydrogen bombs and the nuclear weapons and the like? I suppose it is the fear of attack by other party that drives those countries which possess these weapons to go on enlarging them, everybody knowing that if once they are used, they may be destructive to both as well as to a great part of the world, everybody realising that they should not be used. Yet, they go on using them for fear that the other might have more of them. And so, we go on moving in this vicious circle and we do not get out of that vicious circle by the methods of cold war. It is obvious to me other method has to be adopted, at the same time, protecting yourself against any possible danger or risk. I admit that. Great countries or small countries, both have to do that, but I do submit that the protection has not come in the past and will not come in the future by the systems of military alliances, whether they are with the Soviet Union or the United Kingdom or the United States of America or any other country, because, the whole effect of it is that the other party has them too and they go on balancing these nuclear weapons and other forms of armaments.

Take the question of disarmament. Lately, there have been some indications, some slightly hopeful indications, that this question of disarmament might perhaps yield some results. There is the disarmament conference. But, during the past months and years, there have often been some such indications which have not yielded any result that we hoped for. So, I do not wish to be too optimistic about it, but; anyhow, I do feel that there is something today which if pursued in the right way might lead to some substantial step later on. More I cannot say, because we have been disappointed so often in the past and it has become a little frustrating experience to hope too much.

Yet, the real reason for disarmament remains there, namely, that any other course really leads to something which may end in utter disaster and that it does not, in the present stage, ensure security, in fact, it has the opposite effect; apart from the

vast sums of money that are spent on armaments, so much is required for developing the countries of the world for achieving higher standards for the people.

Recently, two of the great men of the biggest and the most powerful nations in the world, United States of America and Soviet Union made certain proposals. The President of the United States made some proposals which are called the Eisenhower doctrine now. They are referred to like that. The Soviet Union made some, independent proposals. I do not presume, at this stage, to discuss or criticise any of these proposals. I have no doubt that both were meant to advance the cause of security and peace. But, what I ventured to suggest on another occasion was this: that proposals being drawn out from a distance in this atmosphere of suspicion and fear, even when they are good proposals, do not take one far, because nobody accepts them or few people accept them as *bona fide* proposals.

I venture to suggest that the situation in the world is difficult and serious enough for these questions to be tackled face to face by the great leaders, more particularly by the great President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union, as well as others if necessary, but more particularly those two. It is just possible that that might lead to something better than we have seen in the last few months. On the one occasion that they did meet it was about two years ago, I believe that meeting resulted in a change in world atmosphere and the first hopes of some kind of peace.

This is not a question of favouring any particular proposal or not favouring it. I have no doubt that a great deal in President Eisenhower's proposals, more especially those dealing with economic help, are of importance and of great value. I have no doubt that many of the proposals that were put forward by the Soviet Union, on the face of them, are helpful. How they are carried out is a different matter.

But there is one approach that troubles me, and that is this idea of thinking that areas in Asia, say in West Asia, are vacuum which have to be filled in by somebody stepping in from outside. That, I feel, is a dangerous approach, and I think an unreal approach when you say that every country which has not got sufficient armaments is a vacuum. At that rate, if you think in terms of armament, then there are only two countries which have an adequate supply of hydrogen bombs the United States of America and the Soviet Union. You may say, all other countries are vacuums, because they have not got hydrogen bombs, which would be, of course, an absurd thing. What is the test then? Military power? Two countries stand out above all others. There are other countries, powerful military nations, great powers, two, three, four or five whatever the number may be. Are all the smaller and militarily weaker countries vacuums, apart from these six or seven? What is the test of this vacuum idea? It is a dangerous idea, especially for Asian and African countries. It seems to me really to lead to the conclusion that where an imperialist power gradually withdraws, or circumstances' compel it to withdraw, necessarily you must presume that it has left vacuum. If so, how is that vacuum to be filled? Suppose there is a vacuum in power. How is it to be filled? Surely if somebody else comes in, it is a repetition of the old story, maybe in a different form. It can only be filled by the people of that country

growing and developing themselves economically, politically and otherwise. Another difficulty is, when there is a conflict in the world, if one country wants to fill a vacuum, if I may use that word, or to have an area of influence, immediately, the hostile group suspects the intentions of this country and tries to pursue a policy in which it can have its area of influence there or elsewhere. So, you get back into this tug-of-war of trying to capture as areas of influence various parts of the world, which are not strong enough, if you like, to stand by themselves or to prevent this kind of thing happening.

This thing happened, you will remember, two years ago, or probably more, three years ago, in Indo-China, where war was in progress. Ultimately an agreement on Indo-China war reached at the Geneva Conference, which agreement was essentially based on this fact that those great power groups should not push in aggressively in the Indo-China States, but leave them to function for themselves. In effect it meant that those Indo-China States should follow an independent and unaligned policy. They may have their sympathisers.

Of course, they have them; nobody prevents that. But, there should be no military intervention, pacts etc. of a military kind, because the moment one State had it, the other State wanted to have its own pact somewhere in that area and that upset the whole thing. In Indo-China they had a war for six or seven years before this agreement was arrived at and there was a ceasefire, some kind of peace, only on the basis of acknowledging some kind of a mutual agreement that we should not interfere in a military way or anything that might lead up to it. I do not say that everything in Indo-China has turned out to one's entire satisfaction since then, but I think it is true that that agreement not only stopped a war in Indo-China, a terrible war which had devastated parts of it, but also step by step has helped in keeping peace and in improving the situation. There are great difficulties still. We have to shoulder our burden there, as the House knows, because we have been and continue to be the Chairman of the International Commission there. It is a difficult and complicated task, a rather thankless one occasionally, but we could not possibly run away from it. We have been there and we have helped. As soon as we succeed in solving some small problem, others arise. Well, all I can say is that I hope gradually the situation will improve. One cannot do this by some sudden decision or sudden step that you might take. That thing which applied to the Indo-China area in a sense might be considered in other areas too. Why interfere? If you are afraid of the other party interfering, surely the safer course is not to interfere oneself and thus prevent the other party interfering. If the other party interferes even so, well the matter can be considered and dealt with; arrangements can be made to deal with it. In other words, instead of spreading the area of pacts, the way of peace lies in coming to agreement in having less and less of these military pacts on both sides. After all if the military pact balance each other, the lack of them also will balance each other and will not endanger any one country more than the other. I do not say these issues are simple. Of course, they are not; they are complicated and the men of goodwill in every country think about them, want to solve them and yet find them difficulty.

I mentioned it previously and the House knows that we have got a force at present in the Middle-Eastern region, mostly I believe in the Gaza strip of the Egyptian territory. It was made perfectly clear at the time when this force was first of all sent that it was sent after obtaining the permission of the Egyptian Government. We did not wish to move in at all, because it was Egyptian territory. Anyhow, we did not wish to take any step in the matter without their permission. Secondly, this force was sent there on the express understanding that it was not to take the place of the invading forces, *i.e.* it did not go there as an occupying force for occupying other territory. It went there to help in keeping peace on the border on the armistic line and it has been serving there in this capacity. At first it was near the Canal; then it was sent to the Gaza area, where it is, and, I believe the work of our officers and men there has met with the approval of all the people concerned there. I am particularly glad that the people there—I am not talking of the authorities—have also looked upon them with favour and they are popular with them.

Since the last debate we had here, some important developments have taken place, which would have been welcome anyhow, but which were doubly welcome because of the frustration we suffer from in other parts. One of the most important development was the emergence of the old Gold Coast colony as the independent and sovereign State of Ghana. It was my earnest wish to go there myself on this happy occasion, but it coincided with the last days of our elections and the meetings of this Parliament.

So, I just could not go, but naturally we sent our best wishes to the leaders and the people of Ghana. The emergence of Ghana as an independent State is, I think, of great importance and great significance not only because any such thing would be important, but because it is rather symbolic of Africa and the trends in Africa. I am particularly glad that a number of internal conflicts that they had in Ghana—party conflicts and others in regard to their Constitution and in regard to their other matters—had been resolved in a spirit of statesmanship and cooperation, which is of the happiest augury for their future. As the House well knows, the difficulties of a country come after independence. The real problems that they have to face come after independence; and, no doubt Ghana will be faced with those problems and is facing them today. I have little doubt that with goodwill and the wise approach that they have shown, they will overcome these problems.

The other day, only yesterday, I think, I had occasion to meet a Minister of the Malayan Government. Malaya is also rapidly forging ahead towards independence, and provisionally, I believe, it has been fixed that the date for Malayan Independence would be somewhere towards the end of August. All these are happy signs which give one some hope for the future in spite of the other disappointments that we have to experience. Then, there is Nigeria adjoining Ghana which also, I hope, is on the verge of Independence. Thus, on the one side, the colonial picture of the world is changing and yet, unfortunately, on other sides, it is getting stuck up and movements for freedom of colonies are met with the stern opposition.

Hon. Members will know that at present we have an eminent visitor from abroad, the Prime Minister of Poland, in this country. I believe Members are going to have a chance of meeting him and listening to him. We welcome him specially not only because Poland is a country with a fascinating tradition of struggle for freedom, with a very powerful nationalism which has moved it throughout history, but also because of the terrible sufferings they had in the last war and the way they have built up their city of Warsaw and other cities which had been reduced almost to ground level. Apart from all these, Poland has been an example in the last year—a few months—of the process of liberalisation and democratisation in the East European countries which has been welcomed by us and by many others. Because, we feel that that is the natural way of bringing about changes, relaxations and less rigidly and that to bring them about by some kind of compulsion from outside fails and in fact, leads to greater rigidity. Therefore, Poland is also a symbol of certain powerful and very valuable trends in the western world which have a larger significance.

We have also in Delhi, at the present moment Mr. Jarring, who was last month the President of the Security Council, and who has come here at the instance of the Security Council in connection with the Kashmir issue. I had the privilege of meeting him yesterday and having a talk with him. No doubt we shall have further talks before he goes away. I need not say anything about our general position in regard to Kashmir because that has been made quite clear. Even in the President's Address it was made quite clear in a few sentences. In the course of the debate on the President's Address also many references were made to it. There were; I believe quite a number of questions which hon. Members put, and the Speaker was good enough to suggest that instead of those questions being answered seriatim, perhaps, I might deal with them or most of them in the course of this debate. Perhaps some of them have already been answered. However, I shall refer to them briefly presently.

There is a problem which affects all our people here very powerfully and very deeply and that is the question of Goa. On the occasion of the debate here a few days ago on the President's Address, an hon. Member of this House who had a good deal of personal experience of Goa and Goan Portuguese administration and Goan prisons, gave us some account from his personal knowledge and experience. I was not present in the House then, unfortunately. But, I read a report of his speech; others have, no doubt, heard or read it. No one can read that account without feeling a sense of horror as to what has been happening and is, no doubt, continuing to happen in Goa. The other day, some of our nationals were released by the Portuguese Government, and among them, is an hon. Member of this House who has spent a long time there under those very bad conditions. I want to make it clear that the fact of the release of some Indian nationals from there, welcome as that is,— we wanted them to be released naturally— brings little satisfaction to our mind. I do not want any one to imagine that we are in any sense toning down our demands and our opinions in regard to Goa and that this chapter is closed or anyhow postponed for the present. Goa is a live and vital issue, the House may criticise us for the type of policy we adopt or may wish to change it. That is a different matter. We may discuss that. But, it is for all of us, to

whatever party we may belong, a live and vital issue and we feel deeply on it. I particularly want to say that,—welcome as the hon. Member is here, he has come back from prison and the others will come back—we must remember that hundreds and hundreds of Goans are in prison there and continue to be in prison and continue to be treated worse even than the Indian nationals who were there. I do not know if my voice can possibly reach them; probably not. Anyhow, I should have liked to assure them that this question and their fate are very near our minds and it is a matter of deep unhappiness to us that circumstances should be such that this problem cannot be solved easily and quickly. As with other problems, it becomes tied up with world issues, with international problems and one cannot touch a single problem which is tied up with other issues without, may be, creating all kinds of reactions to it. One cannot isolate this problem, and therefore, we have tried to follow there the broad policy which we have enunciated before the world, the broad policy in regard to foreign affairs or internal affairs, and I do not myself see how we can depart from it basically without giving up that broad policy, and without really launching out into an unknown course of action of which we do not know the results. At the same time, I do feel—in fact, we have been feeling it for some time past—that we must give the most careful consideration to the various aspects of our policy; I am not referring to the broad approach to the problem which I believe is correct and should be pursued, but I do think that we should give the most careful consideration to the various other aspects of our policies relating to Goa. In fact, we are in the process of doing that. These elections had come and they rather came in the way,—and other matters—but I hope that in the course of the next few weeks we shall be able to consult not only our own people who have been dealing with them, but others too; I hope we should be able to consult hon. Members of the Opposition too in regard to these matters, and try to evolve courses of action which can be as effective as anything can be in the present circumstances.

May I refer to some of those questions, chiefly in regard to Kashmir and one or two other matters which the Speaker was good enough to keep over for this debate?

There were questions about Mr. Jarring's visit. I need say nothing about it. As the House knows, he is here. The resolution under which he has come here, the resolution of the Security Council, is a simple resolution,—it was passed after much debate, I need not refer to that—it is a simple one, reminding him of previous resolutions and asking him to come here and to meet representatives of India and representatives of Pakistan in their respective places and discuss this matter with them and to report by the 15th April. He has been to Pakistan, spent about a week there. He is here now. That is all I can say.

Then there were several questions about atomic weapons in Pakistan. References had been made about this matter both by my colleague, Shri Krishna Menon in the Security Council, and by me occasionally here in some connection. Both our references were based not on any secret information,—we leave that out,—but on certain official statements or speeches by the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief. We did not say,—I did not say and Shri Krishna Menon did not say,—that they had atomic weapons, but we

only said what he, the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, had said, that in their military exercises in last December, the use of tactical atomic weapons was envisaged and exercises were carried out from that point of view. That is a preparatory stage—preparation for the use of atomic weapons. I did not say they had them, I do not know and since then the United States Government has denied the fact of their having given any atomic weapons to Pakistan, or, indeed, to any other country. Naturally, we accept that denial, but the fact remains that these preparations and exercises and the possible use of them are matters of some concern to us, more especially when all this is tied up with this large scale military aid which comes from the United States to Pakistan, and which has made a great deal of difference, I believe, to many problems, between India and Pakistan. It has been my conviction, it was and is, that it would have been far easier for Pakistan and India to solve their problems, difficult as they were, after the partition, if other countries, outside countries, had not interfered so much, whatever the problem might be, whether it is Kashmir or any other. I am not for the moment criticising outside countries because often they have acted with goodwill in this matter, though not perhaps always, but goodwill or not, the fact is that this interference has come in the way of these two neighbour countries solving their problems in some measure, if not with immediate goodwill, anyhow solving them.

Then there were some questions, I think, enquiring if Pakistan had annexed the area of Kashmir in Jammu and Kashmir State occupied by them. Well, the answer to that is “Yes”. Even by their Constitution they have stated that all the administered area is part of Pakistan, and undoubtedly this is one of their administered areas so that they have for some time past, and practically speaking for a long time past, and later even constitutionally treated this as an area which is part of Pakistan. It has been surprising that little reference has been made to this annexation of part of, in so far as area is concerned nearly half of Jammu and Kashmir State area, while a great deal of discussion has taken place about what is called the annexation of Kashmir State by India. There has been no annexation. The word itself is completely wrong, inappropriate. There was accession, as the House knows, in October, 1947; the circumstances leading to it may have been different, but it was an accession in exactly the same way as was applied to the hundreds of other States in India, the same legal, constitutional way. True, the circumstances were some what different, but it was an accession. Nothing has happened since then to lessen that factor and nothing was necessary to add to it.

There were also questions about Gilgit and a story that was published in the press, a story, emanating from Brigadier Ghansara Singh. We, of course, had known this story for a long time. Brigadier Ghansara Singh was sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Ruler then, under an agreement with the British just prior to partition. They had handed over Gilgit to the Jammu and Kashmir Government, and this Brigadier was sent there to take charge. Some very extraordinary things happened when he went there. Soon after his arrival, after two or three days, he was arrested by the Gilgit Scouts who were under the command of British officers, and the British officers of the Gilgit Scouts informed the Pakistan Government that Gilgit had acceded to Pakistan. I am not going into the merits, but the story was a very odd and curious one.

Brigadier Ghansara Singh was kept in prison there or in detention for a considerable time. When he came out, we had met him, and he had given us this story then. Now, it was given out to the public.

I should like to make clear another thing. We have been asked as to the Government of India's position in regard to the Pakistan occupied territory of Kashmir, and what we propose to do about it. Now, it is clear that in every sense, legally and constitutionally, by virtue of the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State to India, the whole State acceded, not a bit of it or a part of it only; and, therefore, according to that accession, the whole State should form part of the Union of India. That is the legal position.

We may have, in the course of these nine years, in our extreme desire to come to some peaceful arrangement, discussed various suggestions, proposals etc. But those discussions did not lead to any result. There they ended, although, sometimes, something that we said in the course of discussion, some idea or proposal or thought that was thrown out is held up to us as a kind of commitment. Anyhow, in law, that is part of the Jammu and Kashmir territory which is an acceded State of the Union.

But it is true that we have stated in the Security Council and outside too and in fact, this has been our position for a long time past; we have often said that we for our part are not going to take any steps involving the military, involving Armed Forces, to settle the Kashmir problem. Of course, if we are attacked, we shall defend, and indeed we have made it clear that if we are attacked in Kashmir, we consider it an attack on India, which it is. We have made that clear. But we have also made it clear that while we consider the Pakistan occupied part of Kashmir as legally and constitutionally a part of India, of the Indian Union territory, we are not going to take any military steps to recover it or recapture it. We have given that assurance and we shall abide by it.

There were also questions about some messages that had come to me from the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and China in regard to the Kashmir issue. As for those messages, the House will remember that the Prime Minister of China went to Ceylon; and they issued a joint statement there in the course of that statement, there was reference to the Kashmir issue, a friendly reference saying that they hoped that this would be settled by mutual discussions or contacts between the two countries concerned, and hoping that other countries would not interfere. That was a friendly wish from two of our friendly countries. And, so far as I know, there is nothing more that followed from it or was intended to follow.

So, I have dealt with most of these questions which were put to us. One thing more I should like to refer to, which may be in the hon. Members' minds, and about which—I had not seen them—presumably some amendments may have been sent, because whenever there is a debate on foreign affairs in this House, there are always some amendments dealing with India's association with the Commonwealth of nations. I have dealt with this matter in the past on many occasions, and pointed out....

I hope that my suggestion need not be considered as an amendment invitation. But whether there is an amendment or not is immaterial. The question is an important one. And I can very well understand hon. Members, not only on the other side of the House, but on every side of the House, thinking about this matter much more now than they did previously, and enquiring from me, as they have done, sometimes in writing, sometimes orally, as to why in spite of all that has happened, whether in the Middle Eastern region or whether in regard to Kashmir,—that is, the attitudes taken by some Commonwealth countries in regard to Kashmir, which were certainly not impartial or neutral, which were siding with one party, and which were siding with a party which we considered the aggressor party, we still think it is right for us to continue this Commonwealth connection. They put this question to me, and we discussed it with them, but even more so, I have discussed it with my own mind and with my colleagues and others, because this is not a matter which I can settle just because I feel one way or the other. Indeed, we cannot settle any matter that way. It can only be settled, not only after the fullest consultation, but without doing violence to public feeling. Sometimes, it may be that public feeling has to be restrained or even opposed for the time being, because people may get excited, and they may think differently somewhat later. But in the final run, public feeling cannot be ignored, much less violated. So, this was a serious matter, and is a serious matter.

But I have felt, and for the first time I felt, the first time in these many years, that it may some time or other require further consideration. But in this as in other matters we are not going to act in a huff or in a spirit of anger merely because we dislike something that had happened. I feel, as I said here, that in spite of these occurrences that have happened and that have distressed us, it is right for us to continue our association with the Commonwealth for a variety of reasons which I mentioned then, among them being primarily the fact that our policies, as is obvious, are in no way conditioned or deflected from their normal course by that association. So, nobody can say that there has been this conflict in our policies, that these policies have been affected;—affected every policy might be by consultation; that is a different matter. We consult other countries. We have close relations with other countries. But the decision is ours, and is not affected by the fact of our being in the Commonwealth.

Secondly, at this moment, when there are so many disruptive tendencies in the world, it is better to retain every kind of association, which is not positively harmful to us, than to break it. Breaking it itself is a disruptive thing. It does not add to that spirit of peaceful settlements and peaceful associations that we wish to develop in the world.

Therefore, after giving all this thought, I felt, and I felt clearly in my mind, that it would not be good to break up this association in spite of the painful shocks that all of us had experienced in these past few months.

But, again, no decision that we can take in these or other matters for today can be said to be a permanent decision for ever. All kinds of things happen and one has to review these matters from time to time in view of changing conditions. And I would remind the House that the Commonwealth itself is undergoing a change. Ghana

is a member of the Commonwealth. Possibly Malaya will be a member of the Commonwealth. Possibly a little later Nigeria might be. Its inner composition and content is changing, and changing, if I may say so, in the right direction. Therefore, keeping all these things in view and well realising the strong reactions that have been produced in the country in regard to this matter, I would still respectfully submit to the House that it is desirable, in the present context, to continue this association with the Commonwealth.

That is all I have to say on these subjects now. At the end of this debate, I hope that my colleague, Shri Krishna Menon, might be able to deal with the points raised in this debate, and with questions that might be asked. He has been, as the House knows, very intimately connected not only in the Security Council with the various international questions that have arisen there, but also in our discussions with the Egyptian Government.

BACK NOTE

LIX. Motion Regarding International Situation, 25 March,
1957

NIL

VALEDICTORY REFERENCES

28 March, 1957

Mr. Speaker, Sir, you have been pleased to say many generous things about the Member of this House and, to my great embarrassment, about me. You have spoken in generosity but, anyhow, so far as I am concerned, I should like to offer you my grateful thanks, and I am sure I speak on behalf of the House also, when I offer you their thanks for your kind words.

It is befitting that on this occasion, when this Parliament stands at the edge of its own dissolution, there should be some valedictory references to our past. Since you have been good enough to make a reference to the work of this Parliament, I am taking the liberty of saying also a few words on this occasion, certainly on my own behalf and possibly reflecting the views and ideas of other Members also here.

We have gone through, during these five years, a tremendous amount of work and, as you have said, speeches have covered, I do not know how many millions of pages; questions have also been asked and, altogether a vast quantity of paper has been consumed. Yet, the historian of the future will probably not pay too much attention to the number of speeches or the hours which the speeches have taken or to the number of questions, but rather to the deeper things that go towards the making of a nation.

Here, we have sat in this Parliament, the sovereign authority of India, responsible for the governance of India. Surely, there can be no higher responsibility or greater privilege than to be a Member of this sovereign body which is responsible for the fate of the vast number of human beings who live in this country. All of us, if not always, at any rate from time to time, must have felt this high sense of responsibility and destiny to which we had been called. Whether we were worthy of it or not is another matter. We have functioned, therefore, during these five years not only on the edge of history but sometimes plunging into the processes of making history.

We have lived here, as indeed people have lived all over the world, at a moment of great change, transition, and sometimes of vast upsets and revolutionary processes. We have not only been part of that world drama but we have had our own drama also. And it would be interesting for someone to take a rather distant view of this drama of these five years and more so as not to be lost in the innumerable details which confuse, but rather to see this broad current of history in motion in this country, how far has it moved, what changes has it wrought, how far has it laid stable the foundations of this republic of India which we created, which the people of India created, a few years back. That is the important question; not so much how many speeches we have delivered or how many questions we have asked, important, no doubt, though speeches and questions are as bringing out the method of our working the parliamentary process to which we are addicted.

We choose this system of parliamentary democracy deliberately; we choose it not only because, to some extent, we had always thought on those lines previously, but because we thought it was in keeping with our own old traditions also; naturally, the old traditions, not as they were, but adjusted to the new conditions and new surroundings. We choose it also let us give credit where credit is due, because we approved of its functioning in other countries, more especially the United Kingdom.

So, this Parliament, the Lok Sabha, became, to some extent, not entirely, but to a large extent, rather like the British Parliament or the British House of Commons whether it is in regard to our question or our rules of procedure or methods of work.

Now, parliamentary democracy demands many things, demands, of course, ability. It demands a certain devotion to work as every work does. But it demands also a large measure of cooperation, of self-discipline, of restraint. It is obvious that a House like this cannot perform any functions without the spirit of cooperation, without a large measure of restraint and self-discipline in each Member and in each group. Parliamentary democracy is not something which can be transplanted in a country by some wand or by some quick process. We talk about it but we know very well that there are not many countries in the world where it functions successfully. I think it may be said without any partiality that it has functioned with a very large measure of success in this country. Why? Not so much because we, the Members of this House, are exemplars of wisdom, but, I do not think, because of the background in our country, and because our people have the spirit of democracy in them.

We have to remember then what parliamentary democracy means. In this world of change and tremendous ferment, more so than in ordinary times, change is essential; change and adaptation to new order. Even when the old order was good, it has to yield place to new lest one good custom should corrupt the world. It has to change. So, change there must be, change there has to be. in a country like India which was more or less changeless for a long time, changeless not only because of the country being a subject country under the imperialist powers, I do not mean to say that there was no change then, but basically the dynamic aspect of the country was limited, restricted, cabined and confined by foreign domination—changeless also because we had fallen into the ruts of our own making, in mind, in social framework and the rest. So we had to take our souls out both from the ruts and from the disabilities and restrictions caused by alien rule. We had to make rapid changes in order to catch up. So, change was necessary even for survival and, of course, for progress.

But, while change is necessary, there is another thing that is also necessary; that is, a measure of continuity. There is always a balancing of change and continuity. Not one day is like another. We grow older each day yet, there is continuity in us, unrestrained continuity in the life of a nation. It is in the measure that these processes of change and continuity are balancing that a country grows on solid foundations. If there is no change and only continuity, there is stagnation and decay. If there is change only and no continuity, that means uprooting, and no country and no people can survive for long if they are uprooted from the soil which has nurtured them and given them birth.

Now, this system of parliamentary democracy, therefore, embodies, I think, these principles of change and continuity, both. And it is up to those who function in

this system, Parliament, Members of the House and the numerous others who are part of this system, to increase the pace of change, to make it as fast as they like, subject to the principle of continuity, because, the moment that continuity is broken we become rootless and the system of parliamentary democracy breaks down. Parliamentary democracy is a delicate plant and it is a measure of our own success that this plant has become sturdier during these last few years. We have faced grave problems, difficult problems, and solved many of them; but, many remain to be solved indeed, there is going to be no end of the problems that will come to us, because problems are inevitable when you grow. It is only those who are stagnant that have few problems, and if there are no problems, that is a sign of death. Only the dead have no problems; the living have problems and they grow with problems, fighting with problems and overcoming them. It is sign of the growth of this nation that not only we solve problems, but we create new problems to solve.

So, these five years have passed and we are at the end of this chapter of our history; and, the very end suddenly merges into a beginning and we begin afresh, because ends and beginnings are only of our own conception. There is only continuous life of a nation. We may pass out of this House or pass out of our lives, but the nation goes on. Therefore, here when We' stand at this end, which is also a beginning, we indulge in retrospect and we indulge in prospect. Again, standing on this edge of the present, we look back on the past, but we look forward even more to the future. We may think of many things that we have to do to carry on the great work that we have undertaken and undertake new labours; but, above all, we have to remember how stable, how deep, are the foundations of this democracy that we have sought to serve and to build up in this country, because ultimately it is on the strength and depths of those roots that we will prosper, not by the number of laws we pass, not by our external activities, but on the strength of character and grit and the capacity of service that we develop in this country.

Parliamentary democracy involves naturally peaceful methods of action, peaceful acceptance of decisions taken and attempts to change them through peaceful ways again; it is no parliamentary democracy otherwise. It is essential that we, who talk and who believe in the quest of peace so much, should remember that the quest of peace and the quest of democracy can only be made through methods of peace and not through any other. We have 3 great united country, a country which is dear to us, and of which we are proud. But being proud of it does not mean that we should close our eyes to the grave problems we often have to face in the country and the disruptive tendencies that raise their heads and challenge the democratic process which this Parliament represents. It is in the measure that we put an end even in our thinking to these disruptive tendencies which divide us and which tend to break up the unity of India that we will have strengthened our country and laid sound foundations for the future. So, Sir, I would like to thank you, again.

May I, as Leader of the House, express my respectful thanks to all the Members of this House for the great courtesy and consideration which they have shown me during these past five years.

BACK NOTE

LX. Valedictory References, 28 March, 1957

NIL